CA2344429A1 - Device for supplying output data in reaction to input data, method for checking authenticity and method for encrypted data transmission - Google Patents

Device for supplying output data in reaction to input data, method for checking authenticity and method for encrypted data transmission Download PDF

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Publication number
CA2344429A1
CA2344429A1 CA002344429A CA2344429A CA2344429A1 CA 2344429 A1 CA2344429 A1 CA 2344429A1 CA 002344429 A CA002344429 A CA 002344429A CA 2344429 A CA2344429 A CA 2344429A CA 2344429 A1 CA2344429 A1 CA 2344429A1
Authority
CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
data
output data
reaction
electronic circuit
input data
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
CA002344429A
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
CA2344429C (en
Inventor
Florian Oelmaier
Roland Brand
Andre Heuer
Heinz Gerhauser
Markus Prosch
Olaf Korte
Roland Plankenbuhler
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Angewandten Forschung eV
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of CA2344429A1 publication Critical patent/CA2344429A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CA2344429C publication Critical patent/CA2344429C/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0806—Details of the card
    • G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
    • G07F7/082—Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/57—Protection from inspection, reverse engineering or tampering
    • H01L23/576—Protection from inspection, reverse engineering or tampering using active circuits
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L2924/00—Indexing scheme for arrangements or methods for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies as covered by H01L24/00
    • H01L2924/0001—Technical content checked by a classifier
    • H01L2924/0002—Not covered by any one of groups H01L24/00, H01L24/00 and H01L2224/00
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L2924/00—Indexing scheme for arrangements or methods for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies as covered by H01L24/00
    • H01L2924/10—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices to be connected
    • H01L2924/11—Device type
    • H01L2924/12—Passive devices, e.g. 2 terminal devices
    • H01L2924/1204—Optical Diode
    • H01L2924/12044—OLED
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/12—Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/26—Testing cryptographic entity, e.g. testing integrity of encryption key or encryption algorithm

Abstract

In order to determine authenticity of the device on the basis of output data , the device (10) for supplying output data (12) in reaction to input data (14 ) comprises an electronic circuit (16) for executing an algorithm that generat es output data (12) on the basis of input data (14) and a device (18) for detecting operational data that is influenced by an operation of the electronic circuit (16). The device (18) for detecting operational data is coupled to the electronic circuit (16) in such a way that operational data o f the electronic circuit (16) is used by the algorithm in order to generate output data (12). Safety of the device disclosed in the invention is enhance d in that a potential counterfeiter will have to simulate both the functionali ty of the device and hardware features of said device such as power consumption or time response in order to simulate an authentic card.
CA002344429A 1998-09-22 1999-08-27 Device for supplying output data in reaction to input data, method for checking authenticity and method for encrypted data transmission Expired - Lifetime CA2344429C (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19843424.3 1998-09-22
DE19843424A DE19843424A1 (en) 1998-09-22 1998-09-22 Smart card device for delivering output data in response to input data and providing proof of authenticity uses operating data to influence algorithm used to generate output data
PCT/EP1999/006312 WO2000017826A1 (en) 1998-09-22 1999-08-27 Device for supplying output data in reaction to input data, method for checking authenticity and method for encrypted data transmission

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CA2344429A1 true CA2344429A1 (en) 2000-03-30
CA2344429C CA2344429C (en) 2003-12-23

Family

ID=7881831

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CA002344429A Expired - Lifetime CA2344429C (en) 1998-09-22 1999-08-27 Device for supplying output data in reaction to input data, method for checking authenticity and method for encrypted data transmission

Country Status (8)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1099197B1 (en)
AT (1) ATE225548T1 (en)
CA (1) CA2344429C (en)
DE (2) DE19843424A1 (en)
DK (1) DK1099197T3 (en)
ES (1) ES2184500T3 (en)
PT (1) PT1099197E (en)
WO (1) WO2000017826A1 (en)

Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2004105125A2 (en) * 2003-05-26 2004-12-02 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Semiconductor device, method of authentifying and system
US7681103B2 (en) 2002-04-16 2010-03-16 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Reliable generation of a device-specific value
US7702927B2 (en) 2004-11-12 2010-04-20 Verayo, Inc. Securely field configurable device
US8468186B2 (en) 2009-08-05 2013-06-18 Verayo, Inc. Combination of values from a pseudo-random source
US8630410B2 (en) 2006-01-24 2014-01-14 Verayo, Inc. Signal generator based device security
US8683210B2 (en) 2008-11-21 2014-03-25 Verayo, Inc. Non-networked RFID-PUF authentication
US8782396B2 (en) 2007-09-19 2014-07-15 Verayo, Inc. Authentication with physical unclonable functions
US8811615B2 (en) 2009-08-05 2014-08-19 Verayo, Inc. Index-based coding with a pseudo-random source

Families Citing this family (18)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2002008875A2 (en) * 2000-07-25 2002-01-31 Authentisure, Inc. Unified trust model providing secure identification, authentication and validation of physical products and entities, and processing, storage, and exchange of information
DE10041669A1 (en) * 2000-08-10 2002-02-21 Deutsche Telekom Ag Authentication method for chip card, involves determining authenticity of chip card by comparing time dependent output signals of chip card with predetermined time dependent reference signals
FR2823401A1 (en) * 2001-04-04 2002-10-11 St Microelectronics Sa Extraction of a private datum to authenticate an integrated circuit, uses network parameters and noise to generate datum which has a transient life span, for transmission by circuit to allow its authentication
FR2823397A1 (en) * 2001-04-04 2002-10-11 St Microelectronics Sa Extraction of a private datum to authenticate an integrated circuit, uses network parameters and noise to generate datum which has a transient life span, for transmission by circuit to allow its authentication
FR2823398B1 (en) 2001-04-04 2003-08-15 St Microelectronics Sa EXTRACTION OF PRIVATE DATA FOR AUTHENTICATION OF AN INTEGRATED CIRCUIT
FR2825873A1 (en) 2001-06-11 2002-12-13 St Microelectronics Sa PROTECTED STORAGE OF DATA IN AN INTEGRATED CIRCUIT
DE10145365B4 (en) * 2001-09-14 2004-04-15 Infineon Technologies Ag Integrated circuit arrangement
EP1359550A1 (en) * 2001-11-30 2003-11-05 STMicroelectronics S.A. Regeneration of a secret number by using an identifier of an integrated circuit
EP1391853A1 (en) * 2001-11-30 2004-02-25 STMicroelectronics S.A. Diversification of the unique identifier of an integrated circuit
FR2833119A1 (en) * 2001-11-30 2003-06-06 St Microelectronics Sa GENERATION OF SECRET QUANTITIES OF IDENTIFICATION OF AN INTEGRATED CIRCUIT
FR2834177B1 (en) * 2001-12-20 2004-07-09 Television Par Satellite Tps DEVICE FOR DECODING INTERFERED DIGITAL DATA AND METHOD FOR LOCKING THE DESGROWING
DE102004037801B4 (en) * 2004-08-03 2007-07-26 Siemens Ag Method for secure data transmission
DE102006038877B4 (en) * 2006-08-18 2018-01-25 Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security Gmbh Tamper-proof unit, procedure for a tamper-proof unit and storage medium
FR2910657B1 (en) 2006-12-22 2012-11-16 Ingenico Sa METHOD OF VERIFYING THE CONFORMITY OF AN ELECTRONIC PLATFORM AND / OR A COMPUTER PROGRAM PRESENT ON THIS PLATFORM, DEVICE AND CORRESPONDING COMPUTER PROGRAM.
DE102009005255A1 (en) * 2009-01-14 2010-07-15 Khs Ag Method for verifying a tag circuit
WO2015089346A1 (en) 2013-12-13 2015-06-18 Battelle Memorial Institute Electronic component classification
US10789550B2 (en) 2017-04-13 2020-09-29 Battelle Memorial Institute System and method for generating test vectors
IL256108B (en) 2017-12-04 2021-02-28 Elbit Systems Ltd System and method for detecting usage condition and authentication of an article of manufacture

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE3736882C2 (en) * 1987-10-30 1997-04-30 Gao Ges Automation Org Method for checking the authenticity of a data carrier with an integrated circuit
DE4339460C1 (en) * 1993-11-19 1995-04-06 Siemens Ag Method for authenticating a system part by another system part of an information transmission system according to the challenge and response principle

Cited By (16)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7904731B2 (en) 2002-04-16 2011-03-08 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Integrated circuit that uses a dynamic characteristic of the circuit
US7757083B2 (en) 2002-04-16 2010-07-13 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Integrated circuit that uses a dynamic characteristic of the circuit
US7681103B2 (en) 2002-04-16 2010-03-16 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Reliable generation of a device-specific value
US8386801B2 (en) 2002-04-16 2013-02-26 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Authentication of integrated circuits
US7818569B2 (en) 2002-04-16 2010-10-19 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Data protection and cryptographic functions using a device-specific value
US7840803B2 (en) 2002-04-16 2010-11-23 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Authentication of integrated circuits
WO2004105125A2 (en) * 2003-05-26 2004-12-02 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Semiconductor device, method of authentifying and system
WO2004105125A3 (en) * 2003-05-26 2005-01-06 Koninkl Philips Electronics Nv Semiconductor device, method of authentifying and system
US7839278B2 (en) 2004-11-12 2010-11-23 Verayo, Inc. Volatile device keys and applications thereof
US7702927B2 (en) 2004-11-12 2010-04-20 Verayo, Inc. Securely field configurable device
US8756438B2 (en) 2004-11-12 2014-06-17 Verayo, Inc. Securely field configurable device
US8630410B2 (en) 2006-01-24 2014-01-14 Verayo, Inc. Signal generator based device security
US8782396B2 (en) 2007-09-19 2014-07-15 Verayo, Inc. Authentication with physical unclonable functions
US8683210B2 (en) 2008-11-21 2014-03-25 Verayo, Inc. Non-networked RFID-PUF authentication
US8468186B2 (en) 2009-08-05 2013-06-18 Verayo, Inc. Combination of values from a pseudo-random source
US8811615B2 (en) 2009-08-05 2014-08-19 Verayo, Inc. Index-based coding with a pseudo-random source

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
ATE225548T1 (en) 2002-10-15
ES2184500T3 (en) 2003-04-01
DK1099197T3 (en) 2003-02-10
CA2344429C (en) 2003-12-23
WO2000017826A1 (en) 2000-03-30
EP1099197B1 (en) 2002-10-02
DE59902963D1 (en) 2002-11-07
PT1099197E (en) 2003-02-28
EP1099197A1 (en) 2001-05-16
DE19843424A1 (en) 2000-03-23

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Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
EEER Examination request
MKEX Expiry

Effective date: 20190827

MKEX Expiry

Effective date: 20190827