CN102280133A - Anti-interception code encryption burning method - Google Patents
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- CN102280133A CN102280133A CN2011102336117A CN201110233611A CN102280133A CN 102280133 A CN102280133 A CN 102280133A CN 2011102336117 A CN2011102336117 A CN 2011102336117A CN 201110233611 A CN201110233611 A CN 201110233611A CN 102280133 A CN102280133 A CN 102280133A
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Abstract
The invention relates to an anti-interception code encryption burning method. The method comprises the following steps that: a burnt chip generates a decryption key of a burning code cipher text code1 through operation by taking a built-in manufacturer code Num and a random number X which is just generated as seeds and generates an encryption key of a burning code 0 through operation by taking the manufacturer code Num and the random number X as the seeds, wherein the random number X and the manufacturer code Num are equal to a key; a burning tool of a personal computer (PC) converts the burning code 0 into the cipher text code1 by a decryption algorithm and generates an integrity check value CalibNum by using the cipher text code1; and the burnt chip checks the integrity of the cipher text code1 by combing the received integrity check value CalibNum, decrypts the cipher text code 1 into the burning code 0 through a guidance code and writes the burning code 0 into a chip code storage medium. The anti-interception code encryption burning method has the advantages that: cipher texts of burning codes are different during burning each time, and interception burning can be prevented. The burning codes are integrated into the burning tool, so that the phenomenon that the same burning tools can be constructed by copying software is prevented.
Description
Technical field
The application of programming chip when the present invention relates to MCU, MPU, DSP, ARM etc. and embedding, especially a kind of code encryption burning mode of anti-intercepting and capturing.
Background technology
ISP (In-System Programming) is at system programmable, refers to that blank device on the circuit board can be programmed to write final user's code, and do not need from circuit board to take off device that the device of having programmed also can be wiped or programming again with the ISP mode.It is simple that the realization of ISP is wanted relatively, and general common practice is that inner storer can be rewritten by serial ports by the software of host computer.Can receive in the data and write store that host computer transmits by SPI or other serial line interface for single-chip microcomputer.Even so we with chips welding on circuit board, as long as reserve this serial ports with the host computer interface, just can realize the rewriting of chip internal storer, and need not take off chip again.
The appearance of ISP greatly facilitates the online burning of code, but just because of the hidden danger that the convenience of its realization has exactly brought the burning code to reveal.In order to address this problem, just produced the ciphertext burning shown in Fig. 1 first.
An electronic product arrives the consumer and exists all too many levels on hand, as: design, production, test, sale etc.Along with the division of labor refinement, much design manufacturer the production of product, the test outsourcing go out, wherein just relate to the security of embedded code burning.The piracy of PC software is the subject matter of puzzlement software industry development always, in the Embedded Application field, is faced with the problem that code is stolen equally.The deficiency of above-mentioned technology is:
1.PC there is copy hidden danger in the burning code software, obtains burning code (Code0) though can't crack PC software easily, the operator of factory can steal and be installed on any PC and carry out identical burning operation.
2.ISP carry out the communication transmission with ciphertext during burning, though can avoid the burning code to be cracked by intercepting, but whole burning sequential and data stream all are the same at every turn, therefore exist and catch the hidden danger that the transmission instrument is simulated burning repeatedly by special data time sequence.
Summary of the invention
Purpose of the present invention will solve the deficiency that above-mentioned technology exists just, and provides a kind of code encryption burning mode of anti-intercepting and capturing, the security that code transmits when guaranteeing the burning record, integrality and intercepting and capturing ineffectivity.
The present invention solves the technical scheme that its technical matters adopts: the code encryption burning mode of this anti-intercepting and capturing, and these method concrete steps are as follows:
The first step: entered bootmode by the burning/recording chip self-operating that powers on, produce random number X;
Second step: is seed by burning/recording chip with the random number X of the built-in sign indicating number Num of manufacturer, harsh one-tenth, generates the decruption key Key of burning code ciphertext Code1, the sign indicating number Num=of random number X+ manufacturer key K ey by computing;
The 3rd step: driven to PC transmission random number X by ISP by burning/recording chip;
The 4th step: after the replication tool of PC is received the random number X that is sent by burning/recording chip, be seed, by the encryption key Key of computing generation burning code Code0, the sign indicating number Num=of random number X+ manufacturer key K ey with the sign indicating number Num of manufacturer, random number X;
The 5th step: the replication tool of PC converts burning code Code0 to ciphertext Code1 by enciphering and deciphering algorithm, burning code Code0+ key K ey=ciphertext Code1;
The 6th step: the replication tool of PC drives to being sent ciphertext Code1 by burning/recording chip by ISP, wherein comprises segmentation, acknowledgement transmissions mechanism;
The 7th step: the replication tool of PC generates integrity check value CalibNum by CRC16/32 or hash algorithm by ciphertext Code1;
The 8th step: the replication tool of PC drives by ISP ciphertext Code1 integrity check value CalibNum is sent in by burning/recording chip;
The 9th step: by the integrity check value CalibNum that the burning/recording chip combination is received, the integrality of verification ciphertext Code1, the verification failure then enters the tenth step A, and verification succeeds then enters the tenth step B;
The tenth step A: carried out the failure of ciphertext complete checks by burning/recording chip,, enter and finish or the 6th step ciphertext retransmission state by ISP drive feedback burning failure;
The tenth step B: by guidance code, decrypting ciphertext Code1 is burning code Code0, writes the chip code storage medium, ciphertext Code1+ key K ey=burning code Code0 by burning/recording chip;
The 11 step:, finish burning by burning/recording chip feedback burning success.
As preferably, described enciphering and deciphering algorithm is a kind of of DES/3DES, AES, SM1 enciphering and deciphering algorithm.
As preferably, the described computing and the described computing in the 4th step in described second step are same algorithm, are a kind of in spuious or the symmetric encipherment algorithm.
As preferably, the encryption key (Key) in described the 4th step is identical with the decruption key (Key) of the ciphertext Code1 of second step chip generation.
As preferably, the encryption key (Key) in described the 4th step does not carry out the communication transmission with the decruption key (Key) of the ciphertext Code1 that the second step chip generates.
The present invention compared with prior art, useful effect is:
1. the ciphertext (Code1) of burning code (Code0) is different during each burning, can prevent to intercept burning.
2. burning code (Code0) is integrated in replication tool, prevents from just can set up identical replication tool by copy software.
3. two seed keys generate, and guarantee the security and the changeability of key.
4. initiatively interactive by burning/recording chip, guarantee reliability, integrity verification that code is originated.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is existing scheme ciphertext burning synoptic diagram;
Fig. 2 is a system architecture synoptic diagram of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is a schematic flow sheet of the present invention.
Embodiment
The invention will be further described below in conjunction with drawings and Examples:
The description of symbols of Fig. 2:
(1) replication tool: form by software and hardware two parts, be used for chip is carried out burning;
(2) chip:, comprise embedded programming chips such as MCU, MPU, DSP, ARM by burning/recording chip;
(21) ISP drives: a kind of simple communication drives, and is used for data transfer;
(22) random number (X): one of the seed that is used to generate the dynamic encryption key (Key) of burning code Code0;
(23) manufacturer's sign indicating number (Num): with the dynamic encryption key (Key) of random number (X) by certain computing generation burning code Code0,
(24) enciphering and deciphering algorithm:, comprise DES/3DES, AES, SM1 etc. with dynamic key (Key) encryption and decryption burning code;
(3) PC software: comprise (31) burning code Code0, (32) ISP driving, (33) manufacturer sign indicating number (Num), (34) enciphering and deciphering algorithm.Be used to generate key (Key), generate code burning operations such as ciphertext (Code1), data transfer processing.
(31) burning code Code0: the run time version that need finally be written into (2) chip-stored body;
(32) ISP drives: by the driving of burning (2) die terminals, (21) ISP that holds with PC drives coupling;
(33) manufacturer's sign indicating number (Num): manufacturer's sign indicating number that burning (2) die terminals is cured is corresponding with (23) manufacturer sign indicating number (Num) of PC end;
(34) enciphering and deciphering algorithm: corresponding with (24) enciphering and deciphering algorithm of PC end;
(4) PC hardware: the hardware platform of operation (3) PC software;
(5) binding: (3) PC software carries the main ID of equipment etc. to be bound by CPU, hard disk or the plate of (4) PC hardware, changes (4) PC hardware and just can't use this (3) PC software.
The code encryption burning mode of this anti-intercepting and capturing of the present invention, as shown in Figure 3, these method concrete steps are as follows:
The first step: entered bootmode by the burning/recording chip self-operating that powers on, produce random number X;
Second step: is seed by burning/recording chip with the random number X of the built-in sign indicating number Num of manufacturer, harsh one-tenth, (can select other algorithms such as spuious, symmetric cryptography by computing, in the present embodiment, described computing is the SM3 algorithm) generate the decruption key Key of burning code ciphertext Code1, the sign indicating number Num=of random number X+ manufacturer key K ey;
The 3rd step: driven to PC transmission random number X by ISP by burning/recording chip;
The 4th step: after the replication tool of PC is received the random number X that is sent by burning/recording chip, with the sign indicating number Num of manufacturer, random number X is seed, (can select other algorithms such as spuious, symmetric cryptography by computing, in the present embodiment, described computing is the SM3 algorithm) generate the encryption key Key of burning code Code0, described encryption key (Key) is identical with the decruption key (Key) of the ciphertext Code1 that the second step chip generates, for demand for security, this key (Key) does not carry out communication transmission, the sign indicating number Num=of random number X+ manufacturer key K ey;
The 5th step: the replication tool of PC converts burning code Code0 to ciphertext Code1, burning code (Code0)+key (Key)=ciphertext (Code1) by enciphering and deciphering algorithms such as DES/3DES, AES, SM1;
The 6th step: the replication tool of PC drives to being sent ciphertext (Code1) by burning/recording chip by ISP, transmission mechanism such as wherein comprise segmentation, reply;
The 7th step: the replication tool of PC generates integrity check value (CalibNum) by CRC16/32, Hash scheduling algorithm by ciphertext (Code1);
The 8th step: the replication tool of PC drives by ISP ciphertext (Code1) integrity check value (CalibNum) is sent in by burning/recording chip;
The 9th step: by the integrality of burning/recording chip in conjunction with integrity check value (CalibNum) the verification ciphertext of receiving (Code1), the verification failure then enters the tenth step A, and verification succeeds then enters the tenth step B;
The tenth step A: carried out the failure of ciphertext complete checks by burning/recording chip,, enter and finish or the 6th step ciphertext retransmission state by ISP drive feedback burning failure;
The tenth step B: by guidance code, decrypting ciphertext (Code1) is a burning code (Code0), writes the chip code storage medium by burning/recording chip,
Ciphertext (Code1)+key (Key)=burning code (Code0);
The 11 step:, finish burning by burning/recording chip feedback burning success.
Terminological interpretation:
1, ISP:In-System Programming on-line system is able to programme
In addition to the implementation, the present invention can also have other embodiments.All employings are equal to the technical scheme of replacement or equivalent transformation formation, all drop on the protection domain of requirement of the present invention.
Claims (5)
1. one kind resists the code encryption burning mode of intercepting and capturing, and it is characterized in that: these method concrete steps are as follows:
The first step: entered bootmode by the burning/recording chip self-operating that powers on, produce random number X;
Second step: is seed by burning/recording chip with the random number X of the built-in sign indicating number Num of manufacturer, harsh one-tenth, generates the decruption key Key of burning code ciphertext Code1, the sign indicating number Num=of random number X+ manufacturer key K ey by computing;
The 3rd step: driven to PC transmission random number X by ISP by burning/recording chip;
The 4th step: after the replication tool of PC is received the random number X that is sent by burning/recording chip, be seed, by the encryption key Key of computing generation burning code Code0, the sign indicating number Num=of random number X+ manufacturer key K ey with the sign indicating number Num of manufacturer, random number X;
The 5th step: the replication tool of PC converts burning code Code0 to ciphertext Code1 by enciphering and deciphering algorithm, burning code Code0+ key K ey=ciphertext Code1;
The 6th step: the replication tool of PC drives to being sent ciphertext Code1 by burning/recording chip by ISP, wherein comprises segmentation, acknowledgement transmissions mechanism;
The 7th step: the replication tool of PC generates integrity check value CalibNum by CRC16/32 or hash algorithm by ciphertext Code1;
The 8th step: the replication tool of PC drives by ISP ciphertext Code1 integrity check value CalibNum is sent in by burning/recording chip;
The 9th step: by the integrity check value CalibNum that the burning/recording chip combination is received, the integrality of verification ciphertext Code1, the verification failure then enters the tenth step A, and verification succeeds then enters the tenth step B;
The tenth step A: carried out the failure of ciphertext complete checks by burning/recording chip,, enter and finish or the 6th step ciphertext retransmission state by ISP drive feedback burning failure;
The tenth step B: by guidance code, decrypting ciphertext Code1 is burning code Code0, writes the chip code storage medium, ciphertext Code1+ key K ey=burning code Code0 by burning/recording chip;
The 11 step:, finish burning by burning/recording chip feedback burning success.
2. the code encryption burning mode of anti-intercepting and capturing according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: described enciphering and deciphering algorithm is a kind of of DES/3DES, AES, SM1 enciphering and deciphering algorithm.
3. the code encryption burning mode of anti-intercepting and capturing according to claim 1 is characterized in that: the described computing and the described computing in the 4th step in described second step are same algorithm, are a kind of in spuious or the symmetric encipherment algorithm.
4. the code encryption burning mode of anti-intercepting and capturing according to claim 1 is characterized in that: the encryption key Key in described the 4th step is identical with the decruption key Key of the ciphertext Code1 of second step chip generation.
5. the code encryption burning mode of anti-intercepting and capturing according to claim 1 is characterized in that: the decruption key Key of the ciphertext Code1 that the encryption key Key in described the 4th step and the second step chip generate does not carry out communication to be transmitted.
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| CN2011102336117A CN102280133A (en) | 2011-08-16 | 2011-08-16 | Anti-interception code encryption burning method |
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| CN2011102336117A CN102280133A (en) | 2011-08-16 | 2011-08-16 | Anti-interception code encryption burning method |
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| CN103020532A (en) * | 2012-12-28 | 2013-04-03 | 深圳市航盛电子股份有限公司 | Flash encryption method and device for vehicle-mounted terminal |
| CN103475463A (en) * | 2013-08-19 | 2013-12-25 | 华为技术有限公司 | Encryption realization method and apparatus |
| CN104486355A (en) * | 2014-12-30 | 2015-04-01 | 大连楼兰科技股份有限公司 | Method and device for preventing malicious manipulation of codes |
| TWI499929B (en) * | 2012-03-09 | 2015-09-11 | Nuvoton Technology Corp | Programming system |
| CN105468935A (en) * | 2015-11-13 | 2016-04-06 | 福州瑞芯微电子股份有限公司 | Method, sending end, tool end and burning end for guaranteeing safe burning of KEY |
| CN109783299A (en) * | 2018-12-03 | 2019-05-21 | 北京深思数盾科技股份有限公司 | A kind of production test method and apparatus for core board |
| CN110047181A (en) * | 2019-04-20 | 2019-07-23 | 广东珠江智联信息科技股份有限公司 | A kind of intelligent door lock method of controlling security based on Zigbee |
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| CN111814139A (en) * | 2020-07-02 | 2020-10-23 | 深圳市法拉第电驱动有限公司 | Automobile motor controller program safe loading system and method |
| CN112398647A (en) * | 2020-11-03 | 2021-02-23 | 武汉先同科技有限公司 | Consumable dynamic encryption method for channel distribution management |
| CN112989356A (en) * | 2021-03-08 | 2021-06-18 | 广州安凯微电子股份有限公司 | Blank security chip burning method and system, blank security chip and storage medium |
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| TWI499929B (en) * | 2012-03-09 | 2015-09-11 | Nuvoton Technology Corp | Programming system |
| CN103020532A (en) * | 2012-12-28 | 2013-04-03 | 深圳市航盛电子股份有限公司 | Flash encryption method and device for vehicle-mounted terminal |
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| CN103475463B (en) * | 2013-08-19 | 2017-04-05 | 华为技术有限公司 | Encryption implementation method and device |
| CN104486355A (en) * | 2014-12-30 | 2015-04-01 | 大连楼兰科技股份有限公司 | Method and device for preventing malicious manipulation of codes |
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| CN110047181A (en) * | 2019-04-20 | 2019-07-23 | 广东珠江智联信息科技股份有限公司 | A kind of intelligent door lock method of controlling security based on Zigbee |
| CN110047181B (en) * | 2019-04-20 | 2022-05-20 | 广东珠江智联信息科技股份有限公司 | Intelligent door lock safety control method based on Zigbee |
| CN111262910A (en) * | 2020-01-09 | 2020-06-09 | 杭州涂鸦信息技术有限公司 | Wireless equipment firmware protection method and system |
| CN111262910B (en) * | 2020-01-09 | 2022-11-15 | 杭州涂鸦信息技术有限公司 | Wireless equipment firmware protection method and system |
| CN111814139A (en) * | 2020-07-02 | 2020-10-23 | 深圳市法拉第电驱动有限公司 | Automobile motor controller program safe loading system and method |
| CN112398647A (en) * | 2020-11-03 | 2021-02-23 | 武汉先同科技有限公司 | Consumable dynamic encryption method for channel distribution management |
| CN112989356A (en) * | 2021-03-08 | 2021-06-18 | 广州安凯微电子股份有限公司 | Blank security chip burning method and system, blank security chip and storage medium |
| CN112989356B (en) * | 2021-03-08 | 2023-11-10 | 广州安凯微电子股份有限公司 | Blank security chip burning method, system, blank security chip and storage medium |
| CN113091224A (en) * | 2021-04-07 | 2021-07-09 | 青岛海信日立空调系统有限公司 | Air conditioning device and air conditioning control device |
| CN113505399A (en) * | 2021-07-23 | 2021-10-15 | 深圳英集芯科技股份有限公司 | Burning method of encrypted chip and tamper-proof method thereof |
| CN113505399B (en) * | 2021-07-23 | 2023-07-25 | 深圳英集芯科技股份有限公司 | Burning method of encryption chip and tamper-proof method thereof |
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Address after: The city of Hangzhou in West Zhejiang province 311121 No. 998 Building 9 East Sea Park Applicant after: Hangzhou Shengyuan Chip Technique Co., Ltd. Address before: 310012, room 17, building 176, 203 Tianmu Mountain Road, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Xihu District Applicant before: Hangzhou Shengyuan Chip Technique Co., Ltd. |
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Application publication date: 20111214 |