CN106528407A - Embedded software security automation verification system and verification method thereof - Google Patents
Embedded software security automation verification system and verification method thereof Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses an embedded software security automation verification system and a verification method thereof. According to the technical scheme, double verification of software security is realized in combination with a model checking-based formal verification technology and a model-based software test technology. The automation verification system disclosed by the invention comprises four parts, which are a software demand modeling module, a security verification rule database, a formal verification module, and a security test module respectively. The software demand modeling module comprises two sub-modules, wherein the ICD modeling module describes a software external cross-linking environment, and the formal modeling module describes a software internal behavior. The security verification rule database is constructed and used for storing security verification rules. The formal verification module is constructed and used for performing model verification on a software demand based on the security verification rules and a model detection algorithm. The software detection module comprises two modules, wherein the test case generation module is used for generating an executable security case, and a test case translation module performs format conversion on the generated case.
Description
Technical field
The present invention is a kind of embedded software security automatic Verification system and its verification method, belongs to software security
Analysis field.
Background technology
Embedded software is extensively applied in fields such as Aero-Space, and increasing function is realized using software.In recent years,
With the raising of software complexity, caused by software failure, faults frequent occurs, therefore ensures the security of embedded software
Become the study hotspot of field of software engineering in recent years.American-European mature experience shows that it is to carry to carry out software security analysis work
Rise the effective ways of software quality, groundwork includes the extraction of embedded software demand for security and stipulations, towards the embedding of standard
Enter formula software development, embedded software demand for security and verify three partial contents.
Embedded software requirements verification is the key link in safety analysis, and Formal Verification and software test are embedded
The main method of formula software security requirements verification.Both approaches cut both ways, and Formal Verification can be in software requirement analysis
Model leak is found with the early stage of design, is shortened the R＆D cycle, and can be excavated by multiple controls by Formal Verification
Data interaction, temporal constraint between function, the software requirement defect that concurrently the complex logic relation such as combination causes.But form
The change method complexity of itself proposes very high requirement to engineering staff so that current popularization at home is using extremely difficult.
Additionally, the analysis of Formal Verification to as if software model, it is impossible to find software model with implement it is inconsistent and caused
Software defect.At home, software test remains the maximally effective means improved to software security, and software test is generally being ground
The middle and later periods of system carries out, and tested software is run in being installed in real hardware device, can not only find out the local of code realization
The minor details problem such as method fault, moreover it is possible to find out due to software realize with model logically away from and caused great peace
Full sex chromosome mosaicism.But the coverage rate in software test procedure due to test case is limited, it is difficult to test of the limit to whole system, and
The operation of Safety-Critical System is generally relevant with external environment condition, and which performs, and tests extremely difficult, therefore
Method for testing software can not fundamentally ensure the security of system.
At present, formalization verification method due to theoretical property it is stronger, the less development in embedded software development process.And it is right
In software test, although have partial test platform to occur, but popularity is relatively low.Mostly by the way of manual testing, for
Complicated software systems, testing efficiency are low, and cannot find software issue caused by concurrent, multi-functional conflict of multimode etc..
The content of the invention
The present invention is exactly designed there is provided a kind of embedded software for deficiency present in above-mentioned prior art
Security automatic Verification system and its verification method, its objective is according to the characteristics of Formal Verification and software test and complementation
Property, both technological means are blended, with reference to domestic project reality and manufacture claim, Essential Elements Of Analysis and engineering limit is considered
System, proposes a kind of kind embedded software security automatic Verification system for meeting domestic Development Status and its verification method, carries
High country's embedded software requirements verification level.
The purpose of the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions：
Technical solution of the present invention proposes a kind of embedded software security automatic Verification system, it is characterised in that：Should
System includes：
A software requirement modeling modules (1), its function are the ICD files and requirements specification pair according to software to be verified
Software to be verified carries out formalized description, forms software requirement model file, and the software requirement modeling module (1) includes：
ICD MBMs (2), its function are the outside crosslinking environment of description running software to be verified, including setting with outside
Crosslinking relation, bus type and communication protocol between standby, forms ICD model datas；
Software form MBM (3), its function are on the basis of ICD model datas, using UML and OCL forms
Change the internal act that language describes software to be verified, including state transition and function logic, ultimately form software requirement model text
Part；
In the software requirement modeling module (1), ICD MBMs (2) are connected with software form MBM (3), by
ICD MBMs (2) transmit ICD model datas to software form MBM (3)；
B security verification rule databases (4), its function is storage security proof rule, and provide inquiry, matching,
The interface for updating, safeguarding；
C-shaped formula authentication module (5), respectively with software requirement modeling module (1) and security verification rule database (4)
Connection, from software requirement modeling module (1) to Formal Verification module (5) transmitting software demand model file, is tested by security
Card rule database (4) provides the foundation of checking, i.e. security verification rule to Formal Verification module (5), and the form is chemically examined
The function of card module (5) is based on the security verification rule in security verification rule database (4), to software requirement modeling
The software requirement model file that module (1) is formed carries out Formal Verification, forms Formal Verification result；
D security test modules (6), respectively with software requirement modeling module (1), security verification rule database (4)
It is connected with Formal Verification module (5), providing software from software requirement modeling module (1) to security test module (6) needs
Model file is sought, and security verification rule is provided from security verification rule database (4) to security test module (6), by
Formal Verification module (5) provides Formal Verification result to security test module (6), the security test module (6)
Function is that the software requirement model file of basis and Formal Verification result and security verification rule generate test case simultaneously
Use-case form conversion is carried out by translation, to adapt to the needs of different test execution platforms, the security test module (6) is wrapped
Include：
Test cases technology module (7), its function are the test cases for generating XML format；
Test case translation module (8), its function receive the test of the XML format that Test cases technology module (7) is generated
Use-case, and the test case of other forms is transcribed into, other forms include natural language form, script form.
Technical solution of the present invention also proposes the verification method for above-mentioned embedded software security automatic Verification system,
It is characterized in that：The step of the method, is as follows：
Step one, by the outside crosslinking environment to running software to be verified, close including the crosslinking between external equipment
The description of system, bus type and communication protocol, sets up ICD model datas；
Step 2, on the basis of ICD model datas, using the internal rows of OCL Formal Language Descriptions software to be verified
For including state transition and function logic, setting up software requirement model file；
Step 3, by existing software failure reason, conclusion forms security verification rule, sets up security verification rule
Database；Step 4, based in security verification rule database security verification rule, software requirement model file is entered
Row Formal Verification, obtains Formal Verification result；
Step 5, generation XML regular according to software requirement model file, Formal Verification result and security verification
The security test use-case of form；
Step 6, the security test use-case to XML format enter row format conversion, generate use required during test execution
Example form.
Advantages of the present invention with good effect is：
(1) the security automatic Verification system built using technical solution of the present invention, combines Formal Verification and soft
Part tests two methods, and realizing carries out Formal Verification in development early stage to software requirement model, is developing the middle and later periods, is being soft
Part test compensate for the deficiency of existing single method, enhance the adequacy of checking there is provided test case；
(2) the security automatic Verification system built using technical solution of the present invention greatly reduces the use door of user
Sill, it is easy to promote, UML the and OCL Formal Languages adopted in software requirement modeling module are that association area practitioner is universal
The technology of grasp, the rated personnel of checking system is without the need for grasping complicated Formal Verification algorithm；
(3) the security automatic Verification system built using technical solution of the present invention realizes Formal Verification and safety
Property Test cases technology automation, user need to only build software requirement model file and select adopt security verification rule
Then, verify that work is automatically performed by system；
(4) in the security automatic Verification system that technical solution of the present invention builds, security verification rule database is carried
Go out, the accumulation and use for engineering experience provides practicable method, is conducive to setting up the neck with independent intellectual property right
Domain fail data storehouse, by the continuous accumulation of empirical data, constantly strengthens to the directive function that the later stage develops；
(5) the security automatic Verification system that technical solution of the present invention builds reduces engineering construction difficulty, to complexity
Control software of sending out obtain good result when being modeled；
(6) formalization of the security automatic Verification system that technical solution of the present invention builds based on security verification rule
Checking is more targeted, it is to avoid using Space Explosion problem caused by the method for exhaustive traversal；
(7) the preset bar of Formal Verification result that the security automatic Verification system that technical solution of the present invention builds is obtained
Clearly, input numerical value is precisely, operable, can implement for part, artificial reproduction and plays back when being easy to pinpoint the problems；
(8) UML during security automatic Verification system modelling that technical solution of the present invention builds using standard models language
Speech, meets related national military standard standard, the model of structure is used directly in software requirement analysis and design, it is to avoid multiple weight
Rebuild mould；
(9) the security automatic Verification system that technical solution of the present invention builds employs identical in Requirements Modeling and builds
Mould element, Formal Verification and security test to as if with consolidation form software requirement model, it is possible to writing
General Formal Verification algorithm and Test cases generation algorithm, therefore the method can be applied to each field embedded software peace
In full property checking, with good versatility.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the block diagram of the security automatic Verification system that technical solution of the present invention builds
Fig. 2 is software requirement modeling module construction flow chart in technical solution of the present invention
Fig. 3 is to be crosslinked environment and interface diagram in technical solution of the present invention outside software
Fig. 4 is formalized description example of the state diagram based on OCL in technical solution of the present invention
Fig. 5 is the formation of security verification rule database in technical solution of the present invention and uses process
Fig. 6 is the Model Detection Algorithm example in technical solution of the present invention based on security verification rule
Fig. 7 is the demand model example in technical solution of the present invention after status function association
Specific embodiment
Technical solution of the present invention is further described below with reference to drawings and Examples：
Referring to shown in accompanying drawing 1, the embedded software security automatic Verification system described in technical solution of the present invention, which is special
Levy and be：The system includes：
A software requirement modelings module 1, its function are treated according to the ICD files and requirements specification of software to be verified
Checking software carries out formalized description, forms software requirement model file, and the software requirement modeling module 1 includes：
ICD MBMs 2, its function are the outside crosslinking environment of description running software to be verified, including with external equipment
Between crosslinking relation, bus type and communication protocol, form ICD model datas；
Software form MBM 3, its function are, on the basis of ICD model datas, to be retouched using OCL Formal Languages
The internal act of software to be verified is stated, including state transition and function logic, software requirement model file is ultimately formed；
In the software requirement modeling module 1, ICD MBMs 2 are connected with software form MBM 3, are modeled by ICD
Module 2 transmits ICD model datas to software form MBM 3；
Referring to shown in accompanying drawing 2, software requirement modeling module 1 be modeling tool based on SafeTrip by following steps come
Realize, wherein：
The modeling procedure of ICD MBMs 2 is：
1. as shown in figure 3, by taking aero-engine control software as an example, building outside crosslinking environmental model, detailed process is such as
Under：
1.1 use modeling tool, draw software place to be verified system and the system being attached thereto,；
1.2 connect software under testing place system and other systems according to ICD files using bus；
1.3 interface messages for preparing bus, interface message include two parts：A part is interface communication information, i.e., outside
Crosslinking interface model be directed to the various common interface type between software and outside cross-linking apparatus (such as ARINC 429, CAN, from
Dissipate amount, analog quantity etc.) communication format and content, mainly including the baud needed for interface name, interface type, bus communication
Rate, routing addressing, priority, transfer rate etc..Another part is the constraints of input/output interface.According to software requirement text
Shelves, specify each interface itself and logic each other, Timing Constraints.Logical condition mainly include with, or, non-, mutual exclusion
Deng.Sequential condition includes preamble, postorder, concurrent, time delay, calendar scheduling.
2 build bus transfer data model, and detailed process is as follows：
On the basis of outside crosslinking environmental model, bus data is split into into Frame and frame variable.And describe in detail
The attribute of Frame and frame variable.Bus data has transmission direction, transmission week comprising one or more Frames, Frame
The attributes such as phase, data frame length.Each data frame packet contain multiple frame variables, frame variable have types of variables (integer, floating type,
Character type etc.), the attribute such as length.
The modeling procedure of software form MBM 3 is：
1. internal data element and interface data element are built
Interface data element and internal data element are the discernible variables with physical significance of software inhouse, such as high
Degree, speed, Thrust Level Angel, are the operation objects of follow-up function model and state transition model, and variable's attribute includes description thing
The information of reason meaning, such as data unit, resolution ratio, error, valid interval, interface data element describe the external interaction of software
Behavior, is obtained by the mapping of bus transfer data model, and the frame variable of the first two short type such as in Frame can map
Into the Height interface data elements for representing height, mapping expression formula is：Height=Var1<<8+Var2.Here mapping table
What is shown is the mapping of value, and mapping relations adopt mathematic(al) representation, can adopt the instruments such as MuParser to support based on multiple when realizing
The mapping and parsing of miscellaneous computing, except completing the mapping of value, when interface data element obtains the logical sums such as the cycle of Frame
Sequence information, and these information are introduced into into the intermediate result in software inhouse model, when internal data element is processed by software inhouse
Constitute with temporary variable, obtain from requirement documents；
The mode for building interface data element and internal data element is：Newly-built corresponding unit is selected in SafeTrip instruments
Element, then the data unit of configuration element, resolution ratio, error, valid interval, next configure the data of the data element association
Frame variable, and the corresponding relation of data element and frame variable is described using MuParser expression formulas.
2. referring to the formalization State transition model shown in accompanying drawing 4, based on UML state diagrams and OCL
There are interface data element and internal data element, can be using the state diagram in standard UML to running software
State is modeled with mode, is built State transition model, in order to carry out safety analysis, is needed using OCL object constraint languages
Saying carries out formalized description to the state transfer in state diagram, and in standard UML, the syntax format of state transfer is：Event name is [alert
Dharma part]/manual expression formula ^ transmission clause, OCL is to the formalization extension of state diagram mainly including following several respects：
Change events.Change events are referred to if the variable in a Boolean expression changes so that the expression formula
Value correspondingly change, so as to meet the event of some conditions.Different from Alert condition, when an event occurs, Alert condition is only
Calculate once, if condition is false, state transfer will not occur.When change events occur, Alert condition may block, etc.
State transition is carried out after Alert condition meets；
Alert condition.OCL expression formulas can be used for the description of state Alert condition, and it is that triggering transfer occurs to describe position
In square brackets after event；
Manual expression formula argument.Action in state diagram is called and transmission event comprising operation, it usually needs carry ginseng
Number, in order to meet the needs of safety analysis, parameter needs clearly to specify argument herein, and can not use parameter.At this time, it may be necessary to
Argument is specified clearly using OCL expression formulas；
Send clause.State diagram migration manual expression formula indicates that (Obj State occurs to turn when state transfer is activated
During shifting), object itself needs the action for performing.Sometimes object oneself can perform all of function, need the help of other objects,
So as to object is accomplished by sending messages to other objects.Now need using transmission clause.And OCL can be used for description and send son
The destination object of sentence；
3. Function-layer Model
After being modeled to the state of running software, Function Decomposition is proceeded by, build software function hierarchical model.With
In engine as a example by Digital electronic control system core engine software, software function can be decomposed into engine control and failure monitoring
Function, engine control function can be further broken into fuel oil control, wicket gate control, switch control rule.And failure monitor function
Signal self-inspection, monitor loop can be decomposed into and disappeared and breathe heavily function；
During using SafeTrip modeling tool constructing function hierarchical models, in functional hierarchy MBM, add one by one
The functional module that Function Decomposition is obtained, is each functional module addition title, Function Identification.Then connect father's work(using connecting line
Energy and subfunction, closure are to point to subfunction by father's function.
4. status function association is set up
After the completion of Function Decomposition, need to set up the incidence relation of function and state, the function after decomposition is multipair with state
Many relations, may have multiple functions concurrently to perform in same state, same function is possibly be present in multiple different states,
After carrying out functional status association, it is allowed to the software failure that the complex logic such as audit function combinations of states characteristic causes.Function and shape
The incidence relation of state described in Software Requirement Specification, wherein, it is desirable to state and mode when describing running software
State, CSCI ability needs describe each function corresponding with state.SafeTrip there is provided by state relation function and by
Function association state two ways, the incidence relation described according to Software Requirement Specification during concrete structure, by right mouse
Key clicks on state relation software function, it is also possible to click function association application state by right key.
5. the formalization functional mode based on UML operation diagrams and OCL
Software function is modeled using UML and OCL object constraint lanaguages, realizes the shape to software inhouse handling process
Formulaization is described.In order to carry out safety analysis, functional mode is split as into software outer input interface (Input)-function treatment
Process (Process)-this three requirement elements of outside output interface (Output) (being abbreviated as IPO), when constituting running software
Dynamic stale link.Any one link (i.e. outer input interface, function treatment process, outside output interface) in stale link
Break down, through the transmission of stale link, be finally likely to cause software that failure occurs, and then impact is produced on system.
The outer input interface of function and outside output interface are chosen simultaneously from interface data element and internal data element
It is associated.Function treatment process is represented using the activity diagram in UML, similar with the state diagram in State transition model, is adopted
OCL object constraint lanaguages are extended to activity diagram：
Specified object instance.The object instance for performing a certain activity is specified using OCL expression formulas, and using method is similar to shape
The destination object sent in clause in state；
Decision condition and synchronous condition description.Using method is similar to Alert condition in state diagram above；
Specified actual parameter.Using method is similar with state diagram.
B security verifications rule database 4, its function is storage security proof rule, and provides inquiry, matching, more
Newly, the interface safeguarded；
The building mode of security verification rule database 4 is with reference to shown in Fig. 5：
Firstly, it is necessary to fail data is collected, what data source was found in mainly including model number software safety analysis project
Software failure modes；Software self-test, third-party testing, model identification test and appraisal, the software issue that finds in sizing assessment process；
In software test procedure is carried out, the demand defect found in the development process obtained when exchanging with software developer；And
Other retrievable accident case data, such as outfield take a flight test process discovery problem, the typical thing of the association area having occurred and that
Therefore case (Deutsche Lufthansa AG's airplane crash, the crash of U.S.'s Mars probes etc.).
After obtaining fail data, needs are analyzed the failure cause to find initiation problem.Next, with UAL
As a example by No. 751 airliner airplane crashes, the process for obtaining security verification rule is illustrated.This time airplane crash reason be take off before deicing it is not thorough
Bottom, aircraft icing comes off causes engine surge, and pilot attempts to reduce throttle so as to reduce engine surge, but be equipped with aircraft
From dynamicthrust recovery system, thrust increase is made to exacerbate severity of injuries on the contrary.After obtaining failure phenomenon, it is necessary first to losing
Effect reason is summarized, the profound failure mechanism contained in excavating failure cause so that the security for ultimately forming is tested
Card rule is applicable in the security requirement analysis work of all types of softwares.The analysis found that, the profound level of problem is former
Because being that the multiple functions in system reboot state give different values to same variable, cause assignment conflict.Next, to this
Failure mechanism is further expanded, and according to UML state diagrams, there may be concurrent state, in multiple concurrent states in state diagram
The situation that multiple functions conflict to same occurrences assignment is likely to occur, assignment conflict expands to whole system by single status
Multiple concurrent state during system operation.Following security verification rule is obtained finally：" in whole system running, exist many
Individual function is exported to a variable simultaneously, causes assignment conflict ".Using said method accumulation security verification rule, its
Middle part divider is then as follows：The value of input interface data element is defeated for the exceptional value outside valid interval, output interface data element
Go out data rate the whole valid interval of input interface data element, same is not covered more than bus transfer rate, function treatment
Multiple conditions of moving out of individual state are while satisfaction, the complete value area of the non-coverage condition variable of the multiple jump conditions of moving out of state
Between, there is inaccessible state in state diagram, before migration, after state and migration, state is different to the imparting of same variable in state diagram
Value etc..The failure contained in above-mentioned security verification rule may initiating system it is dangerous, be subsequently carry out model inspection and
The foundation of security test.
For the ease of data base querying, matching, update and safeguard, the security verification rule that obtains of analysis is carried out point
Class：It is the failure of function input interface, the failure of fuction output interface fails, standalone feature, combination function failure, state failure respectively
Deng.Ultimately form security verification rule database.Meanwhile, can as needed to right in the business scope analyzed
As again constructing system hierarchical tree, such as aircraft system can be divided into navigation system, flight control system, hydraulic system etc., and each system may be used
To be further divided into subsystem.Finally, can be by security verification regular with specific system relationship, in order to inquire about use.
C-shaped formula authentication module 5, is connected with software requirement modeling module 1 and security verification rule database 4 respectively,
From software requirement modeling module 1 to 5 transmitting software demand model file of Formal Verification module, by security verification regular data
Storehouse 4 provides the foundation of checking, i.e. security verification rule to Formal Verification module 5, and the function of the Formal Verification module 5 is
Based on the security verification rule in security verification rule database 4, the software requirement formed to software requirement modeling module 1
Model file carries out Formal Verification, forms Formal Verification result；
The building mode of Formal Verification module 5 is as follows：
What software security was automatically analyzed realizes that process is the semanteme for every security verification rule, using computer
One Model Detection Algorithm of programming.Model Detection Algorithm is carried out to demand model time according to the semanteme of security verification rule
Go through, algorithm is according to the information such as sequential relationship, Rule of judgment, jump condition, value valid interval, the software requirement model to complexity
Static scanning is carried out, the dangerous failure mode of the be possible to initiating system specified in finding out security verification rule；
In demand model building process, it is consistent to the method for different software inside and outside behavior description, the mould for being obtained
Type is the unambiguous formalized model that the modeling element for adopting builds.During security verification Rule, acquisition
Independent mark is adopted per rule, and the semanteme of analysis rule is also unambiguous.2 points of the above ensure that implementation model is detected
The versatility of the feasibility of algorithm and algorithm；
Next, " in whole system running, there are multiple functions while exporting to a variable, cause
As a example by assignment conflict " analysis rule, the implementation method for providing Model Detection Algorithm describes and realizes the false code of algorithm；
Model Detection Algorithm is described：
The first step, by ergodic state model, finds concurrent state in system, there may be multigroup and hair-like in system
State, needs algorithm following to each group of applying；
Second step, by the status function incidence relation in demand model, the work(run when traveling through out each state similarly hereinafter
Energy；
3rd step, by functional mode, finds the input/output interface data element of each function；
4th step, checks for multiple functions and has identical output interface data element；
5th step, to the function with identical output interface data element, checks the assignment to output interface data element
Whether operation may occur simultaneously.In checking multiple functional modes, the activity from activity diagram starting point to interface assignment operation place
Path on decision condition whether may occur simultaneously.False code is as shown in Figure 6.
During model inspection, need to the security verification rule for finding software failure and the state for producing failure
Stored with function, need to need generation targeted according to these security verification rules when security test use-case is generated
Test case, further confirm that whether model has carried out effective modification, it is to avoid the appearance of failure.
D security test modules (6), respectively with software requirement modeling module 1, security verification rule database 4 and shape
Formula authentication module 5 is connected, and provides software requirement model text from software requirement modeling module 1 to security test module (6)
Part, provides security verification rule from security verification rule database 4 to security test module (6), by Formal Verification
Module 5 provides Formal Verification result to security test module (6), and the function of the security test module (6) is basis
Software requirement model file and Formal Verification result and security verification rule are generated test case and are carried out by translation
Use-case form is changed, and to adapt to the needs of different test execution platforms, the security test module (6) includes：
Test cases technology module (7), its function are the test cases for generating XML format；
Test case translation module (8), its function receive the test of the XML format that Test cases technology module (7) is generated
Use-case, and the test case of other forms is transcribed into, other forms include natural language form, script form.
The implementation of Test cases technology module (7) is：
The security automatic Verification system of technical solution of the present invention structure can be seen that according to Requirements Modeling process above
System adoption status figure descriptive system life cycle, various states and state transition that representation system has, and affect system
The event of state, essentially describes system from a state to the controlling stream of another state change migration.In each state
Service logic is described using activity diagram, there may be multiple functions, and state diagram can be divided into region in a state, and
Region includes the sub- state for exiting or currently performing again.Illustrate that assembled state at a time can be while reach many sub- shapes
State.After state and function are associated, the final illustraton of model of formation.Accompanying drawing 7 is a simple demand model figure, first
First, use state figure describes system each state, and including state 1 and state 2, wherein, state 1 is an assembled state, bag
Containing two concurrent sub- states, it is state 1-1 and state 1-2 respectively.Wherein, one or more use activities of each state relation
The function of figure description, in figure, state 1-1 is associated with function 1 and function 2, and state 1-2 is associated with function 3, and state 2 is associated with function
4。
When generating security test use-case, the method for test example based on state diagram and activity diagram is combined, security is surveyed
Example on probation includes two classes, is general security test use-case respectively and has the security that is directed to based on security verification rule
Test case.
The generation method of universal safety test case：First, when carrying out state verification, using based on state diagram generation side
State diagram with hierarchical structure is converted to individual layer state diagram by method first, is then traveled through using breadth first traversal algorithm whole
Individual state diagram, it is ensured that each state is traversed, this generates multiple test scenes.Each state can be used as a checkout area
Scape, the activity diagram of the multiple functions of associating in state represent all of tested sequence of operation of this scene.The behaviour of each function
It is exactly a test cases to make sequence.Next using the method for generating test case based on activity diagram, generate security test
Use-case.General security test use-case is generated using said method.
Security test case generation method based on security verification rule：First, model inspection is being carried out in step 3
During survey, the security verification rule and the state being located and function for causing software failure is stored.When generating use-case, structure first
Make prerequisite and reach dbjective state, then the implication according to security verification rule, traversal activity diagram produces test case.
The implementation of test case translation module (8) is：
By security test use-case generation module, the test case of XML format, security use-case translation module is generated
Work be mainly into row format replace.In State transition model and activity diagram, transition condition adopts interface data element and interior
Portion's data element is described.Thus, the operation object in the XML format use-case of generation is also interface data element and internal number
According to element.As each interface data element in Requirements Modeling and internal data element have two class names, it is artificial respectively
Discernible variable name and English variable name, and English variable name meets script variable naming specification.This is just use-case lattice
Formula conversion provides scheme that can be feasible.Test case includes multiple steps, and each step includes two key elements, is behaviour respectively
Make time and operation of this moment to variable.The work of security use-case translation module is the requirement according to object format, to XML
Time and variable in use-case operates into row format and replaces.When translating into the use-case for manually performing, variable name is replaced with manually
Variable name, when translating into the use-case of test script form, is replaced with English variable name by discernible variable name.Translate into other
During the XML use-cases of form, retain former variable name, tissue is re-started to use-case form.
The step of verification method of above-mentioned embedded software security automatic Verification system, is as follows：
SafeTrip modeling tools, Formal Verification module and security test module installation and deployment are at same
On the PC of 7 systems of Windows, oracle database is adopted when security verification rule database is realized, single number is deployed in
According on server, PC is connected using netting twine with data server.
Step one, the SafeTrip modeling softwares for opening PC, according to ICD modeling procedures mentioned above, build ICD moulds
Type, forms ICD model datas；
Step 2, on the basis of ICD model datas, using the internal rows of OCL Formal Language Descriptions software to be verified
For including state transition and function logic, setting up software requirement model file；
Step 3, opening data server, by existing software failure reason, conclusion forms security verification rule, deposits
It is placed in oracle database；
Step 4, the safety in Formal Verification module, in importing software requirement model file and oracle database
Property proof rule, carry out Formal Verification to software requirement model file, obtain Formal Verification result；
Step 5, open Test cases technology module, import software requirement model file, Formal Verification result and
Security verification rule in oracle database, generates the security test use-case of XML format；
Step 6, the security test use-case to XML format enter row format conversion, generate use required during test execution
Example form.Including the natural language use-case required for manually performing, the pin required for the testing tool platform based on test script
Other XML format use-cases and other forms that this language format use-case, embedded emulation automatic test platform need are used
Example.
The test case generated in step 7, execution step six, carries out software test to being verified software.
Claims (2)
1. a kind of embedded software security automatic Verification system, it is characterised in that：The system includes：
A software requirement modeling modules (1), its function are to be tested according to the ICD files and requirements specification of software to be verified
Card software carries out formalized description, forms software requirement model file, and the software requirement modeling module (1) includes：
ICD MBMs (2), its function are the outside crosslinking environment of description running software to be verified, including with external equipment it
Between crosslinking relation, bus type and communication protocol, form ICD model datas；
Software form MBM (3), its function are on the basis of ICD model datas, using OCL Formal Language Descriptions
The internal act of software to be verified, including state transition and function logic, ultimately forms software requirement model file；
In the software requirement modeling module (1), ICD MBMs (2) are connected with software form MBM (3), are built by ICD
Mould module (2) transmits ICD model datas to software form MBM (3)；
B security verification rule databases (4), its function is storage security proof rule, and provide inquiry, matching, renewal,
The interface of maintenance；
C-shaped formula authentication module (5), is connected with software requirement modeling module (1) and security verification rule database (4) respectively
Connect, from software requirement modeling module (1) to Formal Verification module (5) transmitting software demand model file, by security verification
Rule database (4) provides the foundation of checking, i.e. security verification rule, the Formal Verification to Formal Verification module (5)
The function of module (5) is based on the security verification rule in security verification rule database (4), to software requirement modeling mould
The software requirement model file that block (1) is formed carries out Formal Verification, forms Formal Verification result；
D security test modules (6), respectively with software requirement modeling module (1), security verification rule database (4) and shape
Formula authentication module (5) is connected, and provides software requirement mould from software requirement modeling module (1) to security test module (6)
Type file, provides security verification rule from security verification rule database (4) to security test module (6), by form
Change authentication module (5) Formal Verification result, the function of the security test module (6) is provided to security test module (6)
It is that software requirement model file and Formal Verification result and the security verification rule of basis is generated and test case passed through
Translation carries out use-case form conversion, and to adapt to the needs of different test execution platforms, the security test module (6) includes：
Test cases technology module (7), its function are the test cases for generating XML format；
Test case translation module (8), its function receive the test case of the XML format that Test cases technology module (7) is generated,
And the test case of other forms is transcribed into, other forms include natural language form, script form.
2. the verification method of embedded software security automatic Verification system described in claim 1 is used for, it is characterised in that：Should
The step of method, is as follows：
Step one, by the outside crosslinking environment to running software to be verified, including the crosslinking relation between external equipment, total
The description of line type and communication protocol, sets up ICD model datas；
Step 2, on the basis of ICD model datas, using the internal act of OCL Formal Language Descriptions software to be verified, wrap
State transition and function logic is included, software requirement model file is set up；
Step 3, by existing software failure reason, conclusion forms security verification rule, sets up security verification regular data
Storehouse；
Step 4, based in security verification rule database security verification rule, software requirement model file is carried out
Formal Verification, obtains Formal Verification result；
Step 5, generation XML format regular according to software requirement model file, Formal Verification result and security verification
Security test use-case；
Step 6, the security test use-case to XML format enter row format conversion, generate use-case lattice required during test execution
Formula.
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