CN106156618A - A kind of safety chip, mobile terminal and the method realizing mobile terminal system safety - Google Patents
A kind of safety chip, mobile terminal and the method realizing mobile terminal system safety Download PDFInfo
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- CN106156618A CN106156618A CN201510185569.4A CN201510185569A CN106156618A CN 106156618 A CN106156618 A CN 106156618A CN 201510185569 A CN201510185569 A CN 201510185569A CN 106156618 A CN106156618 A CN 106156618A
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- public key
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- verification public
- mobile terminal
- checking
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- G06F21/567—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements using dedicated hardware
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/03—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/50, monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms
- G06F2221/034—Test or assess a computer or a system
Abstract
The invention provides a kind of safety chip to include: memory cell, be used for storing verification public key；According to verification public key, judging unit, for verifying whether application program has correct private key signature.It is to have in the mobile terminal of TrustZone framework that this safety chip is applied to application processor, and the mode of operation of application processor includes normal mode and safe mode, and safety chip connects application processor；When application processor switches from normal mode to safe mode, it is judged that whether unit judges application program has correct private key signature, so that it is determined that whether the program initiating handover request is credible；When credible, application processor switches from normal mode to safe mode, and when insincere, application processor does not perform normal mode and switches to safe mode, can be prevented effectively from malicious application and access the trusted application in credible execution environment.Present invention also offers corresponding mobile terminal and realize the method for mobile terminal system safety.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to communication technique field, particularly relate to a kind of safety chip, mobile terminal and realization and move
The method of terminal system safety.
Background technology
Mobile terminal has developed into the Freeware platform that can download various large-scale application program from Internet.
These application programs generally are carried out verifying to guarantee quality by equipment OEM, but not can carry out all functions
Test, and assailant is constantly creating more and more malicious code with this kind equipment as target.Meanwhile,
The demand that mobile device processes critical services increases day by day, from surfing the web, download viewing video, arrives
Mobile phone remote Pay Bill and management bank's account can be passed through.These development trends cause mobile phone etc. to move eventually
End becomes next software attacks target of the viruses such as malicious code, wooden horse and rootkit.
In order to improve the security of mobile terminal system, (ARM Holdings is world-leading half to ARM
Conductor intellectual property (IP) provider) company develops TrustZone technology.TrustZone is by application process
Device kernel is divided into two kinds of mode of operations, and one is normal mode, can perform rich instruction, in traditional sense
Mobile terminal operating system such as Android, iOS all operate in this pattern, referred to as REE environment (Rich
Execution Environment), another kind of pattern is exactly safe mode, can only perform trusted instruction, be referred to as
TEE environment (Trusted Execution Environment).And guarantee TEE by special bus design
The resource in border will not be accessed by REE border.TrustZone technology by original in REE border perform relate to
The operation of safety and key are transferred in TEE environment, if the client application (Client in REE environment
Application, CA) need to access trusted application in corresponding TEE environment (Trusted Application,
TA), as long as (it is relatively difficult that Session translates directly into Chinese, is typically all translated into time domain by session.
In computer major term, Session referred between the time that a terminal use communicates with interactive system
Every being often referred to from registration entrance system to logging off elapsed time system.And the need to
If, may also have certain operating space.) set up the unique channel between CA and TA, due to TEE
Environment, to application processor, screen, the exclusivity of keyboard, can ensure in TEE environment largely
Process information will not be stolen by other CA, and by the unique channel of CA and TA by anti-for TA result
Feed CA, thus improves the security of system.
This mode ensure that uniqueness and a certain degree of security of TEE environment of CA and TA channel,
But the shortcoming of yet suffering from: cannot be avoided the malice access to TA for the CA, there is huge potential safety hazard.
Content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to provide a kind of can be prevented effectively from malice CA TA is accessed safety chip,
Mobile terminal and the method realizing mobile terminal system safety.
The present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:
A kind of safety chip, comprising: memory cell, is used for storing verification public key；Judging unit, is used for root
According to verification public key checking application program, whether there is correct private key signature.
Preferably, memory cell is stored with the verification public key of more than 2, each application program have one close
Code numbering, each verification public key corresponding password numbering, application program is numbered according to password and is gone coupling correspondence
Verification public key.
Preferably, verification public key includes: (bootstrap is being for the verification public key of application program, Bootloader
One section of program that first system runs after powering on.) verification public key and ROM program (refer to be stored in read-only storage
System program in device, generally system bios program, Driver program, embedded system kernel program etc.,
" system program " is in general unification.BIOS is the initialism of English " Basic Input Output System ", directly
After translating, Chinese is exactly " basic input output system ".Driver program, driver).Checking
PKI.
Preferably, also including performance element, verification public key includes the verification public key of Bootloader；Judge single
Unit passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, the integrality of checking Bootloader；Integrality as Bootloader
During by checking, performance element drives Bootloader to pass through public key algorithm and verification public key, verifies ROM journey
The credibility of sequence；When the credibility of ROM program is by checking, performance element drives ROM program to pass through
Built-in public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking application program.
Preferably, BootLoader is exactly the one section of small routine running before operating system nucleus runs.Logical
Cross this section of small routine, we can with initiating hardware equipment, set up memory headroom mapping graph, thus by system
Hardware environment take a proper states to, in order to be ready to correct for final call operation system kernel
Environment.
Preferably, also including performance element, verification public key includes the verification public key of ROM program；Judging unit
By public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking ROM program；When the credibility of ROM program is led to
When crossing checking, performance element drives ROM program to pass through built-in public key algorithm and verification public key, checking application
The credibility of program.
Present invention also offers a kind of mobile terminal, including safety chip.
Preferably, safety chip includes: memory cell, is used for storing verification public key；Judging unit, is used for
Verify whether application program has correct private key signature according to verification public key.
Preferably, memory cell is stored with the verification public key of more than 2, each application program have one close
Code numbering, each verification public key corresponding password numbering, application program is numbered according to password and is gone coupling correspondence
Verification public key.
Preferably, verification public key includes: the verification public key of application program, the verification public key of Bootloader and
The verification public key of ROM program.
Preferably, also including performance element, verification public key includes the verification public key of Bootloader；Judge single
Unit passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, the integrality of checking Bootloader；Integrality as Bootloader
During by checking, performance element drives Bootloader to pass through public key algorithm and verification public key, verifies ROM journey
The credibility of sequence；When the credibility of ROM program is by checking, performance element drives ROM program to pass through
Built-in public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking application program.
Preferably, BootLoader is exactly the one section of small routine running before operating system nucleus runs.Logical
Cross this section of small routine, we can with initiating hardware equipment, set up memory headroom mapping graph, thus by system
Hardware environment take a proper states to, in order to be ready to correct for final call operation system kernel
Environment.
In the present embodiment, also including performance element, verification public key includes the verification public key of ROM program；Judge
Unit passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking ROM program；Credible when ROM program
Property by checking when, performance element drive ROM program pass through built-in public key algorithm and verification public key, checking
The credibility of application program.
Present invention also offers a kind of method realizing mobile terminal system safety.
A kind of method realizing mobile terminal system safety, the method comprises the steps: step A. normal mode
When program under formula needs the service providing under safe mode, program or application processor initiate handover request,
Handover request is that the application processor of mobile terminal switches from normal mode to safe mode；The safe core of step B.
Whether piece has correct private key signature by signature algorithm and verification public key proving program, and by the result
Notice application processor；When private key signature is correct, step C；Otherwise, D is performed；Step C. is applied
Processor switches to safe mode from normal mode；Step D. application processor refusal performs handover request.
Preferably, before step A, also include: the trust authentication of step E.ROM program, Bootloader
By public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking ROM program.
Preferably, before step E, also include: the integrity verification of step F.Bootloader: safe core
Piece passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, the integrality of checking Bootloader.
Preferably, also include after step C: step G. safety chip by signature algorithm and chip private key is
Program provides chip signature.
Preferably, also include before step A: step H. safety chip is by corresponding for private key PKI and chip
Numbering is sent to third-party platform；Also include after step G: step I. third-party platform is according to PKI and core
Whether piece numbering proofing chip signature is correct.
Preferably, third-party platform is the remote server that Alipay, wealth pay logical or wechat payment etc..
The invention have the benefit that a kind of safety chip includes: memory cell, be used for storing verification public key；
According to verification public key, judging unit, for verifying whether application program has correct private key signature.This safety
Chip application is to have in the mobile terminal of TrustZone framework in application processor, the work of application processor
Pattern includes normal mode and safe mode, and safety chip is individual secure chip, and safety chip connects application
Processor；When application processor switches from normal mode to safe mode, safety chip is judged single by it
Unit judges whether application program has correct private key signature, so that it is determined that whether the program of initiation handover request
Credible；When credible, application processor switches from normal mode to safe mode, when insincere, and application
Processor does not perform normal mode and switches to safe mode, can be prevented effectively from malicious application and access credible
Perform the trusted application in environment.
Brief description
In order to become apparent from, effectively illustrate the embodiment of the present invention technical scheme, make required in embodiment
Accompanying drawing be briefly described, it is implicit that, the accompanying drawing in describing below is only some of the present invention
Embodiment, from the point of view of those skilled in the art, it is not necessary on the premise of paying creative work,
Other accompanying drawings can also be made according to these accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is the structural representation of a kind of safety chip of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the workflow diagram of a kind of safety chip of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is the flow chart of a kind of method realizing mobile terminal system safety of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is the stream setting up process of the trust chain of a kind of method realizing mobile terminal system safety of the present invention
Cheng Tu.
Detailed description of the invention
The invention provides a kind of safety chip, mobile terminal and the method realizing mobile terminal system safety,
In order to make, those of skill in the art are clearer understands the present invention program, and make the above-mentioned purpose of the present invention,
Feature, beneficial effect can will be apparent from, understandable, below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings 1～4 and detailed description of the invention to this
Invention is described in further detail.
The invention provides a kind of safety chip.
Embodiment one
A kind of safety chip, comprising: memory cell 1, is used for storing verification public key；Judging unit 2, is used for
Verify whether application program has correct private key signature according to verification public key.
In the present embodiment, memory cell 1 is stored with the verification public key of more than 2, and each application program has
One password numbering, each verification public key corresponding password numbering, application program is numbered according to password and is gone
Join corresponding verification public key.
In the present embodiment, verification public key includes: the verification public key of application program, Bootloader (bootstrap,
First the one section of program run upon power-up of the system.) verification public key and ROM program (refer to be stored in read-only
System program in memory, generally system bios program, Driver program, embedded system kernel journey
Sequences etc., " system program " is in general unification.BIOS is the breviary of English " Basic Input Output System "
Word, literally rear Chinese is exactly " basic input output system ".Driver program, driver).
Verification public key.
In the present embodiment, also including performance element 3, verification public key includes the verification public key of Bootloader；Sentence
Disconnected unit 2 passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, the integrality of checking Bootloader；Work as Bootloader
Integrality by checking when, performance element 3 drives Bootloader to pass through public key algorithm and verification public key,
The credibility of checking ROM program；When the credibility of ROM program is by checking, performance element 3 drives
ROM program passes through built-in public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking application program.This process
The complete procedure set up for trust chain.
In the present embodiment, also include trust chain sets up process, it is adaptable to (App is all of APP
The abbreviation of application, generally refers exclusively to the application software on mobile phone, or claims cell-phone customer terminal.).Trust chain
The process of foundation includes: judging unit 2 passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, and checking Bootloader's is complete
Property；When the integrality of Bootloader is by checking, performance element 3 drives Bootloader to be calculated by PKI
Method and verification public key, the credibility of checking ROM program；When the credibility of ROM program is by checking,
Performance element 3 drives ROM program to pass through built-in public key algorithm and verification public key, checking APP (application journey
Sequence) credibility.
Safety chip is directly responsible for the integrity verification to Bootloader.Assailant may be by entering to equipment
The row modification Bootloader of hardware programming again, can brush the Rom into third-party invalidated afterwards, and the 3rd
The Rom of side there may be trojan horse, thus causes potential safety hazard.After in this programme, application processor powers up
Firstly the need of request safety chip by preset RSA Algorithm (RSA public key encryption algorithm be 1977 by
Peter Lonard Lee Vista (Ron Rivest), A Di Shamir (Adi Shamir) and Leonard A Deman
(Leonard Adleman) proposes together.) and preset verification public key, the integrality of checking Bootloader,
Bootloader is avoided to be tampered.
That time that APP installs i.e. carry out complete trust chain set up process.Meaning is to ensure environment side
, i.e. there is not other APP in other illegal acts such as eavesdroppings in the security in face.But to need in the present invention
The APP wanting TEE to service unifies specially treated, rises to the height the same with Bootloader, cuts in request
Changing and carrying out the certification to APP for the safety chip that time, verification process is identical with Bootloader.Meaning is
Verify this APP initiating itself through Certificate Authority.
Safety element is for chip attack technology through specialized designs, and such as described in this programme, safety chip adds
Enter active defense layer, when detecting that the external world takes intrusive mood to attack, the data of storage inside can have been destroyed；
Carry out instruction power-consumption balance process in design, effectively prevented extraneous by side-channel attacks hands such as power consumption analysis
Section cracks chip.It and application processor is different due to application direction, is to make these protection Designs above-mentioned
's.That is application processor will not carry out the process of power-consumption balance in TEE pattern, it is impossible to avoid by
Physical arrangement within the acquisition such as physical probe.
Safety chip is individual secure chip, and safety chip is used exclusively for carrying out the core that safety stores and calculates
Piece, can effectively protect the attack that violences such as disassembling chip is read；Pass through the built-in peace of safety chip simultaneously
The credible metric datas such as full strategy, confidence level quantity algorithm, root key, verification public key are for access TEE environment
The identity of CA verify, initiate switching by the verification public key checking of the built-in equipment vendors of safety chip
Whether the program of request has the private key signature of equipment vendors, can be prevented effectively from malice CA in the same way
Access TA, substantially increase the security of mobile terminal system.
It is to have in the mobile terminal of TrustZone framework that this safety chip is applied to application processor, answers use
The mode of operation of reason device includes normal mode and safe mode, and safety chip is individual secure chip, safe core
Piece connects application processor；When application processor switches from normal mode to safe mode, safety chip leads to
Cross its judging unit and judge whether application program has correct private key signature, so that it is determined that initiate handover request
Program whether credible；When credible, application processor switches from normal mode to safe mode, when can not
During letter, application processor does not perform normal mode and switches to safe mode, can be prevented effectively from malicious application journey
Sequence accesses the trusted application in credible execution environment.
In the present embodiment, normal mode is referred to as rich INSTRUCTIONS ENVIRONMENT, and safe mode is referred to as credible execution environment, can
Letter performs environment can only perform credit instruction；When the client application requests under rich INSTRUCTIONS ENVIRONMENT accesses credible holding
During trusted application under row environment, safety chip is verified by built-in safe authentication procedure and verification public key and is sent out
Whether the client application playing request carries correct private key signature；If carrying correct private key signature, then
By checking, application processor switches to safe mode from normal mode, and client application starts to access credible
Application；If not carrying private key signature or the private key signature carried being incorrect, then verify and do not pass through, answer use
Reason device refusal switches to safe mode from normal mode, and client application can not access trusted application.
In the present embodiment, the verification public key of safety chip built-in device manufacturer and proving program, safety chip leads to
Whether the program of the verification public key checking initiation handover request crossing built-in equipment vendors has the private of equipment vendors
Key is signed, if private key signature is correctly, judges that the program initiating handover request is believable, if private key label
Name is wrong or does not has private key signature then to judge that the program initiating handover request is incredible.Safety chip is going out
The proving program of the application program that just will need during factory, Bootloader, Rom program etc. and its corresponding factory
The verification public key of business is inserted wherein, and follow-up no longer permission is changed, or is just allowed modification by special certification,
Substantially increase the security of verification public key and proving program.
Embodiment two
A kind of safety chip, comprising: memory cell 1, is used for storing verification public key；Judging unit 2, is used for
Verify whether application program has correct private key signature according to verification public key.
In the present embodiment, memory cell 1 is stored with the verification public key of more than 2, and each application program has
One password numbering, each verification public key corresponding password numbering, application program is numbered according to password and is gone
Join corresponding verification public key.
In the present embodiment, also including performance element 3, verification public key includes the verification public key of ROM program；Sentence
Disconnected unit 2 passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking ROM program；When ROM program
When credibility is by checking, performance element 3 drives ROM program to pass through built-in public key algorithm and verification public key,
The credibility of checking application program.
Public key algorithm include RSA Algorithm (RSA public key encryption algorithm be 1977 by Peter Lonard Lee Vista
(Ron Rivest), A Di Shamir (Adi Shamir) and Leonard A Deman (Leonard Adleman)
Propose together.), (ECC (Elliptic Curves Cryptography) AES is ECC territory public key algorithm
A kind of public key encryption algorithm, compared with the RSA Algorithm of main flow, ECC algorithm can use shorter key to reach
To identical safe coefficient.) etc..
Present invention also offers a kind of mobile terminal.
A kind of mobile terminal, including safety chip.
Safety chip includes: memory cell 1, is used for storing verification public key；Judging unit 2, tests for basis
Whether card public key verifications application program has correct private key signature.
In the present embodiment, memory cell 1 is stored with the verification public key of more than 2, and each verification public key is corresponding
One key ID, application program mates corresponding verification public key according to key ID.
In the present embodiment, safety chip also includes performance element 3, and verification public key includes the checking of ROM program
PKI；Judging unit 2 passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking ROM program；Work as ROM
When the credibility of program is by checking, performance element 3 drives ROM program by built-in public key algorithm and to test
Card PKI, the credibility of checking application program.
In the present embodiment, also including application processor, application processor is connected with safety chip.This safe core
It is to have in the mobile terminal of TrustZone framework that piece is applied to application processor, the Working mould of application processor
Formula includes normal mode and safe mode, and safety chip is individual secure chip, and safety chip connects answers use
Reason device；When application processor switches from normal mode to safe mode, safety chip passes through its judging unit
Judge whether application program has correct private key signature, so that it is determined that the program initiating handover request whether may be used
Letter；When credible, application processor switches from normal mode to safe mode, when insincere, answers use
Reason device does not perform normal mode and switches to safe mode, can be prevented effectively from malicious application and access credible holding
Trusted application in row environment.
Present invention also offers a kind of method realizing mobile terminal system safety
A kind of method realizing mobile terminal system safety, comprising:
When program under step 101. normal mode needs the service providing under safe mode, program or answer use
Handover request initiated by reason device, and handover request is that the application processor of mobile terminal is from normal mode to safe mode
Switching.
Whether step 102. safety chip has correct private key by signature algorithm and verification public key proving program
Signature, and the result is notified application processor；When private key signature is correct, step step 103；Send out
Rise handover request program do not possess private key signature or private key signature incorrect when, step 104.
Step 103. application processor switches to safe mode from normal mode.
Program is all being run under normal mode and safe mode, and after switching to safe mode, program can be in peace
Running under syntype, being disposed can return result to normal mode and (switched back into normally by safe mode here
Pattern) under program.
If such as Alipay uses mode above, as accessed the safety chip service of asking for an autograph, that is signed
This section of program of name service is carried out in the secure mode, returns result to the program under normal mode, so
After be dealt into the remote server-third-party platform of Alipay in the normal mode and carry out sign test process.
Step 104. application processor refusal performs handover request.
In the present embodiment, when initiating the program of handover request and remote third party platform interacts, step
Also include after 103: safety chip provides signature by built-in signature algorithm and chip private key for program.Peace
Full built-in chip type signature algorithm and chip private key；After application processor switches from normal mode to safe mode,
Initiate program and the remote third party platform of handover request carry out sensitive mutual when, safety chip is by built-in
Signature algorithm and chip private key provide data signature service for program.Safety chip built-in one and safety chip
Root key one to one.This key is mainly used in encryption and decryption operation, self signature, certification self to external world
Legitimacy.Sensitivity includes relating to financial sector, private data transmission etc. alternately.
In the present embodiment, before step 101, also include:
The trust authentication of step 100.ROM program: Bootloader passes through public key algorithm and verification public key,
The credibility of checking ROM program.
In the present embodiment, before step 100, also include:
The integrity verification of step 000.Bootloader: safety chip passes through public key algorithm and verification public key,
The integrality of checking Bootloader.
In the present embodiment, also include after step 103: safety chip by signature algorithm and chip private key is
Program provides chip signature.Also included safety chip by corresponding for private key PKI and chip before step 000
Numbering is sent to third-party platform.After safety chip provides chip signature for program, also include: third party puts down
Whether platform signs correct according to PKI and chip number proofing chip.
The Digital signature service that safety chip provides is a kind of service, and program can be signed when this service of needs
Name request.Including registration and use two steps of signature.
The application scenarios of Digital signature service includes paying scene.For example, include under paying scene: user registers,
Corresponding for chip private key PKI and chip number are sent to user needs to use the third-party platform of Digital signature service
(third-party platform is the remote server that Alipay, wealth pay logical or wechat payment etc.)), use after agreement
This PKI carries out sign test.When user has payment demand, payment data is sent in safety chip, please draw lots before idols
Name service, safety chip uses signature algorithm and private key to sign payment data.Payment data and signature
Data are sent to third-party platform.Third-party platform is taken after signed data according to chip number (uniquely)
Whether find corresponding PKI, it is legal to be signed by corresponding signature algorithm and public key verifications.
Here more complicated scheme can also be used: signature does not use the root key of safety chip, but often notes
A kind of Digital signature service (such as Alipay, wealth are paid logical) of volume, it is desirable to safety chip generates pair of secret keys to (PKI
And private key) and cipher key number, and PKI therein and cipher key number are sent to third-party platform；Safe core
Piece leaves corresponding private key and cipher key number；There is provided Digital signature service by described private key and cipher key number, pass through
The corresponding PKI being sent to third-party platform carries out signature authentication.
Optionally, it is also possible to be the verification method using PKI and root key.One be
For the PKI of checking when Bootloader loads, inserted when producing by equipment vendors, only through instrument factory
The Bootloader of the corresponding private key signature that business provides could pass through certification, and verification process and storage are all in peace
Full chip internal completes, it is therefore prevented that the person of being hacked distorts.Another kind is root key, and root key refers to safe core
The private key being used for encryption and signature with safety chip one to one of storage in piece.In encryption and decryption scene:
Application processor will treat that under TEE pattern encryption and decryption data is transferred to safety chip, and safety chip is with preset
Enciphering and deciphering algorithm and root key carry out respective handling, and return result to application processor；This process is complete
Safety chip is carried out.
When being applied to pay scene: certain wallet APP is through examination & verification (can provide manufacturer's private key signature) quilt
Approval uses the security function in this programme, and this APP becomes legal CA, can access TEE；Entering
When row pays this sensitive operation, TEE pattern accesses the self-authentication function that safety chip provides,
Such as payment data needs the privately owned root key in safety chip to sign, and pays third-party platform and just can recognize
It is legal for this payment data.The signature process of safety chip will not come out, and only provides result,
Further increase security of system.
Describe the know-why of the present invention above in association with specific embodiment.These describe and are intended merely to explain this
The principle of invention, and limiting the scope of the invention can not be construed to by any way.Based on herein
Explaining, those skilled in the art does not needs to pay other tools that performing creative labour can associate the present invention
Body embodiment, these modes fall within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. a safety chip, it is characterised in that include:
Memory cell (1), is used for storing verification public key；
According to described verification public key, judging unit (2), for verifying whether application program has correct private key signature.
2. safety chip as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, described memory cell (1) is stored with the verification public key of more than 2, each application program has a password numbering, each described verification public key corresponding described password numbering, described application program is numbered according to described password and is gone to mate corresponding verification public key.
3. safety chip as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that described verification public key includes: the verification public key of the verification public key of application program, the verification public key of Bootloader and ROM program.
4. safety chip as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that described safety chip also includes performance element (3)；
Described verification public key includes the verification public key of Bootloader；Described judging unit (2) passes through public key algorithm and described verification public key, the integrality of checking Bootloader；When the integrality of described Bootloader is by checking, described performance element (3) drives described Bootloader to pass through public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking ROM program；When the credibility of described ROM program is by checking, described performance element (3) drives described ROM program to pass through built-in public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking application program；Or, described verification public key includes the verification public key of ROM program；Described judging unit (2) passes through public key algorithm and described verification public key, the credibility of checking ROM program；When the credibility of described ROM program is by checking, described performance element (3) drives described ROM program to pass through built-in public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking application program.
5. a mobile terminal, it is characterised in that include the safety chip described in any one of claim 1 ~ 4.
6. the method realizing mobile terminal system safety, it is characterised in that the method comprises the steps:
When program under step A. normal mode needs the service providing under safe mode, described program or application processor initiate handover request, and described handover request is that the application processor of mobile terminal switches from normal mode to safe mode；
By signature algorithm and verification public key, step B. safety chip verifies whether described program has correct private key signature, and described the result is notified described application processor；When described private key signature is correct, step C；Otherwise, described D is performed；
Described in step C., application processor switches to safe mode from normal mode；
Described in step D., application processor refusal performs described handover request.
7. realize the method for mobile terminal system safety as claimed in claim 6, it is characterised in that before described step A, also include:
The trust authentication of step E. ROM program, Bootloader passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, the credibility of checking ROM program.
8. realize the method for mobile terminal system safety as claimed in claim 7, it is characterised in that before described step E, also include:
Step F.
The integrity verification of Bootloader: safety chip passes through public key algorithm and verification public key, the integrality of checking Bootloader.
9. realize the method for mobile terminal system safety as claimed in claim 6, it is characterised in that also include after described step C:
Safety chip described in step G. passes through signature algorithm and chip private key provides chip signature for described program.
10. realize the method for mobile terminal system safety as claimed in claim 9, it is characterised in that also include before described step A:
Corresponding for private key PKI and chip number are sent to third-party platform by safety chip described in step H.；
Also include after described step G:
According to described PKI and chip number, third-party platform described in step I. verifies whether described chip signature is correct.
Priority Applications (1)
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