CN106131824A - Cordless communication network allied signal feedback and man made noise's safety of physical layer communication means - Google Patents
Cordless communication network allied signal feedback and man made noise's safety of physical layer communication means Download PDFInfo
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- CN106131824A CN106131824A CN201610394936.6A CN201610394936A CN106131824A CN 106131824 A CN106131824 A CN 106131824A CN 201610394936 A CN201610394936 A CN 201610394936A CN 106131824 A CN106131824 A CN 106131824A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K1/00—Secret communication
- H04K1/02—Secret communication by adding a second signal to make the desired signal unintelligible
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L25/00—Baseband systems
- H04L25/02—Details ; arrangements for supplying electrical power along data transmission lines
- H04L25/03—Shaping networks in transmitter or receiver, e.g. adaptive shaping networks
- H04L25/03993—Noise whitening
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of cordless communication network allied signal feedback and man made noise's safety of physical layer communication means, including: the first stage, the information of need for confidentiality is issued legitimate receipt end by transmitting terminal.Second stage, after legitimate receipt end receives information, mixes a certain amount of man made noise in the information received, and mixed signal is fed back to transmitting terminal.Phase III, the signal fed back is sent to receiving terminal by transmitting terminal, legitimate receipt end is due to the man made noise of known second stage, so man made noise can be eliminated by it, and eavesdrop end and can not be eliminated, thus performance can be cut down by man made noise, thus realize the secure communication between transmitting terminal and receiving terminal.Not having antenna advantage on the most legal communication equipment, do not have outside aid, do not eavesdrop any channel information of end, just can ensure the secure communication between legitimate device, the present invention possesses superiority in terms of communication security.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to wireless communication field, relate to safe transmission scheme, be specifically related in cordless communication network combine letter
Number feedback with man made noise design safety of physical layer communication plan.
Background technology
Due to the broadcast characteristic of radio communication, the communication between equipment and equipment is easy to be eavesdropped end eavesdropping.Although, pass
The safety of physical layer scheme of system can promote the safety of communication to a certain extent effectively, but it still exists some and lacks
Point.Such as, one, the known transient channel information eavesdropping end of transmitting terminal or statistic channel information.But it is it practice, complete for one
For the most passive earwig's (i.e. earwig does not send any information, only receives information), validated user is difficult to obtain its channel
Information.Two, transmitting terminal or legitimate receipt end need ratio to eavesdrop end more antenna.In reality, on the one hand transmitting terminal or connect
Receiving end is likely to be due to the reason of size and cost can not configure multiple antenna, and on the other hand, the advantage on antenna amount is obvious
It is inequitable for eavesdropping end, because it can use more antenna.Three, transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end need outside
The help of cooperative node (such as, relaying).In reality, it is likely that there is not the aid of outside, perhaps this aid itself
Being exactly insecure, it may decode the information of validated user.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve problem potential in above-mentioned existing program, the present invention proposes a kind of new safety of physical layer scheme
Realize the communication security between equipment.
The present invention is realized by following technical proposals.
The cordless communication network allied signal feedback provided according to embodiments of the present invention is led to man made noise's safety of physical layer
Letter method, comprises the steps:
First stage, transmitting terminal uses channel inversion technique, mixes with variance be in information s of need for confidentiality's
Man made noise w1, send first stage signal xa1, it is ensured that send signal and meet first stage Power LimitationLegitimate receipt
Termination receives first stage informationAnd receive first stage Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio accordinglyEavesdrop termination receive include need
Information s to be maintained secrecy with mixing with variance isMan made noise w1InformationEavesdrop end and receive corresponding first rank
Section receives Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio
Second stage, legitimate receipt end is also adopted by channel inversion technique, to transmitting terminal feedback signal xb, this feedback signal
It is to terminate, based on legitimate receipt, the first stage information receivedInformation s of need for confidentiality, melange belt is included in feedback signal
The variance is had to beMan made noise w1, and mix and a certain amount of with variance beGauss man made noise w2, it is ensured that feedback
Signal meets second stage Power LimitationAnd mixed signal is fed back to transmitting terminal;Transmitting terminal receives second
Stage feedback signal ya, transmitting terminal can be with variance beingMan made noise w1Disappear;Eavesdrop end to receive in second stage
Signal ye2, eavesdrop end can not with man made noise w1Disappear;Eavesdrop termination to receive corresponding second stage to receive letter dry
Make an uproar and compare γe2;
Phase III, transmitting terminal still uses channel inversion technique, is sent in feedback signal and includes the letter of need for confidentiality
Cease s, with variance beGauss man made noise w2, and be contaminated with variance and beGauss man made noise w3Signal
Ensure that sending signal meets Power LimitationLegitimate receipt end receives second stage signalReceiving terminal can be w2Disappear
Fall;Legitimate receipt termination receives corresponding second stage and receives Signal to Interference plus Noise RatioEavesdrop the reception phase III signal of endEavesdropping end can not be w2Disappear, w2Sufficiently large infringement is caused to eavesdropping end;Eavesdrop termination corresponding phase III reception letter
Dry making an uproar compares γe3;
By introducing extra first stage variance it isGauss man made noise w1, second stage variance beHeight
This man made noise w2With phase III variance it isGauss man made noise w3, and ensure that second stage feedback signal meets simultaneously
Second stage Power LimitationAnd first stage and phase III send signal and meet first stage Power LimitationAnd to makeAnd then shouldPower Limitation should be all higher than the merit set
Rate threshold value p0So thatWithLess than Power Limitation Less than Power LimitationThus realize transmitting terminal and
Secure communication between receiving terminal.
Further, in the described first stage, channel coefficients is worked as | hAB|2More than interrupt threshold γ0Time, transmitting terminal uses channel
Inversion technique sends signal: xa1=(s+w1)/hAB。
Further, the Power Limitation of transmitting terminalS and w1Variance must be fulfilled for
Further, in the first stage, legitimate receipt termination receives first stage information:
Eavesdrop termination and receive the information of first stage:
Further, in second stage, meet condition at channel coefficients | hBA|2>γ0Time, to transmitting terminal feedback signal:
Further, in second stage, transmitting terminal is connected on the feedback signal that second stage receives and is
Transmitting terminal can be w1Disappearing, disappear w1After reception signal be
But, eavesdrop the signal y that end receives in second stagee2, eavesdrop end can not with man made noise w1Disappear;Steal
Listen the signal y that end receivese2For
Further, in the phase III, when channel coefficients meets | hAB|2>γ0Time, transmission signal:
In phase III, legitimate receipt end receives the signal of second stage and is
Receiving terminal receives signal and becomes
Now, the reception phase III signal eavesdropping end is
Further, the legitimate receipt end in first and third stage receives Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio accordingly and is
The white Gaussian noise of end is eavesdropped in first, second and third stageTime, eavesdropping end received signal to noise ratio is
The present invention has a following useful technique effect:
By introducing extra first stage Gauss man made noise w1, second stage Gauss man made noise w2And the phase III
Gauss man made noise w3, and ensure that second stage feedback signal meets Power Limitation and first stage and phase III simultaneously
Send signal and meet Power Limitation, and the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio that receives of legitimate receipt end to be made is more than the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio eavesdropping end, i.e.And then first, second and third stage power limit should be all higher than set power threshold p0So that the
One, two, triphasic man made noise's variance is respectively less than Power Limitation, thus realizes the safety between transmitting terminal and receiving terminal and lead to
Letter.
In the solution of the present invention, legal communication equipment does not has the advantage on antenna, and (the most all of user is the most single
Antenna), there is no outside aid, any channel information not eavesdropping end (includes eavesdropping the additive white Gaussian noise water of end
Flat), but still can realize secure communication, the present invention possesses superiority in terms of communication security.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the system model figure of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is that safe capacity is with the variation diagram of general power ratio shared by noise power;
Fig. 3 is the safe capacity variation diagram with transmit power;
Fig. 4 is the safe capacity variation diagram with interrupt threshold.
Detailed description of the invention
The invention will be described in further detail with embodiment below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, but is not intended as doing invention any limit
The foundation of system.
Cordless communication network allied signal of the present invention feedback and man made noise's safety of physical layer communication means, first provide this
The system model of invention, shown in illustraton of model as accompanying drawing 1:
There is three nodes, a transmitting terminal in system, a legitimate receipt end and one eavesdrop end.All of equipment is all
Only single antenna.Eavesdrop end and be able to receive that transmitting terminal issues the signal of legitimate receipt end, also can receive legitimate receipt end
Feed back to the signal of transmitting terminal.From transmitting terminal to legitimate receipt end, from legitimate receipt end to transmitting terminal, from transmitting terminal to eavesdropping
End, is respectively h from legitimate receipt end to the channel eavesdropping endAB, hBA, hAEAnd hBE.Wherein, hABAnd hBAIt it is 0 average unit variance
The multiple Gaussian channel of Cyclic Symmetry, and experience quasistatic decline, i.e. within a period of time, channel keeps constant.Transmitting terminal and conjunction
The through-put power of method receiving terminal is respectively less than PaAnd Pb.All additive white Gaussian noises of transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end are all returned
One turns to 0 average and unit variance.Transmitting terminal, legitimate receipt end and eavesdrop end and both know about hABAnd hBAAccurate information.Eavesdrop
End knows oneself channel (i.e. hAEAnd hBE) accurate information.But, transmitting terminal, legitimate receipt end all do not know hAE、hBEAnd steal
Listen the additive white Gaussian noise of endAny information.
Cordless communication network allied signal feedback is as follows with the safety of physical layer communication means step of man made noise:
First stage: transmitting terminal uses channel inversion technique, works as channel coefficients | hAB|2More than interrupt threshold γ0(i.e. | hAB
|2>γ0) time, mix in information s of need for confidentiality and with variance beMan made noise w1, send first stage signal xa1,
Transmission signal is xa1=(s+w1)/hAB。
Wherein, s is the information of need for confidentiality, w1Being the Gauss man made noise mixed the first stage, its average is 0, side
Difference ishABIt is the transmitting terminal channel to receiving terminal, the present invention is normalized to obey the circulation of 0 average unit variance
Symmetric complex channel.Power Limitation due to transmitting terminalS and w1Variance must be fulfilled for
Wherein,For the variance of the information of need for confidentiality, PaThe transmit power instantaneous for transmitting terminal limits,And it appeared that the average power limit of this entiretyIt is and interrupt threshold γ0There are close ties
's.Additionally,
For asking for 1/ | hAB|2Meansigma methods, wherein, p (x) is channel coefficients | hAB|2's
Probability density function, and obey the exponential that parameter is 1, i.e.
P (x)=e-x。
Legitimate receipt termination receives the information of first stage and is
Wherein,Being the legitimate receipt end additive white Gaussian noise in the first stage, average is 0, and variance isMeanwhile,
Legitimate receipt end receives Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio accordingly
Eavesdropping the first stage information that receives of termination is
Wherein, hAEIt is transmitting terminal to eavesdropping the channel of end, ne1It is to eavesdrop to hold the additive white Gaussian noise in the first stage,
Average is 0, and variance is
Meanwhile, termination corresponding reception Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio γ is eavesdroppede1。
Second stage: legitimate receipt end is also adopted by channel inversion technique, and meets condition at channel coefficients | hBA|2>γ0
Time, feedback signalThis feedback signal is the connecing of first stage received based on legitimate receipt termination
The collection of letters numberIncluding need for confidentiality information s, mix and with variance beMan made noise w1, and mix a certain amount of side
Difference isGauss man made noise w2, w2Be its average of Gauss man made noise being mingled in feedback signal be 0.α be in order to
Ensure that feedback signal meets Power LimitationThen there is following formula,
Wherein, PbThe transmit power instantaneous for transmitting terminal limits,Limit for sending signal power,Additionally,
For asking for 1/ | hBA|2Meansigma methods, wherein q (x) is channel coefficients | hBA|2's
Probability density function.Q (x) is channel coefficients | hBA|2Probability density function, and obey the exponential that parameter is 1, i.e. q
(x)=e-x.Thus it is possible to obtain the expression formula of α,
Therefore, transmitting terminal is connected on the feedback signal that second stage receives and is
Wherein, naBeing the additive white Gaussian noise of transmitting terminal, average is 0, and variance isBecause w1It is that transmitting terminal oneself exists
The man made noise that first stage sends, it is to know w1Exact value.Meanwhile, the value of α is disclosed, i.e. system all devices
(including eavesdropping end) both knows about the occurrence of α.So in second stage, transmitting terminal can be w1Disappear.Then, disappear w1After
Reception signal is
Eavesdrop and hold the signal received in second stage to be
Wherein,Being to eavesdrop to hold the additive white Gaussian noise in second stage, average is 0, and variance isNotice w1It is
Eavesdrop end the unknown.Can not be w so eavesdropping end1Disappear, thus its reception signal can be by w1Infringement.Meanwhile, termination is eavesdropped
Corresponding reception Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio γe2。
Consider that channel is quasi-static, i.e. phase III and first stage hABKeep constant.Then, transmitting terminal is on the 3rd rank
Duan Yiran uses channel inversion technique, when channel coefficients meets | hAB|2>γ0Time, send signal
w3Being the Gauss man made noise being mingled in feedback signal, its average is 0, and variance is For the w that disappears1After reception letter
Number, β is to ensure that transmission signal meets Power LimitationIt must is fulfilled for
Therefore, β can be expressed as
Then, the second stage signal that phase III legitimate receipt end receives is
Wherein,Being the legitimate receipt end additive white Gaussian noise in the phase III, average is 0, and variance isDue to w2
Being that receiving terminal feeds back to the signal of transmitting terminal in second stage, it is that receiving end is known.Meanwhile, it is open due to β again
, i.e. all devices (including eavesdropping end) both knows about its exact value.So in the phase III, receiving terminal can be w2Disappear, its
Reception signal becomes
Meanwhile, legitimate receipt end receives Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio accordingly
Now, the reception signal eavesdropping end is
Wherein,Being to eavesdrop to hold the additive white Gaussian noise in the phase III, average is 0, and variance ishAE,2It is to eavesdrop
Hold the channel in the phase III, due to, transmitting terminal is not aware that the channel information eavesdropping end, so h hereAE,2With the first rank
The h of sectionAEThe most identical.W is not known owing to eavesdropping end2Value, this stage it can not be w2Disappear, thus can be by w2
Infringement.Meanwhile, termination corresponding reception Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio γ is eavesdroppede3。
The man made noise w feedbacked in second stage just because of legitimate receipt end2Can by it certainly in the phase III
Oneself disappears, but but can not be eavesdropped end and disappear so that the present invention can design suitable w2Cause sufficiently large to eavesdropping end
Infringement, thus realize secure communication.Concrete w2Design is by meeting following formulaEmbody
's.
Legitimate receipt end can be obtained according to formula (3) and (14) and receive Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio accordingly be
Similarly, can obtain eavesdropping the received signal to noise ratio of end according to formula (4), (10) and (15) is
The channel information of end is eavesdropped, including the white Gaussian noise eavesdropping end owing to transmitting terminal is not aware thatBeing how many is also
Ignorant.So, the present invention considers a kind of for validated user during worst, i.e.Then, eavesdrop
The reception Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio of end can be expressed as
Assume legitimate receipt end and all use maximum-ratio combing receiver with eavesdropping to hold, then legitimate receipt end and the appearance eavesdropping end
Amount is respectively
And
Wherein, Pno_outReferring to the probability not occurring to interrupt when using channel inversion technique in three phases, it is concrete
Can be expressed asHere only have not interrupting generally of the first two-stage
Rate is multiplied, and to be because the channel of phase III and first stage be the same, as long as the first stage can transmit signal, then the 3rd rank
Duan Yiding can transmit.
Thus it is possible to obtain at some fixing interrupt threshold γ0Under, the safe capacity of system is
By traveling through all possible γ0,The safe capacity that can obtain maximum is
So that information can safe transmission, then must assure that safe capacity is more than 0.Observe formula (21) to understand,
Make safe capacity be more than 0, must then be fulfilled for
Without loss of generality, normalization legitimate receipt end and the additive white Gaussian noise of transmitting terminal, i.e.Cause
This, above-mentioned condition can be expressed as
As long as this inequality is set up, then system just can realize safe transmission.Meanwhile, this formula gives this
Bright middle w2Specific design thinking.
In order to proof scheme is realizing the superiority of secure context theoretically, the present invention has carried out following analysis.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end have identical Power Limitation, i.e. Pa=PbAndDue at given γ0In the case of,WithIt is constant, so with a unified symbol p
Represent, i.e.Simultaneously, it is assumed that the variance of the man made noise that first stage and second stage send is
Identical, i.e.The man made noise w of phase III3It is intended merely to introduce uncertainty, it is possible to considerTherefore, the left side of above-mentioned inequality and the right can be expressed as
Wherein, x < p.Thus, safe capacity can be expressed as
Can draw from this expression formula, as long as f (x) > h (x), safe rate just can be more than 0.F (x) > h (x) means
The man made noise sent and be enough to protect the information of need for confidentiality.The situation of the limit is, almost all of available horsepower is used for
Serve as man made noise, and these man made noises just can protect the secret signal slightly larger than 0, i.e. as x → p,Time, Cs→0+.Wherein Cs→0+Can be converted toI.e.This formula can be write as further
Wherein, f (p)=h (p)=0.According to the definition of derivative, above-mentioned formula can be write as f ' (p)=h ' (p), here f '
P () and h ' (p) represent f (x) and the h (x) derivative at x=p respectively.Solve equation f ' (p)=h ' (p), it can be deduced that p=p0=
5.913.If it means that power p > p0=5.913, exist for man made noiseMake transmitting terminal and reception
End can be with secure communication.
This result indicates the advantage of the present invention, even if it means that eavesdropping end is in more favourable than legitimate receipt end
Position (such as eavesdrop end clutch method end closer to), there is no antenna advantage, there is no outside aid, as long as there being enough transmission merits
Rate, still can realize safety.And in traditional safety approach, not by antenna advantage or outside aid, as long as stealing
Listen end channel quality better than legitimate receipt end, then even power is infinitely great, safe transmission can not be realized.
In order to from emulation upper checking present invention effect in terms of secure communication, accompanying drawing 2,3,4 give concrete emulation
Result.
Accompanying drawing 2 gives safe capacity with the change of general power ratio shared by noise power.It can be seen that select suitably
Noise power is so that safe capacity is more than 0, and the ratio that safe capacity can be made to account for general power along with noise power becomes
Changing, when ratio is about 0.6, safe capacity reaches maximum.
Accompanying drawing 3 gives safe capacity change with transmit power under different artifact power.Obviously, merit is sent
Rate is the biggest, and safe capacity is the biggest, and is almost linear increase when high s/n ratio.
Accompanying drawing 4 gives the curve that safe capacity changes with interrupt threshold.It will be seen that along with the increase of interrupt threshold,
Safe capacity first increases and then decreases.Select suitable thresholding, so that safe capacity reaches maximum.
To sum up, the shortcoming that instant invention overcomes traditional scheme, do not eavesdrop end channel information, there is no antenna advantage, with
And in the case of there is no outside aid, still can realize secure communication.
The invention is not limited in above-described embodiment, on the basis of technical scheme disclosed by the invention, the skill of this area
Art personnel are according to disclosed technology contents, it is not necessary to some of which technical characteristic just can be made one by performing creative labour
A little replacements and deformation, these are replaced and deformation is the most within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (9)
1. a cordless communication network allied signal feedback and man made noise's safety of physical layer communication means, it is characterised in that bag
Include following step:
First stage, transmitting terminal uses channel inversion technique, mixes with variance be in information s of need for confidentialityArtificial
Noise w1, send first stage signal xa1, it is ensured that send signal and meet first stage Power LimitationLegitimate receipt terminates
Receive first stage informationAnd receive first stage Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio accordinglyEavesdrop termination to receive and include needing protecting
Close information s with mixing with variance isMan made noise w1First stage informationEavesdrop end and receive corresponding the
One stage received Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio
Second stage, legitimate receipt end is also adopted by channel inversion technique, to transmitting terminal feedback signal xb, this feedback signal is base
The first stage information received is terminated in legitimate receiptInclude information s of need for confidentiality in feedback signal, mix with side
Difference isMan made noise w1, and mix and a certain amount of with variance beGauss man made noise w2, it is ensured that feedback signal
Meet second stage Power LimitationAnd mixed signal is fed back to transmitting terminal;Transmitting terminal receives in second stage
Feedback signal ya, transmitting terminal can be with variance beingMan made noise w1Disappear;Eavesdrop end to receive at second stage signal
ye2, eavesdrop end can not with man made noise w1Disappear;Eavesdrop termination and receive corresponding second stage reception Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio
γe2;
Phase III, transmitting terminal still uses channel inversion technique, be sent in feedback signal include need for confidentiality information s,
With variance it isGauss man made noise w2, and be contaminated with variance and beGauss man made noise w3SignalEnsure
Send signal and meet Power LimitationLegitimate receipt end receives second stage signalReceiving terminal can be w2Disappear;Close
Method receiving terminal receives corresponding second stage and receives Signal to Interference plus Noise RatioEavesdrop end and receive phase III signalEavesdrop end
Can not be w2Disappear, w2Sufficiently large infringement is caused to eavesdropping end;Eavesdrop termination corresponding phase III reception Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio
γe3;
By introducing extra first stage variance it isGauss man made noise w1, second stage variance beHigh this person
Work noise w2With phase III variance it isGauss man made noise w3, and ensure that second stage feedback signal meets second-order simultaneously
Section Power LimitationAnd first stage and phase III send signal and meet first stage Power LimitationAnd want
MakeAnd then shouldPower Limitation should be all higher than the power threshold p set0, make
?WithLess than Power LimitationLess than Power LimitationThus realize between transmitting terminal and receiving terminal
Secure communication.
Method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that in the described first stage, work as channel coefficients | hAB|2More than cutting
Disconnected thresholding γ0Time, transmitting terminal use channel inversion technique transmission signal:
xa1=(s+w1)/hAB
Wherein, s is the information of need for confidentiality, w1Being the Gauss man made noise mixed the first stage, its average is 0, and variance ishABIt it is the transmitting terminal channel to receiving terminal.
Method the most according to claim 2, it is characterised in that the Power Limitation of transmitting terminalS and w1Side
Difference must is fulfilled for
Wherein,For the variance of the information of need for confidentiality, PaThe transmit power instantaneous for transmitting terminal limits,For asking for 1/ | hAB|2Meansigma methods, wherein p (x) is channel coefficients | hAB|2Probability density
Function.
Method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that in the described first stage, legitimate receipt termination receives first
Session information:
Wherein, hABFor the channel of transmitting terminal to receiving terminal,For legitimate receipt end at the additive white Gaussian noise of first stage, all
Value is 0, and variance is
Eavesdrop termination and receive first stage information:
Wherein, hAEIt is transmitting terminal to eavesdropping the channel of end, ne1Being to eavesdrop to hold the additive white Gaussian noise in the first stage, average is
0, variance is
Method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that in described second stage, meet condition at channel coefficients | hBA
|2> γ0Time, to transmitting terminal feedback signal:
α is to ensure that feedback signal meets Power LimitationCoefficient,It is expressed as:
Wherein,For the variance of the information of need for confidentiality, PbThe transmit power instantaneous for transmitting terminal limits,For sending letter
Number Power Limitation,For asking for 1/ | hBA|2Meansigma methods, wherein q (x) is channel coefficients | hBA|2
Probability density function.
Method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that in described second stage, transmitting terminal is connected on second stage and receives
To feedback signal be
Wherein, naBeing the additive white Gaussian noise of transmitting terminal, average is 0, and variance isα is the coefficient meeting Power Limitation, table
It is shown as:
Wherein,For the variance of the information of need for confidentiality,For the variance yields of the additive white Gaussian noise of receiving terminal,For asking for 1/ | hAB|2Meansigma methods, wherein p (x) is channel coefficients | hAB|2Probability density
Function;
Transmitting terminal can be w1Disappearing, disappear w1After reception signal be
But, eavesdrop the signal y that end receives in second stagee2, eavesdrop end can not with man made noise w1Disappear;Eavesdrop end
Receive second stage signal ye2For
Wherein,Being to eavesdrop to hold the additive white Gaussian noise in second stage, average is 0, and variance ishBEIt is that receiving terminal arrives steathily
Listen the channel of end,For legitimate receipt end at the additive white Gaussian noise of first stage, average is 0, and variance is
Method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that in the described phase III, when channel coefficients meets | hAB|2>
γ0Time, transmission signal:
Wherein,For the w that disappears1After reception signal, β be to ensure that transmission signal meet Power LimitationCoefficient,It is expressed as:
Wherein,For the variance of the information of need for confidentiality,For asking for 1/ | hAB|2Meansigma methods,
Wherein p (x) is channel coefficients | hAB|2Probability density function.
Method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that in the described phase III, legitimate receipt end receive second
Stage signal is
Wherein,Being the legitimate receipt end additive white Gaussian noise in the phase III, average is 0, and variance isReceiving terminal receives
Signal becomes
Now, the reception phase III signal eavesdropping end is
Wherein,Being to eavesdrop to hold the additive white Gaussian noise in the phase III, average is 0, and variance ishAE,2It is to eavesdrop end to exist
The channel of phase III.
Method the most according to claim 1, it is characterised in that the legitimate receipt end in first and third stage receives accordingly
Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio is:
The white Gaussian noise of end is eavesdropped in first, second and third stageTime, eavesdropping end reception Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio is
Wherein,For the variance of the information of need for confidentiality,For the variance of the additive white Gaussian noise of transmitting terminal,Connect for legal
Receiving end is in the variance of the additive white Gaussian noise of first stage, and α is for ensureing that feedback signal meets Power Limitation
Coefficient, β is for ensureing that sending signal meets Power LimitationCoefficient.
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CN106535177A (en) * | 2016-11-22 | 2017-03-22 | 浙江工业大学 | Autoregressive artificial noise-based covert communication method |
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