CN103179679A - Method for binding secure channel and open channel - Google Patents
Method for binding secure channel and open channel Download PDFInfo
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- CN103179679A CN103179679A CN201110432202XA CN201110432202A CN103179679A CN 103179679 A CN103179679 A CN 103179679A CN 201110432202X A CN201110432202X A CN 201110432202XA CN 201110432202 A CN201110432202 A CN 201110432202A CN 103179679 A CN103179679 A CN 103179679A
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Abstract
The invention provides a method for binding a secure channel and an open channel. The method comprises the steps of enabling an initiator to send a first random number generated by the initiator to a responder through the secure channel; enabling the responder to receive the first random number through the secure channel, generate a second random number and channel binding information and send the channel binding information to the initiator through the open channel; enabling the initiator to receive the channel binding information, and determining whether the channel binding information comes from the responder within a secure channel working range of the initiator by verifying the channel binding information; and after confirming establishment of binding relations of the secure channel and the open channel of both sides, enabling the both sides to establish connection of the open channel on the basis of channel binding, and starting the next communication interactive process. According to the method, the binding relations of the secure channel and the open channel of the two communication sides are totally confirmed before establishment of the connection of the open channel, and accordingly abnormal connection does not occur in communication of the follow-up open channel.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to wireless communication field, in particular, relate to the method for escape way and open channel binding in wireless communication field.
Background technology
Development along with the communication technology, function integrated in equipment is become stronger day by day, and can possess simultaneously the module of other any escape ways such as being applicable to magnetic, sound, light in equipment and be applicable to the module of other any open channels such as 2.4GHz radio frequency, WiFi, ZigBee, bluetooth.In the mobile electronic payment technical field, become a kind of widely used mobile payment application system with the 2.4GHz close distance radio frequency communication system of magnetic channel.
Under normal circumstances, the 2.4GHz close distance radio frequency communication system with magnetic channel carries out radio-frequency communication between an initiator and the responder in initiator's magnetic channel working range.The communication process of described 2.4GHz close distance radio frequency communication system with magnetic channel is generally, at first the initiator sends one by magnetic channel and comprises the activation query message requesting of random number to the responder, the responder is activated after receiving described activation query message requesting by magnetic channel, sends a radio-frequency responsive message ATI by the radio-frequency channel described activation query messages is made radio-frequency responsive.Communication two party does not usually directly calculate the running parameter of described radio-frequency responsive message ATI with the random number of carrying in described activation query message requesting, but the running parameter that calculates described radio-frequency responsive message ATI with monotonic transformation result or the partial bytes in described random number monotonic transformation result of described random number.typically used the partial bytes that activates in the entrained random number monotonic transformation result of query message requesting to calculate the running parameter of radio-frequency responsive message ATI with the 2.4GHz close distance radio frequency communication system of magnetic channel, this kind mode had both realized the rapid configuration of 2.4GHz radio frequency link running parameter, guarantee again not can the magnetic leakage passage transmits due to the opening of 2.4GHz radio-frequency channel random number information itself, make the random number transmitted by magnetic channel also reusable in other fail safe purposes such as key agreements, thereby improved the transmission utilization ratio of magnetic channel data.
But, aforesaid way has brought a potential problem: when having a plurality of initiators to work in simultaneously in same environment, when calculating ATI radio-frequency responsive running parameter, although the random number of contiguous each self-generating of initiator is fully different, be based on the random number that generates separately and the part data byte that is actually used in the monotonic transformation result that generates might be identical.In case this situation occurs be close to the initiator and can use identical radio frequency operation parameter to remove to receive ATI, use the contiguous initiator of same radio frequency running parameter just might receive the ATI that is positioned at the responder outside its magnetic channel working range, thereby setting up radio frequency with responder outside its magnetic channel working range is connected, make this radio frequency access and transaction have uncertainty, so-called " the abnormal connection " namely occured.The probability that above-mentioned " the abnormal connection " occurs in theory is 1/2
8n, n is the byte number that is actually used in described random number monotonic transformation result.N is 2 bytes in typical case, and the probability that above-mentioned " the abnormal connection " occurs is 1/2
16Although probability is very little, in case occur might cause mistake to swipe the card, therefore must take measures to avoid the generation of this kind situation.
For the settling mode of " abnormal connect ", described 2.4GHz close distance radio frequency communication system with magnetic channel is originally that the transactional stage after " the abnormal connection " may occur connects whether to exist extremely for this and judges.This mode belongs to the detection mode afterwards after " connection " occurs, and needs the hysteresis certain hour just can judge.Therefore when an exchange hour very in short-term, just may be through with detecting " the abnormal connection " transaction before, so there is certain hidden danger.
Therefore, need to propose a kind of method, occur between communication initiator and the communication responder in described initiator's safety communication scope the generation of fundamentally having stopped above-mentioned abnormal connection to guarantee that open communication connects; Further, after the binding relationship establishment of confirming between escape way and open channel, communication two party binds to set up the connection of open channel based on passage, thereby has guaranteed that subsequent communications is to carry out between the entity that passage has been bound.
Summary of the invention
In order to address the above problem, the present invention proposes a kind of method of escape way and open channel binding, and this escape way and open channel comprise escape way and open channel, and the method comprises the steps:
A, initiator generate one first random number, and by described escape way, described the first random number are sent to the responder;
B, responder receive described the first random number by escape way, generate one second random number and passage binding information, and by described open channel, described passage binding information being sent to the initiator, wherein said passage binding information is comprised of described the second random number and mac authentication code Mac1 at least;
C, initiator receive described passage binding information, determine that by verifying described passage binding information whether described passage binding information is from the responder in initiator's escape way working range;
After D, the binding relationship between the described escape way of confirmation and described open channel were set up, communication two party bound to set up the connection of open channel based on passage, begin the communication reciprocal process of next step open channel.
Described escape way is the channel that utilizes magnetic, sound or light to communicate, and described open channel is the channel that utilizes 2.4GHz radio frequency, WiFi, ZigBee or bluetooth to communicate.
The step that obtains mac authentication code in described passage binding information in step B is specially: the responder directly generates MAC key K ey1 as MAC key K ey1 or based on the first random number that is received with the first random number that is received, and utilize described MAC key K ey1 to carry out the MAC computing to comprising at least described the second random number at one section interior clear data, obtain the mac authentication code Mac1 of described clear data; The responder with described clear data and mac authentication code Mac1 thereof together as described passage binding information.Preferably, described clear data is " the second random number || responder's unique identification "; Perhaps, described clear data is " the second random number || responder's unique identification || responder's version information ", wherein " || " expression concatenation; The responder is take described the first random number of receiving as effective secret key bits, inserts 1 mode to this odd parity bit of 7 or even parity bit according to every 7, obtains MAC key K ey1; The CBC encryption mode of block cipher is used in described MAC computing, take MAC key K ey1 as encryption key, described clear data is encrypted operation; Get the partial bytes of encrypted result as mac authentication code Mac1, preferably, get a left side 4 bytes of encrypted result as mac authentication code Mac1.
The step of verifying described in step C is specially: the initiator adopts the mode same with the responder, directly generate MAC key K ey2 as MAC key K ey2 or based on the first random number that oneself produces with the first random number that oneself produces, and utilize described MAC key K ey2, described clear data the passage binding information that receives from the responder is carried out the MAC computing same with the responder, obtain initiator's mac authentication code Mac2; The described mac authentication code Mac2 that the initiator will calculate and the described Mac identifying code Mac1 from the passage binding information that the responder receives compare, if both are identical, think that the binding relationship of described open channel and described escape way sets up, otherwise think mistake has occured, the initiator is interrupted the reciprocal process of follow-up open channel immediately, restarts the passage binding.
Described the first random number and the second random number are the random number that is not less than 2 bytes.Preferably, described the first random number is the random number of 14 bytes, and described the second random number is the random number of 5 bytes.
Described escape way is magnetic channel, open channel is the 2.4GHz radio-frequency channel, in steps A the initiator by magnetic channel activate query message requesting with described the first random number pass to the responder, in step B, the responder activates query message requesting by described magnetic channel and receives described the first random number, and in the radio-frequency responsive message ATI of described request, the passage binding information being sent to the initiator by the radio-frequency channel, in step C, the initiator receives described passage binding information in the radio-frequency responsive message ATI of described request by the radio-frequency channel.
After confirming that binding relationship between magnetic channel and radio-frequency channel is set up, communication two party adopts the new running parameter of using in the passage binding procedure that is different to carry out follow-up radio-frequency communication, and described running parameter is comprised of RF spot and radio frequency address at least; Perhaps, after confirming that binding relationship between magnetic channel and radio-frequency channel is set up, communication two party is based on described the second random number and described the first random number calculated for subsequent radio-frequency communication running parameter, and described running parameter is comprised of RF spot and radio frequency address at least; Perhaps after confirming that binding relationship between magnetic channel and radio-frequency channel is set up, communication two party comes calculated for subsequent radio-frequency communication running parameter based on described the second random number, and described running parameter is comprised of RF spot and radio frequency address at least.
take with the 2.4G close distance radio frequency communication system of magnetic channel as example, technical scheme provided by the invention does not need to change the existing communication flow of this communication system, do not increase large extra binding expense yet, just carry a passage binding information in the communication responder's who receives magnetic channel message radio-frequency responsive message, just can guarantee that described 2.4G close distance radio frequency communication system with magnetic channel setting up radio frequency and confirm before connecting unique binding relationship of the magnetic channel that the radio-frequency channel is corresponding with it, thereby thoroughly stopped the generation of possible radio frequency " the abnormal connection " situation.
Description of drawings
The flow chart of the magnetic channel that Fig. 1 provides for one embodiment of the invention and radio-frequency channel binding.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, principle of the present invention and feature are described, example only is used for explaining the present invention, is not be used to limiting scope of the present invention.
The present invention goes for the binding between other any open channels such as other any escape ways such as magnetic, sound, light and 2.4GHz radio frequency, WiFi, ZigBee, bluetooth.
For the ease of understanding the present invention, the below is only with the magnetic channel of the 2.4GHz close distance radio frequency communication system of magnetic channel and the binding between the radio-frequency channel, and namely escape way is take magnetic channel as example, and open channel describes take the 2.4GHz radio-frequency channel as example.
The initiator produces one first random number R N1 and by magnetic channel message, described the first random number R N1 is sent to the responder, the responder receives described the first random number R N1 by this magnetic channel, and send radio-frequency responsive message to this initiator, comprise a passage binding information in this radio-frequency responsive message, after the initiator receives this radio-frequency responsive message, judge that by described passage binding information whether radio-frequency responsive is from correct radio-frequency responsive side.The binding relationship of radio-frequency channel and magnetic channel is set up if the verification passes, otherwise thinks wrong radio-frequency responsive has occured, and interrupts immediately radio-frequency communication reciprocal process, restarts the passage binding.Idiographic flow as shown in Figure 1.
Step 100: the initiator generates the first random number R N1.Better, RN1 is the random number that is not less than 2 bytes.In the present embodiment, RN1 is 14 byte random numbers.
Step 200: the initiator sends to the responder by magnetic channel with described the first random number R N1, and the responder receives described the first random number R N1 by magnetic channel.
Better, the initiator activates query message requesting by magnetic channel, and described the first random number R N1 is passed to the responder; The responder activates query message requesting by described magnetic channel, receives described the first random number R N1.
Step 300: the responder generates the second random number R N2.Better, RN2 is the random number that is not less than 2 bytes; In the present embodiment, RN2 is 5 byte random numbers.
Step 400: the responder generates the passage binding information, comprises following substep:
Step 401: generate the MAC key: the responder directly generates MAC key K ey1 as MAC key K ey1 or based on the first random number R N1 that receives from magnetic channel with the first random number R N1 that receives from magnetic channel; Better, the responder is take the RN1 that receives as effective secret key bits, inserts 1 mode to this odd parity bit of 7 or even parity bit according to every 7, obtains MAC key K ey1; Perhaps, be 14 bytes (112 s') RN1 for length, according to 1 mode to this odd parity bit of 7 or even parity bit of every 7 insertions, obtain the long MAC key K ey1 of 16 bytes (128);
Step 402:MAC computing: the responder uses this MAC key K ey1, carries out the MAC computing to comprising at least described the second random number R N2 at one section interior clear data PD, obtains the mac authentication code Mac1 of described PD.
Better, described clear data PD is RN2||UID, wherein, " || " expression concatenation, UID is responder's unique identification;
Better, described clear data PD is RN2||UID||Version, wherein, " || " expression concatenation, UID is responder's unique identification, Version is responder's version information;
Better, the CBC encryption mode of block cipher is used in described MAC computing, take Key1 as encryption key, PD is encrypted operation;
Better, the CBC encryption mode of the grouping cryptographic algorithms such as DES/3DES or AES is used in described MAC computing, take Key1 as encryption key, PD is encrypted operation;
Better, get the partial bytes of encrypted result as the Mac1 identifying code;
Better, get a left side 4 bytes of encrypted result as the Mac1 identifying code.
Step 500: the responder sends to the initiator as the passage binding information by the radio-frequency channel together with described cleartext information PD and mac authentication code Mac1 thereof, and the initiator receives described passage binding information and obtains described cleartext information PD and mac authentication code Mac1 by the radio-frequency channel.
Better, the responder together as passage binding information sends to initiator with described cleartext information PD and mac authentication code Mac1 thereof by the radio-frequency channel in the radio-frequency responsive message ATI of described request, the initiator receives described passage binding information and obtains described cleartext information PD and mac authentication code Mac1 in the radio-frequency responsive message ATI of described request by the radio-frequency channel.
Step 600: the initiator calculates channel authentication information, comprises following substep:
Step 601: calculate the MAC key: the initiator adopts the mode same with the responder, directly generates MAC key K ey2 as MAC key K ey2 or based on the first random number R N1 with the first random number R N1;
Step 602:MAC computing: the initiator uses the MAC key K ey2 that oneself generates, and the described clear data PD the passage binding information that receives from the responder is carried out the MAC computing same with the responder, obtains initiator's mac authentication code Mac2.
Step 700: checking passage binding information: the described mac authentication code Mac2 that the initiator will calculate and the described Mac identifying code Mac1 from the passage binding information that the responder receives compare, if both are identical, think that the binding relationship of radio-frequency channel and magnetic channel sets up, otherwise think wrong radio-frequency responsive has occured, the initiator is interrupted follow-up radio frequency reciprocal process immediately, restarts the passage binding.
Step 800: radio-frequency communication: after the binding relationship establishment of confirming between magnetic channel and radio-frequency channel, communication two party is bound to set up radio frequency based on passage and is connected, and begins next step radio-frequency communication reciprocal process.
Better, after the binding relationship establishment of confirming between magnetic channel and radio-frequency channel, communication two party adopts the new running parameter of using in the passage binding procedure that is different to carry out follow-up radio-frequency communication, and described running parameter is comprised of RF spot and radio frequency address at least;
Better, after confirming that binding relationship between magnetic channel and radio-frequency channel is set up, communication two party comes calculated for subsequent radio-frequency communication running parameter based on described RN2 and described RN1, and described running parameter is comprised of RF spot and radio frequency address at least;
Better, after confirming that binding relationship between magnetic channel and radio-frequency channel is set up, communication two party comes calculated for subsequent radio-frequency communication running parameter based on described RN2, and described running parameter is comprised of RF spot and radio frequency address at least.
Use said method provided by the invention, thereby because can receiving correct random number, each responder who only is within initiator's magnetic channel working range produces correct channel authentication information, thereby being positioned at other responders outside initiator's magnetic channel working range can't receive correct random number and can't produce correct channel authentication information, therefore the initiator by verifying the channel authentication information of returning from the radio-frequency channel, just can judge whether the radio-frequency channel has unique binding relationship with magnetic channel.
Due to the binding relationship that can confirm easily and reliably between magnetic channel and radio-frequency channel and communication two party, especially whether magnetic channel and the radio-frequency channel of full confirmation communication two party have the binding corresponding relation before radio frequency connects foundation, thereby have guaranteed that the situation of " the abnormal connection " can not appear in follow-up radio-frequency communication.
The above is only preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is in order to limit the present invention, within the spirit and principles in the present invention not all, any modification of doing, is equal to replacement, improvement etc., within all should being included in protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. the method for an escape way and open channel binding, comprise the steps:
A, initiator generate one first random number, and by described escape way, described the first random number are sent to the responder;
B, responder receive described the first random number by described escape way, generate one second random number, generate MAC key K ey1 with described the first random number R N1 as MAC key K ey1 or based on described the first random number R N1, utilize described MAC key K ey1 to carry out the MAC computing to the clear data that comprises described the second random number, obtain the mac authentication code Mac1 of described clear data, described clear data and mac authentication code Mac1 are sent to the initiator as the passage binding information;
C, initiator receive described passage binding information, generate MAC key K ey2 with described the first random number as MAC key K ey2 or based on described the first random number, utilize described MAC key K ey2 to carry out the MAC computing to described clear data, obtain mac authentication code Mac2;
D, initiator more described mac authentication code Mac2 and described Mac identifying code Mac1, if both are identical, described passage binding information is from the responder in initiator's escape way working range, the binding of described open channel and described escape way is set up, and the initiator is connected the connection of open channel with the responder.
Escape way according to claim 1 and open channel the binding method, it is characterized in that, in steps A the initiator by magnetic channel activate query message requesting with described the first random number pass to the responder, in step B, the responder activates query message requesting by described magnetic channel and receives described the first random number.
Escape way according to claim 1 and open channel the binding method, it is characterized in that, describedly generate MAC key K ey1 based on described the first random number R N1 and comprise that the responder take described the first random number of receiving as effective secret key bits, inserts 1 mode to this odd parity bit of 7 or even parity bit according to every 7 and obtains described MAC key K ey1.
4. the method for escape way according to claim 1 and open channel binding, is characterized in that, described clear data is " the second random number || responder's unique identification "; Perhaps, described clear data is " the second random number || responder's unique identification || responder's version information ", wherein " || " expression concatenation.
5. the method for escape way according to claim 1 and open channel binding, is characterized in that, the CBC encryption mode of block cipher is used in described MAC computing, take MAC key K ey1 as encryption key, described clear data is encrypted operation.
6. the method for escape way according to claim 5 and open channel binding, is characterized in that, gets the partial bytes of encrypted result as mac authentication code Mac1.
7. the method for escape way according to claim 5 and open channel binding, is characterized in that, gets a left side 4 bytes of encrypted result as mac authentication code Mac1.
Escape way according to claim 1 and open channel the binding method, it is characterized in that, in step B, the responder sends to initiator in the radio-frequency responsive message of described query messages with the passage binding information by the radio-frequency channel, in step C the initiator by the radio-frequency channel at the described passage binding information of the radio-frequency responsive message sink of described query messages.
9. the method for escape way according to claim 1 and open channel binding, is characterized in that, described escape way is magnetic channel, and open channel is the 2.4GHz radio-frequency channel.
Escape way according to claim 9 and open channel the binding method, it is characterized in that, after binding relationship between described magnetic channel and described radio-frequency channel is set up, initiator and responder are based on described the first random number and/or described the second random number and calculate next step radio-frequency communication running parameter, and described running parameter is comprised of RF spot and radio frequency address at least.
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| CN116248280B (en) * | 2023-05-09 | 2023-07-28 | 北京智芯微电子科技有限公司 | Anti-theft method for security module without key issue, security module and device |
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Application publication date: 20130626 |
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