CN105354485B - A kind of portable set data processing method - Google Patents
A kind of portable set data processing method Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN105354485B CN105354485B CN201510658131.3A CN201510658131A CN105354485B CN 105354485 B CN105354485 B CN 105354485B CN 201510658131 A CN201510658131 A CN 201510658131A CN 105354485 B CN105354485 B CN 105354485B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- authority
- api
- function
- detection
- files
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/51—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2141—Access rights, e.g. capability lists, access control lists, access tables, access matrices
Abstract
Description
Claims (2)
- A kind of 1. portable set data processing method, it is characterised in that including:Application program installation package file is decompressed, obtains byte code files and Manifest files;By traveling through API Calls all in byte code files extraction procedure, the corresponding authority needed for API is analyzed;The authority asked Manifest files is modified, and deletion has requested that but untapped authority;The amended Manifest files of authority will be passed through and reintegrate into installation package file with byte code files;It is described by traveling through API Calls all in byte code files extraction procedure, further comprise:The authority arrived used in these three situations is extracted to function call extraction, Intent extractions and Content Provider Extracted respectively, to be produced in the byte code files and API authority contingency table generating process that are obtained in installation kit decomposable process API authorities contingency table as input, using the least privilege list that application program actually use be used as export;Api function calls extraction to include all function calls in extraction procedure, and searches and called in API authority contingency tables Authority corresponding to function, the authority found is added in the list of access right of output;Api function calls extraction to include traveling through each instruction in each method of each class, and checks that present instruction is Activation instruction, if it is, obtain the function lambda called of activation instruction, the function lambda include the title of function, parameter and Affiliated class;Judge whether to have in API authority contingency tables associating for function lambda and its authority, if so, then by λ in authority contingency table Corresponding all permissions are added in the list of the access right L of output, can only be added once for same authority;If the authority for not having function lambda in authority contingency table associates, check whether function lambda is possible to be inherited from authority contingency table In some API, extract affiliated the class α and function name β of function lambda, backtracking class α inheritance chain respectively, and check authority Whether contain (α in contingency table:Authority association β), if associated without authority, continue to recall α, if having permission association, Then the permissions list checked in authority contingency table is added in L;Intent extractions include Action parameters when extraction procedure sends Intent requests, and are looked into API authority contingency tables The authority corresponding to these Action parameters is looked for, is added in access right list;Content Provider extract the schema for including the URL request that extraction procedure is sent, and in API authority contingency tables The authority corresponding to these schema is searched, is added in access right list, that is, searches in byte code files whether have phase The character string answered.
- 2. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterised in that the corresponding authority needed for the analysis API, further wrap Include:Manifest is extracted from installation kit to be measured, the apllied authority of application program is analyzed, then according to apllied authority The detection option of sensitive permission detection is determined, detection option includes the private data type of required detection and the side of required detection Boundary, sensitive permission detection is carried out for corresponding private data type and border according to detection option;Detection option is stored using system property, in system initialization, distributes one piece of shared section key to store attribute, init Finger daemon startup attribute service, the global variable that the information that system property is used between record system setting or process exchanges, Each attribute has a title and a respective value, and title and value are character string, and client is changed by attribute service, created Build, obtain system property in shared drive;After start completion, system property is directly set;Read the value of Tag and Bound two systems attributes, that is, the detection set Option, before sensitive permission is added, according to the detection option Tag values read, it is determined that required addition sensitive permission is privately owned Data type, corresponding code is performed, at border detection, according to the detection option Bound values read, it is determined that required monitoring Outlet, perform corresponding code, compiling source code generation system image, the image file compiled out loaded in simulator, Then installed in simulation system and run application program to be measured, the private data leakage behavior of application program is recorded automatically In system journal, system journal is finally obtained, daily record is analyzed and generates examining report.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201510658131.3A CN105354485B (en) | 2015-10-13 | 2015-10-13 | A kind of portable set data processing method |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201510658131.3A CN105354485B (en) | 2015-10-13 | 2015-10-13 | A kind of portable set data processing method |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
CN105354485A CN105354485A (en) | 2016-02-24 |
CN105354485B true CN105354485B (en) | 2018-02-16 |
Family
ID=55330456
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
CN201510658131.3A Active CN105354485B (en) | 2015-10-13 | 2015-10-13 | A kind of portable set data processing method |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
CN (1) | CN105354485B (en) |
Families Citing this family (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN106096399A (en) * | 2016-06-01 | 2016-11-09 | 努比亚技术有限公司 | The detection device and method of application programming interface |
CN107315950B (en) * | 2017-05-03 | 2020-10-09 | 北京大学 | Automatic division method for minimizing authority of cloud computing platform administrator and access control method |
CN108763922A (en) * | 2018-06-19 | 2018-11-06 | 北京金山安全软件有限公司 | Authority detection method and device, electronic equipment and medium |
CN109597620B (en) * | 2018-08-08 | 2022-04-01 | 北京字节跳动网络技术有限公司 | Data processing method, device, equipment and storage medium |
CN111327683B (en) * | 2020-01-21 | 2022-12-16 | 奇安信科技集团股份有限公司 | Encrypted information extraction method and device, computer equipment and readable storage medium |
Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN102289633A (en) * | 2011-09-02 | 2011-12-21 | 广东欧珀移动通信有限公司 | Method for managing dynamic permission of application program under Android platform |
CN103761472A (en) * | 2014-02-21 | 2014-04-30 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | Application program accessing method and device based on intelligent terminal |
CN104408366A (en) * | 2014-11-26 | 2015-03-11 | 清华大学 | Android application permission usage behavior tracking method based on plug-in technology |
CN104462970A (en) * | 2014-12-17 | 2015-03-25 | 中国科学院软件研究所 | Android application program permission abuse detecting method based on process communication |
Family Cites Families (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP4643213B2 (en) * | 2004-09-29 | 2011-03-02 | シスメックス株式会社 | Application program usage restriction method, measuring device user authentication system, authentication server, client device, and application program |
-
2015
- 2015-10-13 CN CN201510658131.3A patent/CN105354485B/en active Active
Patent Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN102289633A (en) * | 2011-09-02 | 2011-12-21 | 广东欧珀移动通信有限公司 | Method for managing dynamic permission of application program under Android platform |
CN103761472A (en) * | 2014-02-21 | 2014-04-30 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | Application program accessing method and device based on intelligent terminal |
CN104408366A (en) * | 2014-11-26 | 2015-03-11 | 清华大学 | Android application permission usage behavior tracking method based on plug-in technology |
CN104462970A (en) * | 2014-12-17 | 2015-03-25 | 中国科学院软件研究所 | Android application program permission abuse detecting method based on process communication |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN105354485A (en) | 2016-02-24 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
CN105184152B (en) | A kind of mobile terminal data processing method | |
Zuo et al. | Why does your data leak? uncovering the data leakage in cloud from mobile apps | |
Backes et al. | Reliable third-party library detection in android and its security applications | |
US10437661B2 (en) | Methods, systems, devices, and products for error correction in computer programs | |
CN105354485B (en) | A kind of portable set data processing method | |
US20180246884A1 (en) | Enterprise-level data protection with variable data granularity and data disclosure control with hierarchical summarization, topical structuring, and traversal audit | |
US20190007443A1 (en) | Security policy analyzer service and satisfaibility engine | |
US8893288B2 (en) | Prevention of information leakage from a document based on dynamic database label based access control (LBAC) policies | |
Akhawe et al. | Privilege Separation in {HTML5} Applications | |
US9152796B2 (en) | Dynamic analysis interpreter modification for application dataflow | |
Acar et al. | No boundaries: data exfiltration by third parties embedded on web pages | |
Arnatovich et al. | A comparison of android reverse engineering tools via program behaviors validation based on intermediate languages transformation | |
US9607171B2 (en) | Preventing sharing of sensitive information through code repositories | |
CN111868727A (en) | Data anonymization | |
CN114124444A (en) | Security policy analyzer service and satisfiability engine | |
Kim et al. | Dwroiddump: Executable code extraction from android applications for malware analysis | |
TW202101263A (en) | Incremental decryption and integrity verification of a secure operating system image | |
CN110266792A (en) | Address conversion method, device, equipment and computer readable storage medium | |
Elsayed et al. | IFCaaS: information flow control as a service for cloud security | |
Shalev et al. | WatchIT: Who watches your IT guy? | |
Cho et al. | Vulnerabilities of android data sharing and malicious application to leaking private information | |
Stamatogiannakis et al. | Prov 2r: practical provenance analysis of unstructured processes | |
Roy Choudhary | Cross-platform testing and maintenance of web and mobile applications | |
Noorulla | Web browser private mode forensics analysis | |
Beksultanova et al. | Analysis tools for smart contract security |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
C06 | Publication | ||
PB01 | Publication | ||
C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
GR01 | Patent grant | ||
GR01 | Patent grant | ||
TR01 | Transfer of patent right |
Effective date of registration: 20190510 Address after: 610000 Room 2101, 21/F, G5 Building 1858, Middle Section of Yizhou Avenue, Chengdu High-tech Zone, Sichuan Province Patentee after: Sichuan Boiling Zhi Technology Co.,Ltd. Address before: 610000 No. 704, 7th Floor, No. 1800, Middle Section of Yizhou Avenue, Chengdu High-tech Zone, Sichuan Province Patentee before: SICHUAN XIECHUANG INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICE Co.,Ltd. |
|
TR01 | Transfer of patent right | ||
TR01 | Transfer of patent right |
Effective date of registration: 20220705 Address after: 610000 Room 2101, 21/F, G5 Building 1858, Middle Section of Yizhou Avenue, Chengdu High-tech Zone, Sichuan Province Patentee after: SHINE TECHNOLOGY Co.,Ltd. Address before: 610000 Room 2101, 21/F, G5 Building 1858, Middle Section of Yizhou Avenue, Chengdu High-tech Zone, Sichuan Province Patentee before: Sichuan Boiling Zhi Technology Co.,Ltd. |
|
TR01 | Transfer of patent right | ||
PE01 | Entry into force of the registration of the contract for pledge of patent right |
Denomination of invention: A data processing method for portable equipment Effective date of registration: 20220713 Granted publication date: 20180216 Pledgee: Chengdu Tianfu New Area sub branch of Postal Savings Bank of China Ltd. Pledgor: SHINE TECHNOLOGY Co.,Ltd. Registration number: Y2022510000209 |
|
PE01 | Entry into force of the registration of the contract for pledge of patent right |