CN104967998B - A kind of wireless networking communications method for preventing beacon from attacking - Google Patents
A kind of wireless networking communications method for preventing beacon from attacking Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN104967998B CN104967998B CN201510414514.6A CN201510414514A CN104967998B CN 104967998 B CN104967998 B CN 104967998B CN 201510414514 A CN201510414514 A CN 201510414514A CN 104967998 B CN104967998 B CN 104967998B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- beacon
- transmission
- node
- transmission interval
- interval
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Fee Related
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
Abstract
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of wireless networking communications methods for preventing beacon from attacking, which comprises the following steps: step S1: regulation beacon transmission interval<T1, T2>, T2>T1;Step S2: next beacon is randomly selected in<T1, T2>section and sends interval Tx;Step S3: containing the transmission interval Tx of next beacon in each frame beacon content, i.e., next beacon will emit after the Tx time, T1 < Tx < T2;Step S4: the part at least including next beacon transmission interval information to beacon encrypts;Step S5: when node inquires beacon message to adjacent node, at least to the Partial encryption in adjacent node return information including beacon transmission interval information;Step S6: in wireless self-networking, network node carries out the transmission of networked beacons, broadcast according to step S1-S5.The present invention by by beacon is random and encrypted transmission, will so that beacon to send rule unpredictable, thus avoid beacon attack.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to fields of communication technology, and in particular to the wireless networking communications method that one kind can prevent beacon from attacking.
Background technique
Communication beacons are key messages in wireless networking communications, and the synchronization, coordination and pipe of wireless group network may be implemented
Reason.In conventional wireless networking communications, beacon uses and regularly sends mechanism;And network attack person receives beacon just by repeatedly tracking
It can be found that the transmission rule of beacon.Network attack person only needs by interfering beacon emissions --- in networked beacons broadcast moments
Issue interference signal or emit pseudo- beacon --- thus make wireless networking network node that can not be normally received beacon, it cannot be normal
It works and is paralysed.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, the present invention provides a kind of wireless networking communications method that can prevent beacon from attacking, when sending beacon
Between can not predict the attacks such as can not be tracked, be intercepted, forged.
The present invention is implemented with the following technical solutions: a kind of wireless networking communications method for preventing beacon from attacking, feature
It is, comprising the following steps: step S1: regulation beacon transmission interval<T1, T2>, T2>T1;Step S2: in<T1, T2>area
It is interior to randomly select next beacon transmission interval Tx;Step S3: the transmission of next beacon is all contained in each frame beacon content
It is spaced Tx, i.e., next beacon will emit after the Tx time, T1 < Tx < T2;Step S4: at least beacon is sent comprising next beacon
The part of interval information is encrypted;Step S5: when node inquires beacon message to adjacent node, at least adjacent node is returned
It writes in reply and sends the Partial encryption of interval information in ceasing comprising beacon;Step S6: in wireless self-networking, network node is according to step
S1-S5 carries out the transmission of networked beacons, broadcast.
Further, the method that randomly selects in step S2 is white Gaussian noise distribution or pseudo-random distribution.
In an embodiment of the present invention, node is sent out by broadcasting beacon querying command to adjacent node to obtain next beacon
Send interval information.
In an embodiment of the present invention, the encryption method of step S4 is AES, 3DS or DES.
Compared with prior art, the invention has the following advantages that step is simple, it is easily operated;It crosses beacon is random and adds
Close transmission is incited somebody to action so that beacon transmission rule is unpredictable, thus avoids beacon attack.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is flow chart of the invention.
Specific embodiment
The present invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and detailed description.
The present invention provides a kind of wireless networking communications method for preventing beacon from attacking, which comprises the following steps:
Step S1: regulation beacon transmission interval<T1, T2>, T2>T1;Step S2: next letter is randomly selected in<T1, T2>section
Mark sends interval Tx;Step S3: containing the transmission interval Tx of next beacon in each frame beacon content, i.e., next beacon will
Emit after the Tx time, T1 < Tx < T2;Step S4: the part at least including next beacon transmission interval information to beacon adds
It is close;Step S5: it when node inquires beacon message to adjacent node, is at least sent in adjacent node return information comprising beacon
The Partial encryption of interval information;Step S6: in wireless self-networking, network node carries out the hair of networked beacons according to step S1-S5
It send, broadcast.Flow chart is referring to Fig. 1.It, can also be with except to including that next beacon sends the part of interval information and encrypts to beacon
Beacon other information is encrypted according to user's specific requirements.
Further, the method that randomly selects in step S2 is white Gaussian noise distribution or pseudo-random distribution.
In an embodiment of the present invention, node can obtain next letter by broadcasting beacon querying command to adjacent node
Mark sends interval information.
In an embodiment of the present invention, the encryption method of step S4 is AES, 3DS or DES.Also other encryptions be can choose
Mode.
In conventional wireless ad hoc network, beacon generallys use and can predict mode and send, and can multiply it to network attack person in this way
Machine, network attack person can obtain beacon transmission rule by monitoring, and then when beacon is sent, by blocking, interfering
Implement network attack with modes such as forgeries.Using technical solution provided by the invention by beacon is random and encrypted transmission, will so that
It is unpredictable that beacon sends rule, thus avoids beacon attack.
Those skilled in the art can do this specific embodiment under the premise of without prejudice to the principle and substance of the present invention
It various modifications or supplement or is substituted in a similar manner out, but these changes each fall within protection scope of the present invention.Cause
This technology of the present invention range is not limited to the above embodiment.
Claims (1)
1. a kind of wireless networking communications method for preventing beacon from attacking, which comprises the following steps:
Step S1: regulation beacon transmission interval<T1, T2>, T2>T1;
Step S2: next beacon is randomly selected in<T1, T2>section and sends interval Tx;
Step S3: containing the transmission interval Tx of next beacon in each frame beacon content, i.e., next beacon will be in the Tx time
After emit, T1 < Tx < T2;
Step S4: the part at least including next beacon transmission interval information to beacon encrypts;
Step S5: it when node inquires beacon message to adjacent node, is at least sent out comprising beacon in adjacent node return information
Send the Partial encryption of interval information;
Step S6: in wireless self-networking, network node carries out the transmission of networked beacons, broadcast according to step S1-S5;
Randomly selecting in step S2 meets white Gaussian noise distribution or pseudo-random distribution;
Node sends interval information by broadcasting beacon querying command to adjacent node to obtain next beacon;
The encryption method of step S4 is AES, 3DS or DES.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201510414514.6A CN104967998B (en) | 2015-07-15 | 2015-07-15 | A kind of wireless networking communications method for preventing beacon from attacking |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201510414514.6A CN104967998B (en) | 2015-07-15 | 2015-07-15 | A kind of wireless networking communications method for preventing beacon from attacking |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
CN104967998A CN104967998A (en) | 2015-10-07 |
CN104967998B true CN104967998B (en) | 2019-02-22 |
Family
ID=54221918
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
CN201510414514.6A Expired - Fee Related CN104967998B (en) | 2015-07-15 | 2015-07-15 | A kind of wireless networking communications method for preventing beacon from attacking |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
CN (1) | CN104967998B (en) |
Families Citing this family (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102018213898B4 (en) * | 2018-08-17 | 2020-03-19 | Continental Automotive Gmbh | Monitoring a network connection for eavesdropping |
CN113595719A (en) * | 2021-07-31 | 2021-11-02 | 中国电子科技集团公司第十五研究所 | Link layer beacon encryption method based on packet CBC mode |
Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN1856963A (en) * | 2003-10-24 | 2006-11-01 | 索尼株式会社 | Radio communication system, radio communication apparatus, radio communication method, and computer program |
CN103002481A (en) * | 2012-12-14 | 2013-03-27 | 福建省邮电工程有限公司 | Wireless fidelity (WIFI) network optimization based on complex environment |
-
2015
- 2015-07-15 CN CN201510414514.6A patent/CN104967998B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN1856963A (en) * | 2003-10-24 | 2006-11-01 | 索尼株式会社 | Radio communication system, radio communication apparatus, radio communication method, and computer program |
CN103002481A (en) * | 2012-12-14 | 2013-03-27 | 福建省邮电工程有限公司 | Wireless fidelity (WIFI) network optimization based on complex environment |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
"无线传感器网络GPSR路由协议研究";张威等;《电子测量技术》;20100930;第33卷(第9期);第1.2节 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN104967998A (en) | 2015-10-07 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
Arjoune et al. | Smart jamming attacks in 5G new radio: A review | |
Alahmadi et al. | Defense against primary user emulation attacks in cognitive radio networks using advanced encryption standard | |
Sajjad et al. | Security analysis of IEEE 802.15. 4 MAC in the context of Internet of Things (IoT) | |
EP4290918A3 (en) | Access stratum security for efficient packet processing | |
Tiloca et al. | JAMMY: A distributed and dynamic solution to selective jamming attack in TDMA WSNs | |
CN102833736B (en) | Communication key generation method and secure channel selection method for cognitive radio system | |
Rose et al. | Detection of jamming attack using timestamp for WSN | |
US9608803B2 (en) | Method for defense against primary user emulation attacks in cognitive radio networks using advanced encryption | |
WO2008127318A3 (en) | Distributed encryption methods and systems | |
US20080220746A1 (en) | Key establishment utilizing link privacy | |
Subbulakshmi et al. | Mitigating eavesdropping by using fuzzy based MDPOP-Q learning approach and multilevel Stackelberg game theoretic approach in wireless CRN | |
Tiloca et al. | DISH: DIstributed SHuffling against selective jamming attack in IEEE 802.15. 4e TSCH networks | |
CN106656405B (en) | A method of minimizing system secrecy outage probability using energy station | |
CN102801522B (en) | Method for generating asymmetric channel communication key for wireless cooperative communication network | |
CN106572467B (en) | A method of protecting information transmission security in the wireless network | |
CN104967998B (en) | A kind of wireless networking communications method for preventing beacon from attacking | |
KR20180096189A (en) | LPWA Module performing Encrypted Communication and method thereof | |
Xu et al. | Combat hybrid eavesdropping in power-domain NOMA: Joint design of timing channel and symbol transformation | |
Daidone et al. | A solution to the GTS-based selective jamming attack on IEEE 802.15. 4 networks | |
Sowmya et al. | A survey of jamming attack prevention techniques in wireless networks | |
Shastri et al. | A wormhole attack in mobile ad-hoc network: detection and prevention | |
Abuhelaleh et al. | Armor-LEACH-energy efficient, secure wireless networks communication | |
Ma et al. | Cooperative jamming for secrecy of wireless communications | |
Ren et al. | Multiple k-hop clusters based routing scheme to preserve source-location privacy in WSNs | |
CN108574952A (en) | A kind of communication means, device and equipment |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
C06 | Publication | ||
PB01 | Publication | ||
C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
GR01 | Patent grant | ||
GR01 | Patent grant | ||
CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee | ||
CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee |
Granted publication date: 20190222 Termination date: 20210715 |