CN106503994B - Block chain private data access control method based on attribute encryption - Google Patents
Block chain private data access control method based on attribute encryption Download PDFInfo
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- CN106503994B CN106503994B CN201610948544.XA CN201610948544A CN106503994B CN 106503994 B CN106503994 B CN 106503994B CN 201610948544 A CN201610948544 A CN 201610948544A CN 106503994 B CN106503994 B CN 106503994B
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms
Abstract
The invention discloses a block chain private data access control method based on attribute encryption, which mainly solves the privacy disclosure problem caused by the prior art that only the true identity of a user in a block chain is protected anonymously and transaction private information is not protected by encryption, and comprises the following implementation steps: 1. initializing a system; 2. registering a user to acquire attribute information; 3. the authority center distributes a user private key according to the user attribute information; 4. the transaction party encrypts the transaction privacy data and uploads the transaction privacy data to the blockchain; 5. the bookkeeper verifies the transaction information and executes the transaction; 6. the authorization supervision center uses the authorization private key to decrypt and view the transaction ciphertext. According to the invention, the transaction privacy information is encrypted, so that the data privacy leakage is avoided, and the method can be used for privacy protection of the virtual asset transaction data in the block chain.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of passwords, and particularly relates to a private data access control method which can be applied to authorized supervision centers of different levels in a block chain and users to effectively access encrypted transaction data in the block chain.
Background
The blockchain is essentially a decentralized database, like a shared book, that records all bitcoin transaction information. As a bottom layer technology of the bitcoin, the block chain has the characteristics of decentralization, openness, anonymity, non-tampering and the like. In a traditional public blockchain, data such as account information and transaction content of a user are public, any user can participate in accounting and viewing transaction data, and the privacy of the user is protected only in a pseudo-anonymous mode. This, while increasing the confidence of the user that the data is truly authentic, for the financial industry, complete disclosure of the data involves a great deal of commercial confidentiality and interest, and thus it is necessary to use encryption techniques to protect the privacy of the data, while at the same time ensuring that regulatory centers such as governments and banks can view the contents of the transaction to prevent the conduct of illegal transactions in the blockchain. This requires flexible access control policies to enable control of access rights for different users. Moreover, as the number of users in the block chain increases dramatically, a large amount of transaction information will be generated, which causes inconvenience in supervision, and therefore supervision centers of different levels need to be set to supervise the progress of transactions in the block chain hierarchically.
In 2005, Sahai and Waters proposed the concept of attribute encryption ABE, ABE is divided into ciphertext policy attribute encryption CP-ABE and key policy attribute encryption KP-ABE, in CP-ABE, ciphertext is related to access policy, key is related to user attribute, and user can decrypt ciphertext only if user attribute satisfies the access control policy of ciphertext, CP-ABE has flexible access control policy, well solves the access control problem of many-to-many communication, but it does not consider the relationship between attributes, and is not suitable for the case where there is a higher authority covering lower authority between different levels of authorized user authorities, so 2009 Jin L i et al proposed the concept of hierarchical attribute encryption HABE, which layered attributes in attribute set according to the correlation between attributes, thus having the property that upper attributes cover lower attributes, but based on basic ABE, it lacks fine-grained access control.
The university of sienna electronic technology disclosed a hierarchical attribute encryption scheme in the patent "a hierarchical attribute encryption scheme" filed by the university of sienna electronic technology (publication No. 105406967a, application No. 201510908416.8, application date: 2016, 03, 16). According to the scheme, corresponding lines of a layered access structure are embedded into each attribute of the layers during encryption, so that the combination of layering and access control is realized. The method has the disadvantages that the attributes are layered only according to the importance of the attributes, the consideration on the correlation among the attributes is not detailed enough, and the method is not suitable for the condition that fine-grained layered access control needs to be carried out on user authorities at all levels in a future block chain.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a block chain private data access control method based on attribute encryption to strengthen the protection of private data in a block chain and ensure that authorized supervision centers and users in different levels can effectively access the private data in the block chain.
The technical scheme of the invention is thatThe user applies for registration to the system, and obtains an identification ID and a user attribute set S which are uniquely corresponding to the user identification informationu(ii) a The authority center CA distributes a private key SK for the user according to the user attribute information; when a trading party A carries out a trade with a trading party B, sensitive information to be traded is encrypted by using a hierarchical attribute encryption technology so as to ensure that the trading party B and each level of authorization supervision centers can decrypt a ciphertext; other unauthorized users in the block chain do not have the right to view the encrypted transaction information, but can verify the validity of the transaction through the verification information attached behind the transaction ciphertext, and the implementation steps comprise the following steps:
(1) initialization:
(1a) input System safety parameters 1λGenerating a first group of multiplication cycles G of order prime p0A second multiplication loop group G1And a finite field ZpRandomly selecting a first multiplication cycle group G0G, defining a bilinear mapping e0×G0→G1；
(1b) From a finite field ZpSelecting N elements as system attributes to form a system attribute set S, dividing the attributes in the S into N trees according to the correlation among the attributes, and setting the depth of the ith tree as liDefinition l ═ max { li}i∈[1,n]Representing the maximum depth of n trees, i ∈ [1, n]；
(1c) Randomly selecting a first vector U ═ U (U)θ)1≤θ≤lAnd a second vector U '═ U'θ′)1≤θ′≤nWherein u isθPublic parameter, u, corresponding to the theta-th level of the representation attribute treeθ∈G0，u′θ′Denotes a public parameter, u ', corresponding to the # attribute tree'θ′∈G0(ii) a Definition of
Is a finite field ZpA set of elements of interp in
Two random numbers α with different sizes are selectedAnd β, calculating public parameters Y ═ e (g, g)αGenerating a system parameter PK and a master private key MK:
PK＝(G0,g,gβ,Y,U,U′)，
MK＝(α,β)；
(2) identity registration:
(2a) the user applies for registration to the system, and obtains the ID and user attribute set S corresponding to the real ID informationuAnd submitting the data to an authority center CA, wherein the user comprises a common user and a supervision center, the attribute authority acquired by the supervision center is higher than the attribute authority of the common user in the jurisdiction range of the user,
(2b) authority center CA verifies user' S ID and user attribute set SuIf the correctness is correct, the step (3) is executed, otherwise, the registration is terminated;
(3) key distribution:
(3a) authority center CA for user attribute set SuThe jth attribute of (1)jCalculating its attribute private key djPrivate key parameter DjAnd privilege parameter set D'j；
(3b) The authority center CA calculates the private key SK of the user:
wherein D ═ g(α+r)/βIs part of the user's private key SK;
(3c) the authority center CA sends the private key SK of the user to the user through a secure channel for secret storage;
(4) encrypting transaction privacy data:
(4a) the trading party A formulates an access control strategy P and constructs an access control structure (M, rho) through a linear secret sharing system L SSS, wherein M is a generator matrix of c rows and d columns, rho is a mapping for mapping elements in a set {1,2,..,. d } to attributes in a ciphertext strategy attribute set L, and the ciphertext strategy attribute set L is a set of all attributes in the access control strategy P;
(4b) selecting a random secret value
Generating d secret shares s of a secret value s}∈[1,d]Wherein s isIs the first secret share of the secret value s, ∈ [1, d]；
(4c) For the jth attribute a in the ciphertext policy attribute set Lj′Calculating its attribute ciphertext Cj′And policy parameter C'j′；
(4d) The transaction party A inputs transaction plaintext information m to be encrypted, and generates a ciphertext E:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is a partial cipher text containing transaction plaintext information m, C ═ gβsIs a partial ciphertext containing a secret value s;
(5) uploading transaction data:
(5a) the transaction party A signs the ciphertext E and the additional verification information M' through a secure signature algorithm Sig, and generates a primary signature file sigmaASending the data to a transaction party B;
(5b) the transaction part B receives the preliminary signature document sigmaADecrypting the ciphertext E, checking the transaction information to be correct, and then signing the primary signature document sigmaASigning is carried out to generate a final signature file sigmaBAnd broadcast to the blockchain;
(6) executing the transaction:
(6a) the system selects the bookkeeper F with the fastest bookkeeping best in a period of time;
(6b) the bookkeeper F broadcasts a data block containing all transaction information in the period of time in a blockchain, each node in the blockchain can verify the transaction information in the data block, and if the transaction information is real and valid, the block is added into the blockchain;
(6c) the bookkeeper F uses an addition homomorphic algorithm to change the account balance of the transaction parties A and B;
(7) and accessing the ciphertext:
(7a) before looking up the specific content of a certain transaction information, a user or a supervision center firstly verifies the attribute set S of the user or the supervision centeruWhether the access control policy P is satisfied:
if not, the decryption operation cannot be executed correctly;
if yes, selecting an authorization set S 'meeting the access control policy P'uAnd (7b) executing the step (7b),
(7b) at grant set S'uSelects the attribute a of the ciphertext strategy capable of being coveredj′User attribute of (a)jWherein a isj∈Su；
(7c) Calculating user attribute ajDecryption authority value d'jAnd bilinear pairs
(7d) And decrypting the ciphertext E of the transaction information in the block chain to obtain transaction plaintext information m.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
firstly, the transaction privacy data in the block chain is encrypted by using an encryption technology, so that the problem of privacy disclosure caused by disclosure of all data in the traditional public block chain is solved, and privacy protection of transaction sensitive information in the block chain is realized;
secondly, the invention combines the hierarchical attribute encryption technology with the linear secret sharing system L SSS, thus realizing fine-grained hierarchical access control to the transaction ciphertext in the block chain, and the transaction party can make the monitoring center to which the transaction party belongs have the authority to access the transaction ciphertext as long as the transaction party adds own authority into the access control strategy, thereby avoiding the situation that the transaction party intentionally does not make the monitoring center look over when using the access control strategy to encrypt the transaction information.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a general flow chart of an implementation of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a sub-flow diagram of encrypting transaction privacy data in accordance with the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Referring to fig. 1, the implementation steps of the present invention are as follows.
And step 1, initializing.
Input System safety parameters 1λGenerating a first group of multiplication cycles G of order prime p0A second multiplication loop group G1And a finite field ZpRandomly selecting a first multiplication cycle group G0G, defining a bilinear mapping e0×G0→G1；
From a finite field ZpSelecting N elements as system attributes to form a system attribute set S, dividing the attributes in the S into N trees according to the correlation among the attributes, and setting the depth of the ith tree as liDefinition l ═ max { li}i∈[1,n]Representing the maximum depth of n trees, i ∈ [1, n]；
Randomly selecting a first vector U ═ U (U)θ)1≤θ≤lAnd a second vector U '═ U'θ′)1≤θ′≤nWherein u isθPublic parameter, u, corresponding to the theta-th level of the representation attribute treeθ∈G0，u′θ′Denotes a public parameter, u ', corresponding to the # attribute tree'θ′∈G0(ii) a Definition of
Is a finite field ZpA set of elements of interp in
Two random numbers α with different sizes are selectedAnd β, calculating public parameters Y ═ e (g, g)αGenerating a system parameter PK and a master private key MK:
PK＝(G0,g,gβ,Y,U,U′)，
MK＝(α,β)。
and 2, identity registration.
The user applies for registration to the system, and obtains the ID and user attribute set S corresponding to the real ID information of the useruAnd submitted to an authority centre CA, wherein
The users comprise common users and supervision centers at all levels, and the attribute authority acquired by the supervision centers is higher than that of the common users in the jurisdiction range of the supervision centers;
authority center CA verifies user' S ID and user attribute set SuIf so, executing the step 3, otherwise, terminating the registration.
And 3, distributing the key.
(3a) Set of user attributes SuJ-th user attribute of (1)jIs located in the ith attribute tree, has the depth h and the path Rj＝(aj0,aj1...,ajk,...,ajh) Wherein, k ∈ [0, h]，ajkIs the user attribute ajPath R ofjCorresponding attributes of the k-th layer, the authoritative central CA selecting random numbers for combating collusion attacks
For user attribute ajSelecting an attribute random number rj∈ZpAnd calculates its attribute private key djPrivate key parameter DjAnd privilege parameter set D'j：
Wherein u'iRepresenting the public parameter, u, corresponding to the ith attribute treekIs a public parameter of the k-th level of the attribute tree,
are the h +1 th to l-th layers of the attribute treeiA public parameter of the layer;
(3b) the authority center CA calculates the private key SK of the user:
wherein D ═ g(α+r)/βIs part of the private key SK of the user.
(3c) The authority center CA sends the private key SK of the user to the user through a secure channel for storage.
And 4, encrypting the transaction privacy data.
Referring to fig. 2, the steps are as follows:
(4a) the trading party A formulates an access control strategy P, and an access control structure (M, rho) is constructed through a linear secret sharing system L SSS, wherein M is a generating matrix of c rows and d columns, rho is a mapping for mapping elements in a set {1,2,..,. d } to attributes in a ciphertext strategy attribute set L, and the ciphertext strategy attribute set L is a set of all attributes in the access control strategy P;
(4b) selecting a random secret value
From a finite field ZpC-1 random numbers v2,...,vcConstructing a random vector v ═ (s, v)2,...,vc)TGenerating d secret shares s of a secret value s}∈[1,d]：
s＝M·v，
Wherein M isIs the first row of the generator matrix M, ∈ [1, d]，sIs with the policy attribute aj′A first secret share of the corresponding secret value s;
(4c) let the jth' policy attribute a in the ciphertext policy attribute set Lj′The attribute tree is positioned in the ith 'attribute tree, the depth of the attribute tree is h', and the path of the attribute tree is Rj′＝(aj′0,aj′1,...,aj′k′,...,aj′h′) Wherein, k '∈ [0, h']，aj′k′Is a policy attribute aj′Path R ofj′Corresponding attribute of the k' th layer in (1), for policy attribute aj′Selecting its corresponding secret share s according to the mapping ρAnd calculating its attribute ciphertext Cj′And policy parameter C'j′：
Wherein u'i′Representing the public parameter, u, corresponding to the ith' attribute treek′Is the public parameter of the k' layer of the attribute tree;
(4d) the transaction party A inputs transaction plaintext information m to be encrypted, and generates a ciphertext E:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is a partial cipher text containing transaction plaintext information m, C ═ gβsIs a partial cipher text containing a secret value s.
And 5, uploading transaction data.
(5a) The transaction party A signs the ciphertext E and the additional verification information M' through a secure signature algorithm Sig:
wherein σAIs the primary signature file signed by the transaction party A, the additional verification information M' contains the amount of the bitcoin and the source information sAIs the private signature key of the transaction party A, | | | represents the cascade operation, IDAIs the identity of the transaction party a;
(5b) the transaction part A signs the preliminary signature file sigmaASending to a transaction party B, which receives the preliminary signature document sigmaAThen, the ciphertext E is decrypted, and after checking that the transaction information is correct, the transaction party B runs a signature algorithm Sig to sign the primary signature file sigmaASigning is carried out to generate a final signature file sigmaB：
Wherein s isBIs the private signature key, ID, of party BBIs the identity of party B;
(5c) the transaction part B will finally sign the document sigmaBBroadcast to the blockchain.
And 6, executing the transaction.
The system selects the bookkeeper F with the fastest bookkeeping best in a period of time;
the bookkeeper F broadcasts a data block containing all transaction information in the period of time in a blockchain, each node in the blockchain can verify the transaction information in the data block, and if the transaction information is real and valid, the block is added into the blockchain;
the biller F uses an additive homomorphic algorithm to alter the balance of both parties a and B of the transaction.
And 7, accessing the ciphertext.
(7a) Before looking up the specific content of a certain transaction information, a user or a supervision center firstly verifies the attribute set S of the user or the supervision centeruWhether the access control policy P is satisfied:
if not, the decryption operation cannot be executed correctly;
if yes, selecting an authorization set S 'meeting the access control policy P'uWherein
(7b) At grant set S'uThe coverable strategy attribute a meeting the following 3 conditions is selectedj′User attribute of (a)j：
User attributes ajIn the ith attribute tree, the policy attribute aj′In the i 'th attribute tree, i ═ i' is satisfied;
user attributes ajDepth h and policy attribute a ofj′Satisfies the following conditions: h is less than or equal to h';
user attributes ajPath R ofj＝(aj0,aj1,...,ajk,...,ajh) With policy attribute aj′Path R ofj′＝(aj′0,aj′1,...,aj′k′,...,aj′h′) Satisfies the following conditions: when k is k', ajk＝aj′k′Where k ∈ [0, h]，k′∈[0,h′]；
(7c) For overlay policy attribute aj′User attribute of (a)jCalculating its decryption permission value d'jAnd bilinear pairs
Wherein d isjIs the private key of the attribute that,
is a set of rights parameters D'jElement (2) representing user attribute ajAuthority parameter of aj′,h+1,aj′,h+2,...,aj′h′Is the ciphertext policy Attribute aj′Path R ofj′Corresponding attributes of the h +1 th to h' th layers, Cj′Is a policy attribute aj′Attribute ciphertext of (D)jIs a policy attribute aj′Private key parameter of, C'j′Is a policy attribute aj′Of the policy parameter u'i′Representing the public parameter, u, corresponding to the ith' attribute treek′Is a public parameter of the k' th layer of the attribute tree, aj′k′Is a policy attribute aj′Path R ofj′Corresponding attribute of the kth ' layer in, k ' ∈ [0, h ']；
(7d) Decrypting the ciphertext E of the transaction information in the block chain to obtain decrypted transaction plaintext information m:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is a partial cipher text containing transaction plaintext information m, C is a partial cipher text containing a secret value s, D is a partial key in a user private key SK, and lambdaIs a set { lambda}∈IOf the first parameter, λ∈ZpSet { λ }}∈IIs a parameter set obtained according to the reconstruction property of L SSS scheme, I {: ρ () ∈ S'uρ () represents the policy attribute a mapped to the ciphertext policy attribute set L with a mapping ρj′，sIs with the policy attribute aj′A first secret share of the corresponding secret value s.
Through the steps, the layered ciphertext strategy attribute encryption technology is combined with the linear secret sharing system L SSS, and the layered ciphertext strategy attribute encryption technology is applied to the transaction process of the block chain, so that encryption protection and layered access control on transaction sensitive information in the block chain are realized.
Claims (9)
1. A block chain private data access control method based on attribute encryption comprises the following steps:
(1) initialization:
(1a) input System safety parameters 1λGenerating a first group of multiplication cycles G of order prime p0A second multiplication loop group G1And a finite field ZpRandomly selecting a first multiplication cycle group G0G, defining a bilinear mapping e0×G0→G1；
(1b) From a finite field ZpSelecting N elements as system attributes to form a system attribute set S, dividing the attributes in the S into N trees according to the correlation among the attributes, and setting the depth of the ith tree as liDefinition l ═ max { li}i∈[1,n]Representing the maximum depth of n trees, i ∈ [1, n]；
(1c) Randomly selecting a first vector U ═ U (U)θ)1≤θ≤lAnd a second vector U '═ U'θ′)1≤θ′≤nWherein u isθPublic parameter, u, corresponding to the theta-th level of the representation attribute treeθ∈G0，u′θ′Denotes a public parameter, u ', corresponding to the # attribute tree'θ′∈G0(ii) a Definition of
Is a finite field ZpA set of elements of interp in
Two random numbers α and β with different sizes are selected, and public parameters Y ═ e (g, g) are calculatedαGenerating a system parameter PK and a master private key MK:
PK＝(G0,g,gβ,Y,U,U′)，
MK＝(α,β)；
(2) identity registration:
(2a) the user applies for registration to the system, and obtains the ID and user attribute set S corresponding to the real ID informationuAnd submitting the data to an authority center CA, wherein the user comprises a common user and a supervision center, the attribute authority acquired by the supervision center is higher than the attribute authority of the common user in the jurisdiction range of the user,
(2b) authority center CA verifies user' S ID and user attribute set SuIf the correctness is correct, the step (3) is executed, otherwise, the registration is terminated;
(3) key distribution:
(3a) authority center CA for user attribute set SuThe jth attribute of (1)jCalculating its attribute private key djPrivate key parameter DjAnd privilege parameter set D'j；
(3b) The authority center CA calculates the private key SK of the user:
wherein D ═ g(α+r)/βIs a partial key in the user's private key SK, r is a random number to resist collusion attacks,
(3c) the authority center CA sends the private key SK of the user to the user through a secure channel for secret storage;
(4) encrypting transaction privacy data:
(4a) the trading party A formulates an access control strategy P and constructs an access control structure (M, rho) through a linear secret sharing system L SSS, wherein M is a generator matrix of c rows and d columns, rho is a mapping for mapping elements in a set {1,2,..,. d } to attributes in a ciphertext strategy attribute set L, and the ciphertext strategy attribute set L is a set of all attributes in the access control strategy P;
(4b) selecting a random secret value
Generating d secret shares s of a secret value s}∈[1,d]Wherein s isIs the first secret share of the secret value s, ∈ [1, d]；
(4c) For the jth attribute a in the ciphertext policy attribute set Lj′Calculating its attribute ciphertext Cj′And policy parameter C'j′；
(4d) The transaction party A inputs transaction plaintext information m to be encrypted, and generates a ciphertext E:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is a partial cipher text containing transaction plaintext information m, C ═ gβsIs a partial ciphertext containing a secret value s;
(5) uploading transaction data:
(5a) the transaction party A signs the ciphertext E and the additional verification information M' through a secure signature algorithm Sig, and generates a primary signature file sigmaASending the data to a transaction party B;
(5b) the transaction part B receives the preliminary signature document sigmaADecrypting the ciphertext E, checking the transaction information to be correct, and then signing the primary signature document sigmaASigning is carried out to generate a final signature file sigmaBAnd broadcast to the blockchain;
(6) executing the transaction:
(6a) the system selects the bookkeeper F with the fastest bookkeeping best in a period of time;
(6b) the bookkeeper F broadcasts a data block containing all transaction information in the period of time in a blockchain, each node in the blockchain can verify the transaction information in the data block, and if the transaction information is real and valid, the block is added into the blockchain;
(6c) the bookkeeper F uses an addition homomorphic algorithm to change the account balance of the transaction parties A and B;
(7) and accessing the ciphertext:
(7a) before looking up the specific content of a certain transaction information, a user or a supervision center firstly verifies the attribute set S of the user or the supervision centeruWhether the access control policy P is satisfied:
if not, the decryption operation cannot be executed correctly;
if yes, selecting an authorization set S 'meeting the access control policy P'uAnd (7b) executing the step (7b),
(7b) at grant set S'uSelects the attribute a of the ciphertext strategy capable of being coveredj′User attribute of (a)jWherein a isj∈Su；
(7c) Calculating user attribute ajDecryption authority value d'jAnd bilinear pairs
(7d) And decrypting the ciphertext E of the transaction information in the block chain to obtain transaction plaintext information m.
2. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that in step (3a) an attribute private key d is calculatedjPrivate key parameter DjAnd attribute privilege parameter set D'jCalculated according to the following formula:
where G is the first multiplication cycle group G0Generating element ofR is a random number for combating collusion attack,
u′ia public parameter indicating the correspondence of the ith attribute tree, and h is a user attribute ajDepth, u, in the attribute treekIs a public parameter of the k-th level of the attribute tree, ajkIs the user attribute ajPath R ofj＝(aj0,aj1...,ajk,...,ajh) Corresponding property of the kth layer, k ∈ [0, h]，rjIs an attribute random number, rj∈Zp，
Are the h +1 th to l-th layers of the attribute treeiDisclosed parameters of the layer.
3. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that d secret shares { s) of the secret value s are calculated in step (4b)}∈[1,d]Calculated according to the following formula:
s＝M·v，
wherein s isIs with the policy attribute aj′A first secret share, M, of the corresponding secret value sIs the first row of the generator matrix M, ∈ [1, d]Random vector v ═ s, v2,...,vc)TS is a randomly selected secret value, v2,...,vcIs from a finite field ZpC-1 random numbers selected randomly.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the attribute ciphertext C is calculated in step (4C)j′And policy parameter C'j′Calculated according to the following formula:
wherein u'i′Denotes the disclosure parameter corresponding to the i 'th attribute tree, h' is the policy attribute aj′Depth, u, in the attribute treek′Is a public parameter of the k' th layer of the attribute tree, aj′k′Is a policy attribute aj′Path R ofj′＝(aj′0,aj′1,…,aj′k′,...,aj′h′) Corresponding attribute of the kth ' layer in, k ' ∈ [0, h ']G is the first multiplication cycle group G0Is generated fromIs with the policy attribute aj′A corresponding first secret share of the secret value s, ∈ [1, d]。
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein the transaction part a in step (5a) signs the ciphertext E and the additional verification information M' by using a secure signature algorithm Sig according to the following formula:
wherein σAIs the primary signature file signed by the transaction party A, the additional verification information M' contains the amount of the bitcoin and the source information sAIs the private signature key of the transaction party A, | | | represents the cascade operation, IDAIs the identity of the transaction party a.
6. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that in step (5b) the preliminary signature file σ is signedAAnd performing signature according to the following formula:
wherein σBIs the final signature file, s, generated by the transaction part BBIs the private signature key, ID, of party BAIs the identity, ID, of the transaction part ABIs an identity tag of a transaction part BAnd i | represents a cascade operation.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein step (7b) is at grant set S'uTo select the overridable policy attribute aj′User attribute of (a)jThe following conditions are simultaneously satisfied:
user attributes ajIn the ith attribute tree, the policy attribute aj′In the i' th attribute tree, the following conditions are satisfied between the two attribute trees: i ═ i';
user attributes ajDepth h and policy attribute a ofj′Satisfies the following conditions: h is less than or equal to h';
user attributes ajPath R ofj＝(aj0,aj1,…,ajk,…,ajh) With policy attribute aj′Path R ofj′＝(aj′0,aj′1,…,aj′k′,...,aj′h′) Satisfies the following conditions: when k is k', ajk＝aj′k′Where k ∈ [0, h]，k′∈[0,h′]。
8. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that in step (7c) a decryption rights value d 'is calculated'jAnd bilinear pair AjCalculated according to the following formula:
wherein d isjIs the private key of the attribute that,
is a set of rights parameters D'jElement (2) representing user attribute ajAuthority parameter of aj′,h+1,aj′,h+2,...,aj′h′Is the ciphertext policy Attribute aj′Path R ofj′＝(aj′0,aj′1,…,aj′k′,...,aj′h′) Respective attributes of the h +1 th to h' th layers, rjIs a random number, rj∈Zp，Cj′Is a policy attribute aj′Attribute ciphertext of (D)jIs a policy attribute aj′Private key parameter of, C'j′Is a policy attribute aj′Policy parameter of (1), sIs with the policy attribute aj′A first secret share of the corresponding secret value s.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the decryption of the ciphertext E of the transaction message in the blockchain in step (7d) is performed according to the following formula:
wherein m is the decrypted clear text information of the transaction,
is a partial cipher text containing transaction plaintext information m, C is a partial cipher text containing a secret value s, D is a partial key in a user private key SK, and lambdaIs a set { lambda}∈IOf the first parameter, λ∈ZpSet { λ }}∈IIs a parameter set obtained according to the reconstruction property of L SSS scheme, I {: ρ () ∈ S'uρ () represents the policy attribute a mapped to the ciphertext policy attribute set L with a mapping ρj′。
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