WO2020233308A1 - 基于本地证书的自校验方法、装置、设备及存储介质 - Google Patents
基于本地证书的自校验方法、装置、设备及存储介质 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2020233308A1 WO2020233308A1 PCT/CN2020/085577 CN2020085577W WO2020233308A1 WO 2020233308 A1 WO2020233308 A1 WO 2020233308A1 CN 2020085577 W CN2020085577 W CN 2020085577W WO 2020233308 A1 WO2020233308 A1 WO 2020233308A1
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- certificate
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- public key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/02—Protocols based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP]
Definitions
- This application relates to the field of security protection, and in particular to a self-verification method, device, equipment and storage medium based on a local certificate.
- the HTTPS certificate (Hyper Transfer Protocol Over Secure Socket Layer, the hypertext transfer protocol with security as the goal) verification of the mobile terminal application software on the market uses the standard certificate chain verification method, that is, the operation of the mobile terminal
- the root certificate preset by the system is verified.
- the inventor realizes that the current certificate chain verification method has security risks in mobile devices. The reason is that many phishing websites will guide users to install illegal root certificates on mobile terminals, and there are even blacklist applications that are installed illegally on mobile clients. Root certificate, so that the HTTPS communication of the operating system of the mobile terminal will be virtual, and the HTTPS communication can be directly captured and cracked by a phishing website or a blacklist application.
- the embodiments of the present application provide a self-verification method, device, device, and storage medium based on a local certificate, which provide a higher level of communication security guarantee for the communication between the application software and the back-end server.
- a self-verification method based on local certificates including:
- a self-checking device based on local certificate including:
- the sending module is used to obtain the verification request sent when the user triggers a preset verification operation through the application software when establishing a communication connection with the back-end server through the application software, and send the verification request to the Back-end server
- the calling module is used to obtain the secondary certificate returned by the back-end server, and call the preset truncation interface to cut the certificate chain verification;
- the self-verification module is configured to obtain a local certificate associated with the application software from a local database, and use the local certificate to perform certificate self-verification on the secondary certificate;
- the execution module is configured to make the application program execute the verification operation when the certificate self-verification is passed.
- the prompt interruption module is configured to prompt the failure of performing the verification operation when the certificate self-verification fails, and interrupt the communication connection established by the application software and the back-end server.
- a computer device includes a memory, a processor, and computer-readable instructions stored in the memory and that can run on the processor.
- the processor implements the above-mentioned local certificate-based Self-checking method.
- a computer-readable storage medium that stores computer-readable instructions that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-mentioned self-verification method based on local certificates.
- the local certificate-based self-verification method, device, device and storage medium provided in this application will send a verification request generated by the user to trigger a verification operation on the application software when a communication connection is established with the back-end server through the application software To the back-end server; and after obtaining the secondary certificate returned by the back-end server, call the preset truncation interface to cut off the certificate chain verification, so that the verification process does not require CA certification, nor does it need to apply for a CA certificate, saving Save money and trouble; further, obtain the local certificate associated with the application software from a local database, and use the local certificate to perform certificate self-verification on the secondary certificate, so that a third-party middleman cannot attack the application software and the backend
- the communication process between servers provides a higher level of communication security.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an application environment of a self-verification method based on a local certificate in an embodiment of the present application
- Figure 2 is a flowchart of a self-verification method based on a local certificate in an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a self-verification method based on a local certificate in an embodiment of the present application
- Figure 5 is a functional block diagram of a self-verification device based on a local certificate in an embodiment of the present application
- Figure 6 is a functional block diagram of a self-verification device based on a local certificate in another embodiment of the present application.
- FIG. 7 is a functional block diagram of a distribution module of a self-verification device based on a local certificate in an embodiment of the present application
- Fig. 8 is a schematic diagram of a computer device in an embodiment of the present application.
- the self-verification method based on the local certificate provided in this application can be applied in the application environment as shown in Figure 1, where the client communicates with the server through the network.
- the client includes, but is not limited to, various personal computers, notebook computers, smart phones, tablet computers, and portable wearable devices.
- the server can be implemented as an independent server or a server cluster composed of multiple servers.
- a self-verification method based on a local certificate is provided. Taking the method applied to the server in FIG. 1 as an example, the method includes the following steps:
- the application software (also called APP) refers to various programming languages that users can use, and a collection of application programs compiled in various programming languages, which are divided into application software packages and user programs;
- the application software packages Refers to a pre-programmed software package that can complete certain functions for sale or lease.
- the application software package can be as small as only one function (for example, printing postal signs), or it can have complex functions and run The large system on the host;
- the user program refers to the part of the software provided to meet the application needs of users in different fields and different problems, for example, game applets.
- the back-end server may be a webpage accessed through a browser installed on the client (ie, application software on a certain client), and the back-end server is different from the local server; understandably, one of the local servers Corresponds to a client.
- the verification request refers to a user triggering a preset verification operation through the client's application software, and when the local server in communication with the client receives the verification request, the verification request is sent to the post End server; each of the verification operations corresponds to a function button, for example, login operations, transfer operations.
- the client application software when the client application software establishes an HTTPS (hypertext transfer protocol for security) communication connection with the back-end server, when the user triggers a function button on the application software, the verification operation The generated verification request is sent to the back-end server. At this time, the local server will wait for the back-end server to respond to the verification request before sending its secondary certificate.
- the secondary certificate is an HTTPS certificate applied by a CA (Certificate Authority, certificate authority) issued by the application software.
- the issuer of the application software sends a certificate application containing the issuer information to the CA, it receives the secondary certificate derived from the CA root certificate by the CA based on the issuer information, and configures the secondary certificate to the back
- the issuer information includes information such as the issuer's organization and domain name
- the secondary certificate includes the certificate public key, the certificate serial number, the digital signature of the certificate authority, and the validity time of the certificate.
- S20 Obtain the secondary certificate returned by the back-end server, and call a preset truncation interface to cut the certificate chain verification.
- the truncation interface is an application program interface provided by a programming language.
- the certificate chain verification refers to verifying the secondary certificate using the CA root certificate preset by the client operating system.
- the CA root certificate is stored in a trusted certificate list. If the client installs an illegal root certificate of a third-party intermediary when visiting a phishing website or installing blacklisted application software, the trusted certificate list also includes Illegal root certificates of third-party intermediaries.
- the back-end server when the back-end server receives the verification request sent when the verification operation is triggered by the user through the client's application software, the back-end server responds to the verification request and stores the verification request on the back-end server.
- the secondary certificate is returned to the local server; and the local server, after obtaining the secondary certificate returned by the back-end server, obtains the truncation interface preset in the client operating system, so that the truncation interface cuts off the certificate chain verification.
- the waiting time refers to the difference between the time of sending the verification request and the current time.
- S30 Obtain a local certificate associated with the application software from a local database, and use the local certificate to perform certificate self-verification on the secondary certificate.
- the local certificate associated with the application software is obtained from the local database according to the unique identifier of the application software, and the local certificate associated with the application software is used to perform self-checking on the secondary certificate returned by the back-end server in step S20. Check to verify the legitimacy of the secondary certificate and avoid communication security risks.
- the local certificate is to store the hardened secondary certificate as a local certificate in a local database when the user installs the application software issued by the issuer on the client.
- the middleman steals the encrypted information in the HTTPS communication process needs to meet three conditions: the illegal root certificate must be installed in the client operating system in advance; the middleman secondary certificate must be issued during the HTTPS handshake process; the client application software must go It is a system check.
- the application software does not need to request to send a system verification request for verifying the validity of the secondary certificate to the client operating system, but directly uses the local certificate inside the application software to verify the returned server certificate.
- the client operating system installed the illegal root certificate of the third-party middleman, and the third-party middleman attacked the secondary certificate returned during the HTTPS handshake process, but the verification still failed.
- the operation page associated with the verification operation can be displayed on the client, for example, a mobile terminal.
- the current verification operation is prompted to be an abnormal operation, and the communication connection with the back-end server is forcibly disconnected, and after the application software re-establishes the communication connection with the back-end server , The user needle can trigger the function button corresponding to the verification operation again to resend the verification request to the back-end server.
- the self-verification method based on the local certificate provided by this application, after obtaining the secondary certificate returned by the back-end server, calls the preset truncation interface to cut the certificate chain verification, and obtains it from the local database A local certificate associated with the application software, and use the local certificate to perform certificate self-verification on the secondary certificate.
- the certificate self-verification is passed, the verification operation is performed; if the certificate self-verification fails, the communication connection between the application software and the back-end server is interrupted, so that the self-verification process does not need CA certification eliminates the need to apply for a CA certificate, saving money and trouble; at the same time, it prevents third-party middlemen from attacking the communication process between the application software and the back-end server, providing a higher level of communication security.
- the communication connection established by the application software and the back-end server can be selected according to the user trigger Make the application software perform the operation associated with the selection button.
- the display mode includes a pop-up window mode or a reload switching mode.
- the preset window includes a plurality of selection buttons; the selection button refers to a non-check button other than the function button corresponding to the check operation; for example, a cancel button, a continue button, a return button, etc.
- the communication connection between the application software and the back-end server is not interrupted.
- the user performs a transfer operation in the banking system of the mobile terminal. If the certificate self-verification fails, the pop-up window displays a message "Transfer Abnormal" for the user to perform the transfer operation again, so as to prevent the transfer request from being hijacked. The account was tampered with to the account of the attacker.
- the back-end server is made not to respond to the user’s
- the verification request re-sent by the verification operation; at this time, the following steps are included after the step S30:
- the record information that fails the verification is temporarily stored in a cache area in the local database, and the record information in the cache area is not cleared before the communication connection between the application software and the back-end server is re-established, At this time, when the verification request is re-sent to the back-end server for the user to trigger the verification operation through the application software, the verification request is directly rejected according to the record information in the cache area, and a prompt may be prompted The user interrupts the communication connection and then returns to the application software.
- the local certificate of the application software may be reinforced; at this time, before the step S10, it specifically includes the following step:
- the application software installation instruction is received, and the application software downloaded from the software publisher in the local database is acquired and installed; wherein the application software contains the local certificate; the local certificate is in the software
- the issuer has been preset in the binary code of the application software when it is released, and has been reinforced by a preset reinforcement tool.
- the application software on the client can package the local certificate into the application software, and then receive the secondary certificate from the back-end server It can effectively verify whether the back-end server is credible and whether the encrypted information is stolen by a third-party middleman.
- the installation instruction containing the name of the application software sent by the user from the client obtaining the application software matching the name of the application software from the local database, the local certificate required to install the application software, and the calling interface of the reinforcement tool
- the application software released by the publisher is automatically installed, and during the installation of the application software, the local certificate is preset in the binary code of the installed application software, and the reinforcement tool is called through the call interface of the reinforcement tool.
- the local certificate is reinforced to further ensure the security of the communication connection.
- the local certificate-based self-verification method provided by this application has pre-installed the certificate into the binary code of the application software and reinforced it when the application software is released by the publisher, so that the application software and the back-end server When a communication connection is established, a higher security level is reached, and it is difficult to crack encrypted information.
- the step S30 is to obtain the local certificate associated with the application software from the local database, and use the local certificate to perform self-certification on the secondary certificate.
- the verification includes the following steps:
- the certificate chain verification is to install a CA root certificate issued by an existing CA organization in the client operating system, and unconditionally information about the root certificate, and subsequent application software issuances apply to the CA organization for an HTTPS certificate , And receiving that the CA organization will generate a secondary certificate based on its own root certificate and issuer information, which is returned by the back-end server; if the local server obtains the secondary certificate returned by the back-end server, it will request the client The end operating system verifies the legitimacy of the secondary certificate. At this time, the client operating system uses the existing CA root certificate to verify the secondary certificate and returns the verification result to the local server.
- the local server after obtaining the secondary certificate returned by the back-end server, the local server obtains the truncation interface preset in the client operating system, so that the truncation interface cuts off the certificate chain verification, and the local server detects When the system verification request fails to be sent to the client operating system, it is determined that the certificate chain verification is cut off, and a system verification failure prompt is issued. At this time, the self-verification is automatically run, that is, the acquisition is built in the local database
- the local public key of the local certificate associated with the application and after obtaining the public key of the secondary certificate to be verified in step S202, according to the local public key of the local certificate and the value of the secondary certificate
- the public key to be verified is self-verified within the application software.
- S302 After parsing the obtained secondary certificate, obtain the public key to be verified of the secondary certificate, and detect whether the local public key is consistent with the public key to be verified.
- the secondary certificate includes the address identifier (domain name or uniform resource locator) of the back-end server, the certificate serial number, the name of the certificate issuer, the certificate public key (that is, the public key to be verified), etc.
- the public key to be verified of the secondary certificate is obtained, and the local public key of the local certificate associated with the application software in the database is used for the public key to be verified of the secondary certificate Perform public key verification (one of the self-verification methods) to verify whether the public key to be verified is consistent with the local public key.
- public key verification one of the self-verification methods
- step S301 the following steps are further included:
- the address detection interface is an application program interface provided by a programming language.
- the address identifier domain name or uniform resource locator
- the address detection interface preset in the client operating system is called Perform address verification on the address identifier to verify the validity and legality of the address identifier; at the same time, use the local public key to perform public key verification on the public key to be verified to verify the public key to be verified. Whether the key is consistent with the local public key.
- the secondary certificate is a legal certificate and the verification passed; and the address is identified as an invalid illegal address , Or when the local public key is inconsistent with the public key to be verified, it is determined that the secondary certificate is an illegal certificate and the verification fails.
- the user uses the browser on the client to access website A of domain name 1. Because the domain name of the website is hijacked by a third-party intermediary, the user will be taken to the fake website B of domain 2; if the certificate of the fake website B is issued by a non-CA organization If the forged secondary certificate of the website is not trusted, the browser will prompt that the certificate of the current website is not trusted; and if the certificate of the forged website B is a secondary certificate issued by the CA, without address verification, the browser on the client There may not be any warnings.
- a self-verification device based on a local certificate is provided, and the self-verification device based on a local certificate corresponds to the self-verification method based on a local certificate in the foregoing embodiment in a one-to-one correspondence.
- the local certificate-based self-verification device includes a sending module 110, a calling module 120, a self-verification module 130, an execution module 140, and a prompt interrupt module 150.
- the detailed description of each functional module is as follows:
- the sending module 110 is used to obtain a verification request sent when a user triggers a preset verification operation through the application software when a communication connection is established with the back-end server through the application software, and send the verification request to the The back-end server.
- the calling module 120 is configured to obtain the secondary certificate returned by the back-end server, and call a preset truncation interface to cut the certificate chain verification.
- the self-verification module 130 is configured to obtain a local certificate associated with the application software from a local database, and use the local certificate to perform certificate self-verification on the secondary certificate.
- the execution module 140 is configured to make the application program perform the verification operation when the certificate self-verification is passed.
- the prompt interruption module 150 is used for prompting that the verification operation fails when the certificate self-verification fails, and interrupts the communication connection established by the application software and the back-end server.
- the self-verification device based on the local certificate further includes a display module 60 and a selection module 70, and each functional module is described in detail as follows:
- the display module 60 is configured to continue to maintain the communication connection established between the application software and the back-end server when the certificate self-verification fails, and display a preset window containing security warning information according to a preset display mode On the client side.
- the selection module 70 is configured to make the application program perform an operation associated with the selection button according to the selection button triggered by the user in the preset window.
- the self-verification device based on the local certificate further includes an installation module, and the functional module is described in detail as follows:
- the installation module is configured to receive an installation instruction of the application software, obtain and install the application software downloaded from the software issuer in the local database; wherein, the application software includes the local certificate; the local The certificate has been preset in the binary code of the application software when issued by the software publisher, and has been reinforced by a preset reinforcement tool.
- the self-checking module 130 includes the following sub-modules, and each functional sub-module is described in detail as follows:
- the obtaining sub-module 131 is configured to obtain the local public key of the local certificate associated with the application program built in the local database after confirming that the certificate chain verification has been cut.
- the detection submodule 132 is configured to obtain the public key to be verified of the secondary certificate after parsing the acquired secondary certificate, and to detect whether the local public key is consistent with the public key to be verified .
- the first result submodule 133 is configured to determine that the certificate self-verification passes when the local public key is consistent with the public key to be verified.
- the second result sub-module 134 is configured to determine that the certificate self-verification fails when the local public key is inconsistent with the public key to be verified.
- the self-checking module 130 further includes the following sub-modules, and each functional sub-module is described in detail as follows:
- the double verification module is used to obtain the address identifier of the secondary certificate and the public key to be verified after parsing the acquired secondary certificate, and call a preset address detection interface to verify the status of the secondary certificate
- the address identifier performs address verification, and uses the local public key to perform public key verification on the public key to be verified of the secondary certificate.
- each module in the above-mentioned local certificate-based self-verification device can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, and combinations thereof.
- the foregoing modules may be embedded in the form of hardware or independent of the processor in the computer device, or may be stored in the memory of the computer device in the form of software, so that the processor can call and execute the operations corresponding to the foregoing modules.
- a computer device is provided.
- the computer device may be a server, and its internal structure diagram may be as shown in FIG. 8.
- the computer equipment includes a processor, a memory, a network interface and a database connected through a system bus. Among them, the processor of the computer device is used to provide calculation and control capabilities.
- the memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory.
- the non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, computer readable instructions, and a database.
- the internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer-readable instructions in the non-volatile storage medium.
- the computer-readable instructions are executed by the processor to realize a self-verification method based on local certificates.
- a computer device including a memory, a processor, and computer-readable instructions stored in the memory and running on the processor, and the processor implements the following steps when the processor executes the computer-readable instructions:
- a computer-readable storage medium may be non-volatile or volatile, and computer-readable instructions are stored thereon, and the computer-readable instructions are The following steps are implemented during execution:
- Non-volatile memory may include read only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory.
- ROM read only memory
- PROM programmable ROM
- EPROM electrically programmable ROM
- EEPROM electrically erasable programmable ROM
- Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory.
- RAM is available in many forms, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous chain Road DRAM (SLDRAM), memory bus direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM), etc.
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Abstract
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Claims (20)
- 一种基于本地证书的自校验方法,其中,包括:在通过应用软件与后端服务器建立通信连接时,获取用户通过所述应用软件触发预设的校验操作时发送的校验请求,并将所述校验请求发送至所述后端服务器;获取所述后端服务器返回的二级证书,调用预设的截断接口斩断证书链校验;自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行证书自校验;在所述证书自校验通过时,令所述应用程序执行该校验操作;在所述证书自校验未通过时,提示执行该校验操作失败,并中断所述应用软件与所述后端服务器建立的通信连接。
- 如权利要求1所述的基于本地证书的自校验方法,所述自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行比对校验,包括:在确认已经斩断所述证书链校验之后,获取内置在所述本地数据库中与所应用程序关联的本地证书的本地公钥;对获取到的所述二级证书进行解析之后,获取所述二级证书的待校验公钥,并检测所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥是否一致;在所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥一致时,确定所述证书自校验通过;在所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥不一致时,确定所述证书自校验未通过。
- 如权利要求2所述的基于本地证书的自校验方法,所述在确认已经斩断所述证书链校验之后,获取内置在所述本地数据库中与所应用程序关联的本地证书的本地公钥之后,包括:对获取到的所述二级证书进行解析之后,获取所述二级证书的地址标识和待校验公钥,调用预设的地址检测接口对所述二级证书 的所述地址标识进行地址校验,且使用所述本地公钥对所述二级证书的所述待校验公钥进行公钥校验。
- 如权利要求1所述的基于本地证书的自校验方法,所述自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行证书自校验之后,包括:在所述证书自校验未通过时,继续保持所述应用软件与所述后端服务器建立的通信连接,并根据预设显示模式将包含安全警告信息的预设窗口显示在客户端;根据所述用户在所述预设窗口触发的选择按钮令所述应用程序执行与所述选择按钮关联的操作。
- 如权利要求1所述的基于本地证书的自校验方法,所述在通过应用软件与后端服务器建立通信连接时,获取用户通过所述应用软件触发预设的校验操作时发送的校验请求,并将所述校验请求发送至所述后端服务器之前,包括:接收所述应用软件的安装指令,获取并安装从软件发布方下载在所述本地数据库中的所述应用软件;其中,所述应用软件中包含所述本地证书;所述本地证书在所述软件发布方发布时已被预置在所述应用软件的二进制代码中,并已通过预设的加固工具进行加固。
- 一种基于本地证书的自校验装置,包括:发送模块,用于在通过应用软件与后端服务器建立通信连接时,获取用户通过所述应用软件触发预设的校验操作时发送的校验请求,并将所述校验请求发送至所述后端服务器;调用模块,用于获取所述后端服务器返回的二级证书,调用预设的截断接口斩断证书链校验;自校验模块,用于自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行证书自校验;执行模块,用于在所述证书自校验通过时,令所述应用程序执行 该校验操作;提示中断模块,用于在所述证书自校验未通过时,提示执行该校验操作失败,并中断所述应用软件与所述后端服务器建立的通信连接。
- 如权利要求6所述的基于本地证书的自校验装置,所述自校验模块,包括:获取子模块,用于在确认已经斩断所述证书链校验之后,获取内置在所述本地数据库中与所应用程序关联的本地证书的本地公钥;检测子模块,用于对获取到的所述二级证书进行解析之后,获取所述二级证书的待校验公钥,并检测所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥是否一致;第一结果子模块,用于在所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥一致时,确定所述证书自校验通过;第二结果子模块,用于在所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥不一致时,确定所述证书自校验未通过。
- 如权利要求6所述的基于本地证书的自校验装置,所述装置还包括:显示模块,用于在所述证书自校验未通过时,继续保持所述应用软件与所述后端服务器建立的通信连接,并根据预设显示模式将包含安全警告信息的预设窗口显示在客户端;选择模块,用于根据所述用户在所述预设窗口触发的选择按钮令所述应用程序执行与所述选择按钮关联的操作。
- 如权利要求6所述的基于本地证书的自校验装置,还包括:双重校验模块,用于对获取到的所述二级证书进行解析之后,获取所述二级证书的地址标识和待校验公钥,调用预设的地址检测接口对所述二级证书的所述地址标识进行地址校验,且使用所述本地公钥对所述二级证书的所述待校验公钥进行公钥校验。
- 如权利要求6所述的基于本地证书的自校验装置,还包括:安装模块,用于接收所述应用软件的安装指令,获取并安装从软件发布方下载在所述本地数据库中的所述应用软件;其中,所述应用软件中包含所述本地证书;所述本地证书在所述软件发布方发布时已被预置在所述应用软件的二进制代码中,并已通过预设的加固工具进行加固。
- 一种计算机设备,包括存储器、处理器以及存储在所述存储器中并可在所述处理器上运行的计算机可读指令,所述处理器执行所述计算机可读指令时实现基于本地证书的自校验方法;其中,所述基于本地证书的自校验方法包括:在通过应用软件与后端服务器建立通信连接时,获取用户通过所述应用软件触发预设的校验操作时发送的校验请求,并将所述校验请求发送至所述后端服务器;获取所述后端服务器返回的二级证书,调用预设的截断接口斩断证书链校验;自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行证书自校验;在所述证书自校验通过时,令所述应用程序执行该校验操作;在所述证书自校验未通过时,提示执行该校验操作失败,并中断所述应用软件与所述后端服务器建立的通信连接。
- 如权利要求11所述的计算机设备,所述自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行比对校验,包括:在确认已经斩断所述证书链校验之后,获取内置在所述本地数据库中与所应用程序关联的本地证书的本地公钥;对获取到的所述二级证书进行解析之后,获取所述二级证书的待校验公钥,并检测所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥是否一致;在所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥一致时,确定所述证书自校验 通过;在所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥不一致时,确定所述证书自校验未通过。
- 如权利要求11所述的计算机设备,所述在确认已经斩断所述证书链校验之后,获取内置在所述本地数据库中与所应用程序关联的本地证书的本地公钥之后,包括:对获取到的所述二级证书进行解析之后,获取所述二级证书的地址标识和待校验公钥,调用预设的地址检测接口对所述二级证书的所述地址标识进行地址校验,且使用所述本地公钥对所述二级证书的所述待校验公钥进行公钥校验。
- 如权利要求11所述的基于本地证书的计算机设备,所述自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行证书自校验之后,包括:在所述证书自校验未通过时,继续保持所述应用软件与所述后端服务器建立的通信连接,并根据预设显示模式将包含安全警告信息的预设窗口显示在客户端;根据所述用户在所述预设窗口触发的选择按钮令所述应用程序执行与所述选择按钮关联的操作。
- 如权利要求11所述的计算机设备,所述在通过应用软件与后端服务器建立通信连接时,获取用户通过所述应用软件触发预设的校验操作时发送的校验请求,并将所述校验请求发送至所述后端服务器之前,包括:接收所述应用软件的安装指令,获取并安装从软件发布方下载在所述本地数据库中的所述应用软件;其中,所述应用软件中包含所述本地证书;所述本地证书在所述软件发布方发布时已被预置在所述应用软件的二进制代码中,并已通过预设的加固工具进行加固。
- 一种计算机可读存储介质,所述计算机可读存储介质存储有计算 机可读指令,,所述计算机可读指令被处理器执行时实现基于本地证书的自校验方法,其中,所述基于本地证书的自校验方法包括如下步骤:在通过应用软件与后端服务器建立通信连接时,获取用户通过所述应用软件触发预设的校验操作时发送的校验请求,并将所述校验请求发送至所述后端服务器;获取所述后端服务器返回的二级证书,调用预设的截断接口斩断证书链校验;自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行证书自校验;在所述证书自校验通过时,令所述应用程序执行该校验操作;在所述证书自校验未通过时,提示执行该校验操作失败,并中断所述应用软件与所述后端服务器建立的通信连接。
- 如权利要求16所述的计算机可读存储介质,所述自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行比对校验,包括:在确认已经斩断所述证书链校验之后,获取内置在所述本地数据库中与所应用程序关联的本地证书的本地公钥;对获取到的所述二级证书进行解析之后,获取所述二级证书的待校验公钥,并检测所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥是否一致;在所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥一致时,确定所述证书自校验通过;在所述本地公钥与所述待校验公钥不一致时,确定所述证书自校验未通过。
- 如权利要求17所述的计算机可读存储介质,所述在确认已经斩断所述证书链校验之后,获取内置在所述本地数据库中与所应用程序关联的本地证书的本地公钥之后,包括:对获取到的所述二级证书进行解析之后,获取所述二级证书的地 址标识和待校验公钥,调用预设的地址检测接口对所述二级证书的所述地址标识进行地址校验,且使用所述本地公钥对所述二级证书的所述待校验公钥进行公钥校验。
- 如权利要求16所述的计算机可读存储介质,所述自本地数据库中获取与所述应用软件关联的本地证书,并使用所述本地证书对所述二级证书进行证书自校验之后,包括:在所述证书自校验未通过时,继续保持所述应用软件与所述后端服务器建立的通信连接,并根据预设显示模式将包含安全警告信息的预设窗口显示在客户端;根据所述用户在所述预设窗口触发的选择按钮令所述应用程序执行与所述选择按钮关联的操作。
- 如权利要求16所述的计算机可读存储介质,所述在通过应用软件与后端服务器建立通信连接时,获取用户通过所述应用软件触发预设的校验操作时发送的校验请求,并将所述校验请求发送至所述后端服务器之前,包括:接收所述应用软件的安装指令,获取并安装从软件发布方下载在所述本地数据库中的所述应用软件;其中,所述应用软件中包含所述本地证书;所述本地证书在所述软件发布方发布时已被预置在所述应用软件的二进制代码中,并已通过预设的加固工具进行加固。
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