WO2020237751A1 - 利用智能合约实现基于身份的密钥管理方法及装置 - Google Patents
利用智能合约实现基于身份的密钥管理方法及装置 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2020237751A1 WO2020237751A1 PCT/CN2019/091788 CN2019091788W WO2020237751A1 WO 2020237751 A1 WO2020237751 A1 WO 2020237751A1 CN 2019091788 W CN2019091788 W CN 2019091788W WO 2020237751 A1 WO2020237751 A1 WO 2020237751A1
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- target user
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- private key
- identity information
- key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
- H04L9/3073—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
Definitions
- This application relates to the field of computer technology, and in particular to a method and device for implementing identity-based key management using smart contracts.
- the Key Generation Center (KGC) generates the master public key and the master private key, and KGC reuses the master public key, the master private key, and the user's identity Information (such as name, e-mail, ID number, etc.) generates a private key for the user, and the user’s identity information is the public key, without digital certificate binding, which can avoid the complexity of digital certificate management in the public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme Difficult problem.
- KKI public key infrastructure
- the user's identity information must be changed to update its private key. Once the user's identity information is changed, the user's identity self-certification will be reduced , Will affect the performance of key update in the IBC scheme.
- the embodiments of the present application provide a method and device for implementing identity-based key management using smart contracts.
- a method for implementing identity-based key management using smart contracts includes:
- the key management process includes:
- the key of the target user needs to be updated, if the target user is an unsupervised user, generate a master public key and a master private key belonging to the target user;
- the key management process further includes:
- the target user is an unsupervised user and the private key of the target user is leaked, or the target user is a supervised user, obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain;
- updating the identity information of the target user includes:
- variable part of the identity information of the target user is updated.
- the key management process further includes:
- the state information of the first target identity information is queried in the blockchain, where the first target identity information is the identity information of any user stored in the blockchain.
- the key management process further includes:
- An identity-based key management device implemented by using smart contracts including:
- the running module is configured to run the smart contract and execute the key management process.
- the key management process includes:
- the key of the target user needs to be updated, if the target user is an unsupervised user, generate a master public key and a master private key belonging to the target user;
- the key management process executed by the running module to run the smart contract further includes:
- the target user is an unsupervised user and the private key of the target user is leaked, or the target user is a supervised user, obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain;
- the operation module runs the smart contract
- the process of updating the identity information of the target user during the execution of the key management process includes:
- variable part of the identity information of the target user is updated.
- the key management process executed by the running module to run the smart contract further includes:
- the state information of the first target identity information is queried in the blockchain, where the first target identity information is the identity information of any user stored in the blockchain.
- the key management process executed by the running module to run the smart contract further includes:
- the target user's key needs to be updated, if the target user is an unsupervised user, the master owner belonging to the target user is generated
- the key and the master private key do not use the master public key and master private key that KGC has generated, and the target user’s identity information is obtained from the blockchain, and the target user’s identity information is not changed, based on the master public key that KGC has generated
- the key and the master private key belong to the target user’s master public key and master private key and the unchanged target user’s identity information, generate the first target private key, and replace the target user’s current private key with the first target private key to achieve Update of the user's private key.
- the self-certification of the target user's identity will not be reduced, thereby improving the key update performance in the IBC scheme.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a blockchain network provided by an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a key management process provided by an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of another key management process provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of another key management process provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of yet another key management process provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of yet another key management process provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- Fig. 7 is a schematic diagram of the logical structure of an identity-based key management device implemented by using a smart contract according to an embodiment of the present application.
- the embodiment of the application discloses an identity-based key management scheme using smart contracts, including: running smart contracts and executing key management processes.
- the key management process includes: when the target user's key needs to be updated In this case, if the target user is an unsupervised user, the master public key and master private key belonging to the target user are generated; the identity information of the target user is obtained from the blockchain, based on belonging to the target user The master public key and the master private key of and the identity information of the target user are generated to generate the first target private key; the current private key of the target user is replaced with the first target private key.
- the performance of key update in the IBC scheme can be improved.
- the method is applied to a computer device, and the method includes the following steps:
- a blockchain network is provided. As shown in Figure 1, the blockchain network is composed of multiple full nodes, and each full node stores the same data, such as the user’s public key and the master generated by KGC. Public key and other information.
- Block chain network can be understood as: public chain network or alliance network.
- the user's private key and the master private key generated by KGC are kept by the user and are not stored in the blockchain to avoid leakage of the private key and master private key.
- smart contracts can be run to execute the key management process, where the key management process can include:
- b_supervis can be understood as: a boolean variable (bool), which mainly indicates whether the registered ID is a supervised user.
- the smart contract administrator can obtain the user's private key, and the smart contract administrator needs to follow it The key is updated; if it is a non-supervised user, the smart contract administrator cannot obtain the user's private key after the user registers, and the user will update the key later; b_valid indicates whether the user ID is currently valid.
- the key management process may further include the following steps:
- Step S21 In the case where the key of the target user needs to be updated, if the target user is an unsupervised user, generate a master public key and a master private key belonging to the target user;
- the master public key and master private key belonging to the target user can be understood as: different values from the master public key and master private key generated by KGC.
- the master public key and master private key belonging to the target user are mainly used to generate the target user's private key.
- Step S22 Obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain
- the identity information of multiple users is stored in the blockchain, so the identity information of the target user can be obtained from the blockchain. Specifically, the identity information of the target user can be obtained from the blockchain according to the identity of the target user.
- the identity information of the target user can be understood as: the public key of the target user.
- Step S23 Generate a first target private key based on the master public key and the master private key belonging to the target user and the identity information of the target user;
- Step S24 Replace the current private key of the target user with the first target private key.
- the current private key of the target user can be understood as: the private key currently available to the target user.
- the target user's private key is updated.
- the target user is an unsupervised user, there is no need to update the target user’s identity information, that is, the target user’s public key.
- the master public key and master private key belonging to the target user that are different from the master public key and master private key generated by KGC are used.
- the private key and the public key of the target user that has not been updated are used to update the private key of the target user.
- the master public key belonging to the target user is generated And the master private key, do not use the master public key and master private key that KGC has generated, and obtain the target user's identity information from the blockchain, without changing the target user's identity information, based on the master public key that is different from the master public key that KGC has generated
- the master public key and the master private key belonging to the target user with the master private key and the unchanged target user’s identity information are generated to generate the first target private key, and replace the current private key of the target user with the first target private key to realize the user Update of the private key.
- the self-certification of the target user's identity will not be reduced, thereby improving the key update performance in the IBC scheme.
- non-supervised users can update their own keys, which can avoid the need to re-update the private keys of all users when KGC replaces the master private key and master public key, realizing a completely decentralized key management method. And improve the practicality.
- this application provides a schematic flowchart of another key management process.
- This embodiment is mainly an extension method of the key management process described in the above embodiment 1, such as As shown in Figure 3, the method may include but is not limited to the following steps:
- Step S31 In the case that the key of the target user needs to be updated, if the target user is an unsupervised user, generate a master public key and a master private key belonging to the target user;
- Step S32 Obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain
- Step S33 Generate a first target private key based on the master public key and the master private key belonging to the target user and the identity information of the target user;
- Step S34 Replace the current private key of the target user with the first target private key
- step S31-step S34 please refer to the related introduction of steps S21-S24 in Embodiment 1, and will not be repeated here.
- Step S35 If the target user is an unsupervised user and the private key of the target user is leaked, or the target user is a supervised user, obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain ;
- b_valid can be set to an invalid state. Then start to perform the key update process, first obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain.
- Step S36 The identity information of the target user is updated, and the updated identity information is used as the target identity information;
- Step S37 Use the target identity information to generate a second target private key
- a new private key is generated as the second target private key.
- Step S38 Replace the current private key of the target user with the second target private key.
- the current private key of the target user can be understood as: the private key currently available to the target user.
- the target user’s public information is updated by updating the target user’s identity information.
- the private key of the target user is updated based on the updated public key.
- this application provides a schematic flow diagram of another key management process.
- This embodiment is mainly a refinement method of the key management process described in the above embodiment 2. As shown in Figure 4, the method may include but is not limited to the following steps:
- Step S41 In the case that the key of the target user needs to be updated, if the target user is an unsupervised user, generate a master public key and a master private key belonging to the target user;
- Step S42 Obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain
- Step S43 Generate a first target private key based on the master public key and the master private key belonging to the target user and the identity information of the target user;
- Step S44 Replace the current private key of the target user with the first target private key
- Step S45 If the target user is an unsupervised user and the private key of the target user is leaked, or the target user is a supervised user, obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain ;
- step S41-step S45 please refer to the related introduction of steps S31-S35 in Embodiment 2, which will not be repeated here.
- Step S46 Update the variable part of the identity information of the target user, and use the updated identity information as the target identity information;
- the identity information of the target user may consist of a fixed part and a variable part.
- variable part can be understood as: a variable part, such as a date or other random numbers.
- variable part of the target user's identity information is updated, and the fixed part of the target user's identity information is not updated, which can ensure the validity and reliability of the target user's identity information.
- Step S47 Use the target identity information to generate a second target private key
- Step S48 Replace the current private key of the target user with the second target private key.
- step S47-step S48 please refer to the related introduction of steps S37-S38 in Embodiment 2, and will not be repeated here.
- FIG. 5 there is a schematic flowchart of another key management process provided for this application.
- This embodiment is mainly an extension method of the key management process described in the above embodiment 1, such as As shown in Figure 5, the method may include but is not limited to the following steps:
- Step S51 In the case that the key of the target user needs to be updated, if the target user is an unsupervised user, generate a master public key and a master private key belonging to the target user;
- Step S52 Obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain
- Step S53 Generate a first target private key based on the master public key and the master private key belonging to the target user and the identity information of the target user;
- Step S54 Replace the current private key of the target user with the first target private key
- step S51 to step S54 please refer to the relevant introduction of steps S21 to S24 in Embodiment 1, which will not be repeated here.
- Step S55 Query the status information of the first target identity information in the blockchain, where the first target identity information is the identity information of any user stored in the blockchain.
- the status information of the first target identity information may include, but is not limited to: whether it has been registered, whether it is the identity information of a supervised user, and whether the identity information is currently valid.
- storing the status information of the identity information in the blockchain can prevent the status information of the identity information from being tampered with, and ensure the reliability of the status information of the queried first target identity information.
- FIG. 6 a schematic flow diagram of another key management process provided for this application.
- This embodiment is mainly an extension method of the key management process described in the above embodiment 1, such as As shown in Figure 6, the method may include but is not limited to the following steps:
- Step S61 In the case that the key of the target user needs to be updated, if the target user is an unsupervised user, generate a master public key and a master private key belonging to the target user;
- Step S62 Obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain
- Step S63 Generate a first target private key based on the master public key and the master private key belonging to the target user and the identity information of the target user;
- Step S64 Replace the current private key of the target user with the first target private key
- step S61-step S64 please refer to the related introduction of steps S21-S24 in Embodiment 1, and will not be repeated here.
- Step S65 Use the historical private key used by the target user to sign the state information associated with the first target private key.
- the historical private key used by the target user can be understood as: the last used private key before updating the private key of the target user to the first target private key.
- the state information associated with the first target private key may include, but is not limited to: whether the identity information of the target user corresponding to the first target private key is registered, and whether the identity information of the target user corresponding to the first target private key is of a supervised user Whether the identity information and the identity information of the target user corresponding to the first target private key are currently valid.
- Using the historical private key used by the target user to sign the state information associated with the first target private key can be understood as: using the historical private key used by the target user to associate the first target private key The status information is signed legally.
- Using the historical private key used by the target user to legally sign the state information associated with the first target private key can ensure the validity of the state information associated with the first target private key.
- the identity information of a certain user needs to be cancelled, the identity information of the user can be cancelled, and the identity information of the user can be deleted from the blockchain.
- the identity-based key management device implemented using smart contracts provided by this application will be introduced.
- the identity-based key management device implemented using smart contracts described below and the smart contract implementation described above are used to implement identity-based keys.
- the management methods can be referred to each other.
- an identity-based key management device implemented by using a smart contract includes: an operating module 11.
- the running module 11 is configured to run a smart contract and execute a key management process.
- the key management process includes:
- the key of the target user needs to be updated, if the target user is an unsupervised user, generate a master public key and a master private key belonging to the target user;
- the key management process executed by the running module 11 to run the smart contract may also include:
- the target user is an unsupervised user and the private key of the target user is leaked, or the target user is a supervised user, obtain the identity information of the target user from the blockchain;
- the running module 11 runs the smart contract
- the process of updating the target user's identity information during the execution of the key management process may include:
- variable part of the identity information of the target user is updated.
- the key management process executed by the running module 11 to run the smart contract may also include:
- the state information of the first target identity information is queried in the blockchain, where the first target identity information is the identity information of any user stored in the blockchain.
- the key management process executed by the running module 11 to run the smart contract may also include:
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Description
Claims (10)
- 一种利用智能合约实现基于身份的密钥管理方法,包括:运行智能合约,执行密钥管理过程,所述密钥管理过程,包括:在目标用户的密钥需要更新的情况下,若所述目标用户为非受监管用户,则生成属于所述目标用户的主公钥和主私钥;从区块链中获取所述目标用户的身份信息;基于属于所述目标用户的主公钥和主私钥及所述目标用户的身份信息,生成第一目标私钥;将所述目标用户的当前私钥替换为所述第一目标私钥。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述密钥管理过程,还包括:若所述目标用户为非受监管用户且所述目标用户的私钥泄露,或,所述目标用户为受监管用户,则从所述区块链中获取所述目标用户的身份信息;对所述目标用户的身份信息进行更新,更新后的身份信息作为目标身份信息;利用所述目标身份信息,生成第二目标私钥;将所述目标用户的当前私钥替换为所述第二目标私钥。
- 根据权利要求2所述的方法,其中,对所述目标用户的身份信息进行更新,包括:对所述目标用户的身份信息中的可变部分进行更新。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述密钥管理过程,还包括:在所述区块链中查询第一目标身份信息的状态信息,所述第一目标身份信息为所述区块链中存储的任意一个用户的身份信息。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述密钥管理过程,还包括:利用所述目标用户使用过的历史私钥对所述第一目标私钥关联的状态信息进行签名。
- 一种利用智能合约实现的基于身份的密钥管理装置,包括:运行模块,配置为运行智能合约,执行密钥管理过程,所述密钥管理过程,包括:在目标用户的密钥需要更新的情况下,若所述目标用户为非受监管用户,则生成属于所述目标用户的主公钥和主私钥;从区块链中获取所述目标用户的身份信息;基于属于所述目标用户的主公钥和主私钥及所述目标用户的身份信息,生成第一目标私钥;将所述目标用户的当前私钥替换为所述第一目标私钥。
- 根据权利要求6所述的装置,其中,所述运行模块运行所述智能合约,执行的密钥管理过程,还包括:若所述目标用户为非受监管用户且所述目标用户的私钥泄露,或,所述目标用户为受监管用户,则从所述区块链中获取所述目标用户的身份信息;对所述目标用户的身份信息进行更新,更新后的身份信息作为目标身份信息;利用所述目标身份信息,生成第二目标私钥;将所述目标用户的当前私钥替换为所述第二目标私钥。
- 根据权利要求7所述的装置,其中,所述运行模块运行所述智能合约,执行的密钥管理过程中对所述目标用户的身份信息进行更新的过程,包括:对所述目标用户的身份信息中的可变部分进行更新。
- 根据权利要求6所述的装置,其中,所述运行模块运行所述智能合约,执行的密钥管理过程,还包括:在所述区块链中查询第一目标身份信息的状态信息,所述第一目标身份信息为所述区块链中存储的任意一个用户的身份信息。
- 根据权利要求6所述的装置,其中,所述运行模块运行所述智能合约,执行的密钥管理过程,还包括:利用所述目标用户使用过的历史私钥对所述第一目标私钥关联的状态信息进行签名。
Priority Applications (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP19930811.5A EP3843326B1 (en) | 2019-05-27 | 2019-06-18 | Method and device employing smart contract to realize identity-based key management |
US17/440,294 US20220158834A1 (en) | 2019-05-27 | 2019-06-18 | Method and device employing smart contract to realize identity-based key management |
JP2021560584A JP7426402B2 (ja) | 2019-05-27 | 2019-06-18 | スマートコントラクトでidベースのキー管理を実現する方法および装置 |
KR1020217040076A KR102663060B1 (ko) | 2019-05-27 | 2019-06-18 | 스마트 계약을 사용하여 신원 기반 키 관리를 구현하는 방법 및 장치 |
AU2019448286A AU2019448286B2 (en) | 2019-05-27 | 2019-06-18 | Method and device employing smart contract to realize identity-based key management |
BR112021023517A BR112021023517A8 (pt) | 2019-05-27 | 2019-06-18 | Método e dispositivo para implementar gerenciamento de chave com base na identidade com o uso de um contrato inteligente, e mídia de armazenamento legível por computador não transitória |
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CN114697001A (zh) * | 2020-12-28 | 2022-07-01 | 山东浪潮质量链科技有限公司 | 一种基于区块链的信息加密传输方法、设备及介质 |
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CN110635899B (zh) * | 2019-09-03 | 2022-10-25 | 核芯互联科技(青岛)有限公司 | 一种ibc用户密钥更新方法及装置 |
CN112019553B (zh) * | 2020-08-31 | 2021-07-06 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | 一种基于ibe/ibbe数据共享方法 |
CN112187454B (zh) * | 2020-09-14 | 2022-12-02 | 国网浙江省电力有限公司 | 基于区块链的密钥管理方法及系统 |
CN112804356B (zh) * | 2021-03-30 | 2021-07-23 | 信联科技(南京)有限公司 | 一种基于区块链的联网设备监管认证方法及系统 |
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AU2019448286B2 (en) | 2022-12-22 |
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KR20220012867A (ko) | 2022-02-04 |
CN110166254B (zh) | 2020-09-29 |
US20220158834A1 (en) | 2022-05-19 |
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BR112021023517A8 (pt) | 2023-02-14 |
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