WO2021060340A1

WO2021060340A1 - Transaction information processing system

Info

Publication number: WO2021060340A1
Application number: PCT/JP2020/035941
Authority: WO
Inventors: 昂希柳谷
Original assignee: スタンダードキャピタル株式会社
Priority date: 2019-09-24
Filing date: 2020-09-24
Publication date: 2021-04-01
Also published as: JP6840319B1; JP2021052260A

Abstract

[Problem] To make it possible to prevent a fraudulent transaction of a cryptographic token. [Solution] This transaction information processing system is characterized by having a plurality of auditing devices in addition to an exchange device and a P2P network. When an electronic transaction of a cryptographic token that uses a code serving as data rights is executed using a multi-signature public key method in which N secret keys (N is a natural number of 3 or higher) are prepared and it is possible to execute a digital signature using N − a secret keys (a is a natural number and N − a is 2 or higher), the exchange device intermediates the transaction between the transfer source and the transfer destination of the cryptographic token. The plurality of auditing devices correspond to a plurality of auditors granted auditing authority in advance, each of whom possesses a secret key corresponding to the transfer source, and the auditing devices authenticate the transaction using the secret keys. The P2P network causes the authenticated transaction to come into effect by writing the authenticated transaction into a blockchain. The transfer source possesses one of the secret keys and the plurality of auditors possess the remaining secret keys, which have been dispersed one by one.

Description

Transaction information processing system

The present invention is suitable for application to, for example, an asset-based encrypted electronic record transfer system.

Conventionally, blockchain technology has been used, and electronic commerce is widely used for the rights to be traded. In these electronic transactions, cryptographic assets, security tokens, etc. (hereinafter referred to as cryptographic tokens) are often traded using a P2P (Peer to Peer) network as rights to be traded (for example, patents). Reference 1). In such crypto token transactions, a business operator who wants to collect funds creates a new crypto token and collects funds from fund providers using methods such as ICO (Initial Coin Offering) and IEO (Initial Exchange Offering). It has been.

Patent No. 6521421

However, there was a problem that there were a lot of vendors who illegally sold intangible cryptographic tokens, and there were a lot of cases where funders were deceived.

The present invention has been made to solve such a problem, and an object of the present invention is to provide a transaction information system capable of suppressing illegal sales of cryptographic tokens.

In order to solve such a problem, the transaction information processing system of the present invention
Publication of a multi-signature in which N private keys (N is a natural number of 3 or more) are prepared and it is possible to digitally sign using NA (a is a natural number and NA is 2 or more) private keys. A transaction information system that uses a key method to process electronic transactions of cryptographic tokens using cryptography, which is a data right, and multiple distribution transactions of the cryptographic tokens.
An exchange device that mediates transactions between the transfer source and transfer destination of the cryptographic token, and
A plurality of auditing devices that are given auditing authority in advance and that correspond to a plurality of auditors holding a private key corresponding to the transfer source and authenticate transactions using the private key, and a plurality of auditing devices.
It has a P2P (Peer to Peer) network that establishes the authenticated transaction by writing the authenticated transaction on the blockchain.
The transfer source holds one of the private keys,
The plurality of auditors hold the remaining private key one by one.

The present invention can realize a transaction information processing system that can suppress the illegal sale of cryptographic tokens.

It is a schematic diagram of the transaction information processing system (1) of this embodiment. It is a schematic diagram of the transaction information processing system (2) of this embodiment. It is a schematic diagram of the transaction information processing system (3) of this embodiment. It is a system chart which shows the ordinary trading transaction processing of this embodiment. It is a system chart which shows the fraudulent opposition transaction processing of this embodiment. It is a schematic diagram of the transaction information processing system (1) of another embodiment. It is a schematic diagram of the transaction information processing system (2) of another embodiment.

Hereinafter, a mode for carrying out the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

<Embodiment>
1 shown in FIG. 1 shows a transaction information processing system as a whole. In the transaction information processing system 1, the exchange device 11A owned by the exchange 11, the solicitor device 12A owned by the solicitor 12, the provider device 13A owned by the provider 13, and the agency 14 owned by the agent 14 It has a device 14A and a P2P (Peer to Peer) network 31, and is connected by an electronic communication line such as the Internet. In this specification, so-called cryptographic assets and electronic record transfer rights are collectively referred to as cryptographic tokens.

In the transaction information processing system 1, the exchange 11 mediates the transaction between the solicitor 12 who wants to solicit funds and the provider 13 who provides the funds. The provider 13 has an account with an agent 14 such as a securities company, and the agent 14 acts on behalf of the provider 13.

In the transaction information processing system 1 of the present embodiment, a case where a security token (electronic record transfer right) based on assets such as real estate, precious metals, natural mineral resources, and fossil resources is traded as a cryptographic token will be described. The exchange 11 confirms the asset status of the solicitor 12 and permits the solicitor to sell the crypto token P only when the crypto token P to be sold (indicated as P-COIN in the figure) is found to be valid. To do. Then, the exchange 11 mediates the transaction of the permitted cryptographic token P.

The P2P network 31 is connected to a normal group 32 that mainly performs mining and an audit group 40 that has audit authority.

The audit group 40 authenticates the ordinary transaction information by digitally signing the ordinary transaction information using the private keys 51 and 52. The information processing device 32A in the normal group 32 confirms the validity of the electronic signature of the electronically signed transaction information and approves the movement information of the cryptographic token P included in the transaction information. As a result, the distributed ledger owned by each information processing device 32A, audit devices 41A to 41D, 42A to 42D (in some cases, the exchange device 11A and the recruiting device 12A may participate) participating in the P2P network 31. The blockchain of the cryptographic token P in is rewritten, and a formal transaction is established.

Here, the P2P network 31 adopts a multi-signature method that requires an electronic certificate using (NA) of the N private keys generated in advance in order to approve the transaction. ing.

Audit group 40 is a group of auditors who have audit qualifications (for example, tax accountant or specific certification) that have been certified by the exchange 11 in advance, and are given audit authority after being examined in advance.

Auditors

41 and 42 participate in the P2P network 31 via the audit devices 41A to 41D and 42A to 41D. This audit authority is granted by the exchange 11, and the audit devices 41A to 41D and 42A to 42D owned by the auditor are registered in the exchange device 11A.

The

auditors

41 and 42 are assigned secret keys 51 and 52 in which the private keys of the recruiting source 12 and the agent 14 are distributed in advance. For convenience of explanation, here, the auditor to which the private key 51 corresponding to the agent 14 is assigned is the auditor 41 (corresponding to the audit devices 41A to 41D), and the audit to which the private key 52 corresponding to the recruiting source 12 is assigned. Personnel will be described as Auditor 42 (corresponding to Audit Devices 42A-42D).

The private keys 51 and 52 may be managed by, for example, being stored by the

auditors

41 and 42 in an external storage medium (for example, paper or electronic medium), and may be stored inside the audit devices 41A to 41D and 42A to 41D. You may memorize it in the department.

The

auditors

41 and 42 have no particular limitation on the number of private keys, but here, when N = 5 private keys are generated and (NA) = 3 private keys are required to be digitally signed. explain.

In the transaction information processing system 1, in the normal sales transaction for the cryptographic token P at the normal time, the normal sales transaction process is executed, and not only the electronic signature of the party (moving source) but also the electronic signature is performed by the audit group 40. After being authenticated, approval is performed by the P2P network 31.

The solicitor 12 places a sell order for the cryptographic token P certified by the exchange 11 via the solicitor device 12A. At this time, the recruiting source device 12A transmits the selling order information to the effect that the cryptographic token P is sold to the exchange device 11A. This sell order information includes the number of crypto tokens sold and the quantity of distribution tokens received in return. The exchange device 11A has a transaction database (not shown) for sell and buy orders. The exchange device 11A registers the sell order represented by the sell order information supplied from the soliciting source device 12A in the transaction database. Here, the selling order information currently being executed can be viewed by the soliciting source device 12A and the agency device 14A as public information. The same applies to buy order information.

The agent 14 recruits providers and sets up an account for each provider. That is, the proxy device 14A has a holding database for managing the holding quantity of each token for each provider and an order management database for managing sell orders and buy orders in the storage unit. The token deposited in the account is treated as a token held by the agent 14 in the distributed ledger, and the transaction is executed using the private key 51E held by the agent 14 and the corresponding secret keys 51A to 51D.

When the request of the provider 13 requests that the cryptographic token P be moved to the wallet owned by the provider 13, the cryptographic token P is moved from the agent 14 to the provider 13. Will be executed.

When the agent device 14A transmits the buy order information to purchase the cryptographic token P from the provider device 13A, the agent device 14A registers the buy order represented by the buy order information in the order management database and purchases the cryptographic token P on behalf of the agent device 14A. The buy order information is transmitted to the exchange device 11A.

As shown in FIG. 2, the exchange device 11A registers the buy order represented by the proxy buy order information in the transaction database. The exchange device 11A executes the transfer of ownership of the cryptographic token P when the sell order and the buy order are matched.

Specifically, the exchange device 11A transmits matching establishment information indicating matching to the soliciting source device 12A and the agency device 14A.

The agency device 14A executes the ownership transfer process of the distribution token from the agency 14 to the recruiting source 12 based on the matching establishment information. Although the description is omitted, the ownership transfer process of the cryptographic token P from the recruiting source 12 to the agent 14 is also executed in the same manner.

The agency device 14A generates normal transaction information (BtoA in the figure) indicating the transfer of ownership from the distribution token agent 14 (B in the figure) to the solicitor 12 (A in the figure), and uses the private key 51E. It is transmitted to the exchange device 11A together with the signed transaction information with the electronic signature. The exchange device 11A broadcasts normal transaction information to the audit group 40.

Among the audit group 40, the audit devices 41A to 41D corresponding to the auditor 41 holding the private keys 51A to 51D corresponding to the agent 14 display the details of the transaction to the auditor 41, for example, on the display unit. Requests confirmation of the legitimacy of the transaction. When the legitimacy of the transaction is confirmed in response to the operation input of the auditor 41, the audit devices 41A to 41D digitally sign the signed transaction information. At this time, only the signed transaction information of the audit devices 41A to 41D that has been processed earliest is used.

It is also possible to automatically confirm the validity of the transaction on the program of the audit devices 41A to 41D. For example, if certain conditions are met, the auditing devices 41A to 41D automatically digitally sign, but the auditor confirms only when, for example, the same trader makes multiple transactions or exceeds the maximum transaction amount. Can be requested.

For example, the audit device 41A performs a second electronic signature on the signed transaction information, and then broadcasts the signed transaction information and the normal transaction information to the audit group 40. Further, when the audit device 41B performs a third electronic signature on the signed transaction information, the audit device 41B broadcasts the signed transaction information and the normal transaction information having the three electronic signatures to the normal group 32. ..

The information processing device 32A, which normally participates in the group 32, confirms the validity of the electronic signature in the signed transaction information, calculates the correct hash value, and broadcasts the calculation result to the P2P network 31. As a result, the transfer of ownership from the agent 14 to the solicitor 12 is written on the blockchain of the distribution token, and the transaction is officially approved and concluded.

In this way, in the transaction information processing system 1, the transfer of ownership of the token is completed after being authenticated by the auditor to whom the private key is assigned in advance. As a result, it is possible to prevent the establishment of fraudulent token transactions due to hacking by a third party or fake order.

Further, in the transaction information processing system 1, when there is a fraudulent transaction, the fraudulent counter-transaction process is executed to offset the transaction without the electronic signatures of the recruiting source 12 and the agent 14 who are the parties to the transaction.

For example, when multiple transactions are made between the same solicitor and provider within a short period of time, or when the transaction price changes significantly within a predetermined time, or when a transaction suspected of fraud occurs, transaction information processing It is automatically detected on the network in the system 1 and broadcast to the audit group 40 as fraudulent evidence and fraudulent transaction information. Note that FIG. 3 shows a case where the agency device 14A detects fraudulent transactions and broadcasts fraudulent evidence and fraudulent transaction information to the audit group 40 via the exchange 11, but the exchange 11, the audit group 40, and the audit group 40 When any device belonging to the normal group 32 detects it, the fraudulent evidence and fraudulent transaction information are broadcast to the audit group 40 in the same manner.

Among the audit group 40, the audit devices 42A to 42D corresponding to the auditor 42 holding the private keys 52A to 52D corresponding to the recruiting source 12 generate counter-transaction information that offsets the fraudulent transaction information. For example, if the ownership of the distribution token is transferred from the agent 14 (B in the figure) to the recruiter 12 (A in the figure), the ownership of the same quantity of distribution tokens is transferred from the agent 12 to the agent 14. The transaction (denoted as AtoB in the figure) is the opposite transaction information.

Among the audit group 40, the audit devices 42A to 42D corresponding to the auditor 42 holding the private keys 52A to 52D corresponding to the recruiting source 12 display the details of the transaction to the auditor 42, for example, on the display unit. Requests confirmation of the legitimacy of the transaction. When fraud is confirmed in response to the operation input of the auditor 42, the audit devices 42A to 42D digitally sign the counter-transaction information. At this time, only the signed transaction information of the auditing devices 42A to 42D that has been processed earliest is used.

For example, the audit device 42A broadcasts the signed transaction information and the fraudulent transaction information to the audit group 40 after performing the first electronic signature on the signed transaction information. When the audit device 42B performs a second electronic signature on the signed transaction information, the signed transaction information and the fraudulent transaction information are broadcast to the audit group 40. Then, when the audit device 42C makes a third electronic signature on the signed transaction information, the audit device 41C broadcasts the signed transaction information and the normal transaction information having the three electronic signatures to the normal group 32.

The information processing device 32A, which normally participates in the group 32, confirms the validity of the electronic signature in the signed transaction information, calculates the correct hash value, and broadcasts the calculation result to the P2P network 31. As a result, the transfer of ownership from the agent 14 to the recruiter 12 is written in the blockchain (distributed ledger) of the distribution token.

After that, the exchange device 11A, the agency device 14A, and the recruiting source device 12A can confirm that the transaction has actually been performed by checking the distributed ledger.

By holding the private keys 51 and 52 in this way, it is not necessary to use the private keys held by the parties to the transaction. In addition, a reliable audit group 40 can be formed by giving audit authority to only qualified auditors after examination. Further, by transmitting the transaction information (normal transaction information and counter-transaction information) before the electronic signatures are prepared only to the audit group 40, the confidentiality of the transaction before the establishment can be guaranteed to some extent.

In addition, even if the private key held by the holder of the cryptographic token P becomes unknown, such as death or loss of the private key, if the audit group 40 authenticates, the cryptographic token P can be used as a new account. The loss of the cryptographic token P can be prevented by special processing such as moving to. In addition, it is possible to cancel (opposite processing) the wrong remittance in the same way. In any case, the special transaction information is generated based on the application from the right party (holder of cryptographic token P or recruiter 12, provider 13), and the private key held by the audit group 40. Is executed by.

This can greatly reduce the risk that the crypto token cannot be withdrawn due to an event such as the holder of the crypto token making a wrong remittance, losing the private key, or the death of the founder or the party of the agent. ..

Next, the normal trading transaction processing executed by the transaction information processing system 1 will be described using the system chart of FIG. The communication terminals used (substitute device 14A, exchange device 11A, recruiting device 12A, audit device 41A to 41D, 42A to 42D, information processing device 32A) are system servers, personal computers, tablet terminals, and smartphones. It has a computer configuration such as.

Each communication terminal has a control unit (not shown) composed of a CPU (Central Processing Unit), a ROM (Read Only Memory), and a RAM (Random Access Memory), which controls the entire communication terminal in a centralized manner, and ROMs in advance. It is designed to carry out a part of normal sales transaction processing and fraudulent counter-transaction processing according to the agency transaction program stored in.

In step S11, a sell order is supplied from the recruiting source device 12A to the exchange device 11A. In step S12, the exchange device 11A registers the sell order in the transaction database.

In step S13, a buy order is supplied from the agency device 14A to the exchange device 11A. In step S13, the exchange device 11A registers the buy order in the transaction database, registers the fact that the matching has been established in the transaction database, and provides the matching establishment information indicating that the matching has been established to the agency device 14A and the recruiting source device. Supply to 12A.

In step S15, the agency device 14A generates normal transaction information indicating the transfer of the distribution token from the agency 14 to the recruiting source 12 based on the matching establishment information, and digitally signs the distribution token using the private key 51E. , The signed transaction information and the normal transaction information are supplied to the exchange device 11A.

In step S16, the exchange device 11A broadcasts the signed transaction information and the normal transaction information to the audit group 40.

In step S17, one of the auditing devices 41A to 41D corresponding to the agent 14 performs a second electronic signature on the signed transaction information, and the signed transaction information and the normal transaction information are audited by the audit group 40. Broadcast to.

In step S18, one of the auditing devices 41A to 41D corresponding to the agent 14 performs a third electronic signature on the signed transaction information, and the signed transaction information and the normal transaction information are combined with the P2P network 31. Broadcast to the information processing device 32A inside.

In step S19, the information processing apparatus 32A verifies the validity of the electronic signature, calculates the correct hash value, and broadcasts the calculated hash value to the P2P network 31. In step S20, the transaction represented by the normal transaction information (that is, the transfer from the agent 14 to the recruiting source 12) is recorded in the distributed ledger in the P2P network 31, and the normal sales transaction process ends.

Next, the fraudulent counter-transaction processing executed by the transaction information processing system 1 will be described using the system chart of FIG.

In step S41, fraudulent evidence indicating fraudulent transactions and fraudulent transaction information in which details of the fraudulent transaction are specified are supplied from the agency device 14A to the exchange device 11A. In step S42, the exchange device 11A generates counter-transaction information that offsets the fraudulent transaction represented by the fraudulent transaction information (that is, represents the transfer of the distribution token from the solicitor 12 to the agent 14). In step S42, the exchange device 11A broadcasts the fraudulent transaction information to the audit group 40 together with the fraudulent evidence.

In step S44, one of the auditing devices 42A to 42D corresponding to the solicitor 12 performs the first electronic signature on the signed transaction information, and the signed transaction information and the fraudulent transaction information are combined with the fraudulent evidence. Broadcast to audit group 40.

In step S45, one of the auditing devices 42A to 42D corresponding to the solicitor 12 performs a second electronic signature on the signed transaction information, and the signed transaction information and the fraudulent transaction information are combined with the fraudulent evidence. Broadcast to audit group 40.

In step S46, one of the auditing devices 42A to 42D corresponding to the solicitor 12 performs a third electronic signature on the signed transaction information, and the signed transaction information and the fraudulent transaction information are audited by the audit group 40. Broadcast to.

In step S47, the information processing device 32A verifies the validity of the electronic signature, calculates the correct hash value, and broadcasts the calculated hash value to the P2P network 31. In step S48, the transaction represented by the counter-transaction information (that is, the transfer from the solicitor 12 to the agent 14) is recorded in the distributed ledger in the P2P network 31, and the fraudulent counter-transaction process ends.

<Operation and effect>
Hereinafter, the characteristics of the invention group extracted from the above-described embodiments will be described while showing the effects and the like as necessary. In the following, for the sake of easy understanding, the corresponding configurations in each of the above embodiments are appropriately shown in parentheses or the like, but the present invention is not limited to the specific configurations shown in the parentheses or the like. In addition, the meanings and examples of terms described in each feature may be applied as meanings and examples of terms described in other features described in the same wording.

In the transaction information processing system of the present invention, N private keys (N is a natural number of 3 or more) are prepared, and a multi-signature public key that can be digitally signed using N-a (a is a natural number) private keys. A transaction information system (transaction information processing system 1) that uses a method to process electronic transactions of cryptographic tokens using cryptography, which is a data right, and multiple distribution transactions of the cryptographic tokens.
An exchange device (exchange device 11A) that mediates transactions between the transfer source (recruitment source 12) and the transfer destination (provider 13 or agent 14) of the cryptographic token, and
A plurality of auditing devices (auditing devices 41A to 41D, 42A to) that correspond to a plurality of auditors who are given audit authority in advance and hold a private key corresponding to the transfer source and authenticate transactions using the private key. 42D) and
It has a P2P network (P2P network 31) that establishes the authenticated transaction by writing the authenticated transaction on the blockchain.
The transfer source holds one secret key (

private keys

51E, 52E),
The plurality of auditors hold the remaining private keys (private keys 51A to D, 52A to D) one by one (that is, secret sharing).

As a result, the auditor's private key is required to execute the transaction, and the transaction can be performed using only the private key held by the auditor. Therefore, the transaction information processing system as a whole monitors the transaction. Can be strengthened, and fraudulent sales of cryptographic tokens can be suppressed.

Further, in the transaction information processing system, among the plurality of auditing devices, the first to N- (a + 1) auditing devices are
When the transaction information that represents the matching transaction between the transfer source and the transfer destination and the electronic signature of the transfer source is supplied and the observer authenticates the validity of the transaction, the first to N- (a + 1) Digitally sign
The P2P network is
It is characterized in that an electronically signed transaction is completed by the first to N- (a + 1) auditing devices.

As a result, since the parties to the transaction (moving source) need only digitally sign the rest with the audit device after the electronic signature, the number of electronic signatures by the audit device can be reduced and the process until the end of the transaction (recording in the distributed ledger). You can save time.

In the transaction information processing system
Of the plurality of auditing devices, the first to NA auditing devices are
When the observer authenticates the fraudulent transaction that was sent in the past, the counter-transaction information that cancels the corresponding transaction is digitally signed.
The P2P network is
It is characterized in that the counter-transaction represented by the authenticated counter-trade information supplied from the audit device that has performed the electronic signature is completed.

As a result, it is possible to conclude a counter-trade only by an auditor who has audit authority, and it is possible to suppress the illegal sale of cryptographic tokens.

In the transaction information processing system
The exchange device or the first audit device
It is characterized in that the counter-transaction information is generated for transactions that have been completed in the past.

As a result, in the transaction information processing system, only the exchange or a plurality of auditors in a fair position can generate the counter-transaction information, and the parties (agent 14) do not generate the counter-transaction information. It is possible to prevent the generation of counter-trade information.

The transaction information system
It has an agency device that acts on behalf of the transaction of the transfer destination,
The transaction is executed between the agency device and the transfer source device corresponding to the transfer source.

This allows individuals and others to easily participate in transactions using agents such as securities companies.

In the transaction information processing system, the exchange device is
Generate transaction information for transactions that match the transfer source and transfer destination.
The relocation destination device corresponding to the relocation destination is
Electronically sign the transaction information
The exchange device or the relocation destination device
It is characterized in that the electronically signed transaction information is transmitted to at least the plurality of observer devices.

As a result, the unsigned transaction information can be transmitted only to the observer device, so that the confidentiality of the unsuccessful transaction can be guaranteed.

<Other embodiments>
In the above-described embodiment, the normal transaction information or the counter-transaction information and the signed transaction information are broadcast only to the audit group 40, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, as shown in FIG. 6, it may be broadcast to the entire P2P network 31. Further, it is not always necessary for the exchange device 11A to broadcast the normal transaction information or the counter-transaction information and the signed transaction information, and the parties to the transaction such as the agency device 14A may broadcast directly to the P2P network 31. .. In this case, for example, by applying a decryptable code only to the audit group 40, the confidentiality of the unsuccessful transaction can be ensured.

Further, in the above-described embodiment, the agent 14 acts as the agent for the transaction of the provider 13, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, as shown in FIG. 7, the process may be executed by the provider device 13A owned by the provider 13. In this case, the provider device 13A executes the same processing as the proxy device 14A instead of the proxy device 14A. In addition, there may be an agent at the recruiting source 12. In this case, as in the above embodiment, the transaction is executed using the private key held by the agent.

In the above-described embodiment, five private keys are used, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, three private keys can be used to digitally sign with two or more private keys, or four private keys can be used to digitally sign with three or more private keys. The point is that there are N private keys, and the electronic signature can be verified by using (NA) private keys.

In the above-described embodiment, the audit group 40 also participates in the P2P network 31, but the present invention is not limited to this. The audit group 40 may exist as a single group that does not overlap with the P2P network 31. In addition, it is not always necessary to broadcast normal transaction information or counter-transaction information, signed transaction information, etc. to the audit group 40. For example, an audit device of an auditor who holds a private key is registered in advance in the exchange device. , An auditing device suitable for the trader may be selected to transmit normal transaction information or counter-transaction information, signed transaction information, and the like.

In the above-described embodiment, the transaction of moving one transaction (distribution token) from the agent 14 to the solicitor 12 has been described, but the present invention is not limited to this. Since two transactions (a transaction for moving the distribution token from the agent 14 to the agent 12 and a transaction for moving the cryptographic token P from the agent 12 to the agent 14) need to be performed in parallel, these are required. By broadcasting or transmitting to the audit group 40 as a set, a more rigorous audit can be performed. In this case, it is preferable that the two normal transaction information and one signed transaction information are sent as a package.

In the above-described embodiment, the case where the transaction information processing system 1 of the present invention is applied at the time of selling the security token based on the asset has been described, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the present invention can be applied to so-called cryptographic assets for the purpose of soliciting funds or transferring funds of start-up companies.

In the above-described embodiment, the normal transaction information is transmitted to all of the auditing devices 41A to 41D corresponding to the auditor 41 having the private keys 51A to 51D corresponding to the agent 14, and the auditing devices 41A to 41A to perform the processing earliest. Only 41D signed transaction information was used, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, a ranking may be assigned in advance or for each transaction, and ordinary transaction information or ordinary transaction information and signed transaction information may be transmitted in order from the earliest order. In this case, for example, if the normal transaction information and the signed transaction information are not transmitted to the audit device of the next rank even after the lapse of a predetermined time, the transmitted audit device is skipped and transmitted to the audit device of the next rank. Can be done.

In the above embodiment, fraudulent transactions were detected by the network, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, when the recruiting source 12 commits fraud by making a false application, proof of fraud is submitted by the provider 13 or the agent 14. Even in this case, fraudulent counter-transaction processing is executed in the same manner. Further, for example, when the recruiting source 12 is arrested, the fraudulent transaction may be specified by the exchange 11 and the fraudulent transaction information may be generated. For accounts where fraudulent transactions have been discovered, transactions will not be possible if the observer does not accept transaction requests. Fraudulent accounts and fraudulent transaction information are recorded and retained in the ledger as evidence of fraud.

In the above-described embodiment, the case where a transaction is conducted between the solicitor 12 and the provider 13 as the transfer source and the transfer destination has been described, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, between the holder and the provider who purchased the crypto token from the solicitor 12 and became the holder of the crypto token, and further between the holder and the provider who became the holder of the crypto token through a plurality of transactions. The present invention can be similarly applied to the next transaction.

Although not described in the above-described embodiment, there is no limitation on the electronic signature method, and a known method such as a threshold signature or a BLS signature can be appropriately selected and used. For example, a transaction (transaction information) signed with (NA) private keys can be verified with the master public key, or (NA) transactions signed with (NA) private keys can be verified. It can be verified with the public key corresponding to the private key of.

In addition, the public key may be attached to a transaction (transaction information), all public keys may be centrally managed and made public by a transaction system, or a public key may be generated using a random number or the like for each transaction. At this time, as the public key, only the number of private keys (N) may be generated, or only the public keys (that is, NA) corresponding to the private keys used for the electronic signature may be generated. By using the public key corresponding to the private key used for the digital signature, or by generating and using the master public key corresponding to the master private key including the private key not used for the digital signature, the digital signature can be used. The legitimacy is verified. As a token transaction method using multisig, a Raw Output method in which a public key is added to a transaction as it is, a P2SH (Pay to Script Hash) method in which a hash of a public key is added to a transaction, and the like are preferably used. ..

The present invention can be used, for example, in a security token trading system linked to an asset.

1: Transaction information processing system 11: Exchange 11A: Exchange device 12: Recruiter 12A: Recruiter device 13: Provider 13A: Provider device 14: Agent 14A: Agency device 31: P2P network 32: Normal group 32A : Information processing device 40: Audit group 41: Auditors 41A to 41D, 42A to 42D:

Audit devices

51, 51A to 51E, 52, 52A to 52E: Private key P: Cryptographic token

Claims

Publication of a multi-signature in which N private keys (N is a natural number of 3 or more) are prepared and it is possible to digitally sign using NA (a is a natural number and NA is 2 or more) private keys. A transaction information system that uses a key method to process electronic transactions of cryptographic tokens using cryptography, which is a data right, and multiple distribution transactions of the cryptographic tokens.
An exchange device that mediates transactions between the transfer source and transfer destination of the cryptographic token, and
A plurality of auditing devices that are given auditing authority in advance and that correspond to a plurality of auditors holding a private key corresponding to the transfer source and authenticate transactions using the private key, and a plurality of auditing devices.
It has a P2P (Peer to Peer) network that establishes the authenticated transaction by writing the authenticated transaction on the blockchain.
The transfer source holds one of the private keys,
A transaction information processing system in which the plurality of auditors hold the remaining private keys one by one.
Of the plurality of auditing devices, the first to N- (a + 1) auditing devices are
When the transaction information that represents the matching transaction between the transfer source and the transfer destination and the electronic signature of the transfer source is supplied and the auditor authenticates the validity of the transaction, the first to N- (a + 1) ) To digitally sign
The P2P network is
The transaction information processing system according to claim 1, wherein an electronically signed transaction is completed by the first to N- (a + 1) auditing devices.
Of the plurality of auditing devices, the first to NA auditing devices are
When the auditor authenticates the fraudulent transaction that was sent in the past, the counter-transaction information that cancels the corresponding transaction is digitally signed.
The P2P network is
The transaction information processing system according to claim 1, wherein the counter-transaction represented by the authenticated counter-trade information supplied from the audit device that has digitally signed is established.
The exchange device or the first audit device
The transaction information processing system according to claim 3, wherein the counter-transaction information is generated for a transaction that has been completed in the past.
The transaction information system
It has an agency device that acts on behalf of the transaction of the transfer destination,
The transaction information processing system according to claim 1, wherein the transaction is executed between the agency device and the transfer source device corresponding to the transfer source.
The exchange device
Generate transaction information for transactions that match the transfer source and transfer destination.
The relocation destination device corresponding to the relocation destination is
Electronically sign the transaction information
The exchange device or the relocation destination device
The transaction information processing system according to claim 2, wherein the electronically signed transaction information is transmitted to at least the plurality of audit devices.