CN103124257B - Security alliance management method and equipment - Google Patents
Security alliance management method and equipment Download PDFInfo
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- CN103124257B CN103124257B CN201110371551.5A CN201110371551A CN103124257B CN 103124257 B CN103124257 B CN 103124257B CN 201110371551 A CN201110371551 A CN 201110371551A CN 103124257 B CN103124257 B CN 103124257B
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of Security Association (SA) creation method, the SA creation methods include:The first router finds from the Key Table of itself and r is recorded corresponding to the second router, and generates random number N once values;The first router generates key identification KeyID and sub-key Ks using the Nonce values and the record r by pseudo-random function prf.The invention also discloses a kind of SA management equipments, can not only effectively solve the problems, such as Replay Attack in RSVP TE protocol securitys using the present invention, and it is compatible with Key Table, RSVP TE protocol ciphers can be achieved and automatically update, so that work arrangements is more convenient, efficient.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to safe practice, more particularly to one kind are route in communication network field for being based on Traffic Engineering extensions
RSVP (Resource ReSerVation Protocol-Traffic Engineering, RSVP-TE) peace
Full alliance's (Security Association, SA) management method and equipment.
Background technology
RSVP (Resource ReSerVation Protocol, RSVP) is initially that Internet engineerings are appointed
Business group (Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF) is service quality (Quality of Service, QoS)
A signaling protocol defining of integrated service model, in stream (flow) institute through being that the stream carries out resource reservation on path,
So as to meet the qos requirement of the stream.
RSVP protocol is a signaling protocol carried in Internet protocol (Internet Protocol, IP), and it permits
Perhaps terminal system or main frame establish reservation bandwidth path among each other on any one end of router network, are the data on network
Transmission makes a reservation for and guaranteed qos.RSVP protocol is for needing to ensure the business of bandwidth and time delay, such as voice transfer, video conference
Have a very important role.
RSVP-TE agreements are the extended versions of RSVP protocol, and the primary demand of RSVP-TE protocol securitys is integrity protection
And preventing playback attack.RSVP-TE agreements need the interaction routing iinformation between node, to safeguard resource reservation information.Because RSVP-
TE protocol messages transmit in the public network, and the channel of transmission RSVP-TE protocol messages is shared by multiple network nodes, so attacking
The person of hitting can easily intercept and forgery/alteration RSVP-TE protocol messages;Router once receives this wrong RSVP-
TE protocol messages, it will the resource reservation of mistake is carried out, so as to influence the normal work of RSVP-TE agreements.Asked to solve this
Topic, it is necessary to integrity protection mechanism is provided for RSVP-TE agreements, to prevent attacker's forgery/alteration route messages.However, only
Attack problem of the attacker to RSVP protocol can not be fully solved by only providing integrity protection mechanism;Attacker is also possible to reset
One out-of-date RSVP-TE protocol message, the resource reservation that now router is safeguarded according to out-of-date RSVP-TE protocol messages are believed
Breath is wrong, and these problems will all have a strong impact on the normal work of RSVP-TE agreements.
For the demand for security of RSVP-TE agreements, IETF RFC2747 propose a kind of RSVP-TE integrity protection and resisted
The mechanism of Replay Attack.Its basic thought is:Define RSVP-TE integrity protection and preventing playback attack object (INTEGRITY
) and corresponding Security Association Object;RSVP-TE agreements calculate INTEGRITY Object using this Security Association
Value, so as to reach the purpose of integrity protection and preventing playback attack.The INTEGRITY Object that IETF RFC2747 are defined
It is as follows:
Wherein, sequence number (Sequence Number) field is used for preventing playback attack, and the eap-message digest (Keyed encrypted
Message Digest) field is then for depositing message authentication code, to message progress integrity protection;Key identification (Key
Identifier, KeyID) field then be used for search Security Association corresponding to integrity protection and preventing playback attack object.
The Security Association of RSVP-TE protocol definitions includes following field:Identifying algorithm (Authentication
Algorithm), key (Key), life cycle (Lifetime), interface (Interface), source address (Source
Address), finally transmit Sequence Number (Latest Sending Sequence Number) and last N number of sequence number table
(List of Last N Sequence Numbers).In these fields, Authentication Algorithm, Key and
Lifetime fields are used for integrity protection;Interface and Source Address fields are used to identify one section of Security Association;
Latest Sending Sequence Number and List of Last N Sequence Numbers fields are used for anti-playback
Attack.
This internal security mechanism of RSVP-TE agreements, can solve integrity protection and preventing playback attack well
Problem.However, it is inadequate only to define Security Association and certification object, RSVP-TE protocol security mechanism also needs to solve such as
Lower problem:
(1) each Security Association has life cycle.To improve the performance that RSVP-TE agreements use internal authentication object,
It is generally necessary to which the short key of low intensity safe to use generates RSVP-TE protocol authentication data, this way causes RSVP protocol
There is certain life span in Security Association, after Security Association is expired, RSVP-TE agreements need to be updated Security Association.
(2) the Sequence Number times of RSVP-TE protocol definitions grow after can repeat.Work as Sequence
When Number repeats, attacker will likely carry out Replay Attack, and this also requires the Sequence in RSVP-TE agreements
Number carries out the renewal of Security Association before repeating, that is, needs to carry out key updating.
It can be seen that above-mentioned two problems require that RSVP-TE agreements carry out key updating, simplest key updating mechanism is
Renewal manually, but the workload updated manually is very big, is unfavorable for actual deployment.
Therefore, IETF RFC2747 suggest using Kerberos agreements, to carry out the Security Association pipe of RSVP-TE agreements
Reason.However, the Security Association management that RSVP-TE agreements are carried out using Kerberos agreements still suffers from the following deficiency:
Firstth, Kerberos agreements are mainly used in generic security service (Generic Security Service, GSS)
To solve the problems, such as service security in agreement, do not define how to carry out the specific of key updating using Kerberos agreements
Mechanism;Secondth, Kerberos agreements and Key Table is incompatible;3rd, Kerberos agreements service dependent on Kerberos
Device, configuration are complicated;4th, the key updating timing of Kerberos agreements can not solve the problems, such as Replay Attack well.
The content of the invention
In view of this, it is a primary object of the present invention to provide a kind of SA management methods and equipment, can not only effectively solve
Replay Attack problem in RSVP-TE protocol securitys, and can be compatible with Key Table, realize effective to the SA of RSVP-TE agreements
Management, so that work arrangements is more convenient, safe and efficient.
To reach above-mentioned purpose, the technical proposal of the invention is realized in this way:
The invention discloses a kind of Security Association (SA) creation method, including:
The first router finds from the Key Table of itself and r is recorded corresponding to the second router, and generates random number
Nonce values;
The first router generates key identification using the Nonce values and the record r by pseudo-random function
KeyID and sub-key Ks.
Further, after the first router generation Nonce values, before generation KeyID and Ks, this method also includes:
The first router using the local key identification LocalKeyID in the record r and the Nonce values as
Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields in SMO objects.
Further, after the first router generation KeyID and Ks, this method also includes:
The KeyID of the generation and Ks is write local RSVP-TE SA storehouses by the first router.
Further, the first router is generated using the Nonce values and the record r by pseudo-random function
KeyID and Ks include:
Using Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the Nonce values and the record r, pass through puppet respectively
Random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate
(prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generates KeyID and Ks.
The invention also discloses a kind of SA method for building up, including:
The first router creates SA, generates SMO objects;And sent to the second router and carry SMO objects, INTEGRITY
The RSVP-TE protocol messages of object;
After the second router receives RSVP-TE protocol messages, according to what is carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages
SMO objects are found from the Key Table of the second router itself records r with identical in the first router, utilizes first
Router creates the random number N once values generated during SA and described record r and generates KeyID and Ks by pseudo-random function, and
The integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages is verified using the KeyID and Ks of generation, is then returned to the first router and carries institute
State the response message of SMO objects;
After the first router receives the response message, respective handling is carried out to the response message.
Further, the second router according to the SMO objects carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages from secondary route
Found in the Key Table of device itself includes with identical record r in the first router:
Key of the second router in the SMO objects carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages
Identifier fields, from the Key Table of the second router itself in lookup and the Key Identifier fields
Hold corresponding PeerKeyID fields, and the Key according to the PeerKeyID fields found from the second router itself
Found in Table and record r with identical in the first router;
Wherein, the content of the Key Identifier fields is what the first router was found during SA is created
LocalKeyID fields in record r corresponding to the second router;The length of the Key Identifier fields is 16.
Further, the second router using Nonce values and the record r by pseudo-random function generation KeyID with
Ks includes:
The second router is by the value and Nonce of Key, PeerKeyID and Interface in the record r
Value, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) respectively
KeyID and Ks is generated with Ks=truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)).
Further, the second router verifies the complete of the RSVP-TE protocol messages using the KeyID and Ks of generation
Property includes:
The second router creates SA corresponding with the SA that the first router creates using the KeyID and Ks of generation, so
The SA created afterwards using the second router itself verifies the integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;After being verified, life is used
Into KeyID and Ks change the value of corresponding K eyID and Ks field in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses.
Further, after the first router receives the response message, respective handling bag is carried out to the response message
Include:
After the first router receives the response message of the carrying SMO objects, if in the SMO objects acknowledged receipt of
Key Identifier fields send consistent with oneself, then the first router and the second router are successfully established SA.
Further, the second router verifies the complete of the RSVP-TE protocol messages using the KeyID and Ks of generation
Property includes:
The second router creates SA corresponding with the SA that the first router creates using the KeyID and Ks of generation, so
The SA created afterwards using the second router itself verifies the integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;After being verified, generate with
Machine number Nonce2 values, and by the value of Key, PeerKeyID and Interface in the record r and Nonce values and described
The Nonce2 values of generation, respectively by pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID,
Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce,
Nonce2 KeyID and Ks)) is generated;Corresponding K eyID and Ks in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses are changed using the KeyID and Ks of generation
The value of field, the value of Nonce fields in SMO objects is then changed to Nonce2 values;
Wherein, the Nonce values are generated by the first router when creating SA.
Further, after the first router receives the response message, respective handling bag is carried out to the response message
Include:
After the first router receives the carrying Nonce values and the response message of SMO objects, if acknowledge receipt of
Key Identifier fields in SMO objects sent with oneself it is consistent, then by Key, PeerKeyID in the record r
Nonce2 values with Interface value and the Nonce values and the SMO objects, pass through pseudo-random function respectively
KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate
(prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generate KeyID and Ks, and using generation KeyID and
Ks changes the value of corresponding K eyID and Ks field in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses.
The present invention further discloses a kind of SA update methods, the first router and the existing identical of the second router
SA1;This method includes:
The first router creates SA, generates SMO objects;And sent to the second router and carry SMO objects, INTEGRITY
The RSVP-TE protocol messages of object;
After the second router receives the RSVP-TE protocol messages that the first router is sent, existing SA1 is used
Verify the integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;After being verified, according to the SMO carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages
Object is found from the Key Table of the second router itself records r with identical in the first router, utilizes Nonce values
KeyID and Ks is generated by pseudo-random function with the record r;Then returned to the first router and carry the SMO objects
Response message;
After the first router receives the response message, respective handling is carried out to the response message.
Further, the second router according to the SMO objects carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages from secondary route
Found in the Key Table of device itself includes with identical record r in the first router:
Key of the second router in the SMO objects carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages
Identifier fields, from the Key Table of the second router itself in lookup and the Key Identifier fields
Hold corresponding PeerKeyID fields, and the Key according to the PeerKeyID fields found from the second router itself
Found in Table and record r with identical in the first router;
Wherein, the content of the Key Identifier fields is what the first router was found during SA is created
LocalKeyID fields in record r corresponding to the second router;The length of the Key Identifier fields is 16.
Further, the second router using Nonce values and the record r by pseudo-random function generation KeyID with
Ks includes:
The second router is by the value and Nonce of Key, PeerKeyID and Interface in the record r
Value, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) respectively
KeyID and Ks is generated with Ks=truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce));Use generation
KeyID and Ks creates SA corresponding with the SA of the first router establishment, and the KeyID of generation and Ks is updated into local RSVP-TE
The value of corresponding K eyID and Ks field in SA;
Wherein, the Nonce values are generated by the first router when creating SA.
Further, after the first router receives the response message, respective handling bag is carried out to the response message
Include:
After the first router receives the response message of the carrying SMO objects, if in the SMO objects acknowledged receipt of
Key Identifier fields send consistent, then that use generates KeyID and the local RSVP-TE SA storehouses of Ks renewals with oneself
Middle corresponding K eyID and Ks fields value.
Further, the second router using Nonce values and the record r by pseudo-random function generation KeyID with
Ks includes:
The second router generates Nonce2 values, by Key, PeerKeyID and Interface's in the record r
Value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values of the generation, pass through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf respectively
(Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID,
Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks;The KeyID of generation and Ks is updated into phase in local RSVP-TE SA
The value of KeyID and Ks fields is answered, creates SA corresponding with the SA that the first router creates;And by Nonce fields in SMO objects
Value is changed to Nonce2 values;
Wherein, the Nonce values are generated by the first router when creating SA.
Further, after the first router receives the response message, respective handling bag is carried out to the response message
Include:
After the first router receives the carrying Nonce values and the response message of SMO objects, if acknowledge receipt of
Key Identifier fields in SMO objects sent with oneself it is consistent, then by Key, PeerKeyID in the record r
Nonce2 values with Interface value and the Nonce values and the SMO objects, pass through pseudo-random function respectively
KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate
(prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generate KeyID and Ks, and using generation KeyID and
Ks changes the value of corresponding K eyID and Ks field in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses.
The invention also discloses a kind of SA to create equipment, including:Searching modul and generation module;Wherein,
The searching modul, for being found from the Key Table of the first router itself corresponding to the second router
Record r;
The generation module, for generating Nonce values, generate KeyID and Ks.
Further, the generation module is additionally operable to:
The KeyID of the generation and Ks is write into local RSVP-TE SA storehouses;By the LocalKeyID in the record r and
The Nonce values are as the Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields in SMO objects.
The invention also discloses a kind of SA to establish equipment, including:First searching modul, the first generation module, first send
Module, the first receiving module, the first authentication module, the second searching modul, the second generation module, the second sending module, second connect
Receive module, the second authentication module;Wherein,
First searching modul, it is corresponding for searching the second router from the Key Table of the first router itself
Record r;
First generation module, it is connected with first searching modul and first authentication module, for generating
Nonce values, value and the Nonce values using Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the record r, lead to respectively
Cross pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=
Truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generates KeyID and Ks;By in the record r
LocalKeyID and the Nonce values pass through Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields in SMO objects;And by life
Into KeyID and Ks write local RSVP-TE SA storehouses;
First sending module, it is connected with first generation module, SMO is carried for being sent to the second router
The RSVP-TE protocol messages of object, INTEGRITY objects, wherein, the SMO objects generate when creating SA by the first router;
Second receiving module, sent for receiving through first sending module forwarding, described the first router
The RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second searching modul, it is connected with second generation module, for the Key from the second router itself
Found in Table and record r with identical in the first router;
Second generation module, it is connected with second searching modul and second authentication module, for utilizing
The value and the Nonce values of Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the record r, pass through pseudo-random function respectively
KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate (prf
(Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generation KeyID and Ks;The KeyID of generation and Ks is write into local RSVP-
In TE SA storehouses;And the value of Nonce fields in SMO objects is changed to Nonce2 values;
Second authentication module, it is connected with second generation module, for KeyID and the Ks checking using generation
The integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second sending module, it is connected with second generation module, institute is carried for being returned to the first router
State the response message of SMO objects;
First receiving module, for receiving carrying that the second router returns, described from second sending module
The response message of the SMO objects;
First authentication module, it is connected with first receiving module, for verifying the response message received
Whether Key Identifier fields in the SMO objects of carrying and the Key Identifier fields oneself sent are consistent.
Further, second generation module, is additionally operable to:Generate Nonce2 values, and utilization the record r in Key,
PeerKeyID and Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=respectively
Truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key,
PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks;
First generation module, is additionally operable to:After first authentication module is verified, using the Key in the record r,
PeerKeyID and Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=respectively
Truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key,
PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks.
Further, first searching modul, first generation module, first sending module, described first connect
Module and first authentication module are received, positioned at the first router side or is arranged in the first router;
Second searching modul, second generation module, second sending module, second receiving module and
Second authentication module, positioned at the second router side or is arranged in the second router.
The present invention further discloses a kind of SA more new equipments, including:First searching modul, the first generation module, first
Sending module, the first receiving module, the first authentication module, the second searching modul, the second generation module, the second sending module,
Two receiving modules, the second authentication module;Wherein,
First searching modul, it is corresponding for searching the second router from the Key Table of the first router itself
Record r;
First generation module, it is connected with first searching modul and first authentication module, for generating
Nonce values, value and the Nonce values using Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the record r, lead to respectively
Cross pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=
Truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generates KeyID and Ks;By in the record r
LocalKeyID and the Nonce values pass through Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields in SMO objects;And by life
Into KeyID and Ks write local RSVP-TE SA storehouses;
First sending module, it is connected with first generation module, SMO is carried for being sent to the second router
The RSVP-TE protocol messages of object, INTEGRITY objects, wherein, the SMO objects are that the first router generates when creating SA
's;
Second receiving module, sent for receiving through first sending module forwarding, described the first router
The RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second authentication module, it is connected with second receiving module, for KeyID and the Ks checking using generation
The integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second searching modul, it is connected with second authentication module, for the Key from the second router itself
Found in Table and record r with identical in the first router;
Second generation module, be connected with second searching modul, for using the Key in the record r,
LocalKeyID and Interface value and the Nonce values, pass through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate- respectively
48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID,
Interface, Nonce)) generation KeyID and Ks;The KeyID of generation and Ks is write in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses;And will
The value of Nonce fields is changed to Nonce2 values in SMO objects;
Second sending module, it is connected with second generation module, institute is carried for being returned to the first router
State the response message of SMO objects;
First receiving module, for receiving carrying that the second router returns, described from second sending module
The response message of the SMO objects;
First authentication module, it is connected with first receiving module, for verifying the response message received
Whether Key Identifier fields in the SMO objects of carrying and the Key Identifier fields oneself sent are consistent.
Further, second generation module, is additionally operable to:Generate Nonce2 values, and utilization the record r in Key,
PeerKeyID and Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=respectively
Truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key,
PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks;
First generation module, is additionally operable to:After first authentication module is verified, using the Key in the record r,
PeerKeyID and Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=respectively
Truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key,
PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks.
Further, first searching modul, first generation module, first sending module, described first connect
Module and first authentication module are received, positioned at the first router side or is arranged in the first router;
Second searching modul, second generation module, second sending module, second receiving module and
Second authentication module, positioned at the second router side or is arranged in the second router.
To sum up, method and apparatus provided by the invention utilizes Key based on the key updating mechanism inside RSVP-TE agreements
Father's key Key defined in the Table and sub-key Ks used during the Nonce values generation communicating pair router generated at random,
And the KeyID fields of RSVP-TE agreements that RFC2747 is defined, thus create SA, and based on the SA of establishment come realize to for
The SA of RSVP-TE agreements effective management;Attacked in this way, not only efficiently solving integrality in RSVP-TE protocol securitys with playback
Problem is hit, and it is compatible with Key Table, realize and the SA of RSVP-TE agreements is effectively managed, so that work arrangements is more just
It is prompt, safe and efficient.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the schematic flow sheet of Security Association of the present invention (SA) creation method;
Fig. 2 is the schematic flow sheet of SA method for building up of the one embodiment of the invention based on folk prescription Nonce;
Fig. 3 is the schematic flow sheet of SA update method of the one embodiment of the invention based on folk prescription Nonce;
Fig. 4 is the structural representation that SA of the present invention creates equipment;
Fig. 5 is the structural representation that SA of the present invention based on folk prescription Nonce establishes equipment;
Fig. 6 is the structural representation of the present invention more new equipments of the SA based on folk prescription Nonce.
Embodiment
The present invention basic thought be:It is corresponding that the first router finds the second router from the Key Table of itself
Record r, and generate random number N once values;The first router using the Nonce values and the record r by puppet with
Machine function prf generates KeyID and Ks, completes local SA establishment.
SA management alleged by the present invention includes but is not limited to:Router creates and is based on folk prescription between SA, two routers
Nonce or both sides Nonce is established between SA and two router based on folk prescription Nonce or both sides Nonce renewals SA.Specifically
Content will be described in detail in corresponding embodiment below.
Before SA management methods proposed by the present invention and equipment are introduced, first to RSVP-TE Security Association pipe
Manage object (SA Management Object, SMO) and carry out following related setting, so that SMO is used in cipher key management procedures.
RSVP-TE protocol messages are made up of a protocol header and a series of object, wherein, RSVP-TE protocol headers
(common header) is defined by RFC2205, and common header form is as follows:
Wherein, illustrating for each field can be found in RFC2205 in common header.Generally, RSVP-TE protocol headers
Determine the type of RSVP-TE protocol messages.
The object included in RSVP-TE protocol messages has multiple, and the basic format of each object is as follows:
Wherein, Class-Num and C-Type is used to identify the object and its type in specific RSVP-TE protocol messages, its
Illustrate and can be found in RFC2205.At present, RFC2205 has been defined for 1~15 Class-Num, and RFC2750,
Some new Class-Num of RFC3936, RFC4495 and RFC5946 complementary definition.
The Class-Num values that SMO objects are set in the present invention are 65, represent SMO objects;It should be noted that Class-
Num value can also be set as other values, such as 63,70 etc., as long as not equal to setting value.
The present invention is defined as follows to C-Type fields:
C-Type=1 represents that this object is used for the request message that SA is established based on folk prescription Nonce;
C-Type=2 represents that this object is used for the response message that SA is established based on folk prescription Nonce;
C-Type=3 represents that this object is used for the request message that SA is established based on both sides Nonce;
C-Type=4 represents that this object is used for the response message that SA is established based on both sides Nonce;
C-Type=5 represents that this object is used for the request message based on personal nocne renewals SA;
C-Type=6 represents that this object is used for the response message based on personal nocne renewals SA;
C-Type=7 represents that this object is used for the request message based on both sides Nonce renewals SA;
C-Type=8 represents that this object is used for the response message based on both sides Nonce renewals SA.
The present invention is defined as follows to object context (Object Contents) field:
Object Contents fields include two parts content:Part I is 16bit Key Identifier words
Section, for interacting the entry r in Key Table;Part II is 64bit Nonce fields, for interacting Nonce values, with
Generate RSVP-TE SA key.
It should be noted that Key Identifier fields selection 16bit be in order to the Key defined in Key Table
Identifier is compatible;And Nonce fields selection 64bit is also a kind of specific embodiment;During practical application, Nonce
Field can also be other length, specifically be produced by random number/timestamp, wherein byte-aligned, random number generation function and when
Between stab all be influence the value size factor, the generating process of Nonce values is prior art means, be will not be repeated here.
The invention provides a kind of SA management methods and equipment, below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiment, the present invention is entered
Row describes in detail.
Embodiment of the method
Embodiment one
Fig. 1 shows SA creation methods schematic flow sheet of the present invention, as shown in figure 1, specific steps include:
Step 101:The first router finds from the Key Table of itself and r is recorded corresponding to the second router, and raw
Into Nonce values;
Specifically, the first router finds from the Key Table of itself r is recorded corresponding to the second router first,
And 64bit random number N once values are generated at random.
It should be noted that the first router searches record r corresponding to the second router and generation random number N once values two
Individual operation can be carried out simultaneously, be not restricted to time order and function order.
Step 102:The first router is generated using the Nonce values and the record r by pseudo-random function prf
KeyID and Ks;
Specifically, the first router passes through pseudo-random function (Pseudo- using the Nonce values and the record r
Random Function, PRF) prf generation RFC2747 defined in RSVP-TE agreements KeyID fields and Ks.
Generation method is as follows:Ks=truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)), KeyID
=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)), the input field of prf functions is explained as follows:
Key is that the Key in r is recorded in Key Table, and LocalKeyID is the local key identification field in record r, and Nonce is step
The Nonce values generated in rapid 101;Wherein, truncate-48 represents to intercept 48 above from the result of prf functions generation;
Truncate when generating Ks represents the key for needing to intercept corresponding length according to algorithm in RSVP-TE SA agreements, conventional
Algorithm is HMAC-MD5 algorithms or HMAC-SHA-1 algorithms in RSVP-TE SA agreements.
After completing step 101 and step 102, that is, complete local RSVP-TE SA establishment.
Further, after step 101, before step 102, the creation method of the SA may also include:
Using the content of the local key identification LocalKeyID fields recorded in r as the Key in SMO objects
Identifier fields, and using the Nonce values generated in step 101 as the Nonce fields in SMO objects, thus form
One SMO object.
Further, after step 102, the creation method of the SA may also include:
The information such as KeyID, Key by generation write local RSVP-TE SA storehouses.
It should be noted that during local RSVP-TE SA are created, it is also necessary to SA other fields are generated, these
In field, RSVP-TE SA identifying algorithm by corresponding algorithm field definitions in Key Table, RSVP-TE SA's
Lifetime fields are defined by corresponding field in Key Table.Initial Sequence Number fields generate at random, other words
The management method of section can refer to RFC2747.
After SA and SMO objects are created, the method generation INTEGRITY objects that RFC2747 defines are reused, and according to
The method generation Hello objects and Common Header information that RFC3209 is defined;Wherein, the type of Hello objects is request;
INTEGRITY objects are generated by SA.
Embodiment two
In the present embodiment, when the first router is to the second router first RSVP-TE protocol message of transmission, both sides only match somebody with somebody
The shared item being equipped with Key Table, without establishing SA.In addition, a piece of news of both sides' interaction is typically Hello.Need
It is noted that Hello message is not to be defined Hello message by RSVP-TE protocol definitions, traditional RSVP protocol;
Hello message is defined by RFC3209.Therefore, the present embodiment introduces first by taking the Hello interacting messages of RSVP-TE agreements as an example
Between router and the second router how the method for establishing SA based on folk prescription Nonce in Hello message;The present embodiment provides
The method that SA is established based on folk prescription Nonce be also suitable in other RSVP-TE protocol messages.
In the present embodiment, message 112 that the first router interacts with the second router and message 114 it is content-defined such as
Under:
Fig. 2 shows the schematic flow sheet of SA method for building up of the one embodiment of the invention based on folk prescription Nonce, such as Fig. 2 institutes
Show, specific steps include:
Step 201:The first router creates SA, generates SMO objects;And sent to the second router carry SMO objects,
The message 112 of INTEGRITY objects;
Specifically, before message 112 is sent, the first router creates one with reference first to the step in embodiment one
SA;Then, the message 112 for carrying SMO objects, INTEGRITY objects and Hello and asking object is sent to the second router;Its
In, the value of C-Type fields is 1 in SMO objects.
Step 202:After the second router receives message 112, KeyID and Ks is generated, and test using the KeyID and Ks of generation
The integrality of message 112 is demonstrate,proved, is then returned to the first router and carries SMO objects, INTEGRITY objects and Hello responses pair
The response message of elephant, i.e. message 114;
Specifically, after the second router receives message 112, check and SMO objects are included in message, and find SMO pairs
As middle C-Type fields value be 1, be known that the first router wish and oneself using based on folk prescription Nonce method create
SA.Then, the second router handles message 112 in accordance with the following steps:
Step a1:The second router obtains LocalKeyID fields from the SMO objects in message 112, should
LocalKeyID fields correspond to the reciprocity key identification PeerKeyID words in the Key Table databases of the second router itself
Section, therefore the second router is looked for according to PeerKeyID fields can from the Key Table databases of the second router itself
R is recorded to identical in the first router;Then, RSVP-TE SA are calculated using the same procedure used with the first router
KeyID fields and Ks, wherein, PeerKeyID fields corresponding to LocalKeyID fields, i.e.,:Utilize the first router
Key, PeerKeyID and Interface in the Nonce values and the record r generated during SA are created, passes through pseudo-random function
KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate (prf
(Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generation KeyID and Ks, and SA corresponding to generation, so, the second router
Also create corresponding SA;
Step b1:The second router verifies the integrality of message 112 using the SA of above-mentioned generation;If the verification passes, and
And the SA of the second router accreditation the first router generation, then directly perform step step c1;If checking not by or the
Corresponding Key Table records are not present on two routers, then the second router sets Object Contents in SMO objects
0 is set to, or after Key Identifier fields only are arranged into 0, then performs step c1;
Step c1:The value of C-Type fields in the SMO objects received is changed to 2 by the second router, reuses RFC2747
The method generation INTEGRITY objects of definition, the method defined according to RFC3209 generate HELLO objects and Common Header
Information, wherein, the type of Hello objects is request;INTEGRITY objects are generated by SA.Response message can be thus generated,
That is message 114.
After message 112 has been handled, the second router by the message 114 that above-mentioned steps c1 is generated be sent to the first via by
Device.
Step 203:After the first router receives message 114, message 114 is handled accordingly;
Specifically, after the first router receives message 114, nonce and Key in SMO objects in inspection message 114
It is consistent whether Identifier fields send with oneself, to confirm whether the second router is recognized the SA of oneself establishment;Such as
Both fruits are consistent, then the first router and the second router have just been successfully established SA;Otherwise, then SA establishes failure.
In the case that this embodiment make it that RSVP-TE SA are not present in the first router, Key Table can be utilized to establish
SA。
It is pointed out that the second router may not approve this SA that the first router creates, or secondary route
Corresponding Key Table records may be not present on device, in this case, the second router will in the SMO objects of return
Object Contents are arranged to 0, or Key Identifier fields only are arranged into 0.
In addition, in step 203, the first router can also pass through the Key Identifier fields in only check object
It is whether consistent with oneself transmission, to confirm whether the second router approves the SA that oneself is created.
Embodiment three
Embodiment two describes the first router and the second router by taking the Hello interacting messages of RSVP-TE agreements as an example
Between how the method for establishing SA based on folk prescription Nonce in Hello message.
The present embodiment will introduce the first router and secondary route still by taking the Hello interacting messages of RSVP-TE agreements as an example
How SA flow is established in Hello message based on both sides Nonce between device.The present embodiment provide based on both sides Nonce
The method for establishing SA is also applied in other RSVP-TE protocol messages.
In the present embodiment, message 116 and the content and embodiment of message 118 that the first router interacts with the second router
The content of message 112 and message 114 is essentially identical in two;Unlike, the C-Type field values of SMO objects are in message 116
3, the C-Type field values of SMO objects are 4 in message 116.
It should be noted that for the ease of description, by the first router in the present invention and the second router interaction
The Nonce values generated at random are referred to as Nonce values and Nonce2 values.
Comprising the following steps that for SA method is established in the present embodiment based on both sides Nonce:
Step 301:The first router creates SA, generates SMO objects;And sent to the second router carry SMO objects,
The message 116 of INTEGRITY objects;
Specifically, handling process is identical with step 201.
Step 302:After the second router receives message 116, KeyID and Ks are generated using identical mode in step 301,
The integrality of message 116 is verified using the KeyID and Ks of generation, and generates Nonce2 values at random, and utilizes the Nonce2 of generation
Record r in value and step 301 generates new KeyID and Ks, then to the first router return carrying SMO objects,
The response message of INTEGRITY objects and Hello response objects, i.e. message 118;
Specifically, after the second router receives message 116, check and SMO objects are included in message, and find SMO pairs
As middle C-Type fields value be 3, be known that the first router wish and oneself using based on both sides Nonce method create
SA.Then, the second router handles message 116 in accordance with the following steps:
Step a2 and step b2:It is identical with the step a1 in the step 202 of embodiment two and step b1, it will not be repeated here;
Step c2:After integrality of the second router using the SA checking message 116 of generation, if the verification passes, and
The SA of the second router accreditation the first router generation, then generate 64bit Nonce2 values, then perform step at random
d2;If checking not by or the second router on be not present corresponding Key Table records, the second router is by SMO
Object Contents are arranged to 0 in object, or after Key Identifier fields only are arranged into 0, then perform step
e2;
Step d2:The second router generates the KeyID words of the RSVP-TE defined in RFC2747 using pseudo-random function prf
Section and key Ks, generation method are as follows:Ks=truncate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce,
Nonce2)), KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)), wherein,
The input field of prf functions is explained as follows:Key is that the Key in r is recorded in Key Table, and PeerKeyID is the word in record r
Section;Truncate-48 represents to intercept 48 above from the result of prf functions generation;Truncate when generating Ks is represented
According to the key for needing to intercept corresponding length of algorithm in RSVP-TE SA;Then, the second router changes local RSVP-TE
The value of corresponding Ks and KeyID fields in SA;
Step e2:The value of C-Type fields in the SMO objects received is changed to 4 by the second router, by SMO objects
Nonce values are changed to the Nonce2 of oneself generation value, reuse the method generation INTEGRITY objects that RFC2747 is defined, according to
The method generation HELLO objects and Common Header information that RFC3209 is defined;Wherein, the type of Hello objects is request,
INTEGRITY objects are generated by SA.Response message, i.e. message 118 can thus be generated.
After message 116 has been handled, the second router by the message 118 that above-mentioned steps e2 is generated be sent to the first via by
Device.
Step 303:After the first router receives message 118, message 118 is handled accordingly;
Specifically, after the first router receives message 118, the Key Identifier in SMO objects in message 118 are checked
It is consistent whether field sends with oneself, to confirm whether the second router approves the SA that oneself is created;If both are consistent,
The first router obtains the Nonce2 of the second router offer from SMO objects, and is generated using pseudo-random function prf
Then the KeyID fields and key Ks of RSVP-TE agreements defined in RFC2747, generation method are changed referring to above-mentioned steps d2
The value of corresponding Ks and KeyID fields in local RSVP-TE SA;In this way, the first router and the second router just establish
SA;If both are inconsistent, SA establishes failure.
In the case that the present embodiment make it that RSVP-TE SA are not present in the first router, Key Table and second can be utilized
Router establishes SA.
It should be noted that the difference of embodiment two and embodiment three is:The first router is one-sided in embodiment two
RSVP-TE SA are determined, and the first router and the second router together decide on RSVP-TE SA in embodiment three.
The invention also provides a kind of SA update methods, with the SA method for building up described in above example two and embodiment three
Unlike:Before the first router carries out interacting message to the second router, the existing identical SA of both sides.
Method proposed by the present invention based on folk prescription Nonce or both sides Nonce renewals SA will be respectively in example IV and reality
Apply and be described in detail in example five.
Example IV
The present embodiment still by taking the Hello interacting messages of RSVP-TE agreements as an example, introduces the first router and the second router
Between how in Hello message based on folk prescription Nonce renewal SA method, the present embodiment provide based on folk prescription Nonce more
New SA method is also applied in other RSVP-TE protocol messages.
In the present embodiment, message 120 and the content and embodiment of message 122 that the first router interacts with the second router
The content of message 112 and message 114 is essentially identical in two;Unlike, the C-Type field values of SMO objects are in message 120
5, the C-Type field values of SMO objects are 6 in message 122.
Fig. 3 shows the schematic flow sheet of SA update method of the one embodiment of the invention based on folk prescription Nonce, such as Fig. 3 institutes
Show, specific steps include:
Step 401:The first router creates SA, generates SMO objects;And sent to the second router carry SMO objects,
The message 120 of INTEGRITY objects;
Specifically, handling process is identical with step 201, still, now the first router and without using newly-generated
Ks and KeyID substitute corresponding field in existing SA.
Step 402:After the second router receives message 120, the second router is complete using existing SA checking message 120
Whole property, KeyID and Ks is generated using the method similar to step 201, then returned to the first router carry SMO objects,
The response message of INTEGRITY objects and Hello response objects, i.e. message 122;
Specifically, the second router checks and SMO objects is included in message, and find SMO after message 120 is received
The value of C-Type fields is 5 in object, is known that the first router wishes to update using the method based on folk prescription Nonce with oneself
SA.Then, the second router handles message 120 in accordance with the following steps:
Step a3:The second router verifies the integrality of message 120 using existing SA;If the verification passes, and
The SA that two routers accreditation the first router newly creates, then directly perform step b3;If checking not by or secondary route
Corresponding Key Table records are not present on device, then Object Contents in SMO objects are arranged to 0 by the second router,
Or only Key Identifier fields are arranged to 0 after, then perform step b3;
Step b3:It is identical with the step b1 in the step 202 of embodiment two, it will not be repeated here;
Step c3:The value of C-Type fields in the SMO objects received is changed to 6 by the second router, is reused RFC2747 and is determined
The method generation INTEGRITY objects of justice, the method defined according to RFC3209 generates HELLO objects and Common Header believe
Breath;Wherein, the type of Hello objects is request, and INTEGRITY objects are generated by new SA.Response can be thus generated to disappear
Breath, i.e. message 122.
After message 120 has been handled, the second router by the message 122 that above-mentioned steps c3 is generated be sent to the first via by
Device.
Step 403:After the first router receives message 122, message 122 is handled accordingly;
Specifically, after the first router receives message 122, nonce and Key in SMO objects in inspection message 122
It is consistent whether Identifier fields send with oneself, to confirm whether the second router approves the SA that oneself is created;If
Both are consistent, then the information such as KeyID, Key of generation are write local RSVP-TE SA storehouses by the first router, complete local SA's
Renewal process, in this way, the first router and the second router just have updated SA;Otherwise, then SA renewals failure.
It should be noted that during SA is updated, it is also necessary to generate SA other fields, in these fields, RSVP-
TE SA identifying algorithm is by corresponding algorithm field definitions in Key Table, RSVP-TE SA lifetime fields
Defined by corresponding field in Key Table.Initial Sequence Number are generated at random, and the management method of other fields can join
According to RFC2747.
Embodiment five
Example IV describes the first router and the second router by taking the Hello interacting messages of RSVP-TE agreements as an example
Between how in Hello message based on folk prescription Nonce renewal SA method.
The present embodiment still by taking the Hello interacting messages of RSVP-TE agreements as an example, introduces the first router and the second router
Between how in Hello message based on both sides Nonce renewal SA flow, the present embodiment provide based on both sides Nonce more
New SA method is also applied in other RSVP-TE protocol messages.
In the present embodiment, message 124 and the content and embodiment of message 126 that the first router interacts with the second router
The content of message 120 and message 122 is essentially identical in four;Unlike, the C-Type field values of SMO objects are in message 124
7, the C-Type field values of SMO objects are 8 in message 126.
Comprising the following steps that for SA method is established in the present embodiment based on both sides Nonce:
Step 501:The first router creates SA, generates SMO objects;And sent to the second router carry SMO objects,
The message 124 of INTEGRITY objects;
Specifically, handling process is identical with step 401, will not be repeated here.
Step 502:After the second router receives message 124, the second router is complete using existing SA checking message 124
Whole property, KeyID and Ks is generated using similar method in step 401, then returned to the first router carry SMO objects,
The response message of INTEGRITY objects and Hello response objects, i.e. message 126;
Specifically, the second router checks and SMO objects is included in message, and find SMO after message 124 is received
The value of C-Type types is 7 in object, is known that the first router wishes to update using the method based on both sides Nonce with oneself
SA.Then, the second router handles message 124 in accordance with the following steps:
Step a4:The second router verifies the integrality of message 124 using existing SA, and particular content is referring to step
Corresponding contents in 402, will not be repeated here;
Step b4:The second router obtains LocalKeyID fields from SMO objects, wherein, the LocalKeyID fields
PeerKeyID fields in the Key Table databases of corresponding the second router local, then the second router according to
PeerKeyID fields are found records r with identical in the first router, particular content referring to corresponding step b1 in step 202,
It will not be repeated here;
Step c4:The second router generates 64bit Nonce2 values at random;
Step d4:RSVP-TE defined in Nonce2 values and record r generations RFC2747 of the second router using generation
KeyID fields and key Ks, concrete operations will not be repeated here referring to the related content of step d2 in step 302;
Step e4:The value of C-Type fields in the SMO objects received is changed to 8 by the second router, by SMO objects
Nonce values are changed to the Nonce2 values of oneself generation, and the method defined using RFC2747 generates INTEGRITY objects, according to
The method generation HELLO objects and Common Header information that RFC3209 is defined;Wherein, the type of Hello objects is request,
INTEGRITY objects are generated by new SA.Response message, i.e. message 126 can thus be generated.
After message 124 has been handled, response message that the second router generates above-mentioned steps e4, i.e. message 126 is sent out
Give the first router.
Step 503:After the first router receives message 126, message 126 is handled accordingly;
Specifically, after the first router receives message 126, the first router carries out corresponding processing and step to message 126
Rapid 303 all fours, will not be repeated here.
Need, the present invention simultaneously need not update Sequence Number fields, it is only necessary to empty List of
Last N Sequence Numbers content.
Compared with example IV, the main distinction is embodiment five:The first router unilateral decision in example IV
RSVP-TE SA, and the first router and the second router together decide on RSVP-TE SA in embodiment five.
Example IV, five and the difference of embodiment two, three are:Example IV, five are protected using already present identical SA
Negotiations process is protected, and SA that two, three uses of embodiment newly create protects negotiations process;The former require before key expiration,
Or Sequence Number repeat preceding startup SA update mechanisms, and the latter then creates SA when in the absence of SA, and what it was interacted disappears
Cease similar, but the handling process of message and SA creation time are different.
Product embodiments
In order to realize method proposed by the present invention, the invention also provides SA establishments, foundation and more new equipment.With reference to
The present invention program is described in detail drawings and Examples.
Embodiment six
Fig. 4 shows that SA of the present invention creates the structural representation of equipment, includes as shown in figure 4, the SA creates equipment:Look into
Look for module and generation module;Wherein,
The searching modul, for being found from the Key Table of the first router itself corresponding to the second router
Record r;
The generation module, for generating Nonce values, generate KeyID and Ks.
Specifically, generation module, it is connected with searching modul, for generating Nonce values, and utilizes the generation
The record r that Nonce values and searching modul are found, the RSVP-TE defined in RFC2747 is generated by pseudo-random function prf and is assisted
The KeyID and Ks of view.
Further, the generation module is additionally operable to:The KeyID of the generation and Ks is write into local RSVP-TE SA
Storehouse;Using the LocalKeyID in the record r and the Nonce values as the Key Identifier fields in SMO objects and
Nonce fields.
Embodiment seven
Fig. 5 shows that SA of the present invention based on folk prescription Nonce establishes the structural representation of equipment, as shown in figure 5, the equipment
Including:First searching modul, the first generation module, the first sending module, the first receiving module, the first authentication module, second are looked into
Look for module, the second generation module, the second sending module, the second receiving module, the second authentication module;Wherein,
First searching modul, it is corresponding for searching the second router from the Key Table of the first router itself
Record r;
First generation module, it is connected with first searching modul and first authentication module, for generating
Nonce values, value and the Nonce values using Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the record r, pass through puppet
Random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate
(prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generates KeyID and Ks;By the LocalKeyID in the record r
Pass through the Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields in SMO objects with the Nonce values;And the KeyID by generation
Local RSVP-TE SA storehouses are write with Ks;
First sending module, it is connected with first generation module, SMO is carried for being sent to the second router
The RSVP-TE protocol messages of object, INTEGRITY objects, wherein, the SMO objects generate when creating SA by the first router;
Second receiving module, sent for receiving through first sending module forwarding, described the first router
The RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second searching modul, it is connected with second generation module, for the Key from the second router itself
Found in Table and record r with identical in the first router;
Second generation module, it is connected with second searching modul and second authentication module, for utilizing
The value and the Nonce values of Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the record r, pass through pseudo-random function
KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate (prf
(Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generation KeyID and Ks;The KeyID of generation and Ks is write into local RSVP-
In TE SA storehouses;And the value of Nonce fields in SMO objects is changed to Nonce2 values;
Second authentication module, it is connected with second generation module, for KeyID and the Ks checking using generation
The integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second sending module, it is connected with second generation module, institute is carried for being returned to the first router
State the response message of SMO objects;
First receiving module, for receiving carrying that the second router returns, described from second sending module
The response message of the SMO objects;
First authentication module, it is connected with first receiving module, for verifying the response message received
Whether Key Identifier fields in the SMO objects of carrying and the Key Identifier fields oneself sent are consistent.
Further, first searching modul, first generation module, first sending module, described first
Receiving module and first authentication module, positioned at the first router side or are arranged in the first router;
Second searching modul, second generation module, second sending module, second receiving module and
Second authentication module, positioned at the second router side or is arranged in the second router.
Embodiment eight
The invention also provides a kind of SA based on both sides Nonce establishes equipment, the equipment also includes:First searches mould
Block, the first generation module, the first sending module, the first receiving module, the first authentication module, the second searching modul, the second generation
Module, the second sending module, the second receiving module, the second authentication module;Wherein, with the SA based on folk prescription Nonce shown in Fig. 5
Establish equipment to compare, each functions of modules of equipment is removed to have and is connected with each module identical in equipment shown in Fig. 5 in the present embodiment
Outside relation and function, following difference is primarily present:
Second generation module, is additionally operable to:Nonce2 values are generated, and utilize Key, PeerKeyID in the record r
Value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values with Interface, pass through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48
(prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID,
Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks;
First generation module, is additionally operable to:After first authentication module is verified, using the Key in the record r,
PeerKeyID and Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=
Truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key,
PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks.
Embodiment nine
Fig. 6 shows the structural representation of the present invention more new equipments of the SA based on folk prescription Nonce, as shown in fig. 6, the equipment
Including:First searching modul, the first generation module, the first sending module, the first receiving module, the first authentication module, second are looked into
Look for module, the second generation module, the second sending module, the second receiving module, the second authentication module;Wherein,
First searching modul, it is corresponding for searching the second router from the Key Table of the first router itself
Record r;
First generation module, it is connected with first searching modul and first authentication module, for generating
Nonce values, value and the Nonce values using Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the record r, pass through puppet
Random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate
(prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generates KeyID and Ks;By the LocalKeyID in the record r
Pass through the Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields in SMO objects with the Nonce values;And the KeyID by generation
Local RSVP-TE SA storehouses are write with Ks;
First sending module, it is connected with first generation module, SMO is carried for being sent to the second router
The RSVP-TE protocol messages of object, INTEGRITY objects, wherein, the SMO objects generate when creating SA by the first router;
Second receiving module, sent for receiving through first sending module forwarding, described the first router
The RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second authentication module, it is connected with second receiving module, for KeyID and the Ks checking using generation
The integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second searching modul, it is connected with second authentication module, for the Key from the second router itself
Found in Table and record r with identical in the first router;
Second generation module, be connected with second searching modul, for using the Key in the record r,
LocalKeyID and Interface value and the Nonce values, pass through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48
(prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID,
Interface, Nonce)) generation KeyID and Ks;The KeyID of generation and Ks is write in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses;And will
The value of Nonce fields is changed to Nonce2 values in SMO objects;
Second sending module, it is connected with second generation module, institute is carried for being returned to the first router
State the response message of SMO objects;
First receiving module, for receiving carrying that the second router returns, described from second sending module
The response message of the SMO objects;
First authentication module, it is connected with first receiving module, for verifying the response message received
Whether Key Identifier fields in the SMO objects of carrying and the Key Identifier fields oneself sent are consistent.
Further, first searching modul, first generation module, first sending module, described first
Receiving module and first authentication module, positioned at the first router side or are arranged in the first router;
Second searching modul, second generation module, second sending module, second receiving module and
Second authentication module, positioned at the second router side or is arranged in the second router.
Embodiment ten
The invention also provides a kind of more new equipments of the SA based on both sides Nonce, the equipment also includes:First searches mould
Block, the first generation module, the first sending module, the first receiving module, the first authentication module, the second searching modul, the second generation
Module, the second sending module, the second receiving module, the second authentication module;Wherein, with the SA based on folk prescription Nonce shown in Fig. 6
More new equipment is compared, and each functions of modules of equipment is removed to have and is connected with each module identical in equipment shown in Fig. 6 in the present embodiment
Outside relation and function, following difference is primarily present:
Second generation module, is additionally operable to:Nonce2 values are generated, and utilize Key, PeerKeyID in the record r
Value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values with Interface, pass through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48
(prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID,
Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks;
First generation module, is additionally operable to:After first authentication module is verified, using the Key in the record r,
PeerKeyID and Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=
Truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key,
PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks.
Scheme and related content for a better understanding of the present invention, other fields in RSVP-TE SA are given below
Establishment and update mechanism.
Key Table are a tables of manual configuration, are shared in all legal routes of common network.In initialization SA
Used with needs during key updating, it is as follows for the primary fields in Key Table below:
-LocalKeyID:16 integers, a mark as local routing node.
-PeerKeyID:16 integers, a mark as opposite end routing node.
-Peers:Record possesses the peer IP address of identical father's key (Key).
-Interfaces:Record possesses the opposite end physical address of identical father's key (Key).
- communication protocol (Protocol):Using the Routing Protocol of father's key in this table, assisted in the present invention for RSVP-TE-TE
View
-KDF:Key-function, pseudo-random function (Pseudo-Random Function, PRF) is used in of the invention
-AlgID:Identifying algorithm, available algorithm have:HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 and
HMAC-SHA-512。
-Key:Father's key, also referred to as long term keys.
Primary fields are as follows in the SA for the RSVP-TE that RFC2747 is defined:
-Authentication algorithm:Identifying algorithm.For generating recognizing in integrity object objects
Demonstrate,prove data.
-Key:RSVP-TE SA key.For generating the authentication data in integrity object objects.
-Lifetime:The life cycle of the Security Association.RSVP-TE must be before lifetime expires to RSVP-TE
Security Association be updated.
-Interface:The interface of RSVP-TE agreements corresponding to safety alliance.
-Source Address:The IP address of sender.
-Latest Sending Sequence Number:The Sequence Number that the last time uses.For right
Sequence Number are increased.
-List of Last N Sequence Numbers:It is the most recently used N number of Sequence Number.
The corresponding relation of corresponding field is as described below from the field generation RSVP-TE in Key table:
- Authentication algorithm fields:Authentication algorithm in RSVP-TE SA
Field is by the AlgID field definitions in Key Table.When creating and updating RSVP-TE SA, directly from Key Table
AlgID fields are copied next.
- Key fields:Key fields in RSVP-TE SA are generated by the Key fields in Key Table according to KDF functions.
The embodiment of the present invention two, three, four, five defines generation method.
- Lifetime fields:Lifetime is by administrator configurations.Indicate from this SA is begun to use to terminating using this SA
Time.
-Interface:Interface fields in RSVP-TE SA are directly from the Interfaces words in Key Table
Section is copied next.
-Source Address:The field is safeguarded that the present invention does not change the definition of this field by RSVP-TE agreements.
-Latest Sending Sequence Number:The field is safeguarded by RSVP-TE current mechanisms, of the invention
Embodiment does not change the field.
-List of Last N Sequence Numbers:The field is safeguarded by RSVP-TE current mechanisms, of the invention
Embodiment does not change the field.
Without definition Key Identifier fields in RSVP-TE SA, but Integriey Object objects use
Key Identifier fields are used as SA index.Each corresponding Key Identifier of SA, therefore, when SA changes,
Key Idnetifier are also required to change.
The generation method of Key Identifier fields is provided by embodiment two, three, four, five.
The preferred embodiments of the present invention are the foregoing is only, are not intended to limit the invention, for the skill of this area
For art personnel, the present invention can have various modifications and variations.That is made within the spirit and principles of the invention any repaiies
Change, equivalent substitution, improvement etc., should be included in the scope of the protection.
Claims (25)
1. a kind of Security Association (SA) creation method, it is characterised in that this method includes:
The first router finds from the Key Table of itself and r is recorded corresponding to the second router, and generates random number
Nonce values;The record r includes:Key Key, local key identification LocalKeyID and interface Interface;
The first router is generated defined in RFC2747 using the Nonce values and the record r by pseudo-random function
The key identification KeyID and sub-key Ks of RSVP-TE agreements.
2. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterised in that after the first router generation Nonce values, generate
Before KeyID and Ks, this method also includes:
The first router is using the local key identification LocalKeyID in the record r and the Nonce values as SMO pairs
Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields as in.
3. method according to claim 1 or 2, it is characterised in that after the first router generation KeyID and Ks,
This method also includes:
The KeyID of the generation and Ks is write local RSVP-TE SA storehouses by the first router.
4. method according to claim 1 or 2, it is characterised in that the first router utilizes the Nonce values and institute
State record r is included by pseudo-random function generation KeyID and Ks:
Using Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the Nonce values and the record r, pass through pseudorandom respectively
Function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate (prf
(Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generation KeyID and Ks.
5. a kind of SA method for building up, it is characterised in that this method includes:
The first router creates SA, generates SMO objects;And sent to the second router and carry SMO objects, INTEGRITY objects
RSVP-TE protocol messages;
After the second router receives RSVP-TE protocol messages, according to SMO pairs carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages
R is recorded with identical in the first router as being found from the Key Table of the second router itself, utilizes the first router
Create the random number N once values generated during SA and described record r and KeyID and Ks is generated by pseudo-random function, and use life
Into KeyID and Ks verify the integralities of the RSVP-TE protocol messages, then returned to the first router and carry the SMO
The response message of object;The record r includes:Key, LocalKeyID and Interface;
After the first router receives the response message, respective handling is carried out to the response message.
6. according to the method for claim 5, it is characterised in that the second router disappears according to the RSVP-TE agreements
The SMO objects carried in breath are found from the Key Table of the second router itself records r with identical in the first router
Including:
Key Identifier word of the second router in the SMO objects carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages
Section, pair corresponding with the content of the Key Identifier fields is searched from the Key Table of the second router itself
Deng key identification PeerKeyID fields, and the Key according to the PeerKeyID fields found from the second router itself
Found in Table and record r with identical in the first router;
Wherein, the content of the Key Identifier fields be the first router found during SA is created second
LocalKeyID fields in record r corresponding to router;The length of the Key Identifier fields is 16.
7. according to the method for claim 6, it is characterised in that the second router utilizes Nonce values and the record r
Generating KeyID and Ks by pseudo-random function includes:
The second router by the value and Nonce values of Key, PeerKeyID and Interface in the record r, point
Do not pass through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=
Truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generates KeyID and Ks;Wherein, LocalKeyID words
The corresponding local PeerKeyID fields of section.
8. according to the method for claim 7, it is characterised in that the second router is tested using the KeyID and Ks of generation
Demonstrate,proving the integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages includes:
The second router creates SA, Ran Houli corresponding with the SA that the first router creates using the KeyID and Ks of generation
The SA created with the second router itself verifies the integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;After being verified, generation is used
KeyID and Ks changes the value of corresponding K eyID and Ks field in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses.
9. according to the method for claim 8, it is characterised in that right after the first router receives the response message
The response message, which carries out respective handling, to be included:
After the first router receives the response message of the carrying SMO objects, if the Key in the SMO objects acknowledged receipt of
Identifier fields send consistent with oneself, then the first router and the second router are successfully established SA.
10. according to the method for claim 7, it is characterised in that the second router is tested using the KeyID and Ks of generation
Demonstrate,proving the integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages includes:
The second router creates SA corresponding with the SA that the first router creates using the KeyID and Ks of generation, then makes
The SA created with the second router itself verifies the integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;After being verified, random number is generated
Nonce2 values, and by the value of Key, PeerKeyID and Interface in the record r and Nonce values and the generation
Nonce2 values, respectively by pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface,
Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generations
KeyID and Ks;The value of corresponding K eyID and Ks field in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses is changed using the KeyID and Ks of generation, then
The value of Nonce fields in SMO objects is changed to Nonce2 values;
Wherein, the Nonce values are generated by the first router when creating SA.
11. according to the method for claim 10, it is characterised in that after the first router receives the response message,
Carrying out respective handling to the response message includes:
After the first router receives the response message for carrying Nonce values and SMO objects, if in the SMO objects acknowledged receipt of
Key Identifier fields sent with oneself it is consistent, then by Key, PeerKeyID in the record r and
Nonce2 values in Interface value and the Nonce values and the SMO objects, pass through pseudo-random function respectively
KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate
(prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generate KeyID and Ks, and using generation KeyID and
Ks changes the value of corresponding K eyID and Ks field in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses.
12. a kind of SA update methods, it is characterised in that the first router and the existing identical SA1 of the second router;This method
Including:
The first router creates SA, generates SMO objects;And sent to the second router and carry SMO objects, INTEGRITY objects
RSVP-TE protocol messages;
After the second router receives the RSVP-TE protocol messages that the first router is sent, verified using existing SA1
The integrality of the RSVP-TE protocol messages;After being verified, according to the SMO objects carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages
Found from the Key Table of the second router itself and record r with identical in the first router, utilize Nonce values and institute
State record r and KeyID and Ks is generated by pseudo-random function;Then the response for carrying the SMO objects is returned to the first router
Message;The record r includes:Key, LocalKeyID and Interface;
After the first router receives the response message, respective handling is carried out to the response message.
13. according to the method for claim 12, it is characterised in that the second router is according to the RSVP-TE agreements
The SMO objects carried in message are found from the Key Table of the second router itself to be remembered with identical in the first router
Record r includes:
Key Identifier word of the second router in the SMO objects carried in the RSVP-TE protocol messages
Section, searched from the Key Table of the second router itself corresponding with the content of the Key Identifier fields
PeerKeyID fields, and found according to the PeerKeyID fields found from the Key Table of the second router itself
R is recorded with identical in the first router;
Wherein, the content of the Key Identifier fields be the first router found during SA is created second
LocalKeyID fields in record r corresponding to router;The length of the Key Identifier fields is 16.
14. according to the method for claim 13, it is characterised in that the second router utilizes Nonce values and the note
Record r generates KeyID and Ks by pseudo-random function to be included:
The second router by the value and Nonce values of Key, PeerKeyID and Interface in the record r, point
Do not pass through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=
Truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generates KeyID and Ks;Wherein, LocalKeyID words
The corresponding local PeerKeyID fields of section;Created using the KeyID and Ks of generation corresponding with the SA that the first router creates
SA, and the KeyID of generation and Ks are updated to the value of corresponding K eyID and Ks field in local RSVP-TE SA;
Wherein, the Nonce values are generated by the first router when creating SA.
15. according to the method for claim 14, it is characterised in that after the first router receives the response message,
Carrying out respective handling to the response message includes:
After the first router receives the response message of the carrying SMO objects, if the Key in the SMO objects acknowledged receipt of
Identifier fields send consistent with oneself, then update phase in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses using the KeyID and Ks of generation
Answer the value of KeyID and Ks fields.
16. according to the method for claim 13, it is characterised in that the second router utilizes Nonce values and the note
Record r generates KeyID and Ks by pseudo-random function to be included:
The second router generates Nonce2 values, by the value of Key, PeerKeyID and Interface in the record r, with
And Nonce values and the Nonce2 values of the generation, respectively by pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key,
PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface,
Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks;By the KeyID of generation and Ks update in local RSVP-TE SA corresponding K eyID and
The value of Ks fields, create SA corresponding with the SA that the first router creates;And the value of Nonce fields in SMO objects is changed to
Nonce2 values;
Wherein, the Nonce values are generated by the first router when creating SA.
17. according to the method for claim 16, it is characterised in that after the first router receives the response message,
Carrying out respective handling to the response message includes:
After the first router receives the response message for carrying Nonce values and SMO objects, if in the SMO objects acknowledged receipt of
Key Identifier fields sent with oneself it is consistent, then by Key, PeerKeyID in the record r and
Nonce2 values in Interface value and the Nonce values and the SMO objects, pass through pseudo-random function respectively
KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate
(prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generate KeyID and Ks, and using generation KeyID and
Ks changes the value of corresponding K eyID and Ks field in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses.
18. a kind of SA creates equipment, it is characterised in that the equipment includes:Searching modul and generation module;Wherein,
The searching modul, for finding record corresponding to the second router from the Key Table of the first router itself
r;The record r includes:Key, LocalKeyID and Interface;
The generation module, is connected with searching modul, for generating Nonce values, and using the generation Nonce values and look into
The record r that module is found is looked for, the KeyID and Ks of the RSVP-TE agreements defined in RFC2747 are generated by pseudo-random function.
19. equipment according to claim 18, it is characterised in that the generation module is additionally operable to:
The KeyID of the generation and Ks is write into local RSVP-TE SA storehouses;By the LocalKeyID in the record r and described
Nonce values are as the Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields in SMO objects.
20. a kind of SA establishes equipment, it is characterised in that the equipment includes:First searching modul, the first generation module, the first hair
Send module, the first receiving module, the first authentication module, the second searching modul, the second generation module, the second sending module, second
Receiving module, the second authentication module;Wherein,
First searching modul, for searching note corresponding to the second router from the Key Table of the first router itself
Record r;
First generation module, it is connected with first searching modul and first authentication module, for generating Nonce
Value, value and the Nonce values using Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the record r, passes through puppet respectively
Random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate
(prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generates KeyID and Ks;By the LocalKeyID in the record r
With the Nonce values as the Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields in SMO objects;And the KeyID by generation
Local RSVP-TE SA storehouses are write with Ks;
First sending module, it is connected with first generation module, SMO pairs is carried for being sent to the second router
As the RSVP-TE protocol messages of, INTEGRITY objects, wherein, the SMO objects generate when creating SA by the first router;
Second receiving module, the institute sent for receiving through first sending module forwarding, described the first router
State RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second searching modul, it is connected with second generation module, for the Key Table from the second router itself
In find and in the first router identical record r;
Second generation module, it is connected with second searching modul and second authentication module, for described in utilization
The value of Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in r and the Nonce values are recorded, passes through pseudo-random function respectively
KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate (prf
(Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generation KeyID and Ks;The KeyID of generation and Ks is write into local RSVP-
In TE SA storehouses;And the value of Nonce fields in SMO objects is changed to Nonce2 values;
Second authentication module, it is connected with second generation module, for described in KeyID and the Ks checking using generation
The integrality of RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second sending module, it is connected with second generation module, the SMO is carried for being returned to the first router
The response message of object;
First receiving module, for being received from second sending module described in carrying that the second router returns, described
The response message of SMO objects;
First authentication module, it is connected with first receiving module, for verifying that the response message received carries
SMO objects in Key Identifier fields and the Key Identifier fields that oneself send it is whether consistent.
21. equipment according to claim 20, it is characterised in that
Second generation module, is additionally operable to:Generate Nonce2 values, and utilization the record r in Key, PeerKeyID and
Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 respectively
(prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID,
Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks;Wherein, the corresponding local PeerKeyID of LocalKeyID fields
Field;
First generation module, is additionally operable to:After first authentication module is verified, using the Key in the record r,
PeerKeyID and Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=respectively
Truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key,
PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks.
22. equipment according to claim 21, it is characterised in that
First searching modul, first generation module, first sending module, first receiving module and described
First authentication module, positioned at the first router side or it is arranged in the first router;
Second searching modul, second generation module, second sending module, second receiving module and described
Second authentication module, positioned at the second router side or it is arranged in the second router.
23. a kind of SA more new equipments, it is characterised in that the equipment includes:First searching modul, the first generation module, the first hair
Send module, the first receiving module, the first authentication module, the second searching modul, the second generation module, the second sending module, second
Receiving module, the second authentication module;Wherein,
First searching modul, for searching note corresponding to the second router from the Key Table of the first router itself
Record r;
First generation module, it is connected with first searching modul and first authentication module, for generating Nonce
Value, value and the Nonce values using Key, LocalKeyID and Interface in the record r, passes through puppet respectively
Random function KeyID=truncate-48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate
(prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) generates KeyID and Ks;By the LocalKeyID in the record r
With the Nonce values as the Key Identifier fields and Nonce fields in SMO objects;And the KeyID by generation
Local RSVP-TE SA storehouses are write with Ks;
First sending module, it is connected with first generation module, SMO pairs is carried for being sent to the second router
As the RSVP-TE protocol messages of, INTEGRITY objects, wherein, the SMO objects are that the first router generates when creating SA;
Second receiving module, the institute sent for receiving through first sending module forwarding, described the first router
State RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second authentication module, it is connected with second receiving module, for described in KeyID and the Ks checking using generation
The integrality of RSVP-TE protocol messages;
Second searching modul, it is connected with second authentication module, for the Key Table from the second router itself
In find and in the first router identical record r;
Second generation module, be connected with second searching modul, for using the Key in the record r,
LocalKeyID and Interface value and the Nonce values, pass through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate- respectively
48 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, Interface, Nonce)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID,
Interface, Nonce)) generation KeyID and Ks;The KeyID of generation and Ks is write in local RSVP-TE SA storehouses;And will
The value of Nonce fields is changed to Nonce2 values in SMO objects;
Second sending module, it is connected with second generation module, the SMO is carried for being returned to the first router
The response message of object;
First receiving module, for being received from second sending module described in carrying that the second router returns, described
The response message of SMO objects;
First authentication module, it is connected with first receiving module, for verifying that the response message received carries
SMO objects in Key Identifier fields and the Key Identifier fields that oneself send it is whether consistent.
24. equipment according to claim 23, it is characterised in that
Second generation module, is additionally operable to:Generate Nonce2 values, and utilization the record r in Key, PeerKeyID and
Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=truncate-48 respectively
(prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID,
Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks;Wherein, the corresponding local PeerKeyID of LocalKeyID fields
Field;
First generation module, is additionally operable to:After first authentication module is verified, using the Key in the record r,
PeerKeyID and Interface value and Nonce values and the Nonce2 values, passes through pseudo-random function KeyID=respectively
Truncate-48 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) and Ks=truncate (prf (Key,
PeerKeyID, Interface, Nonce, Nonce2)) generation KeyID and Ks.
25. equipment according to claim 24, it is characterised in that
First searching modul, first generation module, first sending module, first receiving module and described
First authentication module, positioned at the first router side or it is arranged in the first router;
Second searching modul, second generation module, second sending module, second receiving module and described
Second authentication module, positioned at the second router side or it is arranged in the second router.
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CN101682639A (en) * | 2007-04-12 | 2010-03-24 | 诺基亚公司 | A handshake procedure |
CN101626374A (en) * | 2008-07-11 | 2010-01-13 | 成都市华为赛门铁克科技有限公司 | Method, system and equipment for negotiating security association (SA) in internet protocol version 6 (IPv6) network |
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