WO2021083000A1 - 认证向量的生成方法、获取方法及设备 - Google Patents

认证向量的生成方法、获取方法及设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021083000A1
WO2021083000A1 PCT/CN2020/122423 CN2020122423W WO2021083000A1 WO 2021083000 A1 WO2021083000 A1 WO 2021083000A1 CN 2020122423 W CN2020122423 W CN 2020122423W WO 2021083000 A1 WO2021083000 A1 WO 2021083000A1
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Prior art keywords
authentication
authentication vector
request message
udm
function
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English (en)
French (fr)
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齐旻鹏
刘畅
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China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd
Research Institute of China Mobile Communication Co Ltd
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China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd
Research Institute of China Mobile Communication Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to the field of mobile communication technology, and in particular to a method for generating an authentication vector, a method for obtaining an authentication vector, and a device.
  • 5G network master certification when users access the 5G network, they need to mutually confirm their identities with the network and establish a secure connection. Therefore, they need to perform two-way authentication with the 5G network. Through authentication, the two-way identity confirmation between the user (User Equipment, UE) and the 5G network is realized. And generate the necessary session key for the subsequent secure connection.
  • the above certification is called 5G network master certification.
  • Figure 1 shows the 5G network master authentication process of related technologies, including steps 0-12, as shown in Figure 1:
  • APRF Access and Mobility Management Function
  • AUSF Authentication Server Function
  • ARPF Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function
  • UDM/ARPF needs to create a 5G Home Environment Authentication Vector (HE AV) for each Nudm_Authenticate_Get Request message.
  • HE AV 5G Home Environment Authentication Vector
  • UDM/ARPF first generates an authentication management field (Authentication Management Field, AMF), in which the "separation bit" is 1. Then, UDM/ARPF derives K AUSF and XRES* based on the long-term key K. Finally, UDM/ARPF should create a 5G HE AV containing RAND, AUTN, XRES* and K AUSF , and return the requested 5G HE AV to AUSF in the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response message. It can be seen from the process shown in Figure 1 that the storage and generation of the authentication vector of the related technology are all completed in UDM/ARPF.
  • AMF Authentication Management Field
  • At least one embodiment of the present disclosure provides a method for generating an authentication vector, a method for obtaining an authentication vector, and a device to reduce the risk of leakage of a long-term key and improve the security of the system.
  • At least one embodiment provides a method for generating an authentication vector, which is applied to an authentication function, including:
  • the authentication function receives an authentication vector request message sent by UDM, where the authentication vector request message carries a user identity identifier and a visited network identifier;
  • the authentication function obtains a locally stored long-term key according to the user identity identifier, and calculates an authentication vector based on the long-term key and the visited network identifier.
  • the authentication function and UDM are independent of each other, and there is a preset interface Narpf between the two;
  • the authentication function receives the authentication vector request message sent by the UDM through the preset interface Narpf, and sends an authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector to the UDM through the preset interface Narpf.
  • the authentication vector request message is a Narpf_authentication_get Request message
  • the authentication vector response message is Narpf_authentication_get Response message.
  • the step of calculating an authentication vector according to the long-term key and the visited network identifier includes:
  • the authentication function obtains the long-term key and its corresponding serial number SQN, and generates a random number RAND;
  • the authentication function performs an exclusive OR operation on the random number RAND and the operator's configuration parameter OPc, and uses a long-term key to perform an encryption operation to obtain a first intermediate result;
  • the first parameter group uses the first parameter group to perform a first calculation process on the first intermediate result to obtain a first calculation result, and perform an exclusive OR operation on the preset bits of the first half of the first calculation result and the serial number SQN to obtain The first parameter
  • the authentication function generates a response value XRES* based on the second half of the first calculation result, the random number RAND, and the visited network identifier;
  • the serial number SQN, the authentication management parameters AMF, SQN, and AMF required for authentication stored locally are cascaded, and the fourth parameter group is used to perform the second operation processing on the cascaded parameters to obtain the second operation result, and extract the first operation result. 2. In the first half of the calculation result, the second parameter is obtained;
  • the first parameter, the AMF, and the second parameter are cascaded to obtain the authentication token AUTN, and the RAND, AUTN, XRES* and K AUSF are used as authentication vector parameters to obtain the authentication vector.
  • At least one embodiment provides a method for obtaining an authentication vector, which is applied to a unified data management UDM, including:
  • the UDM After receiving the first authentication vector request message sent by the identity authentication server function AUSF, the UDM sends a second authentication vector request message to the authentication function.
  • the second authentication vector request message carries the user's identity and the visited network identity. ;
  • the UDM receives the authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector sent by the authentication function.
  • the UDM and authentication functions are independent of each other, and there is a preset interface Narpf between the two;
  • the UDM sends the second authentication vector request message to the authentication function through the preset interface Narpf, and receives the authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector sent by the authentication function through the preset interface Narpf.
  • the second authentication vector request message is a Narpf_authentication_get Request message
  • the authentication vector response message is Narpf_authentication_get Response message.
  • At least one embodiment provides a UDM, including:
  • the first receiving module is configured to receive the first authentication vector request message sent by the identity authentication server function AUSF;
  • the sending module is configured to send a second authentication vector request message to the authentication function after receiving the first authentication vector request message, where the second authentication vector request message carries the user's identity identifier and the visited network identifier;
  • the second receiving module is configured to receive the authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector sent by the authentication function.
  • At least one embodiment provides a UDM including a transceiver and a processor, wherein,
  • the transceiver is configured to receive the first authentication vector request message sent by the identity authentication server function AUSF;
  • the processor is configured to receive a first authentication vector request message in the transceiver, and send a second authentication vector request message to the authentication function, where the second authentication vector request message carries the user's identity identifier and the visited network identifier ; And, receiving the authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector sent by the authentication function.
  • At least one embodiment provides a UDM including: a processor, a memory, and a program stored on the memory and capable of running on the processor, and the program is processed by the processor.
  • a UDM including: a processor, a memory, and a program stored on the memory and capable of running on the processor, and the program is processed by the processor.
  • At least one embodiment provides an authentication function including:
  • a receiving module configured to receive an authentication vector request message sent by UDM, where the authentication vector request message carries a user identity identifier and a visited network identifier;
  • the calculation module is configured to obtain a locally stored long-term key according to the user identity identifier, and calculate an authentication vector based on the long-term key and the visited network identifier.
  • At least one embodiment provides an authentication function including a transceiver and a processor, wherein:
  • the transceiver is configured to receive an authentication vector request message sent by UDM, where the authentication vector request message carries a user identity identifier and a visited network identifier;
  • the processor is configured to obtain a locally stored long-term key according to the user identity identifier, and calculate an authentication vector based on the long-term key and the visited network identifier.
  • At least one embodiment provides an authentication function, including: a processor, a memory, and a program stored on the memory and capable of running on the processor, the program being When the processor executes, the steps of the method for obtaining the authentication vector as described above are implemented.
  • At least one embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium with a program stored on the computer-readable storage medium, and when the program is executed by a processor, it implements the method described above. step.
  • the authentication vector generation method, acquisition method, and device put the storage of long-term keys and authentication vector generation in the authentication function, and separate the authentication function from UDM This can ensure that the storage of the long-term key and the generation of the authentication vector are carried out in the same network element, avoiding the risk of leakage caused by the transmission of the long-term key in different network elements; at the same time, it also ensures that the UDM is used as a data management device. Only responsible for information processing, not involved in data storage.
  • the introduction of UDM transparent transmission also effectively inherits the relevant authentication architecture to prevent the introduction of new network elements/network functions from causing changes to the message interface, which will lead to the problem of backward compatibility of the network.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the process of 5G network master authentication in related technologies
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of an embodiment of the disclosure
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of the generation process of the authentication vector of the related technology
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for obtaining an authentication vector provided by an embodiment of the disclosure
  • FIG. 5 is another flowchart of the method for obtaining authentication vectors provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a method for generating an authentication vector provided by an embodiment of the disclosure.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of a structure of UDM provided by an embodiment of the disclosure.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of another structure of UDM provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of a structure of an authentication function provided by an embodiment of the disclosure.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of another structure of an authentication function provided by an embodiment of the disclosure.
  • the technology described in this article is not limited to NR systems and Long Time Evolution (LTE)/LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) systems, and can also be used in various wireless communication systems, such as code division multiple access.
  • Code Division Multiple Access CDMA
  • Time Division Multiple Access TDMA
  • Frequency Division Multiple Access FDMA
  • Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access OFDMA
  • Single-carrier Frequency-Division Multiple Access SC-FDMA
  • SC-FDMA Single-carrier Frequency-Division Multiple Access
  • the terms “system” and “network” are often used interchangeably.
  • the CDMA system can implement radio technologies such as CDMA2000 and Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA).
  • UTRA includes Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) and other CDMA variants.
  • the TDMA system can implement radio technologies such as the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM).
  • GSM Global System for Mobile Communication
  • the OFDMA system can implement radios such as UltraMobile Broadband (UMB), Evolved UTRA (Evolution-UTRA, E-UTRA), IEEE802.21 (Wi-Fi), IEEE802.16 (WiMAX), IEEE802.20, Flash-OFDM, etc. technology.
  • UMB UltraMobile Broadband
  • Evolved UTRA Evolved UTRA
  • E-UTRA Evolved UTRA
  • IEEE802.21 Wi-Fi
  • WiMAX IEEE802.16
  • IEEE802.20 Flash-OFDM
  • Flash-OFDM Flash-OFDM
  • UTRA, E-UTRA, UMTS, LTE, LTE-A, and GSM are described in documents from an organization named "3rd Generation Partnership Project” (3GPP).
  • CDMA2000 and UMB are described in documents from an organization named “3rd Generation Partnership Project 2" (3GPP2).
  • the techniques described in this article can be used for the systems and radio technologies mentioned above, as well as other systems and radio technologies.
  • the following description describes the NR system for exemplary purposes, and NR terminology is used in most of the following description, although these techniques can also be applied to applications other than NR system applications.
  • the wireless communication system includes a terminal 21 and a network device 22.
  • the terminal 21 may also be referred to as a user terminal or a user equipment (UE), and the terminal 21 may be a mobile phone, a tablet (Personal Computer), a laptop (Laptop Computer), or a personal digital assistant (Personal Digital Assistant).
  • PDA mobile Internet device
  • MID mobile Internet Device
  • Wearable Device wearable Device
  • vehicle-mounted device and other terminal-side devices
  • the network device 22 may be a base station and/or a core network element, where the above-mentioned base station may be a base station of 5G and later versions (for example: gNB, 5G NR NB, etc.), or a base station in other communication systems (for example: eNB, WLAN Access point, or other access points, etc.), where the base station can be called Node B, Evolved Node B, Access Point, Base Transceiver Station (BTS), Radio Base Station, Radio Transceiver, Basic Service Set (Basic Service Set, BSS), Extended Service Set (Extended Service Set, ESS), Node B, Evolved Node B (eNB), Home Node B, Home Evolved Node B, WLAN Access Point, WiFi Node or As long as some other suitable terminology in the field achieves the same technical effect, the base station is not limited to a specific technical vocabulary. It should be noted that in the embodiments of the present disclosure, only the base station in the NR system is taken as an example, but not The specific
  • the base station may communicate with the terminal 21 under the control of the base station controller.
  • the base station controller may be a part of the core network or some base stations. Some base stations can communicate control information or user data with the core network through the backhaul. In some examples, some of these base stations may directly or indirectly communicate with each other through a backhaul link, which may be a wired or wireless communication link.
  • the wireless communication system can support operations on multiple carriers (waveform signals of different frequencies). Multi-carrier transmitters can simultaneously transmit modulated signals on these multiple carriers. For example, each communication link may be a multi-carrier signal modulated according to various radio technologies. Each modulated signal can be sent on a different carrier and can carry control information (for example, reference signals, control channels, etc.), overhead information, data, and so on.
  • the base station can wirelessly communicate with the terminal 21 via one or more access point antennas. Each base station can provide communication coverage for its corresponding coverage area. The coverage area of an access point can be divided into sectors that constitute only a part of the coverage area.
  • the wireless communication system may include different types of base stations (for example, a macro base station, a micro base station, or a pico base station).
  • the base station can also utilize different radio technologies, such as cellular or WLAN radio access technologies.
  • the base stations can be associated with the same or different access networks or operator deployments.
  • the coverage areas of different base stations may overlap.
  • the communication link in the wireless communication system may include an uplink for carrying uplink (UL) transmission (for example, from the terminal 21 to the network device 22), or for carrying a downlink (DL) Transmission (e.g., from the network device 22 to the terminal 21) downlink.
  • UL transmission may also be referred to as reverse link transmission
  • DL transmission may also be referred to as forward link transmission.
  • Downlink transmission can use licensed frequency bands, unlicensed frequency bands, or both.
  • uplink transmission can be performed using licensed frequency bands, unlicensed frequency bands, or both.
  • ARPF is defined as a network element that stores long-term keys K and generates authentication vectors, and is merged with UDM.
  • AUSF initiates an authentication request to UDM and obtains the authentication vector from UDM; in addition, in order to facilitate network maintenance, the calculation and storage are separated in the later design, a new definition Unified Data Repository (UDR) as a unified data storage device is only used to store data, including the long-term key K used for authentication, but UDR has no computing power;
  • UDM is a unified data management device that is responsible for using long-term The key K generates an authentication vector, but UDM loses the ability to store data.
  • UDR Unified Data Repository
  • the present application provides a new authentication vector acquisition method, which can reduce the risk of leakage of the long-term key K due to transmission, and is compatible with most network elements of related systems.
  • this application proposes a solution to separate the authentication function from UDM, and introduces an independent authentication function (also called ARPF), that is, the authentication function and UDM are independent of each other. It is no longer a function of UDM, but exists independently as another entity.
  • ARPF independent authentication function
  • the authentication function (ARPF) is responsible for storing long-term keys and authentication-related parameters.
  • the authentication function (ARPF) also has the ability to use authentication algorithms (such as the authentication framework MILENAGE recommended by related technologies) and its own storage parameters to generate relevant authentication vectors.
  • the UDM When the user initiates an access request and the network determines that authentication is required, when the UDM receives the authentication vector request message, the UDM no longer processes the authentication vector request message, but sends the authentication vector request message to the independent authentication function. After the authentication function generates the authentication vector, the authentication vector is sent to the UDM through the newly defined interface, and the UDM then transmits the authentication vector to the AUSF using the existing interface.
  • the authentication vector acquisition process of this application includes:
  • Step 41 AUSF sends an authentication vector request message to UDM. Specifically, AUSF can initiate an authentication vector request to UDM through an existing Nudm_authentication_getRequest message.
  • Step 42 after the UDM receives the authentication vector request message, it sends the authentication vector request message to the authentication function through the newly defined interface between UDM and the authentication function (which can be called Narpf), and carries it in the authentication vector request message The user's identity (Identity). Specifically, the UDM may send a Narpf_authentication_getRequest message to the ARPF carrying the user identity and the identity (ID) of the visited network.
  • the authentication function which can be called Narpf
  • the UDM may send a Narpf_authentication_getRequest message to the ARPF carrying the user identity and the identity (ID) of the visited network.
  • Step 43 After receiving the authentication vector request message, the authentication function obtains the long-term key K stored in the authentication function according to the user identity, and uses the long-term key K to calculate the authentication vector (5G HE AV).
  • the following provides a specific authentication vector generation algorithm:
  • the authentication function obtains the long-term key K (128 bits) and the corresponding serial number SQN (48 bits), and generates a random number RAND (128 bits).
  • the authentication function then performs an exclusive OR operation with the random number RAND combined with the operator’s configuration parameter OPc (128 bits), and then uses K to perform an encryption operation on the exclusive OR operation result (for example, AES encryption algorithm or other encryption algorithms can be used),
  • the result of the operation (denoted as the first intermediate result 1) is XORed with OPc again, and the result of the XOR operation is cyclically shifted according to the displacement parameter r2 (128 bits), and the result obtained by the cyclic shift is confused with Parameter c2 (128 bits) is XORed, and then K is used to encrypt the result of the XOR operation, and then OPc is used to perform the XOR operation on the encrypted operation result, and the above XOR operation result (for ease of description, will The XOR operation result becomes the first parameter)
  • the authentication function records the last 64 bits of the first parameter calculated above as RES or XRES, and then generates a response value (denoted as RES* or XRES*) together with RAND and the ID of the visited network as part of the output parameters .
  • the authentication function performs XOR operation on the first intermediate result 1 and OPc, and then performs cyclic shift on the XOR operation result according to the displacement parameter r3 (128 bits), and then performs the cyclic shift on the result obtained by the cyclic shift and the confusion parameter c3 (128 bits)
  • K to perform the encryption operation on the XOR operation result
  • OPc to perform the XOR operation on the encryption operation result
  • the authentication function replaces the r3 and c3 parameters in the above c) process with r4 and c4, and executes it, and uses the result (128 bits) as the session integrity key (denoted as IK) used after the authentication process;
  • the authentication function generates an intermediate key K AUSF (256 bits) based on CK, IK and the ID of the operator of the visited place
  • the authentication function itself saves the authentication management domain parameter AMF required for authentication, takes SQN
  • the authentication function records SQN AK
  • Step 44 The authentication function transmits the authentication vector to UDM.
  • ARPF can send 5G HE AV to UDM through the existing Narpf_authentication_get Response message.
  • Step 45 UDM transparently transmits the authentication vector to AUSF. Specifically, UDM can send 5G HE AV to AUSF through the existing Nudm_authentication_get Response message.
  • this application puts the storage of long-term keys and the generation of authentication vectors in the authentication function, and separates the authentication function from UDM, which can ensure the storage of long-term keys and the generation of authentication vectors. It is carried out in the same network element, avoiding the risk of leakage caused by the transmission of long-term keys in different network elements; at the same time, it also ensures that UDM, as a data management device, is only responsible for information processing and does not participate in data storage. In addition, the introduction of UDM transparent transmission also effectively inherits the relevant authentication architecture to prevent the introduction of new network elements/network functions from causing changes to the message interface, which will lead to the problem of backward compatibility of the network.
  • the following further introduces the method of obtaining the authentication vector of this application from the UDM and authentication function side respectively.
  • Step 51 After receiving the first authentication vector request message sent by the AUSF, the UDM sends a second authentication vector request message to the authentication function.
  • the second authentication vector request message carries the user's identity and the visited network identity.
  • the UDM and the authentication function are two network elements that are independent of each other, and an interface is newly defined between the two, which is referred to herein as Narpf.
  • the UDM may send the second authentication vector request message to the authentication function through the preset interface Narpf.
  • the second authentication vector request message may be a Narpf_authentication_getRequest message.
  • Step 52 The UDM receives the authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector sent by the authentication function.
  • the UDM can receive the authentication vector response message sent by the authentication function through the preset interface Narpf.
  • the authentication vector response message may be a Narpf_authentication_get Response message.
  • the UDM may also forward the authentication vector to the AUSF.
  • this application no longer generates an authentication vector by UDM, but requests an authentication vector from another network element (authentication function), thus avoiding the risk of leakage caused by the transmission of long-term keys between network elements and improving the security of authentication Sex.
  • Step 61 The authentication function receives the authentication vector request message sent by the UDM, where the authentication vector request message carries the user identity identifier and the visited network identifier.
  • the UDM and the authentication function are two network elements that are independent of each other, and an interface is newly defined between the two, which is referred to herein as Narpf.
  • the authentication function may receive the second authentication vector request message sent by UDM through the preset interface Narpf.
  • the second authentication vector request message may be a Narpf_authentication_getRequest message.
  • the user identity identifier specifically includes but is not limited to SUPI/SUCI/5G-GUTI/NAI
  • the visited network identifier includes but is not limited to SN ID (Serving Network Identifier).
  • SUPI refers to Subscriber Permanent Identifier
  • SUCI refers to Subscriber Concealed Identifier
  • 5G-GUTI refers to 5G Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity
  • NAI refers to the Network Access Identifier (NAI Network Access Identifier).
  • Step 62 The authentication function obtains a locally stored long-term key according to the user identity identifier, and calculates an authentication vector based on the long-term key and the visited network identifier.
  • the authentication function may calculate the authentication vector according to the following steps:
  • the authentication function obtains the long-term key and its corresponding serial number SQN, and generates a random number RAND;
  • the authentication function performs an exclusive OR operation on the random number RAND and the operator's configuration parameter OPc, and uses a long-term key to perform an encryption operation to obtain a first intermediate result;
  • the authentication function generates a response value XRES* based on the second half of the first calculation result, the random number RAND, and the visited network identifier;
  • the second arithmetic processing includes sequential XOR operations, cyclic shift, XOR, XOR, encryption, and XOR.
  • Each of the above-mentioned first parameter group to the fourth parameter group includes a corresponding displacement parameter and a confusion parameter used for exclusive OR operation after the displacement.
  • G Concatenate the first parameter, the AMF, and the second parameter to obtain the authentication token AUTN, and use the RAND, AUTN, XRES* and K AUSF as authentication vector parameters to obtain the authentication vector.
  • the authentication function may also send an authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector to the UDM.
  • the authentication function may send an authentication vector response message to the UDM through the preset interface Narpf.
  • the authentication vector response message may be a Narpf_authentication_get Response message.
  • an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a UDM 70, including:
  • the first receiving module 71 is configured to receive the first authentication vector request message sent by the identity authentication server function AUSF;
  • the sending module 72 is configured to send a second authentication vector request message to the authentication function after receiving the first authentication vector request message, where the second authentication vector request message carries the user's identity identifier and the visited network identifier;
  • the second receiving module 73 is configured to receive an authentication vector response message carrying an authentication vector sent by the authentication function.
  • the UDM and the authentication function are independent of each other, and there is a preset interface Narpf between the two.
  • the sending module 72 is further configured to send the second authentication vector request message to the authentication function through the preset interface Narpf
  • the second receiving module 73 is further configured to receive the second authentication vector request message through the preset interface Narpf The authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector sent by the authentication function.
  • the second authentication vector request message is a Narpf_authentication_get Request message
  • the authentication vector response message is a Narpf_authentication_get Response message.
  • an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a schematic structural diagram of UDM 800, which includes a processor 801, a transceiver 802, a memory 803, and a bus interface, where:
  • the transceiver 802 is configured to receive the first authentication vector request message sent by the identity authentication server function AUSF.
  • UDM 800 further includes: a program that is stored in the memory 803 and can be run on the processor 801. When the program is executed by the processor 801, the following steps are implemented:
  • the transceiver 802 is configured to receive a first authentication vector request message at the transceiver, and send a second authentication vector request message to the authentication function.
  • the second authentication vector request message carries the user's identity and the visited network Identification; and, receiving the authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector sent by the authentication function.
  • the bus architecture may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges. Specifically, one or more processors represented by the processor 801 and various circuits of the memory represented by the memory 803 are linked together.
  • the bus architecture can also link various other circuits such as peripherals, voltage regulators, and power management circuits. These are all known in the art, and therefore, no further descriptions are given here.
  • the bus interface provides the interface.
  • the transceiver 802 may be a plurality of elements, including a transmitter and a receiver, and provide a unit for communicating with various other devices on a transmission medium.
  • the processor 801 is responsible for managing the bus architecture and general processing, and the memory 803 can store data used by the processor 801 when performing operations.
  • a computer-readable storage medium on which a program is stored, and the program is executed by a processor to implement the following steps:
  • the identity authentication server function AUSF After receiving the first authentication vector request message sent by the identity authentication server function AUSF, send a second authentication vector request message to the authentication function, where the second authentication vector request message carries the user's identity and the visited network identity;
  • the embodiment of the present disclosure provides an authentication function as shown in FIG. 9, including:
  • the receiving module 91 is configured to receive an authentication vector request message sent by UDM, where the authentication vector request message carries a user identity identifier and a visited network identifier;
  • the calculation module 92 is configured to obtain a locally stored long-term key according to the user identity identifier, and calculate an authentication vector based on the long-term key and the visited network identifier.
  • the above authentication function may also include:
  • the sending module is used to send an authentication vector response message carrying the authentication vector to UDM
  • the authentication function and UDM are independent of each other, and there is a preset interface Narpf between the two;
  • the receiving module 91 is further configured to receive the authentication vector request message sent by the UDM through the preset interface Narpf, and the sending module is further configured to send the carrying information to the UDM through the preset interface Narpf.
  • the authentication vector response message of the authentication vector is further configured to send the carrying information to the UDM through the preset interface Narpf.
  • the authentication vector request message is a Narpf_authentication_get Request message
  • the authentication vector response message is a Narpf_authentication_get Response message.
  • the calculation module 92 is further configured to calculate the authentication vector in the following manner:
  • the first operation processing includes sequential XOR operation, cyclic shift, XOR operation, encryption operation and XOR operation processing;
  • the serial number SQN, the authentication management parameters AMF, SQN, and AMF required for authentication stored locally are cascaded, and the fourth parameter group is used to perform the second operation processing on the cascaded parameters to obtain the second operation result, and extract the first operation result. 2. In the first half of the calculation result, the second parameter is obtained;
  • the first parameter, the AMF, and the second parameter are cascaded to obtain the authentication token AUTN, and the RAND, AUTN, XRES* and K AUSF are used as authentication vector parameters to obtain the authentication vector.
  • an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a schematic structural diagram of an authentication function 1000, including: a processor 1001, a transceiver 1002, a memory 1003, and a bus interface, where:
  • the transceiver 1002 is configured to receive an authentication vector request message sent by UDM, where the authentication vector request message carries a user identity identifier and a visited network identifier;
  • the authentication function 1000 further includes: a program that is stored in the memory 1003 and can run on the processor 1001, and when the program is executed by the processor 1001, the following steps are implemented:
  • a locally stored long-term key is obtained, and an authentication vector is calculated according to the long-term key and the visited network identifier.
  • the bus architecture may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges. Specifically, one or more processors represented by the processor 1001 and various circuits of the memory represented by the memory 1003 are linked together.
  • the bus architecture can also link various other circuits such as peripheral devices, voltage regulators, power management circuits, etc., which are all known in the art, and therefore, will not be further described herein.
  • the bus interface provides the interface.
  • the transceiver 1002 may be a plurality of elements, including a transmitter and a receiver, and provide a unit for communicating with various other devices on a transmission medium.
  • the processor 1001 is responsible for managing the bus architecture and general processing, and the memory 1003 can store data used by the processor 1001 when performing operations.
  • a computer-readable storage medium on which a program is stored, and the program is executed by a processor to implement the following steps:
  • a locally stored long-term key is obtained, and an authentication vector is calculated according to the long-term key and the visited network identifier.
  • the disclosed device and method may be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, for example, the division of the units is only a logical function division, and there may be other divisions in actual implementation, for example, multiple units or components may be combined or It can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not implemented.
  • the displayed or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the objectives of the solutions of the embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • the functional units in the various embodiments of the present disclosure may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the function is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • the technical solution of the present disclosure essentially or the part that contributes to the related technology or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product.
  • the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including several
  • the instructions are used to make a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, ROM, RAM, magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes.

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Abstract

本公开提供了一种认证向量的生成方法、获取方法及设备，本公开将长期密钥的存储及认证向量的生成等处理放在了认证功能中，并将认证功能与UDM分离，从而可以保证长期密钥的存储与认证向量的产生是在同一网元中进行的，避免了长期密钥在不同网元中传输所导致的泄露风险；同时也保证了UDM作为数据管理设备，只负责信息处理，不参与数据存储。此外，引入UDM透传，还有效的继承了相关的认证架构，防止因为引入新的网元/网络功能导致消息接口发生变化，进而导致网络无法后向兼容的问题。

Description

认证向量的生成方法、获取方法及设备
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请主张在2019年11月1日在中国提交的中国专利申请号No.201911059164.0的优先权，其全部内容通过引用包含于此。
技术领域
本公开涉及移动通信技术领域，具体涉及一种认证向量的生成方法、获取方法及设备。
背景技术
目前，用户在接入5G网络时，需要与网络相互确认身份并建立安全连接，因此需要与5G网络进行双向认证，通过认证来实现用户(User Equipment，UE)与5G网络之间的双向身份确认并为后续安全连接产生必须的会话密钥。上述认证被称为5G网络主认证。
图1给出了相关技术的5G网络主认证的流程，包括步骤0～12等多个步骤，如图1所示：
当用户尝试接入网络进行主认证时，用户将会向网络接入和移动管理功能(Access and Mobility Management Function，AMF)发起接入请求，而AMF会将接入请求发给身份认证服务器功能(Authentication Server Function，AUSF)，AUSF再通过Nudm_Authentication_Get Request消息发给身份认证凭据存储库和处理功能(Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function，ARPF)。APRF负责保存用户认证所需要的长期密钥并负责根据长期密钥产生认证所需参数，通常集成在统一数据管理(Unified Data Management，UDM)中。UDM/ARPF需要对每个Nudm_Authenticate_Get Request消息创建一个5G归属环境认证向量(Home Environment Authentication Vector，HE AV)。为此，UDM/ARPF首先生成一个认证管理域(Authentication Management Field，AMF)，其中的“separation bit”为1。然后，UDM/ARPF根据长期密钥K推衍出K AUSF和XRES*。最后，UDM/ARPF应创建一个包含 RAND、AUTN、XRES*和K AUSF的5G HE AV，并在Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response消息中向AUSF返回所请求的5G HE AV。从图1所示的流程可以看出，相关技术的认证向量的存储和产生均是在UDM/ARPF中完成的。
发明内容
本公开的至少一个实施例提供了一种认证向量的生成方法、获取方法及设备，减少长期密钥的泄露风险，提升系统的安全性。
根据本公开的至少一个方面，至少一个实施例提供了一种认证向量的生成方法，应用于认证功能，包括：
所述认证功能接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识；
所述认证功能根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
可选的，所述认证功能与UDM相互独立，且两者之间存在有预设接口Narpf；
所述认证功能通过所述预设接口Narpf接收UDM发送的所述认证向量请求消息，以及，通过所述预设接口Narpf向UDM发送携带有所述认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
可选的，所述认证向量请求消息为Narpf_authentication_get Request消息；
所述认证向量响应消息为Narpf_authentication_get Response消息。
可选的，根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量的步骤，包括：
所述认证功能获取长期密钥及其对应的序列号SQN，并生成随机数RAND；
所述认证功能对所述随机数RAND和运营商的配置参数OPc进行异或运算，并利用长期密钥进行加密运算，得到第一中间结果；
利用第一参数组，对所述第一中间结果进行第一运算处理，得到第一运算结果，将所述第一运算结果的前半部分的预设比特位与序列号SQN进行异 或运算，得到第一参数；
所述认证功能基于所述第一计算结果的后半部分、所述随机数RAND以及拜访网络标识，生成一响应值XRES*；
利用第二参数组和第三参数组，分别对所述第一中间结果进行所述第一运算处理，得到认证流程后使用的会话加密密钥CK和会话完整性密钥IK；以及，根据所述CK、IK和拜访地运营商的标识，产生一中间密钥K AUSF；
将序列号SQN、本地保存的认证所需的认证管理参数AMF、SQN以及AMF级联，并利用第四参数组，对级联得到的参数进行第二运算处理，得到第二运算结果，提取第二计算结果的前半部分，得到第二参数；
将所述第一参数、AMF、第二参数级联，得到认证令牌AUTN，以及，将所述RAND、AUTN、XRES*和K AUSF作为认证向量参数，得到认证向量。
根据本公开的另一方面，至少一个实施例提供了一种认证向量的获取方法，应用于统一数据管理UDM，包括：
所述UDM在接收到身份认证服务器功能AUSF发送的第一认证向量请求消息后，向认证功能发送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识；
所述UDM接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
可选的，所述UDM与认证功能相互独立，且两者之间存在有预设接口Narpf；
所述UDM通过所述预设接口Narpf向认证功能发送所述第二认证向量请求消息，以及，通过所述预设接口Narpf接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
可选的，所述第二认证向量请求消息为Narpf_authentication_get Request消息；
所述认证向量响应消息为Narpf_authentication_get Response消息。
根据本公开的另一方面，至少一个实施例提供了一种UDM，包括：
第一接收模块，用于接收到身份认证服务器功能AUSF发送的第一认证向量请求消息；
发送模块，用于在接收到所述第一认证向量请求消息后，向认证功能发 送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识；
第二接收模块，用于接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
根据本公开的另一方面，至少一个实施例提供了一种UDM，包括收发机和处理器，其中，
所述收发机，用于接收到身份认证服务器功能AUSF发送的第一认证向量请求消息；
所述处理器，用于在所述收发机接收到第一认证向量请求消息，向认证功能发送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识；以及，接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
根据本公开的另一方面，至少一个实施例提供了一种UDM，包括：处理器、存储器及存储在所述存储器上并可在所述处理器上运行的程序，所述程序被所述处理器执行时实现如上所述的认证向量的获取方法的步骤。
根据本公开的另一方面，至少一个实施例提供了一种认证功能，包括：
接收模块，用于接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识；
计算模块，用于根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
根据本公开的另一方面，至少一个实施例提供了一种认证功能，包括收发机和处理器，其中，
所述收发机，用于接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识；
所述处理器，用于根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
根据本公开的另一方面，至少一个实施例提供了一种认证功能，包括：处理器、存储器及存储在所述存储器上并可在所述处理器上运行的程序，所述程序被所述处理器执行时实现如上所述的认证向量的获取方法的步骤。
根据本公开的另一方面，至少一个实施例提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质上存储有程序，所述程序被处理器执行时，实现如上所述的方法的步骤。
与相关技术相比，本公开实施例提供的认证向量的生成方法、获取方法及设备，将长期密钥的存储及认证向量的生成等处理放在了认证功能中，并将认证功能与UDM分离，这样可以保证长期密钥的存储与认证向量的产生是在同一网元中进行的，避免了长期密钥在不同网元中传输所导致的泄露风险；同时也保证了UDM作为数据管理设备，只负责信息处理，不参与数据存储。此外，引入UDM透传，还有效的继承了相关的认证架构，防止因为引入新的网元/网络功能导致消息接口发生变化，进而导致网络无法后向兼容的问题。
附图说明
通过阅读下文可选实施方式的详细描述，各种其他的优点和益处对于本领域普通技术人员将变得清楚明了。附图仅用于示出可选实施方式的目的，而并不认为是对本公开的限制。而且在整个附图中，用相同的参考符号表示相同的部件。在附图中：
图1为相关技术的5G网络主认证的流程示意图；
图2为本公开实施例的一种应用场景示意图；
图3相关技术的认证向量的生成流程的示意图；
图4为本公开实施例提供的认证向量的获取方法的一种流程图；
图5为本公开实施例提供的认证向量的获取方法的另一种流程图；
图6为本公开实施例提供的认证向量的生成方法的一种流程图；
图7为本公开实施例提供的UDM的一种结构示意图；
图8为本公开实施例提供的UDM的另一种结构示意图；
图9为本公开实施例提供的认证功能的一种结构示意图；
图10为本公开实施例提供的认证功能的另一种结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将参照附图更详细地描述本公开的示例性实施例。虽然附图中显示了本公开的示例性实施例，然而应当理解，可以以各种形式实现本公开而不应被这里阐述的实施例所限制。相反，提供这些实施例是为了能够更透彻地理解本公开，并且能够将本公开的范围完整的传达给本领域的技术人员。
本申请的说明书和权利要求书中的术语“第一”、“第二”等是用于区别类似的对象，而不必用于描述特定的顺序或先后次序。应该理解这样使用的数据在适当情况下可以互换，以便这里描述的本申请的实施例例如能够以除了在这里图示或描述的那些以外的顺序实施。此外，术语“包括”和“具有”以及他们的任何变形，意图在于覆盖不排他的包含，例如，包含了一系列步骤或单元的过程、方法、系统、产品或设备不必限于清楚地列出的那些步骤或单元，而是可包括没有清楚地列出的或对于这些过程、方法、产品或设备固有的其它步骤或单元。说明书以及权利要求中“和/或”表示所连接对象的至少其中之一。
本文所描述的技术不限于NR系统以及长期演进型(Long Time Evolution，LTE)/LTE的演进(LTE-Advanced，LTE-A)系统，并且也可用于各种无线通信系统，诸如码分多址(Code Division Multiple Access，CDMA)、时分多址(Time Division Multiple Access，TDMA)、频分多址(Frequency Division Multiple Access，FDMA)、正交频分多址(Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access，OFDMA)、单载波频分多址(Single-carrier Frequency-Division Multiple Access，SC-FDMA)和其他系统。术语“系统”和“网络”常被可互换地使用。CDMA系统可实现诸如CDMA2000、通用地面无线电接入(Universal Terrestrial Radio Access，UTRA)等无线电技术。UTRA包括宽带CDMA(Wideband Code Division Multiple Access，WCDMA)和其他CDMA变体。TDMA系统可实现诸如全球移动通信系统(Global System for Mobile Communication，GSM)之类的无线电技术。OFDMA系统可实现诸如超移动宽带(UltraMobile Broadband，UMB)、演进型UTRA(Evolution-UTRA，E-UTRA)、IEEE 802.21(Wi-Fi)、IEEE 802.16(WiMAX)、IEEE 802.20、Flash-OFDM等无线电技术。UTRA和E-UTRA是通用移动电信系统(Universal Mobile Telecommunications System，UMTS)的部分。LTE和更高级的LTE(如 LTE-A)是使用E-UTRA的新UMTS版本。UTRA、E-UTRA、UMTS、LTE、LTE-A以及GSM在来自名为“第三代伙伴项目”(3rd Generation Partnership Project，3GPP)的组织的文献中描述。CDMA2000和UMB在来自名为“第三代伙伴项目2”(3GPP2)的组织的文献中描述。本文所描述的技术既可用于以上提及的系统和无线电技术，也可用于其他系统和无线电技术。然而，以下描述出于示例目的描述了NR系统，并且在以下大部分描述中使用NR术语，尽管这些技术也可应用于NR系统应用以外的应用。
以下描述提供示例而并非限定权利要求中阐述的范围、适用性或者配置。可以对所讨论的要素的功能和布置作出改变而不会脱离本公开的精神和范围。各种示例可恰适地省略、替代、或添加各种规程或组件。例如，可以按不同于所描述的次序来执行所描述的方法，并且可以添加、省去、或组合各种步骤。另外，参照某些示例所描述的特征可在其他示例中被组合。
请参见图2，图2示出本公开实施例可应用的一种无线通信系统的框图。无线通信系统包括终端21和网络设备22。其中，终端21也可以称作用户终端或用户设备(User Equipment，UE)，终端21可以是手机、平板电脑(Tablet Personal Computer)、膝上型电脑(Laptop Computer)、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant，PDA)、移动上网装置(Mobile Internet Device，MID)、可穿戴式设备(Wearable Device)或车载设备等终端侧设备，需要说明的是，在本公开实施例中并不限定终端21的具体类型。网络设备22可以是基站和/或核心网网元，其中，上述基站可以是5G及以后版本的基站(例如：gNB、5G NR NB等)，或者其他通信系统中的基站(例如：eNB、WLAN接入点、或其他接入点等)，其中，基站可被称为节点B、演进节点B、接入点、基收发机站(Base Transceiver Station，BTS)、无线电基站、无线电收发机、基本服务集(Basic Service Set，BSS)、扩展服务集(Extended Service Set，ESS)、B节点、演进型B节点(eNB)、家用B节点、家用演进型B节点、WLAN接入点、WiFi节点或所述领域中其他某个合适的术语，只要达到相同的技术效果，所述基站不限于特定技术词汇，需要说明的是，在本公开实施例中仅以NR系统中的基站为例，但是并不限定基站的具体类型。
基站可在基站控制器的控制下与终端21通信，在各种示例中，基站控制 器可以是核心网或某些基站的一部分。一些基站可通过回程与核心网进行控制信息或用户数据的通信。在一些示例中，这些基站中的一些可以通过回程链路直接或间接地彼此通信，回程链路可以是有线或无线通信链路。无线通信系统可支持多个载波(不同频率的波形信号)上的操作。多载波发射机能同时在这多个载波上传送经调制信号。例如，每条通信链路可以是根据各种无线电技术来调制的多载波信号。每个已调信号可在不同的载波上发送并且可携带控制信息(例如，参考信号、控制信道等)、开销信息、数据等。
基站可经由一个或多个接入点天线与终端21进行无线通信。每个基站可以为各自相应的覆盖区域提供通信覆盖。接入点的覆盖区域可被划分成仅构成该覆盖区域的一部分的扇区。无线通信系统可包括不同类型的基站(例如宏基站、微基站、或微微基站)。基站也可利用不同的无线电技术，诸如蜂窝或WLAN无线电接入技术。基站可以与相同或不同的接入网或运营商部署相关联。不同基站的覆盖区域(包括相同或不同类型的基站的覆盖区域、利用相同或不同无线电技术的覆盖区域、或属于相同或不同接入网的覆盖区域)可以交叠。
无线通信系统中的通信链路可包括用于承载上行链路(Uplink，UL)传输(例如，从终端21到网络设备22)的上行链路，或用于承载下行链路(Downlink，DL)传输(例如，从网络设备22到终端21)的下行链路。UL传输还可被称为反向链路传输，而DL传输还可被称为前向链路传输。下行链路传输可以使用授权频段、非授权频段或这两者来进行。类似地，上行链路传输可以使用有授权频段、非授权频段或这两者来进行。
在相关的5G技术方案中，ARPF被定义为存储长期密钥K及产生认证向量的网元，并与UDM合并。如图3所示，在相关技术的认证向量生成过程中，AUSF向UDM发起认证请求，并从UDM获取认证向量；另外，为了便于网络维护，在后期设计时将计算与存储相分离，新定义了统一数据存储库(Unified Data Repository，UDR)作为统一数据存储设备，仅用于存储数据，包括用于认证的长期密钥K，但UDR没有计算能力；UDM为统一数据管理设备，负责利用长期密钥K产生认证向量，但UDM失去了数据存储的能力。
从图3可以看出，由于UDR能用于存储而不能计算，而UDM仅能够计 算而不能存储，因此UDM需要通过Nudr接口从UDR获取密钥，从而导致密钥可能在UDM与UDR之间的传输接口上被泄露，严重影响到后续认证及通信过程的安全性。
为解决以上问题中的至少一种，本申请提供了一种新的认证向量获取方法，可以减少长期密钥K因传输而存在泄露风险的问题，并能与相关系统的大部分网元兼容。
具体的，如图4所示，本申请提出了一种将认证功能与UDM相分离的方案，引入独立的认证功能(也可以将其称作ARPF)，即认证功能与UDM相互独立，认证功能不再作为UDM的一个功能，而作为另外一个实体而独立存在。并且，在认证功能与UDM之间新定义一个接口(这里可以将该接口命名为Narpf)。由认证功能(ARPF)负责存储长期密钥，以及与认证相关的参数。认证功能(ARPF)同时还具备使用认证算法(如相关技术推荐的认证框架MILENAGE)和自身保存参数产生相关认证向量的能力。当用户发起接入请求并由网络判断需要认证的情况下，在UDM接收到认证向量请求消息时，不再由UDM进行处理，而是将认证向量请求消息发送给独立的认证功能。在认证功能生成认证向量后，再通过新定义的接口将认证向量发送给UDM，UDM再将认证向量利用现有接口传给AUSF。
需要说明的是，本文中提及到的各个功能，如AUSF、UDM、ARPF、UDR和AMF等等，可以是网络中的某个具体网元或功能模块或实体。
请参照图4，本申请的认证向量获取过程，包括：
步骤41，AUSF向UDM发送认证向量请求消息，具体的，AUSF可以通过现有的Nudm_authentication_get Request消息向UDM发起认证向量请求。
步骤42，UDM接收到认证向量请求消息后，通过新定义的UDM与认证功能之间的接口(可被称为Narpf)，向认证功能发送认证向量请求消息，并在该认证向量请求消息中携带用户的身份标识(Identity)。具体的，UDM可以通过Narpf_authentication_get Request消息，携带用户身份标识和拜访网络的标识(ID)发送给ARPF。
步骤43，认证功能接收到认证向量请求消息后，根据用户身份标识获取到存储在认证功能中的长期密钥K，利用长期密钥K计算出认证向量(5G HE  AV)。下面提供一种具体的认证向量生成算法：
a)认证功能获取长期密钥K(128位)和对应的序列号SQN(48位)，并生成随机数RAND(128位)。然后认证功能将随机数RAND，结合运营商的配置参数OPc(128位)进行异或运算，然后使用K对异或运算结果进行加密运算(例如，可以使用AES加密算法，或其他加密算法)，再将运算后的结果(记做第一中间结果1)再次与OPc进行异或运算，再根据位移参数r2(128位)对异或运算结果进行循环位移，再将循环位移得到的结果与混淆参数c2(128位)进行异或运算后再使用K对异或运算结果进行加密运算，然后，再用OPc对加密运算结果进行异或运算，并将上述异或运算结果(为了便于描述，将该异或运算结果成为第一参数)拆成前半部分和后半部分(前后2个64位)，然后将前64位中的前48位(记做AK)与SQN进行异或运算，将运算结果作为输出参数中的一部分(记做SQN AK)。
b)认证功能将上述计算得到的第一参数的后64位记为RES或者XRES，然后再与RAND和拜访网络的ID一起产生响应值(记为RES*或者XRES*)作为输出参数中的一部分。
c)认证功能将第一中间结果1与OPc进行异或运算，再根据位移参数r3(128位)对异或运算结果进行循环位移，再对循环位移得到的结果与混淆参数c3(128位)进行异或运算后，再使用K对异或运算结果进行加密运算，然后，再用OPc对加密运算结果进行异或运算，将得到的结果(128位)作为认证流程后使用的会话加密密钥(记做CK)；
d)认证功能用r4和c4替换上述c)过程中的r3和c3参数后执行，将得到的结果(128位)作为认证流程后使用的会话完整性密钥(记做IK)；
e)认证功能根据CK、IK和拜访地运营商的ID产生一个中间密钥K AUSF(256位)
f)认证功能自身保存认证所需的认证管理域参数AMF，将SQN||AMF||SQN||AMF(||为并联符号)作为输入参数，与OPc进行异或，再根据位移参数r1(128位)对异或运算结果进行循环位移，再将位移结果与混淆参数c1(128位)进行异或运算，得到第二中间结果2，再将第二中间结果2与第一中间结果1进行异或运算，然后使用K对异或运算结果进行加密 运算后，再用OPc对加密运算结果进行异或运算，并将所得结果拆成前后2个64位，然后将前64位(记为MAC)，作为输出参数中的一部分；
g)认证功能将SQN AK||AMF||MAC记为AUTN，然后将RAND，AUTN，XRES*，K AUSF作为认证向量参数，从而得到5G HE AV。
步骤44，认证功能将认证向量传送到UDM，具体的，ARPF可以通过现有的Narpf_authentication_get Response消息，将5G HE AV发送给UDM。
步骤45，UDM将认证向量透传给AUSF，具体的，UDM可以通过现有的Nudm_authentication_get Response消息将5G HE AV发送给AUSF。
从以上流程可以看出，本申请将长期密钥的存储及认证向量的生成等处理放在了认证功能中，并将认证功能与UDM分离，这样可以保证长期密钥的存储与认证向量的产生是在同一网元中进行的，避免了长期密钥在不同网元中传输所导致的泄露风险；同时也保证了UDM作为数据管理设备，只负责信息处理，不参与数据存储。此外，引入UDM透传，还有效的继承了相关的认证架构，防止因为引入新的网元/网络功能导致消息接口发生变化，进而导致网络无法后向兼容的问题。
下面进一步从UDM和认证功能侧分别介绍本申请的认证向量的获取方法。
请参照图5，本申请的认证向量的获取方法在应用于UDM侧时，包括：
步骤51，所述UDM在接收到AUSF发送的第一认证向量请求消息后，向认证功能发送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识。
根据本申请的至少一个实施例，所述UDM与认证功能为相互独立的两个网元，并且在两者之间新定义一个接口，本文称之为Narpf。在上述步骤51中，UDM可以通过所述预设接口Narpf向认证功能发送所述第二认证向量请求消息，具体的，所述第二认证向量请求消息可以为Narpf_authentication_get Request消息。
步骤52，所述UDM接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
根据本申请的至少一个实施例，UDM可以通过所述预设接口Narpf接收 认证功能发送的认证向量响应消息。具体的，所述认证向量响应消息可以为Narpf_authentication_get Response消息。
可选的，所述UDM还可以将所述认证向量转发给所述AUSF。
通过以上步骤，本申请不再由UDM生成认证向量，而是向另一网元(认证功能)请求认证向量，从而避免了长期密钥在网元间传输导致的泄露风险，提高了认证的安全性。
请参照图6，本申请的认证向量的生成方法在应用于认证功能侧时，包括：
步骤61，认证功能接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识。
根据本申请的至少一个实施例，所述UDM与认证功能为相互独立的两个网元，并且在两者之间新定义一个接口，本文称之为Narpf。在上述步骤61中，认证功能可以通过所述预设接口Narpf接收UDM发送的第二认证向量请求消息，具体的，所述第二认证向量请求消息可以为Narpf_authentication_get Request消息。
这里，所述用户身份标识具体包括但不限于SUPI/SUCI/5G-GUTI/NAI，所述拜访网络标识包括但不限于SN ID(Serving Network Identifier)。其中，SUPI是指用户永久标识符(Subscription Permanent Identifier)，SUCI是指用户隐藏标识符(Subscriber Concealed Identifier)，5G-GUTI是指5G全局唯一的临时UE标识(5G Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity)，NAI是指网络接入标识符(NAI Network Access Identifier)。
步骤62，所述认证功能根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
根据本申请的至少一个实施例，在步骤62中，所述认证功能可以按照以下步骤计算所述认证向量：
A)所述认证功能获取长期密钥及其对应的序列号SQN，并生成随机数RAND；
B)所述认证功能对所述随机数RAND和运营商的配置参数OPc进行异或运算，并利用长期密钥进行加密运算，得到第一中间结果；
C)利用第一参数组，对所述第一中间结果进行第一运算处理，得到第一运算结果，将所述第一运算结果的前半部分的预设比特位与序列号SQN进行异或运算，得到第一参数，所述第一运算处理包括依次进行的异或运算、循环移位、异或运算、加密运算和异或运算处理；
D)所述认证功能基于所述第一计算结果的后半部分、所述随机数RAND以及拜访网络标识，生成一响应值XRES*；
E)利用第二参数组和第三参数组，分别对所述第一中间结果进行所述第一运算处理，得到认证流程后使用的会话加密密钥CK和会话完整性密钥IK；以及，根据所述CK、IK和拜访地运营商的标识，产生一中间密钥K AUSF；
F)将序列号SQN、本地保存的认证所需的认证管理参数AMF、SQN以及AMF级联，并利用第四参数组，对级联得到的参数进行第二运算处理，得到第二运算结果，提取第二计算结果的前半部分，得到第二参数；
这里，第二运算处理包括依次进行的异或运算，循环移位、异或运算、异或运算、加密运算和异或运算。
以上第一参数组至第四参数组，各自均包括对应的位移参数和移位后用于异或运算的混淆参数。
G)将所述第一参数、AMF、第二参数级联，得到认证令牌AUTN，以及，将所述RAND、AUTN、XRES*和K AUSF作为认证向量参数，得到认证向量。
更为详细的算法流程可以参数图4所示的流程描述，此处不再赘述。
可选的，在上述步骤62之后，认证功能还可以向UDM发送携带有所述认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
根据本申请的至少一个实施例，认证功能可以通过所述预设接口Narpf向UDM发送认证向量响应消息。具体的，所述认证向量响应消息可以为Narpf_authentication_get Response消息。
以上介绍了本公开实施例的各种方法。下面将进一步提供实施上述方法的装置。
请参照图7，本公开实施例提供了一种UDM 70，包括：
第一接收模块71，用于接收到身份认证服务器功能AUSF发送的第一认 证向量请求消息；
发送模块72，用于在接收到所述第一认证向量请求消息后，向认证功能发送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识；
第二接收模块73，用于接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
可选的，所述UDM与认证功能相互独立，且两者之间存在有预设接口Narpf。
所述发送模块72，还用于通过所述预设接口Narpf向认证功能发送所述第二认证向量请求消息，以及，所述第二接收模块73，还用于通过所述预设接口Narpf接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
可选的，所述第二认证向量请求消息为Narpf_authentication_get Request消息；所述认证向量响应消息为Narpf_authentication_get Response消息。
请参考图8，本公开实施例提供了UDM 800的一结构示意图，包括：处理器801、收发机802、存储器803和总线接口，其中：
所述收发机802，用于接收到身份认证服务器功能AUSF发送的第一认证向量请求消息。
在本公开实施例中，UDM 800还包括：存储在存储器上803并可在处理器801上运行的程序，所述程序被处理器801执行时实现如下步骤：
所述收发机802，用于在所述收发机接收到第一认证向量请求消息，向认证功能发送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识；以及，接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
可理解的，本公开实施例中，所述计算机程序被处理器801执行时可实现上述图5所示的认证向量的获取方法实施例的各个过程，且能达到相同的技术效果，为避免重复，这里不再赘述。
在图8中，总线架构可以包括任意数量的互联的总线和桥，具体由处理器801代表的一个或多个处理器和存储器803代表的存储器的各种电路链接在一起。总线架构还可以将诸如外围设备、稳压器和功率管理电路等之类的 各种其他电路链接在一起，这些都是本领域所公知的，因此，本文不再对其进行进一步描述。总线接口提供接口。收发机802可以是多个元件，即包括发送机和接收机，提供用于在传输介质上与各种其他装置通信的单元。
处理器801负责管理总线架构和通常的处理，存储器803可以存储处理器801在执行操作时所使用的数据。
在本公开的一些实施例中，还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现以下步骤：
在接收到身份认证服务器功能AUSF发送的第一认证向量请求消息后，向认证功能发送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识；
接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
该程序被处理器执行时能实现上述应用于UDM的认证向量的获取方法中的所有实现方式，且能达到相同的技术效果，为避免重复，此处不再赘述。
本公开实施例提供了图9所示的一种认证功能，包括：
接收模块91，用于接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识；
计算模块92，用于根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
可选的，上述认证功能还可以包括：
发送模块，用于向UDM发送携带有所述认证向量的认证向量响应消息
可选的，所述认证功能与UDM相互独立，且两者之间存在有预设接口Narpf；
所述接收模块91，还用于通过所述预设接口Narpf接收UDM发送的所述认证向量请求消息，以及，所述发送模块，还用于通过所述预设接口Narpf向UDM发送携带有所述认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
可选的，所述认证向量请求消息为Narpf_authentication_get Request消息；所述认证向量响应消息为Narpf_authentication_get Response消息。
可选的，计算模块92，还用于按照以下方式计算得到认证向量：
获取长期密钥及其对应的序列号SQN，并生成随机数RAND；
对所述随机数RAND和运营商的配置参数OPc进行异或运算，并利用长期密钥进行加密运算，得到第一中间结果；
利用第一参数组，对所述第一中间结果进行第一运算处理，得到第一运算结果，将所述第一运算结果的前半部分的预设比特位与序列号SQN进行异或运算，得到第一参数，所述第一运算处理包括依次进行的异或运算、循环移位、异或运算、加密运算和异或运算处理；
基于所述第一计算结果的后半部分、所述随机数RAND以及拜访网络标识，生成一响应值XRES*；
利用第二参数组和第三参数组，分别对所述第一中间结果进行所述第一运算处理，得到认证流程后使用的会话加密密钥CK和会话完整性密钥IK；以及，根据所述CK、IK和拜访地运营商的标识，产生一中间密钥K AUSF；
将序列号SQN、本地保存的认证所需的认证管理参数AMF、SQN以及AMF级联，并利用第四参数组，对级联得到的参数进行第二运算处理，得到第二运算结果，提取第二计算结果的前半部分，得到第二参数；
将所述第一参数、AMF、第二参数级联，得到认证令牌AUTN，以及，将所述RAND、AUTN、XRES*和K AUSF作为认证向量参数，得到认证向量。
请参考图10，本公开实施例提供了认证功能1000的一结构示意图，包括：处理器1001、收发机1002、存储器1003和总线接口，其中：
所述收发机1002，用于接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识；
在本公开实施例中，认证功能1000还包括：存储在存储器上1003并可在处理器1001上运行的程序，所述程序被处理器1001执行时实现如下步骤：
根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
可理解的，本公开实施例中，所述计算机程序被处理器1001执行时可实现上述图6所示的认证向量的生成方法实施例的各个过程，且能达到相同的技术效果，为避免重复，这里不再赘述。
在图10中，总线架构可以包括任意数量的互联的总线和桥，具体由处理器1001代表的一个或多个处理器和存储器1003代表的存储器的各种电路链 接在一起。总线架构还可以将诸如外围设备、稳压器和功率管理电路等之类的各种其他电路链接在一起，这些都是本领域所公知的，因此，本文不再对其进行进一步描述。总线接口提供接口。收发机1002可以是多个元件，即包括发送机和接收机，提供用于在传输介质上与各种其他装置通信的单元。
处理器1001负责管理总线架构和通常的处理，存储器1003可以存储处理器1001在执行操作时所使用的数据。
在本公开的一些实施例中，还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现以下步骤：
接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识；
根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
该程序被处理器执行时能实现上述应用于认证功能的认证向量的生成方法中的所有实现方式，且能达到相同的技术效果，为避免重复，此处不再赘述。
本领域普通技术人员可以意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，能够以电子硬件、或者计算机软件和电子硬件的结合来实现。这些功能究竟以硬件还是软件方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本公开的范围。
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的系统、装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
在本申请所提供的实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接， 可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本公开实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本公开各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。
所述功能如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本公开的技术方案本质上或者说对相关技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)执行本公开各个实施例所述的方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，仅为本公开的具体实施方式，但本公开的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本公开揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本公开的保护范围之内。因此，本公开的保护范围应以权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (14)

  1. 一种认证向量的生成方法，应用于认证功能，包括：
    所述认证功能接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识；
    所述认证功能根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其中，
    所述认证功能与UDM相互独立，且两者之间存在有预设接口Narpf；
    所述认证功能通过所述预设接口Narpf接收UDM发送的所述认证向量请求消息，以及，通过所述预设接口Narpf向UDM发送携带有所述认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
  3. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其中，
    所述认证向量请求消息为Narpf_authentication_get Request消息；
    所述认证向量响应消息为Narpf_authentication_get Response消息。
  4. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其中，根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量的步骤，包括：
    所述认证功能获取长期密钥及其对应的序列号SQN，并生成随机数RAND；
    所述认证功能对所述随机数RAND和运营商的配置参数OPc进行异或运算，并利用长期密钥进行加密运算，得到第一中间结果；
    利用第一参数组，对所述第一中间结果进行第一运算处理，得到第一运算结果，将所述第一运算结果的前半部分的预设比特位与序列号SQN进行异或运算，得到第一参数；
    所述认证功能基于所述第一计算结果的后半部分、所述随机数RAND以及拜访网络标识，生成一响应值XRES*；
    利用第二参数组和第三参数组，分别对所述第一中间结果进行所述第一运算处理，得到认证流程后使用的会话加密密钥CK和会话完整性密钥IK；以及，根据所述CK、IK和拜访地运营商的标识，产生一中间密钥K AUSF；
    将序列号SQN、本地保存的认证所需的认证管理参数AMF、SQN以及AMF级联，并利用第四参数组，对级联得到的参数进行第二运算处理，得到第二运算结果，提取第二计算结果的前半部分，得到第二参数；
    将所述第一参数、AMF、第二参数级联，得到认证令牌AUTN，以及，将所述RAND、AUTN、XRES*和K AUSF作为认证向量参数，得到认证向量。
  5. 一种认证向量的获取方法，应用于统一数据管理UDM，包括：
    所述UDM在接收到身份认证服务器功能AUSF发送的第一认证向量请求消息后，向认证功能发送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识；
    所述UDM接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
  6. 如权利要求5所述的方法，其中，
    所述UDM与认证功能相互独立，且两者之间存在有预设接口Narpf；
    所述UDM通过所述预设接口Narpf向认证功能发送所述第二认证向量请求消息，以及，通过所述预设接口Narpf接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
  7. 如权利要求5所述的方法，其中，
    所述第二认证向量请求消息为Narpf_authentication_get Request消息；
    所述认证向量响应消息为Narpf_authentication_get Response消息。
  8. 一种认证功能，包括：
    接收模块，用于接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识；
    计算模块，用于根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
  9. 一种认证功能，包括收发机和处理器，其中，
    所述收发机，用于接收UDM发送的认证向量请求消息，所述认证向量请求消息携带有用户身份标识和拜访网络标识；
    所述处理器，用于根据所述用户身份标识，获取本地存储的长期密钥，并根据所述长期密钥和所述拜访网络标识，计算得到认证向量。
  10. 一种认证功能，包括：处理器、存储器及存储在所述存储器上并可 在所述处理器上运行的程序，所述程序被所述处理器执行时实现如权利要求1至4任一项所述的方法的步骤。
  11. 一种UDM，包括：
    第一接收模块，用于接收到身份认证服务器功能AUSF发送的第一认证向量请求消息；
    发送模块，用于在接收到所述第一认证向量请求消息后，向认证功能发送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识；
    第二接收模块，用于接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
  12. 一种UDM，包括收发机和处理器，其中，
    所述收发机，用于接收到身份认证服务器功能AUSF发送的第一认证向量请求消息；
    所述处理器，用于在所述收发机接收到第一认证向量请求消息，向认证功能发送第二认证向量请求消息，所述第二认证向量请求消息携带有用户的身份标识和拜访网络标识；以及，接收认证功能发送的携带有认证向量的认证向量响应消息。
  13. 一种UDM，包括：处理器、存储器及存储在所述存储器上并可在所述处理器上运行的程序，所述程序被所述处理器执行时实现如权利要求5至7任一项所述的方法的步骤。
  14. 一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算机程序，所述计算机程序被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1至7任一项所述的方法的步骤。
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