CN102904723A - Privacy protection method of radio frequency identification device (RFID) system - Google Patents

Privacy protection method of radio frequency identification device (RFID) system Download PDF

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Publication number
CN102904723A
CN102904723A CN2012103631745A CN201210363174A CN102904723A CN 102904723 A CN102904723 A CN 102904723A CN 2012103631745 A CN2012103631745 A CN 2012103631745A CN 201210363174 A CN201210363174 A CN 201210363174A CN 102904723 A CN102904723 A CN 102904723A
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label
rfid
background server
rfid interrogator
tag
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CN102904723B (en
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邹涛
辛柯俊
黄杰
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JIANGSU INTELLITRAINS Co.,Ltd.
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Sanbao Sci & Tech Co Ltd Nanjing
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Abstract

The invention discloses a privacy protection method of a radio frequency identification device (RFID) system and belongs to the field of RFID system communication safety. The method includes the following steps that an RFID reader-writer inquires a tag; the tag responds the RFID reader-writer; the RFID reader-writer submits a verification request to a background server; the background server verifies the identity of the tag; the background server submits a verification request to a legal tag; the tag verifies the identity of the RFID reader-writer; and the tag transmits an original identity to an RFID. According to the method, tracking of illegal RFID reader-writers to the RFID tag can be prevented, confidentiality of data transmitted by the RFID tag can be protected, the RFID reader-writer can effectively read right information in the RFID tag, defects of Kill mechanisms and sleep mechanisms can be effectively overcome, and the method can be widely used in passive tags.

Description

A kind of method for secret protection of rfid system
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of method for secret protection of rfid system, belong to the rfid system field of communication security.
Background technology
Along with development and the extensive use of RFID technology, the potential safety hazard relevant with RFID is following, and wherein secret protection is one of significant challenge that faces in the RFID evolution.Can infer; if rfid system is under attack; may cause personal information, business information and property etc. to lose or usurped by other people; thereby occur that plant downtime, shop are closed the door, civil order is chaotic; even the life security that directly threatens the mankind; therefore secret protection becomes the bottleneck of restriction rfid system large-scale application, a key technology in also becoming design, dispose and using.
From utilize encipherment protection private data confidentiality in the legacy network, utilize anonymous technical protection user's the technology such as identity different, the secret protection in the rfid system presents the feature exclusive with quoting height correlation, resource constraint sternness etc., that is:
(1) application of difference is large.According to the difference of protection of goal object, mainly take information protection and guarded by location as main, the secret protection technology in the legacy network can not be applied directly in the rfid system secret protection in the rfid system.
(2) resource-constrained.Because the computing capability of RFID label own and programmability is seriously limited; cause that ability is restricted on energy, storage, calculating and the communication resource; thereby limited the security mechanisms such as encryption of using on it, so the design of the secret protection technology in the rfid system and all related protection methods must be satisfied the resource constraint demand.
The technical scheme of rfid system safety and privacy concern roughly can be divided into two kinds at present, and a kind of is physical schemes, and another kind is logical scheme.The settling mode of physical schemes has:
(1) Kill label.The Kill label stops Auto-ID Center to propose by standardization, the secret protection that it provides dual mode to realize electronic tag, that is: and one is to remove label ID, another is to kill label fully.But limitation is arranged, can not solve the contradiction between RFID ease for use and the personal secrets.
(2) faraday's guard.Put the RFID label into the faraday guard, outside covering, just can't scan the RFID label so, and the RFID label in the cover both can't have been accepted wireless signal, can not send wireless signal and go out.
(3) active interference.Utilize legal wireless signal to disturb the illegal wireless signal, thereby reach the effect of shielding RFID label.But near rfid system legal this method might interfere with works.
Logical method mainly is to adopt the safety authentication protocol of challenge-response formula between each part of rfid system.Present safety authentication protocol adopts two approach mostly: a kind of is the Hash lock side case of using such as randomizer, and another kind is Hash chain scheme, need not to use randomizer.
But we find, when adopting logical method protection user's privacy, even ID number of RFID label encrypted, because the result who encrypts do not change, although the assailant does not know the content of encrypting so, but have exposed equally user's location privacy.
Summary of the invention
The invention provides a kind of method for secret protection of rfid system, protection user's location privacy and information privacy.The method has adopted symmetric encipherment algorithm and randomizer in order to realize secret protection at limited RFID label, has guaranteed the confidentiality of personal information between rfid interrogator and the RFID label and the not trackability of RFID label.The method is applicable to the occasion that illegal rfid interrogator is attacked the RFID label.
The present invention adopts following technical scheme for solving its technical problem:
A kind of method for secret protection of rfid system comprises following step:
(1) rfid interrogator inquiry label:
Read write line at first produces random number
Figure 148911DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
, together with inquiry request Query form the inquiry request message
Figure 466760DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
, Query} sends to label;
(2) tag responses rfid interrogator:
Label receive the inquiry request message that rfid interrogator sends over
Figure 919738DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
, behind the Query}, at first produce random number
Figure 905012DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
, then produce at random a tag number ID ', calculate symmetric key
Figure 968433DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
, will ,
Figure 577717DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Combine with ID
Figure 355180DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
, then, label produces enciphered message
Figure 773523DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
, at last with response message , ID ' } and send to rfid interrogator;
(3) rfid interrogator is submitted the checking request to background server:
If rfid interrogator is illegal, its message of can responsive tags not sending so; If rfid interrogator is legal, so it receive response message from label , ID ' } after, together with the random number that oneself produces Send to background server by escape way together, the checking request of its submission be
Figure 406925DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
, ID ', ;
(4) identity of background server checking label:
Background server receive rfid interrogator the checking request , ID ',
Figure 271610DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
After, at first utilize ID ' computation key
Figure 94072DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
, then utilize kDecrypt
Figure 298789DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
Obtain
Figure 435372DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
With
Figure 104251DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
If, after the deciphering
Figure 35298DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Produce with read write line
Figure 727310DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Identical, then label is legal label, otherwise label is illegal;
(5) background server is submitted the checking request to legal label:
After background server has been verified the legal identity of label, will decipher
Figure 667584DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
Message obtains
Figure 143301DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Carry out XOR with ID '
Figure 245249DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
, then utilize symmetric key kProduce enciphered message
Figure 424558DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
, send to label by read write line;
(6) identity of label checking rfid interrogator:
Label is received the encrypting messages from read write line After, at first utilize the key of its preservation kDeciphering obtains random number
Figure 218518DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
If obtain
Figure 756947DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Value and its generation
Figure 220290DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Be worth identically, then verified the identity of rfid interrogator;
(7) label transmits primary ID to RFID:
After label has been verified the identity of read write line, utilize the key of its preservation kEncrypt former ID and obtain ciphertext
Figure 502366DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
, then this message is sent to background server by read write line, the background server deciphering After obtain the former ID of label, can inquire all information that this label comprises by ID.
Beneficial effect of the present invention is as follows:
The present invention by each label in the situation that keep former ID number constant; it is change at random that label responds ID number of read write line inquiry first; the each ID value that obtains of read write line is expressly all not identical like this; therefore stop the position of illegal rfid interrogator tracking tags, thereby protected user's location privacy.When sending former ID, adopt the ciphertext load mode, thereby protected user's information privacy, simultaneously, valid reader can obtain the correct information of these article accordingly.
Although rfid interrogator and RFID label are in once complete communication process, its symmetric key changes, and this symmetric key can pass through polynomial function FCalculate, therefore guaranteed the encryption and decryption functions between valid reader and the label.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 rfid system structure chart.
Fig. 2 is method step flow chart of the present invention.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing the invention is described in further details.
The present invention has proposed a kind of method that stops illegal rfid interrogator to destroy the rfid system personal secrets in rfid system secure communication field, the method is utilized symmetric encipherment algorithm and randomizer, sets up secure communication protocols between rfid interrogator and label.In this agreement, randomizer can help to realize the change at random of RFID label ID number, thereby guarantees that illegal rfid interrogator can't realize the tracking to the RFID label, can effectively stop Replay Attack simultaneously.And symmetric encipherment algorithm can guarantee that the sensitive information that transmits all is ciphertext, thereby has protected the userspersonal information not revealed.Among the present invention, the equipment that participates in this communication protocol has three, as shown in Figure 1, that is: and background server, RFID reader and RFID label.The resource of background server is unrestricted, and the rfid interrogator resource can realize complicated security mechanism fully, therefore, can reasonably think among the present invention and have the ability fully between background server and the rfid interrogator to utilize existing security mechanism and strategy to set up high secured communication channel.
1, the initialization of system
The equipment that arrives involved in the present invention, that is: background server, rfid interrogator and label, all concentrate on before deployment in a mechanism or the tissue, therefore, the transmission security of system's some related sensitive informations in initialization procedure has abundant assurance.In initialization procedure, background server will be all labels
Figure 316531DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
Produce former ID number, that is:
Figure 204853DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
To load a multinomial F function and a randomizer in each label a former ID number.Then, set up reliable escape way between rfid interrogator and the background server, guarantee the safety of communication between the two, but its method that adopts is not in the present invention.
The implementation step of 2, secret protection communication protocol as shown in Figure 2.
(1) rfid interrogator inquiry label
Read write line at first produces random number
Figure 25041DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
, together with inquiry request Query form the inquiry request message
Figure 315208DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
, Query} sends to label.
(2) tag responses rfid interrogator
Label receive the inquiry request message that rfid interrogator sends over
Figure 195439DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
, behind the Query}, at first produce random number
Figure 633374DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
, then produce at random a tag number ID ', calculate symmetric key
Figure 257253DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
, will
Figure 401927DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
,
Figure 455989DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Combine with ID
Figure 318903DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
, then, label produces enciphered message
Figure 480894DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
, at last with response message
Figure 745653DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
, ID ' } and send to rfid interrogator.
(3) rfid interrogator is submitted the checking request to background server
If rfid interrogator is illegal, its message of can responsive tags not sending so; If rfid interrogator is legal, so it receive response message from label
Figure 702108DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
, ID ' } after, together with the random number that oneself produces Send to background server by escape way together, the checking request of its submission be
Figure 80317DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
, ID ',
Figure 199583DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
.
(4) identity of background server checking label
Background server receive rfid interrogator the checking request
Figure 654835DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
, ID ',
Figure 226761DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
After, at first utilize ID ' computation key
Figure 727625DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
, then utilize the k decrypt Obtain With
Figure 652353DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
If, after the deciphering Produce with read write line
Figure 116013DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Identical, then label is legal label, otherwise label is illegal.
(5) background server is submitted the checking request to legal label
After background server has been verified the legal identity of label, will decipher
Figure 850750DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
Message obtains Carry out XOR with ID '
Figure 305182DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
, then utilize symmetric key kProduce enciphered message
Figure 253547DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
, send to label by read write line.
(6) identity of label checking rfid interrogator
Label is received the encrypting messages from read write line
Figure 221503DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
After, at first utilize the key k deciphering of its preservation, obtain random number
Figure 255318DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
If obtain Value and its generation Be worth identically, then verified the identity of rfid interrogator.
(7) label transmits primary ID to RFID
After label has been verified the identity of read write line, utilize the key k of its preservation to encrypt former ID and obtain ciphertext
Figure 837544DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
, then this message is sent to background server by read write line, the background server deciphering
Figure 358656DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
After obtain the former ID of label, can inquire all information that this label comprises by ID.
In rfid system, generally all can have
Figure 811634DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
Individual rfid interrogator
Figure 531328DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
,
Figure 778770DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
Individual label
Figure 787177DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
With a cover background server.Be the relation of multi-to-multi between rfid interrogator and the label, in the different time periods, the information of a plurality of different legal rfid interrogator reading tag may be arranged, thus some specific informations of label, as: multinomial FTo remain unchanged with the former ID in each label, and these privacy informations can be in transmission over networks.
In rfid system, rfid interrogator, label and background server all be positioned under a tissue or the unit control, so background server can be each label distribution multinomial before deployment FFunction can distribute unique former ID simultaneously, and the commodity of its ID representative (or goods) information is kept in the background server.
In rfid system, when rfid interrogator was read label at every turn, the ID that label responds first number (that is: ID ') all was different, at ID ' number and key kBetween set up one-to-one relationship, key calculates by random ID ' number of producing, that is:
Figure 778267DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
In rfid system, in order to resist illegal rfid interrogator the RFID label is followed the tracks of, we have adopted randomizer.No matter the RFID label is read by legal rfid interrogator or is read by illegal rfid interrogator, and the first response of each RFID label all can produce different ID number (that is: ID ') and random number
Figure 618047DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
,
Figure 36390DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Send to read write line after the encryption, that is:
Figure 529163DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
Thereby so that the each enciphered data that obtains of rfid interrogator is not identical, illegal rfid interrogator can't be realized the effective tracking to the RFID label for this reason.
In the present invention, can resist Replay Attack in order to guarantee the RFID label, label produces random number
Figure 120682DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
, and utilize symmetric key kTransmission after encrypting, that is: , wherein
Figure 607475DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
The logical operation of statement XOR, ID ' is ID number of change at random, when the RFID label responded first, its value was all different.Adopt the method when guaranteeing data confidentiality, to shorten the length of valid data.
In the present invention, in order to prove the identity of RFID label, read write line produces random number
Figure 387212DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
, send to label together with the inquiry request, if label is legal, the background server decrypt
Figure 720104DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
Rear acquisition Value and read write line send to background server
Figure 294622DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Be worth identically, otherwise the identity of label is illegal.
In the present invention, in order to prove the identity of rfid interrogator, the response message of label to receiving
Figure 499339DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
Be decrypted, then with the random number of its generation
Figure 698239DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Carry out XOR, if the ID ' value that obtains is identical with the ID ' value of its preservation, then the identity of rfid interrogator is verified, otherwise rfid interrogator is illegal.
In the present invention, the correct information that comprises in order to obtain the RFID label, rfid interrogator by authentication after, after the RFID label is encrypted its former ID number
Figure 304801DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
Send to rfid interrogator, background server is according to the former ID query-related information of this label.

Claims (1)

1. the method for secret protection of a rfid system is characterized in that, comprises following step:
(1) rfid interrogator inquiry label:
Read write line at first produces random number
Figure 813728DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
, together with inquiry request Query form the inquiry request message , Query} sends to label;
(2) tag responses rfid interrogator:
Label receive the inquiry request message that rfid interrogator sends over , behind the Query}, at first produce random number
Figure 703821DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
, then produce at random a tag number ID ', calculate symmetric key , will
Figure 250657DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
,
Figure 460534DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Combine with ID
Figure 104005DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
, then, label produces enciphered message
Figure 376855DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
, at last with response message
Figure 43459DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
, ID ' } and send to rfid interrogator;
(3) rfid interrogator is submitted the checking request to background server:
If rfid interrogator is illegal, its message of can responsive tags not sending so; If rfid interrogator is legal, so it receive response message from label
Figure 122274DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
, ID ' } after, together with the random number that oneself produces
Figure 557934DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Send to background server by escape way together, the checking request of its submission be , ID ',
Figure 217903DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
;
(4) identity of background server checking label:
Background server receive rfid interrogator the checking request , ID ',
Figure 390575DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
After, at first utilize ID ' computation key
Figure 270806DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
, then utilize the k decrypt
Figure 646424DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
Obtain With
Figure 491942DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
If, after the deciphering
Figure 543075DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Produce with read write line
Figure 468306DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Identical, then label is legal label, otherwise label is illegal;
(5) background server is submitted the checking request to legal label:
After background server has been verified the legal identity of label, will decipher
Figure 630297DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
Message obtains
Figure 629477DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Carry out XOR with ID '
Figure 913828DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
, then utilize symmetric key kProduce enciphered message , send to label by read write line;
(6) identity of label checking rfid interrogator:
Label is received the encrypting messages from read write line
Figure 229719DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
After, at first utilize the key of its preservation kDeciphering obtains random number If obtain Value and its generation
Figure 376164DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Be worth identically, then verified the identity of rfid interrogator;
(7) label transmits primary ID to RFID:
After label has been verified the identity of read write line, utilize the key of its preservation kEncrypt former ID and obtain ciphertext
Figure 942275DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
, then this message is sent to background server by read write line, the background server deciphering After obtain the former ID of label, can inquire all information that this label comprises by ID.
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Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN103227793A (en) * 2013-04-27 2013-07-31 无锡昶达信息技术有限公司 RFID equipment layer information security transfer method and device based on random sequence
CN103679349A (en) * 2013-11-28 2014-03-26 国家电网公司 Android based cellphone inspection terminal system
CN104683108A (en) * 2015-03-05 2015-06-03 西安电子科技大学 Security authentication method for repealing radio frequency identification tag application of multi-application card
CN106446743A (en) * 2016-09-30 2017-02-22 西安交通大学 Detection method for illegal tampering of ultrahigh frequency RFID (radio frequency identification) label based on physical layer
WO2023207462A1 (en) * 2022-04-26 2023-11-02 华为技术有限公司 Security verification method and apparatus

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CN101217362A (en) * 2007-12-29 2008-07-09 中山大学 RFID communication security mechanism established based on dynamic randomization DRNTRU public key encryption system
CN201886511U (en) * 2010-09-26 2011-06-29 嘉钛华数码科技（天津）有限公司 Hospital baby safety supervision system based on RFID
CN102497264A (en) * 2011-11-10 2012-06-13 西安电子科技大学 RFID security authentication method based on EPC C-1G-2 standard

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101217362A (en) * 2007-12-29 2008-07-09 中山大学 RFID communication security mechanism established based on dynamic randomization DRNTRU public key encryption system
CN201886511U (en) * 2010-09-26 2011-06-29 嘉钛华数码科技（天津）有限公司 Hospital baby safety supervision system based on RFID
CN102497264A (en) * 2011-11-10 2012-06-13 西安电子科技大学 RFID security authentication method based on EPC C-1G-2 standard

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN103227793A (en) * 2013-04-27 2013-07-31 无锡昶达信息技术有限公司 RFID equipment layer information security transfer method and device based on random sequence
CN103679349A (en) * 2013-11-28 2014-03-26 国家电网公司 Android based cellphone inspection terminal system
CN104683108A (en) * 2015-03-05 2015-06-03 西安电子科技大学 Security authentication method for repealing radio frequency identification tag application of multi-application card
CN106446743A (en) * 2016-09-30 2017-02-22 西安交通大学 Detection method for illegal tampering of ultrahigh frequency RFID (radio frequency identification) label based on physical layer
CN106446743B (en) * 2016-09-30 2019-01-18 西安交通大学 Detection method for illegal tampering of ultrahigh frequency RFID (radio frequency identification) label based on physical layer
WO2023207462A1 (en) * 2022-04-26 2023-11-02 华为技术有限公司 Security verification method and apparatus

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