CN104468118A - Communication safety method and system based on Hash function - Google Patents
Communication safety method and system based on Hash function Download PDFInfo
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- CN104468118A CN104468118A CN201410659103.9A CN201410659103A CN104468118A CN 104468118 A CN104468118 A CN 104468118A CN 201410659103 A CN201410659103 A CN 201410659103A CN 104468118 A CN104468118 A CN 104468118A
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- key
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- database server
- label
- information identification
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Abstract
The invention provides a communication safety method and system based on a Hash function. The method comprises the following steps that a label manager obtains a shared secret key H (KEYT) and sends an H(KEYT)||order to a database server through an information identification manager after receiving inquiry information form the information identification manager; the database server obtains a new communication secret key C and sends C, a label unique identifier ID and KEYDB to the information identification manager, wherein C=H(KEYDB||SR||order); the information identification manager generates a random number R, calculates H(KEYDB||R) and sends R, H(KEYDB||R), C and KEYDB to the label manager; the label manager calculates H(KEYT||R) and compares H(KEYT||R) with H(KEYDB||R), and if H(KEYT||R) equals to H(KEYDB||R), the identification to the information identification manager by the label manager is completed. By means of the communication safety method and system, outside attacks are resisted, and the communication safety is ensured.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to field of communication security, particularly relate to a kind of communication security method and system based on Hash function.
Background technology
RFID is the abbreviation of Radio Frequency Identification, i.e. REID, it is a kind of non-contact automatic identification technology, its essential core parts are electronic tags, at a distance of the card reader of several centimetres to several meters by launching radio wave, can the information that stores of reading electronic labels, identify the article of electronic tag representative, the identity of utensil or people.REID has lot of advantages: do not need manual intervention, does not need direct contact, can work in adverse circumstances, easy to operate, and mechanical is worn and torn, and the life-span is long, does not have a physical interface for terminal use; Secure data area, except the cryptoguard of label, data division available algorithm manages, and card reader and electronic tag also can certifications mutually, then communicate; Overall cost is always on a declining curve, much lower than the cost of Contact Type Ic Card, even lower, and this lays a good foundation for its large-scale application.
REID, with the advantage of its uniqueness, is little by little widely used in the collection of heavy dependence data and the fields of process such as production, logistics, communications and transportation, Medical Devices, asset management, false proof, tracking; In addition, along with progress and the production-scale expansion of large scale integrated circuit, the cost of radio frequency identification product will reduce further, and its application also will be more extensive.
Many problems needing solution badly are still had, such as standardization issue, safety issue and price problem, particularly safety issue in RFID application.The open wireless transmission link of RFID subjects to various attack, and its potential safety hazard and privacy concern are very serious, mainly comprise: eavesdropping, follow the tracks of, forge, data are deduced, distort, reset, clone and physical attacks etc.Access to your password algorithm to realize certification and the secret protection of RFID, is main method.But for low cost RFID label, due to the restriction of label surface sum power consumption etc., the great number resource of ordinary password algorithm needs cannot be met.Therefore, safety problem become restriction RFID technique develop and the Main Bottleneck problem widelyd popularize.
Currently much all declare to resist DoS attack based on the RFID authentication protocol of Hash, such as 5 Xinhua's agreements and Seung-Jae Jang agreement, but DoS attack can occur in the multiple steps in verification process, it is all different that different step suffers to attack its consequence caused, assailant can stop label receive card reader send authentication information or card reader receive label send authentication information, these all can cause the failure communicated, and therefore need a kind of effective method to solve the problem of DoS attack.
Summary of the invention
The invention provides a kind of communication security method and system based on Hash function, to solve the problem.
The invention provides a kind of communication security method based on Hash function, said method comprises the following steps:
After label manager receives inquiry message from information identification manager, obtain shared key H (KEYT) and send H (KEY by described information identification manager to database server
t) || order;
Described database server obtains new communication key C, C=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order) and the KEY that C, tags unique identifier are accorded with ID, inquire
dBbe sent to described information identification manager;
Described information identification manager generates random number R, calculates H (KEY
dB|| R) and by random number R, H (KEY
dB|| R) and C ⊕ KEY
dBbe sent to described label manager;
Described label manager calculates H (KEY
t|| R) and with described H (KEY
dB|| R) contrast, if equal, then complete the certification of described label manager to described information identification manager;
Wherein, KEY
dBrefer to the shared key that database server is preserved; SR refers to the secret value that database server is preserved; Order refers to Ciphering Key Sequence Number; KEY
trefer to the shared key that label manager is preserved; ⊕ refers to xor operation; || refer to cascade operation.
Present invention also offers a kind of communication security system based on Hash function, comprise label manager, information identification manager, database server; Wherein, described database server is connected with described label manager by described information identification manager;
Described label manager, after receiving inquiry message from information identification manager, obtains shared key H (KEY
t) and send H (KEY by described information identification manager to database server
t) || order;
Described database server, for obtaining new communication key C, C=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order) and the KEY that C, tags unique identifier are accorded with ID, inquire
dBbe sent to described information identification manager;
Described information identification manager, for generating random number R, calculating H (KEY
dB|| R) and by random number R, H (KEY
dB|| R) and C ⊕ KEY
dBbe sent to described label manager;
Described label manager, also for calculating H (KEY
t|| R) and with described H (KEY
dB|| R) contrast, if equal, then complete the certification of described label manager to described information identification manager;
Wherein, KEY
dBrefer to the shared key that database server is preserved; SR refers to the secret value that database server is preserved; Order refers to Ciphering Key Sequence Number; KEY
trefer to the shared key that label manager is preserved; ⊕ refers to xor operation; || refer to cascade operation.
A kind of communication security method and system based on Hash function provided by the invention, can resist external attack, ensure that communication security.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Accompanying drawing described herein is used to provide a further understanding of the present invention, and form a application's part, schematic description and description of the present invention, for explaining the present invention, does not form inappropriate limitation of the present invention.In the accompanying drawings:
Figure 1 shows that the communication security method flow diagram based on Hash function of the embodiment of the present invention 1;
Figure 2 shows that the communication security system construction drawing based on Hash function of the embodiment of the present invention 2;
Term definition:
H (): One-way Hash function;
ID: tags unique identifier accords with;
KEY
dB: the shared key that database server is preserved;
SR: the secret value that database server is preserved;
Order: Ciphering Key Sequence Number;
KEY
t: the shared key that label manager is preserved;
⊕: xor operation;
||: cascade operation;
C: the key next time communicated;
R: random number.
Embodiment
Hereinafter also describe the present invention in detail with reference to accompanying drawing in conjunction with the embodiments.It should be noted that, when not conflicting, the embodiment in the application and the feature in embodiment can combine mutually.
When research 5 Xinhua protocol communication identifying procedure and Seung-Jae Jang protocol communication identifying procedure, there is the discovery that interesting: both combined and do some and change, this protocol communication identifying procedure of result also can meet all demands for security.Simply, exactly the new and old cipher key system in 5 Xinhua's protocol communication identifying procedures is applied in Seung-Jae Jang protocol communication identifying procedure, do the change that some are little, the defect that Seung-Jae Jang protocol communication identifying procedure cannot resist Dos attack can be solved.
Protocol communication identifying procedure, on the basis of Seung-Jae Jang, does following change:
1, database server preserves new and old two covers and the shared key of label, is designated as KEY
oLD, KEY
nEW, the key that label manager is preserved is designated as KEY
t;
2, database server receives H (KEY
t) time, if H is (KEY
t)=H (KEY
nEW), so directly upgrade key K EY
oLD=KEY
nEW, KEY
nEW=C; If H is (KEY
t)=H (KEY
oLD), so not more new key, and send key K EY to label manager
nEW.
Protocol communication identifying procedure is analyzed, and resists Dos and attacks:
1, database server receives H (KEY
t) time, there is H (KEY
t)=H (KEY
nEW).Lose when information identification manager sends message to label manager, so have H (KEY during next certification
t)=H (KEY
oLD), label manager still can pass through certification; Lose when label manager sends message to information identification manager, so have H (KEY during next certification
t)=H (KEY
nEW), obviously can pass through certification;
2, database server receives H (KEY
t) time, there is H (KEY
t)=H (KEY
oLD).Lose when information identification manager sends message to label manager, because the key of database server does not upgrade, so have H (KEY during next certification
t)=H (KEY
oLD); Lose when label manager sends message to information identification manager, because the key of database server does not upgrade, so have H (KEY during next certification
t)=H (KEY
nEW).
Initial condition:
Label manager preserves unique identifier ID, the H calculated in advance (ID), key K EY
twith Ciphering Key Sequence Number order;
The unique identifier ID of database server stored tag, the key K ET shared with label
dB, the hashed value H (KEY of key
dB), the secret value SR corresponding with label and the Ciphering Key Sequence Number order shared with label.
The present invention includes following steps:
Step 101: in advance preliminary treatment is carried out to label manager and database server;
Carrying out pretreated process to label manager and database server is in advance: label manager preserves tags unique identifier symbol ID, key K EY
t, Ciphering Key Sequence Number order, H (ID);
Database server preserves tags unique identifier symbol ID, the key K ET shared with label
dB, key hash value H (KEY
dB), corresponding with label secret value SR, the Ciphering Key Sequence Number order that shares with label.
Step 102: information identification manager sends inquiry message Query to label manager; Wherein, information identification manager refers to card reader;
Step 103: after label manager receives described inquiry message, obtains shared key H (KEY
t) and send H (KEY to described information identification manager
t) || order;
Step 104: described information identification manager is by described H (KEY
t) || order is sent to described database server;
Step 105: whether described database server inquiry has corresponding H (KEY
dB): if there is corresponding H (KEY
dB), then check whether the order value received mates with the order value stored, if do not mated, then thinks illegal; If there is no corresponding H (KEY
dB), carry out following operation:
A. inquire about order value, see and whether exist than receiving the little storage order value of order value, if do not exist, then think illegal;
B. find and the storage order value (being designated as order ') than the order value little 1 received, calculating K EY
dB'=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order '), and with the KEY received
trelatively.If unequal, then continue to find and recursive calculation, if for all above order values, there is not KEY
dBthrough calculating and KEY
tequal, then think illegal.
Step 106: database server obtains new communication key C, C=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order) and the KEY that C, tags unique identifier are accorded with ID, inquire
dBbe sent to described information identification manager;
Step 107: described information identification manager generates random number R, calculates H (KEY
dB|| R); Wherein, for the unsuccessful legitimate tag of first fit, by above calculate in KEY
dBuse KEY
treplace;
Step 108: described information identification manager is by random number R, H (KEY
dB|| R) and C ⊕ KEY
dBbe sent to label manager;
Step 109: described label manager calculates its H (KEY
t|| R) and and the H (KEY received
dB|| R) contrast, if result of calculation is equal, then complete the certification of described label manager to described information identification manager; Wherein, after the certification that described label manager completes described information identification manager, by calculating C ⊕ KEY
dB⊕ KEY
tc is extracted and namely obtains the key K EY after upgrading
t; In addition, upgrade order value, by order value from adding 1;
Step 110: described label manager is by H (ID) ' ⊕ KEY
tbe sent to described information identification manager, due to described information identification manager and described label manager shared key, so can by calculating H (ID) ' ⊕ KEY
t⊕ KEY
dBh (ID) ' is extracted;
Step 111: described information identification manager is by H (ID) ' and KEY
dBbe sent to described database server;
Step 112: described database server contrasts the H received (ID) ', if H (ID)=H (ID) ', then described database server is to the authentication success of described label manager, and upgrades KEY
dB, H (KEY
dB) and order value (by order value from adding 1).
Figure 1 shows that the communication security method flow diagram based on Hash function of the embodiment of the present invention 1, comprise lower step:
Step 1: after label manager receives inquiry message from information identification manager, obtains shared key H (KEY
t) and send H (KEY by described information identification manager to database server
t) || order;
Step 2: described database server obtains new communication key C, C=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order) and the KEY that C, tags unique identifier are accorded with ID, inquire
dBbe sent to described information identification manager;
Step 3: described information identification manager generates random number R, calculates H (KEY
dB|| R) and by random number R, H (KEY
dB|| R) and C ⊕ KEY
dBbe sent to described label manager;
Step 4: described label manager calculates H (KEY
t|| R) and with described H (KEY
dB|| R) contrast, if equal, then complete the certification of described label manager to described information identification manager.
Wherein, KEY
dBrefer to the shared key that database server is preserved; SR refers to the secret value that database server is preserved; Order refers to Ciphering Key Sequence Number; KEY
trefer to the shared key that label manager is preserved; ⊕ refers to xor operation; || refer to cascade operation.
Figure 2 shows that the communication security system construction drawing based on Hash function of the embodiment of the present invention 2, comprise label manager, information identification manager, database server; Wherein, described database server is connected with described label manager by described information identification manager;
Described label manager, after receiving inquiry message from information identification manager, obtains shared key H (KEY
t) and send H (KEY by described information identification manager to database server
t) || order;
Described database server, for obtaining new communication key C, C=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order) and the KEY that C, tags unique identifier are accorded with ID, inquire
dBbe sent to described information identification manager;
Described information identification manager, for generating random number R, calculating H (KEY
dB|| R) and by random number R, H (KEY
dB|| R) and C ⊕ KEY
dBbe sent to described label manager;
Described label manager, also for calculating H (KEY
t|| R) and with described H (KEY
dB|| R) contrast, if equal, then complete the certification of described label manager to described information identification manager;
Wherein, KEY
dBrefer to the shared key that database server is preserved; SR refers to the secret value that database server is preserved; Order refers to Ciphering Key Sequence Number; KEY
trefer to the shared key that label manager is preserved; ⊕ refers to xor operation; || refer to cascade operation.
Beneficial effect is analyzed:
1. forward security
Hypothesize attack person obtains the H (KEY that in certain verification process, label manager exports in the first step
t) || order, but there is unidirectional feature due to Hash function, therefore assailant cannot export the historical data of backtracking label manager according to the label manager of current acquisition, and therefore this protocol communication identifying procedure has forward security.
2. Replay Attack
Before carrying out Replay Attack, assailant is from steal information inside the swap data information identification manager and label manager communication process.When Replay Attack starts, assailant is replied by the Query Information of its information stolen to information identification manager.In this protocol communication identifying procedure, label manager after being successfully completed certification at every turn, upgrade the KEY value of label, then in each verification process, the return value of label manager is all different with the last time, so the Content of Communication that assailant intercepts before cannot using is reset to information identification manager to cheat database server thus access authentication.Therefore, this protocol communication identifying procedure can resist Replay Attack.
3. location privacy
Generally, label manager, after the Query Information receiving information identification manager, can return some response messages.If label manager send response message be changeless or victim shift to an earlier date anticipation to, will privacy concern be caused.In this protocol communication identifying procedure, label manager, after completing success identity process, upgrade the KEY value of label at every turn, during communication next time, and the return information H (KEY of label manager
t) all different with order value, assailant can not judge the position at label manager place according to the label manager response contents intercepted, and positional information therefore can be prevented tracked.
4. data are drilled and are translated
Communication between information identification manager and label manager adopts Hash function and xor operation, even if assailant utilizes certain means data obtained in label manager to be also difficult to the real information of the communication of inferring.
5. forgery attack
An important goal of rfid system detects fake product exactly.If the session key victim in label manager is eavesdropped or stolen by physical means, be so easily subject to forgery attack.In the protocol communication identifying procedure that invention proposes, session key is transmitted by cryptographic means, and all can more new key after each certification, so this agreement can ensure system not by forgery attack.
6. resist DoS attack
Assailant can carry out Denial of Service attack by setting up a kind of asynchronous state usually; assailant's label manager can be stoped to receive authentication information that information identification manager sends or information identification manager receive the authentication information that label manager sends, and system can think this communication failure.So, the Dos for this agreement attacks existence two kinds of modes, and we are explained respectively:
A. label is stoped to receive the authentication information of card reader transmission
The step 108 of protocol communication identifying procedure, information identification manager makes response to label manager, but label manager does not receive.We analyze the impact that this situation causes next certification.Label manager, owing to not receiving the response of information identification manager, assert sign off, now its not more new key and Ciphering Key Sequence Number.Information identification manager, owing to can not receive the follow-up response of label manager, assert sign off equally, and now database server does not have more new key and Ciphering Key Sequence Number yet.Therefore, in this case, the key of database server and label manager and Ciphering Key Sequence Number remain " synchronous ".
B. card reader is stoped to receive the authentication information of label transmission
The step 110 of protocol communication identifying procedure, label manager makes response to information identification manager, but information identification manager does not receive.We analyze in this case on the impact that next certification causes.Information identification manager, owing to not receiving label manager response, assert sign off, and now database server does not have more new key and Ciphering Key Sequence Number.But label manager has completed the renewal of key and Ciphering Key Sequence Number.Like this, just out of step conditions is caused.But this does not hinder successfully passing of next certification, and detailed process is as follows:
We only need calculating K EY
dB'=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order), then with the KEY received
trelatively.Certainly, order value also needs, from adding 1, then to compare with the order value received.
So far, we can't help there is such query: a key and the nonsynchronous label manager of Ciphering Key Sequence Number communicate with information identification manager, the step 110 of their protocol communication identifying procedure meets with Dos and attacks interruption, cause new asynchronous, so, can label manager be authenticated successfully in communication next time? answer is passable.Specific practice is existing in protocol communication identifying procedure to be embodied: after relatively Ciphering Key Sequence Number, recursively calculate, then compare.
7. database server searches speed
Database server saves the H (KEY calculated in advance in table
dB), in random Hash-Lock agreement, if the in store information more than 10000 parts of label manager of database server, then in the process of each certification, database server all will carry out Hash computing to the information received, and so greatly have impact on the search speed of database server.In this agreement, database server calculates H (KEY in advance
dB), only compare in the process of certification, do not calculate, such design can ensure the search speed of database server.
A kind of communication security method and system based on Hash function provided by the invention, can resist external attack, ensure that communication security.
The foregoing is only the preferred embodiments of the present invention, be not limited to the present invention, for a person skilled in the art, the present invention can have various modifications and variations.Within the spirit and principles in the present invention all, any amendment done, equivalent replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (9)
1., based on a communication security method for Hash function, it is characterized in that, comprise the following steps:
After label manager receives inquiry message from information identification manager, obtain shared key H (KEY
t) and send H (KEY by described information identification manager to database server
t) || order;
Described database server obtains new communication key C, C=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order) and the KEY that C, tags unique identifier are accorded with ID, inquire
dBbe sent to described information identification manager;
Described information identification manager generates random number R, calculates H (KEY
dB|| R) and by random number R, H (KEY
dB|| R) and C ⊕ KEY
dBbe sent to described label manager;
Described label manager calculates H (KEY
t|| R) and with described H (KEY
dB|| R) contrast, if equal, then complete the certification of described label manager to described information identification manager;
Wherein, KEY
dBrefer to the shared key that database server is preserved; SR refers to the secret value that database server is preserved; Order refers to Ciphering Key Sequence Number; KEY
trefer to the shared key that label manager is preserved; ⊕ refers to xor operation; || refer to cascade operation.
2. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that: label manager also comprises: carry out preliminary treatment to label manager and database server in advance before receiving inquiry message from information identification manager.
3. method according to claim 2, is characterized in that: carrying out pretreated process to label manager and database server is in advance:
Tags unique identifier is accorded with ID, key K EY
t, Ciphering Key Sequence Number order, H (ID) be saved to described label manager;
Tags unique identifier is accorded with ID, the key K ET shared with label
dB, key hash value H (KEY
dB), corresponding with label secret value SR, the Ciphering Key Sequence Number order that shares with label be saved to described database server.
4. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described database server also comprises before obtaining new communication key C: whether described database server inquiry has corresponding H (KEY
dB): if there is corresponding H (KEY
dB), then check whether the order value received mates with the order value stored, if do not mated, then thinks illegal.
5. method according to claim 4, is characterized in that: if do not have corresponding H (KEY
dB), carry out following operation:
A. inquire about order value, see and whether exist than receiving the little storage order value of order value, if do not exist, then think illegal;
B. find and the storage order value (being designated as order ') than the order value little 1 received, calculating K EY
dB'=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order '), and with the KEY received
trelatively; If unequal, then continue to find and recursive calculation, if for all above order values, there is not KEY
dBthrough calculating and KEY
tequal, then think illegal.
6. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that: after the certification that described label manager completes described information identification manager, by calculating C ⊕ KEY
dB⊕ KEY
t, C is extracted and namely obtains the key K EY after upgrading
t, upgrade order value simultaneously, order value added 1.
7. method according to claim 1, is characterized in that:
Described information identification manager receives H (the ID) ' ⊕ KEY that described label manager sends
tafter, by calculating H (ID) ' ⊕ KEY
t⊕ KEY
dBh (ID) ' to be extracted and by described H (ID) ' and KEY
dBbe sent to described database server;
Described database server contrasts the H received (ID) ', if H (ID)=H (ID) ', then completes the certification of described database server to described label manager.
8. method according to claim 7, is characterized in that: described database server to described label manager complete certification after, also comprise: upgrade KEY
dB, H (KEY
dB) and order value is added 1.
9. based on a communication security system for Hash function, it is characterized in that, comprise label manager, information identification manager, database server; Wherein, described database server is connected with described label manager by described information identification manager;
Described label manager, after receiving inquiry message from information identification manager, obtains shared key H (KEY
t) and send H (KEY by described information identification manager to database server
t) || order;
Described database server, for obtaining new communication key C, C=H (KEY
dB|| SR||order) and the KEY that C, tags unique identifier are accorded with ID, inquire
dBbe sent to described information identification manager;
Described information identification manager, for generating random number R, calculating H (KEY
dB|| R) and by random number R, H (KEY
dB|| R) and C ⊕ KEY
dBbe sent to described label manager;
Described label manager, also for calculating H (KEY
t|| R) and with described H (KEY
dB|| R) contrast, if equal, then complete the certification of described label manager to described information identification manager;
Wherein, KEY
dBrefer to the shared key that database server is preserved; SR refers to the secret value that database server is preserved; Order refers to Ciphering Key Sequence Number; KEY
trefer to the shared key that label manager is preserved; ⊕ refers to xor operation; || refer to cascade operation.
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| CN201410659103.9A CN104468118A (en) | 2014-11-18 | 2014-11-18 | Communication safety method and system based on Hash function |
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|---|---|---|---|
| CN201410659103.9A CN104468118A (en) | 2014-11-18 | 2014-11-18 | Communication safety method and system based on Hash function |
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ID=52913548
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Application publication date: 20150325 |