CA2555659C - System and method for providing secure message signature status and trust status indication - Google Patents

System and method for providing secure message signature status and trust status indication Download PDF

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Publication number
CA2555659C
CA2555659C CA002555659A CA2555659A CA2555659C CA 2555659 C CA2555659 C CA 2555659C CA 002555659 A CA002555659 A CA 002555659A CA 2555659 A CA2555659 A CA 2555659A CA 2555659 C CA2555659 C CA 2555659C
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Prior art keywords
digital signature
sender
checking
signature
message
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CA002555659A
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French (fr)
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CA2555659A1 (en
Inventor
Herbert A. Little
Michael S. Brown
Neil P. Adams
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BlackBerry Ltd
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Research in Motion Ltd
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12Applying verification of the received information

Abstract

A system and method for providing secure message signature status and trust status indications are disclosed. When a secure message having a digital signature generated by a sender is selected for processing on a messaging client, the digital signature on the message and trust status of the sender are checked. Separate indications are then provided to indicate the results of checking the digital signature and the trust status of the sender.

Description

SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROVIDING SECURE MESSAGE SIGNATURE
STATUS AND TRUST STATUS INDICATION
BACKGROUND
1. Field of the in~nention This invention relates generally to the field of secure electronic messaging, and in particular to processing secure messages to verify and separately indicate signature status and trust status of the messages.
2. De,~niption of the Related Art Known secure messaging software clients, such as e-mail software applications operating on desktop computer systems, represent the status of a signature on a received secure message using a single icon or other type of signature ind'~cator that indicates whether the signature is valid or not. The overall process of signature verif'~cation by these clients typically involves multiple operations, such as mathematical operations to verify the signature status, and a check of trust status. When signature verification fails, however, a user of these known clients is unable to immediately determine the reason for the failure, and which of the signature verification operations failed, due to the fact that the client only provides a single signature verification indicator (i.e. valid or invalid). Therefore, when a signature verification process fails, the user cannot distinguish whether the failure was caused by a mathematical operation failure or by a trust status check failure.

SUMMARY
In one aspect of the invention, there is provided a method of indicating signature status and trust status of a secure message on a messaging client, the method comprising the steps of selecting for processing a secure message stored on the messaging client, the secure message including a digital signature generated by a sender of the secure message; determining if at feast one of the signature status and trust status of the secure message should be checked; checking the digital signature if a determination is made that the signature status should be checked; .
checking trust status of the sender if a determination is made that the trust status should be checked; displaying a first indicator of a result of the step of checking the digital signature; and displaying a second indicator of a result of the step of checking trust status of the sender.
In another aspect, there is provided a system for indicating signature status and trust status of a secure message, comprising a messaging client configured to receive secure messages; each of the secure messages including a digital signature generated by a sender of the secure message; an input configured to receive inputs from a user of the messaging client; a data processor; and an output configured to provide outputs to the user, wherein, when a received secure message is selected for processing by the user via the input, the processor determines if at least one of the signature status and trust status of the selected secure message should be checked, checks the digital signature on the secure message if a determination is made that the signature status should be checked, checks the trust status of the sender if a determination is made that the trust status should be checked, and provides separate output indications of the results of the digital signature check and the trust status check on the output.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Fig. 1 is a block diagram of an exemplary messaging system in which the present invention may be implemented.
Fig. 2 is ablock diagram illustrating a secure e-mail message exchange in a messaging system.
-2a-Fig. 3 is a flow chart illustrating a method for digital signature status and trust status checking and indication for a secure message.
Fig. 4 is a diagram of a messaging client display screen.
Fig. 5 is a diagram of the messaging client display screen illustrating signature status and trust status indications.
Fig. 6 is a block diagram of a wireless mobile communication device on which a messaging client which implements the present in~nfion may operate.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Signature and trust status d~eddng may be performed on secure messages that have at least been signed with a digital signature. A secure message may also be processed in other ways by a message sender or intermediate system between a message sender and a messaging client which receives the secure message. For example, a secure message may be a message that has been signed, encrypted and then signed or signed and then encrypted by a message sender according to variants of Secure Mu~ipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (SJMIME). A secure message could similarly be encoded, compressed or othennrise processed either before or after being signed. Any such processing of a secure message would be reversed at a message receiver if necessary before signature verif'~cation operations are performed.
A messaging client allows a system on which it operates to receive and possibly also send messages. Messaging clients may operate on a computer system, a handheld device, or any other system or device with communications capabilities. Many messaging clients also have add'~ional non-messaging functions.
-3-Fig. 1 is a block diagram of an exemplary messaging system in whid~ the present invention may be implemented. The system 10 includes a Wide Area Network (WAN) 12, coupled to a computer system 14, a wireless network gateway 16, and a corporate Local Area Network (LAN) 18. The wireless network gateway 16 is also coupled to a wireless communication network 20, in which a wireless mobile communication device 22 ('mobile device") is configured to operate.
The computer system 14 may be a desktop or laptop personal computer (PC), which is configured to communicate to the WAN 12, which may be the Internet. PCs, such as computer system 14, normally access the Internet through an Internet Service Provider (tSP), an Application Service Provider (ASP), or the like.
The corporate LAN 18 is an example of a network-based messaging d'~ent. It is normally located behind a security firewall 24. Within the corporate LAN
30, a message server 26, operating on a computer behind the firewall 24 serves as the primary interface for the corporation to exchange messages both within the LAN 18, and with other external messaging clients via the WAN 12. Two known message servers 26 are Microsoft"'"
Exchange server and Lotus Dominos serener. These servers 26 are often used in conjunction with Internet mail roofers that typically use UNIX-based Sendmail protocols to route and deliver mail messages. The message server 26 may also provide additional functionality, such as dynamic database storage for calendars, todo lists, task lists, e-mail, electronic documentation, etc.
The message server 26 provides messaging capabilities to the corporation's networked computer systems 28 coupled to the LAN 18. A typical LAN 18 includes muhiple computer systems 28, each of which implements a messaging client, such as
-4-Microsoft Outtook'~"", Lotus Notes, etc. Within the LAN 18, messages are received by the message server 26, distributed to the appropriate mailboxes for user accounts addressed in the received message, and are then accessed by a user through a computer system 28 operating as a messaging client.
The wireless gateway 16 provides an interface to a wireless network 20, through which messages may be exchanged with a mobile device 22. Such functions as addressing of the mobile device 22, encoding or othervvise tn~nsforming messages for wireless transmission, and any other required interface functions may be performed by the wireless gateway 16. The wireless gateway may be configured to operate with more than one wireless network 20, in which case the wireless gateway 16 may also determine a most likely network for locating a given mobile device user and may also track users as they roam between countries or networks.
Any computer system 14, 28 with access to the WAN 12 may exchange messages with a mobile device 22 through the wireless network gateway 16.
Alternatively, private wireless network gateways, such as wireless Virtual Private Network (VPN) roofers could also be implemented to provide a private interta~ fio a wireless network. 1=or example, a wireless VPN implemented in the LAN 18 may provide a private intertace from the LAN 18 to one or more mobile devices 22 through the wireless network 20.
Such a private interface to mobile devices 22 via the wireless network gateway 16 and/or the wireless network 20 may also effectively be extended to entities outside the LAN 18 by providing a message forwarding or redin3ction system that operates with the message server 26. Such a redirection system is disclosed in United States Patent No.
6,2i 9,694.
In this type of redirection system, incoming messages n~ceived bythe message senrer26
-5-and addressed to a user of a mobile device 22 are sent through the wireless network interface, either a wireless VPN roofer, wireless gateway 16 or other intertace, to the wireless network 20 and to the user's mobile device 22. Another alternate interface to a user's mailbox on a message server 26 may be a Wireless Appiicataon Protocol (WAP) gateway. Through a WAP gateway, a list of messages in a user's mailbox on the message server 26, and possibly each message or a portion of each message, could be sent to the mobile device 22.
A wireless network 20 normally delivers messages to and from mobile devices 22 via RF transmissions between base stations and mobile devices 22.
The wireless network 20 may for example be: (1 ) a data-centric wireless network, (2) a voice-centric wireless network, or (3) a dual-mode network that can support both voice and data communications over the same infrastructure. Recen~y developed wireless networks include: (1 ) the Code Division Multiple Aaess (CDMA) network, (2) the troupe Special Mobile or the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) networks, both developed by the standards oomm~tee of CEPT, and (3) third-generation (3G) networks, such as Enhanced Data rates for Global Evolution (EDGE) and Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS), which are currentf)r under development.
G PRS is a data overlay on top of the existing GSM wireless network, which is used in many parts of the world. Examples of data-centric nefinrork include:
(1 ) the Mobitex~"" Radio Network ("MMobitex"j, and (2) the DataTACT"'~ Radio Network ("DataTAC'~.
Examples of known voice-centric data networks include Personal Communication Systems (PCS) networks like CDMA, GSM, and Time Divis'ron Multiple Access (TDMA) systems that
-6-have been available in North America and world-wide for nearly 10 years.
The mobile device 22 may be a data communication device, a voice communication device, or a multiple-mode device capable of voice, data and other types of communications. An exemplary mobile device 22 is described in further detail below.
Perhaps the most common type of messaging currently in use is e-mail. In a standard e-mail system, an e-mail message is sent by an e-mail sender, possibly through a message server and/or a service provider system, and may then be routed through the intemet to one or more message receivers. E-mail messages are normally sent in the dear and typically use Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) headers and Mutd-purpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) body parts to define the fom~at of the e-mail message.
In recent years, secure messaging techniques hay evohmd to protect both the content and integrity of messages, such as e-mail messages. S/MiME and Pretty Good PrivacyT"" (PGP~ are two public key secure e-mail messaging protocols that provide for both encryption, to protect data content, and signing, which protects the integrity of a message and provides for sender authentication by a message receiver. In addition to utilizing digital signatures and possibly encryption, secure messages may also or instead be encoded, compressed or otherMSe processed.
Fg. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a secure e-mail message exchange in a messaging system. The system includes an e-mail sender 30, coupled to a WAN
32, and a v~rireless gateway 34, which provides an interface between the WAN 32 and a wireless network 36. A mobile device 38 is adapted to operate within the wig network 36.
The e-mail sender 30 may be a PC, such as the system 14 in F~g.1, or it may be a network-connected computer, such as computer 28. The e-mail sender 30 may also _7_ be a mobile device on which e-mail messages may be composed and sent. The WAN
32, wireless gateway 34, wireless network 36 and mobile device 38 are substanfially the same as similarly-labelled components in Fig.1.
A secure e-mail message sender 30 typically signs a message by taking a digest of the message and signing the digest using the sender's private key. A
digest may for example be generated by performing a check-sum, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), or some other non-reversible operation, such as a hash on the message. This digest of the message is then digitally signed by the sender using the sender's private key. The private key may be used to perform an encryption or some other transformation operation on the digest to generate a digest signature. A digital signature, including the digest and the digest signature, is then appended to the outgoing message. In addition, a digital Certificate (Cert) of the sender, which includes the sender's public key and sender idenfrty information that is bound to the public key with one or more digital signatures, and possbiy any chained Certs and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) associated with the Cert and any chained Certs may also be included with the outgoing message.
The secure e-mail message 40 sent by the e-mail sender 30 may include a component 42 including the sender's Cert, Cert chain, CRLs and digital signature and the signed message body 44.. In the S/MIME secure messaging technique, Certs, CRLs and digital signatures are normally placed at the beginning of a message as shown in Fig. 2, and the message body is included in a file attachment Messages generated by other secure messaging schemes may place message components in a different order than shown or include additional and/or different components. For example, a signed message 40 may include addressing information, such as 'To:~ and "From:° email addresses, and _g_ other header information.
When the secure e-mail message 40 is sent from the e-mail sender 30, it is routed through the WAN 32 to the wireless gateway 34. As described above, the e-mail sender 30 may send the message 40 directly to a wireless gateway 34, or the message may instead be delivered to a computer system associated with the mobile device 38 and then sent to the mobile device ~38 through the wireless gateway 34.
Alternatively, the message may be routed or redirected to the mobile device 38 through the wireless network 36 via a winless VPN roofer.
The receiver of such a signed message 40, mobile device 38, may verify a digital signature 42 in the secure message 40 by generating a digest of the message body 44, extracting the transmitted digest from the digital signature 42, comparing the generated digest with the digest extracted from the digital signature 42, and verifying the digest signature in the digital signature. The digest algorithm used by a secure message n~cei~r is the same as the algorithm used by the message sender, and may be specified in a message header, or possibly in a digital signature of the secure message. One commonly used digest algorithm is the Secure Hashing Algorithm 1 (SHAT ), although other digest algorithms such as Message-Digest Algorithm 5 (MD5) may also be used. If a secure message 40 was encrypted by a sender 30 after being signed, then the receiver 38 would first decrypt the message before signature verification is pertormed. If encryption was performed before signing, however, decryption is not requin3d before signature verification.
In order to verify the digest signature, the receiver 38 retrieves the public key of the sender 30, generally by extracting the public key from the senders Cert 42 attached to the message 40, and then by verifying the signature on the digest in the digital signature by performing a reverse transformation on the digest signature. For example, if the message sender 30 generated the digest signature by encrypting the digest using its private key, then a n~ceiver 38 virould use the sender's public key to decrypt the digest signature to recover the original digest. The secure message 40 shown in Fig.
2 includes the sender's Cert 42, from which the sender's public key can be extracted. The sender's public key may also be retrieved from a local store, for example where the public key was extracted from an earlier message from the sender 30 and stored in a key store in the receiver's local store. Alternatively, the public key may be retrieved from the sender's Cert stored in a local store, or from a Public Key Server (PKS). A PKS is a server that is normally associated with a Certificate Authority (CA) from which a Cert for an entity, including the entity's public key, is available. A PKS might reside within a corporate l_AN
such as 18 (Fig. l ), or anywhere on the WAN 32, intemet or other network or system through which message n~ceivers may establish communications with the PKS.
A digest algorithm is generally a non-reversible function that produces a unique output for every unique input. Thus, if an original message is changed or corrupted, then the digest generated by the receiver will be diffen:nt from the digest extracted from the digital signature, and signature verification will fail. Because digest algorithms are publicly known, however, it is possible that an entity may alter a secure message, generate a new digest of the altered message, and forward the altered message to any addressed message receivers. In this case, the digest generated at the receiver on the basis of the altered message will match the new digest that was added by the entity that altered the message. The digest signature deck is intended to prevent verification of a digital signature in such a situation. Although the generated and new digests vinll match, because a sender signs the original digest using its own private key, the entity that alten3d the message cannot generate a new digest signature that can be verified with the sender's private key. Therefore, even though the digests in the altered message match, the digital signature will not be verified since the digest signature ~rification will fail.
These mathematical operations do not prevent anyone from seeing the contents of the secure message 40, but do ensure that the message has not been tampered with after it was signed by the sender, and also ensure that the message was signed by the person as indicated on the '!=rom' field of the message.
The Cert, Cert chain and CRLs 42 are used by a receiver to ensure that the sender's Cert is valid, i.e., that the Cert has not been revoked or expired, and is trusted. A
Cert is often part of a Cert chain, which includes a user's Cent as well as other Certs to verify that the user's Cert is authentic: For example, a Cert for any particular entity typically includes the entity's public key and identification information that is bound to the public key with a dig'~tal signature. Several types of Cert currently in use indude, for e~mpie, X.509 Certs, which are typically used in S/MIME, and PGP Certs, which have a slightly different format. The present invention may be used with any of these types of Certs, as well as other types of Certs. The digital signature in a Cert is generated by the issuer of the Cert, and can be checked by a message receiver as described above. A Cert may include an expiry time or validity period from which a messaging dient may determine if the Cert has expired. Each Cert may also be checked against a CRL to ensure that the Cert has not been revoked.
If the digital signature in a message sender's Cart is veriifed, the Cert has not expired or been revoked and the issuer of the Cert is trusted bya message receiver, then the dig'rtaf signature of the message is trusted by the message receiver. If the issuer of the Cert is not trusted, then the message receiver may trace a certification path through the Cert chain to verify that each Cert in the chain was signed by Its issuer, whose Cert is next in the Cert chain, unfit a Cert is found that was signed by a root Cert from a trusted source, such as from a large PKS. Once a root Cert is found; then a signature can be trusted, because both the sender and receiver trust the source of the root Cent.
In known secure messaging systems, the overall result of the above mathematical operations and trust status check are presented to a user as a single validrnvalid signature indicat<on. This single indication does not provide adequate information to a receiver to determine why the verification of the digital.
signature has failed.
Fig: 3 is a flow chart illustrating a method for digital signature status and trust status verification and indication for a secure message. Although the method in Fig. 3 shows operations for verifying signature and trust status of a secure message, a messaging client in which such a method is implemented may also be enabled for unsecure communications. The steps shown in Fig. 3 can be executed when a user of a messaging client wishes to verify a signature and prefen3bly do not affect other functions of a messaging client or a system on which a messaging client is operating.
The method begins at step 52 when a secure message is n~ceived by a messaging client, such as the mobile device 38 of Fig. 2. Because the content of a secure message may be viewed without verifying its digital signature, a user may be prompted, for example, when a secure message is accessed for display or other processing, to choose whether or not the digital signature should be verified. Configuration settings may also be established at a messaging client to automatically control signature verif'u;ation. For example, digital signatures on secure messages from certain senders may be verified every time such a secure message is selected for display or processing on a messaging client, whereas a user would be prompted when any other secure message is selected for display or processing. At step 54, a determination is made as to whether or not the digital signature on the secure message is to be verified, which is dependent upon a user selection, configuration settings, or both. If the digital signature is not to be verified, then the message is displayed or processed at step 56. An indication that the message is a secure message, but that its digital signature was not verified or processed may also be provided at step 57. Alternatively, a messaging client could be configured to abort any display and processing operations for a secure message unless 'rts digital signature is verified.
!f the signature is to be verfied, then mathematical operations and trust check operations are performed. These operations may be performed in any order, or substantially in parallel as shown in Fig. 3. The mathematical operations involved in signature verification, shown on the right-hand side of I=ig. 3, begin at step 58, where the messaging client generates a digest A of the body of the received secure message. Then, at step 60, the digital signature of the secure message is detected, and the sender's public key is retrieved from a local store, from an attached Cert, or from an external source, such as a PKS. The digest B, which was generated by the message sender, is then extracted from the digital signature at step 64. The two digests, A and B, are then compared and the digest B signature is checked at step 66. If the digests match and the digest signature is verified, then an indication that the digital signature is valid is provided at step 68.
OthenMSe, an indication that the signature is invalid is provided, at step 70.
Each of these indications may be, for example, text, an icon, or some combination of both, for display on a display screen associated with the messaging client.
Trust status checking operations begin at step 72, where the messaging client determines if the sender's Cert is available. Because a sender may attach its Cert to any secure messages that it signs, the sender's Cert will normally be available to a messaging client. If, however, the Cert is not attached to the message or stored at the receiving messaging client, and cannot be retrievv~ed from an external souroe, then trust between the sender and receiver cannot be established and an indication that the Cart is not trusted is provided at step 74. This indication is separate from the indication provided at step 68 or 70 and thereby allows a user to determine whether the mathematical operations, trust status operations, or both, have failed.
If the sender's Cert is available, however, then an expiry time, validity period or any other further similar information in the Cert is checked at step 76 to determine if the Cert is expired. An appropriate CRL for the Cert is also preferably checked to determine if the Cert has been revoked. An expired or revoked Cert results in an unfrosted Cert indication at step 76. If the Cart has not expired or been revoked, then the Cert issuer's signature can be checked, and at step 78, it is determined whether or not the issuer's signature in the Cert is valid. If it is not valid, then the Cert cannot be trusted and the method proceeds to step 74 to provide an indication that the Cert is not trusted. Steps 72, 76 and 78 may be repeated, if necessary, for each Cart in a Cart chain until either one of the chained Certs is found to be missing, expired or revoked or has an invalid signature, in which case an unfrosted Cert indication is provided at step 74, or a root Cart is found. If the entire Cert chain has been processed and no root Cert has been found, as determined at step 80, then trust cannot be established and an untrusted Cart indication is provided at step 74. If a root Cert is found (step 80), then the method continues to step 82, and an indication that the Cert is trusted is provided. This is a separate indication from the digital signature status indication at step 68 or 70 and a different indication than would be provided at step 74.
Thus, two separate indications are provided, one for signature status and one for trust status. Each of the indicafions may have one of mutdple states, dependent upon the results of the corresponding operations, as described in further detail below.
The operations shown on Fig. 3 may be performed in a different order. For example, digests A and B could be compared before the public key is retrieved.
Also, although the digest comparison and digest signature verif'~cation operations have been shown together in steps 64. and 66, these operatrons may be performed sequentially, so that the digest signature is verfied only if digests A and B match, or the digests are compared only if the digest signature is verified. In addition, the trust status checking operations may be performed in a drfferent order than shown, depending upon user preferences, standard practices and possibly the processing resources available on a messaging client. For example, a processing-constrained messaging client may delay performing a CRl_ check until a root Cert is found, thereby avoiding this pnxessor-intensive and time-consuming operation unless a certification path to a trusted root Cert is found.
Signature and trust status operations may also be interdependent, such that one set of operations may be performed only if the other is successfully completed, or a failure of either the signature or trust status operations interrupts and aborts the other operations.
The method shown in Fig. 3 shows only the steps involved in determining signature status and trust status of a secure message. If a secure message was encrypted or otherwise processed by encoding, for example, by a sender after it was signed, then a receiving messaging client will perform corresponding inverse operations before signature verification operations are performed. Such further processing operat'rons may also be performed after the operations in Fig. 3 are completed.
Any one of several altematnre schemes may be implemented for displaying or processing a secure message when it is determined at step 54 that a message signature is to be verified. Since a valid signature is not required to view or process the content of a secure message, message content may be displayed or otherwise processed while signature status and trust status operations shown in Fig. 3 are being performed. The signature and trust status indications may then be displayed when the associated operations have been completed. Message display and processing may also be delayed until signature and/or trust status verification is complete. If ether of these status verification fails, then a user may be prompted to indicate whether or not message-related operations should proceed, despite an invalid signature and/or unfrosted Cart.
In either of the above schemes, 'fin progress° or similar indications are preferably displayed by a messaging client while signature and trust status operations are being performed. Since separate signature status and tmst status indications are provided when signature- and Cert-related operations are complete, separate in progress"
indications may also be provided.
Although a single step 74 is shown in Fg. 3 to indicate that a Cert is not trusted, more than one type of unfrosted Cert indication is preferably provided. Different indications are preferably provided for a revoked Cert, an expired Cert, a missing Cert and an invalid Cert (i.e., a Cert with an invalid signature), in order to provide a user with even more detailed information regarding why a Cert is not trusted. Such untrusted Cert indications may relate to either the sender's Cert or a Cert in a Gert chain.
Another different indication may be provided when a complete Cert chain has been processed without finding a root Cert. In each of these cases, a user may be prompted to invoke a further operation. For example, when no root Cert is found, a user may choose to designate the sender's Cert or a Cert in a Cert chain as a trusted root Cert, whereas if a Cert is missing, then the user may submit a command to retrieve the missing Cent.
Fig. 4 is a diagram of a messaging client display sateen. This screen illustrates example ~n progress° indications. When a secure message is selected for display or other processing, a display screen 90 on a messaging client may appear similar to the representation shown in Fg. 4.
In the example of Fg. 4, a secure message has been selected for display and the digital signature on the message is to be verified. While signature and trust status verification operations are in progress, suitable indicators are preferably displayed, as shown at 92, 94, 96 and 98. Each 'in progress' indicator may include both an icon 92, 96 and related text 94, 98. The hourglass icons 92, 96 shown in F'~g. 4 are used to indicate that operations are in progress. The text shown at 94 and 98 in Fig. 4 provide further information to a user regarding the particular operations that are currently being executed.
As also shown in Fig. 4, message text 100 may be displayed while the signature status and trust status of a secure message are being verified.
Fig. 5 is a diagram of the messaging client display screen illustrating signature status and trust status indications. In Fg. 5, the signaturoe status and tnrst status _ 17_ operations for a secure message have been completed, and separate indicators of the results of signature verification and trust verification are displayed. The signature status indicator and trust status indicator, like the 'in progress' indicators in Fig. 4, preferably include both an icon i 02, 106 and text 104, f 08. The icons 102, 106 allow a user to quickly and easily determine the signature status and trust status of a secure message, while the text 104, 108 provides further Information. In the example of Fg. 5, the tnrst status verification has failed because the sender Cert was found to be invalid. The message text 110 may still be viewed by a user, but the user is not assured that the message text 1 i 0 is actually what the message sender sent, or that the message was actually sent by the sender. As described above, when either of the verification operations fails, a user may be prompted for any further action to be performed.
Figs. 4 and 5 respectively show a messaging client display screen 90 at 9n progress' and "completed" states of signature and trust verification operations. Since these operations involve different amounts of processing and thus may require different amounts of time to complete, it is possible that a completed indication for one of the operations may be displayed while the other operation remains in progress. As described above, it is also possible that failure of one of the operations causes the other operation to abort, and another set of corresponding icons and/or text indications may be provided.
Other icons and text indicators may be used in addition to or instead of those shown in Figs. 4 and 5, which are illustrative examples of status indicators that may be used.
Fig. 6 is a block diagram of a wireless mobile communication device on which a messaging client which may implement the present invention may operate. The mobile device 600 is preferably a two-way communication device having at least voice and data communication capabilities. The device preferably has the capability to communicate with other computer systems on the Internet. Depending on the functionality provided by the device, the device may be referred to as a data messaging device, a two-way pager, a cellular telephone with data messaging capabil'fies, a vnireless Internet appliance or a data communication device (with or without telephony capabilfies).
The dual-mode device 600 includes a transceiver 611, a microprocessor 638, a display 622, Flash memory 624, RAM 626, auxiliary. input/output (U0) devices 628, a serial port 630, a keyboard fi32, a speaker 634, a microphone 636, a short-range wireless communications sub-system 640, and may also include other device sub-systems 642.
The transceiver 611 preferably includes transmit and receive antennas 616, 618, a receiver (Rx) 6i2, a transmitter (Tx) 614, one or more local oscillators (LOs) 613, and a digital signal processor (DSP) 620. Within the Flash memory 624; the device 100 preferably includes a plurality of software modules fi24A-624N that can be executed by the microprocessor 638 (and/or the DSP 620), including a voice communica~on module 624A, a data communication module 6248, and a plurality of other operational modules 624N for carrying out a plurality of other functions.
The mobile communication device 600 is preferably a two-way communication device having voice and data communication capabilities. Thus, for example, the device may communicate over a voice network, such as any of the analog or digital cellular networks, and may also communicate over a data network. The voice and data networks are depicted in Fig. 6 by the communication tovwr 619. These voice and data networks may be separate communication networks using separate infrastructure, _19_ such as base stations, network controllers, etc., or they may be integrated into a single wireless network.
The communication subsystem 611 is used to communicate with the network 619. The DSP 620 is used to send and receive c~nmunication signals to and from the transmitter 614 and receiver 612, and may also exchange control information with the transmitter 614 and n~ceiver 612. If the voice and data communications occur at a single frequency, or closely spaced set of frequencies, then a single LO 613 may be used in conjunction with the transmitter 6i4 and receiver 6i2. Alternatively, if differentfrequencies are utilized for voice communications versus data communications, then a plurality of LOs 613 can be used to generate a plurality of frequencies corresponding to the netwrork 619.
Although two antennas 616, 618 are depicted in Pig. 6, the mobile device 600 could be used with a single antenna structure. Information, which includes both voice and data information, is communicated to and from the communication module 611 via a link between the DSP 620 and the microprocessor 638.
The detailed design of the communication subsystem 61 i , such as frequency band, component selection, power level, etc., will be dependent upon the communication netvrrork 619 in which the mobile device 600 is intended to operate. For example, a mobile device 600 intended to operate in a North American market may include a communication subsystem 617 designed to operate with the Mobitex or DataTAC mobile data communication networks and also designed to operated with any of a variety of voice communication networks, such as AMPS, TDMA, CDMA, PCS, etc., when3as a mobile device 600 intended for use in Europe may be configured to operate with the GPRS data communication network and the GSM voice communication network. Other types of data _2p_ and voice networks, both separate and integrated, may also be u~lized with the mobile device 600.
Depending upon the type of network 619, the access requirements for the dual-mode mobile device 600 may also vary. For example, in the Mobitex and DataTAC
data networks, mobile devices are registered on the network using a unique identification number associated with each device. In GPRS data networks, however, network access is associated with a subscriber or user of a mobile device 600. A GPRS device typically n~quires a subscriber identity module ('SIM'), which is requin:d in order to operate the mobile device 600 on a GPRS network. Local or non-network communication funcctieons ('rf any) may be operable; without the SIM, but the mobile device 600 will be unable to cany out any functions involving communications over the network 619, other than any legally required operations, such as '911' emergency calling.
After any required network registration or activation procedures have been completed, the mobile device 600 may send and receive communication signals, preferably including both voice and data signals, over the network 619. Signals recei~d by the antenna 616 from the communication network 619 are routed to the receiver 6i2, which provides for signal amplification, frequency down conversion, ~Itering, channel selection, etc., and may also provide analog to digital conversion. Analog to digital conversion of the received signal allows more complex communication functions, such as digital demodulation and decoding to be performed using the DSP 620. In a similar manner, signals to be transmitted to the network 619 are processed, including modulation and encoding, for example, by the DSP 620 and are then provided to the transmitter 614 for digital to analog conversion, frequency up conversion, filtering, amplification and transmission to the communication network 619 via the antenna 618. Although a single transceiver 611 is shown in Fig. 6 for both voice and data communications, the mobile device 600 may include two distinct transceivers, a first transceiver for transmitting and receiving voice signals, and a second transceiver for transmitting and receiving data signals.
In addition to processing the communication signals, the DSP 620 may also provide for receiver and transmitter control. For example, the gain levels applied to communication signals in the receiver 612 and tn3nsmitter 614 may be adaptively controlled through automatic gain control algorithms implemented in the DSP
620. Other transceiver control algorithms could also be implemented in the DSP 620 in order to provide more sophisticated control of the transceiver 611.
The microprocessor 638 preferably manages and controls the overall operation of the mobile device 600. Many types of microprocessors or microcontrollers could be used for this part, or, alternatively, a single DSP 620 could be used to cant' out the functions of the microprocessor 638. Low level communication functions, including at least data and voice communications, are performed through the DSP 620 in the transceiver 611. Other, high-level communication applications, such as a voice communication application 624A, and a data communication application 6248 may be stored In the Flash memory 624 for execution by the microprocessor 638. For example, the voice communication module 624A may provide a high-level user interface operable to transmit and receive ~noice calls between the mobile device 600 and a plurality of other voice devices via the network 619. Similarly, the data communication module 624B may provide a high-level user intertace operable for sending and receiving data, such as e-mail messages, files, organizer infom~ation, short text messages, etc., between the mobile device 600 and a plurality of other data devices via the network 6i 9. On the mobile device 600, a secure messaging software application may operate in conjunction with the data communication module 6248 in order to implement the signature and trust verification techniques described above.
The microprocessor 638 also interacts with other device subsystems, such as the display 622, Flash memory 624, random access memory (RAM) 626, auxiliary input/output (U0) subsystems 628, serial port 630, keyboarcJ 632, speaker 634, microphone 636, a short-range communications.subsystem 640 and any other device subsystems generally designated as 642. for example, the modules 624A-N are executed by the microprocessor 638 and may provide a high-level interface between a user of the mobile device and the mobile device. This intertace typically includes a graphical component provided through the display 622, and an input/output component provided through the auxiliary 1/O 628, keyboard 632, speaker 634, or microphone 636.
Some of the subsystems shown in Fg. 6 perform communication-related functions, whereas other subsystems may provide "resident" or on-device functions.
Notably, some subsystems, such as keyboard 632 and display 622 may be used for both communication-related functions, such as enterfng a text message for transmission over a data communication network, and device-resident functions such as a ca~ulator or task list or other PDA type functions.
Operating system software used by the microprocessor 638 is preferably stored in a persistent store such as Flash memory 624. In addition to the operating system and communication modules 624A-N, the Flash memory 624 may also include a file system for storing data. A storage area is also preferably provided in the Flash memory 624 to store public keys, a private key, and other information required for secure messaging. The operating system, specific device applications or modules, or parts thereof, may be temporarily loaded into a volatile store, such as RAM 626 for faster operation. Moreover, n~ceived communication signals may also be temporarily stored to RAM 626 before permanently writing them to a file system located in the persistent store 624.
An exemplary application module 624N that may be loaded onto the dual-mode device 100 is a personal information manager (PIM) application providing PDA
functionality, such as calendar events, appointments, and task items. This module 624N
may also interact with the voice communication module 624A for managing phone caNs, voice mails, etc., and may also interact with the data communication module 6248 for managing e-mail communications and other data transmissions. Alternatively, all of the functionality of the voice communication module 624A and the data communication module 6248 may be integrated into the PIM module.
The Flash memory 624 preferably provides a file system to fadlitate storage of PIM data items on the device. The PIM application preferably indudes the ability to send and receive data items, either by itself, or in conjunction with the voice and data communication modules 624A, 624B, via the wireless netvrork 619. The P(M data items are preferably seamlessly integrated, synchronized and updated, via the wireless network 619, with a corresponding set of data items stored or associated with a host computer system, thereby creating a mirrored system for data items associated with a particular user.
The mobile device 600 may also be manuaAy synchronized with a host system by placing the mobile device 600 in an interface cradle, which couples the serial port 630 of the mobile device 600 to the serial port of the host system. The serial port 630 may also be used to enable a user to set preferences through an external device or software application, to download other application modules 624N for installation, and to load Certs, keys and other information onto a device as descn'bed above. This wired download path may be used to load an encryption key onto the device, which is a more secure method than exchanging encryption information via the wireless network 619.
Additional application modules 624N may be loaded onto the mobile device 600 through the network 619, through an auxiliary UO subsystem 628, through the serial port 630, through the short-range communications subsystem 640, or through any other suitable subsystem 642; and installed by a user in the Flash memory 624 or RAM
626.
Such flexibility in application installation increases the funcdonalit)r of the mobile device 600 and may provide enhanced on-device functions, communication-related functions, or both.
For example, secure communication applications may enable electronic commerce functions and other such financial transactions to be performed using the mobile device 600.
When the mobile device 600 is operating in a data communication mode, a received signal, such as a text message or a web page download, will be processed by the transceiver 611 and provided to the microprocessor 638, which will preferably further process the received signal for output to the display 622, or, alternatively, to an auxif~ary IIO
device 628. A received secure message would be processed as described above. A
user of mobile device.600 may also compose data items, such as email messages, using the keyboard 632, which is preferably a complete alphanumeric keyboard laid out in the QWERTY style, although other styles of complete alphanumeric keyboards such as the known DVORAK style may also be used. User input to the mobile device 600 is further enhanced with a plurality .of auxiliary I/O devices 628, which may include a thumbwheel input device, a touchpad, a variety of switches, a rocker input switch, etc.
The composed data items input by the user may then be transmitted over the communication network 619 via the transceiver 611. Secure messages received by and to be transmitted from the mobile device 600 are processed by the data communication module 624B or an associated secure messaging software application according to the techniques described above.
When the mobile device 600 is operating in a voice communication mode, the overall operation of the mobile device 600 is substantially similar to the data mode, except that received signals are preferably output to the speaker 634 and voice signals for transmission are generated by a microphone 636. Alternative voice or audio I/O
subsystems, such as a voice message recording subsystem, may also be implemented on the mobile device 600. Although voice or audio signal output is preferably accomplished primarily through the speaker 634, the display 622 may also be used to provide an indication of the identif)r of a calling party, the duration of a voice call, or other voice call related information. i=or example, the microprocessor 638, in conjunction with the voice communication module 624A and the operating system software, may detect the caller identification information of an incoming voice call and display it on the display 622.
A short-range communications subsystem 640 may also be included in the dual-mode device 600. For example, the subsystem 640 may include an infrared device and associated circuits and components, or a Bluetooth~'" short-range wireless communication module to provide for communication with similarly-enabled systems and devices.
The above description relates to one example of the present inven~on. Many variations will be apparent to those knowledgeable in the field, and such variations are within the scope of the application.
For example, although a wireless mobile communication device is shown in Fig. 6 and described as one possible messaging client, the invention may also be implemented in other messaging clients, including desktop and laptop computer systems, networked computer systems and other types of messaging clients.

Claims (28)

CLAIMS:
1. A method of indicating signature status and trust status of a secure message on a messaging client, the method comprising the steps of:

selecting for processing the secure message stored on the messaging client, the secure message including a digital signature generated by a sender of the secure message, the digital signature having a digest and a digest signature;
checking the digital signature;

checking trust status of the sender;

displaying a first indicator of a result of the step of checking the digital signature; and displaying a second indicator of a result of the step of checking trust status of the sender;

wherein the step of checking the digital signature includes:

generating another digest of a message body of the secure message;

extracting said another digest from the digital signature;

verifying the digest signature in the digital signature to determine if the digest signature is valid or invalid; and if the digest signature is valid, then comparing the generated and extracted digests.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein:

the secure message includes a message body; and the method further comprises the step of processing the message body.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein:

the step of checking the digital signature comprises determining whether the digital signature is valid or invalid, wherein the digital signature is valid when the generated and extracted digests match.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein if the digest signature is not valid then displaying a result indicating the digital signature is not valid.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of checking trust status comprises determining whether the sender is trusted or untrusted.
6. The method of claim 2, wherein the step of processing the message body is performed only if the digital signature is valid and the sender is trusted.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the step of processing the message body comprises displaying the message body on a display screen on the messaging client.
8. A method of indicating signature status and trust status of a secure message on a messaging client, the method comprising the steps of:

selecting for processing the secure message stored on the messaging client, the secure message including a digital signature generated by a sender of the secure message, the digital signature having a digest and a digest signature;

checking the digital signature;
checking trust status of the sender;

displaying a first indicator of a result of the step of checking the digital signature; and displaying a second indicator of a result of the step of checking trust status of the sender;

wherein the step of checking trust status includes the steps of:
searching for a root certificate; and if the root certificate is not found, then performing a certificate revocation list (CRL) check for use in determining the trust status of the sender.
9. The method of claim 8, wherein if the root certificate is not found then displaying a result indicating that the sender is not trusted.
10. The method of claim 8, wherein if the CRL check indicates that the certificate has been revoked then displaying a result indicating that the sender is not trusted.
11. The method of claim 8, wherein if the CRL check indicates that the certificate has not been revoked, then upon determining whether a signature of the certificate is valid displaying a result indicating that the sender is trusted.
12. The method of claim 8, wherein the first indicator includes a valid signature indication and an invalid signature indication.
13. The method of claim 8, wherein the second indicator includes a trusted indication and an untrusted indication.
14. The method of claim 8, wherein a plurality of untrusted indications includes an invalid certificate indication, a revoked certificate indication, a missing certificate indication, and an expired certificate indication.
15. A method of indicating signature status and trust status of a secure message on a messaging client, the method comprising the steps of:

selecting for processing the secure message stored on the messaging client, the secure message including a digital signature generated by a sender of the secure message;

checking the digital signature, and displaying a first indicator of a result of the step of checking the digital signature; and if the digital signature is determined to be valid, then performing a checking of trust status of the sender, and displaying a second indicator of a result of the step of checking trust status of the sender.
16. The method of claim 15, wherein if the digital signature is determined not to be valid, then displaying a second indicator indicating that the step of checking trust status was not performed.
17. The method claim 16, wherein after displaying a second indicator indicating that the step of checking trust status was not performed, prompting a user to enter a command to initiate a trust status check.
18. A method of indicating signature status and trust status of a secure message on a messaging client, the method comprising the steps of:

selecting for processing the secure message stored on the messaging client, the secure message including a digital signature generated by a sender of the secure message;

checking the trust status of the sender;

if the trust status of the sender is determined to be trusted, checking the digital signature;

displaying a first indicator of a result of the step of checking the trust status;
and if the trust status of the sender is determined to be valid, displaying a second indicator of a result of the step of checking the digital signature.
19. The method of claim 18, wherein if the trust status of the sender is determined not to be trusted, then displaying a second indicator indicating that the step of checking the digital signature check was not performed.
20. The method claim 19, wherein after displaying a second indicator indicating that the digital signature check was not performed, prompting a user to enter a command to initiate a digital signature check.
21. A method of indicating signature status and trust status of a secure message on a messaging client, the method comprising the steps of:

selecting for processing the secure message stored on the messaging client, the secure message including a digital signature generated by a sender of the secure message;

checking the trust status of the sender;
checking the digital signature;

if the trust status of the sender is determined not to be trusted, then aborting the checking of the digital signature if it is not complete;

if the digital signature is determined to not be valid, then aborting the checking of the trust status of the sender if it is not complete;

displaying a first indicator of a result of the step of checking the trust status;
and displaying a second indicator of a result of the step of checking the digital signature.
22. The method of claim 21, wherein if the trust status of the sender is determined not to be trusted, then displaying a second indicator indicating that the digital signature check was aborted.
23. The method of claim 21, wherein if the digital signature of the sender is determined not to be valid, then displaying a second indicator indicating that the trust status check was aborted.
24. The method claim 21, wherein after displaying a second indicator indicating that the digital signature check was aborted, prompting a user to enter a command to initiate another digital signature check.
25. The method claim 21, wherein after displaying a second indicator indicating that the trust status check was aborted, prompting a user to enter a command to initiate another trust status check.
26. The method according to any one of the claims 15, 16, or 17, wherein:
the secure message includes a message body; and the method further comprises the step of processing the message body.
27. The method of claim 26, wherein the step of processing the message body is performed only if the digital signature is valid and the sender is trusted.
28. The method of claim 27, wherein the step of processing the message body comprises displaying the message body on a display screen on the messaging client.
CA002555659A 2002-03-01 2002-03-01 System and method for providing secure message signature status and trust status indication Expired - Lifetime CA2555659C (en)

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