CN100349496C - Message authentication method - Google Patents
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- CN100349496C CN100349496C CNB2005100842706A CN200510084270A CN100349496C CN 100349496 C CN100349496 C CN 100349496C CN B2005100842706 A CNB2005100842706 A CN B2005100842706A CN 200510084270 A CN200510084270 A CN 200510084270A CN 100349496 C CN100349496 C CN 100349496C
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Abstract
The present invention discloses a message authentication method which is applied to authentication between a terminal MS and a base station BS. The method comprises that MS transmits an authentication request message to BS; after BS receives the authentication request message and authenticates the message, BS transmits an authentication reply message containing a digital certificate and a private key signature of BS to MS; after MS receives the authentication reply message, the message is authenticated according to the digital certificate and the private key signature in the message to judge whether the message passes through authentication, and MS discards the message from BS after the message is judged not to pass through the authentication. The preset invention realizes the authentication of the authentication reply message from BS by MS in a mode that BS transmits the authentication reply message containing the digital certificate and the private key signature of BS to MS, MS authenticates the message according to the digital certificate and the private key signature in the message, and the message is discarded after the message does not pass through the authentication; MS can recognize a false authentication reply message, and thus, the safety of the RSA authentication is enhanced.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the technology that improves the wireless communication system fail safe, specially refer to the message authentication method between a kind of MS and the BS.
Background technology
In communication system, fail safe is an important indicator of estimating a communication system performance quality, particularly in wireless communication system, because wireless communication system has open and ambulant characteristics, makes the fail safe of wireless communication system seem particularly important.Along with the development of cryptography and cryptoanalysis, can be by the mode that the last data of transmitting of the air interface (abbreviation is eated dishes without rice or wine) of wireless communication system are encrypted, the fail safe that improves wireless communication system.
IEEE 802.16d/e serial protocols has defined WiMAX and has fixed and moved the consensus standard that inserts the part of eating dishes without rice or wine.In order to guarantee the safety of data transmission of eating dishes without rice or wine, above-mentioned serial protocols has defined a Security Sublayer (Privacy Sublayer), is used to realize the distribution of authentication, key to wireless communication system user and management and follow-up data encryption and authentication or the like.According to agreement regulation, on authentication mode, use Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication method (by the public key encryption algorithm of Rivest, Shamir, Adleman exploitation) to achieve a butt joint into the authentication of the terminal (MS) of base station (BS) based on digital certificate.
In IEEE 802.16e draft agreement D9, disclose MS and inserted key management second edition (Privacy Key Managentment Version 2, PKMv2) the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication flow process that is adopted in the BS process.As shown in Figure 1, when by BS MS being authenticated, this identifying procedure may further comprise the steps:
Step 101, MS send Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication request message (PKMv2 RSA-Request) to BS, comprise digital certificate (MS_Certificate) and the private key signature (SigSS) of MS in this authentication request message.Table 1 is depicted as the attribute information that the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication request message comprises, wherein except that the digital certificate and private key signature of MS, has also comprised being used to prevent 64 random numbers (MS_Random) that produced by MS of Replay Attack and the SAID that is used for follow-up safe connection management.
| Attribute | Content |
| MS_Random | 64 random numbers that MS produces |
| MS_Certificate | The digital certificate X.509 of MS |
| SigSS | MS is to the signature of all properties in the message |
| SAID | The SAID of MS is identical with Basic CID |
Table 1
Step 102, BS authenticate this message according to digital certificate in this message and private key signature after receiving the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication request message of MS transmission, and judge whether by authentication, if then execution in step 103; Otherwise execution in step 105.
In this step, BS is specially the method that message authenticates according to digital certificate and private key signature: BS at first obtains the PKI of MS by digital certificate, utilizes this PKI to judge whether private key signature is legal then.Further, BS can also utilize self storage or the PKI of the digital certificate issuing organization that obtains by escape way, and the private key signature of issuing organization on the digital certificate is authenticated, and judges whether digital certificate is legal.
Step 103, BS return Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication by message (PKMv2 RSA-Reply) to MS, and execution in step 104 then.
Step 104, MS receive from the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication of BS by after the message, return Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication acknowledge message (PKMv2 RSA-Acknowledgement) to BS, and this MS of notice BS has received Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication by message, finishes this flow process then.
Step 105, BS return Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information (PKMv2 RSA-Reject) to MS, comprise the private key signature (SigBS) of BS in this message, and execution in step 106 then.
| Attribute | Content |
| MS_Random | 64 random numbers that MS produces |
| BS_Random | 64 random numbers that BS produces |
| Error-Code | The reason-code of refusal authentication |
| Display String (optional) | The reason of the refusal authentication that shows |
| SigBS | BS is to the signature of all properties in the message |
Table 2
Table 2 is depicted as the attribute information that the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information comprises, wherein except that the private key signature of BS, also comprised and be used to prevent the MS_Random of Replay Attack and 64 random numbers (BS_Random) that BS produces, the refusal authentication reason (Display String) that is used to that the error code (Error-Code) of refusal authentication reason is described and is used to show.Wherein, Display String is an option, promptly also can not comprise this attribute information in this message.
Step 106, MS return the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication acknowledge message to BS, and this MS of notice BS has received the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information, finishes this flow process then.
From above-mentioned flow process as can be seen, though BS comprises the private key signature of BS in the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information that MS returns, but MS is after receiving the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information, owing to there is not the digital certificate of BS, can't utilize the private key signature of BS that this message is authenticated, thereby when the assailant when MS sends the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information, MS can not identify by the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information of authentication with falseness; And, owing to there is not the digital certificate of BS, MS is after receiving the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information, also can't authenticate BS, then when the assailant palms off BS to MS transmission Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information, MS also can't authenticate the transmit leg identity, thereby has stoped the normal access network of MS, has reduced the fail safe of Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve the problems of the technologies described above, the invention provides a kind of message authentication method, be applied to the authentication between terminal and the base station, this method can realize that terminal is to replying the authentication of message from the authentication of base station, message is replied in the authentication of falseness identify, improve the fail safe of Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication.
For achieving the above object, the invention provides a kind of message authentication method, be applied to the authentication between terminal and the base station, this method comprises:
A, terminal send authentication request message to the base station, and the base station receives this authentication request message and this message is authenticated;
B, base station comprise the digital certificate of this base station and the authentication answer message of private key signature to the terminal transmission;
After C, terminal receive described authentication answer message from the base station, according to digital certificate in this message and private key signature this message is authenticated, judge whether by authentication, and after judging, abandon described authentication answer message from the base station not by authentication.
Terminal described in the step C authenticates and can comprise this message according to digital certificate in this message and private key signature:
C1, terminal obtain the PKI of base station by digital certificate, utilize this PKI that described private key signature is authenticated then.
Preferably, further comprise before or after the described step C1:
Terminal is utilized the PKI of this digital certificate issuing organization, and the private key signature of issuing organization on the digital certificate is authenticated.
Preferably, if judge among the step C, further comprise by after the authentication:
The terminal informing base station has received described authentication and has replied message.
Terminal described in the step C receives described authentication from the base station and replys after the message, may further include:
Whether message is replied in this authentication of terminal judges is that this terminal sends authentication request message to the base station and begins to receive in the predefined time, if then carry out the described step that this message is authenticated according to the digital certificate in this message and private key signature; Otherwise, directly finish this flow process.
Described digital certificate can be the X.509 digital certificate of base station.
Described authentication reply message can for: Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication passes through message.
Described Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication is by may further include in the message:
64 random numbers that 64 random numbers that the terminal that described terminal comprises in the authentication request message that the base station sends produces, base station produce, with the basic key that is used to derive from basic KI, password life span and the keying sequence of the public key encryption of terminal number.
Message is replied in described authentication can also be the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information.
May further include in the described Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information:
64 random numbers that 64 random numbers that the terminal that described terminal comprises in the authentication request message that the base station sends produces, base station produce and the reason-code of refusing authentication;
Perhaps further comprise: the refusal authentication reason that is used to show.
From above scheme as can be seen, send the authentication that comprises this base station digital certificate and private key signature by the base station to terminal among the present invention and reply message, after terminal receives this message, according to digital certificate in this message and private key signature this message is authenticated, and after not by authentication, abandon this message, thereby realized that terminal to reply the authentication of message from the authentication of base station, makes terminal the authentication of falseness can be replied message and identifies, improved the fail safe of Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication;
And in the present invention, when above-mentioned message from the base station is authentication during refuse information, terminal is authenticating the authentication refuse information, not by after promptly abandon this message, avoided terminal because false authentication refuse information is prevented from access;
In addition, terminal is when authenticating the authentication answer message from the base station among the present invention, not only private key signature is authenticated by digital certificate, also utilize the PKI of the mechanism that issues digital certificate, private key signature to issuing organization on the digital certificate authenticates, not only realized the authentication from the message of base station has also been realized the further authentication to the legitimacy of base station in the message, the fail safe that has further improved Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 inserts the PKMv2 Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication flow chart that adopts in the process of BS for disclosing MS among the 802.16e draft agreement D9;
Fig. 2 is the overview flow chart of the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 3 is for having used PKMv2 Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication flow chart of the present invention.
Embodiment
For making the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, the present invention is described in further detail below in conjunction with accompanying drawing.
Main thought of the present invention is, in the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication process, the base station receives the authentication request message of self terminal, and after this message authenticated, and sends the digital certificate that comprises this base station and message is replied in the authentication of private key signature to terminal; After the message that comprises digital certificate and private key signature of terminal reception from the base station, this message is authenticated, and judge whether authentication is passed through, after judging, do not abandon this message from the base station by authentication according to digital certificate in this message and private key signature.
Below describe the present invention by specific embodiment.
The overall procedure of the specific embodiment of the invention Figure 2 shows that step 101 among Fig. 1 as shown in Figure 2, and MS sends Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication request message and step 102 to BS, and BS receives the flow process after this message authenticates, and specifically comprises step:
Step 201, BS comprise the digital certificate of this BS and the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication answer message of private key signature to the MS transmission.
Step 202, MS authenticate this message according to digital certificate in this message and private key signature, and judge whether authentication is passed through, if execution in step 203 is passed through in authentication after receiving and replying message from the above-mentioned Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication of BS; Otherwise, execution in step 204.
In this step, MS replys to the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication from BS that receives that the authentication method in the step 102 can be identical among method that message authenticates and Fig. 1, be specially: MS at first obtains the PKI of BS by digital certificate, utilize this PKI to private key signature legal authentication the whether then, if legal then authentication is passed through; Otherwise for authentication is not passed through.In addition, MS authenticates the message from BS that receives and can further include: MS utilizes self storage or the PKI of the mechanism that issues digital certificate that obtains by escape way, private key signature to issuing organization on the digital certificate authenticates, thereby judge whether digital certificate is legal, if legal then authentication is passed through, otherwise for not passing through.
Step 203, MS send the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication acknowledge message to BS, and this MS of notice BS has received the message that BS sends to MS in the above-mentioned steps 201.
Step 204, MS directly abandon the message from BS that is received.
It can be that BS is receiving the request of MS transmission Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication that the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication that BS sends to MS in the above-mentioned flow process is replied message, authenticating by the back and pass through message to the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication that MS returns, also can be to authenticate the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information of not returning to MS by the back.
Referring to table 3, be BS digital certificate (BS_Certificate) and the private key signature attribute information of Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication by comprising in the message.Wherein the concrete format and content of the digital certificate of BS can be with reference to disclosed format and content in the IEEE802.16 agreement.In addition, as can be seen from Table 3, Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication is by also having comprised MS_Random and the BS_Random that is used to prevent Replay Attack in the message, and the basic key that is used to derive from basic KI (Encrypted pre-PAK), password life span (Key Lifetime) and the keying sequence number attribute informations of encrypting such as (Key Sequence Number).
Referring to table 4, be BS digital certificate and the private key signature attribute information that comprises in the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information.Other attribute informations in the table 4 can repeat no more here referring to the explanation of attribute information in the his-and-hers watches 1.
| Attribute | Content |
| MS_Random | 64 random numbers that MS produces |
| BS_Random | 64 random numbers that BS produces |
| Encrypted pre-PAK | Pre-PAK (RSA-PAEP-Encrypt (PubKey (MS), pre-PAK|SS ID)) with the public key encryption of MS |
| Key Lifetime | Basic KI (PAK) Password Ageing timer |
| Key Sequence Number | The PAK sequence number |
| BS_Certificate | The X.509 digital certificate of BS |
| SigBS | BS is to the signature of all properties in the message |
Table 3
| Attribute | Content |
| MS_Random | 64 random numbers that MS produces |
| BS_Random | 64 random numbers that BS produces |
| Error-Code | The reason-code of refusal authentication |
| Display String (optional) | The reason of the refusal authentication that shows |
| BS_Certificate | The X.509 digital certificate of BS |
| SigBS | BS is to the signature of all properties in the message |
Table 4
Further the present invention will be described in detail by having used PKMv2 Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication flow process of the present invention more below.Figure 3 shows that and used PKMv2 Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication flow process of the present invention that wherein step 301 and step 302 are identical with step 101 and step 102 among Fig. 1.Authentication comprises that by back execution in step 303:BS generation the digital certificate of self and the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication of private key signature pass through message in step 302, and this message is sent to MS.Then in step 304, MS receives from the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication of BS by after the message, according to private key signature in this message and digital certificate this message is authenticated, and judge whether authentication is passed through, if authentication is by execution in step 305, it has received Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication and has passed through message to send the authenticate-acknowledge message informing to BS; Otherwise execution in step 306 directly abandons this message.And in step 302, BS comprises the digital certificate of self and the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information of private key signature by back execution in step 307:BS generation to the authentication of MS, and this message is sent to MS.Then in step 308, after MS receives Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information from BS, according to private key signature in this message and digital certificate this message is authenticated, if authentication by execution in step 309, sends the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication acknowledge message to BS and notifies it to receive the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information; Otherwise execution in step 310 directly abandons this message.
In the above-mentioned steps 301, MS can also start predefined timer after sending authentication request message to BS, then in step 304 and step 308, MS judges whether timer is overtime earlier after receiving and replying message from the authentication of BS, if timer expiry then directly finishes this flow process; Otherwise authentication answer message is authenticated described in execution in step 304 and the step 308.
In addition, MS can also judge whether to have received the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication answer message from BS behind timer expiry, and this message authentication is passed through, if then directly finish this flow process; Otherwise MS sends the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication request message to BS again.
The above only is preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is in order to restriction the present invention, within the spirit and principles in the present invention not all, any modification of being made, is equal to replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1, a kind of message authentication method is applied to the authentication between terminal and the base station, comprising:
A, terminal send authentication request message to the base station, and the base station receives this authentication request message and this message is authenticated;
It is characterized in that after the described steps A, this method comprises:
B, base station comprise the digital certificate of this base station and the authentication answer message of private key signature to the terminal transmission;
After C, terminal receive described authentication answer message from the base station, according to digital certificate in this message and private key signature this message is authenticated, judge whether by authentication, and after judging, abandon described authentication answer message from the base station by authentication.
2, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, terminal described in the step C authenticates this message according to the digital certificate in this message and private key signature and comprises:
C1, terminal obtain the PKI of base station by digital certificate, utilize this PKI that described private key signature is authenticated then.
3, method according to claim 2 is characterized in that, further comprises before or after the described step C1:
Terminal is utilized the PKI of this digital certificate issuing organization, and the private key signature of issuing organization on the digital certificate is authenticated.
4, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, if judge among the step C by after the authentication, further comprises:
The terminal informing base station has received described authentication and has replied message.
5, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, terminal described in the step C receives described authentication from the base station and replys after the message, further comprises:
Whether message is replied in this authentication of terminal judges is that this terminal sends authentication request message to the base station and begins to receive in the predefined time, if then carry out the described step that this message is authenticated according to the digital certificate in this message and private key signature; Otherwise, directly finish this flow process.
6, according to arbitrary described method in the claim 1 to 5, it is characterized in that described digital certificate is: the X.509 digital certificate of base station.
According to arbitrary described method in the claim 1 to 5, it is characterized in that 7, described authentication is replied message and is: Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication passes through message.
8, method according to claim 7 is characterized in that, described Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication is by further comprising in the message:
64 random numbers that 64 random numbers that the terminal that described terminal comprises in the authentication request message that the base station sends produces, base station produce, with the basic key that is used to derive from basic KI, password life span and the keying sequence of the public key encryption of terminal number.
According to arbitrary described method in the claim 1 to 5, it is characterized in that 9, described authentication is replied message and is: the Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information.
10, method according to claim 9 is characterized in that, further comprises in the described Revest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) authentication refuse information:
64 random numbers that 64 random numbers that the terminal that described terminal comprises in the authentication request message that the base station sends produces, base station produce and the reason-code of refusing authentication;
Perhaps further comprise: the refusal authentication reason that is used to show.
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| CNB2005100842706A CN100349496C (en) | 2005-07-15 | 2005-07-15 | Message authentication method |
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Families Citing this family (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN101296482B (en) * | 2007-04-28 | 2012-12-12 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method, base station, relay station and relay communication system implementing message authentication |
| CN101394395B (en) * | 2007-09-18 | 2012-04-04 | 华为技术有限公司 | Authentication method, system and device |
| CN101272616B (en) * | 2008-05-07 | 2012-05-30 | 广州杰赛科技股份有限公司 | Safety access method of wireless metropolitan area network |
| CN101640886B (en) * | 2008-07-29 | 2012-04-25 | 上海华为技术有限公司 | Authentication method, re-authentication method and communication device |
| CN101640887B (en) * | 2008-07-29 | 2012-10-03 | 上海华为技术有限公司 | Authentication method, communication device and communication system |
| CN102143489A (en) | 2010-02-01 | 2011-08-03 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method, device and system for authenticating relay node |
| EP3565178B1 (en) * | 2017-01-25 | 2021-03-17 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Message protection method, user device and core network device |
Citations (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1559117A (en) * | 2001-11-29 | 2004-12-29 | Use of a public key pair in terminal equipment for authentication and authorization of telecommunication user with network operator and business partner |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN1559117A (en) * | 2001-11-29 | 2004-12-29 | Use of a public key pair in terminal equipment for authentication and authorization of telecommunication user with network operator and business partner |
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