CN102006663A - Safe positioning method in wireless sensor network - Google Patents
Safe positioning method in wireless sensor network Download PDFInfo
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- CN102006663A CN102006663A CN201010579914XA CN201010579914A CN102006663A CN 102006663 A CN102006663 A CN 102006663A CN 201010579914X A CN201010579914X A CN 201010579914XA CN 201010579914 A CN201010579914 A CN 201010579914A CN 102006663 A CN102006663 A CN 102006663A
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
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- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
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Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of computer network security, relating to a safe positioning method in a wireless sensor network. The traditional positioning methods do not consider the security problems sufficiently, and the invention provides the positioning method based on a signcryption mechanism so as to ensure confidentiality of position information and integrity of the position information in the transmission process. The method comprises the following steps of: carrying out signcryption and broadcasting on the position information by a beacon node; carrying out unsigncryption and authentification on the received position information by an unknown node; calculating a self-position by the unknown node; and updating the self-position by the node. Compared with the prior art, the invention effectively protects the position information in the positioning process, completely considers the characteristic of limited energy of a wireless sensor node, and minimizes the communication cost and calculating cost of the node in the positioning method. The invention has flexible positioning and updating mechanism, and executors can adjust according to the specific circumstances of the network so as to achieve the satisfied positioning convergence time.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the safe positioning method in a kind of wireless sensor network, it specifically is the safe positioning method in a kind of wireless sensor network of signing close scheme based on elliptic curve, can be used for the position calculation of wireless sensor network unknown node, belong to filed of network information security.
Background technology
Wireless sensor network is mainly used in perception, fusion and transmits various types of data, and as temperature, humidity, pressure, speed etc., these data that collect often just have practical meaning together with corresponding positional information.Therefore the wireless sensor network node location technology becomes one of the many aspects of realization transducer key technologies for application.
In wireless sensor network, existing at the wireless sensor node localization method, do not consider safety problem mostly, the positional information of sensor node is placed under the opened state, any node can be visited the positional information of getting other nodes, and such network node can be sayed without any privacy.Some malicious nodes can arbitrarily be distorted the positional information that beaconing nodes sends, even can pretend to be beaconing nodes to send the normal location that some false positional informations are come interfering nodes.Along with current network environment becomes increasingly complex, in order to ensure the validity of localization method, position fixing process needs and can security threat and the attack that face be on the defensive.
Present localization method mainly is divided into based on the location algorithm of range finding and non-location algorithm based on range finding.Representative location algorithm based on range finding comprises the APS location algorithm based on the angle of arrival that people such as Niculescu proposes; The RADAR navigation system that people such as Paramvir propose based on received signal intensity.Non-location algorithm based on range finding mainly comprises the APIT algorithm that people such as T.He proposes, the HiRLoc algorithm that people such as L.Lazos propose.There is following main defective in these localization methods that propose at present: the localization method based on range finding is higher to the hardware requirement of the network equipment, for example the method based on the angle of arrival just needs equipment such as array antenna, is subjected to the obvious effect of environment based on the method for measurement of signal strength signal intensity.Non-algorithm based on range finding covers thought based on the zone mostly, makes positioning accuracy directly depend on the density of beaconing nodes.Also have some safe positioning methods at present, most of scheme is too loaded down with trivial details, and a large amount of Internet resources of communication process consumption of safety measure have increased the delay of position fixing process, make that the positioning performance of wireless sensor node is not ideal enough.
In the wireless sensor network node location, node with known self-positions of positioning function such as GPS is called beaconing nodes, they can provide positional information to help the needing node of location to finish positioning action to other nodes, and ordinary node to be positioned in the network then is called unknown node.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide safe positioning method in a kind of wireless sensor network.Use this method can prevent that malicious node in the network from pretending to be the legal false positional information of beaconing nodes issue, can prevent that also the positional information that legal node sends from illegally being distorted, thereby guarantee the confidentiality and the reliability of information in the position fixing process.This localization method has reduced the calculation cost of wasting when location node is received the deceptive information bag, effectively filters out false positional information.For achieving the above object, the present invention comprises two important mechanisms in position fixing process.
Mechanism 1: the encryption of positional information and authentication mechanism.
In position fixing process, send by legal beaconing nodes for guaranteeing the positional information that is used for location Calculation, and do not distorted in the communication process by malicious node, the present invention introduces a kind of close scheme of label of location information.In this scheme, before beaconing nodes sends positional information it has been finished and encrypted and two functions of signing, encrypting the scheme of signing again with elder generation in the past, to compare step simple, effectively saved the calculation cost of beaconing nodes.The basic thought of this scheme is that information encryption and two steps of signature are closely merged, and in scheme, fully take into account the characteristics of sensor node resource-constrained, especially for ordinary node to be positioned, they have born most evaluation work in position fixing process, therefore the present invention has taken into full account and has signed the close amount of calculation distribution of close reconciliation label, with respect to the close scheme of existing label, this programme has reduced the computation burden of unknown node, node judges by a validation value M who calculates in the comparison algorithm whether information is credible earlier after receiving positional information, after being deceptive information, determination information directly abandons, no longer include follow-up Hash calculation, also just saved energy greatly, especially under the frequent network environment of attack, the superiority of this scheme is particularly evident.This scheme can successfully filter out false positional information, and makes that false positional information is very limited for the energy consumption of node, can not cause too big influence substantially to the resource of node.
Mechanism 2: locate fast and update mechanism.
Conventional localization method usually needs to spend long time and is used for assembling position information, promotes the accuracy of positioning result by collecting positional information as much as possible, and this makes the convergence of location algorithm be subjected to influence.Also have some localization methods in a single day to reach just location immediately of design conditions, lack corresponding update mechanism after drawing positioning result, so just do not guarantee the accuracy of positioning result.This programme is started with from this defective just, finishes the location tasks first of unknown node as far as possible apace, and has introduced update mechanism.Node may still can receive the positional information of beaconing nodes behind the location first, after receiving with these information storage in tabulation.This programme can be set a time threshold T according to concrete conditions such as network size and beaconing nodes density in force, when location Calculation first finished the back threshold value T time of advent, node upgraded operation according to the positional information situation that stores in the tabulation accordingly to position coordinates.This mechanism can be adjusted according to the concrete condition of network, and flexible operation improves positioning accuracy not influencing under the constringent prerequisite of navigation system.
Based on the safe positioning method in the wireless sensor network of mechanism 1 and mechanism 2 four-stage is arranged, be respectively: 1. the beaconing nodes location information is signed close and broadcasting; 2. unknown node is separated the positional information that receives and is signed close and authentication; 3. unknown node is according to the securing position information calculations position coordinates of collecting; 4. node location upgrades.
Safe positioning method in a kind of wireless sensor network, the fail safe that confidentiality by guaranteeing positional information and the integrality in the transmission improve navigation system is characterized in that carrying out under following precondition:
A. the node in the network has synchronised clock;
B. in the network all there be unique ID number each node;
C. it is right that each beaconing nodes all has the key of being made up of a PKI and private key;
D. the node in the network can send two kinds of signals that frequency is different;
E. the node in the network is divided into group by correspondence, each group has a unique ID, at least 3 beaconing nodes are all arranged in each group, and it is right that beaconing nodes in the same group and ordinary node are shared the key of being made up of a PKI and private key;
F. node is static relatively in the position fixing process;
The step of safe positioning method is as follows:
Step 1: beaconing nodes is signed close to the positional information of self and broadcasting;
The feature in this stage is to have introduced the notion of group of nodes in the close mechanism of existing label based on elliptic curve;
At first navigation system is at finite field F
pElliptic curve E of last picked at random:
y
2≡ x
3+ ax+b (modq), Q are the basic points of this elliptic curve, and q is the order that E goes up basic point Q, and (x y) represents that this elliptic curve E goes up the coordinate of point, and a, b are the parameters of determining elliptic curve; The key of any beaconing nodes A is to being expressed as (P in this method
A, S
A), P wherein
AThe expression A PKI, this PKI for the node of A in same group be disclosed, S
AThe private key of expression A; Node member cipher key shared is to being among the j of group of A place
Wherein j represents the ID of A place group,
The PKI of the expression j of group,
The private key of the expression j of group;
The concrete steps in this stage are described below:
Step 1.1: beaconing nodes [1 ..., q-1] in select integer k as a random number at random;
Step 1.2: beaconing nodes is to the PKI of random number k and its place group
Carry out Hash operation, calculate two random key k
1And k
2:
H represents hash function;
Step 1.3: the beaconing nodes location information is made a summary accordingly with the Hash operation of key: r=HMAC (k
1, m), wherein m is the positional information of beaconing nodes, HMAC represents the hash function with key;
Step 1.4: the beaconing nodes private key compute signature s=(k/ (r+S of oneself
A)) modq;
Step 1.5: beaconing nodes utilizes random key k
2Location information m carries out symmetric key encryption, obtains ciphertext
Step 1.6: beaconing nodes is broadcast message { ID periodically
A|| r||s||c}, ID
AID number of expression beaconing nodes A;
Step 2: unknown node is separated the positional information that receives and is signed close and authentication;
The feature in this stage is the judgement that has proposed for validation value M; Unknown node in the j of group is received the positional information of A, and the concrete steps in this stage are described below:
Step 2.1: unknown node is received information { ID
A|| behind the r||s||c}, calculate validation value
Step 2.2: unknown node is calculated
And itself and M compared, if
Just abandon this positional information, if
Illustrate that this information is credible, the calculating below just continuing;
Step 2.3: calculate the random key k that deciphering needs
2Be used to reduce positional information, (k
1, k
2)=H (M);
Step 2.4: restore the positional information that needs
Step 3: unknown node is according to the position coordinates of the securing position information calculations self of collecting;
The concrete steps in this stage are described below:
Step 3.1: the poor distance of calculating between unknown node and the beaconing nodes time of advent that sends positional information according to beaconing nodes;
The moment of supposing the positional information arrival unknown node of two different frequencies that beaconing nodes sends simultaneously is respectively t
1And t
2, the speed that two kinds of signals are propagated in air is respectively v
1And v
2, the distance between beaconing nodes and the unknown node is L, then L=v
1v
2(t
2-v
1)/(v
1-v
2);
Step 3.2: unknown node according to the method in the step 3.1 calculate it with each by the distance between the beaconing nodes of verifying and with beaconing nodes ID, coordinate and and beaconing nodes between distance be stored in the tabulation;
Step 3.3: the beaconing nodes in tabulation in the step 3.2 is when reaching 3, and unknown node just starts location Calculation, utilizes Euclidean distance formula in the two-dimensional space to list unknown node and the distance relation group between the beaconing nodes on every side:
I=1,2,3; At this moment, (x
u, y
u) coordinate of expression unknown node U, (x
i, y
i) represent that ID is the position coordinates of the beaconing nodes of i;
During netinit, the implementer is that navigation system is provided with a time threshold T according to network size and node density; When unknown node is collected first believable positional information, begin self-clocking, if the trustworthy location information in T tabulated in the time reached 3 or more than, then can begin the calculating location coordinate according to said method; If arrive T during the moment, still not enough 3 of the positional information in the tabulation, the unknown node then trusted node in same group is sent request, and the ordinary node of same group can send positional information to this unknown node;
Step 4: the position of node updates self;
The concrete steps in this stage are:
Location node may continue to receive the positional information that beaconing nodes is on every side sent behind first location, node verifies according to location information described in the step 2, to the information by checking according to handling described in the step 3 and depositing relevant information in tabulation; Here still need to use above-mentioned time threshold T, in the T moment behind first location, node is checked the positional information tabulation of self, if not variation of the legal beaconing nodes information of receiving this moment then need not be recomputated, returns the position coordinates of first location; If the beaconing nodes in the positional information tabulation increases to some extent, then upgrade position coordinates according to the maximum likelihood estimation technique.
With existing node security localization method contrast, the present invention has following feature:
(1) the present invention is not the safe positioning method that proposes at a certain attack form, but promoted the reliability of locating from the source of locating information, positional information of pretending to be legal beaconing nodes to send and the legal position information of being distorted can be filtered effectively, thus the accuracy of raising positioning result.
(2) the present invention has saved the time cost of position fixing process and has assessed the cost, and has reduced the energy consumption of location node, has improved location efficiency when guaranteeing positioning security.
(3) flexibility of update stage makes it be applicable to the sensor network of different scales among the present invention.Thereby the implementer can adjust update strategy according to concrete conditions such as network size and beaconing nodes density change time threshold.
(4) the present invention is not high for the hardware requirement of sensor node, only requires that the node in the network has synchronised clock, and can send the signal of different frequency.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is a navigation system flow chart of the present invention
Fig. 2 is the trilateration schematic diagram of the first location of node among the present invention
Fig. 3 estimates the mensuration schematic diagram for the maximum likelihood in node updates stage among the present invention
Fig. 4 is the simulation result figure of range error
Embodiment
In conjunction with above-mentioned explanation and accompanying drawing, describe embodiments of the present invention below in detail.Enforcement of the present invention is supposed based on following precondition and network:
A. all nodes in the network have synchronised clock; B. each node all has and distinguishes identity unique ID number in the network; C. it is right that each beaconing nodes all has the key of being made up of a PKI and private key; D. the node in the network can send the different signal of frequency, as radiofrequency signal and ultrasonic signal; E. the node in the network is divided into group by correspondence, each group has a unique ID, at least 3 beaconing nodes are all arranged in each group, and it is right that beaconing nodes in the same group and ordinary node are shared the key of being made up of a PKI and private key; F. node is static relatively in the position fixing process.
1. positional information is signed the implementation in close stage
This stage has been introduced group of nodes in the close mechanism of existing label based on elliptic curve, positional information after the label that make beaconing nodes send are close can be used for all unknown node in the same group, prevent that it from being caught by illegal node, saved simultaneously to guaranteeing that confidentiality is the repetitive operation that single unknown node is encrypted.
At first navigation system is at finite field F
pElliptic curve E of last picked at random:
y
2≡ x
3+ ax+b (modq), Q are the basic points of this elliptic curve, and q is the order that E goes up basic point Q, and (x y) represents that this elliptic curve E goes up the coordinate of point, and a, b are the parameters of determining elliptic curve.Be that example is signed close to its positional information with beaconing nodes A below.The key of beaconing nodes A is to being (P
A, S
A), P wherein
AThe expression A PKI, this PKI for the node of A in same group be disclosed, S
AThe private key of expression A; Node member cipher key shared is to being among the j of group of A place
Wherein j represents the ID of A place group,
The PKI of the expression j of group,
The private key of the expression j of group.The concrete steps in this stage are described below:
(1) beaconing nodes [1 ..., q-1] in select integer k as a random number at random;
(2) beaconing nodes is to the PKI of random number k and its place group
Carry out Hash operation, calculate two random key k
1And k
2:
H represents hash function;
Beaconing nodes carries out Hash operation by the PKI that group member is shared and generates two random keys, and the label that are used for following step are close; Legal member node receives the positional information that the private key that can utilize group to share after the packets of information cracks out beaconing nodes to have only this group;
(3) the beaconing nodes location information is made a summary accordingly with the Hash operation of key:
R=HMAC (k
1, m), wherein m is the positional information of beaconing nodes, HMAC represents the hash function with key;
Beaconing nodes utilizes random key k
1Location information so just can prevent that with the Hash operation of key information from being distorted;
(4) the beaconing nodes private key compute signature s=(k/ (r+S of oneself
A)) mod q;
(5) beaconing nodes utilizes random key k
2Location information m carries out symmetric key encryption, obtains ciphertext
(6) beaconing nodes broadcast message { ID periodically
A|| r||s||c}, ID
AThe ID of expression beaconing nodes A.
2. positional information is separated the implementation of signing close and authentication phase
After unknown node receives positional information, need separate information and sign close and authentication.This stage proposes the judgement for validation value M, and judgement can filter out the malice positional information, thereby has saved the cost of the decrypt operation that the Hash operation of information is carried out with the reduction positional information, and concrete steps are described below:
(1) unknown node is received information { ID
A|| behind the r||s||c}, calculate validation value
(2) unknown node is calculated
And itself and M compared, if
Just abandon this positional information, if
Illustrate that this information is credible, the calculating below just continuing;
By M value relatively can authorization information confidentiality and integrality; The basic thought of judging draws according to element relation characteristic in the elliptic curve cryptography mechanism: the relation owing to PKI in the elliptic curve and private key has P
A=QS
A,
If therefore data were not distorted, so just have
Dummy location information directly is dropped, and therefore can not consume the too much resource of unknown node;
(3) calculate the random key k that deciphering needs
2Be used to reduce positional information, (k
1, k
2)=H (M);
(4) use key k
2Restore the positional information that needs
From above step as can be seen, if unknown node receives is deceptive information, by calculate M and with
Just compare and to be excluded, can not take the more computational resource of node, be applicable to sensor network nodes.
3. the implementation in location Calculation stage
Positional information by checking is used to calculate distance between unknown node and the beaconing nodes, and concrete steps are as follows:
(1) according to the distance of calculating the time of advent poor (TDOA) of beaconing nodes transmission positional information bag between unknown node and the beaconing nodes;
Suppose that the moment that beaconing nodes uses the different signal of two kinds of frequencies (can with radiofrequency signal and ultrasonic signal) to send positional information simultaneously is t, the moment that arrives unknown node is respectively t
1And t
2, the speed that two kinds of signals are propagated in air is respectively v
1And v
2, the distance between beaconing nodes and the unknown node is L, because the distance of unlike signal transmission is identical, the moment of sending information is also identical, then has
L=v
1(t
1-t)=v
2(v
2-t), can release
Therefore
(2) unknown node is calculated it according to said method and is stored in (as table 1) in the tabulation with each by the distance between the beaconing nodes of verifying and with relevant information;
Table 1 beaconing nodes is apart from tabulation
| Beaconing nodes ID | The beaconing nodes coordinate | Distance |
| B 1(Beacon 1) | (x 1，y 1) | d 1 |
| B 2(Beacon 2) | (x 2，y 2) | d 2 |
| B 2(Beacon 3) | (x 3，y 3) | d 3 |
(3) when the beaconing nodes in the above-mentioned tabulation reaches 3, unknown node just starts location Calculation, utilizes Euclidean distance formula in the two-dimensional space to list unknown node and the distance relation group between the beaconing nodes on every side:
I=1,2,3.At this moment, (x
u, y
u) coordinate of expression unknown node U, (x
i, y
i) represent that ID is the position coordinates (as Fig. 2) of the beaconing nodes of i.
During netinit, the implementer is that navigation system is provided with a time threshold T according to the density of beaconing nodes in the scale of sensor network and the network.When unknown node is collected first believable positional information, begin self-clocking, if the trustworthy location information in T tabulated in the time reached 3 or more than, then can begin the calculating location coordinate according to said method; If arrive T during the moment, still not enough 3 of the positional information in the tabulation, the unknown node then trusted node in same group is sent request, and the ordinary node of same group can send positional information to this unknown node.
4. the implementation of position update stage
Above-mentioned location algorithm is in order to save the positioning time of unknown node, and the time of not overspending goes to wait for the more positional information of multi-beacon node, makes that location process is rapider first.This method of locating fast loses certain accuracy owing to the beacon position of collecting is less.Therefore the present invention has introduced update mechanism flexibly for the accuracy that further promotes the location.Location node may continue to receive the positional information that beaconing nodes is on every side sent behind first location, node is verified according to separating the step location information described in the close stage of label, to handling according to the step described in the location Calculation stage by the information of checking and depositing relevant information in tabulation.Here still need to use above-mentioned time threshold T.In the T moment behind first location, node is checked the positional information tabulation of self, if not variation of the legal beaconing nodes information of receiving this moment then need not be recomputated, returns the position coordinates of first location.If the beaconing nodes in the positional information tabulation increases to some extent, then upgrade position coordinates (as shown in Figure 3) according to the maximum likelihood estimation technique.Still try to achieve the new coordinate of node according to the Euclidean distance formula:
This moment z=1,2 ..., n, n are the number of all beaconing nodes of collecting, (x
u, y
u) still represent the coordinate of unknown node U, (x
z, y
z) represent that ID is the position coordinates of the beaconing nodes of z.
5. emulation experiment assessment
Adopt MATLAB 7.1 versions, emulation under Microsoft windows XP professional, CPU frequency is 3.00G Hz, internal memory 512M gets off to realize method of the present invention.The network scenarios of experiment is disposed 100 beaconing nodes at random in 1000 meters * 1000 meters zone, 200 unknown node are attacked node for 20, and node transmission radius is 100 meters, and the cycle that beaconing nodes sends positional information is 2 seconds.Need consider scale and the density of beaconing nodes and the frequency of giving out a contract for a project of network when time threshold T is set, the time threshold T of this experiment was made as 3 seconds.The range difference of positioning result as shown in Figure 4.As can be seen from Figure 4, the present invention can be significantly improved and remain on one preferably in the scope for the orientation distance error of wireless sensor node under attack context.And because the setting of time threshold, in T finishes whole network in the time location, the convergence time of navigation system is controlled.
In concrete exemplifying embodiment, safe position fixing process has successively experienced label confidential information, authorization information, calculating location, four steps in renewal position.By these four steps, the reliability of position information source and the confidentiality and the integrality of positional information itself have effectively been protected in the position fixing process.By experimental result as can be seen; because the present invention has added authentication mechanism in position fixing process; sign in the close process in positional information and to have introduced group key; have only node legal in the group can receive the positional information of beaconing nodes in the feasible wireless sensor network based on group; limited the flow direction of positional information; filter for illegal node, effectively protected the confidentiality and the privacy of positional information, thereby arrived better positioning effect.This method has reduced the resource consumption that dummy location information causes sensor node; Introduced quick location and update mechanism simultaneously, made the position fixing process better astringency, and do not influenced accurate positioning, the implementer can be provided with flexibly according to the actual conditions of network in the implementation process, has reached safely and effectively the purpose of location fast.
Claims (1)
1. the safe positioning method in the wireless sensor network, the fail safe that confidentiality by guaranteeing positional information and the integrality in the transmission improve navigation system is characterized in that carrying out under following precondition:
A. the node in the network has synchronised clock;
B. in the network all there be unique ID number each node;
C. it is right that each beaconing nodes all has the key of being made up of a PKI and private key;
D. the node in the network can send two kinds of signals that frequency is different;
E. the node in the network is divided into group by correspondence, each group has a unique ID, at least 3 beaconing nodes are all arranged in each group, and it is right that beaconing nodes in the same group and ordinary node are shared the key of being made up of a PKI and private key;
F. node is static relatively in the position fixing process;
The step of safe positioning method is as follows:
Step 1: beaconing nodes is signed close to the positional information of self and broadcasting;
The feature in this stage is to have introduced the notion of group of nodes in the close mechanism of existing label based on elliptic curve;
At first navigation system is at finite field F
pElliptic curve E:y of last picked at random
2≡ x
3+ ax+b (modq), Q are the basic points of this elliptic curve, and q is the order that E goes up basic point Q, and (x y) represents that this elliptic curve E goes up the coordinate of point, and a, b are the parameters of determining elliptic curve; The key of any beaconing nodes A is to being expressed as (P in this method
A, S
A), P wherein
AThe expression A PKI, this PKI for the node of A in same group be disclosed, S
AThe private key of expression A; Node member cipher key shared is to being among the j of group of A place
Wherein j represents the ID of A place group,
The PKI of the expression j of group,
The private key of the expression j of group;
The concrete steps in this stage are described below:
Step 1.1: beaconing nodes [1 ..., q-1] in select integer k as a random number at random;
Step 1.2: beaconing nodes is to the PKI of random number k and its place group
Carry out Hash operation, calculate two random key k
1And k
2:
H represents hash function;
Step 1.3: the beaconing nodes location information is made a summary accordingly with the Hash operation of key: r=HMAC (k
1, m), wherein m is the positional information of beaconing nodes, HMAC represents the hash function with key;
Step 1.4: the beaconing nodes private key compute signature s=(k/ (r+S of oneself
A)) modq;
Step 1.5: beaconing nodes utilizes random key k
2Location information m carries out symmetric key encryption, obtains ciphertext
Step 1.6: beaconing nodes is broadcast message { ID periodically
A|| r||s||c}, ID
AID number of expression beaconing nodes A;
Step 2: unknown node is separated the positional information that receives and is signed close and authentication;
The feature in this stage is the judgement that has proposed for validation value M; Unknown node in the j of group is received the positional information of A, and the concrete steps in this stage are described below:
Step 2.1: unknown node is received information { ID
A|| behind the r||s||c}, calculate validation value
Step 2.2: unknown node is calculated
And itself and M compared, if
Just abandon this positional information, if
Illustrate that this information is credible, the calculating below just continuing;
Step 2.3: calculate the random key k that deciphering needs
2Be used to reduce positional information, (k
1, k
2)=H (M);
Step 2.4: restore the positional information that needs
Step 3: unknown node is according to the position coordinates of the securing position information calculations self of collecting; The concrete steps in this stage are described below:
Step 3.1: the poor distance of calculating between unknown node and the beaconing nodes time of advent that sends positional information according to beaconing nodes;
The moment of supposing the positional information arrival unknown node of two different frequencies that beaconing nodes sends simultaneously is respectively t
1And t
2, the speed that two kinds of signals are propagated in air is respectively v
1And v
2, the distance between beaconing nodes and the unknown node is L, then L=v
1v
2(t
2-t
1)/(v
1-v
2);
Step 3.2: unknown node according to the method in the step 3.1 calculate it with each by the distance between the beaconing nodes of verifying and with beaconing nodes ID, coordinate and and beaconing nodes between distance be stored in the tabulation;
Step 3.3: the beaconing nodes in tabulation in the step 3.2 is when reaching 3, and unknown node just starts location Calculation, utilizes Euclidean distance formula in the two-dimensional space to list unknown node and the distance relation group between the beaconing nodes on every side:
I=1,2,3; At this moment, (x
u, y
u) coordinate of expression unknown node U, (x
i, y
i) represent that ID is the position coordinates of the beaconing nodes of i;
During netinit, the implementer is that navigation system is provided with a time threshold T according to network size and node density; When unknown node is collected first believable positional information, begin self-clocking, if the trustworthy location information in T tabulated in the time reached 3 or more than, then can begin the calculating location coordinate according to said method; If arrive T during the moment, still not enough 3 of the positional information in the tabulation, the unknown node then trusted node in same group is sent request, and the ordinary node of same group can send positional information to this unknown node;
Step 4: the position of node updates self;
The concrete steps in this stage are:
Location node may continue to receive the positional information that beaconing nodes is on every side sent behind first location, node verifies according to location information described in the step 2, to the information by checking according to handling described in the step 3 and depositing relevant information in tabulation; Here still need to use above-mentioned time threshold T, in the T moment behind first location, node is checked the positional information tabulation of self, if not variation of the legal beaconing nodes information of receiving this moment then need not be recomputated, returns the position coordinates of first location; If the beaconing nodes in the positional information tabulation increases to some extent, then upgrade position coordinates according to the maximum likelihood estimation technique.
Priority Applications (1)
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| CN102202393A (en) * | 2011-05-10 | 2011-09-28 | 苏州两江科技有限公司 | Method for locating WSN (Wireless Sensor Network) based on fast table lookup |
| CN102223627A (en) * | 2011-06-17 | 2011-10-19 | 北京工业大学 | Beacon node reputation-based wireless sensor network safety locating method |
| CN102223627B (en) * | 2011-06-17 | 2013-10-23 | 北京工业大学 | Beacon node reputation-based wireless sensor network safety locating method |
| CN103491626B (en) * | 2012-06-13 | 2017-02-15 | 日电（中国）有限公司 | method and device for estimating time of arrival |
| CN103491626A (en) * | 2012-06-13 | 2014-01-01 | 日电（中国）有限公司 | Method and device for estimating time of arrival |
| CN103338491A (en) * | 2013-06-09 | 2013-10-02 | 南京邮电大学 | Mobile beacon routing method based on bee colony algorithm |
| CN103338491B (en) * | 2013-06-09 | 2015-08-19 | 南京邮电大学 | A kind of mobile beacon routing resource based on ant colony algorithm |
| CN104202295A (en) * | 2014-07-25 | 2014-12-10 | 苏州寻息电子科技有限公司 | Beacon node based safeguard system and implementation method thereof |
| CN104202295B (en) * | 2014-07-25 | 2018-05-01 | 苏州寻息电子科技有限公司 | Security protection system and its implementation based on beaconing nodes |
| CN105491562A (en) * | 2015-11-30 | 2016-04-13 | 中北大学 | Anti-attack encrypting positioning method and device of wireless sensor network |
| CN105491562B (en) * | 2015-11-30 | 2018-09-04 | 中北大学 | A kind of wireless sensor network attack resistance encryption localization method and device |
| CN105929301A (en) * | 2016-04-12 | 2016-09-07 | 时建华 | Intelligent monitoring device of substation grounding grid corrosion failure points |
| CN105827483A (en) * | 2016-04-12 | 2016-08-03 | 时建华 | Electric power tower outdoor damage monitoring system based on wireless sensor network |
| CN105929301B (en) * | 2016-04-12 | 2019-01-04 | 扬州盈信电气工程有限公司 | A kind of grounding net of transformer substation corrosion failure point intelligent monitoring device |
| CN106652412A (en) * | 2016-12-19 | 2017-05-10 | 杨智睿 | Civil engineering monitoring system based on wireless communication |
| CN114448724A (en) * | 2022-03-17 | 2022-05-06 | 中国电子科技集团公司第十五研究所 | Data processing method and device for network beacon tampering detection |
| CN114448724B (en) * | 2022-03-17 | 2022-10-14 | 中国电子科技集团公司第十五研究所 | Data processing method and device for network beacon tampering detection |
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