CN103686715B - Lightweight secrete discovery and dissemination method for wireless body area network safety data - Google Patents
Lightweight secrete discovery and dissemination method for wireless body area network safety data Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a lightweight secrete discovery and dissemination method for wireless body area network safety data. The method includes the following stages that at the first stage, a base station performs grouping on sensor nodes, a one-way secrete key Hash chain is created for each sensor node group, and orientation Hash values of the Hash chains are distributed to the sensor nodes of the corresponding groups to serve as secrete keys; at the second stage, the base station executes preprocessing on data packets, and namely the data packets are established and then disseminated; at the third stage, after receiving the data packets, the sensor nodes recover group information included in the data packets, judge whether the received data packets are legal or not and finally process the received data packets according to a judging result. The method has the advantages of resisting sensor node compromise, being high in robustness in the aspects of packet loss and out-of-sequence of data packet transmission, not needing time synchronization between the base station and the sensor nodes and the process that digital signatures are used for guiding identity authentication and allowing dynamic data.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the technical field of radio communication, particularly to a kind of safe number of wireless body area network of lightweight secret
It is found that with distribution method.
Background technology
Wireless body area network（Wireless Body Area Networks or Wireless Body Sensor
Networks）It is a kind of special sensing network, it can detect in real time and report by implanting the human body sensor in human body
Ask for sick leave the physiological situation of people, the data by network transmission for the medical personnel, understand the health status of patient in time, to patient's
Health treatment brings great convenience.After wireless body area network deployment completes, in order to adjust the configuration parameter of sensor node
Or distribute administration order and solicited message to sensor node, often need to transmit data by wireless link.
Existing wireless body area network data finds and distribution method, and sensor node can periodically broadcast its own preservation
Data summarization（Summary), and by contrast the data summarization receiving and the data summarization of itself carry out broadcast cycle
Adjustment.The data summarization receiving when sensor node than the data summarization old times itself preserving, sensor node will broadcast from
The data summarization of body；When the data summarization receiving is newer than its data summary, sensor node is plucked updating the data of itself
Will；When the data summarization receiving is identical with its data summary, sensor node will extend broadcast cycle to save energy.This
Existing wireless sensor network finds and transmission method a bit, can guarantee that the reliability of data transfer, but but have ignored data
Find the safety with communication process.In hostile environment, attacker can be by initiating eavesdropping attack, Denial of Service attack etc.
Multiple malicious attacks changing or to replace the valid data of sensor node, wrong data is incorporated into sensor network or deletes
Except the significant data on sensor node.These attacks can cause immeasurable loss to wireless body area network, so for no
Line body area network, the data of safety finds and communicationss seem particularly significant.
Content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to overcoming shortcoming and the deficiency of prior art, provide a kind of wireless body area of lightweight secret
Net secure data finds and distribution method（It is named as CoDrip, similarly hereinafter）, this technology ensure that data finds and distribution procedure
Efficiency and safety.
The implication that relevant technical term in the present invention represents is as follows：
Ki,jThe numbering of expression jth group sensor node is the one-pass key hash chain node of i；
diRepresent the content of i-th data item；
E (X, K) expression carries out symmetric cryptography with symmetric key K to data item X；
D (X, K) expression symmetric key K is decrypted to data item X；
H (.) represents one-pass key hash function；
H (M) represents the cryptographic Hash of data item M；
PiRepresent the packet of i ＆ lt distribution；
| | represent concatenation operation.
The purpose of the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions：
First stage：In the program initialization stage, sensor node is grouped by base station, simultaneously for each group of sensor node
Generate an one-pass key hash chain, finally by the orientation cryptographic Hash of each bar hash chain（committed value of the
key chain）Distribute to the sensor node of corresponding group.
Second stage：Base station executes the pretreatment of packet, that is, build packet, then distributes data item.
Phase III：Sensor node recovers group information that this packet comprised after receiving packet and judges
Whether the packet of described reception is legal, finally according to the packet receiving described in judged result process.
The described first stage comprises the steps：
A. sensor node is grouped away from size with the jump between base station by base station according to sensor node to be disposed, and jumps
Away from identical sensor node at same group；
B. a random number is chosen for each group in base station, and respectively generates one for seed numeral using function H (.) with random number
Bar length is the one-way hash chain of b, and the wherein value of b is arbitrary integer, but must be greater than sending out in the life cycle of base station
The data item sum sending, in hash chain, each hash chain nodal value passes through H by its previous hash chain nodal value as parameter
(.) function calculates（The cryptographic Hash of first hash chain node passes through H (.) function meter by the random number chosen as parameter
Calculate）, in hash chain, last cryptographic Hash is orientation cryptographic Hash；
C. utilize the hash chain in B, the orientation cryptographic Hash of each hash chain is distributed to respective sensor node group
Sensor node is as key（This key is used for sensor node and the packet receiving is decrypted）；
D.CoDrip four-tuple（order,key,version,data）Represent each data item, four parameter meanings
As follows：order（Rank）Value represents data distribution rank（Rank is higher, data distribution（data dissemination）More
Newly）, key（Marking variable）Value is the unique mark needing more new variables, version（Version number）New and old for representing data
Version number（Version value is bigger, and data is newer）, data (data value) then represents the data value of propagation（As parameter, order or
Request）.Key and version could be arranged to 2 bytes and 4 byte longs.From longer byte number, such as 4 bytes are as order
Length, can avoid packet in network life cycle, occur in the cincture in real number space（wrap around）Existing
As.In addition, if base station employs sliding window mechanism, then can select only 4 bit lengths, it is to avoid because in real number space
Numerical value cincture occurs（wrap around）And produce ambiguity.Such windowing mechanism requires base station to do more process, therefore needs
Will be in the bit length of order（The i.e. transport overhead of CoDrip）Select to make balance and the process load of base station between.
Described second stage comprises the following steps：
I. function E ({ d is passed through in base stationi,Ki,1},Ki-1,1)||...||E({di,Ki,N},Ki-1,N) to data item to be distributed
Carry out symmetric cryptography, wherein diFor data item to be distributed, Ki,j(1≤j≤N) accepts after packet for objective sensor node
Key value to be updated, Ki-1,j(1≤j≤N) is the key of each layer of succession（The i.e. key of objective sensor node storage）.
Ki,j, Ki-1,jIt is by the cryptographic Hash on hash function H (.) each hash chain calculated.Base station utilizes sensor node
On data key bag carry out the detailed process of symmetric cryptography and be：Base station utilizes objective sensor node existing key logarithm
Carry out symmetric cryptography according to bag, described packet comprise data item to be distributed with and objective sensor node successfully accept data item
Key value to be updated afterwards.Last base station will be distributed to the data carrying out symmetric cryptography of each objective sensor node
Bag links together one new packet of composition, wherein, each packet institute of linking together in a distribution procedure
The data item comprising is same data item.
Using broadcast mode when II. will distribute data to all the sensors node when base station, data to be distributed gives some special
Using multicast communication pattern during fixed sensor node, when using multicast communication pattern, objective sensor node need to be according to number
Carry out the authenticity and integrity that H (.) computing to determine packet according to the data on item aiming field
The described phase III includes as follows：
A. the key K that sensor node is had using itselfi-1,1The packet receiving is decrypted, decrypting process is such as
Under：After the packet that base station sends is sent to objective sensor node, objective sensor node utilizes the key of the storage of itself
Each packet wherein linking together is deciphered one by one, only through the key encryption of objective sensor node storage
The packet crossed could be by objective sensor node successful decryption；Specifically formula is：
D(E({di,Ki,1},Ki-1,1),Ki-1,1)={di,Ki,1}
B. the data distribution rank carrying out packet after successful decryption compares, and key step is as follows：
1）If the order value of new packet is bigger than the order value of storage on sensor node, execution step
2）Otherwise execution step 5）；
2）If the K having on sensor nodei-1,1Follow with the key K of the new packet receivingi,1For parameter, by Hash
The cryptographic Hash that function H (.) is derived is identical, then execution step 3）Otherwise execution step 4）；
3）Sensor node is by key Ki,1Replace original key Ki-1,1If the version in data item is new,
Sensor node updates the data, otherwise execution step 4）；
4）Abandon this packet；
5）If the order value of new packet is equal with the order value being stored on sensor node, sensor node
Increase the time interval of broadcast data packet according to Trickle algorithm, otherwise the packet of its own storage of sensor node broadcasts.
On the basis of multiple one-pass key hash chains, Drip is expanded to a safety, lightweight, secrecy and
Resisting abnegation service aggression（Denial-of-Service,DoS）The data attacked finds and distribution method.
In CoDrip, a plurality of hash chain is set up by operation below execution：Base station selection is N number of（The group of sensor node
Number）Different random seed numerals, and start to calculate a length for b one-way hash chain from these seed numerals.Wherein,
B-i hash function value is by j-th random seed numeral（I.e. Kb,j）Derive, and be expressed as Ki,j.The length of each chained list
Degree can arbitrarily change, but can not less than base station want in network lifecycle distribute data item number.Kth
Orientation cryptographic Hash K of individual key chaino,jCorresponding jump away from for j, its just sensor node key as jth group, base simultaneously
Standing using this key is that the packet being sent to jth group sensor node carries out symmetric cryptography, then goes out packet delivery again
Go.CoDrip can provide instant certification in the case of not producing data delay, even if the feelings compromised in some sensor nodes
Under condition, CoDrip still can guarantee that the safety that data finds and propagates.
Wireless body area network has the base station of a fixation and the sensor node that a large amount of mobility is strong, and sensor node
Resource be very limited amount of.Therefore in the discovery of wireless body area network data and transmission method, controlled using Trickle algorithm
System, sensor node periodically broadcasts the data summarization that it has.If all the sensors node data is consistent, broadcast
Time interval increases exponential type so that save energy, whereas if there being sensor node to detect other sensors node
Have updated data, the time interval of broadcast will reduce.This characteristic easily by attacker using with initiate refusal service etc. malice
Attack；CoDrip remains legacy data discovery and the advantage of transmission method, adds the mechanism such as symmetric cryptography it is ensured that counting simultaneously
It is found that efficiency and the safety with communication process.
It is found that CoDrip sets up a number using limited resource on wireless human body sensor for wireless body area network and divides
The security mechanism sent out.Its key property includes the authenticity and integrity guarantee of data it is ensured that data carry mechanism, dynamic data
Support, energy consumption is efficient（With respect to communication and calculating）, low storage overhead, data security, delay-tolerant and instant certification, anti-evil
Meaning is attacked（As node is compromised and Denial of Service attack）.
The present invention passes through system initialisation phase, packet pretreatment stage data bag Qualify Phase, and three phases are complete altogether
Become.In system initialisation phase, base station is based on multiple Hash chain building keys；In packet pretreatment stage, base station according to
Need the data sending, based on multiple Hash chain building packets and complete symmetric cryptography, and to whole network broadcast data packet；
In packet checking stage, each sensor node checks the verity of packet and completes the renewal of data.Described secure data
Find and transmission method is it is contemplated that the resource limit of sensor node, the problems such as data-bag lost data bag is out-of-sequence, Neng Gou
There is provided instant certification without in the case of data buffering time delay, such as Denial of Service attack, Denial of Service attack etc. can be resisted simultaneously
Malicious attack.
The operation principle of the present invention：The present invention is based on multiple hash chains, and famous wireless sensor network data is found
And transmission method（Drip）Carry out security extension, the wireless body area network secure data realizing lightweight secret finds and distribution method
（CoDrip）；In CoDrip, multiple hash chains are set up by operation below execution：Base station selection is N number of（Sensor node
Group number）Different random seed numerals, and start to calculate a length respectively for b one-way hash chain from these seed numerals.
Wherein, the b-i hash function value is by j-th random seed numeral（I.e. Kb,j）Derive, and be expressed as Ki,j.Each chain
The length of table can arbitrarily change, but can not less than base station want in network lifecycle distribute data item number
Mesh, last orientation cryptographic Hash K of k-th key chaino,jCorresponding jump away from for j, it is just as jth group sensor node
Key, simultaneously base station using the key on this group sensor node, the packet being sent to jth group sensor node is carried out symmetrically
Then packet delivery is gone out by encryption again.CoDrip can provide instant certification in the case of not producing data delay.Even if
In the case that some sensor nodes are compromised, still can guarantee that the safety that data finds and propagates.
The present invention has such advantages as with respect to prior art and effect：
（1）The compromise of opposing sensor node：As long as the sensor node do not compromised still is connectable to base station, then
No matter the number of compromise sensor node is how many, agreement can be resisted sensor node and be compromised.
（2）On the transmission of packet loss data bag is out-of-sequence, there is high robust：In going out of wireless sensor network high frequency
Existing packet loss data bag transmits out-of-sequence phenomenon, and this requires Protocol Design tolerance high packet loss and transmission can lose on to greatest extent
Sequence.
（3）No time synchronized between base station and sensor node：Must not seeking time synchronization between base station and sensor node.Cause
This, the data Inter-arrival Time time need not be done any it is assumed that just can be at once to institute when sensor node receives packet
State the packet receiving to be authenticated.
（4）It is not required to guide authentication process itself using digital signature：Directly pass through multiple hash chains calculating symmetrical accordingly
Key is mated, and this just takes full advantage of on each sensor node computing capability in advance and avoids digital signature
Energy consumption.
（5）Allow dynamic data：Base station does not need to know the complete information of each broadcast data item in advance, thus improve
Quantity of information.
Brief description
Fig. 1 is that the wireless body area network secure data of lightweight secret of the present invention finds the flowchart with distribution method.
Fig. 2 is the structural representation that multiple hash chains produce N number of key.
Specific embodiment
With reference to embodiment and accompanying drawing, the present invention is described in further detail, but embodiments of the present invention do not limit
In this.
Embodiment
As shown in figure 1, CoDrip is divided into system initialization, the checking three phases of packet pretreatment data bag, tool
Body is：
First stage：Sensor node is grouped by base station, creates an one-way sealing for each sensor node group simultaneously
Key hash chain, and the orientation cryptographic Hash of hash chain is distributed to the sensor node of corresponding group as key.
Second stage：Base station executes the pretreatment of packet, that is, build packet, then packet distribution again.
Phase III：Sensor node recovers group information that this packet comprised after receiving packet and judges
Whether the packet of described reception is legal, finally according to the packet receiving described in judged result process.
In system initialisation phase, according to sensor node, with the jump between base station, away from size, sensor node is divided by we
Group, jumps and assigns to same group it is assumed that there being N group away from identical sensor node.Before sensor node is deployed, base station builds such as
Under N number of hash chain（Each group of sensor node corresponds to a hash chain）.Base station is each sensor node component corresponding
Not Xuan Qu random number as seed numeral, and to start to calculate a length respectively from these seed numerals be the unidirectional Kazakhstan of b
Uncommon chain.As shown in Figure 2（The b-i hash function value is by j-th random seed numeral（I.e. Kb,j）Derive, and be expressed as
Ki,j）. the length of each chained list can arbitrarily change, but can not less than base station want in network lifecycle distribute
Data item number.
Orientation cryptographic Hash K of last k-th key chaino,jCorresponding jump away from for j, it will be in deployment sensor node
It is preassigned sensor node to jth group as key before.
In CoDrip, using four-tuple（order,key,version,data）To represent each data item, wherein to join
Number order（Order）Represent the rank of data distribution（Rank is higher, and data distribution is newer）, key（Marking variable）Value is needs
The unique mark of more new variables, version（Version number）The version number new and old for representing data（Version value is bigger, data
Newer）, data (data value) then represents the data value of propagation（As parameter, order or request）.Key and version can set
It is set to 2 bytes and 4 byte longs., from longer byte number, such as 4 bytes, packet can be avoided in network taking order as a example
In life cycle, occur in the cincture in real number space（wrap around）Phenomenon.In addition, if base station employs sliding window
Mouth mechanism, then can select only 4 bit lengths, it is to avoid because numerical value cincture in real number space（wrap around）And
Produce ambiguity.Such windowing mechanism requires base station to do more and processes the bit length it is therefore desirable in order（I.e.
The transport overhead of CoDrip）Select to make balance and the process load of base station between.
After completing system initialisation phase, enter packet pretreatment stage.If base station is wanted to distribute data item d=
{ order, key, version, data }, it will (i.e. sensor of interest section accepts by joint data item d and the key inherited
The key updating after packet) generating packet, and need the key with inheriting（I.e. objective sensor node group is close
Key）By symmetric cryptosystem come encrypted data item.More specifically, i-th data item（di={orderi,keyi,versioni,
datai}）It is distributed to the encrypted result of N group objective sensor node（Pi）As follows：
Pi=E({di,Ki,1},Ki-1,1)||...||E({di,Ki,N},Ki-1,N)
Wherein 1≤i≤b, orderi=i.Different from DIP and DHV, each of Drip data item is independently to distribute
With broadcast.Therefore, in Drip agreement, base station can send all of biography to by the data that the pattern of broadcast will be distributed
Sensor node is it is also possible to pass to special several sensor nodes by multicast communication pattern.In the latter, objective sensor node
Identification information be included on the head of packet, i.e. aiming field on packet.As described above, each cryptographic Hash function H (.)
The authenticity and integrity to guarantee packet for the aiming field of calculating packet.
Three phases are the packet authentication stages.Taking to the data verification being sent to first group of packet as a example（Other heat
The packet authentication process of point group sensor node is similar to）.When receiving a packet（Use PiRepresent）（Come from phase
Away from one jump away from any one sensor node or base station）, each sensor node, referred to as Sk, will be from PiUpper retrieval
Go out correct group information（I.e. sensor node will explain correct region E ({ di,Ki,1},Ki-1,1) and then utilize key Ki-1,1
Come by executing function
D(E({di,Ki,1},Ki-1,1),Ki-1,1)={di,Ki,1}
Packet is decrypted.Then sensor node SkExecution following steps：
1）If the order value of new packet is bigger than the order value of storage on sensor node, execution step 2）Otherwise
Execution step 5）；
2）If the K having on sensor nodei-1,1Follow with the key K of the new packet receivingi,1For radix, by Hash
The cryptographic Hash that function H (.) is derived is identical, then execution step 3）Otherwise execution step 4）；
3）Sensor node is by key Ki,1Replace original key Ki-1,1If the version of packet is new, passes
Sensor node is according to key updating data, otherwise execution step 4）；
4）Abandon this packet；
5）If the order value of new packet is equal with the order value being stored on sensor node, sensor node
Increase the time interval of broadcast data packet according to Trickle algorithm, otherwise the packet of its own presence of sensor node broadcasts.
The Qualify Phase of packet can also be described below：
Sensor node SiRecover the new packet P receivingoGroup information and whether just judge the purpose group of packet
Really, if the described group information receiving is correct, sensor node SiExecution is following to be operated：
A. if new data distribution（The order that i.e. packet comprisesiThan storage on sensor node<
orderi-1,Ki-1,1>Orderi-1Value is new）, then sensor node SkJudge the new key K receivingi,1Whether have
Ki-1,1The cryptographic Hash derived.If it is, the authenticity and integrity of explanation packet（By using suitable block encryption mould
The method of formula）It is guaranteed, sensor node SkReceiving data bag, otherwise packet will be abandoned.The K of storagei-1,1Will be by
Ki,1Replace.If version is new, then sensor node SkAccording to the key updating data of packet, otherwise sensor
Node SkThis packet will be abandoned.
If B. sensor node SkListen to a discernible packet（It is the order comprising in this packeti
With original storage<orderi-1,Ki-1,1>Value identical）, then it will increase this data of broadcast by Trickle algorithm
Bag time interval, thus save energy consumption while ensureing network consistency.
If C. this data distribution is old（It is the orderi comprising in this packet than original storage<
orderi-1,Ki-1,1>Value old that is to say, that be separated by one jump away from the packet sent out of sensor node be old）, then pass
Sensor node SkThe packet that it had originally will be broadcasted.
Above-described embodiment is the present invention preferably embodiment, but embodiments of the present invention are not subject to above-described embodiment
Limit, other any spirit without departing from the present invention and the change made under principle, modification, replacement, combine, simplify,
All should be equivalent substitute mode, be included within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. the wireless body area network secure data of lightweight secret finds and distribution method is it is characterised in that include following three rank
Section：
First stage：Sensor node is grouped by base station, creates an one-pass key for each sensor node group simultaneously and breathes out
Uncommon chain, and the orientation cryptographic Hash of hash chain is distributed to the sensor node of corresponding group as key；Specifically include following
Step：
Jump is assigned to same group away from identical sensor node by A1, base station, and chooses one for each sensor node group
Individual random number is as seed numeral；
B1, base station utilize the seed numeral producing in step A1 to build a unidirectional Kazakhstan for each sensor node group corresponding
Uncommon chain, as hash chain cephalomere point value, other hash chain nodal values are by its previous hash chain nodal value as ginseng for seed numeral
Number is input in hash function and is calculated, and last nodal value of hash chain referred to as orients cryptographic Hash, the wherein length of hash chain
Degree have to be larger than the total number of the data item distributed in the life cycle of base station；
C1, the orientation cryptographic Hash producing in step B1 is distributed to the sensor node of corresponding sensor node group, as
Key is used for the packet receiving is decrypted backward；
D1, system use each data item of quadruple notation；
Second stage：Base station executes the pretreatment of packet, then packet distribution again；
Phase III：Sensor node recovers group information that this packet comprised after receiving packet and judges described
Whether the packet receiving is legal, finally according to the packet receiving described in judged result process.
2. the wireless body area network secure data of lightweight secret according to claim 1 finds and distribution method, its feature
It is, described in step D1, four-tuple is respectively：Rank, marking variable, version number's data value；Wherein rank represents data item
Data distribution rank, marking variable represents the unique mark of needs more new variables, and version number represents the new and old of data, data value
Represent the data value of data item.
3. the wireless body area network secure data of lightweight secret according to claim 1 finds and distribution method, its feature
It is, described second stage comprises the following steps：
A2, base station carry out symmetric cryptography using the data key bag in objective sensor node；
B2, when will distribute data to all the sensors node when base station using broadcast mode, data to be distributed gives some specific
Using multicast communication pattern during sensor node, when using multicast communication pattern, objective sensor node need to be according to data item
The authenticity and integrity to determine packet for the data on aiming field being comprised.
4. the wireless body area network secure data of lightweight secret according to claim 3 finds and distribution method, its feature
It is, the base station described in step A2 carries out the detailed process of symmetric cryptography using the data key bag on sensor node
For：Base station carries out symmetric cryptography using objective sensor node existing data key bag, and described packet comprises to distribute
Data item with and objective sensor node successfully accept data item after key value to be updated；Last base station will be distributed to
The packet carrying out symmetric cryptography of each objective sensor node links together and constitutes a new packet, wherein,
The data item that each packet linking together in a distribution procedure is comprised is same data item.
5. the wireless body area network secure data of lightweight secret according to claim 1 finds and distribution method, its feature
It is, the described phase III comprises the following steps：
A3, sensor node are decrypted to the packet receiving using the key itself storing；
The data-level carrying out packet after B3, successful decryption compares.
6. the wireless body area network secure data of lightweight secret according to claim 5 finds and distribution method, its feature
It is, the concrete mistake that the sensor node described in step A3 is decrypted to the packet receiving using the key itself storing
Cheng Wei：After the packet that base station sends is sent to objective sensor node, objective sensor node utilizes the close of the storage of itself
Key is deciphered one by one to each packet wherein linking together, and only the key through objective sensor node storage adds
The packet of close mistake could be by objective sensor node successful decryption.
7. the wireless body area network secure data of lightweight secret according to claim 5 finds and distribution method, its feature
It is, step B3 is specially：
If the data distribution class value of the new packet of B31 is than data distribution class value original on sensor node greatly, hold
Row step B32, otherwise execution step B35；
If the cryptographic Hash that the key value of the new packet receiving of B32 is obtained after being calculated by hash function is with sensor node
The key value preserving is identical, then execution step B33, otherwise execution step B34；
B33, sensor node replace original key value with the key value in the new packet receiving, if the version number of packet
It is new, then sensor node updates the data, otherwise execution step B34；
B34, abandon this packet；
If the data distribution class value of the new packet of B35 is equal with data distribution class value original on sensor node,
Sensor node increases the time interval of broadcast data packet according to Trickle algorithm；Otherwise broadcast the packet itself having.
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| CN114079877B (en) * | 2020-08-13 | 2023-05-09 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Group communication method and system based on hierarchical symmetric key pool |
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| 面向异构传感器网络的层级多哈希链认证机制研究;闫文耀 等;《现代电子技术》;20130930;第36卷(第17期);全文 * |
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