CN105162797B - A kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system - Google Patents
A kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system Download PDFInfo
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- CN105162797B CN105162797B CN201510616278.6A CN201510616278A CN105162797B CN 105162797 B CN105162797 B CN 105162797B CN 201510616278 A CN201510616278 A CN 201510616278A CN 105162797 B CN105162797 B CN 105162797B
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- rsa
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- video monitoring
- random number
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3249—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
- Closed-Circuit Television Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to safety identification authentication field, is more particularly to a kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system, and user uses access equipment（Visitorial Device, VD）To video monitoring equipment（Video Surveillance Device, VSD）Conduct interviews obtain video resource when, bidirectional identity authentication is carried out between VD and VSD, methods described is as follows：Safety certificate equipment is inserted with VD and VSD（Ukey）, Ukey is made up of random number generator, RSA encryption and decryption program and RSA private keys and RSA public keys；VD generates random number using Ukey and will be sent to VSD after random number encryption with RSA public keys, and VSD sends back to VD with RSA private key signatures again after being decrypted with RSA private keys, and VD after RSA public key decryptions with determining whether former random number；VSD is authenticated using same method to VD.The method is simple to operate, is easy to develop, and safety coefficient is high, and module cost is cheap, and can should be based on other systems extensively.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to safety identification authentication field, recognize more particularly, to a kind of two-way based on video monitoring system
Card method.
Background technology
Video monitoring is the important component of safety and protection system, and it is a kind of stronger integrated system of prevention ability,
Video monitoring is enriched with its directly perceived, accurate, timely and information content and should be based on many occasions extensively.In recent years, with calculating
The rapid development of machine, network and image procossing, transmission technology, Video Supervision Technique there has also been significant progress.
Video monitoring system developed short twenties year, from earliest simulation monitoring to digital supervision again till now
Network Video Surveillance, there occurs earth-shaking change.But change anyway, video monitoring brings the same of the sense of security
When, there is also a little hidden danger.Imperfect Verification System between most video monitoring equipments and access equipment, malice
It is of common occurrence to access the situation that video monitoring equipment causes video resource to leak, therefore has very urgent need in access equipment
The safe outpost of the tax office together with being established between video monitoring equipment, improve Verification System, improve probability level.
The content of the invention
The present invention is to overcome the incomplete defect of Verification System described in above-mentioned prior art, there is provided one kind is supervised based on video
The mutual authentication method of control system, it can effectively reduce the probability of malicious access video monitoring equipment.
In order to solve the above technical problems, technical scheme is as follows：
A kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system, the video monitoring system include access equipment and video
Monitoring device, it is characterised in that：Methods described comprises the following steps：
S1：User inserts safety certificate equipment Ukey1 on the access device, while safety is inserted on video monitoring equipment
Authenticating device Ukey2, and established by access equipment and access connection application；
S2：Access equipment generates one group of random number A by Ukey1, and carries out public key encryption to random number A and be sent to video
Monitoring device；
S3：Video monitoring equipment carries out public key decryptions to the ciphertext received by Ukey2 and obtains random number A；
S4：Video monitoring equipment is sent to access equipment after the random number A after decryption is signed by Ukey2；
S5：Access equipment carries out signature verification by Ukey1 to the signature received, if the result and random number A are complete
Complete consistent, then access equipment success identity video monitoring equipment, performs S6；Otherwise authentification failure, access reject；
S6：Video monitoring equipment generates one group of random number B by Ukey2, and is sent after carrying out public key encryption to random number B
To access equipment；
S7：Access equipment carries out public key decryptions to the ciphertext received by Ukey1 and obtains random number B；
S8：Access equipment is sent to video monitoring equipment after the random number B after decryption is signed by Ukey1；
S9：The signature that video monitoring equipment is received by Ukey2 carries out signature verification, if the result and random number B
Completely the same, then video monitoring equipment success identity access equipment, accesses permission；Otherwise authentification failure, access reject.
Further, the access equipment be Built In Operating System, installation application program be provided simultaneously with setting for display output
It is standby, it is connected between the access equipment and video monitoring equipment by network.
Further, the safety certificate equipment is a kind of portable plug-in type hardware device, has globally unique sequence
Row number.
Further, the safety certificate equipment secure package has random number generator, rsa encryption program and RSA solutions
Close program；
The access equipment generates one group of random number A, and the RSA for passing through Ukey1 by Ukey1 random number generator
Encipheror is sent to video monitoring equipment after carrying out rsa encryption to random number A, and the video monitoring equipment passes through Ukey2's
RSA decryption programs carry out RSA to the ciphertext received and decrypt to obtain random number A；
The video monitoring equipment generates one group of random number B by Ukey2 random number generator, and passes through Ukey2
Rsa encryption program to random number B carry out rsa encryption after be sent to access equipment, the RSA that the access equipment passes through Ukey1
Decryption program carries out RSA to the ciphertext received and decrypts to obtain random number B.
Further, the safety certificate equipment is also packaged with RSA signature program and RSA signature proving program safely；
After random number A after decryption is carried out RSA signature by the video monitoring equipment by Ukey2 RSA signature program
Access equipment is sent to, the access equipment carries out RSA label by Ukey1 RSA signature proving program to the signature received
Name checking；
The access equipment is sent after the random number B after decryption is carried out into RSA signature by Ukey1 RSA signature program
To video monitoring equipment, the video monitoring equipment is carried out by Ukey2 RSA signature proving program to the signature received
RSA signature is verified.
Further, in the step S1, when establishing access connection application by access equipment, Ukey1 PIN is first inputted
Code is authenticated, and the PIN code can freely be set by user.
Further, the random number generator in the safety certificate equipment, rsa encryption program, RSA decryption programs,
RSA signature program and RSA signature proving program have been finished writing before safety certificate equipment issue, the random number generator,
Rsa encryption program, RSA decryption programs, RSA signature program and RSA signature proving program are by providing regarding for video monitoring equipment
Frequency monitoring developer modifies.
Further, the safety certificate equipment Ukey1 and Ukey2 includes RSA public keys and RSA private keys, the rsa encryption
Program is encrypted using RSA public keys, and the RSA decryption programs are decrypted using RSA private keys, and the RSA signature program is adopted
Signed with RSA private keys, the RSA signature proving program carries out signature verification using RSA public keys.Assuming that video monitoring operation
Business is distributed to the RSA key of access equipment to for VD.pubkey and VD.prikey, being distributed to the RSA key of video monitoring equipment
To for VSD.pubkey and VSD.prikey, wherein VD.pubkey, VSD.pubkey is RSA public keys, VD.prikey,
VSD.prikey is RSA private keys, then what is deposited in the safety certificate equipment Ukey1 inserted on the access device is
Deposited in VSD.pubkey and VD.prikey, the Ukey2 inserted on video monitoring equipment for VD.pubkey and
VSD.prikey。
The present invention compared with prior art, has the advantages that：Two-way based on video monitoring system of the present invention is recognized
Card method, the connection that conducted interviews between access equipment and video monitoring equipment need authentication, access equipment and video each other
The legal safety certificate equipment issued by video monitoring operation developer is inserted with monitoring device, is used in two-way authentication
Safety certificate equipment in related content can not arbitrarily change, can only by video monitoring run developer modify.Cause
This, when no safety certificate equipment, or possesses safety certificate equipment but built in content is not inconsistent, it is not known that user's PIN code etc., this
A little situations will all cause access reject, and this is greatly lowered the possibility of malicious access video monitoring equipment, effectively prevents
The criminal offence of video is stolen, protects the personal secrets of video content.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the decomposition module figure of the safety certificate equipment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the mutual authentication method flow chart based on video monitoring system in the present invention.
Embodiment
Accompanying drawing is based only upon exemplary illustration, it is impossible to is interpreted as the limitation to this patent；To those skilled in the art,
Some known features and its explanation omission will be understood by accompanying drawing.
Technical scheme is described further with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.
Embodiment 1
A kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system, the authentication method should be based on video monitoring system, institute
Stating video monitoring system includes access equipment（Visitorial Device, VD）And video monitoring equipment（Video
Surveillance Device, VSD）, user using access equipment VD to video monitoring equipment VSD conduct interviews obtain video
During resource, authenticating device safe to use is needed（Ukey）Two-way authentication is carried out, certification is by that can conduct interviews.The VD is to possess
Operating system, application program can be installed and possess the equipment of high pixel display output, the VSD is that video monitoring develops operator
The video monitoring equipment of offer, established and connected by network between the VD and the VSD.The Ukey is a kind of portable slotting
Enter formula hardware device, there is globally unique hardware sequence number, as shown in figure 1, wherein secure package random number generator,
Rsa encryption program, RSA decryption programs, RSA signature program and RSA signature proving program, and have RSA operation operation institute
The RSA public keys and RSA private keys needed.
As shown in Fig. 2 the authentication method comprises the following steps：
S0：User inserts Ukey1 on VD, and confirms VSD while be inserted with Ukey2；User operates VD and establishes access connection
Application, and input PIN code and proceed by two-way authentication.
PIN code described in step S0 is Ukey1 user's PIN code, and developer is runed by video monitoring when issuing Ukey
Specify, the modification authority of user's PIN code is reserved to user after issue；If user forgets user's PIN code, described in replacement
The authority of user's PIN code is only reserved to video monitoring operation developer.
Mutual authentication method described in step S0 is based on RSA encryption and decryption, it is necessary to using the public and private keys of RSA, RSA relative programs with
RSA public keys and RSA private keys have all been finished writing by secure package in Ukey when Ukey is distributed to user, and modification authority is only
It is reserved to video monitoring operation developer.RSA public keys and RSA private keys in same Ukey are not a pair.Assuming that the video
Monitoring operator be distributed to VD RSA key to for VD.pubkey and VD.prikey, be distributed to VSD RSA key to for
VSD.pubkey and VSD.prikey, then deposited in the Ukey inserted on VD for VSD. pubkey and VD.prikey, VSD
Deposited in the Ukey of upper insertion for VD.pubkey and VSD.prikey.
S1：VD generates one group of random number A by the random number generator in Ukey1.
S2：VD is sent to VSD after carrying out rsa encryption to random number A by Ukey1 rsa encryption program.
Rsa encryption uses VSD.pubkey described in step S2.
S3：VSD receives ciphertext and carries out RSA decryption by Ukey2 RSA decryption programs afterwards, obtains random number A.
The decryption of RSA described in step S3 uses VSD.prikey.
S4：VSD is sent to VD after random number A is carried out into RSA signature by Ukey2 RSA signature program.
RSA signature uses VSD.prikey described in step S4.
S5：VD is received and is carried out RSA signature checking by Ukey1 RSA signature proving program after signature, if checking knot
Fruit and random number A are completely the same, then VD success identities VSD, perform S6；Otherwise authentification failure, access reject.
The checking of RSA signature described in step S5 uses VSD.pubkey.
S6：VSD generates one group of random number B by the random number generator in Ukey2.
S7：VSD is sent to VD after carrying out rsa encryption to random number B by Ukey2 rsa encryption program.
Rsa encryption uses VD.pubkey described in step S7.
S8：VD receives ciphertext and carries out RSA decryption by Ukey2 RSA decryption programs afterwards, obtains random number B.
The decryption of RSA described in step S8 uses VD.prikey.
S9：VD is sent to VSD after random number B is carried out into RSA signature by Ukey1 RSA signature program.
RSA signature uses VD.prikey described in step S9.
S10：VSD is received and is carried out RSA signature checking by Ukey2 RSA signature proving program after signature, if checking
As a result completely the same with random number B, then VSD success identities VD, accesses permission；Otherwise authentification failure, access reject.
The checking of RSA signature described in step S10 uses VD.pubkey.
So far, the two-way authentication between access equipment and video monitoring equipment in video monitoring system is realized, if recognized
Demonstrate,prove successfully, then allow to access；If certification is unsuccessful, do not allow to access.
A kind of mutual authentication method based in video monitoring system provided by the invention, supervised based on access equipment and video
The safety certificate equipment of equipment insertion is controlled, safety certificate equipment Ukey is packaged with random number generator, rsa encryption program, RSA
Decryption program, RSA signature program and RSA signature proving program, it can realize that access equipment and video monitoring are set by RSA Algorithm
Signature and certification between standby.Therefore, when no safety certificate equipment, or possess safety certificate equipment but built in content not
Symbol, it is not known that user's PIN code etc., these situations will all cause access reject, and this is greatly lowered malicious access video monitoring
The possibility of equipment, the criminal offence for stealing video is effectively prevent, protect the personal secrets of video content.
The embodiment of invention described above is only intended to clearly illustrate invention example, composition pair
The restriction of the scope of the present invention.For those of ordinary skill in the field, on the basis of the above description can be with
Make other changes in different forms.Any made modification within the spiritual principles of the present invention, equivalent substitution
With improve etc., should be included in the present invention claims within.
Claims (8)
1. a kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system, the video monitoring system includes access equipment and video is supervised
Control equipment, it is characterised in that：Methods described comprises the following steps：
S1：User inserts safety certificate equipment Ukey1 on the access device, while safety certification is inserted on video monitoring equipment
Equipment Ukey2, and established by access equipment and access connection application；
S2：Access equipment generates one group of random number A by Ukey1, and carries out public key encryption to random number A and be sent to video monitoring
Equipment；
S3：Video monitoring equipment carries out public key decryptions to the ciphertext received by Ukey2 and obtains random number A；
S4：Video monitoring equipment is sent to access equipment after the random number A after decryption is signed by Ukey2；
S5：Access equipment carries out signature verification by Ukey1 to the signature received, if the result and random number A complete one
Cause, then access equipment success identity video monitoring equipment, perform S6；Otherwise authentification failure, access reject；
S6：Video monitoring equipment generates one group of random number B by Ukey2, and is sent to visit after carrying out public key encryption to random number B
Ask equipment；
S7：Access equipment carries out public key decryptions to the ciphertext received by Ukey1 and obtains random number B；
S8：Access equipment is sent to video monitoring equipment after the random number B after decryption is signed by Ukey1；
S9：The signature that video monitoring equipment is received by Ukey2 carries out signature verification, if the result and random number B are complete
Unanimously, then video monitoring equipment success identity access equipment, access allow；Otherwise authentification failure, access reject.
2. the mutual authentication method according to claim 1 based on video monitoring system, it is characterised in that：The access is set
The standby equipment for being provided simultaneously with display output for Built In Operating System, installation application program, the access equipment are set with video monitoring
It is connected between standby by network.
3. the mutual authentication method according to claim 1 based on video monitoring system, it is characterised in that：The safety is recognized
It is a kind of portable plug-in type hardware device to demonstrate,prove equipment Ukey1 and Ukey2, has globally unique sequence number.
4. the mutual authentication method according to claim 3 based on video monitoring system, it is characterised in that：The safety is recognized
Card equipment Ukey1 and Ukey2 secure package has random number generator, rsa encryption program and RSA decryption programs；
The access equipment generates one group of random number A, and the rsa encryption for passing through Ukey1 by Ukey1 random number generator
Program is sent to video monitoring equipment after rsa encryption is carried out to random number A, and the video monitoring equipment is solved by Ukey2 RSA
Close program carries out RSA to the ciphertext received and decrypts to obtain random number A；
The video monitoring equipment generates one group of random number B, and the RSA for passing through Ukey2 by Ukey2 random number generator
Encipheror is sent to access equipment after rsa encryption is carried out to random number B, and the access equipment decrypts journey by Ukey1 RSA
The ciphertext that ordered pair receives carries out RSA and decrypts to obtain random number B.
5. the mutual authentication method according to claim 4 based on video monitoring system, it is characterised in that：The safety is recognized
Card equipment Ukey1 and Ukey2 are also packaged with RSA signature program and RSA signature proving program safely；
The video monitoring equipment is sent after the random number A after decryption is carried out into RSA signature by Ukey2 RSA signature program
To access equipment, the access equipment carries out RSA signature to the signature received by Ukey1 RSA signature proving program and tested
Card；
The access equipment will be sent to after the random number B progress RSA signatures after decryption by Ukey1 RSA signature program and be regarded
Frequency monitoring device, the video monitoring equipment carry out RSA label by Ukey2 RSA signature proving program to the signature received
Name checking.
6. the mutual authentication method according to claim 1 based on video monitoring system, it is characterised in that：The step S1
In, when establishing access connection application by access equipment, the PIN code for inputting Ukey1 first is authenticated.
7. the mutual authentication method according to claim 5 based on video monitoring system, it is characterised in that：The safety is recognized
Demonstrate,prove random number generator, rsa encryption program, RSA decryption programs, RSA signature program and the RSA in equipment Ukey1 and Ukey2
Signature verification program has been finished writing before safety certificate equipment Ukey1 and Ukey2 issue, and the random number generator, RSA add
Close program, RSA decryption programs, RSA signature program and RSA signature proving program are by providing the video monitoring of video monitoring equipment
Developer modifies.
8. the mutual authentication method according to claim 5 based on video monitoring system, it is characterised in that：The safety is recognized
Card equipment Ukey1 and Ukey2 include RSA public keys and RSA private keys, and the rsa encryption program is encrypted using RSA public keys, institute
State RSA decryption programs to be decrypted using RSA private keys, the RSA signature program is signed using RSA private keys, the RSA label
Name proving program carries out signature verification using RSA public keys.
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| CN201510616278.6A CN105162797B (en) | 2015-09-24 | 2015-09-24 | A kind of mutual authentication method based on video monitoring system |
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| CN105162797B true CN105162797B (en) | 2018-03-09 |
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Families Citing this family (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105610837B (en) * | 2015-12-31 | 2018-12-18 | 上海交通大学 | For identity authentication method and system between SCADA system main website and slave station |
| CN108282456A (en) * | 2017-12-08 | 2018-07-13 | 济南中维世纪科技有限公司 | The method that web camera mandate accesses |
| CN108111497B (en) * | 2017-12-14 | 2021-01-22 | 深圳市共进电子股份有限公司 | Mutual authentication method and device for camera and server |
| CN109618344B (en) * | 2019-01-25 | 2020-06-23 | 广东省恒博信息有限公司 | Safe connection method and device of wireless monitoring equipment |
| CN109819217A (en) * | 2019-02-14 | 2019-05-28 | 上海图丽信息技术有限公司 | A kind of monitoring is mobile to have access to system |
| CN110300289B (en) * | 2019-07-31 | 2020-08-21 | 北京中安国通科技有限公司 | Video safety management system and method |
| CN110324358B (en) * | 2019-07-31 | 2020-05-05 | 北京中安国通科技有限公司 | Video data management and control authentication method, module, equipment and platform |
| CN110430204A (en) * | 2019-08-12 | 2019-11-08 | 徐州恒佳电子科技有限公司 | A kind of modified JSON safety communicating method based on third party's password book server |
| CN110995708B (en) * | 2019-12-05 | 2021-09-24 | 珠海市鸿瑞信息技术股份有限公司 | Public network communication data safety protection system |
| CN111600870B (en) * | 2020-05-13 | 2021-08-03 | 山东大学 | Bidirectional communication authentication method and system |
| CN111901303A (en) * | 2020-06-28 | 2020-11-06 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | Device authentication method and apparatus, storage medium, and electronic apparatus |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| EP1892878A1 (en) * | 2006-08-25 | 2008-02-27 | InterVideo Inc. | Content protection system |
| CN101459559B (en) * | 2008-12-26 | 2011-05-11 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and system for storing and managing monitored user configuration information |
| CN101729854B (en) * | 2009-12-24 | 2012-12-12 | 公安部第一研究所 | Method for distributing code stream encrypting and decrypting keys in SIP video monitoring system |
| CN102833068B (en) * | 2011-06-15 | 2017-05-17 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method for bidirectional authentication of terminal and smart card, protocol and smart card |
| CN104113547B (en) * | 2014-07-23 | 2017-04-26 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | SIP (session initiation protocol) security protection video monitoring network access control system |
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