WO2023006243A1

WO2023006243A1 - Update agent with provisioning connectivity and secure element comprising the same

Info

Publication number: WO2023006243A1
Application number: PCT/EP2022/025346
Authority: WO
Inventors: David Patino; Clara Gifre; Federico RUAU
Original assignee: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security Germany GmbH
Current assignee: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security Germany GmbH
Priority date: 2021-07-28
Filing date: 2022-07-26
Publication date: 2023-02-02
Anticipated expiration: 2024-01-28
Also published as: US12572661B2; CN117716359A; EP4124977A1; US20240346147A1

Abstract

The present invention relates to an update agent, a secure element containing the update agent, and a method for retrieving a software image to be stored onto the secure element. The update agent comprises a communication interface for providing connectivity to a storage module for downloading software images onto the SE. The update agent comprises further a first memory storing authentication data for authenticating software images, and a second memory storing credentials for personalizing software images.

Description

Update agent with provisioning connectivity and secure element comprising the same

The present invention relates to secure elements in general and in particular to a se cure element fitted with an update agent with provisioning connectivity and a method for providing provisioning connectivity to devices the secure element is em bedded on.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Smart cards are widely used in a variety of systems such as mobile phones, payment cards, access cards, to provide identification, authentication, data storage and appli cation processing.

Where the smart card contains security-critical applications and sensitive data, such as in the case of payment cards and the like, a secure element is used to store the data. A secure element is a tamper resistant element, TRE, that provides a secure memory and execution environment in which application code and application data can be securely stored and administered. The secure element ensures that access to the data stored on the card is provided only when authorized.

Such a secure element may exist in any form factor such as UICC, embedded SE, smartSD, smart microSD, etc.

A secure element may include one or more security domains (SDs), each of which in cludes a collection of data, such as operating system, personalization data, packages, applets, applications, and the like, which are authenticated using security keys. Thus, the operating system and applications are stored within the secure element in vola tile and non-volatile memory modules, and are executed in a secured processor of the secure element.

The specification Global Platform Card Technology Open Firmware Loader for Tam per Resistant Element vl.3 (in the following referred by [1]) describes a standardized mechanism for loading firmware (that is, use case dependent data which may con tain the operating system and application data) into a secure element. In particular, an Open Firmware Loader, OFL, is provided inside the secure element, and config ured to receive images of operation system and personalization data, to perform se curity checks - particularly authentication and integrity checks - on the images, and to trigger installation of the image contents into a memory of the secure element, so as to install in the secure element an operating system and personalization data.

For usage as an eSIM card, it is of utmost importance to keep identities safe and pro tected for unauthorized modifications. Some of these identities have specific certifica tion requirements related to the environment where they can be loaded to a card. In particular, credentials comprising keys and certificates must be loaded in a con trolled environment due to certain production-related restrictions, such as the need to have a certified environment to store keys from the GSMA or the adaptations re quired to personalize diversified data in factory.

Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of the conventional production flow for load ing firmware (e.g., an operating system, OS) into a secure element. The upper row shows the entities responsible for the corresponding production phase (I, II, III, IV), while the lower row shows the content of the secure element (i.e., chip). A chip man ufacturer can provide, during a first production phase I, for a secure element to be loaded (usually in the chip factory) with trusted software, such as a secure operating system (OS) 130. The secure OS is personalized with credentials or personalization data, which are keys or certificates, and which are stored in a personalized OS image (in Fig. 1 identified by "maxiinit").

The personalized secure OS image 130 is loaded together with the OFL 110 inside the chip. The chip with its OS can then (phase II) be embedded in a portable card-like de vice or delivered to another device manufacturer to be included (phase III) in a big ger electronic device like a smart phone, a computer, a car, a measurement equip ment, etc., and finally released to the market (phase IV).

In the conventional scenario as depicted in Fig. 1, the already installed OS has con nectivity capabilities that allow it to communicate with a storage module or image delivery server to download an image of a new OS and to perform an update. In this way an OS installed and personalized during the first production phase can be later on updated with a new version.

Recent solutions for enabling secure download of OS images onto a tamper resistant element employ a stand-alone software loader (also referred to as an update agent or Image Trusted Loader, ITL), which is loaded onto the tamper resistant element dur ing factory production, and which allows to perform updates of OS in the field, that is, outside the certified environment. Such an update agent could allow to load an OS onto a secure element at any time after the first production phase, provided that the trusted OS image itself is properly secured and the credentials including the keys and certificates have already been loaded in the certified environment during factory production.

With the stand-alone approach for an update agent/loader, there is thus a need for providing an update agent with provisioning capabilities for being able to efficiently retrieve and load an OS at any time during deployment of the secure element. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention addresses the above object by the subject-matter covered by the independent claims. Preferred embodiments of the invention are defined in the dependent claims.

Through this application the expression "software" refers to any trusted software to be loaded and executed in the secure element. Examples include firmware, an operat ing system (OS), and any other use-case dependent secure applications. The expres sion "software image" (or "OS image") refers to a generic data format encapsulating a software version and cryptographic data to be used by the update agent.

According to a first aspect of the present invention, there is provided a secure ele ment, SE, comprising an update agent. The update agent comprises a communication interface for providing connectivity to a storage module for downloading software images onto the SE. The update agent comprises further a first memory storing au thentication data for authenticating software images, and a second memory storing credentials for personalizing software images.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided an update agent for updating software in a secure element. The update agent comprises a com munication interface for providing connectivity to a storage module for downloading software images onto the secure element. The update agent comprises further a first memory storing authentication data for authenticating software images; and a sec ond memory storing credentials for personalizing software images.

By equipping the update agent in the secure element with connectivity capabilities for establishing connection with a storage module, a flexible and independent way for loading software images onto the secure element is achieved, which does not de pend on other connectivity capabilities of a host device, the secure element is embed ded on.

The update agent is thus a stand-alone entity which is loaded in the factory onto the secure element, and which allows an operating system and/ or other trusted software to be loaded on top of it at any time, even when the secure element, respectively a device the secure element is embedded on, is already deployed in the field. The up date agent allows, through its provisioning connectivity means, to directly load an operating system in the field, that is, outside a certified environment.

The storage module can be a server, a database, a cloud node in a network system or any other entity capable of storing software images.

In some embodiments of the present invention according to the first or the second as pect, the communication interface is configured to provide connectivity through a mobile network and to implement network authentication algorithms.

Preferably, the communication interface is a wireless communication inter-face.

In some embodiments of the present invention according to the first or the second as pect, the update agent is configured to establish a direct connection with the storage module via the communication interface.

In some embodiments of the present invention according to the first or the second as pect, the update agent is configured to establish a connection with a Local Profile As sistant, LPA, of a device, the secure element is embedded on, via the communication interface, and to provide the LPA with connectivity to the storage module. With other words, the update agent within the SE has limited, but functional, UICC capabilities (network authentication algorithms, and the minimal set of commands to effectively use them).

This allows a secure element without an UICC OS yet installed to provide the miss ing part to the mobile network modem in the device, thus enabling the device to download the UICC OS without requiring any other external aid or action from the user (i.e. WiFi or tethering to other devices).

In some embodiments of the present invention, the update agent is configured to es tablish a secure communication connection with the storage module through the communication interface, to retrieve a software image from the storage module; and to perform authentication of the software image using the authentication data stored in the first memory of the update agent.

Preferably, the secure element, particularly the update agent, authenticates the soft ware image by verifying a digital signature, which may be associated with a vendor of the secure element or with a provider of an electronic device the secure element is embedded on. The digital signature may also be associated with an applet installed on the secure element. For instance, the update agent may use an encryption key as sociated with a particular vendor or device to verify the integrity of the software im age.

In some embodiments of the present invention, the update agent is configured upon retrieving and authenticating the software image, to perform decryption of the soft ware image. Preferably, decryption is performed using the authentication data stored in the first memory of the update agent.

The update agent may decrypt the software image using a second encryption key, which may be the same or different from the encryption key used for authentication. In one embodiment a public -private keys pair is used. Alternatively, a symmetric en cryption method is used. The same encryption key may be used to sign, encrypt and/ or decrypt the software image.

In some embodiments of the present invention, the update agent is configured to load the software image into a memory of the secure element.

In some embodiments of the present invention, the software image to be loaded in the SE is an operating system, OS.

Preferably, the OS is configured to retrieve the credentials or personalization data stored in the second memory of the update agent, and to perform personalization of the loaded OS image using the credentials. The obtained personalized OS image may be stored in the memory of the SE, preferably, by replacing the unpersonalized OS image. The OS may also be downloaded directly with the personalization or be per sonalized by another method.

According to a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method, per formed by an update agent in a secure element, wherein the update agent comprises a communication interface, a first memory, and a second memory. The method com prises establishing a secure communication connection with a storage module through the communication interface; retrieving a software image from the storage module; and storing the personalized software image in a memory of the secure ele ment.

Preferably, the method comprises further performing authentication of the software image using authentication data stored in the first memory, and/ or performing per sonalization of the software image using the credentials stored in the second memory In some embodiments according to the third aspect, establishing a secure communi cation connection with the storage module comprises establishing via the communi cation interface a connection with a Local Profile Assistant, LPA, of a device, the se cure element is embedded on, wherein the software image is retrieved from the stor age module via the LPA.

It has to be noted that all the devices, elements, units and means described in the pre sent application could be implemented in software or hardware elements or combi nation thereof. All steps which are performed by the various entities described in the present application as well as the described functionalities are intended to mean that the respective entity is adapted to or configured to perform the respective steps and functionalities.

Further aspects, features and advantages of the present invention will become appar ent to those of ordinary skills in the art upon reviewing the following detailed de scription of preferred embodiments and variants of the present invention in conjunc tion with the accompanying figures.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Reference will now be made to the accompanying figures, in which:

FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of the conventional production flow of a se cure element;

FIG. 2 shows a schematic representation of the production flow of a secure element according to an embodiment;

FIG. 3 shows the structure of a secure element according to an embodiment; FIG. 4 shows the architecture of a system for implementing a method for retrieving software in a secure element according to an embodiment;

FIG. 5 shows the architecture of a system for implementing a method for retrieving software in a secure element according to another embodiment;

FIG. 6 shows a flow diagram illustrating a method implemented in a secure element according to an embodiment; and

FIG. 7 shows a mapping of the steps of the method implemented in the secure ele ment onto the production flow of Fig. 2 according to an embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Detailed explanations of the present invention are given below with reference to at tached drawings that illustrate specific embodiment examples of the present inven tion. These embodiments are described in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the art to practice the invention. It is to be understood that the various embodiments of the present invention, although different, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described herein in con nection with one embodiment may be implemented within other embodiments with out departing from the scope of the present invention. In addition, it is to be under stood that the position or arrangement of individual elements within each disclosed embodiment may be modified without departing from the scope of the present in vention. The following detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting sense, and the scope of the present invention is defined only by the appended claims, appropriately interpreted, along with the full range of equivalents to which the claims are entitled. In the drawings, like numerals refer to the same or similar func tionality throughout the several views.

Fig. 2 shows a schematic representation of the production flow of a secure element comprising a stand-alone software loader or update agent according to an embodi ment. The upper row in the figure shows the entities responsible for the correspond ing production phases (I, II, III, IV), while the lower row shows the content of the se cure element (i.e., chip) in each production phase.

The stand-alone update agent (i.e., Image Trusted Loader, ITL) is loaded onto the tamper resistant element during factory production phase I. That is, instead of load ing the whole set at the chip factory (as in conventional production according to Fig. 1), only the ITL would be loaded at the first stage I of the process. The operating sys tem OS could later on be loaded onto the SE 100 at any time even in the field, for in stance when the chip is installed in a device (phase II), during device initialization (phase III) or when the device is used by a customer (phase IV).

Such a stand-alone update agent allows to load an OS onto a secure element at any time after the first production phase, provided that the trusted OS image itself is properly secured.

In order to retrieve the OS, a way to communicate with the update agent or software loader is needed. This could be done by setting a blackbox in a controlled environ ment or by using the connectivity provided by the device in which the tamper re sistant element is located.

Any of these solutions, however, imply that an extra effort is required in order to re trieve the OS and load it into the TRE via the update agent/loader already loaded in the TRE. To provide an efficient solution for loading an OS onto the SE after the SE production phase, the update agent according to the present invention is equipped with connec tivity capabilities for connecting to an image delivery server to download the OS im age at any time, whenever it is needed.

Fig. 3 shows the structure of a SE 100 containing a stand-alone update agent 110 ac cording to an embodiment.

The SE 100 is a tamper resistant element, containing the update agent 110 and the OS 130. Both the update agent 110 and the OS 130 may be stored in a memory of the SE (not shown in Fig. 3). The OS and the update agent are independent entities that can communicate with each other, for instance over an Application Programming Inter face, API 125.

The update agent 110 is a loader entity allowing the provisioning of software (such as, for instance, use case dependent firmware, operating system) within the SE. The update agent is the main entity in charge of loading software in the secure element, as well as any other procedure related to it (e.g., update, restore, rollback). The up date agent 110 is loaded onto the SE 100 during factory production. The OS may be loaded onto the SE at a later time, after the SE has been installed in a host device.

The update agent 110 may contain two different memory structures or regions, to store sensible data thereon. A first memory structure 115 preferably contains authen tication data, which is used by the update agent to authenticate and decrypt the soft ware or OS image when loaded or updated at a later time. With other words, the first memory contains ITL data, that is, mainly the keys used to check authentication of the OS image to perform a load or an update and to decrypt them in order to be able to properly write the OS into the SE memory. Preferably, the first memory structure 115 comprises security keys or private credentials, for example, to gain access to change the firmware or to authenticate access for another application such as eSIM and other applications needed protected security keys. Only the update agent 110 has access to the memory region 115.

The second memory structure 120, which is accessible both by the update agent 110 and the operating system 130, may contain the personalization data of the OS, that is, the OS credentials 135. The credentials 135 comprise keys and certificates for person alizing OS images. With other words, the second memory stores OS data, that is, per sonalization data of the OS that could be lost in an update and needs to be kept. This way, if it is lost when performing an update, it can be retrieved and applied to the new OS. This will also contain the data for the first personalization of the OS for the ITL standalone use case.

The update agent 110 is fitted with a communication interface 150, for providing con nectivity to a storage module, such as the image delivery server 300, as depicted in Fig. 4, by means of which an OS can be retrieved and loaded onto the SE.

With reference to Fig. 4, the communication interface 150 may be realized as a wire less interface to allow the update agent 110 to establish a direct connection 160 with the storage module 300 for retrieving software and/ or OS images stored thereon. Conventional wireless communication protocols, such as WiFi, Bloothoot, radio, NFC can be herein deployed.

The update agent 110 may also establish a connection with a Local Profile Assistant, LPA, of a device 200, as depicted in Fig. 5. The external device 200 may describe an entity which is in control and communicates with the SE 100. It can be a mobile terminal, or whatever device it is that the SE is mounted on. The device 200 may connect to the storage module or server 300, for in stance via WiFi or similar protocols, download an OS image and sent it to the secure element through the connection 150 provided by the update agent. However, this so lution requires a pre-existing connectivity in the device in order to retrieve the OS and load it into the TRE via the update agent/loader already loaded in the TRE.

Through the architecture depicted in Fig. 5, the update agent 110 may establish a connection 160 with the Local Profile Assistant LPA 250 of the device 200 via the communication interface 150, and thus provide the LPA with connectivity to the stor age module 300. The update agent within the SE has limited, but functional, UICC capabilities (network authentication algorithms, and the minimal set of commands to effectively use them). This allows an SE without an UICC OS yet installed to provide the missing part to the mobile network modem in the device, thus enabling the de vice to download the UICC OS without requiring any other external aid or action from the user (i.e. WiFi or tethering to other devices).

Through the communication interface 150, the update agent 110 provides connectiv ity to a mobile network and allows to implement suitable network authentication al gorithms based on credentials associated with the mobile network, which are stored in its second memory 120.

FIG. 6 shows a flow diagram illustrating a method implemented in a secure element according to an embodiment. FIG. 7 shows a mapping of the steps of the method from Fig. 6 onto the production flow phases of Fig. 2 according to an embodiment. The method is described in the following taking the OS as an example of software to be loaded and personalized. However, the method is not restricting to the OS soft ware, and is applicable to any other software that can be executed on the secure ele ment, such as, for instance firmware or an applet/ application.

With reference to Figs. 6 and 7, in a first step SI, the update agent 110 (ITL in Fig. 7), which has been loaded during phase I onto the SE/TRE 100, may establish a secure communication connection with a storage module or a server 300. Upon establishing the connection with the server 300, the update agent 110 may retrieve in step S2 an OS image from the server 300. Optionally, in step S3 the OS image may be authenti cated using authentication data stored in the first memory 115 of the update agent 110. The retrieved OS image may be personalized in step S4 using the personaliza tion data stored in the second memory 120 of the update agent 110. The personalized OS image is finally stored in a memory (not shown) of the SE 100.

All steps SI to S5 can be performed outside of the certified environment available only during factory production phase I. The operations performed within the certi fied environment during factory production phase I include the loading of the up date agent onto the SE.

The actual software (operating system) is downloaded, stored and personalized within the SE by the method illustrated in Fig. 6. The contents of the SE after each step of the claimed method are depicted in Fig. 7. In particular, before execution of step S2, the SE is in the state it was delivered from the factory, that is, with any oper ating system installed thereon. After step S2 (as well as after the optional step S3) the SE 100-3 contains an unpersonalized version of the OS. After step S4 is executed, the SE 100-4 contains the final personalized OS version (identified by OS maxiinit in Fig. 2), which contains the operating system plus its specific personalization/ configura tion, including credentials. The methods and apparatus as described through the embodiments above, provides an efficient and secure solution for loading an operating system onto a secure ele ment without the need of third parties, such as an extra step in the production line or the need of a preexisting connectivity in the device that contains the secure element. Through the secure communication interface provided by the update agent a flexible and efficient solution is provided for retrieving and loading software onto the secure element at any time during the lifecycle of the secure element. For instance, the solu tion allows for the actual OS to be loaded in the field, meaning that the OS-to-be- loaded could be decided later on after the production phase.

In the foregoing specification, the invention has been described with reference to spe cific embodiments thereof. It will, however, be evident that various modifications and changes may be made thereto without departing from the broader scope of the invention. For example, the above-described process flows are described with refer ence to a particular ordering of process actions. However, the ordering of many of the described process actions may be changed without affecting the scope or opera tion of the invention. The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded in an illustrative rather than restrictive sense.

Claims

What is claimed is:

1. A secure element, SE (100), comprising an update agent (110), wherein the up date agent (110) comprises: a communication interface (150) for providing connectivity to a storage module (300) for downloading software images onto the SE (100); a first memory (115) storing authentication data for authenticating soft ware images; and a second memory (120) storing credentials for personalizing software im ages.

2. The secure element (100) according to claim 1, wherein the communication in terface (150) is configured to provide connectivity to the storage module through a mobile network and to implement network authentication algo rithms, preferably using the credentials stored in the second memory (120) of the update agent (110).

3. The secure element (100) according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the update agent (110) is configured to establish a direct connection with the storage module (300) via the communication interface (150).

4. The secure element (100) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the update agent (110) is configured to establish a connection with a Local Profile Assistant, LPA (250), of a device (200), the SE is embedded on, via the communication interface (150) and to provide the LPA (250) with con nectivity to the storage module (300).

5. The secure element (100) according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the up date agent (110) is configured to: - establish a secure communication connection with the storage module through the communication interface (150);

- retrieve a software image from the storage module (300); and

- perform authentication of the software image using the authentication data stored in the hrst memory (115) of the update agent (110).

6. The secure element (100) according to claim 5, wherein the update agent (110) is configured upon retrieving and authenticating the software image, to per form decryption of the software image using the authentication data stored in the first memory (115) of the update agent (110).

7. The secure element (100) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the update agent (110) is configured to load the software image into a memory of the secure element (100).

8. The secure element (100) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the software image to be loaded in the SE (100) is an operating sys tem, OS, wherein the OS is configured to retrieve the credentials (135) stored in the second memory (120) of the update agent (110), and to perform person alization of the loaded OS image using the credentials (135), wherein the per sonalized OS image is stored in the memory of the SE (100).

9. An update agent (110) for updating software in a secure element (100), the up date agent (110) comprising: a communication interface (150) for providing connectivity to a storage module (300) for downloading software images onto the SE (100); a hrst memory (115) storing authentication data for authenticating soft ware images; and a second memory (120) storing credentials for personalizing software im ages.

10. The update agent (110) according to claim 9, wherein the update agent (110) is configured to establish a direct connection with the storage module (300) via the communication interface (150).

11. The update agent (110) according to claim 10, wherein the update agent (110) is configured to establish a connection with a Local Profile Assistant, LPA (250), of a device (200) via the communication interface (150) and to provide the LPA (250) with connectivity to the storage module (300).

12. The update agent (110) according any one of claims 9 to 11, wherein the com munication interface (150) is configured to provide connectivity through a mo bile network and to implement network authentication algorithms.

13. A method, performed by an update agent (110) in a secure element (100), wherein the update agent (110) comprises a communication interface (150), a first memory (115), and a second memory (120), the method comprising:

- establishing (SI) a secure communication connection with a storage mod ule (300) through the communication interface (150);

- retrieving (S2) a software image from the storage module (300);

- performing (S4) personalization of the software image using credentials (135) stored in the second memory (120); and storing (S5) the personalized software image in a memory of the secure ele ment (100).

14. The method according to claim 13, further comprising:

- performing (S3) authentication of the software image using authentication data stored in the first memory (115).

15. The method according to claim 13 or 14, wherein establishing a secure com munication connection with the storage module comprises establishing via the communication interface (150) a connection with a Local Profile Assistant, LPA (250), of a device (200), the secure element (100) is embedded on, wherein the software image is retrieved from the storage module (300) via the LPA (250).