CN101887385B - Microprocessor and method for generating uncertain key - Google Patents
Microprocessor and method for generating uncertain key Download PDFInfo
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- CN101887385B CN101887385B CN201010243162XA CN201010243162A CN101887385B CN 101887385 B CN101887385 B CN 101887385B CN 201010243162X A CN201010243162X A CN 201010243162XA CN 201010243162 A CN201010243162 A CN 201010243162A CN 101887385 B CN101887385 B CN 101887385B
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Abstract
Microprocessor and method for generating uncertain key. The microprocessor includes a manufacture identification code stored in the microprocessor in a non-volatile mode during manufacturing of the microprocessor. The manufacture identification code is particular to the microprocessor. The microprocessor also includes an encryption key, stored in the microprocessor and is unable to be read from external of the microprocessor. The microprocessor also includes an advanced encipher standard encipher engine, for receiving the manufacture identification code and the encryption key, and using the encryption key to encipher the manufacture identification code, to generate the particular one uncertain key of the microprocessor.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to encrypt the particularly generation of the encryption key of exclusive (unique).
Background technology
Safe context (context), namely exclusive number or the key of particular microprocessor needs.One of mode is to make exclusive sequence number in microprocessor.Yet because sequence number has structural (structured) and repeatability, so sequence number is very easy to predicted arriving.In many safe contexts, high predictability is not advantage.
United States Patent (USP) notification number the 5th, 790, No. 783, the 5th, 790, No. 663 and the 5th, 774, the patent such as No. 544 is described the method and apparatus that the sequence number to microprocessor is encrypted and deciphers, wherein this legacy system discloses an integrated antenna package and comprises a central processing unit (CPU) crystal grain (die) and a nonvolatile ram (Non-volatile random access memory, NVRAM) crystal grain, and wherein two crystal grain are coupled in together by serial line interface.Manufacturer's setting has a special module register (Model Specific Register, MSR) of the sequence number of wanting to central processing unit, and other two special module registers with not identical key are set.According to encrypting algorithm, central processing unit then can use the first key that sequence number is encrypted, and then uses the second key that sequence number and the first key of having encrypted is encrypted.Then, central processing unit can write to sequence number and a crc value (cyclic redundancy check, CRC) of double-encryption (double-encrypted) in the nonvolatile ram.
In addition, the open manufacturer of legacy system can arrange the special module register with second key.Then, central processing unit reads out the sequence number (checking this crc value) of double-encryption from nonvolatile ram, and uses the second key the sequence number of double-encryption to be decrypted to obtain sequence number and first key of single encryption (singly-encrypted).Then, central processing unit uses the first key deciphered that the sequence number of single encryption is decrypted and the sequence number of having been deciphered, and the sequence number that will decipher is stored in the special module register.Write sequence number to nonvolatile ram and only can not pin at processor from the action that nonvolatile ram reads out sequence number in the situation of (unlocked) and just can be performed, it occurs in when processor detects the nonvolatile ram no-output or works as manufacturer's setting has in the situation of present processor sequence number and two keys, and wherein two keys are used for making sequence number and mate with sequence number.
Legacy system also discloses application programming interfaces (Application Programming Interface, API), it allows the software of serializing (serialize) (namely to chain to the software of a processor sequence number, so that this software can't be performed at the processor with another sequence number, for example in the situation that processor is upgraded) can have the special module register of the second key and read out the sequence number of central processing unit from nonvolatile ram by setting.The second key also is stored in complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) (Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor, the CMOS) element of system.Application programming interfaces also provide and allow serializing software to read recently by the function of the sequence number of the central processing unit that system stored (may be stored in cmos device or the disk).If when both values were identical, then serializing software can continue to be performed.Otherwise serializing software can think that the user upgrades to the new central processing unit with new sequence number with this central processing unit, and calls out Another Application routine interface function, and it needs to authorize (authorization) to be performed at new central processing unit.If authorize licensedly, then serializing software can come executive software to pin with the sequence number of new central processing unit.Otherwise serializing software can not be performed, otherwise is performed under limited ability exactly.
The disclosed method of legacy system has some shortcoming.At first, although two encryption keys of legacy system and encryption algorithm are only known by manufacturer, be stored in the special module register yet possible risk is two keys, it can be read by the user.Moreover the second key is stored in the cmos device of system.So, gone out by the legacy system deducibility: although this System and method for can't provide complete protection to prevent key or sequence number are carried out uncommitted access, but can stop the user to obtain undelegated access without heart.Although legacy system uses two independently encryption keys, yet each encryption key only has 32, it is for many application and non-security.At last, only there are needs to read sequence number in two encryption keys.
Summary of the invention
The invention provides a kind of microprocessor.Above-mentioned microprocessor comprises: one makes identification code, during making above-mentioned microprocessor, is stored in the above-mentioned microprocessor in a non-volatile mode, and wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is that above-mentioned microprocessor is exclusive; One encryption key is stored in the inside of above-mentioned microprocessor, and can't be read by the outside of above-mentioned microprocessor; And, one advanced encryption standard (AES) crypto engine, in order to receiving above-mentioned manufacturing identification code and above-mentioned encryption key, and use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, to produce the exclusive uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor.
Moreover, the invention provides a kind of method that produces uncertain key.Said method comprises: during making a microprocessor, store one in a non-volatile mode and make identification code in above-mentioned microprocessor, wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is that above-mentioned microprocessor is exclusive; In the mode that can't read from the outside of above-mentioned microprocessor, store an encryption key in the inside of above-mentioned microprocessor; And, use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, to produce the exclusive uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor, wherein above-mentioned encrypting step is performed by an advanced encryption standard crypto engine of above-mentioned microprocessor.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 shows according to the described microprocessor of one embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 2 is the calcspar that shows the operation of microprocessor among Fig. 1; And
Fig. 3 is the process flow diagram that shows the operation of microprocessor among Fig. 1.
[main element symbol description]
100～microprocessor; 132～special module register;
134～manufacturing identification code; 136～key;
142～exclusive uncertain key; 601～extraction logic unit;
602～translation logic unit; 603～transfer interpreter;
604～microcode ROM (read-only memory); 605～register;
606～address; 607～be written into;
608～carry out;
609,611,613,615～micro-order formation;
610～integer unit; 612～floating point unit;
614～MMX unit; 616～SSE unit;
617～Cryptographic unit; 618～storage;
619～write-back; 620～be written into bus;
621～idle signal; 622～memory bus
624～EFLAGS register; 625～X position;
626～interrupt logic unit; 627～micro-order;
628～MSR register; 629～E position;
630～FCR register; 631～D position;
632～performance element; And 633～bus.
Embodiment
For above and other purpose of the present invention, feature and advantage can be become apparent, cited below particularlyly go out preferred embodiment, and cooperate accompanying drawing, be described in detail below:
Embodiment:
With reference to figure 1, Fig. 1 shows according to the described microprocessor 100 of one embodiment of the invention.When making each other microprocessor 100, can produce exclusive uncertain key (unique unpredictable key, uukey) 142, it is that this microprocessor 100 is exclusive, and can be unpredictable fully for user's security purpose, for example can be used as encryption key.136 pairs of manufacturings of the key identification code 134 that is hidden in microprocessor 100 inside by use is carried out advanced encryption standard (Advanced Encryption Standard, AES) encrypt, to realize producing exclusive uncertain key 142, wherein making identification code 134 is exclusive sequence numbers of processor of user visual (visible) and measurable (predictable), and key 136 can't be seen from the outside by anyone and only known by the personnel of only a few.Yet, access keys 136 that microprocessor 100 can internally (namely pass through the microcode in the microcode ROM (read-only memory) 604) is to the advanced encryption standard engine, it can use 136 pairs of predictable manufacturing identification codes 134 of key to be encrypted, to produce exclusive uncertain key 142.Exclusive uncertain key 142 can be used in the different application; the encrypt/decrypt of the password of the shielded special module register of access (Model Specific Register, MSR) 132, microcode patching (patch) or in software protection mechanism, use exclusive uncertain key 142 in conjunction with the specific microprocessor 100 of the use to of software for example.
Because embodiments of the invention are to be encrypted in the exclusive uncertain key 142 with can't making identification code 134 from the key 136 that the outside is seen, the exclusive uncertain key 142 of having encrypted is not only exclusive, and is uncertain.Otherwise previous described legacy system can't provide complete protection to prevent key or sequence number are carried out undelegated access, but only can stop the user to obtain undelegated access without heart.
Moreover compared to legacy system, system described in the invention does not need nonvolatile ram (NVRAM) in the encapsulation of central processing unit.Legacy system need to use nonvolatile ram, reason is that legacy system can produce the sequence number of the central processing unit of double-encryption in its manufacture process, and with the sequence number of this central processing unit programming (program) to the part nonvolatile memory, so that processor can change the sequence number of central processing unit in the situation of upgrading.Otherwise embodiment described in the invention can produce exclusive uncertain key 142 with the key 136 that can't read from the outside in the microprocessor 100 in the operation of microprocessor 100.In this field, need to by be encrypted to produce exclusive uncertain key 142 to making identification code 134, wherein make identification code 134 and be non-volatile (namely in the manufacture process of microprocessor 100, programming by blowout) at every turn.
The microprocessor 100 of Fig. 1 comprises manufacturing identification code 134 and the key 136 that is coupled to performance element 632, and it is all received by Cryptographic unit 617.According to an embodiment, Cryptographic unit 617 comprises an advanced encryption standard crypto engine (AES encryption engine), in order to use key 136 expressly (plain text) be encrypted as ciphertext (cypher text), and be plaintext with decrypt ciphertext.By using key 136 (namely outside not visible) that exclusive predictable manufacturing identification code 134 is encrypted, the advanced encryption standard crypto engine of Cryptographic unit 617 can produce the exclusive uncertain key 142 of each indivedual microprocessor 100, describes such as the calcspar of Fig. 2 and the process flow diagram of Fig. 3.
With reference to figure 3, Fig. 3 is the process flow diagram that shows the operation of microprocessor among Fig. 1.Flow process begins in step 302.
In step 302, software application requires to produce exclusive uncertain key.Then, flow process enters step 304.
In step 304, the microcode of microprocessor reads to temporary transient register with key and manufacturing identification code.Then, flow process enters step 306.
In step 306, microcode indication advanced encryption standard crypto engine uses key to be encrypted making identification code.Then, flow process enters step 308.
In step 308, the advanced encryption standard crypto engine uses key to be encrypted making identification code, to produce exclusive uncertain key.Then, flow process enters step 312.
In step 312, microcode is loaded into the framework register with exclusive uncertain key, reads for software application.Flow process finishes in step 312.
If assailant (attacker) learns one of them the manufacturing identification code 134 in numerous microprocessors 100 of manufacturer, then make identification code 134 for predictable, namely the assailant can relatively easily dope in numerous microprocessors 100 of manufacturer another manufacturing identification code 134.Reason is to make identification code 134 and intentionally is set as and has higher structurally, namely makes identification code 134 for relatively continuous.Making identification code 134 can be used, and for making relevant purpose, for example for the purpose of failure analysis, can identify this microprocessor 100 from which particular batch (patch) in the manufacture process by making identification code 134.Moreover, guess password or key about computed ability, the number quantity of the possible manufacturing identification code 134 of numerous microprocessors 100 of manufacturer (for example tens million of or several hundred million) is relatively little.Owing to make identification code 134 for very predictable, therefore make identification code 134 and be not suitable for being used as key and use.Otherwise with regard at least two reasons, exclusive uncertain key 142 is uncertain.First reason is, as long as employed encryption algorithm can produce uncertain value, then be encrypted the exclusive uncertain key 142 that can cause producing for very unpredictable to making identification code 134, for example, according to an embodiment, use the advanced encryption standard of 128 place values of 128 encryption key to encrypt algorithm.Being got cicada even the advantage of advanced encryption standard encryption algorithm is two projects in three projects (making identification code 134, key 136 and exclusive uncertain key 142), is to calculate the 3rd project within the time of meaningful length (meaningful length) by the present or following ability.Second reason be, exclusive uncertain key 142 is 128, and it can produce the probable value of enough large quantity, and wherein these probable values are that present computer capacity is unpredictable.
Generally speaking, embodiments of the invention can be applicable in any application that needs uncertain key, and wherein uncertain key is that each processor is exclusive, for example can be in conjunction with software in a par-ticular processor.The part application-specific of exclusive uncertain key 142 comprises microcode patching is encrypted and limits access to special module register.
Except previous described advantage, method described in the invention also can be saved fuse.Fuse in the microprocessor 100 can be used in non-volatile mode stores exclusive uncertain key 142, rather than produces exclusive uncertain key 142 with the cardinal rule of needs.Yet, be taken as at exclusive uncertain key 142 in the situation of key use, can provide the key of strong security will use at least 128 fuses, according to an embodiment, it will be more than the twice more than the quantity of making identification code 134 employed fuses.
Although the present invention is with preferred embodiment openly as above, so it is not to limit the present invention, those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, when doing a little change and retouching.For example, but the software activation is function, manufacturing, modelling, simulation, description and/or the test of device and method as described in the present invention, its can by use universal programming language (such as C, C++), comprise the hardware description language (HDL) of Verilog, HDL, VHDL etc. or other can with program realize.Above-mentioned software can be arranged in any known computer usable medium, such as tape, semiconductor, disk, CD (such as CD-ROM, DVD-ROM etc.), network, wired line, wireless or other communication medias.The embodiment of device and method of the present invention can be included in the semiconductor intellecture property kernel, micro-processor kernel (being specialized by HDL) for example, and convert the hardware product of integrated circuit to.In addition, the combination that the described device and method of the embodiment of the invention can hardware and software is specialized.Therefore, the present invention should not be defined in published embodiment, is as the criterion and should look the appended claims person of defining.Particularly, invention can be implemented in the micro processor, apparatus, it can be used in multi-purpose computer.At last, those skilled in the art can based on concept disclosed in this invention and specific embodiment, without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, can do a little change and retouch to reach identical purpose of the present invention.
Claims (16)
1. device that produces uncertain key comprises:
Be used for during making microprocessor, store one in a non-volatile mode and make the device of identification code in above-mentioned microprocessor, wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is that above-mentioned microprocessor is exclusive;
Be used for the mode reading from the outside of above-mentioned microprocessor, store an encryption key in the device of the inside of above-mentioned microprocessor; And
Be used for using above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, to produce the device of the exclusive uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor, wherein above-mentioned encrypting step is performed by an advanced encryption standard crypto engine module of above-mentioned microprocessor.
2. device as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned uncertain key only is stored in above-mentioned microprocessor internal in volatile mode.
3. device as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is during making above-mentioned microprocessor, uses in above-mentioned non-volatile mode to be arranged at the fuse in the above-mentioned microprocessor and to be stored in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
4. device as claimed in claim 1, wherein the above-mentioned microprocessor of same manufacturer manufacturing has identical above-mentioned encryption key.
5. device as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned microprocessor is in order to the request corresponding to a software application, and produces the exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor, and wherein above-mentioned software application is executed in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
6. device as claimed in claim 1 also comprises:
One microcode unit, use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted in order to indicate above-mentioned advanced encryption standard crypto engine module, producing the exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor, and the above-mentioned uncertain key that will produce is loaded into a framework register of above-mentioned microprocessor.
7. device as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned encryption key internally is manufactured in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
8. device as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned encryption key is above-mentioned advanced encryption standard crypto engine module employed unique-encryption key when above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, to produce the exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor.
9. method that produces uncertain key comprises:
During making a microprocessor, store one in a non-volatile mode and make identification code in above-mentioned microprocessor, wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is that above-mentioned microprocessor is exclusive;
In the mode that can't read from the outside of above-mentioned microprocessor, store an encryption key in the inside of above-mentioned microprocessor; And
Use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, to produce the exclusive uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor, wherein above-mentioned encrypting step is performed by an advanced encryption standard crypto engine module of above-mentioned microprocessor.
10. method as claimed in claim 9 also comprises:
Only in volatile mode, store above-mentioned uncertain key in above-mentioned microprocessor internal.
11. method as claimed in claim 9 wherein during making above-mentioned microprocessor, is stored the step of above-mentioned manufacturing identification code in above-mentioned microprocessor and is used in above-mentioned non-volatile mode and be arranged at the fuse in the above-mentioned microprocessor and be performed.
12. method as claimed in claim 9, wherein the above-mentioned microprocessor of same manufacturer manufacturing has identical above-mentioned encryption key.
13. method as claimed in claim 9, wherein ask corresponding to one of a software application, carry out the step of using above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, to produce the exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor, wherein above-mentioned software application is executed in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
14. method as claimed in claim 9 also comprises:
Carry out the microcode in the above-mentioned microprocessor, use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted to indicate above-mentioned advanced encryption standard crypto engine module, in order to produce the exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor, and the above-mentioned uncertain key that will produce is loaded into a framework register of above-mentioned microprocessor.
15. method as claimed in claim 9, wherein above-mentioned encryption key internally is manufactured in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
16. method as claimed in claim 9, wherein above-mentioned encryption key is above-mentioned advanced encryption standard crypto engine module employed unique-encryption key when above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, to produce the exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key of above-mentioned microprocessor.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US12/781,124 US8316243B2 (en) | 2009-08-07 | 2010-05-17 | Apparatus and method for generating unpredictable processor-unique serial number for use as an encryption key |
| US12/781,124 | 2010-05-17 |
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| CN101887385A CN101887385A (en) | 2010-11-17 |
| CN101887385B true CN101887385B (en) | 2013-04-10 |
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| CN102156843B (en) * | 2011-03-28 | 2015-04-08 | 威盛电子股份有限公司 | Data encryption method and system as well as data decryption method |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1309351A (en) * | 2000-02-14 | 2001-08-22 | 株式会社东芝 | Interference-free microprocessor |
| CN1677922A (en) * | 2003-11-10 | 2005-10-05 | 美国博通公司 | System and method for securing executable code |
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| JP3713141B2 (en) * | 1998-05-19 | 2005-11-02 | インターナショナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレーション | How to prevent unauthorized execution of programs |
| US20030196096A1 (en) * | 2002-04-12 | 2003-10-16 | Sutton James A. | Microcode patch authentication |
| US20090285390A1 (en) * | 2008-05-16 | 2009-11-19 | Ati Technologies Ulc | Integrated circuit with secured software image and method therefor |
| US8402279B2 (en) * | 2008-09-09 | 2013-03-19 | Via Technologies, Inc. | Apparatus and method for updating set of limited access model specific registers in a microprocessor |
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Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1309351A (en) * | 2000-02-14 | 2001-08-22 | 株式会社东芝 | Interference-free microprocessor |
| CN1677922A (en) * | 2003-11-10 | 2005-10-05 | 美国博通公司 | System and method for securing executable code |
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| CN101887385A (en) | 2010-11-17 |
| TW201142645A (en) | 2011-12-01 |
| TWI497344B (en) | 2015-08-21 |
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