CN101582761B - Identity authentication method adopting password firewall - Google Patents
Identity authentication method adopting password firewall Download PDFInfo
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- CN101582761B CN101582761B CN2008100978150A CN200810097815A CN101582761B CN 101582761 B CN101582761 B CN 101582761B CN 2008100978150 A CN2008100978150 A CN 2008100978150A CN 200810097815 A CN200810097815 A CN 200810097815A CN 101582761 B CN101582761 B CN 101582761B
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- Prior art keywords
- password
- user
- private key
- firewall
- digital signature
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Abstract
The invention relates to an identity authentication method adopting a password firewall. An initialization mechanism of the identity authentication method comprises the following steps: carrying out an initialization operation; establishing an account number and registering a password; applying a private key based on the password; calculating a public key based on the password; and extracting the private key based on the password. A user identity authentication mechanism comprises the following steps: sending out a request; generating an inquiry code; calculating a message; generating a digital signature; returning to the password firewall by a response code; calculating the public key of a user; reversely calculating the password of the user; and logging in a password authentication server by a user agent. The identity authentication method converts a password authentication mechanism of the physical/logical inner side of the firewall into an inquiry-response authentication mechanism of the physical/logical outer side of the firewall so as to overcome the weak point of password authentication and improve the safety of the authentication system. The inquiry-response authentication mechanism adopts the digital signature based on the password and provides the authentication service of the signature public key without depending on a public key infrastructure. The digital signature adopts a novel and quick algorithm with the speed hundreds of times higher than that of a conventional algorithm so as to be convenient for curing in a token.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to field of information security technology, more particularly, relate to a kind of inquiry of adopting novel digital signature method-reply identity identifying method.
Background technology
Authenticating user identification is the basis of computer system security, if can not confirm reliably whether the visitor's of system identity is legal, and other safety measure will perform practically no function.Though the conventional password authentication techniques comparative maturity that the unit era development is got up, and have light, advantage efficiently, security intensity is not high enough, suffers eavesdropping, playback, attack such as exhaustive easily.Enter after cybertimes, the distributed computer application system is flourishing day by day, and above-mentioned authentication techniques can't satisfy its growing demand.
Adopt the supporting inquiry of conventional Digital Signature Algorithm-response authentication agreement can constitute the higher method for authenticating user identity of a kind of fail safe.But this authentication method relies on Public Key Infrastructure(PKI) and realizes binding between user and the PKI thereof, its build with operating cost all than higher.In addition, in fact above-mentioned Verification System is subordinated to an external authentication system, incompatible with the conventional password Verification System.The situation that at present two kinds of Verification Systems in the practice of computer security, occurred and deposited, password authentication is primarily aimed at the local user, and inquiry-response authentication then is primarily aimed at the long-distance user.This situation has not only increased the cost of computer application system construction and operation, also makes troubles and puzzles to the user.
Summary of the invention
For addressing the above problem, the object of the present invention is to provide a kind of identity identifying method that adopts password firewall, this method is utilized password authentication firewall agent of digital signature technology exploitation based on password (PWB) of a kind of novelty, being password firewall, is the password authentication mechanism transformation of fire compartment wall physical/logical inboard the inquiry-response authentication mechanism in the fire compartment wall physical/logical outside with it.Password firewall not only can be used for isolating inside and outside net, also is used in Quarantine Server and client in the in-house network, can also be directly installed in the computer host system as inserting security module (PAM).
For achieving the above object, the present invention is by the following technical solutions:
A kind of identity identifying method that adopts password firewall, the applied system physical of this method/comprise in logic password firewall, private key generator, user side and password authentication server, this identity identifying method is made up of initialization mechanism (A) and authenticating user identification mechanism (B), it is characterized in that: described initialization mechanism (A) comprises the steps:
Step (A1), the private key generator carries out initialization operation, utilizes software or hardware to produce two big prime numbers of secret at random, is designated as p and q respectively, forms the required master key of private key generator with them, while computing system parameter n=pq, and with its announcement;
Step (A2), each user sets up account number and log-in password to the application of password authentication server;
Step (A3), each user utilizes registered password, is designated as w, to the private key of private key generator application based on password;
Step (A4), private key generator are that user password adds a suffix (being the salt of password, the English salt that claims) at random, are designated as v, and are the PKI α of user's calculating based on password by following formula:
α＝h(v)w(modn)，
Wherein h is an one-way Hash function;
Step (A5), the private key generator is the private key β of user's extraction based on password according to following equation:
α＝β
e(modn)，
Wherein e is a parameter, e 〉=2.
Described authenticating user identification mechanism (B) comprising:
Step (B1), the user sends request at user side to password firewall, requires to carry out authentication;
Step (B2), password firewall produces a random challenge sign indicating number R
s, send to user side;
Step (B3), user side produces another random number R
u, and calculate message
m＝{h(w，v)，ID
u，R
u，R
s}，
ID wherein
uBe user account number, (w v) is the cryptographic Hash of password and suffix thereof to h;
Step (B4), user side with based on private key β, the system parameters n of password and message m as input variable, generate the digital signature based on password of message m by Digital Signature Algorithm;
Step (B5), user side is with ID
u, R
u, R
sReturn to password firewall based on the digital signature of password as answer back code together with message m;
Step (B6), password firewall with system parameters n, message m and based on the digital signature of password as input variable, from answer back code, calculate the PKI α of this user by digital signature verification algorithm based on password with following form:
α＝f(m
h，s)(modn)，
M wherein
h=h (m), representative is by the cryptographic Hash of signature information, and s is the signature of this message, and f is a trap-door one-way function, and its trapdoor is exactly private key for user β, and the codomain of f and h satisfies D (f),
Wherein F is certain number field, and * is the multiplication on the F;
Step (B7), the formula that password firewall is used according to step (A4), the reverse password w that calculates this user from PKI α based on password from w calculating α;
Step (B8), the number of the account that the user agent in the password firewall provides with the user password of calculating and user again, is then accepted this user, otherwise is refused if login successfully to the password authentication server log.
Traditional digital signature method needs the third party with public credibility, and promptly usually said security authentication center (CA) is by digital certificate user bound and PKI thereof.Knownly then directly calculate client public key and extract private key for user according to user identity by the private key generator based on identity (IB) digital signature method, so do not need CA that PKI binding service is provided, but in a single day signature private key awards the user, just can't be deprived again.Therefore, should not adopt the supporting inquiry of IB digital signature method-response authentication agreement.PWB digital signature method provided by the invention can be considered the distortion of IB digital signature method, and both main distinctions are the password of PWB digital signature method with the user, rather than identity is calculated client public key and extracted private key for user.In the PWB digital signature method, activating a user's signature private key needs two conditions, indispensable.Above-mentioned condition comprises: a) PKG calculates user's private key according to user's password, and authorizes the user with it, and b) user's password is registered in the password authentication server.Because the keeper of password authentication server can remove name from the rolls a user at any time, thereby deprive this user's signature power, so the PWB digital signature method can overcome the shortcoming of IB digital signature method, be particularly suitable for supporting inquiry-response authentication agreement.In addition, calculate PKI with the user password of maintaining secrecy and to reduce adversary's attack opportunity, thereby make endorsement method have higher fail safe.
The present invention has following positive beneficial effect:
The invention provides the new departure that can on the basis that does not change original system, solve the password authentication safety problem.Compare with the scheme with ssl protocol protection password authentication process commonly used at present, main advantage of the present invention is that it does not rely on the support of PKI, therefore can implement with lower cost.
The present invention also provides a novelty, Digital Signature Algorithm fast, and the conventional digital signature of the comparable RSA of its signature speed exceeds hundred times.In inquiry-response authentication system, private key for user and signature algorithm be solidificated in prevent in the token that private key from divulging a secret, and the efficient that improves signature algorithm can reduce its demand for the token computation ability, thereby reduce the cost of above-mentioned curing.
Authentication method provided by the invention can also compatible conventional password authentication method and seamless combination with it.If in the application system that adopts the conventional password authentication; as introducing the present invention in bank counter machine system and ATM (Automatic Teller Machine) system; then the user both can keep the password authentication mode; also can select to adopt safer inquiry-response authentication mode; or according to the above-mentioned two kinds of authentication modes of preset condition Dynamic Selection; even increase finger print identifying where necessary, to obtain more careful safeguard protection.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention.
Embodiment
Please refer to Fig. 1, the present invention is a kind of identity identifying method that adopts password firewall, the applied system physical of this method/comprise in logic password firewall, private key generator, user side and password authentication server, wherein the private key generator can be considered the annex of password firewall, user side is in the physical/logical outside of password firewall, and the password authentication server is in the physical/logical inboard of password firewall.This identity identifying method is made up of initialization mechanism (A) and authenticating user identification mechanism (B), it is characterized in that: described initialization mechanism (A) comprises the steps:
Step (A1), the private key generator carries out initialization operation, utilizes software or hardware to produce two big prime numbers of secret at random, is designated as p and q respectively, forms the required master key of private key generator with them, while computing system parameter n=pq, and with its announcement;
Step (A2), each user sets up account number and log-in password to the application of password authentication server;
Step (A3), each user utilizes registered password, is designated as w, to the private key of private key generator application based on password;
Step (A4), private key generator are that user password adds a suffix (being salt salt) at random, are designated as v, and are the PKI α of user's calculating based on password by following formula:
α＝h(v)w(modn)，
Wherein h is an one-way Hash function;
Step (A5), the private key generator is the private key β of user's extraction based on password according to following equation:
α＝β
e(modn)，
Wherein e is a parameter, e 〉=2.
Described authenticating user identification mechanism (B) comprising:
Step (B1), the user sends request at user side to password firewall, requires to carry out authentication;
Step (B2), password firewall produces a random challenge sign indicating number R
s, send to user side;
Step (B3), user side produces another random number R
u, and calculate message
m＝{h(w，v)，ID
u，R
u，R
s}，
ID wherein
uIt is user account number; (w v) is the cryptographic Hash of password and suffix thereof to h;
Step (B4), user side with based on private key β, the system parameters n of password and message m as input variable, generate the digital signature based on password of message m by Digital Signature Algorithm;
Step (B5), user side is with ID
u, R
u, R
sReturn to password firewall based on the digital signature of password as answer back code together with message m;
Step (B6), password firewall with system parameters n, message m and based on the digital signature of password as input variable, from answer back code, calculate the PKI α of user by digital signature verification algorithm based on password with following form:
α＝f(m
h，s)(modn)，
M wherein
h=h (m), representative is by the cryptographic Hash of signature information, and s is the signature of this message, and f is a trap-door one-way function, and its trapdoor is exactly private key for user β, and the codomain of f and h satisfies D (f),
Wherein F is certain number field, and * is the multiplication on the F;
Step (B7), password firewall according to step (A4) used calculate the formula of α from w, oppositely calculate this user's password w, promptly from PKI α based on password
w＝α[h(v)]
-1(modn)；
Step (B8), the number of the account that the user agent in the password firewall provides with the user password of calculating and user again is to the password authentication server log or ask it to carry out bindings, if login or bind is successfully then accepted this user, otherwise refused;
Described step (A5) is extendible to be following little step, avoids revealing with the protection user password:
Step 1., the user calculates
μ＝θ
ew(modn)，
Wherein θ＜n is the integer of a picked at random, and μ is submitted to the private key generator;
2. step utilizes that the private key generator is the suffix v that user password adds at random in the step (4), and master key is found the solution following equation:
η
θ(v) μ (modn) returns to the user to v and η to=h then;
Step 3., the user calculates
β＝θ
-1η(mod?n)，
Thereby obtain the required private key β of signature;
In the described step (B3), the formula that is used to calculate message m can be revised as
m＝{ρ，，v，ID
u，R
u，R
s}，
The fingerprint masterplate data of ρ representative of consumer wherein, thus realize binding between user fingerprints masterplate and the user account number;
Signature in the described step (B4) produces algorithm and adopts following formula:
x
1＝k
1+k
2+k
3(modn)，
x
2＝k
1k
2+k
2k
3+k
3k
1
＝k
1k
2+(k
1+k
2)k
3(modn)，
y＝β
-1(k
1-k
2)(k
2-k
3)(k
3-k
1)(modn)，
k
3＝m
h(k
1k
2)
-1(modn)，
The user was based on the private key of password, m when wherein β was parameter e=2
hBy the cryptographic Hash of signature information, k
1, k
2Be two random numbers less than n, x
1, x
2, y forms the signature of this message; Digital signature verification algorithm corresponding in the step (B6) adopts following formula:
Wherein α is the PKI of user based on password, and it satisfies following two equations simultaneously:
α＝h(v)w(modn)，
α＝β
2(modn)。
Also can introduce other Digital Signature Algorithm in the described step (B4), comprise known Digital Signature Algorithm, when not destroying whole Verification System novelty, realize the diversity of embodiment, for example, can adopt following formula to calculate digital signature in this step:
x＝k
e(modn)，
y＝β
-1k
h(m，x)(modn)，
Wherein β is the private key of user based on password, the message that m is signed, and k is a random number less than n, and x, y form the signature of this message, and it can adopt following equation to verify in step (B6):
αy
e＝x
h(m，x)(modn)，
Wherein α is the PKI of user based on password.
The identity identifying method of employing password firewall of the present invention, is the password authentication mechanism transformation of fire compartment wall physical/logical inboard the inquiry-response authentication mechanism in the fire compartment wall physical/logical outside, to overcome the weakness of password authentication, promote the fail safe of Verification System; Described inquiry-response authentication mechanism adopts the digital signature based on password, does not therefore rely on the discriminating service that PKIX provides public signature key; Described digital signature adopts a kind of novelty, algorithm produces fast, and the conventional Digital Signature Algorithm of the comparable RSA of the signature speed of this algorithm exceeds hundred times, is convenient to solidify in token.
Claims (3)
1. identity identifying method that adopts password firewall, the applied system physical of this method/comprise in logic password firewall, private key generator, user side and password authentication server, this identity identifying method is made up of initialization mechanism (A) and authenticating user identification mechanism (B)
It is characterized in that: described initialization mechanism (A) comprises the steps:
Step (A1), the private key generator carries out initialization operation, utilizes software or hardware to produce two big prime numbers of secret at random, is designated as p and q respectively, forms the required master key of private key generator with them, while computing system parameter n=pq, and with its announcement;
Step (A2), each user sets up account number and log-in password to the application of password authentication server;
Step (A3), each user utilizes registered password, is designated as w, to the private key of private key generator application based on password;
Step (A4), private key generator are that user password adds a suffix at random, are designated as v, and are the PKI α of user's calculating based on password by following formula:
α＝h(v)w(modn)，
Wherein h is an one-way Hash function;
Step (A5), the private key generator is the private key β of user's extraction based on password according to following equation:
α＝β
e(modn)，
Wherein e is a parameter, e 〉=2;
Described authenticating user identification mechanism (B) comprising:
Step (B1), the user sends request at user side to password firewall, requires to carry out authentication;
Step (B2), password firewall produces a random challenge sign indicating number R
s, send to user side;
Step (B3), user side produces another random number R
u, and calculate message
m＝{h(w，v)，ID
u，R
u，R
s}，
ID wherein
uBe user account number, (w v) is the cryptographic Hash of password and suffix thereof to h;
Step (B4), user side with based on private key β, the system parameters n of password and message m as input variable, generate the digital signature based on password of message m by Digital Signature Algorithm;
Step (B5), user side is with ID
u, R
u, R
sReturn to password firewall based on the digital signature of password as answer back code together with message m;
Step (B6), password firewall with system parameters n, message m and based on the digital signature of password as input variable, from answer back code, calculate the PKI α of this user by digital signature verification algorithm based on password with following form:
α＝f(m
h，s)(modn)，
M wherein
h=h (m), representative is by the cryptographic Hash of signature information, and s is the signature of this message, and f is a trap-door one-way function, and its trapdoor is exactly private key for user β, and the codomain of f and h satisfies D (f),
Wherein F is certain number field, and * is the multiplication on the F;
Step (B7), the formula that password firewall is used according to step (A4), the reverse password w that calculates this user from PKI α based on password from w calculating α;
Step (B8), the number of the account that the user agent in the password firewall provides with the user password of calculating and user again, is then accepted this user, otherwise is refused if login successfully to the password authentication server log.
2. the identity identifying method of employing password firewall as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that: described step (A5) is extended for following little step, avoids revealing with the protection user password:
Step 1., the user calculates
μ＝θ
ew(modn)，
Wherein θ＜n is the integer of a picked at random, and μ is submitted to the private key generator;
2. step utilizes that the private key generator is the suffix v that user password adds at random in the step (A4), and master key is found the solution following equation:
η
θ＝h(v)μ(modn)，
Then v and η are returned to the user;
Step 3., the user calculates
β＝θ
-1η(modn)，
Thereby obtain private key β based on password.
3. the identity identifying method of employing password firewall as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that:
Setup parameter e=2 is to extract the private key of user based on password in the described step (A5);
Digital Signature Algorithm in the described step (B4) adopts following formula:
x
1＝k
1+k
2+k
3(mod?n)，
x
2＝k
1k
2+k
2k
3+k
3k
1＝k
1k
2+(k
1+k
2)k
3(mod?n)，
y＝β
-1(k
1-k
2)(k
2-k
3)(k
3-k
1)(mod?n)，
k
3＝m
h(k
1k
2)
-1(modn)，
Wherein β is based on the private key of password, and n is a system parameters, m
hBy the cryptographic Hash of signature information, k
1, k
2Be two random numbers less than n, x
1, x
2, y forms the signature of this message;
Digital signature verification algorithm in the described step (B6) adopts following formula:
Wherein α is based on the PKI of password.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN2008100978150A CN101582761B (en) | 2008-05-15 | 2008-05-15 | Identity authentication method adopting password firewall |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN2008100978150A CN101582761B (en) | 2008-05-15 | 2008-05-15 | Identity authentication method adopting password firewall |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN101582761A CN101582761A (en) | 2009-11-18 |
| CN101582761B true CN101582761B (en) | 2011-05-04 |
Family
ID=41364743
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN2008100978150A Expired - Fee Related CN101582761B (en) | 2008-05-15 | 2008-05-15 | Identity authentication method adopting password firewall |
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| CN (1) | CN101582761B (en) |
Families Citing this family (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101873216B (en) * | 2010-07-08 | 2012-09-05 | 布日古德 | Host authentication method, data packet transmission method and receiving method |
| CN101938500B (en) * | 2010-09-28 | 2012-12-12 | 中国人民解放军信息工程大学 | Method and system for verifying source address |
| CN104901932A (en) * | 2014-07-30 | 2015-09-09 | 易兴旺 | Secure login method based on CPK (Combined Public Key Cryptosystem) identity authentication technology |
| CN104935591A (en) * | 2015-06-16 | 2015-09-23 | 苏盛辉 | Dynamic password generating and verifying method based on asymmetric identity |
| CN109005037B (en) * | 2018-06-15 | 2021-06-29 | 武汉链芯区块链技术有限公司 | Password authentication system and method based on identity |
| CN111585771B (en) * | 2020-05-20 | 2021-07-06 | 浙江大学 | Centralized authentication system of Internet of things equipment based on U2F physical token |
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| EP1773018A1 (en) * | 2005-10-05 | 2007-04-11 | Privasphere AG | Method and devices for user authentication |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US5497421A (en) * | 1992-04-28 | 1996-03-05 | Digital Equipment Corporation | Method and apparatus for protecting the confidentiality of passwords in a distributed data processing system |
| EP1773018A1 (en) * | 2005-10-05 | 2007-04-11 | Privasphere AG | Method and devices for user authentication |
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