CN102256249A - Identity authentication method and equipment applied to wireless network - Google Patents

Identity authentication method and equipment applied to wireless network Download PDF

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CN102256249A
CN102256249A CN2011100824879A CN201110082487A CN102256249A CN 102256249 A CN102256249 A CN 102256249A CN 2011100824879 A CN2011100824879 A CN 2011100824879A CN 201110082487 A CN201110082487 A CN 201110082487A CN 102256249 A CN102256249 A CN 102256249A
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information
authentication
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文红
吕世超
韩祺祎
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University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
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University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
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Abstract

The technical problem to be solved by the invention is to provide an identity authentication method for performing auxiliary authentication by using a physical layer in a wireless network and equipment for implementing the method. The method comprises an initial authentication step and a physical layer authentication step. In the initial authentication step, when receiving an information packet not passing authentication from a transmitter, a receiver performs identity authentication on the received information packet by upper-layer authentication. In the physical layer authentication step, the receiver acquires the channel information of the information packet from the pilot frequency of the information packet passing the authentication, extracts the channel information in the pilot frequency of the information packet to be authenticated, performs comparison to judge whether the channel information corresponding to the information packet passing the authentication is close to the channel information corresponding to the information packet to be authenticated or not, determines the information packet passes the authentication and returns the physical layer authentication step if the channel information corresponding to the information packet passing the authentication is close to the channel information corresponding to the information packet to be authenticated, otherwise determines the information packet does not pass the authentication and returns to the last step.

Description

Be applicable to the identity identifying method and the equipment thereof of wireless network
Technical field
The present invention relates to the information technology security fields, as the information security technology in fields such as radio communication, mobile communication, deep space communication.
Background technology
Ripe at present identity identifying technology first-selection is utilized PKI (the Public Key Infrastructure that public key cryptography is theoretical and symmetric key technique is set up, PKIX) authentication and CBC-MAC (Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code) are based on the message authentication of ciphertext).
Wireless broadcast communication has work to use very widely in next generation communication, as: mobile TV, real-time video broadcast system etc.Information is in the transmission course of wireless channel, message may be caught by some network interception instrument, and be transmitted to message recipient after being maliciously tampered, the message recipient reception can be done the operation that makes mistake or return to the result of client error, such as client call service is carried out bank transfer, this request can comprise to be produced and changes over to account No. and change the amount of money over to, if network hacker has changed corresponding number of the account or amount of money data after intercepting and capturing this message, and the request after will distorting is transmitted, if it is normal transfer request that service end is treated as the message that receives, will cause big loss.In order to ensure communication safety, need the legitimacy and the confidence level of the information source of validation of wireless communication.But, need to carry out a considerable amount of efficient real-time authentications at short notice in wireless broadcast communication because communication additional information and amount of calculation are all bigger based on the PKI authentication techniques of public key cryptography, it is not all right only adopting the PKI authentication techniques.Additional information and the amount of calculation of CBC-MAC are smaller, but because it still has the upper strata authentication feature that is guaranteed data security by a large amount of encryption and decryption computings, the demand of low complex degree with the application scenario that reaches rapid authentication of can't satisfying the demand.
In the wireless channel that real-time is had relatively high expectations, how can realize efficiently that authentication becomes the focus of a research.
Summary of the invention
Technical problem to be solved by this invention is to provide a kind of in wireless network, the equipment that uses physical layer to carry out the identity identifying method of assistant authentification and realize this method.
The present invention solves the problems of the technologies described above the technical scheme that is adopted to be, is applicable to the identity identifying method of wireless network, comprises step:
Initial authentication step: when the recipient receives the packets of information that comes from unverified successful transmit leg, the packets of information that receives is carried out authentication,, enter next step as authentication success by the upper strata authentication; As authentification failure, then return this step; The authentication of described upper strata is for operating in the identity identifying method more than the physical layer, as the authentication of data link layer, network layer authentication, transport layer authentication and application layer authentication;
The physical layer authenticating step: the recipient obtains the channel information of this packets of information from the pilot tone of the packets of information of authentication success, afterwards, extract the channel information in the pilot tone of packets of information to be certified, more whether the channel information that the channel information of the packets of information correspondence of authentication success is corresponding with packets of information to be certified is approaching, in this way, then be judged as authentication success, return this step; As not, then be judged as authentification failure, return previous step.
The present invention utilizes the wavelength of the position distance of two different transmit legs in the radio communication greater than the information of transmission, then the channel information of two different transmit leg correspondences is incoherent physical channel characteristics, confirm this reception information and received information last time whether sent by the entrained channel information of the packets of information that the recipient is received by same physical entity, whether but can only discern this correspondent based on the authentication of physical channel characteristics is identical correspondent last time, whether and can not discern initial connector is legitimate correspondence person, so the present invention will the inserting safely and authenticating in conjunction with the system of realization based on the authentication of physical channel characteristics and existing upper strata authentication mode.The present invention relies on the upper strata authentication mode relatively fully with existing, and the physical layer authentication is very quick, directly extracts channel information in physical layer, if authentification failure, to fake information do not do further processing (as, demodulation, decoding).The present invention only uses the big upper strata authentication of operand when first the access, to guarantee the legal identity of transmit leg, the physical layer authentication of use afterwards fast, complexity is low promptly guarantees authentication reliability, avoid information send in the distorting and transmitting of illegal entity, again can requirement of real time.Be fit to be applied in to real-time requirement high, but in energy and the computing capability limited wireless communication network, be particularly suitable for being applied to the authentication in the radio sensing network communication process.
The physical layer authenticating step specifically comprises:
The recipient is to the pilot extraction channel information of the packets of information of the authentication success that constantly receives at k-1 (k is a positive integer) At the pilot extraction channel information of next moment (k constantly) recipient to a new frame information bag to be certified of reception
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000022
The channel information that compares these two moment, if twice channel information is enough approaching, think that then these two moment send same physical entity of coming from of information, if twice channel information is approaching inadequately, think that then two moment send different physical entity of coming from of information, back one packet source of (k constantly) constantly is illegal.The extraction of channel information can adopt following two methods to realize the comparison of channel information:
(1) likelihood ratio statistics:
The comparative result of the k-1 moment with k moment channel information is Λ 1, k is a positive integer:
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000023
Wherein,
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000024
The channel information that extracts the pilot tone of the bag of authentication success message that receives constantly from k-1 for the recipient, The channel information that extracts the pilot tone of the packets of information to be certified that receives constantly from k for the recipient; K ColBe normalization coefficient,
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000026
Be the phase difference of two packets of information that constantly receive constantly with k of k-1, ‖ ‖ 2Be two norm computings;
With Λ 1With threshold value η 1Compare, wherein η 1∈ [0,1] is if Λ 1<η 1Then channel information is enough approaching constantly with k constantly for k-1, and what then two moment sent information is same entity, k authentication success constantly; If Λ 1〉=η 1What then k-1 constantly sent information constantly with k is not same entity, k authentication failure constantly.
(2) sequence probability statistics:
The sequence probability statistical method be judge k constantly channel information whether be legal on during user institute photos and sending messages, repeatedly channel information before will consider promptly can take into account k-S constantly to the comparative result Λ of the k channel information of adjacent moment in twos constantly xK-S to k constantly in the comparative result Λ of the channel information of adjacent moment in twos xSum is Λ 2, the packets of information that k-S to k-1 receives constantly is authentication success, and the packets of information that k receives constantly is a packets of information to be certified; K, S are positive integer, and k 〉=S 〉=1:
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000031
Wherein,
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000032
The channel information that extracts the pilot tone of the packets of information that receives constantly from k-i for the recipient,
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000033
The channel information that extracts the pilot tone of the packets of information that receives constantly from k-i+1 for the recipient, i, x are temporary variable, i=1 ..., S; X=k ..., k-S; Be the phase difference of two packets of information that constantly receive constantly with k-i of k-i+1, ‖ ‖ 2Be two norm computings;
Same relatively Λ 2With threshold value η 2∈ [0,1] is if Λ 2<η 2, then k authentication success constantly; If Λ 2〉=η 2, then k authentication failure constantly.
Threshold value η 1, η 2Choose can be by obtaining at the experiment or the emulation of different applied environments and demand for security.
Concrete, the upper strata authentication is PKI authentication or CBC-MAC.
At said method, the present invention also provides a kind of identification authentication system of realizing said method, comprises initial authentication module, physical layer authentication module, distribution module;
Distribution module is used for, and when receiving the packets of information that comes from unverified successful transmit leg, triggers the initial authentication module; When receiving the packets of information that comes from the transmit leg of authentication success, trigger the physical layer authentication module;
The initial authentication module is used for, and by upper strata authentication the packets of information that comes from unverified successful transmit leg is carried out authentication, and the return authentication result, when authentication success, triggers the physical layer authentication module; The authentication of described upper strata is for operating in the authentication more than the physical layer;
The physical layer authentication module is used for, triggered by the initial authentication module after, from the pilot tone of the packets of information of authentication success, obtain the channel information of this packets of information; After triggered by distribution module, extract the channel information in the pilot tone of packets of information to be certified, more whether the channel information that the channel information of the packets of information correspondence of authentication success is corresponding with packets of information to be certified is approaching, in this way, then is judged as authentication success; As not, then be judged as authentification failure.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows, utilize the characteristic of wireless channel, combine with existing upper strata authentication techniques, realize the authentication of high reliability by the physical layer assistant authentification that uses low complex degree.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is a physical layer Verification System instance model schematic diagram;
Fig. 2 strides layer authentication example process for physical layer is auxiliary;
Fig. 3 is embodiment identifying procedure figure.
Embodiment
As shown in Figure 1, comprise in the wireless broadcast communication system of self-organization network (Ad-Hoc Network) that legitimate correspondence both sides (transmit leg A, recipient B) and conduct distort the illegal wiretapping person of forwarding side.Illegal wiretapping person distorts packets of information, and the information of distorting is sent to recipient B behind the legal information bag that recipient B sends at interception transmit leg A on the channel.Include identification authentication system among the recipient B, this identification authentication system comprises initial authentication module, physical layer authentication module, distribution module, as shown in Figure 2;
Distribution module is used for, and when receiving the packets of information that comes from unverified successful transmit leg, triggers the initial authentication module; When receiving the packets of information that comes from the transmit leg of authentication success, trigger the physical layer authentication module;
The initial authentication module is used for, and by CBC-MAC or PKI authentication the packets of information that comes from unverified successful transmit leg is carried out authentication, and the return authentication result, when authentication success, triggers the physical layer authentication module;
The physical layer authentication module is used for, triggered by the initial authentication module after, from the pilot tone of the packets of information of authentication success, obtain the channel information of this packets of information; After triggered by distribution module, extract the channel information in the pilot tone of packets of information to be certified, more whether the channel information that the channel information of the packets of information correspondence of authentication success is corresponding with packets of information to be certified is approaching, in this way, then is judged as authentication success; As not, then be judged as authentification failure.
Each packets of information of transmitting in the system channel is formed by pilot tone (pilot) and data (data);
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000041
Pilot tone (pilot) the estimated channel information of the legal information bag that expression k-1 receives constantly;
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000042
With
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000043
Represent pilot tone (pilot) the estimated channel information of distorting packets of information and legal information bag that k receives constantly respectively.Extracting channel information by the mode of channel estimating from pilot tone has been mature technology, and existing all methods of extracting channel information from pilot tone all are applicable to the present invention, and about the extraction of channel information, this paper does not give unnecessary details at this.Used the recipient B of identification authentication system can normally receive k-1 and come from transmit leg A legal information before reaching constantly, after k received the information of distorting constantly, recipient B can judge authentification failure fast, distorted and cheat generation to prevent information.
K authentication constantly can adopt following dual mode to carry out:
By k-1 constantly with k constantly the comparative result Λ of channel information compare with default threshold value and carry out authentication
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000051
K wherein ColBe normalization coefficient, Be k-1 constantly with the phase difference of k time information bag.Λ and threshold value η are compared, η ∈ [0,1] wherein, if Λ<η then k-1 channel information is enough approaching constantly with k constantly, then two what constantly send information is same entity, k authentication success constantly; If then k-1 constantly sends information with k to Λ 〉=η constantly is not same entity, k authentication failure constantly.
Perhaps, judge k constantly channel information whether be legal on during user institute photos and sending messages, repeatedly channel information before will consider promptly can take into account k-S constantly to k-1 each channel information constantly, wherein, k 〉=S 〉=1; K-S to k constantly in the comparative result Λ of the channel information of adjacent moment in twos xSum is Λ:
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000053
Same comparative result Λ and threshold value η ∈ [0,1], if Λ<η, then k authentication success constantly; If Λ 〉=η, then k authentication failure constantly.
As shown in Figure 3, the identifying procedure of recipient B is as follows:
Transmit leg A transmission information is given recipient B, and it is from transmit leg A that recipient B at first needs confirmation, and transmit leg A and recipient B at first carry out access authentication by CBC-MAC:
Transmit leg A generates random sequence NA and with itself and information R AGive recipient B together.Recipient B returns random sequence N BWith information R BGive transmit leg A.Allow K A-BIt is the key between transmit leg A and the recipient B.Enciphered message has form:
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000054
M represents information, so authentication protocol can be expressed as follows:
A→B:{N A,R A}
B &RightArrow; A : { [ R B ] < K A - B > , MAC ( K mac , N A | T | [ R B ] < K A - B > ) } - - - ( 3 )
Wherein T is the time tag for preventing to transmit; " | " expression beading process.Whether the recipient receives after the packets of information review time sign T and message authentication code (MAC) correct.If transmit leg A sends to the X that is expressed as of recipient B 1, X 2, L, X N, X here i(i=1,2 ..., N) be current transmission bag.First packets of information that transmit leg A sends to recipient B is as follows:
A &RightArrow; B : { [ X 1 ] < K A - B , T > , MAC ( K mac , T | [ X 1 ] < K A - B , T > ) } - - - ( 4 )
Key K in formula (3) and (4) A-BWith the MAC key K MacPeel off for the master key of sharing in advance and to get.Recipient B behind first packets of information authentication success authenticate by physical layer confirm after each frame information whether from transmit leg A, the verification process of recipient B is as follows:
Recipient B carries out MAC (Message Authentication Code) code authentication after receiving first packets of information of formula (4) form that transmit leg A sends, and recipient B extracts the channel information of first packets of information behind the authentication success from the pilot tone of packets of information
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000061
Transmit leg A is directly with the second packets of information X 2Send to recipient B, recipient B is from X 2Pilot tone extract the channel information of second packets of information
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000062
And the comparative result Λ that obtains of through type (1),
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000063
Because second packets of information and first information bag are that same physical entity sends, the channel information of two packets of information correspondences should be enough approaching, k-1 constantly with k constantly the comparative result Λ of (k=1) channel information compare with default threshold value and carry out authentication, therefore can access Λ R<η, the physical layer authentication success.If k is constantly, the equal authentication success of the k-1 of a front packets of information, recipient B receives k packets of information X kAfter, then extract the channel information of k packets of information
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000064
And with the channel information of before S packets of information Compare, through type (2) authenticates, when k packets of information is to be sent by legitimate sender A, then
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000066
Can access Λ R<η, the physical layer authentication success; If k packets of information is to send by distorting forwarding side, then
Figure DEST_PATH_GDA0000065541840000067
As long as the distance of distorting forwarding side and legitimate sender A surpasses the wavelength of transmission information, then the channel information of the channel information of k packets of information correspondence and legal information bag before is uncorrelated, can access Λ E〉=η, physical layer authentification failure, transmit leg B can abandon immediately and come from the packets of information that illegal transmit leg is distorted or puppet is sent out.If S=1 then is equal to through type (1) and authenticates.The wavelength of transmission information is relevant with the centre frequency of carrier wave, and in the present embodiment, as long as two different position distances that send physical entity differ more than the 8cm, the inventive method all effectively authenticates.

Claims (10)

1. be applicable to the identity identifying method of wireless network, it is characterized in that, comprise step:
Initial authentication step: when the recipient receives the packets of information that comes from unverified successful transmit leg, the packets of information that receives is carried out authentication,, enter next step as authentication success by the upper strata authentication; As authentification failure, then return this step; The authentication of described upper strata is for operating in the identity identifying method more than the physical layer;
The physical layer authenticating step: the recipient obtains the channel information of this packets of information from the pilot tone of the packets of information of authentication success, afterwards, extract the channel information in the pilot tone of packets of information to be certified, more whether the channel information that the channel information of the packets of information correspondence of authentication success is corresponding with packets of information to be certified is approaching, in this way, then be judged as authentication success, return this step; As not, then be judged as authentification failure, return previous step.
2. be applicable to the identity identifying method of wireless network according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, in the physical layer authenticating step, whether the recipient is by relatively going up a channel information that the channel information of the packets of information correspondence of authentication success is corresponding with the packets of information to be certified of current time constantly near carrying out authentication.
3. as being applicable to the identity identifying method of wireless network as described in the claim 2, it is characterized in that whether the recipient relatively goes up a channel information that the channel information of the packets of information correspondence of authentication success is corresponding with the packets of information to be certified of current time constantly near specifically carrying out in the following manner:
The comparative result of the k-1 moment with k moment channel information is Λ 1, k is a positive integer:
Wherein,
Figure FDA0000053598900000012
The channel information that extracts the pilot tone of the bag of authentication success message that receives constantly from k-1 for the recipient,
Figure FDA0000053598900000013
The channel information that extracts the pilot tone of the packets of information to be certified that receives constantly from k for the recipient; K ColBe normalization coefficient,
Figure FDA0000053598900000014
Be the phase difference of two packets of information that constantly receive constantly with k of k-1, || || 2Be two norm computings;
With comparative result Λ 1With threshold value η 1Compare, wherein η 1∈ [0,1] is if Λ 1<η 1Then the channel information of two moment correspondences is approaching; If Λ 1〉=η 1Then two corresponding constantly channel informations are kept off.
4. be applicable to the identity identifying method of wireless network according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, in the physical layer authenticating step, whether the section channel information that the channel information of a plurality of packets of information correspondences of authentication success is corresponding with the packets of information to be certified of current time is approaching constantly carries out authentication by adjacent continuous relatively for the recipient.
5. as being applicable to the identity identifying method of wireless network as described in the claim 4, it is characterized in that the section channel information that the channel information of a plurality of packets of information correspondences of authentication success is corresponding with the packets of information to be certified of current time is whether approaching relatively continuously constantly specifically carries out in the following manner for the recipient:
K-S to k constantly in the comparative result Λ of the channel information of adjacent moment in twos xSum is Λ 2, a packets of information that k-S to k-1 receives constantly is authentication success, and the packets of information that k receives constantly is a packets of information to be certified; K, S are positive integer, and k 〉=S 〉=1:
Figure FDA0000053598900000021
Wherein,
Figure FDA0000053598900000022
The channel information that extracts the pilot tone of the packets of information that receives constantly from k-i for the recipient,
Figure FDA0000053598900000023
The channel information that extracts the pilot tone of the packets of information that receives constantly from k-i+1 for the recipient, i, x are temporary variable, i=1 ..., S; X=k ..., k-S;
Figure FDA0000053598900000024
Be the phase difference of two packets of information that constantly receive constantly with k-i of k-i+1, || || 2Be two norm computings;
With comparative result Λ 2With threshold value η 2Compare, wherein η 2∈ [0,1] is if Λ 2<η 2Then the channel information of two moment correspondences is approaching; If Λ 2〉=η 2Then two corresponding constantly channel informations are kept off.
6. as being applicable to the identity identifying method of wireless network as described in above-mentioned any claim, it is characterized in that the authentication of described upper strata authenticates or CBC-MAC for PKI.
7. identification authentication system is characterized in that, comprises initial authentication module, physical layer authentication module, distribution module;
Described distribution module is used for, and when receiving the packets of information that comes from unverified successful transmit leg, triggers the initial authentication module; When receiving the packets of information that comes from the transmit leg of authentication success, trigger the physical layer authentication module;
Described initial authentication module is used for, and by upper strata authentication the packets of information that comes from unverified successful transmit leg is carried out authentication, and the return authentication result, when authentication success, triggers the physical layer authentication module; The authentication of described upper strata is for operating in the authentication more than the physical layer;
Described physical layer authentication module is used for, triggered by the initial authentication module after, from the pilot tone of the packets of information of authentication success, obtain the channel information of this packets of information; After triggered by distribution module, extract the channel information in the pilot tone of packets of information to be certified, more whether the channel information that the channel information of the packets of information correspondence of authentication success is corresponding with packets of information to be certified is approaching, in this way, then is judged as authentication success; As not, then be judged as authentification failure.
8. as identification authentication system as described in the claim 7, it is characterized in that described initial authentication module is used for, carry out the upper strata authentication by PKI authentication or CBC-MAC.
9. as identification authentication system as described in claim 7 or 8, it is characterized in that, described physical layer authentication module is used for, by whether relatively going up a channel information that the channel information of the packets of information correspondence of authentication success is corresponding with the packets of information to be certified of current time constantly near carrying out authentication.
10. as identification authentication system as described in claim 7 or 8, it is characterized in that, described physical layer authentication module is used for, and whether the section channel information that the channel information of a plurality of packets of information correspondences of authentication success is corresponding with the packets of information to be certified of current time is approaching constantly carries out authentication by adjacent continuous relatively.
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Application publication date: 20111123