CN102664904B - Hidden file transfer service positioning method in passive mode - Google Patents
Hidden file transfer service positioning method in passive mode Download PDFInfo
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- CN102664904B CN102664904B CN201210152929.7A CN201210152929A CN102664904B CN 102664904 B CN102664904 B CN 102664904B CN 201210152929 A CN201210152929 A CN 201210152929A CN 102664904 B CN102664904 B CN 102664904B
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Abstract
The invention discloses a hidden file transfer service positioning method in a passive mode. The method mainly solves the problem that a hidden file transfer protocol (FTP) service provided by an anonymous communication system Tor is positioned in the passive access mode, and is used for reviewing and forbidding illegal FTP service and providing necessary technical means for supervision of network crimes. The method comprises the following steps of: supposing occupying an entry node of a suspicious anonymous circuit, triggering specific traffic characteristics in the anonymous circuit through a special access mode of an FTP client by using the characteristics of an FTP, and associating the time of accessing the hidden service and the time of detecting the specific traffic characteristics, wherein if the association result is larger than the set threshold value and the front node of a node of which the traffic characteristics are detected is not the onion router node of Tor, the front jump node of the node is a hidden server; and thus completing positioning of the hidden FTP service.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to network security particularly anonymous communication field, a kind of regulation technique of anonymous communication specifically, utilize the feature of File Transfer Protocol to position hiding service, to follow the trail of and to ban illegal FTP service.
Background technology
First the abbreviation of using in the present invention is defined:
OP(Onion Proxy): onion is acted on behalf of;
OR(Onion Router): ONION ROUTER;
HS(Hidden Service): hide service;
HSA(Hidden Service Authority): hide service authority;
RP(Rendezvous Point): convergent point;
InP(Introduction Point): service imports point;
AES(Advanced Encryption Standard): Advanced Encryption Standard;
AES-CTR(AES in counter mode): AES counter mode;
FTP(File Transfer Protocol): file transfer protocol (FTP);
Tor is a kind of anonymous communication system based on transport layer TCP according to MIX principle design, can the privacy of identities of protecting network user effectively.Complete Tor network by client end, LIST SERVER, an ONION ROUTER and application server composition.Client is the local program operated on subscriber's main station, is referred to as onion agency (Onion Proxy, OP), is responsible for user and builds anonymous path and the data cell (Cell) encapsulating data into length is transmitted; LIST SERVER mainly stores the nodal information of onion routing, comprises node descriptor, public-key cryptography etc.; ONION ROUTER (Onion Router, OR) be responsible for composition anonymous circuit and heavy-route is carried out to user data, Tor gives tacit consent to an anonymous path and is made up of 3 OR, is respectively Ingress node (Entry Node), intermediate node (Middle Node) and Egress node (Exit Node); Application server then provides concrete TCP application service, as FTP etc.
Except providing anonymous service to domestic consumer; Tor also protects the anonymity of Internet Service Provider; be referred to as to hide service (Hidden Service; HS); it comprises five parts, is respectively user, hides service authority (Hidden Service Authority, HSA), hidden server, convergent point (RendezvousPoint; RP) and service import point (Introduction Point, InP).Hidden server imports some registration service information in service, user imports the information of point from the service that hiding service authority obtains hiding autumn server, then connect with convergent point, initiate request by importing point to hidden server, server sets up the anonymous channel with convergent point simultaneously.Like this, an anonymous connection between user, convergent point and hidden server, will be set up, connect by this true identity and the position that provide service can not expose ISP.
Attack for resisting flow analysis, application layer data is packaged into the equal data cell of length (Cell) and transmits by Tor, and some controls are also filled to same length with administration order, to improve the fail safe of whole system.The data cell of Tor divides control unit (Control Cell) and TU Trunk Unit (Relay Cell) two kinds, and length is all fixed as 512 bytes, is divided into head and load two parts.Wherein, head comprises circuit identifier (CircID) field of 2 bytes and order (CMD) field of 1 byte, and head can not be encrypted in transmitting procedure, and therefore the OR node of relaying can check header information.Because the data cell of different communication both sides is likely transmitted in same TLS connects, circuit identifier is for recording the anonymous circuit (Circuit) belonging to this data cell, anonymous circuit identifier between same OP-OR or OR-OR is different, and OR node utilizes circuit identifier set up routing table and forward data cell accordingly.Data cell can be divided into control unit and TU Trunk Unit according to command field, wherein control unit is responsible for transmitting management information, as the establishment of anonymous circuit and maintenance etc., is processed by OP or the OR node receiving this data cell; TU Trunk Unit is then responsible for transmitting communication data end to end, and its payload segment is encrypted layer by layer by setting up the symmetric key consulted in anonymous circuitry processes, only has Egress node could obtain information expressly by data decryption completely.For TU Trunk Unit, except the head of standard, also has an extra head, for recording the relevant information of end-to-end data at payload segment.Whole payload segment adopts AES counter mode (AES in counter mode, AES-CTR) to carry out encryption and decryption, at Egress node place, clear data is passed to final recipient.
Summary of the invention
The object of the invention is while ensure that ISP's privacy, also to bring opportunity to illegal service in order to overcoming the service of hiding, propose the hidden file transmission service localization method under a kind of Passive Mode, solve the orientation problem of serving at hiding FTP, to examine illegal FTP service and to ban, the supervision for the network crime provides the necessary technical means.
The technical solution used in the present invention is: the hidden file transmission service localization method under a kind of Passive Mode, comprises the following steps:
1) ONION ROUTER or the Bridge node of right quantity is configured:
Due to anonymous circuit Ingress node directly and hidden server (Hidden Server, HS) be connected, therefore it can obtain the IP address of HS, if regulator can control this Ingress node, then can complete the location to hiding service easily.Because the OR node aspiration of Tor provides, any configurable Tor software that it runs per capita becomes OR node, and therefore regulator can utilize this characteristic in Tor network, insert some OR nodes controlled by it.When building anonymous circuit, Tor adopts bandwidth method of weighting to select OR node, but bandwidth information is only reported by each node and does not verify, therefore regulator OR node can be lied about it and had the maximum bandwidth 50MB/s that Tor allows, thus obtains larger probability than normal OR node and be chosen as the node building anonymous circuit.In addition, also can utilizing the antiblocking mechanism of Tor, completing occupying anonymous circuit Ingress node by providing the mode of Bridge.After occupying Ingress node, first regulator supposes that its previous dive node is hidden server, to be verified subsequently and get rid of wrong report by following steps to it;
2) regulator starts Tor client and is connected into Tor network, utilizes ftp client to access hiding FTP in a particular manner and serves:
Regulator runs Tor client and is connected into Tor network on local host, and configuration ftp client utilizes Tor to access the service of hiding.Regulator accesses the object of the service of hiding except its content of acquisition, and also will be caused specific flowed fluctuation in anonymous circuit by special access mode, the node controlled for regulator detects.All data encapsulation are transmitted by Tor in Cell, and intermediate node cannot know particular content wherein, uniquely the available quantity being statistics and transmitting Cell.File Transfer Protocol has initiatively and passive two kinds of modes, as shown in Figure 1, but due to Tor be the agency of a transport layer in essence, therefore can not open port according to active mode and connect for ftp server, therefore can only adopt passive mode by Tor access FTP.For at the detectable traffic characteristic of passive lower initiation, the present invention devises following two kinds of methods:
21) set up after TCP is connected at ftp client and server, send series of orders to carry out corresponding file operation by this connection, as: change current directory, set up new directory, deleted file etc., the number by order detects flow.Because the data in Tor are that encryption is transmitted, OR by the quantity identification flow of Cell, for making different orders not be encapsulated in same Cell, can only need reserve corresponding interval when sending order;
22) when downloading a certain file first, the Cell quantity of OP record transmission needed for this file of Tor need be utilized, after being transmitted, again downloading identical file, and detecting flowed fluctuation by the mode of detection Cell quantity;
3) ONION ROUTER controlled regulator or Bridge detect specific traffic characteristic, according to step 2), the required feature detected is be transmitted to unidirectional Cell quantity in certain hour window, if the size consistent (access modules according to different) of its number and the order quantity sent or download file, then can judge particular flow rate to be detected, record corresponding IP address and time;
4) repeatedly step 2 is repeated) and 3), will detect that the time that the time of particular flow rate feature and the hiding FTP of access serve associates, alternative relevant parameter comprises relative coefficient etc.;
5) association results is greater than to the object of setting threshold, judges whether it is ONION ROUTER or Bridge node, if all do not meet, then can determine that it is hidden server:
Because the traffic characteristic of all nodes in the anonymous circuit of whole hiding service is identical, therefore need the accurate location of the node determining to detect particular flow rate.Circuit length due to Tor is defaulted as 3 jumpings, if OR correlative flow therefore being detected directly and convergent point (Rendezvous Point, RP) be connected, then Egress node can be determined that it is, previous dive can not be hidden server, now need to cut off anonymous circuit, and continue to detect after hidden server re-establishes circuit; Otherwise, check that LIST SERVER is to judge whether the previous dive node of current OR node is disclosed OR node, if not then set up one one circuit of jumping and connect previous dive node, if can not connect, then it is hidden server.
Beneficial effect: the present invention utilizes the feature of File Transfer Protocol, by manufacturing discernible flowed fluctuation and detecting, achieves in the passive mode to the location that hiding FTP serves, for the supervision of illegally serving provides necessary technological means.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the comparison diagram of File Transfer Protocol of the present invention two kinds of modes.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with embodiment, the invention will be further described:
1. configure ONION ROUTER or the Bridge node of right quantity, to occupy the Ingress node of anonymous circuit:
Due to anonymous circuit Ingress node directly and hidden server (Hidden Server, HS) be connected, therefore it can obtain the IP address of HS, if regulator can control this Ingress node, then can complete the location to hiding service easily.Because the OR node aspiration of Tor provides, any configurable Tor software that it runs per capita becomes OR node, and therefore regulator can utilize this characteristic in Tor network, insert some OR nodes controlled by it.When building anonymous circuit, Tor adopts bandwidth method of weighting to select OR node, but bandwidth information is only reported by each node and does not verify, therefore regulator OR node can be lied about it and had the maximum bandwidth 50MB/s that Tor allows, thus obtains larger probability than normal OR node and be chosen as the node building anonymous circuit.In addition, also can utilizing the antiblocking mechanism of Tor, completing occupying anonymous circuit Ingress node by providing the mode of Bridge.
According to pertinent literature, occupy the probability of Ingress node except closely related with bandwidth, also relevant with the scale of monitor node, when resource allows, the quantity also by increasing monitor node occupies more Ingress node.After occupying Ingress node, first regulator supposes that its previous dive node is hidden server, is verified subsequently by following steps to it;
2. service is hidden in access, generates particular flow rate and detects association:
A) associate according to the FTP order quantity sent:
(1) set up FTP connect and obtain listed files.After regulator Tor client and hidden server set up anonymous path, be access FTP, ftp client sends TCP connection request.Therefore, client OP is by transmission RELAY_BEGIN TU Trunk Unit, hidden server then returns a RELAY_CONNECTED TU Trunk Unit and represents that TCP connection establishment completes, and client OP sends order by a RELAY_DATA TU Trunk Unit and obtains listed files subsequently.In the process, the OR node on anonymous circuit does not know the specific instructions of TU Trunk Unit, but can detect to hidden server direction and have sent two TU Trunk Units, and between two TU Trunk Unit, rightabout returns a TU Trunk Unit.
(2) FTP order is sent.After the list of acquisition current directory, ftp client can continue to send order and carry out various file operation, as switched current directory, setting up new directory, deleted file etc., until send the order of download file.Regulator controls the time interval of giving an order, and to make for each order, client OP all can send an independent RELAY_DATA TU Trunk Unit to hidden server direction.Regulator records the order number sent and the concrete time sent.
(3) flow rate mode is detected.OR node on anonymous circuit cannot know the specific instructions of TU Trunk Unit, but can to distinguish data cell be TU Trunk Unit or command unit, and knows the circuit identifier belonging to data cell.If will " send a TU Trunk Unit → hidden server to hidden server and return a TU Trunk Unit → send a TU Trunk Unit to hidden server " and be considered as a traffic characteristic assembly (Characteristic Component), m order is sent altogether after supposing to obtain directory listing, then in whole process, generation 1 traffic characteristic assembly to be followed thereafter the TU Trunk Unit that m mails to hidden server direction by anonymous circuit, until be set up new TCP to connect and again send a features component during download file.Access regulator in the process of the service of hiding, the data cell on the anonymous circuit of the every bar of its OR nodes records controlled, if just above-mentioned m+2 pattern detected in these data cells, then think and detect that the particular flow rate of serving and producing is hidden in access.Regulator's record detects the time of particular flow rate and the IP address of corresponding anonymous circuit previous dive node.
(4) communication flows association.Regulator repeats step 1-3, serving and download file, detecting the traffic characteristic that it produces respectively by repeatedly accessing hiding FTP.For the testing result recording identical ip addresses, the relevance between the hiding service access of calculating and communication flows fluctuate.The present invention adopts coefficient correlation (correlation coefficient) to represent relevance, and its computational methods are:
Wherein, x represents the time starting download file, and y represents time specific access flow being detected,
with
represent the mean value of x and y respectively, i represents the number of times of repetition.As the ρ calculated
x,ywhen value is greater than the threshold value of setting in advance, think that the behavior that service is hidden in access has relevance with the flowed fluctuation detected.
B) associate according to the size of file:
(1) download file.Regulator hides FTP service by ftp client access, downloads certain file.Regulator utilizes the OP revised to record in the page RELAY_DATA TU Trunk Unit quantity transmitted needed for this file.Suppose that transmitting this file needs k RELAY_DATA TU Trunk Unit altogether
(2) this file is again downloaded.Regulator again downloads this file after this file of acquisition, and record second time obtains the time of this file and informs that regulator OR node transmits value and the k of the RELAY_DATA TU Trunk Unit needed for this file.
(3) flow rate mode is detected.The RELAY_DATA TU Trunk Unit quantity that the OR nodes records that regulator controls the anonymous circuit of every bar is transmitted after download file again, in regular hour window, if the quantity of RELAY_DATA TU Trunk Unit equals k, then think and detect that the particular flow rate of serving and producing is hidden in access.Regulator's record detects the time of particular flow rate and the IP address of corresponding anonymous circuit previous dive node.
(4) communication flows association.Regulator repeats step 1-3, by multiple different file, detects the traffic characteristic that it produces respectively.For the testing result recording identical ip addresses, utilize formulae discovery same a) hide service access and communication flows fluctuate between relevance.
3. association results is greater than to the object of setting threshold, judges whether it is ONION ROUTER or Bridge node, if all do not meet, then can determine that it is hidden server:
Because the traffic characteristic of all nodes in the anonymous circuit of whole hiding service is identical, therefore need the accurate location of the node determining to detect particular flow rate.Circuit length due to Tor is defaulted as 3 jumpings, if OR correlative flow therefore being detected directly and convergent point (Rendezvous Point, RP) be connected, then Egress node can be determined that it is, previous dive can not be hidden server, now need to cut off anonymous circuit, and continue to detect after hidden server re-establishes circuit; Otherwise, check that LIST SERVER is to judge whether the previous dive node of current OR node is disclosed OR node, if not then set up one one circuit of jumping and connect previous dive node, if can not connect, then it is hidden server.It should be pointed out that for those skilled in the art, under the premise without departing from the principles of the invention, can also make some improvements and modifications, these improvements and modifications also should be considered as protection scope of the present invention.The all available prior art of each part not clear and definite in the present embodiment is realized.
Claims (3)
1. the hidden file transmission service localization method under Passive Mode, is characterized in that: comprise the following steps:
1) ONION ROUTER or the Bridge node of right quantity is configured:
Because the Ingress node of anonymous circuit is directly connected with hidden server HS, therefore it can obtain the network ip address of HS, and regulator controls this Ingress node, namely completes the location to hiding service easily; Second generation onion routing system Tor follows bandwidth weighting algorithm when selecting Ingress node, namely the probability that the ONION ROUTER OR that bandwidth is higher becomes anonymous circuit Ingress node is larger, regulator configures some OR nodes and the maximum bandwidth 50MB/s reporting it to allow, then have very large possibility to occupy the Ingress node of anonymous circuit; In addition, also utilizing the antiblocking mechanism of Tor, completing occupying anonymous circuit Ingress node by providing the mode of Bridge;
2) be connected into Tor network, utilize ftp client to access and hide FTP service, ftp client is generate and record particular flow rate to take special access behavior and mode:
Regulator runs Tor client and is connected into Tor network on local host, and configuration ftp client utilizes Tor to access the service of hiding; Because every bar FTP order all needs a data cell to transmit, file size downloaded in addition is also not quite similar, and therefore by controlling to send the number of order or the file of transmission, in hiding ftp server and Tor network, generates specific flow;
3) ONION ROUTER controlled regulator or Bridge detect specific traffic characteristic, and it forms different data cell numbers on anonymous circuit;
4) will detect that the time that the time of particular flow rate feature and the hiding FTP of access serve associates;
5) association results is greater than to the object of setting threshold, carries out confirmation work, judge whether it is ONION ROUTER or Bridge node, if all do not meet, then can determine that it is hidden server:
Because the traffic characteristic of all nodes in the anonymous circuit of whole hiding service is identical, therefore need the accurate location of the node determining to detect particular flow rate, specifically whether can be connected with convergent point RP according to this node and whether previous dive node is that open OR node or Bridge judge;
Described step 2) in, ftp client is generate and the record special access behavior taked of particular flow rate and mode:
1) ftp client connects the ftp server hidden, and sends a FTP order at regular intervals, by being controlled, to make it be distributed in different data cells, to detect it the transmitting time of order;
2) Tor client records ftp client downloads the data cell Cell quantity needed for a certain file, again downloads this file after a certain interval;
2. the hidden file transmission service localization method according to claim 1 under Passive Mode, is characterized in that: described step 3) in, the ONION ROUTER controlled regulator or Bridge detect the method for specific traffic characteristic:
1) because ftp client sends a FTP order at regular intervals, each order is all by a data cell transmission, and node detects particular flow rate and writing time according to the quantity of the data cell in the sensing hidden server direction forwarded;
2) because the size of download file is fixing, whether node detects according to the quantity of the data cell from hidden server end return data is the particular flow rate that certain file of download produces.
3. the hidden file transmission service localization method according to claim 1 under Passive Mode, it is characterized in that: described step 5) in, association results is greater than to the object of setting threshold, carry out confirmation work, concrete grammar is: if node is connected with RP, then previous dive can not be hidden server, otherwise, check that LIST SERVER is to judge whether the previous dive node of current OR node is disclosed OR node, if not, then set up one one circuit of jumping and connect previous dive node, if can not connect, then it is hidden server.
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN103458046B (en) * | 2013-09-13 | 2016-09-07 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | A kind of data secret shared system based on core network and method |
| CN104580475B (en) * | 2015-01-13 | 2018-03-09 | 华为技术有限公司 | Long-range control method, terminal device, management server and tele-control system |
| CN108494769B (en) * | 2018-03-21 | 2020-01-14 | 广州大学 | Tracing method for hidden service in Tor anonymous network |
| CN114051236B (en) * | 2022-01-12 | 2022-04-12 | 华东交通大学 | Anonymous communication method, system, medium and electronic device based on rerouting mechanism |
| CN115242674B (en) * | 2022-07-25 | 2023-08-04 | 上海交通大学 | Hidden service tracking system based on Torr protocol time sequence characteristic |
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| CN1564508A (en) * | 2004-03-22 | 2005-01-12 | 西安电子科技大学 | Anonymous connection method of broadband radio IP network |
| CN101714974A (en) * | 2008-10-08 | 2010-05-26 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method and network equipment for improving anonymity degree in anonymous network |
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