WO2022227679A1 - 基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法及装置 - Google Patents

基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法及装置 Download PDF

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WO2022227679A1
WO2022227679A1 PCT/CN2021/143463 CN2021143463W WO2022227679A1 WO 2022227679 A1 WO2022227679 A1 WO 2022227679A1 CN 2021143463 W CN2021143463 W CN 2021143463W WO 2022227679 A1 WO2022227679 A1 WO 2022227679A1
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fire
cables
cable
safety analysis
nuclear power
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English (en)
French (fr)
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刘美汝
杨健
邓伟
马超
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China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd
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China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd
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Priority to GB2313564.3A priority Critical patent/GB2618947A/en
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F30/00—Computer-aided design [CAD]
    • G06F30/10—Geometric CAD
    • G06F30/13—Architectural design, e.g. computer-aided architectural design [CAAD] related to design of buildings, bridges, landscapes, production plants or roads
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F30/00—Computer-aided design [CAD]
    • G06F30/20—Design optimisation, verification or simulation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q50/00—Information and communication technology [ICT] specially adapted for implementation of business processes of specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
    • G06Q50/06—Energy or water supply
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
    • G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
    • G21D3/04—Safety arrangements
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2113/00—Details relating to the application field
    • G06F2113/16—Cables, cable trees or wire harnesses
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2119/00—Details relating to the type or aim of the analysis or the optimisation
    • G06F2119/02—Reliability analysis or reliability optimisation; Failure analysis, e.g. worst case scenario performance, failure mode and effects analysis [FMEA]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2119/00—Details relating to the type or aim of the analysis or the optimisation
    • G06F2119/08—Thermal analysis or thermal optimisation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F30/00—Computer-aided design [CAD]
    • G06F30/10—Geometric CAD
    • G06F30/17—Mechanical parametric or variational design
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F30/00—Computer-aided design [CAD]
    • G06F30/10—Geometric CAD
    • G06F30/18—Network design, e.g. design based on topological or interconnect aspects of utility systems, piping, heating ventilation air conditioning [HVAC] or cabling
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
    • G21C21/00—Apparatus or processes specially adapted to the manufacture of reactors or parts thereof
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01B—CABLES; CONDUCTORS; INSULATORS; SELECTION OF MATERIALS FOR THEIR CONDUCTIVE, INSULATING OR DIELECTRIC PROPERTIES
    • H01B7/00—Insulated conductors or cables characterised by their form
    • H01B7/17—Protection against damage caused by external factors, e.g. sheaths or armouring
    • H01B7/29—Protection against damage caused by extremes of temperature or by flame
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
    • Y02E40/00—Technologies for an efficient electrical power generation, transmission or distribution
    • Y02E40/70—Smart grids as climate change mitigation technology in the energy generation sector
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
    • Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
    • Y04S10/00—Systems supporting electrical power generation, transmission or distribution
    • Y04S10/50—Systems or methods supporting the power network operation or management, involving a certain degree of interaction with the load-side end user applications

Definitions

  • the invention belongs to the design technology of nuclear power plants, and in particular relates to a selection method and a selection device for fire protection of cables in nuclear power plants based on probabilistic safety analysis (PSA, Probabilistic Safety Assessment).
  • PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment
  • the large number of cables present in nuclear power plants is an important source of internal fire risk, and the occurrence of fire or fire damage to cables can also have a significant impact on plant operation and safety functions. Especially due to the fire spreading characteristics, in a serious fire situation, a large number of cables in some areas are likely to be damaged. Serious harm. Therefore, fire cladding or physical isolation is required for cables that may cause common mode failures in power plants.
  • the current cable fire protection analysis adopts the traditional deterministic qualitative analysis method.
  • a qualitative fire weak link analysis is carried out for each fire zone or fire zone of the nuclear safety plant.
  • Identification, functional analysis, fire risk analysis, treatment of confirmed fire common mode points Determine the cable fire protection list.
  • the current deterministic cable fire protection analysis cannot give quantitative risk results, and the resulting cable fire protection list cannot make nuclear power plants achieve a balance between safety and economy.
  • the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method and device for selecting fire protection of nuclear power plant cables based on probabilistic safety analysis, which can quantitatively identify cables with important risks as those requiring fire protection Protected cables, optimize the fire protection investment in nuclear power plants, and achieve the maximum balance of safety and economy.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for selecting fire protection of nuclear power plant cables based on probabilistic safety analysis, including the following steps: constructing an initial fire probabilistic safety analysis model; performing circuit failure analysis and post-fire personnel reliability analysis, and substituting the analysis results into the initial
  • the fire probability safety analysis model of the nuclear power plant is analyzed and the fire situation analysis is carried out to obtain an improved fire probability safety analysis model; the improved fire probability safety analysis model is quantitatively analyzed, and the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant are calculated and obtained;
  • Risk results obtain the initial fire protection sheathed cable list, identify and model the cables in the initial fire protection sheathed cable list in the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model, and obtain the fire risk quantification after cable modeling determine whether the fire risk quantification result satisfies the probabilistic safety objective, if not, further obtain other cables affected by the fire according to the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant, and add the other cables to the initial fireproof coating
  • use the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model for identification and modeling, until the obtained fire risk quant
  • the method for selecting a nuclear power plant cable fire protection based on probabilistic safety analysis further includes: calculating the risk result of whether the cable combination is covered or not in the cable fire protection target list, and judging the cable combination.
  • the size of the first risk result without coating and the second risk result with coating, and the optimized cable fire protection target list is obtained according to the judgment result.
  • obtaining the optimized cable fire protection target list according to the judgment result specifically includes: if the judgment result is that the difference between the first risk result of the uncoated cable combination and the second risk result of the coated cable combination is less than If the threshold is preset, the corresponding cables of the cable combination are eliminated from the cable fire protection target list to obtain an optimized cable fire protection target list. If not, the corresponding cables of the cable combination are retained in the cable fire protection target list. cable.
  • the preset threshold is 0.1% of the requirements of the probabilistic safety index.
  • the constructing an initial fire probabilistic safety analysis model specifically includes: building a risk logic model from an event tree, a fault tree and basic data based on a first-level probabilistic safety analysis model of an internal event in a nuclear power plant, taking into account fire risk characteristics; Obtain the division of the fire compartment, the equipment for the fire probability safety analysis, the cable for the fire probability safety analysis, and the ignition frequency of the fire compartment, and use the three as the input conditions of the risk logic model to obtain the initial fire probability safety Analytical model.
  • obtaining the division of fire compartments, the equipment for fire probability safety analysis, the cables for fire probability safety analysis, and the ignition frequency of fire compartments specifically include: defining an analysis boundary of a nuclear power plant, and based on fire protection in fire protection design Partitioning divides the area in the analysis boundary of the nuclear power plant into several fire compartments; identifies the fire probabilistic safety analysis equipment in the fire compartment, determines the fire probabilistic safety analysis scope, and obtains the fire probabilistic safety analysis equipment; Based on the equipment, identify the fire probability safety analysis cable in the fire compartment, and establish the association between the cable and the fire probability safety analysis equipment; identify the ignition source in the fire compartment and calculate the ignition frequency of the fire compartment.
  • the equipment for obtaining fire probability safety analysis specifically includes: establishing an initial fire probability safety analysis equipment list, and according to the system design data, electrical and process equipment layout data of the nuclear power plant, all equipment that may be damaged by fire is Listed in the initial fire probabilistic safety analysis equipment list; carry out failure mode and impact analysis on the equipment in the initial fire probabilistic safety analysis equipment list, and equipment failure will not affect the normal operation and safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant Removed from the initial fire PSA equipment list.
  • the ignition sources include fixed ignition sources and temporary fires
  • the calculation to obtain the ignition frequency of the fire compartment specifically includes: calculating the ignition frequency of the fire compartment to be the ignition of all ignition sources in the compartment The sum of the frequencies ⁇ IS,J to obtain the ignition frequency of the fire compartment, where the calculation formula of the ignition frequency ⁇ IS,J of a single ignition source is as follows:
  • ⁇ IS is the general ignition frequency of the ignition source IS
  • W L is the location weighting factor of the ignition source
  • W IS, J, L is the ignition source weight factor, which represents the quantity weight of IS type ignition sources corresponding to the power plant area L in the fire compartment J.
  • circuit failure analysis is performed, specifically: analyzing the failure mode of the cable or circuit causing the failure of the target device, and determining the probability value of the failure mode occurrence.
  • Personnel reliability analysis after fire specifically: using human factors analysis method to evaluate the impact of fire on personnel actions, to determine and quantify the probability value of personnel failure events and personnel failure events occurring during the development and quantification of fire probabilistic safety analysis models.
  • obtaining an initial list of fireproof coated cables specifically includes: identifying the cables with important risks according to the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant, and obtaining the list of fireproof coated cables based on determinism. Consolidate to form the initial Fire Covered Cable List.
  • an embodiment of the present invention also provides a probabilistic safety analysis-based device for selecting fire protection for cables in nuclear power plants, including a modeling module, a calculation module, an acquisition module, and a determination module.
  • the modeling module is used to construct the initial fire probabilistic safety analysis model.
  • the calculation module connected with the modeling module, is used for circuit failure analysis and post-fire personnel reliability analysis.
  • the analysis results are substituted into the initial fire probabilistic safety analysis model, and the fire scenario analysis is carried out to obtain an improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model.
  • the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model is quantitatively analyzed, and the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant are calculated and obtained.
  • the obtaining module is connected with the calculation module, and is used for obtaining an initial fire protection clad cable list according to the fire risk result of the nuclear power plant, and performing the fire protection on the cables in the initial fire protection clad cable list in the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model; Identify and model, and obtain quantitative results of fire risk after cable modelling.
  • the determining module is connected with the acquiring module, and is used for judging whether the fire risk quantification result satisfies the probabilistic safety objective, if not, further acquiring other cables affected by the fire according to the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant, Add to the initial list of fire-resistant covered cables and then use the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model for identification and modeling until the fire risk quantification results obtained meet the probabilistic safety objectives, then stop adding cables to the original fire-resistant covered cables. Checklist for a list of cable fire protection targets.
  • the device for selecting fire protection of nuclear power plant cables based on probabilistic safety analysis further includes an optimization module.
  • the calculation module is also used to calculate the risk result of whether the cable combination in the cable fire protection target list is covered or not.
  • the optimization module is connected with the calculation module and the determination module, and is used for judging the size of the first risk result of the cable combination without coating and the second risk result of the coating according to the fire risk quantification result obtained by the calculation module, and According to the judgment results, the optimized cable fire protection target list is obtained.
  • the present invention proposes a method for selecting cables that need fire protection based on probabilistic safety analysis technology, quantitatively identifying cables with important risks through the PSA method, and obtaining a list of cable fire protection targets. It can identify common-mode failures and superimposed failures with complex logic, and can also accurately and quantitatively evaluate the change of power plant risk caused by each cable covering, which can achieve maximum safety improvement with minimum economic investment. At the same time, this method can also effectively reduce the conservatism in the deterministic analysis and design, while ensuring the safety of the nuclear power plant is not affected, optimize the fire protection investment of the nuclear power plant, reduce the economic burden of the nuclear power plant, and fully balance the nuclear power plant's safety Safety and economy.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for selecting a method for fire protection of nuclear power plant cables based on probabilistic safety analysis according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a method for selecting fire protection of nuclear power plant cables based on probabilistic safety analysis according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram (1) of a fire probability safety analysis event tree model in a specific embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram (2) of a fire probability safety analysis event tree model in a specific embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram (3) of an event tree model for fire probabilistic safety analysis in a specific embodiment of the present invention.
  • this embodiment provides a method for selecting fire protection of nuclear power plant cables based on probabilistic safety analysis, including the following steps:
  • Step 101 constructing an initial fire probabilistic safety analysis model (fire PSA model).
  • step 102 circuit failure analysis and post-fire personnel reliability analysis are performed, the analysis results are substituted into the initial fire probabilistic safety analysis model, and fire scenario analysis is performed to obtain an improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model.
  • Step 103 perform quantitative analysis on the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model, and calculate and obtain the fire risk result of the nuclear power plant.
  • Step 104 according to the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant, obtain an initial list of fire-resistant covered cables, identify and model the cables in the initial fire-resistant covered cable list in the improved fire probability safety analysis model, and obtain: Fire risk quantification results after cable modelling.
  • Step 105 determine whether the fire risk quantification result satisfies the probabilistic safety objective, if not, further obtain other cables affected by the fire according to the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant, and add the other cables to the initial fireproof coating
  • the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model for identification and modeling, until the obtained fire risk quantification results meet the probabilistic safety target, then stop adding cables to the initial fire-proof covered cable list to obtain cables. Fire protection target list.
  • the improved fire probability safety analysis model is used to identify and model the cables that need to be covered with fire protection to obtain the fire risk quantification result, and then determine whether it will be affected by the fire according to whether the fire risk quantification result satisfies the probability safety target.
  • the other cables are added to the list, resulting in a target list of cable fire protection.
  • the cable fire protection target list obtained in this embodiment is obtained based on quantitative analysis, so that the obtained list is more accurate and can achieve the maximum balance between safety and economy.
  • the method for selecting a nuclear power plant cable fire protection based on probabilistic safety analysis further includes: calculating the risk result of whether the cable combination in the cable fire protection target list is covered or not, and judging the cable fire protection target list. The size of the combined first risk result without coating and the second risk result with coating is combined, and the optimized cable fire protection target list is obtained according to the judgment result.
  • the cables in the cable fire protection target list can be divided into various cable combinations, and the corresponding risk results of coating or not coating each cable combination are calculated respectively, and the cables are further optimized according to the comparison of the two risk results.
  • the number of cables in the fire protection target list can further optimize the economic investment of fire protection on the basis of ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants.
  • obtaining the optimized cable fire protection target list according to the judgment result specifically includes: if the judgment result is the difference between the first risk result of the cable combination that is not covered and the second risk result that is covered If it is less than the preset threshold, the corresponding cables of the cable combination are eliminated from the cable fire protection target list to obtain an optimized cable fire protection target list. If not, the cable combination is retained in the cable fire protection target list. corresponding cable.
  • the preset threshold is 0.1% of the requirements of the probabilistic safety index.
  • the difference between the first risk result (referring to no coating) and the second risk result (referring to the implementation of the coating) of the cable combination A is less than 0.1% of the requirements of the probabilistic safety index, it means that the cable combination A is implemented
  • the risk result of coating is basically the same as the risk result of not coating the cable combination A.
  • the implementation of the coating will generate a large economic investment.
  • Corresponding cables included in Cable Combination A are excluded from the list.
  • step 101 constructing an initial fire probabilistic safety analysis model, which specifically includes: building a risk logic from an event tree, fault tree and basic data after considering the fire risk characteristics based on the first-level probabilistic safety analysis model of internal events in the nuclear power plant. model; obtain the division of fire compartments, the equipment for fire probabilistic safety analysis, the cables for fire probabilistic safety analysis, and the ignition frequency of the fire compartment, and use all three as the input conditions of the risk logic model to obtain the initial fire Probabilistic Safety Analysis Model.
  • a circuit failure analysis is performed, specifically: analyzing the failure mode of the cable or circuit causing the failure of the target device, and determining the probability value of the failure mode occurrence.
  • Personnel reliability analysis after fire specifically: using human factors analysis method to evaluate the impact of fire on personnel actions, to determine and quantify the probability value of personnel failure events and personnel failure events occurring during the development and quantification of fire probabilistic safety analysis models.
  • obtaining an initial list of fireproof coated cables specifically includes: identifying the cables with important risks according to the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant, and comparing the fireproof coated cables obtained based on determinism. The lists are combined to form the initial Fire Covered Cable List.
  • the important cable list obtained in step 103 of this embodiment according to the fire risk result of the nuclear power plant is combined to form an initial list of fireproof coated cables, so that This initial list of fireproof sheathed cables is more comprehensive and meets the safety requirements of nuclear power plants.
  • the subsequently obtained list of fire protection targets for cables it is possible to obtain specific cables that are too conservatively selected in the list of fireproof sheathed cables obtained based on determinism, which further reflects the advantages of this embodiment, that is, obtaining safety A list of the best cable fire protection with economy.
  • Step (1) Divide the fire affected area, that is, obtain the division result of the fire compartment
  • the nuclear power plant analysis boundary Define the nuclear power plant analysis boundary, and divide the area in the nuclear power plant analysis boundary into several fire compartments based on the fire compartments in the fire protection design.
  • the purpose of the nuclear power plant analytical boundary definition is to define the analytical boundary to encompass all areas with a significant potential contribution to fire risk.
  • the nuclear power plant analysis boundary begins with the plant's protected area and includes all plant areas related to normal and emergency operation of the reactor, support systems, and electricity production (eg, the steam turbine building).
  • the area within the analytical boundary of a nuclear power plant needs to be divided into fire compartments to perform a probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) of internal fires.
  • PSA probabilistic safety analysis
  • the purpose of the fire compartment division is to divide the nuclear power plant into a series of physical analysis units, and map the equipment and cables of the power plant to these areas to study the effects of fire.
  • the fire affected area includes the reactor building, safety building, electrical building, nuclear auxiliary building, diesel generator building, etc.
  • the fire compartment includes the reactor building fire zone, the safety building, etc.
  • fire compartments such as the pressure-safety injection pump room, the battery column A room, the DC and AC uninterrupted power distribution column A, and the instrument control electronic equipment room.
  • Step (2) Identify the fire PSA equipment in the fire compartment
  • the fire PSA equipment is the power plant equipment involved in the fire PSA power plant response model. Fire will not cause damage to high melting point metals such as steel, and passive mechanical equipment such as manual valves, shut-off valves, filters, heat exchangers, etc. do not need to be included in the list of fire PSA equipment.
  • passive mechanical equipment such as manual valves, shut-off valves, filters, heat exchangers, etc. do not need to be included in the list of fire PSA equipment.
  • first of all establish the initial fire probability safety analysis equipment list, and list all the equipment that may be damaged by fire according to the system design data, electrical and process equipment layout data of the nuclear power plant, etc. Initial fire PSA equipment list.
  • the initial fire PSA equipment list includes all the structures, systems and equipment (SSC) required to mitigate fire initiating events and bring the nuclear power plant to a safe and stable state, where failure of fire may directly result in core damage or initiating events,
  • SSC systems and equipment
  • the initial fire PSA equipment list all the equipment that may be affected by the fire are included, but the failure of some of these equipment will not affect the normal operation and safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant, and there is no need to model in the fire PSA model. change. Therefore, it is necessary to further screen the equipment in the initial fire probabilistic safety analysis equipment list to form a fire PSA equipment list that is convenient to support the internal fire PSA modeling and analysis work.
  • FMEA failure mode and effect analysis
  • a room in column A of the DC and AC uninterrupted power distribution of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant is used as an example of a fire compartment, and the main equipment in the fire compartment is shown in Table 1 below.
  • Step (3) Identify the fire PSA cable in the fire compartment
  • Fire PSA cables are cables related to fire PSA equipment.
  • the selection of fire PSA cables is based on the list of fire PSA equipment, and the cables related to fire PSA equipment are selected, including power supply, control, display and instrument cables.
  • all cables that may affect the operation of the equipment are listed in the fire PSA cable list, and the association between the fire PSA cable and the fire PSA equipment is established.
  • the fire PSA cable list establishes a correlation between the three “cable-related equipment-laying position” for each cable in the fire compartment.
  • the main cables in the fire compartment are shown in Table 2 below.
  • the associated equipment in Table 2 refers to the equipment associated with the cable in the fire compartment that can affect the operation of the equipment.
  • one end of the fire PSA cable in the fire compartment is connected to the fire PSA device in the fire compartment, and the other end of the fire PSA cable in the fire compartment is connected to the fire compartment.
  • One end of the equipment connected to other fire compartments that may affect the operation of the equipment due to cable failure, or the fire PSA equipment connected to both ends of the fire PSA cable in the fire compartment are all in other fire compartments.
  • Step (4) Identify the ignition source and calculate the ignition frequency of the fire compartment
  • the ignition source is the ignition source that may cause a fire.
  • the ignition source in a nuclear power plant includes two types: fixed ignition source and temporary fire.
  • Fixed ignition sources refer to ignition sources with fixed positions and known combustion parameters in the design of nuclear power plants, such as electrical cabinets, motors, etc.; the other is the location and combustion parameters introduced due to temporary storage or personnel activities. Undetermined temporary fire.
  • the calculation of ignition frequency is the basis for fire scenario analysis and fire quantification.
  • the ignition frequency of the fire compartment is the sum of the ignition frequencies ⁇ IS,J of all ignition sources in the compartment.
  • the ignition frequency of the ignition source is calculated by the following formula:
  • ⁇ IS is the general ignition frequency of the ignition source IS
  • W L is the location weighting factor of the ignition source
  • W IS, J, L is the ignition source weight factor, which represents the quantity weight of IS type ignition sources corresponding to the power plant area L in the fire compartment J.
  • the fixed ignition source includes a battery, an electric pump, a diesel generator, an air compressor, a charger, an electrical cabinet, a bus bar, a junction box, a hydrogen tank, and the like.
  • Temporary fires include cable fires caused by welding and cutting, temporary fires caused by welding and cutting, temporary and high temperature operations, etc.
  • the ignition frequency is calculated by counting the number of ignition sources in the room. The ignition frequency in the fire compartment is shown in Table 3.
  • Fire PSA model is a risk logic model composed of event tree, fault tree and basic data after considering the characteristics of fire risk.
  • the division of fire compartments, the selection of equipment and cables, and the calculation of firing frequency are all input conditions for the fire PSA model.
  • the fire PSA model can model the real response of the nuclear power plant in the fire situation, calculate the core damage frequency (CDF) caused by the fire, and quantify the risk brought by the fire to the nuclear power plant.
  • CDF core damage frequency
  • the establishment of the nuclear power plant fire PSA model is completed on the basis of the existing first-level PSA model of internal events in power conditions, low power and shutdown conditions, and reflects the actual design, completion, and operation of the power plant (that is, the existing operating experience). )Happening.
  • the establishment of the fire PSA model is based on the internal event-level PSA model, and the following technical elements in the internal event-level PSA model are also included in the fire PSA model:
  • the initiating event of the fire compartment is the loss of the DC power supply of column A.
  • the event sequence analysis mainly refers to the existing accident handling procedures, and can be transferred to the internal event loss column A DC event tree for processing.
  • the equipment will have specific failure modes and failure probability, and the fault tree in the internal event model needs to be modified or supplemented.
  • the occurrence of fire will have various adverse effects on the execution of personnel actions.
  • the personnel reliability analysis considers the impact of fire, and recalculates the failure probability of human error events under the influence of fire.
  • the fire risk model in this fire compartment is shown as an example in Figures 3-5.
  • the main purpose of circuit failure analysis is to analyze the failure mode of the cable or circuit that causes the failure of the target equipment, and to determine the probability value of the failure mode occurrence.
  • Circuit failure mode analysis is to determine the response of the equipment to the failure mode of the cable or circuit by carrying out a detailed analysis of the cables and circuits related to the target equipment, and to screen out the cables that will not affect the equipment to perform the required function.
  • the failure of the circuit is mainly due to the cable being exposed to fire, which leads to the damage of the insulation function of the cable, and then causes the circuit failure. Therefore, the circuit failure mode analysis is mainly the analysis of the cable failure mode and its corresponding circuit response.
  • the occurrence probability of the circuit failure mode is determined according to the characteristics of the circuit.
  • the results of the failure analysis of the fire compartment circuit are shown in Table 4.
  • Appropriate human factors analysis methods are used to evaluate the impact of fire on personnel movements, and to identify and quantify personnel failure events and their probability values during the development and quantification of fire PSA models.
  • HRA fire personnel reliability analysis
  • the personnel reliability analysis before the initiating event is the same as the internal event PSA
  • the personnel reliability analysis after the initiating event (Category C) mainly refers to the method recommended by the NUREG-1921 guideline. Value, Scoping and detailed analysis are carried out in three stages.
  • the fire personnel response has the following characteristics: 1) The accident scenario is more complex. 2) Higher staff pressure and workload. 3) The environmental factors in which the action is performed are more severe. 4) There are relatively few trainings and drills for fire scenarios, and the level of proficiency is relatively low. 5) The fire in the main control room requires specific analysis.
  • a fire scenario is a set of elements that describe a fire event. Fire scenarios are defined based on the characteristics and outcomes of a fire from one or more ignition sources.
  • the fire compartment-level analysis is refined into a fire scenario-level analysis and modeled in the fire PSA model to assess the fire risk of each fire scenario.
  • the preliminary quantitative result of the fire compartment is 7.84E-05/reactor year, which needs to be analyzed in detail, and the results of circuit failure analysis and post-fire personnel reliability analysis are substituted into the fire PSA model.
  • the fire risk of the nuclear power plant is calculated and obtained, and the main contribution of the fire CDF is determined.
  • the specific calculation method is a well-known technology in the art.
  • a minimum cut set is generated by logical calculation of the model, and then the calculation is performed by calling the data input in the model.
  • the purpose of the sensitivity analysis includes evaluating the sensitivity of the CDF to data such as initiating events, human error, etc., analyzing and discussing modeling assumptions that have a potentially significant impact on the results, and changing the case parameter values by a factor of 10 by identifying a series of sensitivity analysis cases. (The sensitivity factor is generally set to 10), and the degree of influence is calculated.
  • Step (10) Identify and Model a Preliminary Fire Covered Cable List
  • the risk important cables are identified, compared with and merged with the deterministic fire-resistant covered cable list to form a preliminary fire-resistant covered cable list, and these cables are identified and modeled in the fire PSA model.
  • the cables in the fire compartment involve auxiliary water supply system (TFA), secondary side passive residual heat removal system (PRS) and passive containment heat removal system (PCS). Since the TFA and PRS related equipment in Table 4 are necessary to perform the same safety function, these cables must be protected at the same time, otherwise the removal of the fire protection coating of any one cable will result in a CDF increment greater than 1E-8/reap year.
  • the PCS performs another safety function and is designed in a 3-column configuration.
  • the PSA believes that at least two columns are required for the system to perform its function successfully, so at least two columns of the PCS cables in Table 4 must be fire-resistant.
  • the corresponding target cables of TFA, PRS and PCS are identified in the model, and the fire PSA model is modified according to the following three schemes:
  • Step (11) Determine whether the fire risk quantification result satisfies the safety target
  • the quantification step (9) considers the fire PSA model after the preliminary fire cladding list, if the risk quantitative analysis results cannot meet the probabilistic safety objectives (taking China as an example, CDF ALL is 1E-5/reactor year, LRF ALL is 1E- 6/stack year), the key cables affected by the fire are further identified through the model, and the requirements for increasing fire protection cladding are continued until the probabilistic safety objectives are met.
  • the fire PSA model of the three schemes in step (10) is quantified, and the quantitative risk result meets the probabilistic safety objective.
  • Step (12) Calculate the amount of risk change with or without wrapping
  • the risk change of whether the cable combination is covered or not is calculated.
  • the risks of various schemes ie, different cable combinations
  • reasonable screening criteria are adopted.
  • the accepted risk increment can be calculated as follows:
  • the total probabilistic safety index requirements CDF ALL , LRF ALL , if the risk increase caused by the cancellation of fire protection coating of a certain cable is less than 0.1% of the probabilistic safety index requirements, it can be Consider accepting.
  • the CDF ALL is 1E-5/stack year
  • the LRF ALL is 1E-6/stack year. Therefore, if the fire protection coating of a certain cable is cancelled, the CDF increment is less than 1E-8/stack year, and the LRF increment is less than 1E-8/stack year. If it is less than 1E-9/heap year, it can be considered acceptable.
  • Step (13) get the optimized cable fire protection list
  • the risk results in Table 6 are compared and analyzed, and it is found that the protection of TFA and PRS-related cables has the greatest risk balance benefit, that is, it is determined that EAWB0234, TFAC0595, ETEB0242, ETEB0241, PRSC0164, ETEB0244, ETEB0243 in the room , PRSC0169, ETEB0240, ETEB0239, PRSC0159 cables for fire protection to reduce fire risk.
  • fire protection cables can be selected according to the above steps.
  • This embodiment provides a probabilistic safety analysis-based cable fire protection selection device for a nuclear power plant, including a modeling module, a calculation module, an acquisition module, and a determination module.
  • the modeling module is used to construct the initial fire probabilistic safety analysis model.
  • the calculation module connected with the modeling module, is used for circuit failure analysis and post-fire personnel reliability analysis.
  • the analysis results are substituted into the initial fire probabilistic safety analysis model, and the fire scenario analysis is carried out to obtain an improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model.
  • the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model is quantitatively analyzed, and the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant are calculated and obtained.
  • the obtaining module is connected with the calculation module, and is used for obtaining an initial fire protection clad cable list according to the fire risk result of the nuclear power plant, and performing the fire protection on the cables in the initial fire protection clad cable list in the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model; Identify and model, and obtain quantitative results of fire risk after cable modelling.
  • the determining module is connected with the acquiring module, and is used for judging whether the fire risk quantification result satisfies the probabilistic safety objective, if not, further acquiring other cables affected by the fire according to the fire risk results of the nuclear power plant, Add to the initial list of fire-resistant covered cables and then use the improved fire probabilistic safety analysis model for identification and modeling until the fire risk quantification results obtained meet the probabilistic safety objectives, then stop adding cables to the original fire-resistant covered cables. Checklist for a list of cable fire protection targets.
  • the device for selecting fire protection of nuclear power plant cables based on probabilistic safety analysis further includes an optimization module.
  • the calculation module is also used to calculate the risk result of whether the cable combination in the cable fire protection target list is covered or not.
  • the optimization module is connected with the calculation module and the determination module, and is used for judging the size of the first risk result of the cable combination without coating and the second risk result of the coating according to the fire risk quantification result obtained by the calculation module, and According to the judgment results, the optimized cable fire protection target list is obtained.

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Abstract

一种基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法及装置，方法包括：对改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行定量化分析，计算并得到核电厂的火灾风险结果；进而获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，在模型中对初始的防火包覆电缆清单中的电缆进行识别和模化，并得到火灾风险定量化结果；判断火灾风险定量化结果是否满足概率安全目标，若不满足，则将受火灾影响的其他电缆增加至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，直至火灾风险定量化结果满足概率安全目标，以得到电缆防火保护目标清单。该方法可定量化地识别出风险重要的电缆作为需进行防火保护的电缆，优化核电厂的防火投入，实现安全性和经济性的最大平衡。

Description

基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法及装置
本公开要求申请日为2021年04月29日、申请号为202110474473.5、名称为“基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取设计方法”的中国专利申请的优先权。
技术领域
本发明属于核电厂设计技术，具体涉及一种基于概率安全分析(PSA，Probabilistic Safety Assessment)的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法及选取装置。
背景技术
核电厂中存在的大量电缆是重要的内部火灾风险源，而电缆一旦起火或受到火灾损坏也会对电厂运行和安全功能造成重要影响。特别是由于火灾的蔓延特性，在较严重的火灾情形下，很可能会造成部分区域的大量电缆受损，若冗余安全列的电缆也在同一场火灾中受到损坏，就会对核安全造成严重危害。因此，对于在电厂中可能引起共模失效的电缆，需要进行防火包覆或物理隔离。
当前电缆防火保护分析采用的是传统确定论的定性分析方法，在施工设计后期，基于电缆数据库针对核安全厂房每个防火区或防火小区开展定性的火灾薄弱环节分析，通过潜在火灾共模点的鉴别、功能分析、火灾风险分析、已确认火灾共模点的处理确定电缆防火保护清单。目前的确定论电缆防火保护分析无法给出定量化的风险结果，从而得到的电缆防火保护清单无法使核电厂实现安全性和经济性的平衡。
发明内容
本发明要解决的技术问题是针对现有技术存在的上述不足，提供一种基 于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法及选取装置，可定量化地识别出风险重要的电缆作为需进行防火保护的电缆，优化核电厂的防火投入，实现安全性和经济性的最大平衡。
本发明实施例提供一种基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，包括如下步骤：构建初始的火灾概率安全分析模型；进行电路失效分析和火灾后人员可靠性分析，将分析结果代入初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，并进行火灾情景分析，得到改进的火灾概率安全分析模型；对改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行定量化分析，计算并得到核电厂的火灾风险结果；根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，在改进的火灾概率安全分析模型中对所述初始的防火包覆电缆清单中的电缆进行识别和模化，并得到电缆模化后的火灾风险定量化结果；判断所述火灾风险定量化结果是否满足概率安全目标，若不满足，则进一步根据核电厂的火灾风险结果获取受火灾影响的其他电缆，将所述其他电缆增加至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，再利用改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行识别和模化，直至得到的火灾风险定量化结果满足概率安全目标，则停止再增加电缆至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，以得到电缆防火保护目标清单。
优选地，在所述得到电缆防火保护目标清单之后，基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法还包括：计算电缆防火保护目标清单中电缆组合实施包覆与否的风险结果，判断电缆组合的未实施包覆的第一风险结果与实施包覆的第二风险结果的大小，并根据判断结果得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单。
优选地，所述根据判断结果得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单，具体包括：若判断结果为电缆组合的未实施包覆的第一风险结果与实施包覆的第二风险结果的差值小于预设阈值，则在电缆防火保护目标清单中剔除所述电缆组合的相应电缆，以得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单，若否，则在电缆防火保 护目标清单中保留所述电缆组合的相应电缆。
优选地，预设阈值为概率安全指标要求的0.1％。
优选地，所述构建初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，具体包括：以核电厂内部事件一级概率安全分析模型为基础，考虑火灾风险特点后由事件树、故障树和基本数据构建风险逻辑模型；获取火灾隔间的划分、火灾概率安全分析的设备和火灾概率安全分析的电缆，以及火灾隔间的点火频率，并将三者均作为所述风险逻辑模型的输入条件，得到初始的火灾概率安全分析模型。
优选地，所述获取火灾隔间的划分、火灾概率安全分析的设备和火灾概率安全分析的电缆，以及火灾隔间的点火频率，具体包括：定义核电厂分析边界，并基于消防设计中的防火分区将核电厂分析边界中的区域划分成若干个火灾隔间；识别火灾隔间中的火灾概率安全分析设备，确定火灾概率安全分析范围，以获取火灾概率安全分析的设备；以火灾概率安全分析的设备为基础，识别出火灾隔间中的火灾概率安全分析电缆，并建立电缆与火灾概率安全分析设备的关联；识别火灾隔间中的点火源并计算得到火灾隔间的点火频率。
优选地，所述获取火灾概率安全分析的设备，具体包括：建立初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单，根据核电厂的系统设计资料、电气及工艺设备布置资料，将所有可能受到火灾损坏的设备都列入初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单中；对初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单中的设备进行失效模式及影响分析，对于设备失效不会对核电厂的正常运行及安全停堆造成影响的设备在所述初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单中去除。
优选地，所述点火源包括固定点火源和临时性火灾两类，所述计算得到火灾隔间的点火频率，具体包括：计算火灾隔间的所述点火频率为隔间内所有点火源的点火频率λ IS,J之和，以得到火灾隔间的点火频率，其中，单个点火源的点火频率λ IS,J计算公式如下：
λ IS,J＝λ ISW LW IS,J,L
其中，
λ IS为点火源IS的通用点火频率；
W L为点火源的位置权重因子；
W IS,J,L为点火源权重因子，表示火灾隔间J中对应电厂区域L的IS类点火源的数量权重。
优选地，进行电路失效分析，具体是：分析导致目标设备失效的电缆或电路的失效模式，并确定失效模式发生的概率值。火灾后人员可靠性分析，具体是：采用人因分析方法评估火灾对人员动作的影响，确定和量化火灾概率安全分析模型的开发和定量过程中出现的人员失效事件及人员失效事件的概率值。
优选地，所述根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，具体包括：根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，识别出风险重要电缆，与基于确定论得到的防火包覆电缆清单进行合并，形成初始的防火包覆电缆清单。
进一步地，本发明实施例还提供一种基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取装置，包括建模模块、计算模块、获取模块、确定模块。建模模块，用于构建初始的火灾概率安全分析模型。计算模块，与建模模块连接，用于进行电路失效分析和火灾后人员可靠性分析，将分析结果代入初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，并进行火灾情景分析，得到改进的火灾概率安全分析模型，并对改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行定量化分析，计算并得到核电厂的火灾风险结果。获取模块，与计算模块连接，用于根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，在改进的火灾概率安全分析模型中对所述初始的防火包覆电缆清单中的电缆进行识别和模化，并得到电缆模化后的火灾风险定量化结果。确定模块，与获取模块连接，用于判断所述火灾风险定量化结果是否满足概率安全目标，若不满足，则进一步根据核电厂的火灾风险结果获取受火灾影响的其他电缆，将所述其他电缆增加至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中再利用改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行识别和模化，直至得到的火灾风险定量化结果 满足概率安全目标，则停止再增加电缆至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，以得到电缆防火保护目标清单。
优选地，基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取装置还包括优化模块。计算模块，还用于计算电缆防火保护目标清单中电缆组合实施包覆与否的风险结果。优化模块，与计算模块和确定模块连接，用于根据计算模块得到的火灾风险定量化结果，判断电缆组合的未实施包覆的第一风险结果与实施包覆的第二风险结果的大小，并根据判断结果得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单。
本发明的有益效果如下：本发明提出了一种基于概率安全分析技术来选取需进行防火保护的电缆的方法，通过PSA方法定量识别出风险重要的电缆，得到电缆防火保护目标清单，该方法不仅可以识别逻辑复杂的共模失效和叠加失效，还能精确的定量评价每根电缆包覆所引起的电厂风险变化情况，可在最小经济投入下得到最大的安全性提升。同时，采用本方法也可以有效减少确定论的分析设计中的保守性，在保证核电厂安全性不受影响的同时，优化核电厂的防火投入，减轻核电厂的经济负担，充分平衡核电厂的安全性和经济性。
附图说明
图1为本发明实施例1的一种基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法的流程图；
图2本发明实施例2的一种基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法的流程图；
图3为本发明具体实施例中火灾概率安全分析事件树模型示意图(1)；
图4为本发明具体实施例中火灾概率安全分析事件树模型示意图(2)；
图5为本发明具体实施例中火灾概率安全分析事件树模型示意图(3)。
具体实施方式
为了使本发明的目的、技术方案及优点更加清楚明白，以下结合附图及实施例，对本发明进行进一步详细说明。应当理解，此处所描述的具体实施例仅用以解释本发明，并不用于限定本发明。
实施例1：
如图1所示，本实施例提供一种基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，包括如下步骤：
步骤101，构建初始的火灾概率安全分析模型(火灾PSA模型)。
步骤102，进行电路失效分析和火灾后人员可靠性分析，将分析结果代入初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，并进行火灾情景分析，得到改进的火灾概率安全分析模型。
步骤103，对改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行定量化分析，计算并得到核电厂的火灾风险结果。
步骤104，根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，在改进的火灾概率安全分析模型中对所述初始的防火包覆电缆清单中的电缆进行识别和模化，并得到电缆模化后的火灾风险定量化结果。
步骤105，判断所述火灾风险定量化结果是否满足概率安全目标，若不满足，则进一步根据核电厂的火灾风险结果获取受火灾影响的其他电缆，将所述其他电缆增加至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，再利用改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行识别和模化，直至得到的火灾风险定量化结果满足概率安全目标，则停止再增加电缆至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，以得到电缆防火保护目标清单。
本实施例中，通过改进的火灾概率安全分析模型识别和模化需要进行防火包覆的电缆，得到火灾风险定量化结果，再根据火灾风险定量化结果是否满足概率安全目标确定是否将受火灾影响的其他电缆增加至清单中，从而得到电缆防火保护目标清单。相比于基于确定论得到的电缆防火保护清单，本实施例得 到的电缆防火保护目标清单是基于定量分析得到，从而得到的清单更为准确，能实现安全性和经济性的最大平衡。
可选地，在所述得到电缆防火保护目标清单之后，基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法还包括：计算电缆防火保护目标清单中电缆组合实施包覆与否的风险结果，判断电缆组合的未实施包覆的第一风险结果与实施包覆的第二风险结果的大小，并根据判断结果得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单。
本实施例中，电缆防火保护目标清单中的电缆可划分为多种电缆组合，分别计算各电缆组合实施包覆或者未实施包覆的相应的风险结果，根据两种风险结果的对比进一步优化电缆防火保护目标清单中的电缆数量，可在保证核电厂安全性的基础上，进一步优化防火保护的经济投入。
可选地，所述根据判断结果得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单，具体包括：若判断结果为电缆组合的未实施包覆的第一风险结果与实施包覆的第二风险结果的差值小于预设阈值，则在电缆防火保护目标清单中剔除所述电缆组合的相应电缆，以得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单，若否，则在电缆防火保护目标清单中保留所述电缆组合的相应电缆。可选地，预设阈值为概率安全指标要求的0.1％。
本实施例中，当电缆组合A的第一风险结果(指未实施包覆)与第二风险结果(指实施包覆)的差值小于概率安全指标要求的0.1％，说明对电缆组合A实施包覆的风险结果与对电缆组合A不实施包覆的风险结果基本持平，反而实施包覆会产生较大的经济投入，为达到核电厂安全性和经济性的平衡，故在电缆防火保护目标清单中剔除电缆组合A所包括的相应电缆。
可选地，步骤101：构建初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，具体包括：以核电厂内部事件一级概率安全分析模型为基础，考虑火灾风险特点后由事件树、故障树和基本数据构建风险逻辑模型；获取火灾隔间的划分、火灾概率安全分析 的设备和火灾概率安全分析的电缆，以及火灾隔间的点火频率，并将三者均作为所述风险逻辑模型的输入条件，得到初始的火灾概率安全分析模型。
本实施例中，获取火灾隔间的划分、火灾概率安全分析的设备和火灾概率安全分析的电缆，以及火灾隔间的点火频率的具体处理过程在实施例2中详述。
可选地，进行电路失效分析，具体是：分析导致目标设备失效的电缆或电路的失效模式，并确定失效模式发生的概率值。火灾后人员可靠性分析，具体是：采用人因分析方法评估火灾对人员动作的影响，确定和量化火灾概率安全分析模型的开发和定量过程中出现的人员失效事件及人员失效事件的概率值。
可选地，所述根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，具体包括：根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，识别出风险重要电缆，与基于确定论得到的防火包覆电缆清单进行合并，形成初始的防火包覆电缆清单。
本实施例中，在基于确定论得到的防火包覆电缆清单的基础上，合并本实施例步骤103根据核电厂的火灾风险结果得到的重要电缆清单，以形成初始的防火包覆电缆清单，使得该初始的防火包覆电缆清单更为全面，满足核电厂的安全性。此外，通过对后续得到的电缆防火保护目标清单进行优化，能获取基于确定论得到的防火包覆电缆清单中过于保守所选取的具体电缆，更体现出本实施例的优越性，即获取安全性与经济性的最优的电缆防火保护清单。
实施例2：
本实施例提供的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法的流程如图2所示，包括如下步骤：
步骤(1)划分火灾影响区域，即获取火灾隔间的划分结果
定义核电厂分析边界，并基于消防设计中的防火分区将核电厂分析边界中的区域划分成若干个火灾隔间。核电厂分析边界定义的目的是所定义的分析边界能够包容所有对火灾风险具有明显的潜在贡献的区域。核电厂分析边界从电 厂的保护区开始，包括与反应堆正常和应急运行、支持系统以及电力生产(如汽轮机厂房)相关的全部电厂区域。对核电厂分析边界中的区域，需要划分成若干火灾隔间，以开展内部火灾概率安全分析(PSA)。火灾隔间划分的目的是将核电厂划分为一系列的实体分析单元，将电厂的设备与电缆对应到这些区域以研究火灾的影响。
本实施例中，以某压水堆核电厂为例，火灾影响区域包括反应堆厂房、安全厂房、电气厂房、核辅助厂房、柴油发电机厂房等，火灾隔间包括反应堆厂房防火区、安全厂房中压安注泵房间、蓄电池A列房间、直流及交流不间断配电A列、仪控电子设备间等几百个火灾隔间。
步骤(2)识别火灾隔间中的火灾PSA设备
识别火灾隔间中的火灾概率安全分析(PSA)设备，确定火灾概率安全分析范围，以获取火灾PSA设备。火灾PSA设备即火灾PSA电厂响应模型中所涉及的电厂设备。火灾不会造成钢等高熔点金属的损坏，非能动的机械设备如手动阀、截止阀、过滤器、热交换器等不需要包含在火灾PSA设备的清单中。为了保证火灾PSA设备清单的完整性，首先，建立初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单，根据核电厂的系统设计资料、电气及工艺设备布置资料等，将所有可能受到火灾损坏的设备都列入了初始火灾PSA设备清单中。初始的火灾PSA设备清单包括了所有火灾失效可能直接导致堆芯损坏或导致始发事件，以及用于缓解火灾始发事件使核电厂达到安全稳定状态所需的构筑物、系统和设备(SSC)，火灾PSA设备清单的范围确定了火灾PSA的分析范围。
在初始的火灾PSA设备清单中，包含了所有可能受到火灾影响的设备，但是其中某些设备的失效并不会对核电厂的正常运行及安全停堆造成影响，无需在火灾PSA模型中进行模化。因此，需要进一步对初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单中的设备进行筛选，形成便于支持内部火灾PSA建模分析工作的火灾PSA设备清单。
在对设备清单进行筛选前，需要对初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单中的设备进行失效模式及影响分析(FMEA)，分析设备在火灾中的失效模式可能造成的后果，再通过一定筛选准则确定是否保留在火灾PSA设备清单中(例如，对于设备失效不会对核电厂的正常运行及安全停堆造成影响的设备在所述初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单中去除)。
本实施例中，以某压水堆核电厂直流及交流不间断配电A列房间为火灾隔间示例，该火灾隔间内主要设备见下表1。
表1火灾PSA设备
设备编码 设备类型 设备描述
EDA001TB 配电盘 110V直流配电柜
EDG001TB 配电盘 110V直流配电柜
ECC001TB 配电盘 48V直流配电柜
EAG001TB 配电盘 220V交流配电柜
EDA001RD 蓄电池充电器和逆变器 110V蓄电池充电器
EDA002RD 蓄电池充电器和逆变器 110V蓄电池充电器
ECC001RD 蓄电池充电器和逆变器 48V蓄电池充电器
ECC002RD 蓄电池充电器和逆变器 48V蓄电池充电器
EAG001DL 蓄电池充电器和逆变器 220V逆变器
EAG001TR 变压器 旁路变压器
步骤(3)识别火灾隔间中的火灾PSA电缆
火灾PSA电缆即与火灾PSA设备相关的电缆。火灾PSA电缆的选取以火灾PSA设备清单为基础，选取火灾PSA设备相关的电缆，包括供电、控制、显示及仪表电缆等。在此步骤中将所有可能影响设备运行的电缆列入火灾PSA电缆清单中，建立起火灾PSA电缆与火灾PSA设备的关联。
本实施例中，火灾PSA电缆清单对火灾隔间内的每一根电缆建立“电缆—关联设备—敷设位置”这三者之间的相关性，该火灾隔间内主要电缆见下表2，其中表2中的关联设备指与该火灾隔间内电缆相关联的可影响设备运行的设备，例如，该火灾隔间内的火灾PSA电缆的一端连接该火灾隔间内的火灾PSA设备， 另一端连接其他火灾隔间的可因电缆故障产生影响设备运行的设备，或者该火灾隔间内的火灾PSA电缆的两端分别连接的火灾PSA设备均在其他火灾隔间内。
表2火灾PSA电缆
电缆编码 系列 关联设备 不利的失效模式
TFAC0595 A TFA081VV 拒关
EAWB0234 A TFA081VV 拒关
PRSC0164 A PRS208VV 误关闭
PRSC0169 A PRS308VV 误关闭
ETEB0242 A PRS208VV 误关闭
ETEB0244 A PRS308VV 误关闭
ETEB0241 A PRS208VV 误关闭
ETEB0243 A PRS308VV 误关闭
ETEB0240 A PRS108VV 误关闭
PRSC0159 A PRS108VV 误关闭
ETEB0239 A PRS108VV 误关闭
ETEB0241 A PRS208VV 误关闭
ETEB0243 A PRS308VV 误关闭
PCSC0102 A PCS101VD 误动作
PCSC0112 A PCS103VD 误动作
PCSC0122 A PCS112VD 误动作
PCSC0202 A PCS201VD 误动作
PCSC0212 A PCS203VD 误动作
PCSC0222 A PCS212VD 误动作
PCSC0302 A PCS301VD 误动作
PCSC0312 A PCS303VD 误动作
PCSC0322 A PCS312VD 误动作
步骤(4)点火源识别和计算火灾隔间的点火频率
点火源即可能导致火灾的火源，核电厂中的点火源包括固定点火源和临时性火灾两类。固定点火源是指在核电厂设计中就已经存在的位置固定、燃烧参数已知的点火源，如电气柜、电机等；另一种是由于临时性贮存或人员活动引入的位置和燃烧参数均无法确定的临时性火灾。
点火频率计算是进行火灾情景分析和火灾定量化的基础。火灾隔间的点火频率为隔间内所有点火源的点火频率λ IS,J之和。点火源的点火频率由以下公式计算：
λ IS,J＝λ ISW LW IS,J,L
其中：
λ IS为点火源IS的通用点火频率；
W L为点火源的位置权重因子；
W IS,J,L为点火源权重因子，表示火灾隔间J中对应电厂区域L的IS类点火源的数量权重。
本实施例中，固定点火源包括蓄电池、电动泵、柴油发电机、空气压缩机、充电器、电气柜、母线、接线盒、氢气罐等。临时火灾包括焊接和切割引起的电缆火灾、焊接和切割引起的临时火灾、临时和高温作业等。通过统计房间内的点火源数量计算点火频率，该火灾隔间内的点火频率见表3。
表3火灾隔间的点火频率
Figure PCTCN2021143463-appb-000001
步骤(5)开发火灾PSA模型
火灾PSA模型是考虑火灾风险特点后由事件树、故障树和基本数据等构成 的风险逻辑模型。火灾隔间的划分、设备和电缆的选取以及点火频率的计算都是火灾PSA模型的输入条件。火灾PSA模型可以对核电厂在火灾情形下的真实响应进行模化，计算火灾所导致的堆芯损伤频率(CDF)，定量化火灾给核电厂所带来的风险。核电厂火灾PSA模型的建立是在已有的功率工况、低功率和停堆工况内部事件一级PSA模型基础上完成，并反映电厂的实际设计、竣工、运行(即已有的运行经验)情况。
火灾PSA模型的建立以内部事件一级PSA模型为基础，内部事件一级PSA模型中的下列技术要素也都包含在火灾PSA模型中：
电厂运行状态分析；
始发事件分析；
事件序列分析；
系统分析；
人员可靠性分析；
数据分析。
本实施例中，该火灾隔间的始发事件为丧失A列直流电源。事件序列分析主要参考已有事故处理规程，可转入内部事件丧失A列直流电事件树中处理。在火灾中设备会有特定的失效模式和失效概率，需要对内部事件模型中的故障树进行修改或增补。火灾的发生会对人员动作的执行产生多种不利影响，人员可靠性分析考虑火灾的影响，重新计算火灾影响下的人误事件失效概率。该火灾隔间内的火灾风险模型如图3-图5的示例。
步骤(6)电路失效分析
电路失效分析的主要目的是分析导致目标设备失效的电缆或电路的失效模式，并确定失效模式发生的概率值。
电路失效模式分析是通过对与目标设备相关的电缆、电路开展详细分析，确定设备对电缆或电路失效模式的响应，筛除不会影响设备执行需求功能的电 缆。电路的失效主要源于电缆暴露于火灾中，从而导致电缆绝缘功能损害，进而引起电路故障，因此电路失效模式分析主要是电缆失效模式及其相应的电路响应的分析。
本实施例中，根据电路的特性，确定电路失效模式的发生概率。该火灾隔间电路失效分析结果如表4所示。
表4火灾导致失效的电缆
Figure PCTCN2021143463-appb-000002
步骤(7)火灾后人员可靠性分析
采用合适的人因分析方法评估火灾对人员动作的影响，确定和量化火灾PSA 模型的开发和定量过程中出现的人员失效事件及其概率值。火灾人员可靠性分析(HRA)分析中，始发事件前人员可靠性分析与内部事件PSA相同，始发事件后(C类)人员可靠性分析主要参考NUREG-1921导则推荐的方法，按筛选值、Scoping和详细分析三个阶段进行。
本实施例中，根据核电厂现场人因访谈，得到火灾后人员响应过程。火灾人员响应具有以下特点：1)事故情景更加复杂。2)人员压力和工作负荷更高。3)执行动作的环境因素更加恶劣。4)针对火灾情景的培训和演练相对较少，熟练程度相对较低。5)主控室火灾需特定分析。
人员可靠性分析定量化分析主要基于NUREG-1921导则，在人员可靠性分析分析中，大致将火灾情景分为主控室火灾和非主控室火灾，对于主控室火灾情景中操纵员工作站退防和主控室后撤等在火灾PSA中新增的人误事件，鉴于其分析的复杂性，在定量化过程中主要采用专家判断的方法进行量化。
步骤(8)火灾情景分析
火灾情景是描述火灾事件的一组要素。火灾情景根据一个或多个点火源的火灾的特征和结果进行定义。
对于在风险较高的隔间需要开展火灾情景级别的详细分析。将火灾隔间级别的分析细化为火灾情景级别的分析并在火灾PSA模型中模化，评估各火灾情景的火灾风险。
初步的定量化分析是以火灾隔间为单位进行的，基于“任一点火源起火就会导致隔间内所有设备和电缆损坏”的保守假设进行了初步的火灾风险定量化。但实际上火灾的发展和蔓延过程是与点火源类型、环境条件等密切相关的，某些点火源起火可能只会影响到有限的范围，并不会造成火灾隔间内所有设备和电缆损坏。因此，为了更加真实的评估火灾风险，对于定量筛选中保留的火灾隔间需要开展火灾情景级别的分析。
本实施例中，该火灾隔间的初步定量化结果为7.84E-05/堆年，需要进行详 细分析，将电路失效分析和火灾后人员可靠性分析结果代入火灾PSA模型。
步骤(9)火灾风险结果定量化
通过对火灾PSA模型进行定量化分析，计算并得到核电厂的火灾风险，确定火灾CDF的主要贡献。具体计算方法为本领域的公知技术，通过在软件中构建逻辑模型，按模型逻辑计算生成最小割集(MCS)，然后通过调取模型中的数据输入进行计算。
不确定性分析
不确定性分析的目的就是对分析结果中的不确定性给出定性讨论和定量评价。尽管PSA模型试图模化核电厂的现实情况，但是，有时为了简化模型及工作的顺利进行，不可避免地会对复杂的过程和现象引入一些简化或理想化的假设，这些都会给分析结果带来不确定性。
敏感性分析
敏感性分析的目的包括评价CDF对始发事件、人误等数据的敏感性，分析讨论对结果有潜在重大影响的建模假设，通过确定一系列敏感性分析案例，将案例参数值变化10倍(敏感性因子一般设为10)，计算其影响程度。
本实施例中，对火灾PSA模型进行定量化分析，计算并得到该房间的火灾情景分析定量化结果如表5所示，这是未考虑电缆防火保护的基准风险结果。
表5未考虑电缆防火保护的基准风险结果
Figure PCTCN2021143463-appb-000003
Figure PCTCN2021143463-appb-000004
步骤(10)识别并模化初步防火包覆电缆清单
基于内部火灾PSA模型定量分析结果，识别出风险重要电缆，与确定论防火包覆电缆清单进行对比、合并，形成初步防火包覆电缆清单，在火灾PSA模型中对这些电缆进行识别和模化。
本实施例中，该火灾隔间内的电缆涉及到辅助给水系统(TFA)、二次侧非能动余热导出系统(PRS)和非能动安全壳热量导出系统(PCS)。由于表4中TFA和PRS相关设备是执行同一项安全功能所必须的，因此这些电缆必须同时保护，否则任一根电缆的防火包覆取消将导致CDF增量大于1E-8/堆年。PCS是执行另一项安全功能的，其设计为3列配置，PSA中认为该系统执行功能最少需两列成功运行，因此需至少保证表4中PCS电缆有两列得到防火包覆。在模型中识别出TFA、PRS和PCS相应的目标电缆，分别依据以下三种方案对火灾PSA模型进行修改：
1.保护TFA和PRS相关电缆；
2.保护PCS一列电缆；
3.保护PCS两列电缆。
步骤(11)判断火灾风险定量化结果是否满足安全目标
定量化步骤(9)考虑初步防火包覆清单后的火灾PSA模型，如果风险定量化分析结果不能满足概率安全目标(以中国为例，CDF ALL为1E-5/堆年，LRF ALL为1E-6/堆年)，则进一步通过模型识别出受火灾影响的关键电缆，继续提出增加防火包覆的要求，直至概率安全目标满足。
本实施例中，定量化步骤(10)三种方案的火灾PSA模型，定量化风险结果满足概率安全目标。
步骤(12)计算实施包覆与否的风险变化量
通过对电缆防火保护清单反复迭代和模型定量化计算，计算电缆组合实施包覆与否的风险变化量。在概率安全目标满足的前提下，对多种方案(即不同的电缆组合)的风险进行比较分析，采取合理的筛选准则，对于风险增量较小的情景，可以选择不进行防火包覆，可接受的风险增量可由以下方式计算：
根据核电厂所在国家的核安全监管要求，确定总的概率安全指标要求，CDF ALL，LRF ALL，如果某根电缆的防火包覆取消导致的风险增量小于概率安全指标要求的0.1％，则可以考虑接受。以中国为例，CDF ALL为1E-5/堆年，LRF ALL为1E-6/堆年，因此如果某根电缆的防火包覆取消导致CDF增量小于1E-8/堆年，LRF增量小于1E-9/堆年，则可以考虑接受。
本实施例中，针对目标电缆进行防火包覆和不进行防火包覆两种情景分别计算，评估两种情景的堆芯损坏频率。以不进行防火保护为基准方案，分别计算三种防火保护方案的风险结果，如表6所示。
表6考虑不同电缆防火保护方案的风险结果
Figure PCTCN2021143463-appb-000005
步骤(13)得到优化后的电缆防火保护清单
通过步骤(10)到步骤(12)的反复迭代，对电缆防火保护方案进行对比分析，在概率安全目标满足的前提下，选择同时兼具安全性和经济性的最优解，得到最终优化后的电缆防火保护清单。
本实施例中，对表6的风险结果进行比较分析得到，保护TFA和PRS相 关电缆方案获得的风险平衡收益最大，即确定对该房间中的EAWB0234、TFAC0595、ETEB0242、ETEB0241、PRSC0164、ETEB0244、ETEB0243、PRSC0169、ETEB0240、ETEB0239、PRSC0159电缆进行防火保护以降低火灾风险。
针对全厂高风险火灾隔间均可依据上述步骤进行防火保护电缆选取。
实施例3：
本实施例提供一种基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取装置，包括建模模块、计算模块、获取模块、确定模块。
建模模块，用于构建初始的火灾概率安全分析模型。
计算模块，与建模模块连接，用于进行电路失效分析和火灾后人员可靠性分析，将分析结果代入初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，并进行火灾情景分析，得到改进的火灾概率安全分析模型，并对改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行定量化分析，计算并得到核电厂的火灾风险结果。
获取模块，与计算模块连接，用于根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，在改进的火灾概率安全分析模型中对所述初始的防火包覆电缆清单中的电缆进行识别和模化，并得到电缆模化后的火灾风险定量化结果。
确定模块，与获取模块连接，用于判断所述火灾风险定量化结果是否满足概率安全目标，若不满足，则进一步根据核电厂的火灾风险结果获取受火灾影响的其他电缆，将所述其他电缆增加至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中再利用改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行识别和模化，直至得到的火灾风险定量化结果满足概率安全目标，则停止再增加电缆至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，以得到电缆防火保护目标清单。
可选地，基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取装置还包括优化模块。
计算模块，还用于计算电缆防火保护目标清单中电缆组合实施包覆与否的风险结果。
优化模块，与计算模块和确定模块连接，用于根据计算模块得到的火灾风险定量化结果，判断电缆组合的未实施包覆的第一风险结果与实施包覆的第二风险结果的大小，并根据判断结果得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单。
对于本领域技术人员而言，显然本发明的结构不限于上述示范性实施例的细节，而且在不背离本发明的精神或基本特征的情况下，能够以其他的具体形式实现本发明。因此，无论从哪一点来看，均应将实施例看作是示范性的，而且是非限制性的，本发明的范围由所附权利要求而不是上述说明限定，因此旨在将落在权利要求的等同要件的含义和范围内的所有变化囊括在本发明内。不应将权利要求中的任何附图标记视为限制所涉及的权利要求。
此外，应当理解，虽然本说明书按照实施方式加以描述，但并非每个实施方式仅包含一个独立的技术方案，说明书的这种叙述方式仅仅是为清楚起见，本领域技术人员应当将说明书作为一个整体，各实施例中的技术方案也可以经适当组合，形成本领域技术人员可以理解的其他实施方式。

Claims (12)

  1. 一种基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，其特征在于，包括如下步骤：
    构建初始的火灾概率安全分析模型；
    进行电路失效分析和火灾后人员可靠性分析，将分析结果代入初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，并进行火灾情景分析，得到改进的火灾概率安全分析模型；
    对改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行定量化分析，计算并得到核电厂的火灾风险结果；
    根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，在改进的火灾概率安全分析模型中对所述初始的防火包覆电缆清单中的电缆进行识别和模化，并得到电缆模化后的火灾风险定量化结果；
    判断所述火灾风险定量化结果是否满足概率安全目标，若不满足，则进一步根据核电厂的火灾风险结果获取受火灾影响的其他电缆，将所述其他电缆增加至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，再利用改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行识别和模化，直至得到的火灾风险定量化结果满足概率安全目标，则停止再增加电缆至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，以得到电缆防火保护目标清单。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，其特征在于，在所述得到电缆防火保护目标清单之后，还包括：
    计算电缆防火保护目标清单中电缆组合实施包覆与否的风险结果，判断电缆组合的未实施包覆的第一风险结果与实施包覆的第二风险结果的大小，并根据判断结果得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方 法，其特征在于，所述根据判断结果得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单，具体包括：
    若判断结果为电缆组合的未实施包覆的第一风险结果与实施包覆的第二风险结果的差值小于预设阈值，则在电缆防火保护目标清单中剔除所述电缆组合的相应电缆，以得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单，若否，则在电缆防火保护目标清单中保留所述电缆组合的相应电缆。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，其特征在于，预设阈值为概率安全指标要求的0.1％。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，其特征在于，所述构建初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，具体包括：
    以核电厂内部事件一级概率安全分析模型为基础，考虑火灾风险特点后由事件树、故障树和基本数据构建风险逻辑模型；
    获取火灾隔间的划分、火灾概率安全分析的设备和火灾概率安全分析的电缆，以及火灾隔间的点火频率，并将三者均作为所述风险逻辑模型的输入条件，得到初始的火灾概率安全分析模型。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，其特征在于，所述获取火灾隔间的划分、火灾概率安全分析的设备和火灾概率安全分析的电缆，以及火灾隔间的点火频率，具体包括：
    定义核电厂分析边界，并基于消防设计中的防火分区将核电厂分析边界中的区域划分成若干个火灾隔间；
    识别火灾隔间中的火灾概率安全分析设备，确定火灾概率安全分析范围，以获取火灾概率安全分析的设备；
    以火灾概率安全分析的设备为基础，识别出火灾隔间中的火灾概率安全分析电缆，并建立电缆与火灾概率安全分析设备的关联；
    识别火灾隔间中的点火源并计算得到火灾隔间的点火频率。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，其特征在于，所述获取火灾概率安全分析的设备，具体包括：
    建立初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单，根据核电厂的系统设计资料、电气及工艺设备布置资料，将所有可能受到火灾损坏的设备都列入初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单中；
    对初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单中的设备进行失效模式及影响分析，对于设备失效不会对核电厂的正常运行及安全停堆造成影响的设备在所述初始的火灾概率安全分析设备清单中去除。
  8. 根据权利要求6所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，其特征在于，所述点火源包括固定点火源和临时性火灾两类，
    所述计算得到火灾隔间的点火频率，具体包括：
    计算火灾隔间的所述点火频率为隔间内所有点火源的点火频率λ IS,J之和，以得到火灾隔间的点火频率，其中，单个点火源的点火频率λ IS,J计算公式如下：
    λ IS,J＝λ ISW LW IS,J,L
    其中，
    λ IS为点火源IS的通用点火频率；
    W L为点火源的位置权重因子；
    W IS,J,L为点火源权重因子，表示火灾隔间J中对应电厂区域L的IS类点火源的数量权重。
  9. 根据权利要求1所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，其特征在于，进行电路失效分析，具体是：分析导致目标设备失效的电缆或电路的失效模式，并确定失效模式发生的概率值；
    火灾后人员可靠性分析，具体是：采用人因分析方法评估火灾对人员动作的影响，确定和量化火灾概率安全分析模型的开发和定量过程中出现的人员失效事件及人员失效事件的概率值。
  10. 根据权利要求1所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取方法，其特征在于，所述根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，具体包括：
    根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，识别出风险重要电缆，与基于确定论得到的防火包覆电缆清单进行合并，形成初始的防火包覆电缆清单。
  11. 一种基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取装置，其特征在于，包括建模模块、计算模块、获取模块、确定模块，
    建模模块，用于构建初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，
    计算模块，与建模模块连接，用于进行电路失效分析和火灾后人员可靠性分析，将分析结果代入初始的火灾概率安全分析模型，并进行火灾情景分析，得到改进的火灾概率安全分析模型，并对改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行定量化分析，计算并得到核电厂的火灾风险结果；
    获取模块，与计算模块连接，用于根据核电厂的火灾风险结果，获取初始的防火包覆电缆清单，在改进的火灾概率安全分析模型中对所述初始的防火包覆电缆清单中的电缆进行识别和模化，并得到电缆模化后的火灾风险定量化结果，
    确定模块，与获取模块连接，用于判断所述火灾风险定量化结果是否满足 概率安全目标，若不满足，则进一步根据核电厂的火灾风险结果获取受火灾影响的其他电缆，将所述其他电缆增加至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中再利用改进的火灾概率安全分析模型进行识别和模化，直至得到的火灾风险定量化结果满足概率安全目标，则停止再增加电缆至初始的防火包覆电缆清单中，以得到电缆防火保护目标清单。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的基于概率安全分析的核电厂电缆防火保护选取装置，其特征在于，还包括优化模块，
    计算模块，还用于计算电缆防火保护目标清单中电缆组合实施包覆与否的风险结果，
    优化模块，与计算模块和确定模块连接，用于根据计算模块得到的火灾风险定量化结果，判断电缆组合的未实施包覆的第一风险结果与实施包覆的第二风险结果的大小，并根据判断结果得到优化后的电缆防火保护目标清单。
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