CN100466803C - Method for realizing right discriminating to network by terminal in CDMA network - Google Patents
Method for realizing right discriminating to network by terminal in CDMA network Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN100466803C CN100466803C CNB2006101505367A CN200510005161A CN100466803C CN 100466803 C CN100466803 C CN 100466803C CN B2006101505367 A CNB2006101505367 A CN B2006101505367A CN 200510005161 A CN200510005161 A CN 200510005161A CN 100466803 C CN100466803 C CN 100466803C
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- network
- authentication
- portable terminal
- random number
- vlr
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Fee Related
Links
Images
Landscapes
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
A method for realizing right certification of network by terminal in CDMA network includes generating a random number in mobile terminal first, then sending random number to MSC/VLR in CDMA network ;obtaining calculation result of right certification by MSC/VLR according to said random number then returning calculation result of right certification to mobile terminal, comparing received calculation result of right certification with right certification calculation result obtained by itself as per random number by mobile terminal and judging that network is legal if the two are identical or otherwise judging that network is illegal .
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the authentication techniques in code division multiple access (CDMA) communication system, be specifically related to realize in a kind of cdma network the method for terminal network authentication.
Background technology
Along with the progress of science and technology and the development of society, mobile communication is more and more universal, and mobile phone has become an indispensable part in people's daily life and the work.Corresponding, the fail safe of portable terminal also more and more is subjected to people's attention.
In cdma network,, authentication techniques has been proposed at present in order to ensure the fail safe of portable terminal.Whether just when connection of mobile terminal into network, network carries out authentication to portable terminal, be legal portable terminal to verify this portable terminal, and network only provides service to legal portable terminal.By this authentication, if a disabled user uses the information of a validated user to land network, for example the disabled user steals IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) information and Electronic Serial Number (ESN) information of Subscriber Identity Module (UIM) card of validated user, then this information is fired on the illegal UIM card, and use illegal UIM clamping to go into network, this moment cdma network can to identify this UIM card be illegal subscriber card through authentication, thereby refuse the access of this UIM card, thereby improved the terminal security of validated user, ensured the interests of validated user.
Existing C DMA network, for example CDMA IS-95A and CDMA 2000 1X networks comprise at the related network entity of the authentication of circuit domain: base station sub-system (BSS), mobile switching centre (MSC)/VLR Visitor Location Register (VLR), attaching position register (HLR)/AUC (AC) etc.Existing authorizing procedure comprises that global challenge, unique challenge, Shared Secret Data (SSD) upgrade, call history is counted (COUNT) renewal etc.In these all authorizing procedures, great majority all are the authentication of network to the UIM card, and the authentication of terminal/UIM card to network only arranged in the shared secret data (SSD) update process.But this terminal/UIM card must be to carry out in the process of shared secret data (SSD) update to the authentication of network, and the shared secret data (SSD) update flow process therefore in the prior art, does not have the authentication operation of proper terminal to network in fact by network control and execution.
Not having terminal is the fail safe that has greatly reduced portable terminal to the direct result that the authentication operation of network causes.At first, unauthorized person can come user cheating by a network of pretending to be, a terminal that has increased power for example is set as the base station of pretending to be, in some areas existing C DMA net mask is fallen then, and made the terminal in this area all be linked into the base station that this is pretended to be.After these terminals are linked into this base station of pretending to be, the disabled user can obtain user's end message and revise user's end message, thereby make the user can not normally use this portable terminal, in addition, disabled user even can send virus to user's terminal, thereby on user's terminal, carry out some illegal operations, cause bigger infringement to the user.
Have again, if user's lost terminal owing to there be not the authentication of terminal to network, may be stolen the disabled user who robs this terminal so and can normally use this terminal at other regional networks, be unfavorable for the antitheft of terminal like this, therefore also damaged the fail safe of portable terminal.
In view of this, can realize in cdma network that portable terminal is a problem that presses for solution to the authentication of network, particularly for military network or concerning security requirement than especially true the higher network.
Summary of the invention
Main purpose of the present invention provides a kind of portable terminal of realizing network is carried out the method for authentication in cdma network, with the fail safe of the portable terminal that improves cdma network.
Above-mentioned purpose of the present invention is achieved by the following technical solutions:
A kind of method of portable terminal to network authentication that realize in cdma network comprises at least:
When a. initiating caller, receive called or receiving and dispatching short message at portable terminal, portable terminal generates a random number, initiate the base station querying flow then, mobile switching center MSC/VLR in cdma network sends the base station inquiry request message by the base station, carries described random number in the described base station requests message;
B.MSC/VLR will return to portable terminal by the base station query response message according to the authentication calculations result that this random number obtains;
C. portable terminal relatively is received from authentication calculations result and the own authentication calculations result who obtains according to random number of MSC/VLR, if the two unanimity, decision network is legal; Otherwise decision network is illegal.
Wherein, the authentication calculations result who obtains according to random number is the authentication calculations result that random number and SSD data are calculated.
Preferably, described calculating is that CAVE calculates.
MSC/VLR may further include before the authentication calculations result is returned to portable terminal among the step b:
MSC/VLR calculates the authentication calculations result according to the SSD data of random number and oneself preservation.
Perhaps, MSC/VLR further comprises before the authentication calculations result is returned to portable terminal among the step b:
MSC/VLR will pass through attaching position register/HLR/AC of AUC from the random number of portable terminal;
HLR/AC calculates the authentication calculations result according to the SSD data of random number and oneself preservation;
HLR/AC returns to MSC/VLR with the authentication calculations result.
This method further comprises, when portable terminal connects network, carries out described portable terminal and generates a random number, the independent then operation of initiating the base station querying flow.
The step that portable terminal generates the authentication calculations result according to random number in the method for the present invention can be included among the step a or among the step c
Method of the present invention may further include the step of configuration authentication parameter in portable terminal.Specifically, whether whether whether the configuration authentication parameter be to dispose the parameter, the configuration that whether allow portable terminal that network is carried out authentication to allow when the access network the parameter of network authentication, allow when called parameter, configuration to network authentication to allow when the transmitting-receiving short message the parameter of network authentication and configuration any one or combination in any in the failure maximum times of network authentication to parameter, the configuration of network authentication when whether configuration allows in caller.
Preferably, comprising further after decision network is illegal that portable terminal is carried out power-off operation, restarts operation or disconnected speech channel operates.
Among the present invention portable terminal generate random number and relatively the authentication calculations result generate random number and authentication calculations result relatively by the portable terminal program, or generate random number and authentication calculations result relatively by the Subscriber Identity Module UIM card in the portable terminal.
From technical scheme of the present invention as can be seen, the present invention generates a random number by portable terminal, then this random number is sent to the MSC/VLR of network side.The MSC/VLR of network side will return to portable terminal according to the result that this random number calculates.Whether the portable terminal comparison is consistent with the own result of calculation that obtains according to random number by the result that MSC/VLR returns then, if consistent, decision network is legal, otherwise decision network is illegal.Like this, by the authorizing procedure of initiating, can realize the authentication of portable terminal to network by portable terminal.Here, the comparison of portable terminal can be that the portable terminal program compares itself, also can be by portable terminal relevant information to be sent to the UIM card, sticks into row relatively by UIM then.
Can prevent mobile terminal data leakage that causes because of network cheating or the safety issue that is modified owing to realized the authentication of portable terminal to network, the present invention, thus the fail safe that has greatly improved portable terminal.And, by authentication to current network, avoided the portable terminal lost by the disabled user in the phenomenon that other regional networks or other networks use, prevented from the driven machine that portable terminal is stolen to rob, further improved the fail safe of portable terminal.
Further, the present invention has used for reference existing terminal inquiry flow process, and is very little to the change of the network equipment, makes that application network upgrade cost of the present invention is very little, thereby is convenient to practical application of the present invention.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is an overview flow chart of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the authorizing procedure figure according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is authorizing procedure figure according to a second embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is the message interaction process figure of the authentication process when the MS access network.
Fig. 5 is the message interaction process figure of the authentication process when MS communicates operation.
Embodiment
The present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments.
The present invention uses existing base station querying flow to realize the authentication of portable terminal (MS) to network, thus to greatest extent with existing communication protocol compatibility, be beneficial to the present invention program's practical application.
According to the present invention, need improve existing C DMA terminal, comprise specifically that the requirement terminal is can be in control channel and Traffic Channel independent to initiate the base station querying flow, and terminal can be configured the various data that network authentication need be used.For existing base station, require to receive and to handle independently base station query messages.For existing HLR/AC, then do not need to carry out any modification.
Below with reference to Fig. 1 overall procedure of the present invention is described.
In step 101, MS generates a random number RA NDB, and uses the SSD parameter of RANDB and oneself preservation to generate authentication calculations MS_AUTHR as a result.
Here, MS can generate RANDB by the tandom number generator of oneself, and the authentication random number that perhaps can use mobile communications network broadcasting is as RANDB.The SSD parameter is kept on the MS in the shared secret data (SSD) update process, and this is treated to conventionally known to one of skill in the art, no longer describes in detail here.MS can use the CAVE algorithm to come to obtain MS_AUTHR according to RANDB and SSD parameter, just RANDB and SSD parameter is carried out CAVE and calculates MS_AUTHR.
In step 102, MS initiates the base station querying flow, sends the base station inquiry request message by the base station to MSC/VLR, carries RANDB in this request message.
In step 103, MSC/VLR obtains authentication calculations that the SSD calculation of parameter according to RANDB and network side preservation obtains AC_AUTHR as a result, sends it to MS by the base station query response message then.Certainly, the AC_AUTHR here also is that SSD parameter to RANDB and network side preservation calculates by CAVE.
In step 104, the authentication calculations that MS relatively is received from MSC/VLR as a result AC_AUTHR whether MS_AUTHR identical as a result with the authentication calculations that oneself generates, if in step 105, the MS decision network is legal; Otherwise in step 106, the MS decision network is illegal.
Like this, by initiatively initiating the base station querying flow, can realize the authentication of MS to network by MS.
Certainly, the present invention can not calculate MS_AUTHR according to random number and SSD parameter yet in step 101, but in step 104, MS calculates after the AC_AUTHR that receives from MSC/VLR again, also can reach same effect.So same for following specific embodiment, in the back no longer to this repeat specification.
In addition, of the present inventionly being judged by MS, can be itself to be generated random number, generate authenticating result and carried out decision operation by the MS program, also can be to be generated random number, generate authenticating result and carried out decision operation by the UIM card in the MS.Under latter event, the UIM card sends random number and the authentication calculations result that receives from MSC/VLR needs to come transparent transmission by the MS program to MSC/VLR.
After the MS decision network was legal, MS can normally use this network to converse, receive and dispatch operations such as short message.And after the MS decision network was illegal, MS can directly close a terminal, thereby prevents from self to be subjected to the infringement of illegal network.
In the above-mentioned steps 103, if MSC/VLR shares the SSD data, then directly obtain AC_AUTHR according to the SSD calculation of parameter of RANDB and oneself preservation by MSC/VLR, its concrete handling process as shown in Figure 2.If MSC/VLR does not share the SSD data, then by MSC/VLR to HLR/AC transparent transmission base station inquiry request message, HLR/AC generates AC_AUTHR then, MSC/VLR will pass through MS from the AC_AUTHR of HLR/AC again, its concrete handling process is as shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 2 shows the authorizing procedure according to first embodiment of the invention, and wherein MSC/VLR shares the SSD data.As shown in Figure 2, in step 201, MS generates a random number RA NDB, and uses the SSD parameter of RANDB and oneself preservation to calculate generation authentication calculations MS_AUTHR as a result by CAVE.
In step 202, MS initiates the base station querying flow, sends the base station inquiry request message by the base station to MSC/VLR, carries RANDB in this request message.
In step 203, MSC/VLR uses the RANDB that carries in this message to calculate authentication calculations AC_AUTHR as a result with the SSD data of oneself preserving by identical CAVE behind the base station inquiry request message that receives from MS.
In step 204, the AC_AUTHR that MSC/VLR calculates oneself sends to MS by the base station query response message.
In step 205, the authentication calculations that MS relatively is received from MSC/VLR as a result AC_AUTHR whether MS_AUTHR identical as a result with the authentication calculations that oneself generates, if in step 206, the MS decision network is legal; Otherwise in step 207, the MS decision network is illegal.
Fig. 3 shows the authorizing procedure according to second embodiment of the invention, and wherein MSC/VLR does not share the SSD data, and just MSC/VLR does not preserve the SSD data of corresponding MS.As shown in Figure 3, in step 301, MS generates a random number RA NDB, and uses the SSD parameter of RANDB and oneself preservation to calculate generation authentication calculations MS_AUTHR as a result by CAVE.
In step 302, MS initiates the base station querying flow, sends the base station inquiry request message by the base station to MSC/VLR, carries RANDB in this request message.
In step 303, MSC/VLR passes through HLR/AC with this message behind the base station inquiry request message that receives from MS.
In step 304, HLR/AC uses the RANDB that carries in this message to calculate authentication calculations AC_AUTHR as a result with the SSD data of oneself preserving by identical CAVE.
In step 305, HLR/AC sends to MSC/VLR with AC_AUTHR by the base station query response message.
In step 306, MSC/VLR will pass through MS from the base station query response message of HLR/AC.
In step 307, the authentication calculations that MS relatively is received from MSC/VLR as a result AC_AUTHR whether MS_AUTHR identical as a result with the authentication calculations that oneself generates, if in step 308, the MS decision network is legal; Otherwise in step 309, the MS decision network is illegal.
When reality is used, can carry out the authentication of terminal before also can initiating caller, receive called or receive and dispatch short message by the authentication of terminal initiation when the MS access network to network to network at MS, will be elaborated to this below.
Fig. 4 carries out the message flow chart of authentication by terminal to network when the MS access network, suppose that here MSC/VLR does not share the SSD data.As shown in Figure 4, in step 401, after the MS start, send position updating request to MSC/VLR.
In step 402, MSC/VLR sends position updating request to HLR/AC.
In step 403, HLR/AC carries out location update operations, upgrades response message to the MSC/VLR home position.
In step 404, MSC/VLR upgrades to the MS home position and accepts message.
Above-mentioned steps 401 to 404 is identical with existing location update operations, by this operation, finishes the location registers operation of MS and the network authentication to MS.
Then, in step 405, MS is after receiving expression location registers successful positions register response, generate random number RA NDB, and use the SSD parameter of RANDB and oneself preservation to calculate generation authentication calculations MS_AUTHR as a result by CAVE, MS sends the base station inquiry request message to MSC/VLR then, carries random number RA NDB in this request message.
In step 406, MSC/VLR passes through HLR/AC with this message behind the base station inquiry request message that receives from MS.
In step 407, HLR/AC uses the RANDB that carries in this message to calculate authentication calculations AC_AUTHR as a result with the SSD data of oneself preserving by identical CAVE, then AC_AUTHR is sent to MSC/VLR by the base station query response message.
In step 408, MSC/VLR will pass through MS from the base station query response message of HLR/AC.
In step 409, the authentication calculations that MS relatively is received from MSC/VLR as a result AC_AUTHR whether MS_AUTHR identical as a result with the authentication calculations that oneself generates, if the MS decision network is legal; Otherwise decision network is illegal.
Fig. 5 initiates caller at MS, by terminal network is carried out the message flow chart of authentication when receiving called or transmitting-receiving short message, supposes equally that here MSC/VLR does not share the SSD data.As shown in Figure 5, in step 501, when MS initiates caller, receives called or receives and dispatches short message, at first generate random number RA NDB, and use the SSD parameter of RANDB and oneself preservation to calculate generation authentication calculations MS_AUTHR as a result by CAVE, MS sends the base station query requests to MSC/VLR then, carries random number RA NDB in this request.
Be meant when initiating caller here that MS initiates before the caller, receive and be meant MS after receiving called paging when called, be meant when sending SMS message before MS sends SMS message, be meant when receiving short message receive paging after.In addition, caller here and the called caller that not only comprises speech business and called also comprise the caller of data service and called.
In step 502, MSC/VLR passes through HLR/AC with this message behind the base station inquiry request message that receives from MS.
In step 503, HLR/AC uses the RANDB that carries in this message to calculate authentication calculations AC_AUTHR as a result with the SSD data of oneself preserving by identical CAVE, then AC_AUTHR is sent to MSC/VLR by the base station query response message.
In step 504, MSC/VLR will pass through MS from the base station query response message of HLR/AC.
In step 505, the authentication calculations that MS relatively is received from MSC/VLR as a result AC_AUTHR whether MS_AUTHR identical as a result with the authentication calculations that oneself generates, if the MS decision network is legal, continue follow-up caller, called, transmitting-receiving short message service process then; Otherwise decision network is illegal, no longer carries out follow-up caller, called, transmitting-receiving short message service process.
In the present invention, if decision network is illegal, can resend verification operation, just MS regenerates MS_AUTHR, initiates the base station querying flow to network side then.Certainly, can set number of repetition, still can not the success identity network if for example repeat 3 times, then decision network is illegal, no longer carries out authentication operations next time.
After the final decision network was illegal, MS can carry out power-off operation, also can carry out to disconnect speech channel, restart operation such as MS.Certainly, can carry out some otherly such as operations such as warnings, the present invention does not carry out any restriction to this yet.
In addition, authentication operations to network can be set on MS.For example, the authentication of whether carrying out network can be set.Like this, MS at first reads the value of setting behind start and completing place log-on operation, determine whether to be provided with the authentication to network, if carry out processing of the present invention, otherwise the processing of directly carrying out prior art gets final product.
Except network authentication being provided with to whether, can also be provided with whether allow when access network to network authentication, whether allow when the caller to network authentication, whether allow when called to network authentication, when whether allowing at the transmitting-receiving short message to network authentication.Failure maximum times to network authentication also can be set in addition, be arranged on the further operation after the network authentication failure, for example shut down, restart or disconnect speech channel or the like.These all settings can provide by the MS program, and are presented on the screen of MS, and the user can select the option that is provided with that shows on the screen by operation keyboard, thereby increase, delete or revise different settings in MS.
Except the authentication of initiating under Fig. 4 and the situation shown in Figure 5 network, can also be provided with and initiatively initiate by the user.The user comes at any time initiatively initiation to the authentication of network by function screen, and MS can feed back to the user by screen display with authenticating result.
Being appreciated that above-mentioned only is displaying to spirit of the present invention, rather than restriction.
Claims (11)
1. in cdma network, realize the method for portable terminal for one kind, comprise at least network authentication:
When a. initiating caller, receive called or receiving and dispatching short message at portable terminal, portable terminal generates a random number, the independent then base station querying flow of initiating, mobile switching center MSC/VLR in cdma network sends the base station inquiry request message by the base station, carries described random number in the inquiry request message of described base station;
B.MSC/VLR will return to portable terminal by the base station query response message according to the authentication calculations result that this random number obtains;
C. portable terminal relatively is received from authentication calculations result and the own authentication calculations result who obtains according to random number of MSC/VLR, if the two unanimity, decision network is legal; Otherwise decision network is illegal.
2. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, the described authentication calculations result who obtains according to random number is the authentication calculations result that random number and SSD data are calculated.
3. method according to claim 2 is characterized in that, described calculating is that CAVE calculates.
4. method according to claim 2 is characterized in that, MSC/VLR further comprises before the authentication calculations result is returned to portable terminal among the step b:
MSC/VLR calculates the authentication calculations result according to the SSD data of random number and oneself preservation.
5. method according to claim 2 is characterized in that, MSC/VLR further comprises before the authentication calculations result is returned to portable terminal among the step b:
MSC/VLR will pass through attaching position register/HLR/AC of AUC from the random number of portable terminal;
HLR/AC calculates the authentication calculations result according to the SSD data of random number and oneself preservation;
HLR/AC returns to MSC/VLR with the authentication calculations result.
6. according to any described method in the claim 1 to 5, it is characterized in that this method further comprises: when portable terminal connects network, carry out described portable terminal and generate a random number, the independent then operation of initiating the base station querying flow.
7. according to any described method in the claim 1 to 5, it is characterized in that, further be included among the step a or portable terminal generates the authentication calculations result among the step c according to random number step.
8. according to any described method in the claim 1 to 5, it is characterized in that, further be included in the step of configuration authentication parameter in the portable terminal.
9. method according to claim 8, it is characterized in that described configuration authentication parameter is to dispose the parameter, the configuration that whether allow portable terminal that network is carried out authentication whether to allow when the access network the parameter of network authentication, whether allow when called parameter, configuration to network authentication whether to allow when the transmitting-receiving short message the parameter of network authentication and configuration any one or combination in any in the failure maximum times of network authentication to parameter, the configuration of network authentication when whether configuration allows in caller.
10. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, further comprises portable terminal execution power-off operation after decision network is illegal, restarts operation or disconnects the speech channel operation.
11. method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, described portable terminal generate random number and relatively the authentication calculations result generate random number and authentication calculations result relatively by the portable terminal program, or generate random number and authentication calculations result relatively by the Subscriber Identity Module UIM card in the portable terminal.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2006101505367A CN100466803C (en) | 2005-01-28 | 2005-01-28 | Method for realizing right discriminating to network by terminal in CDMA network |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2006101505367A CN100466803C (en) | 2005-01-28 | 2005-01-28 | Method for realizing right discriminating to network by terminal in CDMA network |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN1812620A CN1812620A (en) | 2006-08-02 |
| CN100466803C true CN100466803C (en) | 2009-03-04 |
Family
ID=36845219
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2006101505367A Expired - Fee Related CN100466803C (en) | 2005-01-28 | 2005-01-28 | Method for realizing right discriminating to network by terminal in CDMA network |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN100466803C (en) |
Families Citing this family (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105792194B (en) * | 2016-04-25 | 2019-06-28 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Authentication method, authentication device, the network equipment, the Verification System of base station legitimacy |
| CN106028331B (en) * | 2016-07-11 | 2020-03-10 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method and equipment for identifying pseudo base station |
| CN106211169A (en) * | 2016-07-28 | 2016-12-07 | 努比亚技术有限公司 | Pseudo-base station identification device and method |
| CN108076460B (en) * | 2016-11-15 | 2021-07-30 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | Method and terminal for authentication |
| CN109769250B (en) * | 2017-11-09 | 2022-03-29 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | Method, terminal and system for identifying pseudo base station |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1311608A (en) * | 2000-03-01 | 2001-09-05 | 于强敏 | Method for realizing telephone set/card separation on CDMA mobile communication net |
| US20030114155A1 (en) * | 2001-12-14 | 2003-06-19 | Nikhil Jain | Method and system for GSM mobile station roaming to IS-41 |
| CN1549526A (en) * | 2003-05-16 | 2004-11-24 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method for realizing radio local area network authentication |
-
2005
- 2005-01-28 CN CNB2006101505367A patent/CN100466803C/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1311608A (en) * | 2000-03-01 | 2001-09-05 | 于强敏 | Method for realizing telephone set/card separation on CDMA mobile communication net |
| US20030114155A1 (en) * | 2001-12-14 | 2003-06-19 | Nikhil Jain | Method and system for GSM mobile station roaming to IS-41 |
| CN1549526A (en) * | 2003-05-16 | 2004-11-24 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method for realizing radio local area network authentication |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN1812620A (en) | 2006-08-02 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| EP1758417B1 (en) | Authentication method | |
| US20070293192A9 (en) | Identification of a terminal to a server | |
| US7050797B2 (en) | Remote control system in mobile communication terminal and method thereof | |
| US7565142B2 (en) | Method and apparatus for secure immediate wireless access in a telecommunications network | |
| US6014085A (en) | Strengthening the authentication protocol | |
| CA2665961C (en) | Method and system for delivering a command to a mobile device | |
| CN100459799C (en) | Control system and control method for terminal to use network | |
| KR20080066956A (en) | Remote activation of a user account in a telecommunication network | |
| CA2265698A1 (en) | Preventing misuse of a copied subscriber identity in a mobile communication system | |
| CN101563944A (en) | IMSI handling system | |
| CN102318386A (en) | Service-based authentication to a network | |
| KR20040053353A (en) | Authentication of a mobile telephone | |
| CN100466803C (en) | Method for realizing right discriminating to network by terminal in CDMA network | |
| CN111050324B (en) | 5G terminal equipment access method, equipment and storage medium | |
| KR20160143333A (en) | Method for Double Certification by using Double Channel | |
| CN107666470A (en) | A kind of processing method and processing device of checking information | |
| US20070105530A1 (en) | Method for Ensuring Security of Subscriber Card | |
| CN101835150B (en) | Method, device and system for updating shared enciphered data | |
| CN106658349B (en) | Method and system for automatically generating and updating shared secret key | |
| CN109993532B (en) | Intelligent service information pushing method and device and terminal | |
| CN102595391A (en) | Method, system and device capable of achieving safe triggering | |
| CN102202290A (en) | Method and system for updating authentication key of user equipment and user equipment | |
| CN101175324A (en) | Safety guaranteeing method of user card | |
| CN111414645B (en) | Safe HSS/UDM design method and system for realizing privacy protection function | |
| CN100579274C (en) | Safety key setting-up method |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| C06 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| C14 | Grant of patent or utility model | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee |
Granted publication date: 20090304 Termination date: 20130128 |
|
| CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee |