CN104239942A - Anti-fake Bluetooth chip for mutual identity authentication - Google Patents
Anti-fake Bluetooth chip for mutual identity authentication Download PDFInfo
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- CN104239942A CN104239942A CN201410446271.XA CN201410446271A CN104239942A CN 104239942 A CN104239942 A CN 104239942A CN 201410446271 A CN201410446271 A CN 201410446271A CN 104239942 A CN104239942 A CN 104239942A
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Abstract
The invention relates to an anti-fake Bluetooth chip for mutual identity authentication. The anti-fake Bluetooth chip for mutual identity authentication comprises a Bluetooth communication module and a read-only memory module, wherein the Bluetooth communication module is in communication with the other anti-fake Bluetooth chip. The anti-fake Bluetooth chip for mutual identity authentication further comprises a computing module, the read-only memory module is used for storing the private key and the public key of itself, the private key corresponds to the public key, the computing module is used for encoding, decoding, signing and authentication, the public key of the other anti-fake Bluetooth chip in communication with the anti-fake Bluetooth chip is adopted for encoding in the encoding process, the private key stored in the read-only memory module is adopted for decoding or signing in the decoding or signing process, and the computing module can have access to the read-only memory module just when the computing module performs decoding. The anti-fake Bluetooth chip for mutual identity authentication can prevent the situation that a wireless chip is simulated and tampered maliciously.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to wireless communication technology field, particularly relate to a kind of false proof Bluetooth chip for mutual authentication.
Background technology
Wireless technology comprises Bluetooth technology, near-field communication technology etc., wherein, Bluetooth technology (comprises conventional Bluetooth, low-power consumption bluetooth, and High Speed Bluetooth) be the short-range radio communications technology be widely used, be short distance wireless data transmits one of conventional mode.But due to the MAC Address of Bluetooth chip, be easy to maliciously be pretended to be, distort, although new versions Bluetooth4.0 introduces encipheror, maliciously pretend to be and still cannot solve.Which limits Bluetooth technology and be applied to the very high data transmission of security requirement, such as financial payment.
Summary of the invention
Technical matters to be solved by this invention is to provide a kind of false proof Bluetooth chip for mutual authentication, can prevent wireless chip from maliciously being pretended to be and distorting.
The technical solution adopted for the present invention to solve the technical problems is: provide a kind of false proof Bluetooth chip for mutual authentication, it has unique identification number, when the false proof Bluetooth chip of itself and another set up communicate time, can be checked by identification number between the two.
The described false proof Bluetooth chip for mutual authentication comprises bluetooth communication and read-only memory module, and described bluetooth communication is used for setting up with another false proof Bluetooth chip communicating, and described read-only memory module is for storing itself private key and PKI; Described private key and PKI are mutually corresponding; Described false proof Bluetooth chip also comprises computing module, described computing module is used for coding, decoding, signature and checking, adopting when encoding and encode with the PKI of another false proof Bluetooth chip of its foundation communication, adopting when decoding or sign the private key be stored in read-only memory module to carry out decoding or signing.Wherein, described private key and the mutual correspondence of PKI refer to, can be decoded by this private key to the information of the coding that uses public-key; Described read-only memory module only could be conducted interviews by described computing module when described computing module is decoded.
Described PKI is as the identification number of false proof Bluetooth chip.
PKI is sent to the false proof Bluetooth chip be communicated with it by described bluetooth communication when being communicated with other false proof Bluetooth chips.
Beneficial effect
Owing to have employed above-mentioned technical scheme, the present invention compared with prior art, there is following advantage and good effect: the present invention can make each Bluetooth chip with unique identity recognition number, and by safety authentication protocol provided by the invention, the true and false of this chip can be authenticated, thus allow the chip communicated for a pair know the true identity of the other side.The present invention adopts the PKI received to be encrypted in ciphering process, uses the private key of oneself to be decrypted during deciphering, due to PKI be can disclosed in, as long as user takes good care of the private key of oneself, therefore the distribution of encryption key will become very simple.In the application, private key is stored in ROM (read-only memory) and can not changes and only read when decoding, thus guarantees the security of private key.Simultaneously, private key due to each user is unique, whether other users are true except coming the source of authorization information by the PKI of information transmitter, can also guarantee that sender cannot deny once sending this information, thus improve the security of data transmission, prevent wireless chip from maliciously being pretended to be and distorting.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with specific embodiment, set forth the present invention further.Should be understood that these embodiments are only not used in for illustration of the present invention to limit the scope of the invention.In addition should be understood that those skilled in the art can make various changes or modifications the present invention, and these equivalent form of values fall within the application's appended claims limited range equally after the content of having read the present invention's instruction.
Embodiments of the present invention relate to a kind of false proof Bluetooth chip for mutual authentication, and it has unique identification number, when the false proof Bluetooth chip of itself and another set up communicate time, can be checked by identification number between the two.Specifically comprise bluetooth communication and read-only memory module, described bluetooth communication is used for setting up with another false proof Bluetooth chip communicating, and described read-only memory module is for storing itself private key and PKI; Described private key and PKI are mutually corresponding; Described false proof Bluetooth chip also comprises computing module, described computing module is used for coding, decoding, signature and checking, adopting when encoding and encode with the PKI of another false proof Bluetooth chip of its foundation communication, adopting when decoding or sign the private key be stored in read-only memory module to carry out decoding or signing.Wherein, described private key and the mutual correspondence of PKI refer to, can be decoded by this private key to the information of the coding that uses public-key; Described read-only memory module only could be conducted interviews by described computing module when described computing module carries out decoding or signing, that is, the private key stored in described read-only memory module only has and just can be read in these cases, can not be conducted interviews by other approach, thus effectively prevent the possibility of information leakage.
Due to PKI be can disclosed in, as long as therefore take good care of the private key of oneself, therefore the distribution of encryption key will become very simple, only need send to all wireless anti-counterfeiting chips be communicated with it.Meanwhile, the private key due to each user is unique, and other users, except whether truly coming the source of authorization information by the PKI of information transmitter, can also guarantee that sender cannot deny once sending this information.
Assuming that the PKI of chip A is m, private key is p; The PKI of chip B is n, and private key is q, and as fruit chip A and chip B attempt to intercom mutually, it must first identity verification, and its detailed process is as follows:
1. chip A transmits m to chip B plain code; Chip B transmits n to chip A plain code.
2. chip A produces random information M; Chip B produces random information N.
3. random information M is encoded into C by chip A n; Random information N is encoded into D by chip B m.
4. chip A sends C to chip B; Chip B sends D to chip A.
5. its decoded back is become N with private key p by chip A after receiving D, then signs with private key p again, is finally encoded into V with the PKI n of chip B; Its decoded back is become M with private key q by chip B after receiving C, then signs with private key q again, is finally encoded into U with the PKI m of chip A.
6. V is sent to chip B by chip A; U is sent to chip A by chip B.
7. chip A uses private key p decoded back after receiving U, and then does signature verification, the information obtained and M is checked, and illustrates that chip B is real if consistent.Chip B uses private key q decoded back after receiving V, and then does signature verification, the information obtained and N is checked, and illustrates that chip A is real if consistent.When confirmation is both real, chip A can intercom mutually with chip B.
Be not difficult to find, the present invention adopts the PKI received to be encrypted in ciphering process, uses the private key of oneself to be decrypted during deciphering, due to PKI be can disclosed in, as long as user takes good care of the private key of oneself, therefore the distribution of encryption key will become very simple.Simultaneously, private key due to each user is unique, whether other users are true except coming the source of authorization information by the PKI of information transmitter, can also guarantee that sender cannot deny once sending this information, thus improve the security of data transmission, prevent Bluetooth chip from maliciously being pretended to be and distorting.
Claims (4)
1. for a false proof Bluetooth chip for mutual authentication, it is characterized in that, described false proof Bluetooth chip has unique identification number, when the false proof Bluetooth chip of itself and another set up communicate time, can be checked by identification number between the two.
2. the false proof Bluetooth chip for mutual authentication according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, comprise bluetooth communication and read-only memory module, described bluetooth communication is used for setting up with another false proof Bluetooth chip communicating, it is characterized in that, described read-only memory module is for storing itself private key and PKI; Described private key and PKI are mutually corresponding; Described false proof Bluetooth chip also comprises computing module, described computing module is used for coding, decoding, signature and checking, adopting when encoding and encode with the PKI of another false proof Bluetooth chip of its foundation communication, adopting when decoding or sign the private key be stored in read-only memory module to carry out decoding or signing; Described read-only memory module only could be conducted interviews by described computing module when described computing module is decoded.
3. the false proof Bluetooth chip for mutual authentication according to claim 2, is characterized in that, described PKI is as the identification number of false proof Bluetooth chip.
4. the false proof Bluetooth chip for mutual authentication according to claim 2, is characterized in that, PKI is sent to the false proof Bluetooth chip be communicated with it by described bluetooth communication when being communicated with other false proof Bluetooth chips.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201410446271.XA CN104239942A (en) | 2014-09-03 | 2014-09-03 | Anti-fake Bluetooth chip for mutual identity authentication |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201410446271.XA CN104239942A (en) | 2014-09-03 | 2014-09-03 | Anti-fake Bluetooth chip for mutual identity authentication |
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| CN104239942A true CN104239942A (en) | 2014-12-24 |
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| CN201410446271.XA Pending CN104239942A (en) | 2014-09-03 | 2014-09-03 | Anti-fake Bluetooth chip for mutual identity authentication |
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110011805A (en) * | 2019-03-22 | 2019-07-12 | 大科数据(深圳)有限公司 | Two-way authentication anti-counterfeiting system and method based on low-power consumption bluetooth system |
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2014
- 2014-09-03 CN CN201410446271.XA patent/CN104239942A/en active Pending
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| CN1757195A (en) * | 2003-03-06 | 2006-04-05 | Tim意大利股份公司 | Methods and software program product for mutual authentication in a communications network |
| CN1538632A (en) * | 2003-04-15 | 2004-10-20 | 栗宏刚 | Intelligent mobile identification method based on blue teeth technology and its application |
| CN101114901A (en) * | 2006-07-26 | 2008-01-30 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Safety authentication system, apparatus and method for non-contact type wireless data transmission |
| CN103997731A (en) * | 2014-05-13 | 2014-08-20 | 刘洪明 | Method and system for intelligently recognizing Bluetooth low-power-consumption equipment |
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Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110011805A (en) * | 2019-03-22 | 2019-07-12 | 大科数据(深圳)有限公司 | Two-way authentication anti-counterfeiting system and method based on low-power consumption bluetooth system |
| CN110011805B (en) * | 2019-03-22 | 2022-02-15 | 深圳市令加信息技术有限公司 | Bidirectional authentication anti-counterfeiting system and method based on low-power-consumption Bluetooth system |
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Application publication date: 20141224 |
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