CN102546272B - Information leakage detection method and device and system utilizing method - Google Patents
Information leakage detection method and device and system utilizing method Download PDFInfo
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- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 45
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 15
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 35
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 claims description 119
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 22
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000009795 derivation Methods 0.000 description 15
- 238000005242 forging Methods 0.000 description 13
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 description 6
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000011084 recovery Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012216 screening Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012098 association analyses Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000015572 biosynthetic process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000007405 data analysis Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005065 mining Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012958 reprocessing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003997 social interaction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 1
Abstract
The invention provides an information leakage detection method and a device and a system utilizing the method. The information leakage detection method includes: adding preset tested user information containing tested user numbers into real user information containing real user numbers, and then determining that information is leaked when at least one tested user terminal which corresponds to the tested user numbers is triggered. When fake user numbers are contacted, the fake user terminals are triggered actively correspondingly, so that information leakage is detected and information leakage detection efficiency is improved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to business supporting network technical field, be specifically related to a kind of information leakage detection method, Apparatus and system.
Background technology
In order to realize decision-making needed for enterprise and analysis ability, a lot of enterprise all establishes global data warehouse, contains the data of enterprise key, comprises customer data, client traffic uses record, consumer record etc.Enterprise can pass through analysis mining, filters out the user list with certain feature, and such as high value, new business use the high feature of tendency.These user lists can comprise address name, age, telephone number, terminal type etc., for the customer care, product marketing etc. of enterprise.Such as, but these lists can become expressly when entering and using link, are distributed to certain channel and contact client, outgoing call, bulk SMS etc.These plaintext lists just have may by what extensively contact, become the data being easy to steal, these, once reveal, can cause privacy of user to be revealed, and by contacting with user, data theft person realizes that user instigates rebellion within enemy camp, refuse messages mass-sending etc., brings direct or indirect loss to enterprise.
In order to protect these customer privacy data, avoiding user to suffer unnecessary harassing and wrecking, usually can take a series of secrecy technology in data warehouse, as data encryption, digital watermarking etc.Wherein, data encryption is the treatment technologies of a kind of data on backstage, database is by carrying out process according to common cryptographic algorithm and realize data to part table, part field and deposit with encrypted test mode, by keeping properly and regular update key, avoid the leaking data that back-end data access mode causes as far as possible.Digital watermarking is the treatment technologies of a kind of data in foreground (namely representing link), by embedding the shading that some are difficult to revise in webpage or document, increase the difficulty that data theft person batch obtains data, when data to be revealed from foreground and when not being removed watermark, can according to information implicit in digital watermarking as the source of this leaking data be followed the trail of in visitor, access time, access IP address etc.
Above-mentioned two kinds of data safety management technology are Shortcomings part and the restriction of applicable scene in practice, specific as follows:
For data encryption mode: data encrypting and deciphering process for system performance impact is serious, and current performance impact, usually about 30%, can affect the service level of on-line system; Data encrypting and deciphering is mainly for the data protection on backstage, inapplicable for the leaking data produced in foreground and data use procedure; Cannot initiatively find leaking data event;
For digital watermarking mode: once watermark is removed, just tracked information source cannot be revealed; Cannot initiatively find information leakage event; Data cannot derive reprocessing.
Summary of the invention
The first object of the present invention proposes a kind of information leakage detection method efficiently.
The second object of the present invention proposes a kind of information leakage checkout gear efficiently.
The third object of the present invention proposes a kind of information leakage detection system efficiently.
For realizing above-mentioned first object, the invention provides a kind of information leakage detection method, comprising: in the real user information comprising real user number, add default test subscriber's information, test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number; When at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed.
For realizing above-mentioned second object, the invention provides a kind of information leakage checkout gear, comprising: processing module, for adding default test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number, test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number; Detection module, for when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed.
For realizing above-mentioned 3rd object, the invention provides a kind of information leakage detection system, comprise: information leakage checkout gear, for adding default test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number, test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number; When at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed; At least one test subscriber's terminal, for when being triggered, trigger message leak detection apparatus works.
In each embodiment of the present invention, by inserting the user data (i.e. test subscriber's information) of forgery in actual user data, Subscriber Number in data falsification is at net state, be touched once these forge Subscriber Number, these are forged user terminal active triggering and carry out information leakage detection.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Accompanying drawing is used to provide a further understanding of the present invention, and forms a part for specification, with embodiments of the invention in the lump for explaining the present invention, is not construed as limiting the invention.In the accompanying drawings:
Fig. 1 is embodiment one flow chart of information leakage detection method of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is embodiment two flow chart of information leakage detection method of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is the example structure figure of information leakage checkout gear of the present invention;
Fig. 4 is the example structure figure of information leakage detection system of the present invention.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the preferred embodiments of the present invention are described, should be appreciated that preferred embodiment described herein is only for instruction and explanation of the present invention, is not intended to limit the present invention.
Embodiment of the method
Fig. 1 is embodiment one flow chart of information leakage detection method of the present invention.As shown in Figure 1, the present embodiment comprises:
Step 102: add default test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number, test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number;
Step 104: when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed.
The present embodiment by inserting the user data (i.e. test subscriber's information) of forgery in actual user data, Subscriber Number in data falsification is at net state, be touched once these forge Subscriber Number, these are forged user terminal active triggering and carry out information leakage detection.
Fig. 2 is embodiment two flow chart of information leakage detection method of the present invention.As shown in Figure 2, the present embodiment comprises:
Step 202: data warehouse carries out the screening of real user; This step mainly generates normal list (user is wherein real user), with the existing derivation list for concrete business (as user shows loving care for), step before being various embodiments of the present invention, should not be construed as the restriction to each embodiment, concrete operations are as follows:
Data warehouse is by some data digging methods or screening technique (for prior art), draw the user list with some feature, as shown in table 1, list can comprise user ID, Subscriber Number, user's base attribute (as name, terminal type and VIP attribute etc.), user's statistical attribute (as new business average per-user income (Average revenue per user, ARPU) etc.);
Table 1
| User ID | Subscriber Number | Name | VIP belongs to | Terminal class | New business | Recommend industry |
Step 204: according to the information of forging in user resources information bank, determine the information such as user ID, Subscriber Number, base attribute (as name, VIP attribute, terminal etc.) of forging user, this forgery user is test subscriber, and add forgery user profile in the real user information selected in step 202., and this forgery user list of deriving event is charged to daily record.
During concrete operations, some statistical attributes forged in user profile can obtain according to numerical value in true list is derivative, such as " new business ARPU " can be " mean value adds the product of mean square deviation and [-1; 1] interval random value ", new business ARPU mean value as real user in table 1 is 67.47, mean square deviation is 6.58, supposes that random value is 0.31, then the new business ARPU forging user is 69.5; Forge user list Examples of information as table 2;
Table 2
User is forged to can be arranged one or more in each derivation event (namely comprising the list of real user) as required; For the multiple derivation events needing to follow the tracks of simultaneously, suppose that forging total number of users is n, being used for the number of identified event is m, then the derivation event number can simultaneously followed the tracks of is
During concrete operations, various forgery user combination (can deposit in the form of a table) can also be obtained according to forgery user, as shown in table 3, forge user and combine for order or randomly draw, ensure that each forgery user is assigned difference, combination is assigned with rear state and is used by available being updated to, because user exists from the operation such as net or transfer, namely user has life cycle, client representated by certain number can't keep having certain feature forever, such as high value, therefore a list can't be forever useful, through after a while, the protection level of this list just can reduce, no longer include leakage tracing scope in, forgery user now for identifying this list just can be recovered use, simultaneously, certain Subscriber Number does not need always for forging the purposes of user, after the term of validity of all marks lost efficacy, also normal intermediate links can be entered, become normal users, therefore user can also be forged to each or forge user combined resource and arrange and reclaim the date, (represent that derivation event has occurred for a long time when reaching and reclaiming the date, derive list to lose efficacy), state can be recovered as available, the recovery date can be set to system maximum when being recovered as available,
Table 3
| Combination mark | Forge number 1 | Forge number 2 | State | Reclaim the date |
| 1 | 13911165432 | 13510054321 | Use | 2010-12-31 |
| 2 | 13911165432 | 13810056789 | Available | 2999-12-31 |
Step 206: after forgery user profile is added real user information by step 204, namely can generate the derivation list comprising and forge user profile and real user information, and exports derivation list;
During concrete operations, can by whole derivation lists stored in daily record, comprise derivation activity corresponding relation, derive whereabouts etc., presetting of derivation event can also be preserved normally contact rule (normal time that in each derivation event, all users are touched as arranged and the normal calling number in the time of being touched), as table 4 in daily record;
Table 4
Step 208: forge user and contact event capture;
Owing to forging the user that user is not necessary being, there is not social interaction circle, therefore once these users are touched, then mean that this list exists and reveal possibility; Therefore when forging user and being touched (as speech called, note receptions, multimedia message reception, information on services or push information (i.e. Wap Push) etc.), this event can be captured by the monitoring unit (explanation that this monitoring unit refers to Fig. 4 illustrates) be connected with forgery user terminal; During concrete operations, can reveal by direct determination information after capturing the event of being touched, or carry out information leakage judgement again after execution step 210;
Step 210: the preliminary eliminating normally contacts; Be specially: monitoring unit by the default normal time of contact of each forgery time of being touched of user and log recording in step 206 or/and normally calling number compare, if belong to normal time of contact or/and belong to normal calling number, then this event is left in the basket, and no longer carries out subsequent treatment;
It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that, when can occur that at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with test subscriber's number is triggered in step 208, then perform step 210, that is: judge whether the time that is triggered of at least one test subscriber's terminal be that default time period (namely preset normal time of contact section) is or/and whether the calling number judging to trigger at least one test subscriber's terminal is default Subscriber Number (namely default normal calling number);
The time of being triggered for preset time period or/and calling number for pre-set user number time, can directly comformed information revealed or, first determine not belong to normal contact, carry out the operation of step 212, then judge whether information is revealed;
Step 212: initiate relevant data acquisition request to data warehouse, gathers related data, and carries out data leak tracking (executive agent of step 212 can for the discriminance analysis unit in Fig. 4, and the explanation referring to Fig. 4 illustrates); Specific as follows:
Leaking data follows the trail of relating module according to the total data gathered, and carries out associate comparison with the forgery user record distributed in usage log, according to the forgery user group contacted determine leaking data doubtful from statistical conversion event.Judgment rule mainly comprises a few class:
First, the communication information of all calling numbers triggering at least one test subscriber's terminal is obtained; Concrete as: forge the number of user according to contact, the combinations of numbers of forging user, contact period, Position/Point Of Contact, the way of contact (voice, note, multimedia message etc.) collect relevant signaling data, call bill data from data warehouse, data acquisition once can obtain total data, also can step acquisitions data;
Secondly, according to the communication information of each calling number, judge whether each calling number carries out the communication of all number section; And when existence is not the calling number undetermined of carrying out the communication of all number section, judge whether calling number undetermined have called multiple test subscriber's number within a preset time interval or/and multiple real user number; That is, if calling number carries out is the general call to all station of all number section, not for particular group, does not then belong to leakage event, ignore follow-up flow process;
Again, when have have called multiple test subscriber's number within a preset time interval or/and at least one calling number undetermined of multiple real user number time, comformed information is revealed;
That is, if calling number is in certain time interval, have called multiple forgery user simultaneously, forge user's combination and uniquely can determine one or many statistical conversion event, or/and the real user in determined derivation event is also partly or entirely contacted, then confirm as doubtful leakage event, this situation is applicable to data theft, and person harasses with one number;
During concrete operations, when have have called multiple test subscriber's number within a preset time interval or/and the calling number multiple undetermined of multiple real user number (that is, not directly using the calling number of at least one calling number undetermined as the leakage of information time) time, according to the communication information of multiple calling number undetermined, the communication locations determining multiple calling number undetermined whether in default geographic range and/or call duration time whether in preset time range; The communication locations of multiple calling number undetermined in default geographic range and/or call duration time in preset time range time, comformed information is revealed;
That is, if calling number is in certain time interval, have called part and forge user, forge other user in user's combination also to be contacted by other calling numbers in certain time interval simultaneously, these calling number caller times are similar, and caller place is close, or/and have called other real user in the relevant derivation time, then confirm as doubtful leakage event, person harasses with multiple number to be applicable to data theft in this case;
Step 214; According to the leakage of information result determined in step 212, generate leaking data and follow the trail of report.
The present embodiment is before actual user data (comprising Subscriber Number and other user characteristicses) derived data warehouse system, insert the user data of forgery wherein, the Subscriber Number inserted combines corresponding derivation event, Subscriber Number in data falsification is at net state, be touched once these forge Subscriber Number, these forge user terminal initiatively trigger message leak detection, forge user profile and there is very strong camouflage, data falsification and True Data are not easily differentiated, data theft user sensitiveness is not high, cannot antitracking; Preferably, after user terminal is triggered in forgery, analyze time and number that whether the time of contact of forging number and calling number be non-normal use further, and determination information is revealed when time of non-normal use and number, improves the accuracy detected; Preferably, by triggering collection related data after the time judging non-normal use and number, the dependency rule such as forgery number, derivation event information according to contact carries out discriminatory analysis, and comformed information is revealed, and forms report.
Device embodiment
Fig. 3 is embodiment one structure chart of information leakage checkout gear of the present invention.The embodiment of the method for Fig. 1-Fig. 2 all can be applicable to the present embodiment.As shown in Figure 3, the present embodiment comprises: processing module 32, and for adding default test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number, test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number; Detection module 34, for when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed.
During concrete operations, detection module 34 can comprise:
First judges submodule 340, for when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with test subscriber's number is triggered, whether the time that is triggered judging at least one test subscriber's terminal is the default time period, and judges whether the calling number triggering at least one test subscriber's terminal is default Subscriber Number;
First detection sub-module 342, for the time of being triggered for preset time period or/and calling number for pre-set user number time, comformed information is revealed;
Detection module 34 can also comprise:
Obtain submodule 344, for obtaining the communication information of all calling numbers triggering at least one test subscriber's terminal;
Second judges submodule 346, for the communication information according to each calling number, judges whether each calling number carries out the communication of all number section; And when existence is not the calling number undetermined of carrying out the communication of all number section, judge whether calling number undetermined have called multiple test subscriber's number within a preset time interval or/and multiple real user number;
Second detection sub-module 348, for when have have called multiple test subscriber's number within a preset time interval or/and at least one calling number undetermined of multiple real user number time, comformed information is revealed;
Processing module 32 can comprise:
Process submodule 322, for adding test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number;
Reclaim submodule 324, for after preset time threshold test subscriber's information being added to real user information, reclaim test subscriber's information.
The present embodiment introduces the forgery user profile not easily differentiated in real user information by processing module 32, data falsification is followed the tracks of by detection module 34, initiatively find that True Data is revealed, used, in addition, this recovery submodule 324 carries out some cycles management to forgery Subscriber Number, and realizing forging Subscriber Number can recycle with physical number.
System embodiment
Fig. 4 is the example structure figure of information leakage detection system of the present invention.The embodiment of the method for Fig. 1-Fig. 2 all can be applicable to the present embodiment.As shown in Figure 4, the present embodiment comprises: information leakage checkout gear 42, and for adding default test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number, test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number; When at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed; At least one test subscriber's terminal 44, for when being triggered, trigger message leak detection apparatus works.
It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that processing module 32 can correspond to the number resource administrative unit in Fig. 4, first judges that submodule 340 and the first detection sub-module 342 can correspond to monitoring unit, obtain submodule 344, second judges that submodule 346 and the second detection sub-module 348 can correspond to discriminance analysis unit, wherein, number resource administrative unit is in charge of the number resource forging user, be responsible for distributing and reclaiming, and safeguard forgery user combined resource record sheet, monitoring unit catches the contact to forging user, and tentatively get rid of, external formation alarm prompt, discriminance analysis unit is responsible for gathering related data from data warehouse, and according to certain rule, association analysis is carried out to leaking data relevant data, form leaking data analysis report.
The present embodiment introduces the forgery user profile not easily differentiated in real user information by information leakage checkout gear, and follow the tracks of data falsification, initiatively find that True Data is revealed, used, in addition, carry out some cycles management to forgery Subscriber Number, realizing forging Subscriber Number can recycle with physical number.
Last it is noted that these are only the preferred embodiments of the present invention, be not limited to the present invention, although with reference to previous embodiment to invention has been detailed description, for a person skilled in the art, it still can be modified to the technical scheme described in foregoing embodiments, or carries out equivalent replacement to wherein portion of techniques feature.Within the spirit and principles in the present invention all, any amendment done, equivalent replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. an information leakage detection method, is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
In the real user information comprising real user number, add default test subscriber's information, described test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number;
When at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed;
Described when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is comprised by the step revealed:
When at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, judge whether the time that is triggered of at least one test subscriber's terminal described is the default time period or/and judge whether the calling number triggering at least one test subscriber's terminal described is default Subscriber Number;
Described be triggered the time for the described default time period or/and described calling number for described pre-set user number time, comformed information is revealed.
2. the information leakage detection method according to the claims 1, is characterized in that, also comprise:
Described test subscriber's information is added to described real user information, after preset time threshold, reclaim described test subscriber's information.
3. an information leakage detection method, is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
In the real user information comprising real user number, add default test subscriber's information, described test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number;
When at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed; Described when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is comprised by the step revealed:
Obtain the communication information of all calling numbers triggering at least one test subscriber's terminal described;
According to the communication information of each calling number, judge whether each calling number carries out the communication of all number section; And when existence is not the calling number undetermined of carrying out the communication of all number section, judge whether described calling number undetermined have called multiple described test subscriber's number within a preset time interval or/and multiple described real user number;
When have in described prefixed time interval, have called multiple described test subscriber's number or/and multiple real user number at least one described in calling number undetermined time, comformed information is revealed.
4. information leakage detection method according to claim 3, it is characterized in that, described when have in described prefixed time interval, have called multiple described test subscriber's number or/and multiple real user number at least one described in calling number undetermined time, comformed information is comprised by the step revealed:
When have in described prefixed time interval, have called multiple described test subscriber's number or/and multiple described calling number undetermined of multiple real user number time, according to the communication information of described multiple described calling number undetermined, the communication locations determining described multiple described calling number undetermined whether in default geographic range and/or call duration time whether in preset time range;
The communication locations of described multiple described calling number undetermined in described default geographic range and/or call duration time in described preset time range time, comformed information is revealed.
5. the information leakage detection method according to any one of the claims 3-4, is characterized in that, also comprise:
Described test subscriber's information is added to described real user information, after preset time threshold, reclaim described test subscriber's information.
6. an information leakage checkout gear, is characterized in that, comprising:
Processing module, for adding default test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number, described test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number;
Detection module, for when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed; Described detection module comprises:
First judges submodule, for when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, described in judging, whether the time that is triggered of at least one test subscriber's terminal is the default time period, and judges whether the calling number triggering at least one test subscriber's terminal described is default Subscriber Number;
First detection sub-module, for described be triggered the time for the described default time period or/and described calling number for described pre-set user number time, comformed information is revealed.
7. information leakage checkout gear according to claim 6, is characterized in that, described processing module comprises:
Process submodule, for adding test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number;
Reclaim submodule, for described test subscriber's information is added to described real user information, after preset time threshold, reclaim described test subscriber's information.
8. an information leakage checkout gear, is characterized in that, comprising:
Processing module, for adding default test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number, described test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number;
Detection module, for when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed;
Described detection module comprises:
Obtain submodule, for obtaining the communication information of all calling numbers triggering at least one test subscriber's terminal described;
Second judges submodule, for the communication information according to each calling number, judges whether each calling number carries out the communication of all number section; And when existence is not the calling number undetermined of carrying out the communication of all number section, judge whether described calling number undetermined have called multiple described test subscriber's number within a preset time interval or/and multiple described real user number;
Second detection sub-module, for when have in described prefixed time interval, have called multiple described test subscriber's number or/and multiple real user number at least one described in calling number undetermined time, comformed information is revealed.
9. information leakage checkout gear according to claim 8, is characterized in that, described processing module comprises:
Process submodule, for adding test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number;
Reclaim submodule, for described test subscriber's information is added to described real user information, after preset time threshold, reclaim described test subscriber's information.
10. an information leakage detection system, is characterized in that, comprising:
Information leakage checkout gear, for adding default test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number, described test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number; When at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed;
At least one test subscriber's terminal described, for when being triggered, triggers the work of described information leakage checkout gear;
Described information leakage checkout gear comprises:
Processing module, for adding default test subscriber's information in the real user information comprising real user number, described test subscriber's information comprises test subscriber's number;
Detection module, for when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, comformed information is revealed; Described detection module comprises:
First judges submodule, for when at least one test subscriber terminal corresponding with described test subscriber's number is triggered, described in judging, whether the time that is triggered of at least one test subscriber's terminal is the default time period, and judges whether the calling number triggering at least one test subscriber's terminal described is default Subscriber Number;
First detection sub-module, for described be triggered the time for the described default time period or/and described calling number for described pre-set user number time, comformed information is revealed.
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| CN105743904B (en) * | 2016-03-14 | 2019-02-01 | 上海携程商务有限公司 | The leakage detection method and system of the user information of website |
| CN106685966B (en) * | 2016-12-29 | 2020-08-04 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | Method, device and system for detecting leakage information |
| CN108683587B (en) * | 2018-05-11 | 2021-09-21 | 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 | Account management method and device |
| CN112104779B (en) * | 2020-09-22 | 2021-05-07 | 深圳市艾酷通信软件有限公司 | Information prompting method and device and electronic equipment |
| CN114465978B (en) * | 2022-02-07 | 2023-10-13 | 北京知道创宇信息技术股份有限公司 | Mailbox leakage discovery method, device and system and readable storage medium |
| CN115242531B (en) * | 2022-07-27 | 2023-12-22 | 上海齐屹信息科技有限公司 | Method for tracking user information in cross-system multi-scene mode |
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| CN1700356A (en) * | 2004-05-18 | 2005-11-23 | 富士通株式会社 | Semiconductor memory |
| CN101150449A (en) * | 2006-09-22 | 2008-03-26 | 中国移动通信集团公司 | Content information monitoring system and method |
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| CN101984629B (en) * | 2010-10-22 | 2013-08-07 | 北京工业大学 | Cooperative identification method of Web service based site revealing user privacy information |
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| CN1700356A (en) * | 2004-05-18 | 2005-11-23 | 富士通株式会社 | Semiconductor memory |
| CN101150449A (en) * | 2006-09-22 | 2008-03-26 | 中国移动通信集团公司 | Content information monitoring system and method |
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