CN104118392A - Engine anti-theft authentication method and device of engine anti-theft system - Google Patents

Engine anti-theft authentication method and device of engine anti-theft system Download PDF

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Publication number
CN104118392A
CN104118392A CN201310157281.7A CN201310157281A CN104118392A CN 104118392 A CN104118392 A CN 104118392A CN 201310157281 A CN201310157281 A CN 201310157281A CN 104118392 A CN104118392 A CN 104118392A
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engine
module
management module
data
key
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CN104118392B (en
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赖瑞福
杨土超
杨佩君
任强
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Guangzhou Automobile Group Co Ltd
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Guangzhou Automobile Group Co Ltd
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Abstract

The invention provides an engine anti-theft authentication method. Engine anti-theft authentication comprises key authentication and engine controller authentication. Engine controller authentication comprises the following steps that an engine management module generates a set of random numbers and transmits the numbers to an intelligent access key-free starting module through a vehicle body controller communication gateway; the intelligent access key-free starting module carries out encryption calculation through an XTEA algorithm according to a fixed code stored in the intelligent access key-free starting module, a secret key and the received random numbers, replaces part of digits in the calculation result with the key authentication result to generate second data, and transmits the second data back to the engine management module through the vehicle body controller communication gateway; the engine management module compares the key authentication result pre-stored in the engine management module and first data generated through the XTEA algorithm with the fed back second data, permits the engine to start if the data are matched, otherwise forbids starting. The invention further provides an engine anti-theft authentication device. The engine anti-theft authentication method and device adopt the XTEA algorithm, and are small in occupied space and short in calculation time.

Description

A kind of engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system and device
Technical field
The present invention relates to automotive field, relate in particular to a kind of XTEA(eXtended of employing Tiny Encryption Algorithm, the miniature cryptographic algorithm of expansion) engine anti-theft authentication method and device.
Background technology
Engine theftproof system is by FOB(Intelligent key module), PEPS(Passive Entry and Passive Start, intelligence enters without spoon and starts a module) and EMS(Engine Management System, engine management module) form.The cipher authentication of described engine theftproof system comprises key certification and engine controller certification, key has authenticated Intelligent key module and intelligence enters the certification between nothing spoon startup module, and engine controller has authenticated intelligence and entered without the certification between spoon startup module and engine management module.
Described key certification has special chip to process, and in described Intelligent key, is provided with repeater, and repeater is provided by quartz conductor supplier, and cryptographic algorithm is solidificated in repeater, the defined good communication mechanism of key certification; And the certification that intelligence enters between nothing spoon startup module and engine management module is generally developed by car load factory oneself, there is different strategies in different car load factories, if the engine anti-theft communication mechanism of car load factory exploitation is considered comprehensive not, various signal intelligences can not be tackled, may cause engine anti-theft certification to occur unpredictable problem, affect engine starting and car load is antitheft.And the present inventor studies discovery, although some car load factory has developed engine anti-theft authentication method, the cryptographic algorithm code that it adopts is long, takies storage space larger, and computing time is long.
Summary of the invention
Long in order to solve the cryptographic algorithm code that in prior art, engine anti-theft authentication method adopts, take storage space larger, and the technical matters that computing time is long, the invention provides a kind of engine anti-theft authentication method of novel engine theftproof system.
The object of the invention is to be achieved through the following technical solutions:
A kind of engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system, this engine theftproof system comprises Intelligent key module, intelligence enters without spoon and starts module and engine management module, described engine anti-theft certification comprises key certification and engine controller certification, described key has authenticated described Intelligent key module and described intelligence enters without the certification between spoon startup module, described engine controller has authenticated described intelligence and has entered without the certification between spoon startup module and described engine management module, it is characterized in that, described intelligence enters without spoon and starts between module and described engine management module by car body controller gateway communication, comprise the following steps completing described engine controller certification after the certification of described key:
Described engine management module produces one group of random number, and by described random number by car body controller communication gate be transmitted to intelligence enter without spoon start a module, the random number producing according to self, fixed code and the key that self prestores, be encrypted and calculated the first output data by XTEA algorithm, described the first output data comprise enciphered data;
Described intelligence enters without spoon and starts module according to the described random number receiving, fixed code and the key that self prestores, be encrypted and calculate the second output data by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise replacement data and enciphered data, replacement data in described the second output data is entered without spoon and starts the key authentication result replacement that module self prestores by described intelligence, the second output data after replacing are turned round to described engine management module by described car body controller communication gate;
Enciphered data in the key authentication result that described engine management module prestores self and described the first output data and the second output data after described replacement compare, if coupling, driving engine release information is sent in bus, and allow described engine starting; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
The engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system provided by the invention, adopt XTEA algorithm to carry out the calculating of the first output data and the second output data, the structure of described XTEA algorithm is very simple, the hardware that only need to carry out addition, XOR and deposit, and the code of realizing in cryptographic algorithm is short and small, there is portability, be applicable to very much embedded system application, take storage space less, can save ECU(Electronic Control Unit, electronic control unit) resource, computation speed is very fast; Simultaneously, the release communication of engine controller certification of the present invention is to enter without spoon and start between module and engine management module and carry out in intelligence, enter without spoon and start between module and engine management module and set up and have communication gate in the intelligence of engine theftproof system, described communication gate specifically can select car body controller (BCM) to form complete engine anti-theft authentication framework, has effectively ensured the communication of engine anti-theft certification.
The present invention also provides a kind of engine anti-theft authenticate device of engine theftproof system, this engine theftproof system comprises Intelligent key module, intelligence enters without spoon and starts module and engine management module, described engine anti-theft authenticate device comprises key Verification System and engine controller Verification System, described key Verification System completes described Intelligent key module and described intelligence enters without the certification between spoon startup module, described engine controller Verification System completes described intelligence and enters without the certification between spoon startup module and described engine management module, it is characterized in that, described intelligence enters without spoon and starts between module and described engine management module by car body controller gateway communication, after the certification of described key Verification System, carry out described engine controller Verification System certification completing, described engine controller Verification System comprises:
The first output data generation module, produce one group of random number for described engine management module, and by described random number by car body controller communication gate be transmitted to intelligence enter without spoon start a module, the random number producing according to self, fixed code and the key that self prestores, be encrypted and calculated the first output data by XTEA algorithm, described the first output data comprise enciphered data;
The second output data generation module, enter without spoon and start module according to the described random number receiving, fixed code and the key that self prestores for described intelligence, be encrypted and calculate the second output data by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise replacement data and enciphered data, replacement data in described the second output data is entered without spoon and starts the key authentication result replacement that module self prestores by described intelligence, the second output data after replacing are turned round to described engine management module by described car body controller communication gate;
Data are control module relatively, comprise comparing unit and control unit, the second output data after the enciphered data of the key authentication result that described comparing unit prestores self for described engine management module and described the first output data and described replacement compare; Described control unit is for controlling according to the comparative result of described comparing unit, if described comparative result coupling sends to driving engine release information in bus, and allows described engine starting; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
The engine anti-theft authenticate device of engine theftproof system provided by the invention, adopt XTEA algorithm to carry out the calculating of the first output data and the second output data, the structure of described XTEA algorithm is very simple, the hardware that only need to carry out addition, XOR and deposit, and the code of realizing in cryptographic algorithm is short and small, there is portability, be applicable to very much embedded system application, take storage space less, can save ECU(Electronic Control Unit, electronic control unit) resource, computation speed is very fast; Simultaneously, the release communication of engine controller certification of the present invention is to enter without spoon and start between module and engine management module and carry out in intelligence, enter without spoon and start between module and engine management module and set up and have communication gate in the intelligence of engine theftproof system, described communication gate specifically can select car body controller (BCM) to form complete engine anti-theft authentication framework, has effectively ensured the communication of engine anti-theft certification.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the engine anti-theft authentication framework structural representation that the embodiment of the present invention provides;
Fig. 2 is that engine management module and the intelligence that the embodiment of the present invention provides enters the detailed process schematic diagram that carries out XTEA algorithm without spoon startup module;
Fig. 3 is that the key that the embodiment of the present invention provides authenticates the schematic flow sheet while being invalid;
Fig. 4 is the engine anti-theft authentication success schematic flow sheet that the embodiment of the present invention provides;
Fig. 5 is that the key that the embodiment of the present invention provides authenticates the schematic flow sheet for busy;
Fig. 6 is schematic flow sheet when enciphered data is different in the return of value that provides of the embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 7 is the schematic flow sheet that engine management system that the embodiment of the present invention provides is not received return of value;
Fig. 8 is that engine management module and the intelligence that the embodiment of the present invention provides enters the schematic flow sheet that carries out cipher key match without the side in spoon startup module;
Fig. 9 is that engine management module and the intelligence that the embodiment of the present invention provides enters the schematic flow sheet that carries out cipher key match without the both sides in spoon startup module;
Figure 10 is that the replacing intelligence that the embodiment of the present invention provides enters without the schematic flow sheet that carries out cipher key match after spoon startup module;
Figure 11 is the schematic flow sheet that cipher key match is provided after the replacing engine management module that provides of the embodiment of the present invention;
Figure 12 is the structural representation of engine controller Verification System in the engine anti-theft authenticate device that provides of the embodiment of the present invention.
Wherein, 10, first export data generation module; 20, the second output data generation module; 30, relatively control module of data.
Detailed description of the invention
In order to make technical matters solved by the invention, technical scheme and beneficial effect clearer, below in conjunction with drawings and Examples, the present invention is further elaborated.Should be appreciated that specific embodiment described herein, only in order to explain the present invention, is not intended to limit the present invention.
A kind of engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system, this engine theftproof system comprises Intelligent key module, intelligence enters without spoon and starts module and engine management module, described engine anti-theft certification comprises key certification and engine controller certification, described key has authenticated described Intelligent key module and described intelligence enters without the certification between spoon startup module, described engine controller has authenticated described intelligence and has entered without the certification between spoon startup module and described engine management module, it is characterized in that, described intelligence enters without spoon and starts between module and described engine management module by car body controller gateway communication, comprise the following steps completing described engine controller certification after the certification of described key:
Described engine management module produces one group of random number, and by described random number by car body controller communication gate be transmitted to intelligence enter without spoon start a module, the random number producing according to self, fixed code and the key that self prestores, be encrypted and calculated the first output data by XTEA algorithm, described the first output data comprise enciphered data;
Described intelligence enters without spoon and starts module according to the described random number receiving, fixed code and the key that self prestores, be encrypted and calculate the second output data by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise replacement data and enciphered data, replacement data in described the second output data is entered without spoon and starts the key authentication result replacement that module self prestores by described intelligence, the second output data after replacing are turned round to described engine management module by described car body controller communication gate;
Enciphered data in the key authentication result that described engine management module prestores self and described the first output data and the second output data after described replacement compare, if coupling, driving engine release information is sent in bus, and allow described engine starting; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
The engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system provided by the invention, adopt XTEA algorithm to carry out the calculating of the first output data and the second output data, the structure of described XTEA algorithm is very simple, the hardware that only need to carry out addition, XOR and deposit, and the code of realizing in cryptographic algorithm is short and small, there is portability, be applicable to very much embedded system application, take storage space less, can save ECU(Electronic Control Unit, electronic control unit) resource, computation speed is very fast; Simultaneously, the release communication of engine controller certification of the present invention is to enter without spoon and start between module and engine management module and carry out in intelligence, enter without spoon and start between module and engine management module and set up and have communication gate in the intelligence of engine theftproof system, described communication gate specifically can select car body controller (BCM) to form complete engine anti-theft authentication framework, has effectively ensured the communication of engine anti-theft certification.
As specific embodiment, please refer to shown in Fig. 1, in engine anti-theft authentication framework provided by the invention, described engine management module (EMS) is communication main body, it is that communication is from body that intelligence enters without spoon startup module (PEPS), car body controller (BCM) is communication gate, completes the communication authentication flow process of EMS and PEPS.
As specific embodiment, please refer to shown in Fig. 2, be engine management system and the intelligent detailed process schematic diagram that carries out XTEA algorithm without spoon startup system that enters.In the time that the engine anti-theft certification of engine theftproof system starts, described engine management module can produce the random number of a group 128, these 128 random numbers are transmitted to intelligence by car body controller communication gate and enter a nothing spoon startup module, and described intelligence enters without a spoon startup module will be encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm according to the described random number receiving; Described engine management module inside also can be encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm.
Described engine management module is encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm, specifically comprises the following steps:
Described engine management module is calculated 32 fixed code that send to intelligence to enter 128 random numbers same without spoon startup module and self to prestore by encrypting number composite function, form 128 bit encryption data, then described 128 bit encryption data and 128 keys self prestoring are calculated to 128 first output data by XTEA encryption function module, described 128 first output data comprise 8 replacement data and 120 bit encryption data;
Described intelligence enters without spoon startup module and is encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm, specifically comprises the following steps:
Described intelligence enters and starts module without spoon 128 described random numbers that receive and 32 fixed code self prestoring are calculated by encryption number composite function, form 128 bit encryption data, described 128 bit encryption data and 128 keys self prestoring are calculated to 128 second output data of composition by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise 8 replacement data and 120 bit encryption data, and described 8 replacement data are entered without the key authentication result self prestoring in spoon startup module and replaced by described intelligence.
As specific embodiment, random number code (EMS → PEPS) information in described engine management module is as follows:
Name of the information Address Message length Type Explanation
Random number code (IMMO_Code) xx 16 bytes Event The random number of 16 bytes is as random number code
Wherein, the 0x00 of all 16 bytes (bytes) or 0xff do not allow as effective random number code (challenge code), while being normal engine anti-theft authentication starting, it is full 0 or full f that the challenge code that engine management module (EMS) sends does not allow; Unless EMS did not learn,, in initial (virgin) state, be also so also in order to improve safety.If EMS is in virgin state, this means the ESK(Engine Cryptology Secret Key in EMS, engine anti-theft key) be initialization values, also under car load factory, line process is not write with a brush dipped in Chinese ink, and the challenge code of 16bytes should be just 0xff.
It is that the output of second after described replacement data (EMS → PEPS) information is as follows that described intelligence enters the answer codes starting in module without spoon:
Signal map in its concrete encrypted response code information is as follows:
Further, described mode bit (Status) is defined as follows:
Authentication state Describe Response value
0x64 PEPS key authentication state: invalid 15 bytes (0xff)
0x44 PEPS key authentication state: busy 15 bytes (0xff)
0x46 PEPS encoding the response calculates: busy 15 bytes (0xff)
0x11 PEPS replys key transmission: effectively key 15 response values that calculate
Other numerical value Not definition Not definition
Wherein: authentication state definition can freely be defined by car load factory, is not limited to table.
If it is full 0 xff that PEPS receives the challenge code that EMS sends, this means that EMS state is virgin.Now, no matter whether PEPS in virgin state, PEPS all can return full 0 xff as response message to EMS.In like manner, if PEPS in virgin state, the ESK that this means PEPS is initial value, also, by EOL(End Of Line, automobile rolls off the production line) write with a brush dipped in Chinese ink or also do not have key study; If receive an illegal challenge code, PEPS will return authentication failure (authentication failed) state to EMS.
As specific embodiment, enciphered data in the key authentication result that described engine management module prestores self and described the first output data and the second output data after described replacement compare, if coupling, driving engine release information is sent in bus, and allow described engine starting; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid the step of described engine starting, specifically comprise:
Key authentication result in after the key authentication result that first described engine management module prestores himself and described replacement second output data compares, judge whether described key certification is legal, described key authentication result is that Intelligent key module and intelligence enter the result that starts module authentication without spoon, enter without spoon and start the EEPROM(EEPROM of module in described intelligence) in store the state of key authentication result, in the EEPROM of described engine management module, store the state definition database of key authentication result, engine management module is received after the output of second after described replacement data, can be the key authentication result contrast of the key authentication result in the output of second after described replacement data and data bank the inside, if the state in described key authentication result is invalid, described engine management module is sent engine locking information on bus, forbids described engine starting, and its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 3,
If the state in described key authentication result is that effectively described key authentication result is legal, whether the enciphered data in more described the first output data of continuation is the same with the enciphered data in the output of second after described replacement data; If enciphered data result too, engine anti-theft authentication success, only have key certification and enciphered data all to mate, its engine anti-theft certification is just passed through, and then described engine management module can send to driving engine release information in bus, and allowing described engine starting, its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 4; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
Mode bit definition in the key authentication result that aforementioned answer codes returns according to the present invention is known, and the mode bit in the key authentication result that it returns is effective, invalid and busy three kinds of situations.The present inventor, according to the various situations of authentication state in verification process, has also made the Communication processing mechanism for various authentication states, to prevent that engine anti-theft from occurring that startup and the car load that can not affect driving engine are antitheft when various unpredictable problem.Below will be elaborated to various concrete Communication processing mechanisms.
As a kind of specific embodiment of Communication processing mechanism, when key authentication result in after the key authentication result that described engine management module prestores self and described replacement second output data compares, if the state in described key authentication result is for busy, described engine management module is being waited for after the first setting-up time, again sending the random number the same with last time enters without spoon startup system and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence, if sent continuously after the first set point number in described engine management module, state in described key authentication result is still for busy, described engine management module will stop sending random number, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting, its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 5, if described engine management module is sending continuously in the first set point number, as long as the state once in described key authentication result be effective, finish to send random number, then carry out the comparison of follow-up enciphered data according to normal flow.Wherein, state in described key authentication result is for busy, refer to that mode bit in the second output data after the described replacement that described engine management module receives is for busy, specifically comprise key authentication state carry out in and key authentication response coding calculate in two kinds of situations, what now, in the second output data mode position after described intelligence enters the described replacement that returns to described engine management module without spoon startup module, show is all busy.
As a kind of embodiment, the time sequence parameter of described the first setting-up time is made as tECMAuthDelayRetry, and the implication of its expression refers to after this time delays, and engine management module starts to send next random number request; If engine management module enters and starts a module without spoon and receive busy condition or tKeyStatusRx(EMS and wait for the time-out time that PEPS replys random number sending from intelligence) overtime or intelligent enter without spoon start module response value and engine management module inconsistent, after this first setting-up time, intelligence enters without spoon and starts between module and engine management module and can trigger new authentication attempt.Wherein, the setting of described the first setting-up time depends on that EMS produces the computation speed of random number and the time that BCM E-Packets; Preferably, described the first setting-up time is 50-200 millisecond, and the first set point number is 5 times, is waiting for after 50-200 millisecond, again send the random number the same with last time and enter without spoon startup module and authenticate to intelligence, and the number of times of transmission capable of circulation is 5 times.
As the another kind of specific embodiment of Communication processing mechanism, described engine management module compares the enciphered data in the second output data after the enciphered data in described the first output data and described replacement, when described engine management module/or and described intelligence enter without spoon and start a module internal cause key failure, make second after the enciphered data of described the first output in data and described replacement export enciphered data in data when different, described engine management module enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence sending new random number, if antitheft certification is passed through, described engine management module sends to driving engine release information in bus, and allow described engine starting, otherwise described engine management module will stop sending certification stream, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting, its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 6.Wherein, the different reason of enciphered data in enciphered data in described the first output data and the second output after described replacement may have: 1, EMS sends random number to PEPS, described random number is obtained by other external nodes (as the instrument of cartheft), return to EMS through calculating (certainly wrong because not knowing that ESK calculates), make like this computations value inconsistent, communication failure; 2, may be out of order due to PEPS software (as the ESK of write memory loses etc.), the recovery value mistake of calculating; 3, the ESK of EMS loses, and causes the value of value that EMS calculates and PEPS inconsistent etc.
As another specific embodiment of Communication processing mechanism, when entering without spoon, described engine management module and described intelligence starts between module because of communication failure, described engine management module is not received when the output of second after described replacement data are returned in the second setting-up time, described engine management module is being waited for after the first setting-up time, again sending the random number the same with last time enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence, if still do not received after described engine management module is sent the first set point number continuously when the output of second after described replacement data are returned, described engine management module will stop sending random number, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting, its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 7, if described engine management module, sending continuously in the first set point number, as long as once receive the output of second after described replacement data, finishes to send random number, then carry out the comparison of follow-up key certification according to normal flow.Wherein, described engine management module and described intelligence enter without the reason that produces communication failure between spoon startup module may have: PEPS has fault (PEPS can not reply), bus failure (PEPS can not successfully receive the random number of EMS), BCM gateway fails (not forwarding EMS random number and PEPS replys) etc.
As a kind of embodiment, the time sequence parameter of described the second setting-up time is made as aforesaid tKeyStatusRx, the implication of its expression refers to that EMS is sending the time-out time of waiting for PEPS reply after random number, if overtime EMS does not receive the return information of PEPS, EMS can trigger and send random number again again after the first setting-up time.Wherein, described the second setting-up time depends on the time that PEPS and key authenticated time, PEPS enciphered data time and BCM E-Packet; Preferably, described the second setting-up time is 50-150 millisecond.
In engine anti-theft authentication method provided by the invention, reference data in described engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon and start the reply data that module is returned, in the time being encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm respectively, can use corresponding random number (challenge), fixed code (fixed code) and engine anti-theft key (Engine Cryptology Secret Key is called for short ESK).Wherein, described challenge is 16bytes data, is produced at random by EMS; Described fixed code is 4bytes data, and by car load, factory defines, and is stored in the read-only memory (Read-Only Memory is called for short ROM) of EMS and PEPS, and PEPS and EMS share same fixed code; Described ESK is 16bytes data, in EOL process, produces at random, is stored in that EMS and PEPS are non-to be lost in internal memory, can carry out read/write by the diagnosis service of specifying, and ESK only can write once in EMS and PEPS.
Therefore, described engine anti-theft key, before carrying out engine anti-theft certification, can first mate the key self prestoring in described engine management module and security, and then carries out engine anti-theft identifying procedure.The present inventor, according to aforementioned cipher key match requirement, has also made various antitheft ECU coupling flow processs, forms perfect reflexless terminal, is conducive to the hardware and software platform of whole antitheft identifying procedure, applicable automated production in enormous quantities and after sale diagnosis and repair.Below will be elaborated to the various concrete coupling flow processs of engine anti-theft key.
As a kind of specific embodiment, described engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon and start the key prestoring in module, if only have a side there is no key in the time dispatching from the factory, only having engine management module to have key or only having intelligence to enter without spoon startup module has key, now only needs a side learn coupling.For this kind of situation, its coupling flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 8, and this coupling specifically comprises the following steps:
S11, device initialize rolls off the production line;
On S12, car load, arrive ON shelves electricity;
S13, judge whether security permission login source ECU, if YES, performed step S14; If NO, exit coupling;
S14, read the key of source ECU by OBD interface;
S15, judge whether security permission login target ECU; If YES, perform step S16, otherwise exit coupling;
S16, by OBD interface, the key that reads source ECU is write in target ECU;
S17, read respectively engine management module and intelligence by OBD interface and enter without spoon and start the key in module;
S18, judge whether it is identical key, if YES, the match is successful; If NO, and first try number of times again and be less than the first preset times, tries after number of times adds 1 to go to step S13 by first again, if first try number of times again and be more than or equal to the first preset times, directly exits coupling.
Wherein, described OBD is the abbreviation of On-Board Diagnostics, and Chinese implication is On-Board Diagnostics (OBD).And described the first preset times can arrange according to the needs of car load factory self, and the first preset times arranging in the present embodiment is 3, start key in module when different when judging in described step S18 that engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon, can have 2 chances to carry out retry (Retry) and mate.
As another kind of specific embodiment, described engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon and start the key prestoring in module, if both sides do not have key in the time dispatching from the factory, be that described engine management module and intelligence enter without all there is no key in spoon startup module, now need both sides all to learn coupling.For this kind of situation, its coupling flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 9, and this coupling specifically comprises the following steps:
S21, device initialize rolls off the production line;
S22, produce random driving engine key;
On S23, car load, arrive ON shelves electricity;
S24, judge whether security permission login engine management module, if YES, performed step S25; If NO, exit coupling;
S25, by OBD interface, described key is write in engine management module;
S26, judge whether that security permission login intelligence enters without spoon and started a module; If YES, perform step S27, otherwise exit coupling;
S27, by OBD interface, described key is write to intelligence and enter without spoon and start in module;
S28, read respectively engine management module and intelligence by OBD interface and enter without spoon and start the key in module;
S29, judge whether it is identical key, if YES, the match is successful; If NO, and second try number of times again and be less than the second preset times, tries after number of times adds 1 to go to step S24 by second again, if second try number of times again and be more than or equal to the second preset times, directly exits coupling.
Wherein, described the second preset times can arrange according to the needs of car load factory self, and the second preset times arranging in the present embodiment is 3, start key in module when different when judging in described step S29 that engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon, can have 2 chances to carry out retry coupling.Those skilled in the art is understood that; in the present embodiment; the write sequence of described key is not limited to this; technical personnel is on the basis of aforementioned coupling flow process; can also first enter without spoon and start in module and write key toward intelligence; in engine management module, write key again, this variation also all belongs to the replacement that is equal to of the present embodiment, within all should belonging to protection scope of the present invention.
As another specific embodiment, described engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon and start the key prestoring in module, if in the time dispatching from the factory need change intelligence enter without spoon start module or by the intelligence of having learnt enter without spoon start a module use on an other chassis, now need to intelligence enter without spoon start a module learn mate.For this kind of situation, its coupling flow process please refer to shown in Figure 10, and this coupling specifically comprises the following steps:
S31, diagnostic equipment initialization after sale;
On S32, car load, arrive ON shelves electricity;
S33, judge whether security permission login engine management module, if YES, performed step S34; If NO, exit coupling;
S34, read the key in engine management module by OBD interface;
S35, judge whether that security permission login intelligence enters without spoon and started a module; If YES, perform step S36, otherwise exit coupling;
S36, by OBD interface, the key reading from engine management module is write to intelligence and enter without spoon and start module;
S37, read respectively engine management module and intelligence by OBD interface and enter without spoon and start the key in module;
S38, judge whether it is identical key, if YES, the match is successful; If NO, and the 3rd try number of times again and be less than the 3rd preset times, tries after number of times adds 1 to go to step S33 by the 3rd again, if the 3rd try number of times again and be more than or equal to the 3rd preset times, directly exits coupling.
Wherein, described the 3rd preset times can arrange according to the needs of car load factory self, and the 3rd preset times arranging in the present embodiment is 3, start key in module when different when judging in described step S38 that engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon, can have 2 chances to carry out retry coupling.
As another specific embodiment, described engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon and start the key prestoring in module, if need to change engine management module or the engine management module of having learnt is used on an other chassis in the time dispatching from the factory, now need engine management module to learn coupling.For this kind of situation, its coupling flow process please refer to shown in Figure 11, and this coupling specifically comprises the following steps:
S41, diagnostic equipment initialization after sale;
On S42, car load, arrive ON shelves electricity;
S43, judge whether that security permission login intelligence enters without spoon and started a module, if YES, performed step S44; If NO, exit coupling;
S44, read intelligence by OBD interface and enter without spoon and start the key in module;
S45, judge whether security permission login engine management module; If YES, perform step S46, otherwise exit coupling;
S46, start the key that reads of module without spoon and write engine management module entering from intelligence by OBD interface;
S47, read respectively engine management module and intelligence by OBD interface and enter without spoon and start the key in module;
S48, judge whether it is identical key, if YES, the match is successful; If NO, and the 4th try number of times again and be less than the 4th preset times, tries after number of times adds 1 to go to step S43 by the 4th again, if the 4th try number of times again and be more than or equal to the 4th preset times, directly exits coupling.
Wherein, described the 4th preset times can arrange according to the needs of car load factory self, and the 4th preset times arranging in the present embodiment is 3, start key in module when different when judging in described step S48 that engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon, can have 2 chances to carry out retry coupling.
Please refer to shown in Figure 12, the present invention also provides a kind of engine anti-theft authenticate device of engine theftproof system, this engine theftproof system comprises Intelligent key module, intelligence enters without spoon and starts module and engine management module, described engine anti-theft authenticate device comprises key Verification System and engine controller Verification System, described key Verification System completes described Intelligent key module and described intelligence enters without the certification between spoon startup module, described engine controller Verification System completes described intelligence and enters without the certification between spoon startup module and described engine management module, it is characterized in that, described intelligence enters without spoon and starts between module and described engine management module by car body controller gateway communication, after the certification of described key Verification System, carry out described engine controller Verification System certification completing, described engine controller Verification System comprises:
The first output data generation module 10, produce one group of random number for described engine management module, and by described random number by car body controller communication gate be transmitted to intelligence enter without spoon start a module, the random number producing according to self, fixed code and the key that self prestores, be encrypted and calculated the first output data by XTEA algorithm, described the first output data comprise enciphered data;
The second output data generation module 20, enter without spoon and start module according to the described random number receiving, fixed code and the key that self prestores for described intelligence, be encrypted and calculate the second output data by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise replacement data and enciphered data, replacement data in described the second output data is entered without spoon and starts the key authentication result replacement that module self prestores by described intelligence, the second output data after replacing are turned round to described engine management module by described car body controller communication gate;
Data are control module 30 relatively, comprise comparing unit and control unit, the second output data after the enciphered data of the key authentication result that described comparing unit prestores self for described engine management module and described the first output data and described replacement compare; Described control unit is for controlling according to the comparative result of described comparing unit, if described comparative result coupling sends to driving engine release information in bus, and allows described engine starting; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
The engine anti-theft authenticate device of engine theftproof system provided by the invention, adopt XTEA algorithm to carry out the calculating of the first output data and the second output data, the structure of described XTEA algorithm is very simple, the hardware that only need to carry out addition, XOR and deposit, and the code of realizing in cryptographic algorithm is short and small, there is portability, be applicable to very much embedded system application, take storage space less, can save ECU(Electronic Control Unit, electronic control unit) resource, computation speed is very fast; Simultaneously, the release communication of engine controller certification of the present invention is to enter without spoon and start between module and engine management module and carry out in intelligence, enter without spoon and start between module and engine management module and set up and have communication gate in the intelligence of engine theftproof system, described communication gate specifically can select car body controller (BCM) to form complete engine anti-theft authentication framework, has effectively ensured the communication of engine anti-theft certification.
As specific embodiment, please refer to shown in Fig. 1, in engine anti-theft authentication framework provided by the invention, described engine management module (EMS) is communication main body, it is that communication is from body that intelligence enters without spoon startup module (PEPS), car body controller (BCM) is communication gate, completes the communication authentication flow process of EMS and PEPS.
As specific embodiment, please refer to shown in Fig. 2, be engine management module and the intelligent detailed process schematic diagram that carries out XTEA algorithm without spoon startup module that enters.In the time that engine anti-theft certification starts, described engine management module can produce the random number of a group 128, these 128 random numbers are transmitted to intelligence by car body controller communication gate and enter a nothing spoon startup module, and described intelligence enters without a spoon startup module will be encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm according to the described random number receiving; Described engine management module inside also can be encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm.Particularly, described the first output data generation module 10 comprises the first computations unit, and described the first computations unit is encrypted calculating for engine management module by XTEA algorithm, specifically comprises:
Described engine management module is calculated 32 fixed code that send to intelligence to enter 128 random numbers same without spoon startup module and self to prestore by encrypting number composite function, form 128 bit encryption data, then described 128 bit encryption data and 128 keys self prestoring are calculated to 128 first output data by XTEA encryption function module, described 128 first output data comprise 8 replacement data and 120 bit encryption data, and engine management module is taken out 128 first 120 bit encryption data in output data as 120 reference datas;
Described the second output data generation module 20 comprises the second computations unit, and described the second computations unit enters without spoon startup module and is encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm for described intelligence, specifically comprises:
Described intelligence enters and starts module without spoon 128 described random numbers that receive and 32 fixed code self prestoring are calculated by encryption number composite function, form 128 bit encryption data, described 128 bit encryption data and 128 keys self prestoring are calculated to 128 second output data of composition by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise 8 replacement data and 120 bit encryption data, and 8 replacement data described in 1 are entered without the key authentication result self prestoring in spoon startup module and replaced by described intelligence.
As specific embodiment, random number code (EMS → PEPS) information in described engine management module is as follows:
Name of the information Address Message length Type Explanation
Random number code (IMMO_Code) xx 16 bytes Event The random number of 16 bytes is as random number code
Wherein, the 0x00 of all 16 bytes (bytes) or 0xff do not allow as effective random number code (challenge code), while being normal engine anti-theft authentication starting, it is full 0 or full f that the challenge code that engine management module (EMS) sends does not allow; Unless EMS did not learn,, in initial (virgin) state, be also so also in order to improve safety.If EMS is in virgin state, this means the ESK(Engine Cryptology Secret Key in EMS, engine anti-theft key) be initialization values, also under car load factory, line process is not write with a brush dipped in Chinese ink, and the challenge code of 16bytes should be just 0xff.
It is that the output of second after described replacement data (EMS → PEPS) information is as follows that described intelligence enters the answer codes starting in module without spoon:
Signal map in its concrete encrypted response code information is as follows:
Further, described mode bit (Status) is defined as follows:
Authentication state Describe Response value
0x64 PEPS key authentication state: invalid 15 bytes (0xff)
0x44 PEPS key authentication state: busy 15 bytes (0xff)
0x46 PEPS encoding the response calculates: busy 15 bytes (0xff)
0x11 PEPS replys key transmission: effectively key 15 response values that calculate
Other numerical value Not definition Not definition
Wherein: authentication state definition can freely be defined by car load factory, is not limited to table.
If it is full 0 xff that PEPS receives the challenge code that EMS sends, this means that EMS state is virgin.Now, no matter whether PEPS in virgin state, PEPS all can return full 0 xff as response message to EMS.In like manner, if PEPS in virgin state, the ESK that this means PEPS is initial value, also, by EOL(End Of Line, automobile rolls off the production line) write with a brush dipped in Chinese ink or also do not have key study; If receive an illegal challenge code, PEPS will return authentication failure (authentication failed) state to EMS.
As specific embodiment, comparing unit in described data comparison control module 30 comprises the first comparing unit and the second comparing unit, described control unit comprises the first control unit and the second control unit, key authentication result in after the key authentication result that first described the first comparing unit prestores self specifically for described engine management module and described replacement two output data compares, judge whether described key certification is legal, described key authentication result is that Intelligent key module and intelligence enter the result that starts module authentication without spoon, enter without spoon and start the EEPROM(EEPROM of module in described intelligence) in store the state of key authentication result, in the EEPROM of described engine management module, store the state definition database of key authentication result, engine management module is received after the output of second after described replacement data, can be the key authentication result contrast of the key authentication result in the output of second after described replacement data and data bank the inside, if the state in described key authentication result is invalid, described the first control unit, for described engine management module is sent to engine locking information to bus, is forbidden described engine starting, and its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 3,
If described the second comparing unit is effective for the state of described key authentication result, be that described key authentication result is legal, continue the enciphered data of more described the first output in data whether the same with the enciphered data in the output of second after described replacement data; If described the second control unit for enciphered data result too, engine anti-theft authentication success, only have key certification and enciphered data all to mate, its engine anti-theft certification is just passed through, and then described engine management module can send to driving engine release information in bus, and allowing described engine starting, its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 4; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
Mode bit definition in the key authentication result that aforementioned answer codes returns according to the present invention is known, and the mode bit in the key authentication result that it returns is effective, invalid and busy three kinds of situations.The present inventor, according to the various situations of authentication state in verification process, has also made the Communication processing mechanism for various authentication states, to prevent that engine anti-theft from occurring that startup and the car load that can not affect driving engine are antitheft when various unpredictable problem.Below will be elaborated to various concrete Communication processing mechanisms.
As a kind of specific embodiment of Communication processing mechanism, control unit in described data comparison control module 30 also comprises the 3rd control unit, described the 3rd control unit is busy for the state of described key authentication result, described engine management module is being waited for after the first setting-up time, again sending the random number the same with last time enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence, if sent continuously after the first set point number in described engine management module, state in described key authentication result is still for busy, described engine management module will stop sending random number, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting, its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 5, if engine management module is sending continuously in the first set point number, as long as in described key authentication result be once effective, finish to send random number, then carry out the comparison of follow-up enciphered data according to normal flow.Wherein, state in described key authentication result is for busy, refer to that mode bit in the second output data after the described replacement that described engine management module receives is for busy, specifically comprise key authentication state carry out in and key authentication response coding calculate in two kinds of situations, what now, in the second output data mode position after described intelligence enters the described replacement that returns to engine management module without spoon startup module, show is all busy.
As a kind of embodiment, the time sequence parameter of described the first setting-up time is made as tECMAuthDelayRetry, and the implication of its expression refers to after this time delays, and engine management module starts to send next random number request; If engine management module enters and starts a module without spoon and receive busy condition or tKeyStatusRx(EMS and wait for the time-out time that PEPS replys random number sending from intelligence) overtime or intelligent enter without spoon start module response value and engine management module inconsistent, after this first setting-up time, intelligence enters without spoon and starts between module and engine management module and can trigger new authentication attempt.Wherein, the setting of described the first setting-up time depends on that EMS produces the computation speed of random number and the time that BCM E-Packets; Preferably, described the first setting-up time is 50-200 millisecond, and the first set point number is 5 times, is waiting for after 50-200 millisecond, again send the random number the same with last time and enter without spoon startup module and authenticate to intelligence, and the number of times of transmission capable of circulation is 5 times.
As the another kind of specific embodiment of Communication processing mechanism, control unit in described data comparison control module 30 also comprises the 4th control unit, described the 4th control unit is for starting key failure in module when described engine management module or/and described intelligence enters without spoon, while making the enciphered data of second after the enciphered data of described the first output in data and described replacement in exporting different, described engine management module enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence sending new random number, if antitheft certification is passed through, described engine management module sends to driving engine release information in bus, and allow described engine starting, otherwise described engine management module will stop sending certification stream, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting, its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 6.Wherein, the different reason of enciphered data in enciphered data in described the first output data and the second output after described replacement may have: 1, EMS sends random number to PEPS, described random number is obtained by other external nodes (as the instrument of cartheft), return to EMS through calculating (certainly wrong because not knowing that ESK calculates), make like this computations value inconsistent, communication failure; 2, may be out of order due to PEPS software (as the ESK of write memory loses etc.), the recovery value mistake of calculating; 3, the ESK of EMS loses, and causes the value of value that EMS calculates and PEPS inconsistent etc.
As another specific embodiment of Communication processing mechanism, control unit in described data comparison control module 30 also comprises the 5th control unit, described the 5th control unit enters between nothing spoon startup module because of communication failure for working as described engine management module and described intelligence, described engine management module is not received when the output of second after described replacement data are returned in the second setting-up time, described engine management module is being waited for after the first setting-up time, again sending the random number the same with last time enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence, if still do not received after described engine management module is sent the first set point number continuously when the output of second after described replacement data are returned, described engine management module will stop sending random number, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting, its concrete flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 7, if described engine management module, sending continuously in the first set point number, as long as once receive the output of second after described replacement data, finishes to send random number, then carry out the comparison of follow-up key certification according to normal flow.Wherein, described engine management module and described intelligence enter without the reason that produces communication failure between spoon startup module may have: PEPS has fault (PEPS can not reply), bus failure (PEPS can not successfully receive the random number of EMS), BCM gateway fails (not forwarding EMS random number and PEPS replys) etc.
As a kind of embodiment, the time sequence parameter of described the second setting-up time is made as aforesaid tKeyStatusRx, the implication of its expression refers to that EMS is sending the time-out time of waiting for PEPS reply after random number, if overtime EMS does not receive the return information of PEPS, EMS can trigger and send random number again again after the first setting-up time.Wherein, described the second setting-up time depends on the time that PEPS and key authenticated time, PEPS enciphered data time and BCM E-Packet; Preferably, described the second setting-up time is 50-150 millisecond.
In engine anti-theft Verification System provided by the invention, reference data in described engine management module and intelligence enter without spoon and start the reply data that module is returned, in the time being encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm respectively, can use corresponding random number (challenge), fixed code (fixed code) and engine anti-theft key (Engine Cryptology Secret Key is called for short ESK).Wherein, described challenge is 16bytes data, is produced at random by EMS; Described fixed code is 4bytes data, and by car load, factory defines, and is stored in the read-only memory (Read-Only Memory is called for short ROM) of EMS and PEPS, and PEPS and EMS share same fixed code; Described ESK is 16bytes data, in EOL process, produces at random, is stored in that EMS and PEPS are non-to be lost in internal memory, can carry out read/write by the diagnosis service of specifying, and ESK only can write once in EMS and PEPS.
Therefore, described engine anti-theft key, before carrying out engine anti-theft certification, can first mate the key self prestoring in described engine management module and security, and then carries out follow-up antitheft identifying procedure.The present inventor is according to aforementioned coupling requirement, various antitheft ECU coupling flow processs are also made, form perfect reflexless terminal, be conducive to the hardware and software platform of whole antitheft identifying procedure, applicable automated production in enormous quantities and after sale diagnosis and repair, specifically in described engine controller Verification System, matching module is set, for by engine management module or/and described intelligence enter and start the key that prestores of module self without spoon and mate.Below will be elaborated to the various concrete coupling flow processs of engine anti-theft key.
As a kind of specific embodiment, described matching module comprises the first matching module, start for engine management module and intelligent entering without spoon the key that module prestores, if only have a side there is no key in the time dispatching from the factory, only having engine management module to have key or only having intelligence to enter without spoon startup module has key, now only needs a side learn coupling.For this kind of situation, coupling flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 8, and its concrete flow process is described in detail in aforementioned authentication method, does not repeat them here.
As another kind of specific embodiment, matching module in described engine anti-theft Verification System comprises the second matching module, start for described engine management module and intelligent entering without spoon the key that module prestores, if both sides do not have key in the time dispatching from the factory, be that described engine management module and intelligence enter without all there is no key in spoon startup module, now only need both sides all to learn coupling.For this kind of situation, coupling flow process please refer to shown in Fig. 9, and its concrete flow process is described in detail in aforementioned authentication method, does not repeat them here.
As another specific embodiment, matching module in described engine anti-theft Verification System comprises the 3rd matching module, start for described engine management module and intelligent entering without spoon the key that module prestores, start module or the intelligence of having learnt is entered without a spoon startup module and used on an other chassis if need to change the intelligent nothing spoon that enters in the time dispatching from the factory, now only need to enter without spoon startup module and learn to mate intelligence.For this kind of situation, coupling flow process please refer to shown in Figure 10, and its concrete flow process is described in detail in aforementioned authentication method, does not repeat them here.
As another specific embodiment, matching module in described engine anti-theft Verification System comprises the 4th matching module, start for described engine management module and intelligent entering without spoon the key that module prestores, if need to change engine management module or the engine management module of having learnt is used on an other chassis in the time dispatching from the factory, now only need to learn coupling to engine management module.For this kind of situation, coupling flow process please refer to shown in Figure 11, and its concrete flow process is described in detail in aforementioned authentication method, does not repeat them here.
The foregoing is only preferred embodiment of the present invention, not in order to limit the present invention, all any amendments of doing within the spirit and principles in the present invention, be equal to and replace and improvement etc., within all should being included in protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (13)

1. the engine anti-theft authentication method of an engine theftproof system, this engine theftproof system comprises Intelligent key module, intelligence enters without spoon and starts module and engine management module, described engine anti-theft certification comprises key certification and engine controller certification, described key has authenticated described Intelligent key module and described intelligence enters without the certification between spoon startup module, described engine controller has authenticated described intelligence and has entered without the certification between spoon startup module and described engine management module, it is characterized in that, described intelligence enters without spoon and starts between module and described engine management module by car body controller gateway communication, comprise the following steps completing described engine controller certification after the certification of described key:
Described engine management module produces one group of random number, and by described random number by car body controller communication gate be transmitted to intelligence enter without spoon start a module, the random number producing according to self, fixed code and the key that self prestores, be encrypted and calculated the first output data by XTEA algorithm, described the first output data comprise enciphered data;
Described intelligence enters without spoon and starts module according to the described random number receiving, fixed code and the key that self prestores, be encrypted and calculate the second output data by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise replacement data and enciphered data, replacement data in described the second output data is entered without spoon and starts the key authentication result replacement that module self prestores by described intelligence, the second output data after replacing are turned round to described engine management module by described car body controller communication gate;
Enciphered data in the key authentication result that described engine management module prestores self and described the first output data and the second output data after described replacement compare, if coupling, driving engine release information is sent in bus, and allow described engine starting; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
2. the engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system according to claim 1, is characterized in that,
Described engine management module is encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm, specifically comprises the following steps:
Described engine management module is calculated 128 random numbers and 32 fixed code self prestoring by encrypting number composite function, form 128 bit encryption data, then described 128 bit encryption data and 128 keys self prestoring are calculated to 128 first output data by XTEA encryption function module, described 128 first output data comprise 8 replacement data and 120 bit encryption data;
Described intelligence enters without spoon startup module and is encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm, specifically comprises the following steps:
Described intelligence enters and starts module without spoon 128 described random numbers that receive and 32 fixed code self prestoring are calculated by encryption number composite function, form 128 bit encryption data, described 128 bit encryption data and 128 keys self prestoring are calculated to 128 second output data of composition by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise 8 replacement data and 120 bit encryption data, and described 8 replacement data are entered without the key authentication result prestoring in spoon startup module and replaced by described intelligence.
3. the engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, enciphered data in the key authentication result that described engine management module prestores self and described the first output data and the second output data after described replacement compare, if coupling, driving engine release information is sent in bus, and allow described engine starting; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid the step of described engine starting, specifically comprise:
Key authentication result in after the key authentication result that first described engine management module prestores self and described replacement second output data compares, if the state in key authentication result is invalid, described engine management module is sent engine locking information on bus, forbids described engine starting;
If the state in key authentication result is effectively, whether the enciphered data in more described the first output data of continuation is the same with the enciphered data in the output of second after described replacement data; If enciphered data is the same, coupling, described engine management module sends to driving engine release information in bus, and allows described engine starting; Otherwise, described engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
4. the engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system according to claim 3, it is characterized in that, if the state in described key authentication result is for busy, described engine management module is being waited for after the first setting-up time, again sending the random number the same with last time enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence, if sent continuously after the first set point number in described engine management module, state in described key authentication result is still for busy, described engine management module will stop sending random number, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
5. the engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, described method also comprises: start module internal cause key failure when described engine management module or/and described intelligence enters without spoon, cause second after the enciphered data of described the first output in data and described replacement to export enciphered data in data when different, described engine management module enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence sending new random number, if antitheft certification is passed through, described engine management module sends to driving engine release information in bus, and allow described engine starting, otherwise described engine management module will stop sending certification stream, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
6. the engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, described method also comprises: start between module because of communication failure when described engine management module and described intelligence enter without spoon, cause described engine management module in the second setting-up time, not received when the output of second after described replacement data are returned, described engine management module is being waited for after the first setting-up time, again sending the random number the same with last time enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence, if still do not received after described engine management module is sent the first set point number continuously when the output of second after described replacement data are returned, described engine management module will stop sending random number, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
7. the engine anti-theft authenticate device of an engine theftproof system, this engine theftproof system comprises Intelligent key module, intelligence enters without spoon and starts module and engine management module, described engine anti-theft authenticate device comprises key Verification System and engine controller Verification System, described key Verification System completes described Intelligent key module and described intelligence enters without the certification between spoon startup module, described engine controller Verification System completes described intelligence and enters without the certification between spoon startup module and described engine management module, it is characterized in that, described intelligence enters without spoon and starts between module and described engine management module by car body controller gateway communication, after the certification of described key Verification System, carry out described engine controller Verification System certification completing, described engine controller Verification System comprises:
The first output data generation module, produce one group of random number for described engine management module, and by described random number by car body controller communication gate be transmitted to intelligence enter without spoon start a module, the random number producing according to self, fixed code and the key that self prestores, be encrypted and calculated the first output data by XTEA algorithm, described the first output data comprise enciphered data;
The second output data generation module, enter without spoon and start module according to the described random number receiving, fixed code and the key that self prestores for described intelligence, be encrypted and calculate the second output data by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise replacement data and enciphered data, replacement data in described the second output data is entered without spoon and starts the key authentication result replacement that module self prestores by described intelligence, the second output data after replacing are turned round to described engine management module by described car body controller communication gate;
Data are control module relatively, comprise comparing unit and control unit, the second output data after the enciphered data of the key authentication result that described comparing unit prestores self for described engine management module and described the first output data and described replacement compare; Described control unit is for controlling according to the comparative result of described comparing unit, if described comparative result coupling sends to driving engine release information in bus, and allows described engine starting; Otherwise, engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
8. the engine anti-theft authenticate device of engine theftproof system according to claim 7, it is characterized in that, described the first output data generation module comprises the first computations unit, described the first computations unit is encrypted calculating for described engine management module by XTEA algorithm, specifically comprises:
Described engine management module is calculated 128 random numbers and 32 fixed code self prestoring by encrypting number composite function, form 128 bit encryption data, then described 128 bit encryption data and 128 keys self prestoring are calculated to 128 first output data by XTEA encryption function module, described 128 first output data comprise 8 replacement data and 120 bit encryption data;
Described the second output data generation module comprises the second computations unit, and described the second computations unit enters without spoon startup module and is encrypted calculating by XTEA algorithm for described intelligence, specifically comprises:
Described intelligence enters and starts module without spoon 128 described random numbers that receive and 32 fixed code self prestoring are calculated by encryption number composite function, form 128 bit encryption data, described 128 bit encryption data and 128 keys self prestoring are calculated to 128 second output data of composition by XTEA algorithm, described the second output data comprise 8 replacement data and 120 bit encryption data, and described 8 replacement data are entered without the key authentication result prestoring in spoon startup module and replaced by described intelligence.
9. the engine anti-theft authenticate device of engine theftproof system according to claim 7, is characterized in that, described comparing unit specifically comprises the first comparing unit and the second comparing unit, and described control unit comprises the first control unit and the second control unit,
The key authentication result of the second output data after key authentication result and described replacement that described the first comparing unit is used for described engine management module self to prestore compares, if when described the first control unit is invalid for the state of described key authentication result, described engine management module is sent engine locking information on bus, forbids described engine starting;
Described the second comparing unit is for when the state of described key authentication result is while being effective, continues more described first and exports enciphered data in data and second after described replacement whether export enciphered data in data the same; If described the second control unit is the same for enciphered data, coupling, described engine management module sends to driving engine release information in bus, and allows described engine starting; Otherwise, described engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
10. the engine anti-theft authenticate device of engine theftproof system according to claim 9, it is characterized in that, described control unit also comprises the 3rd control unit, described the 3rd control unit is busy for the state when described key authentication result, described engine management module is being waited for after the first setting-up time, again sending the random number the same with last time enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence, if sent continuously after the first set point number in described engine management module, state in described key authentication result is still for busy, described engine management module will stop sending random number, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
The engine anti-theft authenticate device of 11. engine theftproof systems according to claim 7, it is characterized in that, described control unit also comprises the 4th control unit, described the 4th control unit is for starting module internal cause key failure when described engine management module or/and described intelligence enters without spoon, cause second after the enciphered data of described the first output in data and described replacement to export enciphered data in data when different, described engine management module enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence sending new random number, if antitheft certification is passed through, described engine management module sends to driving engine release information in bus, and allow described engine starting, otherwise described engine management module will stop sending certification stream, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
The engine anti-theft authenticate device of 12. engine theftproof systems according to claim 7, it is characterized in that, described control unit also comprises the 5th control unit, described the 5th control unit enters between nothing spoon startup module because of communication failure for working as described engine management module and described intelligence, described engine management module is not received when the output of second after described replacement data are returned in the second setting-up time, described engine management module is being waited for after the first setting-up time, again sending the random number the same with last time enters without spoon startup module and carries out antitheft certification to described intelligence, if still do not received after described engine management module is sent the first set point number continuously when the output of second after described replacement data are returned, described engine management module will stop sending random number, and engine locking information is sent in bus, forbid described engine starting.
The engine anti-theft authenticate device of 13. engine theftproof systems according to claim 7, it is characterized in that, described engine controller Verification System also comprises matching module, for by described engine management module or/and described intelligence enter and start the key that prestores of module self without spoon and mate.
CN201310157281.7A 2013-04-28 2013-04-28 A kind of engine anti-theft authentication method of engine theftproof system and device Active CN104118392B (en)

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CN109094516A (en) * 2018-09-30 2018-12-28 安徽江淮汽车集团股份有限公司 A kind of automobile anti-theft method and burglary-resisting system
CN109150514A (en) * 2018-08-30 2019-01-04 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 A kind of wiring method and equipment of key
CN109624919A (en) * 2018-12-25 2019-04-16 爱驰汽车有限公司 VATS Vehicle Anti-Theft System configuration method, computer readable storage medium and terminal
CN109849937A (en) * 2019-03-26 2019-06-07 深圳市元征科技股份有限公司 A kind of vehicle device accumulator charging control method and relevant device
CN110254391A (en) * 2019-05-09 2019-09-20 浙江吉利控股集团有限公司 A kind of Anti-theft vehicle starting method, device and equipment
CN110271511A (en) * 2019-05-09 2019-09-24 浙江吉利控股集团有限公司 A kind of vehicle safety starting method, device and equipment
CN112693425A (en) * 2021-01-15 2021-04-23 江西江铃集团新能源汽车有限公司 Vehicle anti-theft method, device, storage medium, vehicle control unit and vehicle
CN113138591A (en) * 2020-01-20 2021-07-20 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 Control method and device of vehicle safety factor, control equipment and automobile
CN113561932A (en) * 2021-07-19 2021-10-29 东风汽车集团股份有限公司 Vehicle engine starting anti-theft authentication control strategy with intelligent key detection function
CN113830024A (en) * 2021-09-22 2021-12-24 中国第一汽车股份有限公司 Anti-theft control method and device for engine
CN114268449A (en) * 2021-11-02 2022-04-01 浙江零跑科技股份有限公司 Important CAN encryption method

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CN104724057B (en) * 2015-02-13 2017-01-04 中国第一汽车股份有限公司 A kind of hybrid vehicle electronic locking theft preventing method of high security
CN104724057A (en) * 2015-02-13 2015-06-24 中国第一汽车股份有限公司 High-safety hybrid electric automobile electronic lock anti-theft method
CN105245406A (en) * 2015-11-02 2016-01-13 厦门雅迅网络股份有限公司 Method for preventing in-car terminal from being detached
CN105681331B (en) * 2016-03-01 2019-06-11 宁波市江北九方和荣电气有限公司 A kind of Vehicle Electronic Control component verifying matching process
CN105681331A (en) * 2016-03-01 2016-06-15 宁波市江北九方和荣电气有限公司 Method for verifying matching of automobile electronic control parts
CN106627489A (en) * 2016-12-09 2017-05-10 广州汽车集团股份有限公司 Method and system for anti-theft authentication of pure electric vehicle
CN107097753A (en) * 2017-05-02 2017-08-29 大陆汽车电子(长春)有限公司 Intelligent key system of vehicle and the method for verifying Vehicular intelligent key
CN107276748B (en) * 2017-06-01 2020-04-03 贵州师范大学 Key derivation method for keyless entry and starting system of automobile
CN107276748A (en) * 2017-06-01 2017-10-20 贵州师范大学 A kind of keyless entry of automobile and the key derivation process of activation system
CN108039946A (en) * 2017-12-12 2018-05-15 贵州航天计量测试技术研究所 A kind of automobile intelligent key safety control system and control method
CN109150514A (en) * 2018-08-30 2019-01-04 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 A kind of wiring method and equipment of key
CN109150514B (en) * 2018-08-30 2021-05-28 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 Key writing method and device
CN109094516A (en) * 2018-09-30 2018-12-28 安徽江淮汽车集团股份有限公司 A kind of automobile anti-theft method and burglary-resisting system
CN109624919A (en) * 2018-12-25 2019-04-16 爱驰汽车有限公司 VATS Vehicle Anti-Theft System configuration method, computer readable storage medium and terminal
CN109849937A (en) * 2019-03-26 2019-06-07 深圳市元征科技股份有限公司 A kind of vehicle device accumulator charging control method and relevant device
CN110271511A (en) * 2019-05-09 2019-09-24 浙江吉利控股集团有限公司 A kind of vehicle safety starting method, device and equipment
CN110254391A (en) * 2019-05-09 2019-09-20 浙江吉利控股集团有限公司 A kind of Anti-theft vehicle starting method, device and equipment
CN113138591A (en) * 2020-01-20 2021-07-20 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 Control method and device of vehicle safety factor, control equipment and automobile
CN112693425A (en) * 2021-01-15 2021-04-23 江西江铃集团新能源汽车有限公司 Vehicle anti-theft method, device, storage medium, vehicle control unit and vehicle
CN113561932A (en) * 2021-07-19 2021-10-29 东风汽车集团股份有限公司 Vehicle engine starting anti-theft authentication control strategy with intelligent key detection function
CN113830024A (en) * 2021-09-22 2021-12-24 中国第一汽车股份有限公司 Anti-theft control method and device for engine
CN114268449A (en) * 2021-11-02 2022-04-01 浙江零跑科技股份有限公司 Important CAN encryption method
CN114268449B (en) * 2021-11-02 2023-08-29 浙江零跑科技股份有限公司 Important CAN encryption method

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