CN100472547C - System and method for killing ROOTKIT - Google Patents
System and method for killing ROOTKIT Download PDFInfo
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- CN100472547C CN100472547C CNB2006100654951A CN200610065495A CN100472547C CN 100472547 C CN100472547 C CN 100472547C CN B2006100654951 A CNB2006100654951 A CN B2006100654951A CN 200610065495 A CN200610065495 A CN 200610065495A CN 100472547 C CN100472547 C CN 100472547C
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Abstract
This invention discloses one virus killing ROOTKIT system and method, wherein, the system comprises virtual machine monitor, service operation system in virtual monitor and at least one customer operation system; the service operation system comprises test module to check whether there is ROOTKIT in the operation system and to find alarm. This invention system and method can check ROOTKIT in reliable operation inside the memory area besides operation system.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of system and method for killing virus, particularly a kind of system and method for killing ROOTKIT.
Background technology
Along with the commercial user to dependent the continuing to increase of personal computer (PC), user's main viral instrument with wooden horse of inspection on PC is anti-(killing) virus and anti-(killing) wooden horse tool software, these tool work principles are when moving in system, the system file of preserving on process in the scanning system internal memory and the hard disk, and coupling correlated characteristic file, thereby find virus and wooden horse.
Operating system is dimerous by kernel (Kernel) and shell (Shell), and wherein: kernel is responsible for a job that corresponds to reality, and comprises CPU task scheduling, Memory Allocation management, equipment control, file operation etc.; Shell is based on the interactive function that kernel provides and the interface that exists, and it is responsible for instruction and transmits and explain.General process scan tool and antivirus software are no exception, and the process that can see is that kernel " is seen " and fed back to application program by relevant interface instruction (API) in fact, so just inevitable data channel of existence.Briefly, ROOTKIT manages to allow the operation rank that oneself reaches the same with kernel, even enter kernel spacing, it has just had the access rights the same with kernel like this, thereby can make amendment to core instructions, modal is to revise the API that kernel is enumerated process, allow data that they the return information of " omissions " ROOTKIT self process all the time, general process instrument naturally with regard to " seeing " less than ROOTKIT.More senior ROOTKIT also distorts more API, like this, the user just can't see process (process API is blocked), can't see file (file read-write API is blocked), can't see the port (networking component SOCKAPI is blocked) that is opened, more tackled less than relevant network packet (networking component NDIS API is blocked), ROOTKIT replaces the data of returning by the function of monitoring system, with legal numerical value like this.Other clandestine activities of ROOTKIT comprise to be covered network activity and revises the WINDOWS registration table, has reached and has hidden the not found target of its code.
When virus or wooden horse employing ROOTKIT technology, the file that process and hard disk are preserved in its viral internal memory own is hidden, then can not found by anti-virus, anti-Trojan tool software, therefore more can not mate, adopt the virus of ROOTKIT technology and the anti-virus that wooden horse can not be used prior art and the tool software discovery of anti-Trojan with tag file.
Virus and the wooden horse hidden in the system gently then destroy system, and be heavy then steal sensitive datas such as user's contract, account No., brings seriously to the user and lose.
At present, the way that detects ROOTKIT the most reliably is that shutoff operation system (OFFLINE OS) detects.For example, system self starts, and lists all files, REGISTRY item or the like then.Start from CD with WINPE then, list all files, REGISTRY item again.At this moment, contrast two tabulations, under normal circumstances, listed content should be the same in two tabulations, if different place, just can find the file that those be can't see under the situation with self system start-up.
The major defect of this method is:
1) this method can only detect file in the hard disk, for may checking by the process that network or mode enter run mode in system or the system;
2) shutdown system can be made troubles to the user, and particularly for some important system that can not shut down in 24 hours (for example, the authoring system of bank etc.), the method for shutdown system is unpractical;
3) some ROOTKIT has anti-function of killing the disease instrument after wound is introduced into system, can disturb even end the antivirus software operate as normal.
Summary of the invention
The objective of the invention is to, overcome the system that above-mentioned defective provides a kind of killing ROOTKIT.
Another object of the present invention is to, overcome the method that above-mentioned defective provides a kind of killing ROOTKIT.
Be a kind of killing ROOTKIT system that realizes that the object of the invention provides, comprise virtual machine monitor 3, and operate in service operations system 2 and at least one client operating system 1 on the virtual machine monitor 3, described service operations system 2 comprises and checks module 21, is used for checking whether client operating system 1 exists ROOTKIT and report to the police when finding ROOTKIT.
The inspection module 21 of described service operations system 2 can comprise filtering module 211, be used for scanning the system file of client operating system 1 and the file in the proceeding internal memory, and compare with the condition code of known ROOTKIT, judge whether there is ROOTKIT in the client operating system 1, and when finding ROOTKIT, report to the police.
Described inspection module 21 can comprise testing tool 212, and described client operating system 1 can also comprise testing tool proxy module 212 ';
Described testing tool proxy module 212 ' is used for when client operating system 1 operation the file set that the collection client operating system is opened and the information of process sets;
Described testing tool 212, be used for the file set when virtual machine monitor 3 is collected client operating systems 1 operation, opened and the information of process sets, and the information of collecting compared with the information of described testing tool proxy module 212 ' collection, judge whether to exist ROOTKIT.
The information of described collection is listed files information or Installed System Memory status information.
For realizing the method for a kind of killing ROOTKIT that another object of the present invention provides, may further comprise the steps:
Steps A): the service operations system 2 that runs on the virtual machine monitor 3 checks in the client operating system 1 that runs on the virtual machine monitor 3 whether have ROOTKIT, and reports to the police when finding ROOTKIT.
Described steps A) can comprise the following steps:
Steps A 1): service operations system 2 filters scanning and operates in system file in the client operating system 1 and the file in the proceeding internal memory, the condition code in the locating file, and with its condition code and known ROOTKIT condition code compare judge whether consistent;
Steps A 2): if condition code relatively shows unanimity, then demonstrate and the known corresponding to file of ROOTKIT condition code, analyzing and processing this document, ROOTKIT is removed in prompting.
Described steps A) can also comprise the following steps:
Steps A 1 '): the testing tool 212 in the service operations system 2 transmits testing tool proxy module 212 ' in client operating system 1, and moves and resident testing tool proxy module 212 ' in client operating system 1;
Steps A 2 '): the testing tool 212 in the service operations system 2 is collected the file set that client operating system 1 opens and the information of process sets in virtual machine monitor 3;
Steps A 3 '): testing tool proxy module in the client operating system 1 212 ' is collected the file set that client operating system 1 opens and the information of process sets, and the information transmission of collecting is given the testing tool 212 of service operations system 2;
Steps A 4 '): with described steps A 2 ') in testing tool 212 information of collecting and steps A 3 ') in the information of testing tool proxy module 212 ' collection compare judge whether consistent;
Steps A 5 '): if consistent, then do not have ROOTKIT in the client operating system 1, checking process finishes; If not consistent, the information of collection there are differences code, then reports to the police.
Described steps A 5 ') can also comprise the following steps:
Analyze not corresponding to file characteristic sign indicating number in the information of collecting, judge whether it is ROOTKIT, if, then with its removing; Otherwise, finish checking process to client operating system 1 prompting back.
Described steps A 2) can further include the following step:
After removing ROOTKIT, will remove by the virus and the wooden horse of its protection.
The information of described collection can be listed files information or Installed System Memory status information.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: according to the system and method for killing ROOTKIT of the present invention, when the operating system real time execution, killing ROOTKIT reliably, and inspection module of the present invention runs on the region of memory of the VMM control outside the operating system, the virus of attack operation system and wooden horse can't be attacked on the VMM, check that module can be not under attack, safe.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the system architecture synoptic diagram of killing ROOTKIT of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is the method flow diagram of the known ROOTKIT of killing of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is the method flow diagram of the unknown ROOTKIT of killing of the present invention.
Embodiment
Further describe the system and method for killing ROOTKIT of the present invention below with reference to accompanying drawing 1～3.
Fig. 1 is the system architecture synoptic diagram of killing ROOTKIT of the present invention.
As shown in Figure 1, the system of killing ROOTKIT of the present invention comprises: at least one client operating system (client OS) 1, service operations system 2, virtual machine monitor (Virtual Machine Monitor, VMM) 3.
Wherein, virtual machine monitor 3 operates on the hardware platform of virtual support computations, and moves existing various operating system (comprising client operating system 1 of the present invention and service operations system 2) thereon; Service operations system 2, it runs on the virtual machine monitor 3, comprise and check module 21, check that module 21 comprises filtering module 211 and testing tool 212, wherein, filtering module 211, be used for scanning the system file of client operating system and the file in the proceeding internal memory, and compare with the feature of known ROOTKIT, check in the client operating system and whether have ROOTKIT, and when finding ROOTKIT, report to the police, testing tool 212 is used for information such as the file set opened and process sets when virtual machine monitor 3 is directly collected the client operating systems operation; Client operating system 1 comprises the proxy module (AGENT) 212 ' of testing tool 212 in the service operations system 2, is used to collect information such as file set that the user opens and process sets.Wherein, testing tool 212 and act on behalf of instrument 212 ' collected information and comprise: 1) listed files information: be stored in the lists of documents on the memory device; 2) Installed System Memory status information, particularly system's api interface address.
Be understandable that, among the present invention testing tool proxy module 212 ' being arranged in the client operating system is a kind of preferred mode, the present invention is not limited to testing tool proxy module 212 ' is arranged in the client operating system, this testing tool proxy module 212 ' can be realized by various other modes, for example, when the testing tool in the service operations system brings into operation, it passes through self-replication, then in client operating system the testing tool of transmission copying as the testing tool proxy module, and in client operating system the operation and resident this testing tool proxy module; Testing tool in the perhaps service operations system transmits the testing tool proxy module in client operating system, and moves and resident testing tool proxy module in client operating system.
Can take the known killing technology of present antivirus software: by known ROOTKIT code is analyzed to known viruse, extract ROOTKIT condition code (condition code of different ROOTKIT may there are differences), can adopt the known killing technology of similar antivirus software to remove ROOTKIT then: comprise the file that deletion ROOTKIT produces or the system core file of replacement on hard disk.
Concrete, when killing ROOTKIT, need distinguish in two kinds of situation:
The known ROOTKIT of I killing
When the detection module 21 of service operations system 2 moves on virtual machine monitor 3; system file in its filtering module 211 scanning client operating systems 1 and the file in the proceeding internal memory; and compare with the feature of known ROOTKIT; check in the client operating system 1 and whether have ROOTKIT; and when finding ROOTKIT, report to the police; and then can be by this document being handled in conjunction with prior art; to remove ROOTKIT; after ROOTKIT is eliminated; then come out by hiding virus of its protection and wooden horse, and therefore can utilize existing antivirus software to remove on virus and the wooden horse that comes out.
Below, specifically describing the method for the known ROOTKIT of killing as Fig. 2, this method may further comprise the steps:
Step 101) the inspection module 21 beginnings operation on virtual machine monitor 3 in the service operations system 2;
Step 102) filtering module 211 of checking module 21 filters scanning and operates in system file in the client operating system 1 and the file in the proceeding internal memory, condition code in the locating file, and with its condition code and known ROOTKIT condition code compare judge whether consistent;
Step 103) if condition code relatively shows unanimity, then demonstrate and the known corresponding to file of ROOTKIT feature, analyzing and processing this document, ROOTKIT is removed in prompting, otherwise, return step 102) continue to filter and scan;
Step 104) removes after the ROOTKIT, be exposed by the virus and the wooden horse hidden of its protection, utilize prior art virus and wooden horse deletion.
The unknown ROOTKIT of II killing
Below, the method in conjunction with Fig. 3 specifically describes the unknown ROOTKIT of killing may further comprise the steps:
The testing tool 212 of the inspection module 21 in step 201) the service operations system 2 brings into operation, in virtual machine monitor 3, collect the file set that the user opens at client operating system 1 and the information of process sets, and testing tool proxy module 212 ' is collected the file set that the user opens and the information of process sets in the notice client operating system 1 in client operating system 1;
Step 202) information transmission of file set that the user of its collection is opened in client operating system 1 of the testing tool proxy module 212 ' in the client operating system 1 and process sets is given the testing tool 212 of service operations system 2;
Step 203) testing tool 212 is with described step 201) in testing tool 212 information and step 202 of collecting) in the information of testing tool proxy module 212 ' collection compare judge whether consistent;
Step 204) if consistent, then do not have ROOTKIT in the client operating system 1, checking process finishes; If not consistent, analyze not corresponding to file characteristic sign indicating number in the information of collecting, judge whether it is ROOTKIT, if, then with its removing; Otherwise, finish checking process to client operating system 1 prompting back;
Step 205) removes after the ROOTKIT, be exposed by the virus and the wooden horse hidden of its protection, utilize prior art virus and wooden horse deletion.
When the testing tool in the service operations system 2 212 transmits testing tool proxy module 212 ' in client operating system 1, and in client operating system 1 when operation and resident testing tool proxy module 212 ', the method of the unknown ROOTKIT of killing of the present invention may further comprise the steps:
Step 201 ') testing tool 212 in the service operations system 2 transmits testing tool proxy module 212 ' in client operating system 1, and in client operating system 1 operation and resident testing tool proxy module 212 ';
Step 202 ') testing tool 212 in the service operations system 2 collects the file set that client operating system 1 opens and the information of process sets in virtual machine monitor 3;
Step 203 ') testing tool proxy module 212 ' in the client operating system 1 collects the file set that client operating system 1 opens and the information of process sets, and the information transmission of collecting given the testing tool 212 of service operations system 2;
Step 204 ') testing tool 212 with described step 202 ') in testing tool 212 information of collecting and step 203 ') in the information of testing tool proxy module 212 ' collection compare judge whether consistent;
Step 205 ') if consistent, then there is not ROOTKIT in the client operating system 1, checking process finishes; If not consistent, analyze not corresponding to file characteristic sign indicating number in the information of collecting, judge whether it is ROOTKIT, if, then with its removing; Otherwise, finish checking process to client operating system 1 prompting back;
Step 206 ') remove after the ROOTKIT, be exposed by the virus and the wooden horse hidden of its protection, utilize prior art with virus and wooden horse deletion.
In sum, system according to killing ROOTKIT of the present invention, by operation VMM software on hardware platform, on VMM, move client operating system and service operations system then, and module is checked in increase in the service operations system, when being used to realize system's real time execution, known or the unknown ROOTKIT of killing reliably, and inspection module of the present invention runs on the region of memory of the VMM control outside the operating system, because the virus and the wooden horse of attack operation system can't be attacked on the VMM, therefore, check that module can be not under attack, safe.
More than describing is to make things convenient for those of ordinary skills to understand the present invention; to the detailed description that the present invention carried out; but can expect; in the scope that does not break away from claim of the present invention and contained, can also make other variation and modification, these variations and revising all in protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. the system of a killing ROOTKIT, it is characterized in that, comprise virtual machine monitor (3), and operate in service operations system (2) and at least one client operating system (1) on the virtual machine monitor (3), described service operations system (2) comprises and checks module (21), is used for checking whether client operating system (1) exists ROOTKIT and report to the police when finding ROOTKIT;
Described inspection module (21) comprises testing tool (212), and described client operating system (1) comprises testing tool proxy module (212 ');
Described testing tool proxy module (212 ') is used for when client operating system (1) moves, the file set that collection client operating system (1) is opened and the information of process sets;
Described testing tool (212), be used for the file set when virtual machine monitor (3) is collected client operating system (1) operation, opened and the information of process sets, and the information of collecting compared with the information of described testing tool proxy module (212 ') collection, judge whether to exist ROOTKIT.
2. the system as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, the inspection module (21) of described service operations system (2) also comprises filtering module (211), be used for scanning the system file of client operating system (1) and the file in the proceeding internal memory, and compare with the condition code of known ROOTKIT, judge in the client operating system (1) whether have ROOTKIT, and when finding ROOTKIT, report to the police.
3. the system as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that, the information of described collection is listed files information or Installed System Memory status information.
4. the method for a killing ROOTKIT is characterized in that, may further comprise the steps:
Steps A): the service operations system (2) that runs on the virtual machine monitor (3) checks in the client operating system (1) that runs on the virtual machine monitor (3) whether have ROOTKIT, and reports to the police when finding ROOTKIT;
Described steps A) comprises the following steps:
Steps A 1 '): the testing tool (212) in the service operations system (2) transmits testing tool proxy module (212 ') in client operating system (1), and moves and resident testing tool proxy module (212 ') in client operating system (1);
Steps A 2 '): the testing tool (212) in the service operations system (2) is collected the file set that client operating system (1) opens and the information of process sets in virtual machine monitor (3);
Steps A 3 '): testing tool proxy module (212 ') in the client operating system (1) is collected the file set that client operating system (1) opens and the information of process sets, and the information transmission of collecting is given the testing tool (212) of service operations system (2);
Steps A 4 '): with described steps A 2 ') in testing tool (212) information of collecting and steps A 3 ') in the information of testing tool proxy module (212 ') collection compare, judge whether consistent;
Steps A 5 '): if consistent, then do not have ROOTKIT in the client operating system (1), checking process finishes; If not consistent, the information of collection there are differences code, then reports to the police.
5. the method for killing ROOTKIT as claimed in claim 4 is characterized in that, described steps A) also comprise the following steps:
Steps A 1): service operations system (2) filters scanning and operates in system file in the client operating system (1) and the file in the proceeding internal memory, the condition code in the locating file, and with its condition code and known ROOTKIT condition code compare judge whether consistent;
Steps A 2): if condition code relatively shows unanimity, then demonstrate and the known corresponding to file of ROOTKIT condition code, analyzing and processing this document, ROOTKIT is removed in prompting.
6. the method for killing ROOTKIT according to claim 4 is characterized in that, described steps A 5 ') also comprise the following steps:
Analyze not corresponding to file characteristic sign indicating number in the information of collecting, judge whether it is ROOTKIT, if, then with its removing; Otherwise, finish checking process to client operating system (1) prompting back.
7. as the method for killing ROOTKIT as described in the claim 5, it is characterized in that described steps A 2) also comprise the following steps:
After removing ROOTKIT, will remove by the virus and the wooden horse of its protection.
8. the method for killing ROOTKIT as claimed in claim 4 is characterized in that, the information of described collection is listed files information or Installed System Memory status information.
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| CNB2006100654951A CN100472547C (en) | 2006-03-21 | 2006-03-21 | System and method for killing ROOTKIT |
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| CNB2006100654951A CN100472547C (en) | 2006-03-21 | 2006-03-21 | System and method for killing ROOTKIT |
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| CN101042719A CN101042719A (en) | 2007-09-26 |
| CN100472547C true CN100472547C (en) | 2009-03-25 |
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| CN100504904C (en) * | 2007-12-25 | 2009-06-24 | 北京大学 | Windows concealed malevolence software detection method |
| CN101499016B (en) * | 2008-01-31 | 2011-09-21 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Virtual machine monitor, virtual machine system and process handling method of client operating system |
| CN101567787B (en) * | 2008-04-25 | 2011-05-25 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Computer system, computer network and data communication method |
| US8539584B2 (en) | 2010-08-30 | 2013-09-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Rootkit monitoring agent built into an operating system kernel |
| CN102682229B (en) * | 2011-03-11 | 2015-04-01 | 北京市国路安信息技术有限公司 | Malicious code behavior detection method based on virtualization technology |
| CN102339371B (en) * | 2011-09-14 | 2013-12-25 | 奇智软件（北京）有限公司 | Method, device and virtual machine for detecting rogue program |
| CN103617069B (en) * | 2011-09-14 | 2017-07-04 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | Malware detection methods and virtual machine |
| US20130152200A1 (en) * | 2011-12-09 | 2013-06-13 | Christoph Alme | Predictive Heap Overflow Protection |
| RU2472215C1 (en) * | 2011-12-28 | 2013-01-10 | Закрытое акционерное общество "Лаборатория Касперского" | Method of detecting unknown programs by load process emulation |
| CN102710664A (en) * | 2012-06-27 | 2012-10-03 | 苏州奇可思信息科技有限公司 | Network communication system |
| CN102724202A (en) * | 2012-06-27 | 2012-10-10 | 苏州奇可思信息科技有限公司 | Network communication method |
| CN104573511B (en) * | 2013-10-15 | 2018-01-23 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | The method and system of caryogram virus in a kind of killing |
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| CN108038375A (en) * | 2017-12-21 | 2018-05-15 | 北京星河星云信息技术有限公司 | A kind of malicious file detection method and device |
| CN109977669B (en) * | 2017-12-28 | 2022-05-20 | 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 | Virus identification method and device and computer equipment |
| CN110505246B (en) * | 2019-09-25 | 2021-10-08 | 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 | Client network communication detection method, device and storage medium |
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