CN106487796A - Identity card reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process - Google Patents
Identity card reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process Download PDFInfo
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- CN106487796A CN106487796A CN201610935187.3A CN201610935187A CN106487796A CN 106487796 A CN106487796 A CN 106487796A CN 201610935187 A CN201610935187 A CN 201610935187A CN 106487796 A CN106487796 A CN 106487796A
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
Abstract
Identity card reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, it is characterized in that described safe ciphering unit (Secure Crypto Element, SCE) it is used for identity card to read in equipment, identity card machine sensible information (abbreviation ID_Data) encryption 467 2013 standard SAM_A of GA exported using asymmetric arithmetic or signature, it is ensured that ID_Data is not tampered in client or network channel or is multiplexed；Encryption method includes：SCE uses system public key encryption ID_Data, generates identity card machine sensible information ciphertext (abbreviation En_ID_Data) and uploads background system, and background system obtains ID_Data using system private key deciphering En_ID_Data；Endorsement method includes：SCE generates ID_Data_DS using SCE private key pair ID_Data signature, uploads background system together with ID_Data, and background system uses SCE public key verifications ID_Data_DS.
Description
Technical field：
The invention belongs to electronic information technology and application, and in particular to hard in a kind of reading equipment for identity card
The technology of the safe ciphering unit of part, device and its application process.
Background technology：
Nearly more than ten years, China's No.2 residence card made using RF identification (RFID) chip technology has obtained general
All over distribution and extensively application.Reading and examination for the identity card machine sensible information in radio frequency chip, general requirement is using special
Identity card read equipment complete；And read in equipment in special identity card, it is desirable to realize recognizing using special security module
Card and deciphering function.This security module is referred to as " checking safety control module " (Secure in 467 2004 standard of GA
Access and control Module for Validation, SAM_V) module, lexical or textual analysis be " be embedded in checking equipment in,
The part having to information control reading, safety verification, output function in resident identification card certificate "；Revise in GA 467 2013
SAM_V is renamed as SAM_A (Secure Access Module for Authentication, SAM_A) in standard.
SAM_A external interface mainly has service terminal interface (UART serial ports or USB interface) and radio-frequency module interface (parallel port
Or the serial line interface of similar I2C), service terminal interface connects host computer or microprocessor (MCU), and radio-frequency module interface connects radio frequency mould
Block.The interface mode of the SAM_A that 467 2013 standard of GA is given is that one end connects service terminal by service terminal interface, separately
One end connects radio-frequency module by radio-frequency module interface.However, common identity card reads equipment, in order to adapt to dissimilar and
Radio frequency chip, also for the convenience for increasing operation radio-frequency module, generally uses MCU and connects SAM_A service terminal interface respectively
With radio-frequency module interface, the other interface connection radio frequency chip of MCU is reused, now the radio-frequency module interface of SAM_A becomes one
Plant virtual radio frequency interface.
Conventional identity card reads the process of equipment reading identity card machine sensible information：Service terminal or host computer pass through business
Terminal interface sends " reading machine-readable Word message and photographic intelligence " order (0x300x01) to SAM_A, or " reads machine-readable word letter
Breath, photographic intelligence and finger print information " order (0x300x10), SAM_A export the operation of identity card Card Reader by radio-frequency module interface
Order, including select file, reads binary system, internal authentication, takes random number and external authentication order, and radio-frequency module operates identity card
Command response is returned to SAM_A after executing mentioned order by radio frequency chip.After correct execution mentioned order is finished, SAM_A passes through
Service terminal interface returns the identity card machine sensible information after deciphering.
For convenience of description, described identity card machine sensible information is referred to as ID_Data by the present invention, contains identity card machine-readable
Text message and photographic information, the identity card that issues in recent years also have finger print information, host computer or background system software parsing ID_
The machine-readable word of identity card, photograph and finger print information is obtained after Data.
Above identity card reads the process of equipment reading identity card machine sensible information, from the point of view of data safety angle, is more suitable for
The application scenario of identity card machine sensible information is locally read in service terminal, is read unsuitable for network system backstage and checking identity
The application demand of card machine sensible information.For example in mobile communication corporate networks real name system, much uncontrolled third party sells on a commission basis
There is, using client reading identity card machine sensible information, the potential safety hazard that client software palms off identity card machine sensible information in point.
Specifically, understand as the data structure that ID_Data has determination is available for analysis, for specific identity card be again
Changeless, without dynamic encryption or signature etc data security protecting measure, client software are pieced together, distort and are palmed off
ID_Data uploads background system, and background system remains to normal parsing, without reliable technological means checking ID_Data information
The data true and false.And, real ID_Data data are transmitted on network channel there is also the potential safety hazard that is illegally intercepted and captured.
In short, the identity card for being currently based on SAM_A reads equipment, is only based on SAM_A manager (public security department)
Local Card Reader safety certification means, in addition, be directed to network system user, such as bank or carrier network
The safety measure of system, is less compliant in network system client and reads equipment reading identity card machine sensible information using identity card,
The application on network system backstage, particularly client uncontrolled application scenario is uploaded to again.
Content of the invention：
In consideration of it, the present invention proposes to use a kind of safe ciphering unit (Secure Encrypt Element, SCE), embedding
Enter and read in equipment in identity card, the identity card machine sensible information 467 2013 standard SAM_A of GA exported using asymmetric arithmetic
ID_Data encryption is signed, and the signature of generation identity card machine sensible information ciphertext (abbreviation En_ID_Data) or ID_Data is (referred to as
ID_Data_DS), decipher for net background system or verify.
SCE is connected using the main control MCU in one or more interface and identity card reading equipment, SAM_A or other devices
Connect, its major function is included but is not limited to：
(1) the business order from main control MCU is received；
(2) parsing, execution and acknowledgement command；
(3) create, generate, store, read and write or use the file related to cryptographic algorithm or application；
(4) forward MCU order if necessary or voluntarily send commands to SAM_A；
(5) the identity card machine sensible information ID_Data from MCU or SAM_A is received, is selected using corresponding according to command parameter
Key ID_Data is encrypted or signature algorithm, generate identity card machine sensible information ciphertext En_ID_Data or sig ID _
Data_DS, returns to main control MCU.
SCE function listed above can be realized in an independent safety chip, it is also possible to used as a safe core
The part of functions unit of piece or security module.The different possibility of consideration and adaptability, we provide following three kinds optionally
SCE embodiment：
The first scheme is outside the main control MCU that identity card reads in equipment, and SCE safety chip is separately configured.SCE's
A kind of interface mode is only to be connected with MCU, receives the ID_Data from MCU, returns En_ID_Data or ID_Data_DS and gives
MCU；Another kind of interface mode of SCE is to be connected with SAM_A and MCU between SAM_A and MCU respectively, receives the industry from MCU
Business order, processes Added Business order, forwards the order of SAM_A business to SAM_A, receives the ID_Data from SAM_A, generate
En_ID_Data or ID_Data_DS return to MCU.This embodiment of SCE is easily embedded in the identity card of current routine and reads
Read in equipment, second interface mode particularly therein, current routine identity card need not be changed substantially and read the soft of equipment
Hardware design, it is only necessary to increase a small amount of business order newly, you can realize encryption or the signature function to ID_Data.Described in this programme
Main control MCU uses routine MCU, it is not necessary to realize SCE function in MCU, this programme can also use safe main control MCU reality
Existing identity card reads the basic function of equipment.
Second scheme is the safe main control MCU for using safety chip to read equipment as identity card, is realizing identity card
While read function, SCE function is realized.By taking data ciphering method as an example, safe main control MCU in accordance with 467 2013 standard of GA,
" reading machine-readable Word message and photographic information order " (0x300x01) is sent to SAM_A by service terminal interface or " is read machine-readable
Word message, photographic information and finger print information order " (0x300x10), receives the ID_ that SAM_A service terminal interface is returned
Data, SCE are encrypted to ID_Data using system public key, are exported ciphertext En_ID_Data of ID_Data, or are used SCE private key
Identity card machine sensible information is signed and generates ID_Data_DS.The encryption of Card Reader data or signature process both can be in safe master controls
MCU starts after receiving client Card Reader order, it is also possible to be automatically performed card seeking, card selection and Card Reader in advance by safe main control MCU,
En_ID_Data or ID_Data_DS is directly returned after receiving Client command to client.This embodiment requires identity card
Reading equipment manufacturer uses safe main control MCU to replace routine MCU as main control chip, needs to make again identity card reading equipment
Design of hardware and software, different identity card read equipment manufacturer if do not followed unified technical specification, client and background system
Softwarecompatible has certain difficulty.
The third scheme is realized inside SAM_A, realizes SCE function using the existing safe software and hardware of SAM_A module,
Or SCE function is realized in SAM_A inside modules increase safety chip.The newly-increased business life related to data encryption or signature
Order, by ciphertext En_ID_Data or the ID_Data of the service terminal interface output identity card machine sensible information ID_Data of SAM_A
And its sig ID _ Data_DS.Meanwhile, can continue the service terminal interface command output ID_Data's of compatible current SAM_A
Function.This implementation security and convenience good, most convenient identity card read equipment manufacturer use, but need revise GA
467 2013 standards work out new standard, are related to that face is many, and difficulty is big.
The first scheme and second scheme although can effectively prevent client software from forging ID_Data, but can not
The ID_Data for effectively preventing the personation SAM_A offer of " illegal " hardware from forging is to the En_ID_ of SCE generation " illegal " of " legal "
Data or ID_Data_DS.For this purpose, we can design SCE has locking and unlocking function, net background system once finds
Suspicious client, can add the mark category information about " locking ", " unblock " and " normal " in dynamic public key cryptography is issued,
Locking, unblock or normal operating are executed according to relevant information after SCE deciphering.
For data ciphering method, SCE needs to be encrypted ID_Data using background system public key, obtains En_ID_
Data uploads background system, is decrypted acquisition ID_Data by background system using system private key pair En_ID_Data；For number
According to the method for signature, SCE is signed using SCE private key pair ID_Data, obtains ID_Data_DS, by ID_Data and ID_Data
Background system is uploaded together, and background system obtains ID_Data using SCE public key verifications ID_Data_DS.
No matter using data ciphering method or data signature method, both can be using fixing close in the certain period of time
Key pair, can generate key pair in each reading identity card machine sensible information ID_Data again temporarily, wherein be used for data encryption and
To being produced by background system, background system needs to safely issue system public key to SCE the key of deciphering；For data signature and testing
To being produced by SCE, SCE needs safety to upload SCE public key to background system to the key of card.
In order to ensure that public key that recipient receives, from real sender, can set up certificate class practical writing in SCE
Part (is referred to X.509 standard certificate), is issued or updated by background system SCE application file, and background system can read SCE
Application file, obtains its public key after its signature and validity is verified.SCE uploads public key to background system, or background system
Public key is issued to SCE, can be encrypted to sending out the public key for sending using the public key of other side, own private key is used by recipient
After deciphering, the public key of other side is obtained.
Using data ciphering method benefit be encrypted public key from background system, client can not be palmed off, and have the disadvantage visitor
En_ID_Data data can not be deciphered and be parsed in family end, it may be necessary to issue ID_Data again to client after background system deciphering；
The use of the benefit of data signature method is that ID_Data_DS is verified by background system, client can be lacked directly using ID_Data
Point is the need to ensure that digital signature is strictly that SCE does.
The two methods for ID_Data being encrypted using SCE or signing are cut both ways, if stressing to consider background system
Security control ability, it is proposed that the method for preferably using data encryption, using the method for data signature, certain SCE is permissible for secondary choosing
While supporting data encryption data two kinds of data security methods of signature, one is selected to make as needed by net background system
With.
It is proposed that the close SM2 asymmetric arithmetic of asymmetric arithmetic used in SCE, such as state, naturally it is also possible to using which
His asymmetric arithmetic, such as RSA or ECC algorithm；Symmetric key algorithm can also be used in theory, but for key safety management
For the sake of convenient, and ID_Data data length itself is less, and asymmetric encryption efficiency is enough, it is not recommended that using symmetric key algorithm.
Between SCE and background system in addition to the related security information of interactive key, background system can be issued at random
Or multidate information is further ensured that En_ID_ to SCE by being encrypted again or signing after SCE and ID_Data information combination
Data or ID_Data_DS has not reusable ageing.
SCE is realized encrypting ID_Data by newly-increased order or signature, original SAM_A service terminal interface command
Can be continuing with, and existing application product and application system compatibility.
Current identity card reads the limitation that equipment only can guarantee that local authentication Card Reader data safety based on SAM_A, passes through
Using SCE open network system data security control means to network system user (such as mobile operator), network is met
System background is authenticated the Data Security Control of Card Reader to uncontrolled client；Support the integrated SCE of upgrading SAM_A standard
Function and one, first do initialization distribution by public security department, by doing personalized distribution after system user to SCE to SCE；In order to save
Resource-saving and improve efficiency, in the future the SAM_A module of integrated SCE function, it is proposed that business function is all passed through its service terminal and is connect
Cause for gossip is existing, cancels its radio-frequency module interface for being unprofitable to improve data safety.
With the SCE that the variforms such as chip, module, COB circuit board are present, can read in equipment in various identity cards makes
With both having included desk-top desk device, also included that handheld device, self contained facility and its other general or full identity cards were read and set
Standby.
Description of the drawings：
The several embodiments of Fig. 1, SCE
Fig. 2, the SCE exemplary scenario block diagram that is realized with CCM3310S chip
Fig. 3, the application flow citing of identity card machine sensible information encryption
Specific embodiment：
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings for SCE be embodied as and its application process elaborates.Fig. 1 is several realities of SCE
The schematic diagram of scheme is applied, the figure stresses to consider feature and its interface annexation with MCU and SAM_A of SCE.In scheme 1a
With scheme 1b, SCE is an independent hardware safe unit, in scheme 2 and scheme 3, SCE be safe main control MCU piece and
A part of security function unit of SAM_A.
In scheme 1a of Fig. 1, SCE can be to be communicated using multiple interfaces mode and MCU, and such as SPI, I2C, UART etc. go here and there
Line interface.This interface mode of SCE determines which is operated in passive mode, receives the operational order from conventional main control MCU, should
Command execution results are answered, including the identity card machine sensible information ID_Data from MCU is received, is encrypted or returned to after signing by SCE
MCU.
In scheme 1b of Fig. 1, SCE is connected with MCU and SAM_A communication interface respectively.One business end of consideration SAM_A
End interface is UART, and in order to have more preferable software and hardware compatibility with existing identity card reading machine, SCE can use two
UART interface connects the UART interface of conventional main control MCU and SAM_A respectively.So MCU can be the same to original operation SAM_A
Operation SCE, and the business order from MCU directly can be transmitted to SCE by SCE, the response that equally SAM_A is beamed back go back to
MCU.For SAM_A business order, increase SCE does not feel assorted for the software and hardware function that original identity card reads equipment
Difference, including can by continue according to local authentication in the way of reading identity card machine sensible information.Of course, MCU and SAM_A it
Between to increase the purpose of SCE be to support the Added Business order of MCU, realize the encryption of relevant identity card machine sensible information or signature be related
Function.It is particular in that, SCE, for the service terminal interface of SAM_A, is order active sender, receives in SCE
After the newly-increased order of MCU encryption Card Reader etc, SCE is by sending its original " the machine-readable Word message of reading and photograph letter to SAM_A
Breath order " (0x300x01) or " reading machine-readable Word message, photographic information and finger print information order " (0x300x10), start SAM_
The Card Reader verification process of A, Card Reader receive, after terminating, the identity card machine sensible information ID_Data that SAM_A is returned, through encrypting or signing
After return again to MCU.
The scheme 2 of Fig. 1 realizes the function of SCE while being and realize identity card card-reading function using safe main control MCU.In recent years
Resource and the function for carrying out safety chip is stronger and stronger, it is easy to realizes identity card and reads multiple interface communication functions in equipment,
For example connect radio frequency chip using SPI interface, connect SAM_A using UART interface and quasi- I2C interface (or parallel port), using USB
Interface connects computer client.Equally it is easy to realize the safe encryption function of SCE in safe main control MCU, many including supporting
Plant symmetrically or non-symmetrically algorithm, and the file storage related to algorithm and read-write capability.The benefit of this scheme is to save
The hardware cost that SCE is separately configured is saved, and communication efficiency can be improved to a certain extent,
Scheme 1 and scheme 2 can effectively prevent client software from forging ID_Data, but effectively can not prevent " non-
The ID_Data that the personation SAM_A offer of method " hardware is forged is to the En_ID_Data or ID_ of SCE generation " illegal " of " legal "
Data_DS.For this purpose, we design SCE has locking and unlocking function, net background system once finds suspicious client, can
To issue the mark category information added in dynamic public key cryptography about " locking ", " unblock " and " normal ", basis after SCE deciphering
Relevant information executes locking, unblock or normal operating.
Function of the scheme 3 of Fig. 1 by the function of SCE with SAM_A becomes one, no matter in terms of security and convenience
It is all optimal implementation.The existing service terminal interface that can connect client host (computer) of current SAM_A, has again
Radio-frequency module interface, its ideal were that to connect radio frequency chip be exactly that a complete identity card reads equipment originally.Unfortunately due to
Radio frequency chip interface and the diversity of communications protocol, and lack necessary ancillary control function, add can only use limited
Business command operation radio frequency chip so that all in addition use MCU as main control chip in practical application, SAM_A is fallen low into simple
Security module role.Its function simply can be summarised as：(1) legitimacy (internal authentication) of authenticating identity card；(2)
The legitimacy (external authentication) of authentication idses SAM_A, opens the reading authority of identity card chip file after certification；(3)
Identity card chip file is carried out to the computing of similar deciphering, export identity card machine sensible information ID_Data
Certainly, above certification and decrypting process are the use of the dispersion factor dispersion of identity-based card management file and obtain
Temporary symmetric key, is completed based on symmetric key algorithm.However, SAM_A is using the static identity card of symmetric key algorithm output
Machine sensible information ID_Data, it is clear that far can not meet the security request data of network system.However, SAM_A function and spy
Property be specified in public security professional standard GA 467 2013, being directed to multi-party technology and economic interests, revision and upgrade
Certainly there is very big difficulty.
Here, we still free thought in the near future, the SAM_A (may rename) after upgrading can support to be similar to
The asymmetric encryption of SCE or the function of signature, prevent scheme 1 in hardware view and scheme 2 may be input into puppet on hardware circuit
Make the possibility of ID_Data.Further, it is desirable to its showy and not substantial and unhelpful with safety radio frequency mould need not be retained after SAM_A upgrading
Block interface, gives MCU process radio-frequency module, completes all security-related function using single face.
It is the SCE exemplary scenario block diagram that is realized with CCM3310S chip shown in Fig. 2, is thin for one of Fig. 1 scheme 1b
The embodiment of change.Wherein CCM3310S chip is a safety chip with the close qualification of state of Tianjin Guo Xin company, and it supports
Including the asymmetric arithmetic including SM2, RSA, ECC, also the symmetry algorithm such as DES/3DES, AES, SM1, SSF33 is supported, also support
The digest algorithms such as SM3, MD5.It also has multiple external interface resources, the custom interface such as including SPI, I2C, UART, USB.
Two UART interface (one of them is switched using I2C interface internal) of CCM3310S chip used in Fig. 2,
Connect the UART interface of MCU and SAM_A respectively.By row's pin of welding and row are female back-to-back on a circuit board so as to can
Read in equipment with being easily embedded in conventional identity card, the basis for reading equipment hardware circuit is demonstrate,proved in not change of status
On, only need to increase a small amount of MCU business order, you can realize being encrypted the identity card machine sensible information ID_Data of SAM_A output
Or signature.At the same time it can also completely compatible original identity card read function.
It is the application flow citing of identity card machine sensible information encryption shown in Fig. 3, specifically describes identity card and read equipment (master
SAM_A, SCE and MCU to be included), between client host (such as computer or smart mobile phone) and far-end network background system
A kind of typical operation flow.Interface scheme is referred to using Fig. 1 scheme 1b, and SCE is between SAM_A and MCU.Practical application system
System operation flow is certain to little bit different, but as long as its essence to the encryption of identity card machine sensible information is identical, just still belongs to this
The rights protection scope of invention.
We are divided into 4 processes whole application flow, and wherein process 0 is set-up procedure, read for client host
Identity card reads the certificate file in equipment (SCE), frequently need not read certificate in practical application, can be in client host
Connection identity card is read when reading equipment, naturally it is also possible to be stored in client host, is changed when identity card reads equipment and is read
Take.
Process 1 is that client host reads the safe Card Reader of equipment Card Reader feedforward network background system transmission in operation identity card
Request, does not require that every time request all uploads SCE certificate, and typically logging in online situation, continuous Card Reader can be without repeating upload
SCE certificate, it is only necessary to upload the request of simple and safe Card Reader.This procedure request net background system sending system public key, in order to
Ensure that the public key that issues arbitrarily is not used, it is possible to use the SCE public key included in SCE certificate is under after system public key encryption
Send out.
Process 2 is that system public key cryptography is handed down to SCE by client host, deciphers acquisition system by SCE using SCE private key
In plain text, SCE starts SAM_A Card Reader to public key, and after MCU operation radio-frequency module completes whole Card Reader processes, SAM_A exports ID_
Data obtains En_ID_Data to SCE, SCE using system public key encryption ID_Data and is sent to client host.
Process 3 is that En_ID_Data is uploaded to network system backstage by client host, and network system backstage uses system
ID_Data is obtained after private key deciphering En_ID_Data.The shorthand information that identity card can be issued as needed (for example covers part
ID card No.) give client host.
Suggestion network system backstage answers client request all to generate system key pair temporarily every time, after interim reservation, use
I.e. discardable.Network system backstage can also issue other random or other multidate informations, it is desirable to SCE by these multidate informations with
Ciphertext is uploaded to net background system after combining encryption by ID_Data, can compare dynamic letter after background system deciphering
Breath, has En_ID_Data preferably ageing.
Except application process ID_Data being encrypted using system public key, SCE is also supported using SCE private key pair ID_
Data carries out the application process of data signature.Its application flow is similar with shown in Fig. 3, will not be described here.Using SCE data label
The benefit of name is that client host can be in local parsing ID_Data, it is not necessary to return after the deciphering of net background system.Have the disadvantage
Need the method by secondary public key encryption, it is ensured that the really SCE of the SCE public key that SCE is uploaded is produced, rather than client is false
Emit.Otherwise client software may generate key pair, and personation SCE public key is uploaded to net background system, using personation private key
Digital signature is done to palming off ID_Data.
In actual application system, through SCE and net background system secure interactive cipher key related information, it is right to realize
ID_Data is encrypted or the application process signed and method can do necessary adjustment as needed.For example, client host can
To send the order (such as 0x300x01) of the reading identity card machine sensible information of SAM_A standard by MCU to SCE, SCE forwards life
The identity card machine sensible information ID_Data for receiving SAM_A response to SAM_A is made to be uploaded to client for local solution to MCU, MCU
Analysis and display ID card information；While ID_Data is encrypted and (or) signed by SCE, En_ID_Data and (or) ID_ is generated
Data_DS, client host can issue reading identity card machine sensible information ciphertext order by MCU to SCE, read En_ID_
Data and (or) ID_Data_DS are uploaded to net background system to client host, then by client host.Sum it up, only
Still to belong to for the process of the encryption of identity card machine sensible information or signature with method without substantial improvements compared with the present invention
Interest field in the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. identity card reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, described safe ciphering unit (Secure
Crypto Element, SCE) be single safety chip or a safety chip or module partial function unit, SCE use
Read in equipment in identity card, using one or more communication interfaces and identity card read MCU, SAM_A in equipment or other
Device is connected, and receives identity card machine sensible information (the abbreviation ID_ of 467 2013 standard SAM_A service terminal interface of GA output
Data), ID_Data is encrypted using asymmetric cryptographic algorithm or signs, response output identity card machine sensible information ciphertext (letter
Claim En_ID_Data) or ID_Data and its digital signature (abbreviation ID_Data_DS), decipher for background system or verify, it is to avoid
Network system identity card reads the potential safety hazard that equipment client is forged or is multiplexed ID_Data.
2. identity card according to claim 1 reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, it is characterized in that
SCE is read the main control MCU in equipment with identity card and is connected, receive the ID_ from MCU as an independent safety chip
Data information, returns En_ID_Data or ID_Data_DS to MCU；SCE can also between SAM_A and MCU respectively with SAM_A
Connect with MCU, the business order from MCU is received, Added Business order is processed, the original business order of transparent transmission SAM_A, reception come
From the ID_Data of SAM_A, generate En_ID_Data or ID_Data and ID_Data_DS and return to MCU.
3. identity card according to claim 1 reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, it is characterized in that
SCE reads the part of functions unit of the safe main control MCU of equipment as identity card, and safe main control MCU is marked in accordance with GA 467 2013
Standard, sends " reading machine-readable Word message and photographic information order " by service terminal interface to SAM_A or " reads machine-readable word letter
Breath, photographic information and finger print information order ", the ID_Data encryption returned by SAM_A service terminal interface obtain En_ID_
Data, or ID_Data_DS, output En_ID_Data or ID_Data and ID_Data_DS information are obtained to ID_Data signature.
4. identity card according to claim 1 reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, it is characterized in that
Read in equipment in identity card and safe main control MCU is not required the use of, can be using conventional main control MCU, by revising GA 467 2013
Standard causes SCE to become the part of functions unit of SAM_A, realizes SCE function using the existing secure hardware of SAM_A；Or
In addition increase safety chip in SAM_A inside modules and SCE function realized, main control MCU sends existing business order to SAM_A,
The compatible output ID_Data of SAM_A, using SAM_A Added Business order, SAM_A can then export En_ID_Data or ID_
Data and ID_Data_DS information.
5. identity card according to claim 1 reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, its feature bag
SCE is included using asymmetric cryptographic algorithm (the close SM2 algorithm of such as state), defeated to 467 2013 standard SAM_A service terminal interface of GA
The ID_Data for going out carries out data encryption, and process includes：Background system generates asymmetric arithmetic key pair, public including background system
Key and background system private key, sending system public key is to SCE, SCE using system public key to ID_Data encryption generation in a suitable manner
Identity card machine sensible information ciphertext (abbreviation En_ID_Data) uploads background system, and background system deciphers En_ID_ using system private key
Data obtains ID_Data.
6. identity card according to claim 1 reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, its feature bag
SCE is included using asymmetric cryptographic algorithm (the close SM2 algorithm of such as state), defeated to 467 2013 standard SAM_A service terminal interface of GA
The ID_Data for going out carries out data signature, and process includes：SCE generates asymmetric arithmetic key pair, private including SCE public key and SCE
Key, is uploaded SCE public key in a suitable manner to background system, is signed using SCE private key pair ID_Data and generate ID_Data_DS, with
ID_Data uploads background system together, and background system is using obtaining ID_Data after SCE public key verifications ID_Data_DS.
7. the identity card according to claim 5 or 6 reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, its feature
Also include：Though the public key interacted between SCE and background system can be with plaintext transmission, in order to avoid client software palms off SCE
The system public key that public key or retention background system are issued, it is proposed that sender is using ciphertext after the public key encryption own public key of recipient
Recipient is transferred to, recipient obtains sender's public key using own private key in plain text after deciphering；For encrypting to ID_Data or signing
Name key to can continuously using, periodically or non-periodically change, but in order to avoid client be multiplexed En_ID_Data or ID_
Data_DS, it is proposed that Card Reader all generates key pair temporarily by background system or SCE every time, public key cryptography is sent to other side, is used for
SCE is encrypted to ID_Data or background system is verified to ID_Data_DS；Background system can also issue random or dynamic to SCE
Information, by being encrypted again or signing after SCE and ID_Data information combination, is further ensured that En_ID_Data or ID_Data_
DS has not reusable ageing；In order to prevent client use " illegal " hardware personation SAM_A provide forgery ID_Data to
SCE deciphering or sign, background system can add in the dynamic public key cryptography for be handed down to SCE about " locking ", " unblock " and
The status indicator category information of " normal ", by the SCE function locking of suspicious client.
8. identity card according to claim 7 reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, and its feature is also
Including：In SCE, suggestion uses asymmetric arithmetic, the close SM2 asymmetric arithmetic of such as state, naturally it is also possible to asymmetric using other
Algorithm, such as RSA or ECC algorithm；Symmetric key algorithm can also be used in theory, or consulted using asymmetric arithmetic interim
Symmetric key, for the sake of key management conveniently, and ID_Data data length is less, and asymmetric encryption efficiency is enough, it is not recommended that
Using symmetric key algorithm；SCE is encrypted to summary after can making an abstract to ID_Data again or is signed, but due to ID_Data number
According to length less, directly ID_Data can be encrypted or sign；SCE can support to demonstrate,prove with CA used in IC-card or USB Key
Book class function, by, in CA center issued certificate write SCE certificate file, during network application, background system can read,
Checking and renewal SCE certificate.
9. the identity card according to the claims reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process, its feature
It is to limit to for the data safety for overcoming current identity card reading equipment only to can guarantee that local authentication Card Reader based on SAM_A, by SCE
Data Security Control opening to network system user (such as mobile operator), meet network system backstage to uncontrolled
Client be authenticated the Data Security Control of Card Reader；The SCE integrated with SAM_A can be first done just by public security management department
Beginningization is issued, then does personalized distribution by network system user；For save resources and raising efficiency, integrated SCE function
SAM_A module, it is proposed that its whole safety service function is passed through its service terminal interactive interfacing, cancels and is unprofitable to improve data peace
Full radio-frequency module interface.
10. the safe ciphering unit in the identity card equipment according to the claims and its application process, is characterized in that
SCE can be the product form such as chip, module, COB circuit board, used in multiple identity cards read equipment, both include desk-top
Desk device, also includes handheld device, self contained facility and other universal or special equipment.
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| CN201610935187.3A CN106487796A (en) | 2016-11-01 | 2016-11-01 | Identity card reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process |
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| CN201610935187.3A CN106487796A (en) | 2016-11-01 | 2016-11-01 | Identity card reads the safe ciphering unit in equipment and its application process |
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