WO2023116268A1 - 网络隔离方法和系统及代理设备 - Google Patents
网络隔离方法和系统及代理设备 Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/40—Network security protocols
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- the present disclosure relates to the field of network and information security, in particular to a network isolation method, a network isolation system and proxy equipment.
- Layer 2 network isolation generally uses technologies such as VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network, virtual local area network) or VXLAN (Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network, virtual extended local area network), GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation) general routing encapsulation. Due to the limited number of supported VLANs, VXLAN or GRE technologies are used in scenarios such as private clouds or public clouds. VXLAN or GRE technology is a layer outside the transport layer, which involves unpacking and unpacking, which affects network efficiency.
- VLAN Virtual Local Area Network, virtual local area network
- VXLAN Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network, virtual extended local area network
- GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
- Some embodiments of the present disclosure propose a network isolation method, including: the proxy device receives the first data packet sent by the switch; the proxy device determines the network slice corresponding to the first data packet according to the flow space, and the flow space defines the network slice corresponding to the data flow Network slicing to build an isolated logical network; the proxy device rewrites the matching field content of the field that can identify different network slices in the first data packet; the proxy device sends the rewritten first data packet to the first data packet The slice controller corresponding to the network slice corresponding to the packet.
- the network isolation method further includes: the proxy device receives the second data packet sent by the slice controller; the proxy device rewrites the second data packet according to the corresponding network slice of the slice controller, so that after rewriting The second data packet has a field capable of identifying different network slices; the proxy device sends the rewritten second data packet to a corresponding switch.
- the proxy device rewriting the content of the matching field of the field capable of identifying different network slices in the first data packet includes: the proxy device rewriting the content of the matching field of the field capable of identifying different network slices in the first data packet The content is rewritten to the information of the proxy device.
- the proxy device rewrites the content of the matching field of the field capable of identifying different network slices in the first data packet into the information of the proxy device, including: the proxy device writes the source IP address, the source port in the first data packet No., the matching domain content of at least one field in the source MAC address, at least one in the IP address, the port number, the MAC address of the switch, is rewritten as at least one of the IP address, the port number, and the MAC address of the proxy device.
- the proxy device before the proxy device sends the rewritten first data packet to the slice controller corresponding to the network slice corresponding to the first data packet, the destination IP address, destination port number, The matching domain content of at least one field in the destination MAC address is rewritten by at least one of the IP address, port number, and MAC address of the proxy device as the IP address of the slice controller corresponding to the network slice corresponding to the first data packet, At least one of port number and MAC address.
- the proxy device rewrites the second data packet according to the corresponding network slice of the slice controller, so that the rewritten second data packet has a field capable of identifying different network slices, including: the proxy device rewrites the second The content of the matching field of at least one field in the destination IP address, the destination port number and the destination MAC address in the data packet is rewritten as the IP address, the port number and the MAC address of the proxy device as the IP address, At least one of port number and MAC address.
- the matching of at least one field in the source IP address, source port number, and source MAC address in the second data packet Domain content is rewritten from at least one of the slice controller's IP address, port number, and MAC address to at least one of the proxy device's IP address, port number, and MAC address.
- the first data packet sent by the switch is a data packet for requesting a flow table
- the second data packet sent by the slice controller is a data packet for delivering a flow table
- the network isolation method further includes: the proxy device receives the symmetric message sent by the switch, if the target proxy device corresponding to the switch is the current proxy device, checks whether there is a corresponding network slice, and if so, converts the symmetric message of the switch to Sent to the corresponding slice controller of the network slice.
- the network isolation method further includes: if the target proxy device corresponding to the switch is not the current proxy device, flooding the symmetric message of the switch to all proxy devices, and the target proxy device corresponding to the switch checks whether there is a corresponding network The slice, if present, sends the switch's symmetric message to the slice controller corresponding to the network slice.
- the network isolation method further includes: the proxy device receives the symmetric message sent by the slice controller, and sends the symmetric message of the slice controller to a switch corresponding to the network slice according to the network slice corresponding to the slice controller.
- the network isolation method further includes: when the logical network where the switch is located is changed, the proxy device synchronously updates the data stored in the proxy device on the network slice to which the switch belongs according to the network slice corresponding to the latest slice controller after the change .
- the network isolation method further includes: the proxy device receives the third data packet sent by the switch, and sends the third data packet to the destination corresponding to the corresponding network slice according to the flow table, so as to reduce the need for the slice controller to real-time Processed control flow.
- Some embodiments of the present disclosure propose a proxy device, including: a memory; and a processor coupled to the memory, where the processor is configured to perform the network isolation of various embodiments based on instructions stored in the memory method.
- Some embodiments of the present disclosure provide a network isolation system, including a switch, a slice controller, and a proxy device, wherein the switch is connected to the proxy device in communication, and the proxy device is connected to the slice controller in communication.
- Some embodiments of the present disclosure provide a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, the steps of the network isolation method of each embodiment are implemented.
- Fig. 1 shows a schematic flowchart of a network isolation method in some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- Fig. 2 shows a schematic flowchart of a network isolation method in some other embodiments of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 3 shows a schematic diagram of a network isolation system of some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- Fig. 4 shows a schematic diagram of a proxy device of some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- the proxy device plays the role of the slice controller for the switch, and takes the role of the switch for the slice controller.
- Each proxy device defines its own flow space.
- the switch is, for example, an OpenFlow switch.
- the proxy device is, for example, an OpenFlow proxy device.
- the slice controller is, for example, an SDN (Software-defined Networking, software-defined network) controller, which may be referred to as a controller for short.
- the flow table delivered by the slice controller is, for example, an OpenFlow flow table. OpenFlow is a network communication protocol.
- the embodiment of the present disclosure is based on the agent, realizes the update and improvement of network isolation, omits the related operation of the virtual network bridge on the VLAN, and avoids the performance loss of VXLAN or GRE conversion.
- decoupling the network isolation from the controller reduces the complexity of the controller's network management (such as flow table operation and troubleshooting), and simplifies the slice controller's management of real-time control flow.
- Fig. 1 shows a schematic flowchart of a network isolation method in some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- the network isolation method of this embodiment includes the following steps.
- Step 110 the proxy device receives the first data packet sent by the switch.
- the first data packet sent by the switch is, for example, a data packet requesting a flow table.
- the proxy device takes the role of the controller for the switch, and when the switch finds no match, it sends a data packet requesting the flow table to the proxy device.
- Step 120 the proxy device searches for a match in its own flow space to determine whether the network slice corresponding to the first data packet can be determined according to its own flow space. If there is no match, the proxy device may drop the first packet. If it matches, that is, the proxy device determines the network slice corresponding to the first data packet according to the flow space, and rewrites the content of the matching field of the field capable of identifying different network slices in the first data packet.
- the flow space defines the network slice corresponding to the data flow, and different data flows correspond to different network slices to build an isolated logical network.
- the flow space can be constructed according to the network topology before interconnection, and the proxy device uses the flow space to slice the traffic.
- the proxy device synchronously updates the data stored in the proxy device on the network slice to which the switch belongs according to the network slice corresponding to the latest slice controller after the change.
- the proxy device can first convert the first data packet into an ofmatch data structure, and then match the entries in its own flow space. If there is no matching item, it can notify the controller to discard the first data packet. If there is a matching item, then Get the action list and execute the corresponding command.
- the proxy device rewriting the content of the matching field of the field capable of identifying different network slices in the first data packet includes: the proxy device rewriting the content of the matching field of the field capable of identifying different network slices in the first data packet The content is rewritten to the information of the proxy device.
- the proxy device rewrites the content of the matching field of the field that can identify different network slices in the first data packet into the information of the proxy device, including: the proxy device converts the source IP (Internet Protocol, Internet interconnection protocol) address, source port number, source MAC (Media Access Control, media access control) address in the matching domain content of at least one field, by at least one in the IP address, port number, MAC address of switch, repeat It is written as at least one of the IP address, port number, and MAC address of the proxy device.
- IP Internet Protocol, Internet interconnection protocol
- source MAC Media Access Control, media access control
- the proxy device before the proxy device sends the rewritten first data packet to the slice controller corresponding to the network slice corresponding to the first data packet, the destination IP address and destination port number in the first data packet , the content of the matching field of at least one field in the destination MAC address is rewritten by at least one of the IP address, port number, and MAC address of the proxy device to the IP address of the slice controller corresponding to the network slice corresponding to the first data packet At least one of , port number, and MAC address.
- Step 130 the proxy device sends the rewritten first data packet to the slice controller corresponding to the network slice corresponding to the first data packet.
- the slice controller only obtains the switch information in the network slice it is responsible for, reducing the complexity of the network management work of the slice controller and simplifying
- the slice controller manages the real-time control flow.
- Step 140 after the slice controller receives the flow table request, it sends the corresponding flow table according to the global topology of the flow space, the data packet of the flow table is called the second data packet, and the proxy device receives the second data pack.
- Step 150 The proxy device rewrites the second data packet after matching its own flow space according to the network slice corresponding to the slice controller, so that the rewritten second data packet has a field capable of identifying different network slices.
- the proxy device rewriting the second data packet so that the rewritten second data packet has fields capable of identifying different network slices includes: the proxy device, according to the corresponding network slice of the slice controller, through its own After the flow space is matched, at least one of the IP address, the port number, and the MAC address of the proxy device is used to match the content of the matching domain of at least one field in the destination IP address, the destination port number, and the destination MAC address in the second data packet, Rewrite as at least one of the IP address, port number, and MAC address of the switch.
- the source IP address, source port number, and source MAC address in at least one field in the second data packet
- the content of the matching field is rewritten from at least one of the slice controller's IP address, port number, and MAC address to at least one of the proxy device's IP address, port number, and MAC address.
- step 160 the proxy device sends the rewritten second data packet to a corresponding switch after matching through its own flow space, so that the switch obtains a flow table.
- the switch can obtain the flow table of its corresponding flow space.
- the proxy device intercepts the data packets between the switch and the controller, and completes network isolation through message rewriting.
- Each controller only manages the global policy flow table of its own slice space, without frequent modification, improving management efficiency.
- the embodiment shown in Figure 1 can be executed to obtain the flow table; otherwise, the embodiment shown in Figure 2 can be executed first, so that the switch and the slice controller Each obtains the information of the node devices in its own flow space, and then executes the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 to obtain the flow table.
- Fig. 2 shows a schematic flowchart of a network isolation method in some other embodiments of the present disclosure.
- the network isolation method of this embodiment includes the following steps.
- Step 210 the proxy device receives the symmetric message sent by the switch.
- the symmetric message is, for example, a link discovery message, such as an LLDP (Link Layer Discovery Protocol, Link Layer Discovery Protocol) message.
- LLDP Link Layer Discovery Protocol, Link Layer Discovery Protocol
- Link discovery sends messages to other nodes through nodes in the network, so that other nodes know the existence of their own nodes.
- a node can send its own processing capability, management address, device identifier, interface identifier, etc. to other directly connected nodes in encapsulated form.
- Step 220 if the target proxy device corresponding to the switch is the current proxy device, the current proxy device checks whether there is a corresponding network slice according to its own flow space, and if so, sends the symmetric message of the switch to the slice controller corresponding to the network slice, so that The slice controller is notified of the existence of the switch.
- Step 230 if the target proxy device corresponding to the switch is not the current proxy device, the current proxy device floods the symmetric message of the switch to all proxy devices, and the target proxy device corresponding to the switch searches whether there is a corresponding network slice according to its own flow space, If it exists, send the symmetric message of the switch to the slice controller corresponding to the network slice, so that the slice controller knows the existence of the switch.
- Step 240 the proxy device receives the symmetric message sent by the slice controller.
- the symmetric message is, for example, a link discovery message, such as an LLDP message.
- Step 250 the proxy device sends the symmetric message of the slice controller to the switch corresponding to the flow space of the network slice according to the flow space of the network slice corresponding to the slice controller, so that the switch knows the existence of the slice controller.
- the switch and the slice controller are respectively informed of the information of the node devices in their own flow spaces.
- the proxy device receives the third data packet sent by the switch, If the corresponding flow table entry can be matched, the third data packet is sent to the destination corresponding to the corresponding network slice according to the flow table, so as to reduce the control flow that needs to be processed by the slice controller in real time.
- the traffic in the network is matched with slices according to the flow space to realize coarse-grained network isolation.
- the network traffic is forwarded according to the flow table issued by the slice controller to realize fine-grained network isolation.
- the network isolation technology disclosed in the present disclosure may be applied to network isolation in the process of interconnection and intercommunication of heterogeneous network shooting ranges, for example.
- Cyber Range is a technology or product that simulates and reproduces the network architecture, system equipment, business process operating status and operating environment in real cyberspace based on virtualization technology, so as to more effectively realize the Network security-related learning, research, testing, competitions, exercises and other behaviors, so as to improve the level of network security confrontation of personnel and institutions.
- network isolation is required during the interconnection and intercommunication of heterogeneous shooting ranges or shooting ranges.
- FIG. 3 shows a schematic diagram of a network isolation system of some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- the network isolation system of this embodiment includes: a switch 300 , a proxy device 400 , and a slice controller 500 , wherein the switch communicates with the proxy device, and the proxy device communicates with the slice controller. That is, a proxy device is set between the switch and the slice controller, the proxy device plays the role of the slice controller for the switch, and takes the role of the switch for the slice controller.
- Fig. 4 shows a schematic diagram of a proxy device of some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- the agent device 400 of this embodiment includes: a memory 410 and a processor 420 coupled to the memory 410, the processor 420 is configured to execute any of the foregoing embodiments based on instructions stored in the memory 410
- the processor 420 is configured to execute any of the foregoing embodiments based on instructions stored in the memory 410
- For the network isolation method in refer to the foregoing embodiments for details, and details are not repeated here.
- the memory 410 may include, for example, a system memory, a fixed non-volatile storage medium, and the like.
- the system memory stores, for example, an operating system, an application program, a boot loader (Boot Loader) and other programs.
- the processor 420 can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (Digital Signal Processor, DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (Application Specific Integrated Circuit, ASIC), a field programmable gate array (Field Programmable Gate Array, FPGA) or It can be realized by discrete hardware components such as other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistors.
- DSP Digital Signal Processor
- ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
- FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
- FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
- the agent device 400 may also include an input and output interface 430, a network interface 440, a storage interface 450, and the like. These interfaces 430 , 440 , 450 and the memory 410 and the processor 420 may be connected through a bus 460 , for example.
- the input and output interface 430 provides a connection interface for input and output devices such as a display, a mouse, a keyboard, and a touch screen.
- the network interface 440 provides connection interfaces for various networked devices.
- the storage interface 450 provides connection interfaces for external storage devices such as SD cards and U disks.
- Bus 460 may use any of a variety of bus structures.
- the bus structure includes but is not limited to an Industry Standard Architecture (Industry Standard Architecture, ISA) bus, a Micro Channel Architecture (Micro Channel Architecture, MCA) bus, and a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus.
- Industry Standard Architecture Industry Standard Architecture
- MCA Micro Channel Architecture
- PCI Peripheral Component Inter
- the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, the steps of the network isolation method of each embodiment are implemented.
- the embodiments of the present disclosure may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Accordingly, the present disclosure can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present disclosure may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) having computer program code embodied therein. .
- These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to operate in a specific manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising instruction means, the instructions
- the device realizes the function specified in one or more procedures of the flowchart and/or one or more blocks of the block diagram.
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Claims (17)
- 一种网络隔离方法,包括:代理设备接收交换机发送的第一数据包;代理设备根据流空间确定第一数据包对应的网络切片,所述流空间定义了数据流对应的网络切片,以构建隔离的逻辑网络;代理设备对第一数据包中的能够识别不同网络切片的字段的匹配域内容进行重写;代理设备将重写后的第一数据包发送给第一数据包对应的网络切片对应的切片控制器。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,还包括:代理设备接收切片控制器发送的第二数据包;代理设备根据切片控制器相应的网络切片,对第二数据包进行重写,使得重写后的第二数据包具有能够识别不同网络切片的字段;代理设备将重写后的第二数据包发送给相应的交换机。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,代理设备对第一数据包中的能够识别不同网络切片的字段的匹配域内容进行重写包括:代理设备将第一数据包中的能够识别不同网络切片的字段的匹配域内容重写为代理设备的信息。
- 根据权利要求3所述的方法,其中,代理设备将第一数据包中的能够识别不同网络切片的字段的匹配域内容重写为代理设备的信息包括:代理设备将第一数据包中的源IP地址、源端口号、源MAC地址中的至少一个字段的匹配域内容,由交换机的IP地址、端口号、MAC地址中的至少一个,重写为代理设备的IP地址、端口号、MAC地址中的至少一个。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,代理设备在将重写后的第一数据包发送给第一数据包对应的网络切片对应的切 片控制器之前,将第一数据包中的目的IP地址、目的端口号、目的MAC地址中的至少一个字段的匹配域内容,由代理设备的IP地址、端口号、MAC地址中的至少一个,重写为第一数据包对应的网络切片对应的切片控制器的IP地址、端口号、MAC地址中的至少一个。
- 根据权利要求2所述的方法,其中,代理设备根据切片控制器相应的网络切片,对第二数据包进行重写,使得重写后的第二数据包具有能够识别不同网络切片的字段包括:代理设备将第二数据包中的目的IP地址、目的端口号、目的MAC地址中的至少一个字段的匹配域内容,由代理设备的IP地址、端口号、MAC地址中的至少一个,重写为交换机的IP地址、端口号、MAC地址中的至少一个。
- 根据权利要求2所述的方法,其中,代理设备在将重写后的第二数据包发送给相应的交换机之前,将第二数据包中的源IP地址、源端口号、源MAC地址中的至少一个字段的匹配域内容,由切片控制器的IP地址、端口号、MAC地址中的至少一个,重写为代理设备的IP地址、端口号、MAC地址中的至少一个。
- 根据权利要求2所述的方法,其中,交换机发送的第一数据包为请求流表的数据包,切片控制器发送的第二数据包为下发流表的数据包。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,还包括:代理设备接收交换机发送的对称消息,如果交换机对应的目标代理设备是当前代理设备,查找是否存在相应的网络切片,如果存在,将交换机的对称消息发送到网络切片相应的切片控制器。
- 根据权利要求9所述的方法,还包括:如果交换机对应的目标代理设备不是当前代理设备,将交换机的对称消息泛洪给所有代理设备,由交换机对应的目标代理设备查找是否存在相应的网络切片,如果存 在,将交换机的对称消息发送到网络切片相应的切片控制器。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,还包括:代理设备接收切片控制器发送的对称消息,根据切片控制器相应的网络切片,将切片控制器的对称消息发送到网络切片相应的交换机。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,还包括:当交换机所在逻辑网络变更时,代理设备根据变更后的最新切片控制器相应的网络切片,同步更新代理设备中存储的交换机所属的网络切片的数据。
- 根据权利要求8所述的方法,还包括:代理设备接收交换机发送的第三数据包,根据流表将第三数据包发送给对应的网络切片对应的目的地,以减少需要切片控制器实时处理的控制流。
- 一种代理设备,包括:存储器;以及耦接至所述存储器的处理器,所述处理器被配置为基于存储在所述存储器中的指令,执行权利要求1-13中任一项所述的网络隔离方法。
- 一种网络隔离系统,包括交换机,切片控制器,以及如权利要求14所述的代理设备,其中,交换机与代理设备通信连接,代理设备与切片控制器通信连接。
- 一种非瞬时性计算机可读存储介质,其上存储有计算机程序,该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求1-13中任一项所述的网络隔离方法的步骤。
- 一种计算机程序,包括:指令,所述指令由处理器执行时使所述处理器执行根据权利要求1-13中任一项所述的网络隔离方法。
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| CN114338119B (zh) * | 2021-12-23 | 2024-08-20 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | 网络隔离方法和系统及代理设备 |
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| CN103905523A (zh) * | 2013-12-23 | 2014-07-02 | 浪潮(北京)电子信息产业有限公司 | 一种基于sdn的云计算网络虚拟化实现方法及系统 |
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| CN112532445B (zh) * | 2020-11-26 | 2022-12-30 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司信息通信分公司 | 一种用于无虚拟化能力的网络设备的网络切片方法及其系统、存储介质 |
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| CN107395532A (zh) * | 2017-07-11 | 2017-11-24 | 北京航空航天大学 | 一种基于sdn的多租户虚拟网络隔离方法 |
| US20190223023A1 (en) * | 2018-01-17 | 2019-07-18 | Netsia, Inc. | System and method for an integrated virtual customer premises equipment |
| CN112187610A (zh) * | 2020-09-24 | 2021-01-05 | 北京赛宁网安科技有限公司 | 一种网络靶场的网络隔离系统与方法 |
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| CN118785289A (zh) * | 2024-06-19 | 2024-10-15 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | 一种基于动态垂直切片的网络切换方法、设备及存储介质 |
| CN119728393A (zh) * | 2024-12-24 | 2025-03-28 | 博智安全科技股份有限公司 | 一种网络靶场任务的评估方法、装置、设备及存储介质 |
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