CN103761456A - Anti-cracking method for core code of singlechip - Google Patents
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- G06F21/12—Protecting executable software
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- G06F21/125—Restricting unauthorised execution of programs by manipulating the program code, e.g. source code, compiled code, interpreted code, machine code
Abstract
The invention discloses an anti-cracking method for the core code of a singlechip. The method comprises the following steps: during code execution of the singlechip, generating an interrupt by using an MPU (Microprocessor Unit) memory protection module when executing a specific storage area when a ciphertext code is positioned; during the interrupt, decrypting the ciphertext code into a plaintext code by adopting an AES (Auxiliary Encoder System) module, and transmitting the plaintext code back to the specific storage area after correct CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check); returning from the interrupt, executing the plaintext code in the specific storage area by using the singlechip, and encrypting the plaintext code of the specific storage area into the ciphertext code by using the AES module; after correct CRC, transmitting the ciphertext code to the specific storage area. By adopting the anti-cracking method, the core code in the singlechip exists in the form of the ciphertext, and a cracker cannot translate the core code in the form of the ciphertext into a plaintext even if the core code in the singlechip is read out, thereby protecting the core code.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to single-chip microcomputer code protection technical field, relate in particular to a kind of anti-method cracking of monolithic microcomputer kernel code.
Background technology
Now on the market the technology that cracks of single-chip microcomputer is emerged in an endless stream, mainly contain two kinds of modes: non-intrusion type and immersion.The mode of non-intrusion type is to utilize some leak in chip design or chip programming sequential to crack chip.Certainly along with the development of chip design industry, this kind of situation also can be fewer and feweri.The mode of intrusive mood is to destroy the encapsulation of chip; utilize semiconductor testing apparatus; the instrument such as microscope and micropositioner finds the position of chip protection fuse and by its reparation; make it become the chip of not encrypted; then with Special programming, program is read, or directly probe is placed on to the program in readout memory in chip internal bus.
China Patent Publication No. CN1971470A, open day on May 30th, 2007, the name of invention is called a kind of system encrypted method that adopts multifunctional assistant SCM, this application case discloses a kind of system encrypted method that adopts multifunctional assistant SCM, it is in multidigit processor system, get function relatively simple, the support microprocessor that software program amount is little is used with the built-in single-chip microcomputer of burning program storage to death and is substituted, in host-processor program and assistant SCM program, increase according to the cryptographic check of agreement cryptographic protocol algorithm, calling program can not be read out and cannot copy, thereby reach the object of system encryption.Its weak point is, the code in this single-chip microcomputer is plain code, and cracker can crack by the mode of intrusive mood, the plaintext code in single-chip microcomputer read out, thereby be reduced into higher level lanquage, grasps core technology.
Summary of the invention
The object of the invention is to overcome the technical matters that current single-chip microcomputer is easily cracked by intrusive mood mode; provide a kind of monolithic microcomputer kernel code the anti-method cracking; it makes core code in single-chip microcomputer exist with the form of ciphertext; even if cracker uses intrusive mood, mode has cracked single-chip microcomputer; single-chip microcomputer inner core code is read; also the core code of ciphertext form cannot be translated into expressly, thereby protect core code.
In order to address the above problem, the present invention is achieved by the following technical solutions:
The anti-method cracking of monolithic microcomputer kernel code, described single-chip microcomputer, with MPU memory protect module, AES just part accelerating module, dma module and CRC module, comprises the following steps:
S1: in advance the core code needing protection in single-chip microcomputer is carried out to initial encryption, core code is encrypted to ciphertext code by AES cryptographic algorithm, this ciphertext code is backed up simultaneously, the ciphertext code storage of backup is on the nonvolatile memory of single-chip microcomputer;
S2: in single-chip microcomputer run time version process, when carrying out the particular memory region at one section of ciphertext code place, MPU memory protect module produces an interruption;
S3: the code of the current execution of single-chip microcomputer enters interruption; dma module is transferred to this ciphertext code the appointed area in the volatile memory of single-chip microcomputer; AES just part accelerating module is decrypted into expressly code by the ciphertext code of appointed area; the verification of CRC module is code expressly; if check errors; perform step S4, if verification is correct, perform step S5;
S4: former ciphertext code remains unchanged, dma module can not pass back to plaintext code the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place, and the code of the current execution of single-chip microcomputer is always in interrupting, and interruption cannot be returned;
The particular memory region that S5:DMA module passes back to former ciphertext code place by plaintext code, by former ciphertext code coverage, after expressly code all returns, interrupts returning, and single-chip microcomputer is carried out expressly code;
S6: after expressly code is finished; dma module is transferred to this plaintext code the appointed area in the volatile memory of single-chip microcomputer; AES just part accelerating module becomes ciphertext code by the plaintext code encryption of appointed area; CRC module verification ciphertext code; if check errors; perform step S7, if verification is correct, perform step S8;
S7:DMA module is transferred to the ciphertext code of backup the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place by plaintext code coverage, and after ciphertext code end of transmission, single-chip microcomputer is carried out code below;
S8:DMA module passes back to ciphertext code the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place by plaintext code coverage, and after ciphertext code all returns, single-chip microcomputer is carried out code below;
In the process of execution step S2 to S8, if the power down of unit sheet, the particular memory region that dma module is transferred to former ciphertext code place by the ciphertext code of backup is by the code coverage in current this particular memory region.
In the technical program, MPU (MemoryProtectionUnit; Memory protect unit) memory protect module: can configure specific region internal memory reading and writing and code and carry out, when singlechip chip is carried out the ciphertext core code of specific region, MPU produces an interruption.AES (AdvancedEncryptionStandard; Advanced Encryption Standard) just just just part computing aes algorithm of part accelerating module of part accelerating module: AES, greatly reduces the AES enciphering/deciphering time, and AES can adopt 128/192/256bits key.DMA (DirectMemoryAccess; Direct memory access unit) module: data transmission module, can under CPU sleep quality, transmit data, reduce power consumption and transmission data time.CRC (CyclicRedundancyCheck; Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code) module: data check module, the data after energy verification AES module enciphering/deciphering.
At singlechip chip, move in whole process, the core code overwhelming majority time is all that the form with ciphertext code exists, only have when it is performed, after deciphering verification are correct, just there will be expressly code, and after this plaintext code is finished, can become ciphertext code by re-encrypted again, the time that expressly code occurs is very short.Even if rival uses immersion mode to obtain the binary code of single-chip microcomputer; the core code that in this binary code, we will protect is the ciphertext code of encrypting; rival cannot be reduced into source code, obtains the core code that we will protect, and the value that chip cracks reduces greatly.
Performing step S2 to the process of step S8, if single-chip microcomputer power down, the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place may retain whole plaintext codes or part plaintext code, can cause data entanglement like this, single-chip microcomputer cannot normally be moved next time, the risk that simultaneously exists code to be cracked to read.Therefore when single-chip microcomputer power down, the particular memory region that the ciphertext code of backup is transferred to corresponding former ciphertext code place, by the code coverage in current this particular memory region, prevents that power down, causes data entanglement in the particular memory region plaintext stage.
As preferably, in described step S1, to first core code being divided into some sections before core code initial encryption, the data length of every section of core code is 0 to 1024bytes, then every section of core code is encrypted to ciphertext code by AES cryptographic algorithm respectively.The particular memory region at every execution to section ciphertext code place, MPU memory protect module all produces an interruption, then performs step S3 to S8.The data length of every section of core plaintext code is controlled in 1024bytes, because ciphertext code is identical with corresponding plaintext code data length, the data length of ciphertext code is also in 1024bytes, make single-chip microcomputer carry out each time expressly code and encryption and decryption expressly time of code very short, thereby reduce each section period that expressly code exists, increase the difficulty cracking, improved the security of core code.Meanwhile, even if core code data length is longer, the volatile memory of temporarily depositing plaintext code and ciphertext code does not need too large yet.
As preferably, in described step S1, single-chip microcomputer inner core code initial encryption is comprised the following steps: use computer host computer that the plaintext core code in single-chip microcomputer code is encrypted to ciphertext code by AES cryptographic algorithm, this ciphertext code is transferred to expressly expressly core code covering of the storage area at core code place in single-chip microcomputer scale-of-two recordable paper, and the plaintext CRC key and the ciphertext CRC key that computer host computer are generated add in single-chip microcomputer scale-of-two recordable paper simultaneously.
As preferably, in described step S6, dma module is transferred to plaintext code behind the appointed area in the volatile memory of single-chip microcomputer, removes the plaintext code in the particular memory region of former ciphertext code place.Reduce the section time that expressly code exists, increased the difficulty cracking, improve the security of core code.
As preferably, described AES just part accelerating module adopts 256bits key.
Substantial effect of the present invention is: (1) makes core code in single-chip microcomputer exist with the form of ciphertext; even if cracker uses intrusive mood, mode has cracked single-chip microcomputer; single-chip microcomputer inner core code is read; also the core code of ciphertext form cannot be translated into expressly, thereby protect core code.(2) core code is divided into some sections, the data length of every section of core code is 0 to 1024bytes, make single-chip microcomputer carry out each time expressly code and encryption and decryption expressly time of code shorter, thereby reduce each section period that expressly code exists, increase the difficulty cracking, improved the security of core code.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is a kind of process flow diagram of the present invention.
Embodiment
Below by embodiment, and by reference to the accompanying drawings, technical scheme of the present invention is described in further detail.
Embodiment: the anti-method cracking of a kind of monolithic microcomputer kernel code of the present embodiment, single-chip microcomputer, with MPU memory protect module, AES just part accelerating module, dma module and CRC module, as shown in Figure 1, comprises the following steps:
S1: in advance the plaintext core code in single-chip microcomputer is divided into some sections of expressly codes; every section expressly the data length of code be 0 to 1024bytes; use computer host computer that every section of plaintext code is encrypted to ciphertext code by AES cryptographic algorithm; every section of ciphertext code is transferred to the storage area at corresponding one section of plaintext code place in single-chip microcomputer by one section of plaintext code coverage of correspondence; and plaintext CRC key and ciphertext CRC key are sent to single-chip microcomputer, back up in the back-up storage region that simultaneously these ciphertext codes is transferred to the nonvolatile memory of single-chip microcomputer;
S2: in single-chip microcomputer run time version process, when carrying out the particular memory region at one section of ciphertext code place (first address in this section of ciphertext code storage region), MPU memory protect module produces an interruption;
S3: the code of the current execution of single-chip microcomputer enters interruption; dma module is transferred to this ciphertext code the appointed area in the volatile memory of single-chip microcomputer; AES just part accelerating module is decrypted into expressly code by the ciphertext code of appointed area; the verification of CRC module is code expressly; if check errors; perform step S4, if verification is correct, perform step S5;
S4: former ciphertext code remains unchanged; dma module can not pass back to plaintext code the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place; the plaintext code decrypting is retained in the appointed area in volatile memory; the code of the current execution of single-chip microcomputer is always in interrupting; interruption cannot be returned, single-chip microcomputer cisco unity malfunction;
The particular memory region that S5:DMA module passes back to former ciphertext code place by plaintext code is by former ciphertext code coverage, and former ciphertext code, by full scale clearance, after expressly code all returns, interrupts returning, and single-chip microcomputer is carried out expressly code;
S6: after expressly code is finished; dma module is transferred to this plaintext code the appointed area in the volatile memory of single-chip microcomputer; after end of transmission, remove the plaintext code in the particular memory region of former ciphertext code place; AES just part accelerating module becomes ciphertext code by the plaintext code encryption of appointed area; CRC module verification ciphertext code, if check errors performs step S7; if verification is correct, perform step S8;
S7:DMA module is transferred to the ciphertext code of backup the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place by plaintext code coverage, and after ciphertext code end of transmission, single-chip microcomputer is carried out code below;
S8:DMA module passes back to ciphertext code the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place by plaintext code coverage, and after ciphertext code all returns, single-chip microcomputer is carried out code below;
In the process of execution step S2 to S8, if the power down of unit sheet, the particular memory region that dma module is transferred to corresponding former ciphertext code place by the ciphertext code of backup is by the code coverage in current this particular memory region.
MPU (MemoryProtectionUnit; Memory protect unit) memory protect module: can configure specific region internal memory reading and writing and code and carry out, when singlechip chip is carried out the ciphertext core code of specific region, MPU produces an interruption.AES (AdvancedEncryption Standard; Advanced Encryption Standard) just just just part computing aes algorithm of part accelerating module of part accelerating module: AES, greatly reduces the AES enciphering/deciphering time, and AES can adopt 128/192/256bits key.DMA (DirectMemoryAccess; Direct memory access unit) module: data transmission module, can under CPU sleep quality, transmit data, reduce power consumption and transmission data time.CRC (CyclicRedundancyCheck; Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code) module: data check module, the data after energy verification AES module enciphering/deciphering.
At singlechip chip, move in whole process, the core code overwhelming majority time is all that the form with ciphertext code exists, only have when it is performed, after deciphering verification are correct, just there will be expressly code, and after this plaintext code is finished, can become ciphertext code by re-encrypted again, the time that expressly code occurs is very short.Even if rival uses immersion mode to obtain the binary code of single-chip microcomputer; the core code that in this binary code, we will protect is the ciphertext code of encrypting; rival cannot be reduced into source code, obtains the core code that we will protect, and the value that chip cracks reduces greatly.
In the present embodiment, single-chip microcomputer dominant frequency is 8MHz, and AES just part accelerating module adopts 256bits key, and the data length of the monolithic microcomputer kernel code that protect is 2304bytes.In step S1, be divided into 5 sections of expressly codes, the data length of 5 sections of plaintext codes is respectively 512bytes, 512bytes, 512bytes, 512bytes and 256bytes, the data length of every section of plaintext code is all no more than 512bytes, because ciphertext code is identical with corresponding plaintext code data length, so the data length of every section of ciphertext code is also all no more than 512bytes.
In single-chip microcomputer dominant frequency, be 8MHz, AES just part accelerating module adopts in the situation of 256bits key, for the code of data length 512bytes: the deciphering time is 1.35ms, and the encryption time is 1.35ms, and the code execution time is 0.1ms.It is very short that single-chip microcomputer is carried out the time of plaintext code and encryption and decryption plaintext code each time, thereby reduce each section period that expressly code exists, and increased the difficulty cracking, and improves the security of core code.Meanwhile, even if core code data length is longer, the volatile memory of temporarily depositing plaintext code and ciphertext code does not need too large yet.
Performing step S2 to the process of step S8, if single-chip microcomputer power down, the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place may retain whole plaintext codes or part plaintext code, can cause data entanglement like this, single-chip microcomputer cannot normally be moved next time, the risk that simultaneously exists code to be cracked to read.Therefore when single-chip microcomputer power down, the particular memory region that the ciphertext code of backup is transferred to corresponding former ciphertext code place, by the code coverage in current this particular memory region, prevents that power down, causes data entanglement in the particular memory region plaintext stage.
Claims (5)
1. the anti-method cracking of monolithic microcomputer kernel code, described single-chip microcomputer with MPU memory protect module, AES just part accelerating module, dma module and CRC module, is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
S1: in advance the core code needing protection in single-chip microcomputer is carried out to initial encryption, core code is encrypted to ciphertext code by AES cryptographic algorithm, this ciphertext code is backed up simultaneously, the ciphertext code storage of backup is on the nonvolatile memory of single-chip microcomputer;
S2: in single-chip microcomputer run time version process, when carrying out the particular memory region at one section of ciphertext code place, MPU memory protect module produces an interruption;
S3: the code of the current execution of single-chip microcomputer enters interruption; dma module is transferred to this ciphertext code the appointed area in the volatile memory of single-chip microcomputer; AES just part accelerating module is decrypted into expressly code by the ciphertext code of appointed area; the verification of CRC module is code expressly; if check errors; perform step S4, if verification is correct, perform step S5;
S4: former ciphertext code remains unchanged, dma module can not pass back to plaintext code the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place, and the code of the current execution of single-chip microcomputer is always in interrupting, and interruption cannot be returned;
The particular memory region that S5:DMA module passes back to former ciphertext code place by plaintext code, by former ciphertext code coverage, after expressly code all returns, interrupts returning, and single-chip microcomputer is carried out expressly code;
S6: after expressly code is finished; dma module is transferred to this plaintext code the appointed area in the volatile memory of single-chip microcomputer; AES just part accelerating module becomes ciphertext code by the plaintext code encryption of appointed area; CRC module verification ciphertext code; if check errors; perform step S7, if verification is correct, perform step S8;
S7:DMA module is transferred to the ciphertext code of backup the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place by plaintext code coverage, and after ciphertext code end of transmission, single-chip microcomputer is carried out code below;
S8:DMA module passes back to ciphertext code the particular memory region at former ciphertext code place by plaintext code coverage, and after ciphertext code all returns, single-chip microcomputer is carried out code below;
In the process of execution step S2 to S8, if the power down of unit sheet, the particular memory region that dma module is transferred to former ciphertext code place by the ciphertext code of backup is by the code coverage in current this particular memory region.
2. a kind of monolithic microcomputer kernel code according to claim 1 is prevented the method cracking, it is characterized in that: in described step S1 to first core code being divided into some sections before core code initial encryption, the data length of every section of core code is 0 to 1024bytes, then every section of core code is encrypted to ciphertext code by AES cryptographic algorithm respectively.
3. a kind of monolithic microcomputer kernel code according to claim 1 is prevented the method cracking, it is characterized in that, in described step S1, single-chip microcomputer inner core code initial encryption is comprised the following steps: use computer host computer that the plaintext core code in single-chip microcomputer code is encrypted to ciphertext code by AES cryptographic algorithm, this ciphertext code is transferred to expressly expressly core code covering of the storage area at core code place in single-chip microcomputer scale-of-two recordable paper, the plaintext CRC key and the ciphertext CRC key that computer host computer are generated add in single-chip microcomputer scale-of-two recordable paper simultaneously.
4. according to the anti-method cracking of a kind of monolithic microcomputer kernel code described in claim 1 or 2 or 3, it is characterized in that: in described step S6, dma module is transferred to plaintext code behind the appointed area in the volatile memory of single-chip microcomputer, removes the plaintext code in the particular memory region of former ciphertext code place.
5. according to the anti-method cracking of a kind of monolithic microcomputer kernel code described in claim 1 or 2 or 3, it is characterized in that: described AES just part accelerating module adopts 256bits key.
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