WO2020215958A1 - 一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备 - Google Patents

一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020215958A1
WO2020215958A1 PCT/CN2020/080934 CN2020080934W WO2020215958A1 WO 2020215958 A1 WO2020215958 A1 WO 2020215958A1 CN 2020080934 W CN2020080934 W CN 2020080934W WO 2020215958 A1 WO2020215958 A1 WO 2020215958A1
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Prior art keywords
network device
key
terminal
type
authentication
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PCT/CN2020/080934
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
刘福文
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China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd
Research Institute of China Mobile Communication Co Ltd
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China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd
Research Institute of China Mobile Communication Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to wireless communication technology, in particular to an authentication information processing method, terminal and network equipment.
  • the user equipment (UE, User Equipment) and the network side are authenticated through the authentication and key agreement (AKA, Authentication and Key Agreement) protocol.
  • the authentication methods between the UE and the network side in the 5G system include the following two authentication methods: 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA'.
  • the former is based on the Long Term Evolution (LTE) authentication protocol evolved packet system authentication and key agreement (EPS-AKA, Evolved Packet System-Authentication and Key Agreement) development, while the latter is the International Internet Engineering Task Force
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • EPS-AKA Evolved Packet System-Authentication and Key Agreement
  • the authentication protocol defined by (IETF, The Internet Engineering Task Force) is used for the UE in the 4G network to use wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi, Wireless-Fidelity) to access the operator's network.
  • the two authentication methods, 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA' are subject to correlation attacks because the UE may send two different types of error messages when it fails
  • the embodiments of the present application provide an authentication information processing method, terminal, and network equipment.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a method for processing authentication information.
  • the method includes: in the case of a network authentication failure, a terminal separately based on the encryption key and the integrity key pair contains the first type of error message.
  • the indication information is encrypted and integrity protected; the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on the session root key; the first authentication of the session root key between the terminal and the first network device is successful Generated below; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • the terminal sends the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device; wherein the encrypted instruction information is sent to the first network device through the second network device.
  • the method before the terminal performs network authentication, the method further includes: the terminal uses a key derivation function to determine the encryption at least according to the session root key and a random challenge (RAND) Key and the integrity key.
  • the terminal uses a key derivation function to determine the encryption at least according to the session root key and a random challenge (RAND) Key and the integrity key.
  • RAND random challenge
  • the method further includes: the terminal executes a non-access stratum security mode command (NAS SMC, Non Access Stratum Security Mode Command) process with the second network device In the case of success, the terminal stores the session root key.
  • NAS SMC Non Access Stratum Security Mode Command
  • the method further includes: performing a non-initial authentication between the terminal and the first network device, and after the authentication is successful and the terminal and the second network device are If the inter-NAS SMC process is successful, the session root key is updated, or the session root key is maintained.
  • the terminal sending the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device includes: the terminal sending the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device through an authentication response message And MAC information for integrity protection.
  • the encrypting and integrity protecting the first indication information containing the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively includes: the terminal is based on the encryption key Encrypting the first indication information, and generating MAC information based on the integrity key.
  • that the terminal sends the encrypted first indication information to the first network device includes: the terminal sends the encrypted first indication information and MAC information to the first network device.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes a first type or a second type
  • the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; where, in the error message
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is a first random number; The length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first A ciphertext indicating the information.
  • the session root key includes a first session root key and a second session root key; the second session and key are determined by the first session and key .
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides an authentication information processing method, the method includes: a first network device receives first instruction information sent by a terminal through a second network device; the first instruction information is based on an encrypted secret Key and integrity key for encryption and integrity protection; the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on the session root key; the session root key is the first time between the terminal and the first network device Generated when the authentication is successful; the first indication information includes the error message type corresponding to the terminal network authentication failure; different error message types correspond to the first indication information of the same format;
  • the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • the first network device determining the encryption key and the integrity key according to the session root key includes:
  • the first network device uses a key derivation function to determine the encryption key and the integrity key at least according to the session root key and a random challenge (RAND).
  • RAND random challenge
  • the method further includes: the first network device receives second indication information of the second network device, where the second indication information is used to indicate the second network
  • the NAS SMC process between the device and the terminal is successful; the first network device stores the session root key.
  • the method further includes: performing non-first authentication between the first network device and the terminal, and after the authentication is successful, and the first network device receives the first network device 2.
  • the second indication information of the network device update the session root key or keep the session root key; the second indication information is used to indicate the communication between the second network device and the terminal The NAS SMC process was successful.
  • that the first network device receives the first indication information sent by the terminal through the second network device includes: the first network device receives the first indication information sent by the terminal through an authentication response message. An indication information and MAC information used for integrity protection; the authentication response message is received through the forwarding of the second network device.
  • the first network device decrypting the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key includes: the first network device is based on the The integrity key verifies the MAC information, and if the verification is successful, decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes a first type or a second type
  • the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; where, in the error message
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is a first random number; The length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first A ciphertext indicating the information.
  • the method further includes: in a case where the error message type included in the first indication information is the second type, the first network device sends the error message to the third The network device sends an authentication failure synchronization parameter, where the authentication failure synchronization parameter is at least used for the third network device to resume SQN synchronization with the terminal.
  • the method further includes: the first network device sends third instruction information to the second network device, and the third instruction information includes at least one of the following information: Error message type, permanent user identification.
  • the session root key includes a first session root key and a second session root key; the second session and key are determined by the first session and key .
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a terminal, the terminal including an encryption unit and a first communication unit; wherein,
  • the encryption unit is configured to perform encryption and integrity protection on the first indication information containing the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively when the network authentication fails; the encryption key and the integrity key The integrity key is obtained based on the session root key; the session root key is generated when the first authentication between the terminal and the first network device is successful; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format ;
  • the first communication unit is configured to send encrypted first instruction information to the first network device; wherein the encrypted instruction information is sent to the first network device through a second network device.
  • the terminal further includes a first determining unit configured to use a key derivation function to determine the encryption key and the encryption key according to at least the session root key and a random challenge (RAND).
  • RAND random challenge
  • the terminal further includes a first execution unit and a first storage unit;
  • the first execution unit is configured to execute a non-access layer security mode command NAS SMC process with the second network device;
  • the first storage unit is configured to store the session root key when the NAS SMC process between the first execution unit and the second network device is successfully executed.
  • the first execution unit is further configured to perform non-initial authentication with the first network device, and when the authentication is successful and the communication with the second network device If the NAS SMC process is successful, update the session root key, or keep the session root key.
  • the first communication unit is configured to send the encrypted first indication information and the MAC information for integrity protection to the first network device through an authentication response message.
  • the encryption unit is configured to encrypt the first indication information based on an encryption key, and generate MAC information based on the integrity key.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes a first type or a second type
  • the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; where, in the error message
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is a first random number; The length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first A ciphertext indicating the information.
  • the session root key includes a first session root key and a second session root key; the second session and key are determined by the first session and key .
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a network device, the network device is a first network device, and the network device includes a second communication unit and a decryption unit; wherein,
  • the second communication unit is configured to receive the first instruction information sent by the terminal through the second network device; the first instruction information is encrypted and integrity protected based on the encryption key and the integrity key; the encryption key And the integrity key is obtained based on the session root key; the session root key is generated when the first authentication between the terminal and the first network device is successful; the first indication information includes the terminal network authentication failure Corresponding error message types; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • the decryption unit is configured to decrypt the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • the network device further includes a second determining unit configured to determine the encryption key and the encryption key at least according to the session root key and a random challenge (RAND) using a key derivation function The integrity key.
  • a second determining unit configured to determine the encryption key and the encryption key at least according to the session root key and a random challenge (RAND) using a key derivation function The integrity key.
  • the network device further includes a second storage unit
  • the second communication unit is further configured to receive second indication information of the second network device, where the second indication information is used to indicate that the NAS SMC process between the second network device and the terminal is successful;
  • the second storage unit is configured to store the session root key.
  • the network device further includes a second execution unit configured to perform non-first authentication with the terminal, and after the authentication is successful and the second communication unit receives the In the case of the second indication information of the second network device, update the session root key or keep the session root key; the second indication information is used to indicate the relationship between the second network device and the terminal The NAS SMC process was successful.
  • the second communication unit is configured to receive the first indication information sent by the terminal and the MAC information for integrity protection through an authentication response message; the authentication response message passes The second network device is forwarded and received.
  • the decryption unit is configured to verify the MAC information based on the integrity key, and if the verification is successful, pair the first based on the encryption key An instruction message is decrypted.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes a first type or a second type
  • the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; where, in the error message
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is a first random number; The length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first A ciphertext indicating the information.
  • the second communication unit is further configured to send an error message to the third network device when the error message type included in the first indication information is the second type Send an authentication failure synchronization parameter, where the authentication failure synchronization parameter is used at least for the third network device to resume SQN synchronization with the terminal.
  • the second communication unit is further configured to send third indication information to the second network device, and the third indication information includes at least one of the following information: error message Type and permanent user identification.
  • the session root key includes a first session root key and a second session root key; the second session and key are determined by the first session and key .
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, which when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the authentication information processing method described in the first aspect of the embodiment of the present application; or, the program When executed by a processor, the steps of the authentication information processing method described in the second aspect of the embodiments of the present application are implemented.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a terminal, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and capable of running on the processor.
  • the processor executes the program when the program is executed. The steps of the authentication information processing method are described.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a network device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor.
  • the processor implements the second aspect of the embodiment of the present invention when the program is executed. The steps of the authentication information processing method.
  • the authentication information processing method, terminal, and network equipment provided by the embodiments of the present application include: when the network authentication fails, the terminal includes a first indication of an error message type based on an encryption key and an integrity key pair, respectively Information is encrypted and integrity protected; the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on the session root key; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format; the session root key is in the Generated when the first authentication between the terminal and the first network device is successful; the terminal sends the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device; wherein the encrypted instruction information is sent to the first network device through the second network device Sent by the first network device.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application indicates the type of error message through a message (i.e., the first indication information), that is, no matter what type of error message it obtains, the terminal will send the indication information in the same format to the network side, avoiding the network side according to different types.
  • the terminal determines the encryption key and the integrity key through the shared key known to the network side, and according to the encryption key
  • the first indication information is encrypted and integrity protected with the integrity key, so that even if an attacker captures the authentication response message, he cannot obtain the error message type in the authentication response message from the ciphertext.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the flow of correlation attacks in related technologies
  • FIG. 2 is a first flowchart of a method for processing authentication information according to an embodiment of the application
  • FIG. 3 is a second schematic diagram of the flow of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a specific flow of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a composition structure of a terminal according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another composition structure of a terminal according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of another composition structure of a terminal according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a composition structure of a network device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of another composition structure of a network device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of another composition structure of a network device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram of the hardware composition structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the flow of correlation attacks in related technologies;
  • Figure 1 takes a 4G network (such as an LTE network) as an example for illustration. As shown in Figure 1, it includes:
  • Step 101 The mobility management entity (MME, Mobility Management Entity) sends an authentication request message to the UE, and the authentication request message includes a random challenge (RAND, Random challenge) and an authentication token (AUTN).
  • the attacker may intercept the authentication request message, obtain and store the random challenge (RAND) and authentication token (AUTN) in the authentication request message.
  • Step 102 The UE performs network authentication. After the network authentication is completed, the UE sends an authentication response message to the MME. In this step, the attacker may intercept the authentication response message.
  • the UE may send two different types of error messages when the network authentication fails, including: a MAC failure (MAC_FAIL) message or a synchronization failure (SYNC_FAIL) message; among them, the MAC_FAIL message indicates that the UE fails to check the MAC information, usually It is caused by the mismatch between the root key of the UE and the root key of the network side; the SYNC_FAIL message indicates that the sequence number (SQN, Sequence Number) value of the network side is outside the range allowed by the UE.
  • MAC_FAIL MAC failure
  • SYNC_FAIL synchronization failure
  • Step 103 The attacker resends an authentication request message to the UE.
  • the authentication request message includes the random challenge (RAND) and the authentication token (AUTN) captured in step 101.
  • Step 104 The UE performs network authentication. After the network authentication is completed, the UE sends an authentication response message.
  • the UE sends an authentication response message carrying an error message, for example, the error message is a SYNC_FAIL message; the attacker intercepts the authentication response message, obtains the error message in the authentication response message, and determines the need to track based on the error message
  • the UE is in a specific area, so the attacker can track the UE by intercepting the error message in the authentication response message.
  • Fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart 1 of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in Fig. 2, the method includes:
  • Step 201 When the network authentication fails, the terminal encrypts and protects the first indication information including the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively; the encryption key and the integrity The key is obtained based on the session root key; the session root key is generated when the first authentication between the terminal and the first network device is successful; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • Step 202 The terminal sends the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device; wherein the encrypted instruction information is sent to the first network device through the second network device.
  • the first network device and the second network device may be core network devices used for network authentication.
  • the first network device may specifically be an authentication server function node (AUSF, Authentication Server Function); the second network device may be a security anchor node function ( SEAF, SEcurity Anchor Function).
  • AUSF authentication server function node
  • SEAF SEcurity Anchor Function
  • the method before the terminal performs network authentication, that is, before step 201, the method further includes: the terminal determines the encryption key and the encryption key according to the session root key. The integrity key.
  • the terminal determines the encryption key and the integrity key based on the session root key commonly known by the terminal and the network side, and compares the first encryption key and the integrity key based on the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • One indication information is encrypted and integrity protected; on the other hand, the first network device can determine the encryption key and the integrity key based on the session root key that is commonly known to the terminal, and based on the encryption key and integrity key pair The first indication information is decrypted, thereby obtaining the error message type contained in the first indication information.
  • the session root key includes a first session root key and a second session root key; the second session root key is determined by the first session root key.
  • the first session root key may specifically be K AUSF ; the second session root key may specifically be K SEAF .
  • the terminal determining the encryption key and the integrity key according to the session root key includes: the terminal uses a key derivation function at least according to the session root key and a random challenge (RAND) Determine the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • RAND random challenge
  • the method for determining the encryption key may satisfy the following expression:
  • K E KDF (K AUSF , RAND "length of RAND”"EncryptionKey”"length of “Encryption Key”);
  • K E represents an encryption key
  • KDF is a key derivation function
  • RAND represents a random challenge
  • ⁇ represents string concatenation
  • Encryption Key represents an encryption key
  • Encryption Key can be The character string corresponding to K E obtained in advance in the terminal and the first network device.
  • the method for determining the integrity key may satisfy the following expression:
  • K M KDF (K AUSF , the length of RAND ⁇ RAND ⁇ "MAC Key” ⁇ "MAC Key”length);
  • K M represents the encryption key
  • KDF is the key derivation function
  • RAND represents the random challenge
  • ⁇ represents the string concatenation
  • MAC Key represents the integrity key
  • MAC Key can be It is a character string corresponding to K M that is known in advance in the terminal and the first network device.
  • the foregoing encryption key and integrity key are determined according to the session root key K AUSF .
  • the encryption key and integrity key may also be determined according to the session root key K SEAF .
  • the determination method is similar to the determination method represented by the above expression, and will not be repeated here.
  • the method before the terminal performs network authentication, the method further includes: performing the first authentication between the terminal and the first network device, and generating a session root if the authentication is successful Key.
  • the method further includes: in the case that the terminal successfully executes the NAS SMC procedure with the second network device, the terminal stores the session root key .
  • the method further includes: performing non-initial authentication between the terminal and the first network device, and after the authentication is successful, the terminal and the second network device If the NAS SMC process between the two is successful, the session root key is updated, or the session root key is maintained.
  • the terminal and the first network device when the terminal succeeds in the first mutual authentication between the first network device, the terminal and the first network device both generate the session root key, such as generating K AUSF and/or K SEAF ; In the case that the NAS SMC process between the network devices is successful, the terminal and the first network device store the session root key. Or in the case that the non-first mutual authentication between the terminal and the first network device is successful, and in the case that the NAS SMC process between the terminal and the second network device is successful, the terminal and the first network device can update the stored session root Key, or keep the stored session root key unchanged.
  • the session root key such as generating K AUSF and/or K SEAF
  • the terminal sending the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device includes: the terminal sends the first network device through an authentication response message The encrypted first indication information and MAC information used for integrity protection; wherein, the authentication response message is sent to the first network device through the second network device. It can be understood that the terminal sends an authentication response message containing the encrypted first indication information and MAC information for integrity protection to the second network device, and the second network device forwards the authentication response message to The first network equipment.
  • the authentication response message includes an encrypted part of the first indication information and an integrity protection part of the first indication information; the integrity protection part of the first indication information is used for integrity protection The MAC information; the encryption and integrity protection of the first indication information containing the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively includes: the terminal encrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key, based on The integrity key generates MAC information.
  • the terminal sending the encrypted first indication information to the first network device includes: the terminal sending the encrypted first indication information and MAC information to the first network device.
  • the MAC information may be understood as a sequence or a value, which is used to protect the integrity of the first indication information.
  • the terminal receives an authentication request message from a network device (specifically a third network device), and the authentication request message includes a random challenge (RAND) and an authentication token (AUTN); as an example, the authentication request message
  • the token (AUTN) can be a 128-bit value; the terminal performs MAC information verification based on the information in the authentication token (AUTN). For example, the terminal generates MAC information based on the information in the authentication token (AUTN), and verifies the generated MAC information with its own MAC information; if the verification is consistent, the verification is successful; if the verification is inconsistent, the verification is The test failed.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes the first type or the second type; the first type of error The message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; wherein, the type of the error message is the second
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is a first random number; the length of the numeric value is The lengths of the first random numbers are the same.
  • the first type of error message may specifically be a MAC failure (MAC_FAIL) message, where the MAC_FAIL message indicates that the UE failed to verify the MAC information in the authentication token (AUTN), usually due to the UE's root key and the network side It is caused by the mismatch of the root keys of;
  • the second type of error message may specifically be a synchronization failure (SYNC_FAIL) message, which indicates that the SQN value on the network side is outside the range allowed by the UE.
  • MAC_FAIL MAC failure
  • SYNC_FAIL synchronization failure
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number (such as represented by Nonce), a permanent user identification (such as SUPI); the second The random number is used to distinguish the encrypted ciphertext of the first indication information.
  • a second random number such as represented by Nonce
  • a permanent user identification such as SUPI
  • the second random number is a one-time random number, which is used to make the ciphertext of the first indication information (or authentication response message) different every time, so as to prevent an attacker from guessing the The error message type in the first indication message.
  • the first indication information may carry a permanent user identification to prevent the second network device from initiating an identity request to the terminal when the user permanent identification of the terminal cannot be obtained.
  • the response data is related to the error message type.
  • the response data is a numerical value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; as an example, the response data is AUTS; when the type of the error message is the first
  • the response data may be a first random number; the length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the terminal sends an authentication response message in the same format to the network side, and the authentication response message is encrypted and complete by the encryption key and the integrity key
  • the security protection makes it impossible for an attacker to obtain the error message type in the authentication response message from the ciphertext even if the authentication response message is captured.
  • the terminal since the terminal sends the authentication response message in the same format, it prevents the SEAF from responding to different types of authentication Respond to the message, thereby generating a correlation attack, preventing the terminal from being tracked by the attacker.
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram 2 of the flow of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in Fig. 3, the method includes:
  • Step 301 The first network device receives the first instruction information sent by the terminal through the second network device; the first instruction information performs encryption and integrity protection based on the encryption key and the integrity key; the encryption key and the integrity key The integrity key is obtained based on the session root key; the session root key is generated when the first authentication between the terminal and the first network device is successful; the first indication information includes information corresponding to the terminal network authentication failure Error message type; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • Step 302 The first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • the first network device and the second network device may be core network devices used for network authentication.
  • the first network device may specifically be AUSF; and the second network device may be SEAF.
  • the method before the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, the method further includes: The first network device determines the encryption key and the integrity key according to the session root key.
  • the first network device determines the encryption key and the integrity key based on the session root key commonly known by the terminal and the network side, and pairs the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key. Decryption is performed to obtain the error message type contained in the first indication information.
  • the session root key includes a first session root key and a second session root key; the second session root key is determined by the first session root key.
  • the first session root key may specifically be K AUSF ; the second session root key may specifically be K SEAF .
  • the first network device determining the encryption key and the integrity key according to the session root key includes: the first network device uses at least the session root key and a random challenge (RAND)
  • RAND random challenge
  • the method for determining the encryption key may satisfy the following expression:
  • K E KDF (K AUSF , RAND "length of RAND”"EncryptionKey”"length of “Encryption Key”);
  • K E represents an encryption key
  • KDF is a key derivation function
  • RAND represents a random challenge
  • ⁇ represents string concatenation
  • Encryption Key represents an encryption key
  • Encryption Key can be The character string corresponding to K E obtained in advance in the terminal and the first network device.
  • the method for determining the integrity key may satisfy the following expression:
  • K M KDF (K AUSF , the length of RAND ⁇ RAND ⁇ "MAC Key” ⁇ "MAC Key”length);
  • K M represents the encryption key
  • KDF is the key derivation function
  • RAND represents the random challenge
  • ⁇ represents the string concatenation
  • MAC Key represents the integrity key
  • MAC Key can be It is a character string corresponding to K M that is known in advance in the terminal and the first network device.
  • the foregoing encryption key and integrity key are determined according to the session root key K AUSF .
  • the encryption key and integrity key may also be determined according to the session root key K SEAF .
  • the determination method is similar to the determination method expressed by the above expression, and will not be repeated here.
  • the method before the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, that is, before step 302, The method further includes: performing first authentication between the first network device and the terminal, and generating a session root key if the authentication is successful.
  • the method further includes: the first network device receives second indication information of the second network device, and the second indication information is used to indicate the second The NAS SMC process between the network device and the terminal is successful; the first network device stores the session root key.
  • the method further includes: performing non-initial authentication between the first network device and the terminal, and after the authentication is successful and the first network device receives the In the case of the second indication information of the second network device, update the session root key or keep the session root key; the second indication information is used to indicate the relationship between the second network device and the terminal
  • the NAS SMC process was successful.
  • the terminal and the first network device when the terminal succeeds in the first mutual authentication between the first network device, the terminal and the first network device both generate the session root key, such as generating K AUSF and/or K SEAF ; In the case that the NAS SMC process between the network devices is successful, the terminal and the first network device store the session root key. Or in the case that the non-first mutual authentication between the terminal and the first network device is successful, and in the case that the NAS SMC process between the terminal and the second network device is successful, the terminal and the first network device can update the stored session root Key, or keep the stored session root key unchanged.
  • the session root key such as generating K AUSF and/or K SEAF
  • the first network device receives the first indication information sent by the terminal through the second network device includes: the first network device receives the first indication information sent by the terminal through an authentication response message The first indication information and MAC information used for integrity protection; the authentication response message is received through forwarding by the second network device. It can be understood that the terminal sends an authentication response message containing the encrypted first indication information and MAC information for integrity protection to the second network device, and the second network device forwards the authentication response message to The first network equipment.
  • the authentication response message includes an encrypted part of the first indication information and an integrity protection part of the first indication information; the integrity protection part of the first indication information is used for integrity protection The MAC information; the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, including: the first network device checks based on the integrity key If the MAC information is successfully verified, decrypt the first indication information based on the encryption key.
  • the MAC information may be understood as a sequence or a value, which is used to protect the integrity of the first indication information.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes the first type or the second type; the first type of error The message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; wherein, the type of the error message is the second
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes the failure of authentication synchronization; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is the first random number; the length of the numeric value is equal to The lengths of the first random numbers are the same.
  • the first type of error message may specifically be a MAC failure (MAC_FAIL) message, where the MAC_FAIL message indicates that the UE fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication token (AUTN), usually because the root key of the UE and the network side It is caused by the mismatch of the root keys of;
  • the second type of error message may specifically be a synchronization failure (SYNC_FAIL) message, which indicates that the SQN value on the network side is outside the range allowed by the UE.
  • MAC_FAIL MAC failure
  • SYNC_FAIL synchronization failure
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number (such as represented by Nonce), a permanent user identification (such as SUPI); the second The random number is used to distinguish the encrypted ciphertext of the first indication information.
  • a second random number such as represented by Nonce
  • a permanent user identification such as SUPI
  • the second random number is a one-time random number, which is used to make the ciphertext of the first indication information (or authentication response message) different every time, so as to prevent an attacker from guessing the The error message type in the first indication message.
  • the first indication information may carry a permanent user identification to prevent the second network device from initiating an identity request to the terminal when the user permanent identification of the terminal cannot be obtained.
  • the response data is related to the error message type.
  • the response data is a numerical value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; as an example, the response data is AUTS; when the type of the error message is all
  • the response data may be a first random number; the length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the method further includes: when the error message type included in the first indication information is the second type, the first network device sends the error message to the first The third network device sends an authentication failure synchronization parameter, where the authentication failure synchronization parameter is at least used for the third network device to resume SQN synchronization with the terminal.
  • the method further includes: the first network device sends third instruction information to the second network device, and the third instruction information includes at least one of the following information : Error message type, permanent user identification.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application indicates the type of error message through a message (i.e., the first indication information), that is, no matter what type of error message it obtains, the terminal will send the indication information in the same format to the network side, avoiding the network side according to different types In order to prevent the attacker from intercepting different types of responses to determine the error message type; and, the terminal determines the encryption key and the integrity key through the shared key known to the network side, and according to the encryption key
  • the first indication information is encrypted and integrity protected with the integrity key, so that even if an attacker captures the authentication response message, he cannot obtain the error message type in the authentication response message from the ciphertext.
  • AUSF corresponds to the first network device in the foregoing embodiment
  • SEAF corresponds to the second network in the foregoing embodiment
  • FIG 4 is a schematic diagram of a specific flow of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in Figure 4, the method includes:
  • Step 401 Perform the first authentication between the UE and AUSF.
  • the UE and AUSF respectively generate a session root key; in this example, the session root key includes: K AUSF and/or K SEAF .
  • Step 402 A NAS SMC process is performed between the UE and the SEAF. In the case that the NAS SMC process is successful, the terminal stores the session root key.
  • Step 403 SEAF sends instruction information to AUSF.
  • the SEAF sends indication information to the AUSF, and the indication information is used to indicate that the NAS SMC process is successful.
  • the AUSF stores the session root key. Based on this, both the UE and the AUSF store the session root key.
  • the UE and the AUSF may update the stored session root key, or Keep the stored session root key unchanged.
  • Step 404 UDM/ARPF sends an authentication request message to the UE based on the selected authentication protocol; the authentication request message may include: a random challenge (RAND) and an authentication token (AUTN).
  • RAND random challenge
  • AUTN authentication token
  • Step 405 The UE performs network verification based on the network, and obtains a result of network verification failure.
  • Step 406 The UE sends an authentication response message (Authentication Response) to AUSF through SEAF.
  • Authentication Response an authentication response message
  • the authentication response message may include: error reason (FAIL_CAUSE), random number (Nonce), SUPI, response data (RES_DATA), and MAC information for integrity protection.
  • the different values of the error cause (FAIL_CAUSE) correspond to the first type of error message and the second type of error message respectively; the first type of error message may specifically be a MAC failure (MAC_FAIL) message, and the second The type of error message may specifically be a synchronization failure (SYNC_FAIL) message.
  • the random number is a one-time random number, which is used to make the ciphertext of the first indication information (or an authentication response message) different each time, so as to prevent an attacker from guessing an error in the first indication information Message type.
  • the authentication response message may carry SUPI to prevent the second network device from initiating an identity request to the terminal when the second network device cannot obtain the SUPI of the terminal.
  • the response data is related to the error message type. In the case that the type of the error message is the second type, the response data is a numerical value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; as an example, the response data is AUTS; when the type of the error message is all In the case of the first type, the response data may be a random number. Among them, the length of AUTS is the same as the length of the random number.
  • the UE encrypts the authentication response message based on the encryption key K E , and generates MAC information based on the integrity key K M for integrity protection.
  • the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M are determined based on the session root key (K AUSF and/or K SEAF ).
  • Step 407 AUSF decrypts the authentication response message based on the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M , and determines the error message type.
  • AUSF may determine the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M based on the stored session root key ( KAUSF and/or K SEAF ), so as to decrypt the authentication response message.
  • AUSF verifies the MAC information in the authentication response message based on the integrity key K M ; in the case of passing the verification, decrypts the authentication response message based on the encryption key K E. If the verification fails, the process ends.
  • Step 408 In the case that the error message type included in the authentication response message is the second type, AUSF sends an authentication failure synchronization parameter to UDM/ARPF, and the authentication failure synchronization parameter is used at least for UDM/ARPF recovery and the The SQN of the terminal is synchronized.
  • AUSF sends a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message to UDM/ARPF, and the message carries authentication failure synchronization parameters.
  • the authentication failure synchronization parameter may specifically be a random challenge (RAND) and AUTS, so that the UDM/ARPF can resume synchronization with the SQN of the terminal according to the random challenge (RAND) and AUTS.
  • Step 409 AUSF sends the error message type and SUPI to SEAF.
  • AUSF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to SEAF, and the message carries the error message type and SUPI, that is, the message carries the error cause (FAIL_CAUSE) and SUPI.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application indicates the type of error message through a message (i.e., the first indication information), that is, no matter what type of error message it obtains, the terminal will send the indication information in the same format to the network side, avoiding the network side according to different types.
  • the terminal determines the encryption key and the integrity key through the shared key known to the network side, and according to the encryption key
  • the first indication information is encrypted and integrity protected with the integrity key, so that even if an attacker captures the authentication response message, he cannot obtain the error message type in the authentication response message from the ciphertext.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a terminal.
  • 5 is a schematic diagram of a structure of a terminal according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 5, the terminal includes an encryption unit 51 and a first communication unit 52; wherein, the encryption unit 51 is configured to fail network authentication
  • the encryption key and the integrity key the first indication information containing the error message type is encrypted and integrity protected respectively; the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on the session root key
  • the session root key is generated when the first authentication is successful between the terminal and the first network device; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • the first communication unit 52 is configured to send encrypted first instruction information to the first network device; wherein the encrypted instruction information is sent to the first network device through a second network device.
  • the terminal further includes a first determining unit 53 configured to determine the encryption key according to the session root key before performing network authentication And the integrity key.
  • the first determining unit 53 is configured to use a key derivation function to determine the encryption key and the encryption key according to at least the session root key and a random challenge (RAND). Integrity key.
  • the terminal further includes a first execution unit 54 configured to perform the first authentication with the first network device, and if the authentication is successful Generate the session root key.
  • the terminal further includes a first storage unit 55; the first execution unit 54 is configured to perform inter-operation with the second network device NAS SMC process;
  • the first storage unit 55 is configured to store the session root key when the NAS SMC process between the first execution unit 54 and the second network device is successfully executed.
  • the first execution unit 54 is further configured to perform non-initial authentication with the first network device, and when the authentication is successful, and with the second network device If the inter-NAS SMC process is successful, the session root key is updated, or the session root key is maintained.
  • the first communication unit 52 is configured to send the encrypted first indication information and the MAC information for integrity protection to the first network device through an authentication response message.
  • the encryption unit 51 is configured to encrypt the first indication information based on an encryption key, and generate MAC information based on the integrity key.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; and the error message type includes the first type or the second type.
  • Type the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal has failed to verify the MAC information in the authentication information
  • the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal has failed to verify the SQN; wherein, in the error message
  • the response data is a value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure
  • the response data is a first random number ; The length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted The ciphertext of the first indication information.
  • the session root key includes a first session root key and a second session root key; the second session root key is determined by the first session root key.
  • the encryption unit 51, the first determination unit 53, and the first execution unit 54 in the terminal can all be controlled by the central processing unit (CPU, Central Processing Unit), digital Signal processor (DSP, Digital Signal Processor), microcontroller unit (MCU, Microcontroller Unit) or programmable gate array (FPGA, Field-Programmable Gate Array) is implemented;
  • the first communication unit 52 in the terminal is used in practical applications It can be realized by a communication module (including: basic communication kit, operating system, communication module, standardized interface and protocol, etc.) and a transceiver antenna;
  • the first storage unit 55 in the terminal can be realized by a memory in practical applications.
  • the terminal provided in the above embodiment performs authentication information processing
  • only the division of the above-mentioned program modules is used as an example for illustration.
  • the above-mentioned processing can be allocated by different program modules as needed, namely The internal structure of the terminal is divided into different program modules to complete all or part of the processing described above.
  • the terminal provided in the foregoing embodiment and the embodiment of the authentication information processing method belong to the same concept, and the specific implementation process is detailed in the method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a composition structure of a network device according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 8, the network device includes a second communication unit 61 and a decryption unit 62; wherein, the second communication unit 61 is configured as
  • the first indication information sent by the terminal is received through the second network device; the first indication information is encrypted and integrity protected based on the encryption key and the integrity key; the encryption key and the integrity key are based on the session The root key is obtained; the session root key is generated when the first authentication between the terminal and the first network device is successful; the first indication information includes the error message type corresponding to the terminal network authentication failure; different errors The message type corresponds to the first indication information in the same format;
  • the decryption unit 62 is configured to decrypt the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • the network device further includes a second determining unit 63, configured so that the decryption unit 62 is based on the encryption key and the integrity key Before decrypting the first indication information, determine the encryption key and the integrity key according to the session root key.
  • the second determining unit 63 is configured to use a key derivation function to determine the encryption key and the encryption key according to at least the session root key and a random challenge (RAND). Integrity key.
  • the network device further includes a second execution unit 64 configured such that the decryption unit 62 is based on the encryption key and the integrity key Before decrypting the first indication information, perform a first authentication with the terminal, and generate a session root key if the authentication is successful.
  • the network device further includes a second storage unit 65; the second communication unit 61 is further configured to receive the second network device 2. Indication information, where the second indication information is used to indicate that the NAS SMC process between the second network device and the terminal is successful;
  • the second storage unit 65 is configured to store the session root key.
  • the second execution unit 64 is further configured to perform non-first authentication with the terminal, and when the authentication succeeds and the second communication
  • the unit 61 receives the second indication information of the second network device, it updates the session root key or keeps the session root key; the second indication information is used to indicate the second network
  • the NAS SMC process between the device and the terminal is successful.
  • the second communication unit 61 is configured to receive the first indication information sent by the terminal and the MAC information for integrity protection through an authentication response message; the authentication response The message is received through the forwarding of the second network device.
  • the decryption unit 62 is configured to verify the MAC information based on the integrity key, and in the case of a successful verification, perform the verification based on the encryption key.
  • the first instruction information is decrypted.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; and the error message type includes the first type or the second type.
  • Type the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal has failed to verify the MAC information in the authentication information
  • the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal has failed to verify the SQN; wherein, in the error message
  • the response data is a value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure
  • the response data is a first random number ; The length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted The ciphertext of the first indication information.
  • the second communication unit 61 is further configured to send an error message to the third type when the error message type included in the first indication information is the second type
  • the network device sends an authentication failure synchronization parameter, where the authentication failure synchronization parameter is at least used for the third network device to resume SQN synchronization with the terminal.
  • the second communication unit 61 is further configured to send third indication information to the second network device, and the third indication information includes at least one of the following information: Error message type, permanent user identification.
  • the session root key includes a first session root key and a second session root key; the second session root key is determined by the first session root key.
  • the decryption unit 62, the second determination unit 63, and the second execution unit 64 in the network device can all be implemented by the CPU, DSP, MCU or FPGA in the network device in practical applications;
  • the second communication unit 61 in the network device can be implemented in practical applications through a communication module (including: basic communication suite, operating system, communication module, standardized interface and protocol, etc.) and a transceiver antenna;
  • the second storage unit 65 can be implemented by a memory in practical applications.
  • the network device provided in the above embodiment performs authentication information processing
  • only the division of the above-mentioned program modules is used as an example.
  • the above-mentioned processing can be distributed by different program modules as needed. That is, the internal structure of the network device is divided into different program modules to complete all or part of the processing described above.
  • the network equipment provided in the above-mentioned embodiment and the authentication information processing method embodiment belong to the same concept. For the specific implementation process, please refer to the method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram of the hardware composition structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • the communication device includes a memory 72, a processor 71, and a computer program stored on the memory 72 and running on the processor 71.
  • the processor 71 executes the program, the steps of the authentication information processing method applied to the terminal in the embodiment of the present application are implemented; as another implementation manner, when the processor 71 executes the program Implement the steps of the authentication information processing method applied to the first network device in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device further includes a communication interface 73.
  • the various components in the communication device are coupled together through the bus system 74.
  • the bus system 74 is used to implement connection and communication between these components.
  • the bus system 74 also includes a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus.
  • various buses are marked as the bus system 74 in FIG. 11.
  • the memory 72 may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, and may also include both volatile and non-volatile memory.
  • the non-volatile memory can be a read only memory (ROM, Read Only Memory), a programmable read only memory (PROM, Programmable Read-Only Memory), an erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM, Erasable Programmable Read- Only Memory, Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM, Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory), magnetic random access memory (FRAM, ferromagnetic random access memory), flash memory (Flash Memory), magnetic surface memory , CD-ROM, or CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory); magnetic surface memory can be magnetic disk storage or tape storage.
  • the volatile memory may be random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), which is used as an external cache.
  • RAM random access memory
  • SRAM Static Random Access Memory
  • SSRAM synchronous static random access memory
  • DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • DDRSDRAM Double Data Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • ESDRAM enhanced -Type synchronous dynamic random access memory
  • SLDRAM SyncLink Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • direct memory bus random access memory DRRAM, Direct Rambus Random Access Memory
  • DRRAM Direct Rambus Random Access Memory
  • the memory 72 described in the embodiment of the present application is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.
  • the method disclosed in the above embodiments of the present application may be applied to the processor 71 or implemented by the processor 71.
  • the processor 71 may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capability. In the implementation process, the steps of the foregoing method can be completed by hardware integrated logic circuits in the processor 71 or instructions in the form of software.
  • the aforementioned processor 71 may be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP, Digital Signal Processor), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, and the like.
  • the processor 71 may implement or execute various methods, steps, and logical block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.
  • the steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be directly embodied as being executed and completed by a hardware decoding processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor.
  • the software module may be located in a storage medium, and the storage medium is located in the memory 72.
  • the processor 71 reads the information in the memory 72 and completes the steps of the foregoing method in combination with its hardware.
  • the communication device may be used by one or more application specific integrated circuits (ASIC, Application Specific Integrated Circuit), DSP, programmable logic device (PLD, Programmable Logic Device), complex programmable logic device (CPLD, Complex Programmable Logic Device, Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA, Field-Programmable Gate Array), general-purpose processor, controller, microcontroller (MCU, Micro Controller Unit), microprocessor (Microprocessor), or other electronic components Implementation, used to perform the aforementioned method.
  • ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
  • DSP programmable logic device
  • PLD Programmable Logic Device
  • CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Device
  • FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
  • general-purpose processor controller, microcontroller (MCU, Micro Controller Unit), microprocessor (Microprocessor), or other electronic components Implementation, used to perform the aforementioned method.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored.
  • a computer program As an implementation manner, when the program is executed by a processor, the authentication information processing method applied to the terminal in the embodiment of the present application is implemented. Step; As another implementation manner, when the program is executed by the processor, the steps of the authentication information processing method applied to the first network device in the embodiment of this application are implemented; as another implementation manner, when the program is executed by the processor Implement the steps of the authentication information processing method applied to the third network device in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the disclosed device and method may be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division, and there may be other divisions in actual implementation, such as: multiple units or components can be combined, or It can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not implemented.
  • the coupling, or direct coupling, or communication connection between the components shown or discussed may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be electrical, mechanical or other forms of.
  • the units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units; Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.
  • the functional units in the embodiments of the present application can all be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can be individually used as a unit, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit;
  • the unit can be implemented in the form of hardware, or in the form of hardware plus software functional units.
  • the foregoing program can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it is executed. Including the steps of the foregoing method embodiment; and the foregoing storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a mobile storage device, ROM, RAM, magnetic disk, or optical disk.
  • the above-mentioned integrated unit of this application is implemented in the form of a software function module and sold or used as an independent product, it can also be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • the computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for A computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) executes all or part of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: removable storage devices, ROM, RAM, magnetic disks, or optical disks and other media that can store program codes.

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备。所述方法包括：终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；所述终端向所述第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。

Description

一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请基于申请号为201910324947.0、申请日为2019年4月22日的中国专利申请提出，并要求该中国专利申请的优先权，该中国专利申请的全部内容在此以引入方式并入本申请。
技术领域
本发明涉及无线通信技术，具体涉及一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备。
背景技术
移动通信系统中用户设备(UE，User Equipment)与网络侧之间通过认证与密钥协商(AKA，Authentication and Key Agreement)协议进行认证。而5G系统中UE与网络侧之间的认证方式包括以下两种认证方式：5G-AKA和EAP-AKA′。前者是基于长期演进(LTE，Long Term Evolution)的认证协议演进型分组系统认证与密钥协商(EPS-AKA，Evolved Packet System-Authentication and Key Agreement)发展而来，而后者是国际互联网工程任务组(IETF，The Internet Engineering Task Force)定义的认证协议用于4G网络中UE使用无线保真(Wi-Fi，Wireless-Fidelity)接入运营商网络。5G-AKA和EAP-AKA′这两种认证方式会因为UE认证网络失败时可能会发送两个不同类型的错误消息而受到关联性攻击。
为解决关联性攻击的相关技术中，在UE认证网络失败时，通过试用网络的公钥加密的信息以指示错误消息类型，由于此消息是加密的，攻击者得不到此消息的内容，从而攻击者无法发起关联性攻击。然而这种方式虽 然能够解决关联性攻击的问题，但需要运营商部署公钥基础设施(PKI，Public Key Infrastructure)；并且这种方式使用非对称算法进行加密，需要消耗大量的计算资源，这对于电池工作时长有需求的物联网终端不适用。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备。
为达到上述目的，本申请实施例的技术方案是这样实现的：
第一方面，本申请实施例提供了一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述终端向所述第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，在终端进行网络认证之前，所述方法还包括：所述终端至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战(RAND)采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端执行与所述第二网络设备之间的非接入层安全模式命令(NAS SMC，Non Access Stratum Security Mode Command)流程成功的情况下，所述终端存储所述会话根密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端与所述第一网络设备之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且所述终端与所述第二网络设备之间的NAS SMC流程成功的情况下更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息，包括：所述终端通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，包括：所述终端基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息，包括：所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和MAC信息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
第二方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所 述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备根据所述会话根密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥，包括：
所述第一网络设备至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战(RAND)采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备接收所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功；所述第一网络设备存储所述会话根密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备与所述终端之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且所述第一网络设备接收到所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息的情况下，更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥；所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息，包括：所述第一网络设备通过认证响应消息接收所述终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥 和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密，包括：所述第一网络设备基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备向所述第二网络设备发送第三指示信息，所述第三指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
第三方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端，所述终端包括加密单元和第一通讯单元；其中，
所述加密单元，配置为在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述第一通讯单元，配置为向所述第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端还包括第一确定单元，配置为至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战(RAND)采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端还包括第一执行单元和第一存储单元；
所述第一执行单元，配置为执行与所述第二网络设备之间执行非接入层安全模式命令NAS SMC流程；
所述第一存储单元，配置为在所述第一执行单元执行与所述第二网络设备之间执行NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，存储所述会话根密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一执行单元，还配置为与所述第一网络设备之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且与所述第二网络设备之间的NAS SMC流程成功的情况下更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一通讯单元，配置为通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述加密单元，配置为基于加密密钥 加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
第四方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种网络设备，所述网络设备为第一网络设备，所述网络设备包括第二通讯单元和解密单元；其中，
所述第二通讯单元，配置为通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述解密单元，配置为基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述网络设备还包括第二确定单元， 配置为至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战(RAND)采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述网络设备还包括第二存储单元；
所述第二通讯单元，还配置为接收所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功；
所述第二存储单元，配置为存储所述会话根密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述网络设备还包括第二执行单元，配置为与所述终端之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且所述第二通讯单元接收到所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息的情况下，更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥；所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元，配置为通过认证响应消息接收所述终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述解密单元，配置为基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第 一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为向所述第二网络设备发送第三指示信息，所述第三指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例第一方面所述认证信息处理方法的步骤；或者，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例第二方面所述认证信息处理方法的步骤。
本申请实施例还提供了一种终端，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现本发明实施例第一方面所述认证信息处理方法的步骤。
本申请实施例还提供了一种网络设备，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现本发明实施例第二方面所述认证信息处理方法的步骤。
本申请实施例提供的认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备，所述方法包括：终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对 包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；所述终端向所述第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。本申请实施例的技术方案通过一个消息(即第一指示信息)指示错误消息类型，即终端无论获得何种类型的错误消息，均向网络侧发送相同格式的指示信息，避免网络侧根据不同类型的指示信息进行响应，从而避免攻击者通过截获不同类型的响应以确定错误消息类型；并且，终端通过与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并根据加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，使得攻击者即使捕获到认证响应消息，也无法从密文上获取认证响应消息中的错误消息类型。
附图说明
图1为相关技术中关联性攻击的流程示意图；
图2为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图一；
图3为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图二；
图4为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的具体流程示意图；
图5为本申请实施例的终端的一种组成结构示意图；
图6为本申请实施例的终端的另一种组成结构示意图；
图7为本申请实施例的终端的又一种组成结构示意图；
图8为本申请实施例的网络设备的一种组成结构示意图；
图9为本申请实施例的网络设备的另一种组成结构示意图；
图10为本申请实施例的网络设备的又一种组成结构示意图；
图11为本申请实施例的通信设备的硬件组成结构示意图。
具体实施方式
在对本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法进行详细阐述之前，首先对关联性攻击进行简单介绍。
图1为相关技术中关联性攻击的流程示意图；图1以4G网络(如LTE网络)为例进行说明。如图1所示，包括：
步骤101：移动性管理实体(MME，Mobility Management Entity)向UE发送认证请求消息，所述认证请求消息中包括随机挑战(RAND，Random challenge)和认证令牌(AUTN)。在本步骤中，攻击者可能会截获认证请求消息，获得认证请求消息中的随机挑战(RAND)和认证令牌(AUTN)并存储。
步骤102：UE进行网络认证，在网络认证完成后，UE向MME发送认证响应消息。在本步骤中，攻击者可能会截获认证响应消息。
本步骤中，UE在网络认证失败的情况下可能发送两个不同类型的错误消息，包括：MAC失败(MAC_FAIL)消息或同步失败(SYNC_FAIL)消息；其中，MAC_FAIL消息表示UE检验MAC信息失败，通常是由于UE的根密钥与网络侧的根密钥不匹配造成的；SYNC_FAIL消息表示网络侧的序列号(SQN，Sequence Number)值在UE允许的范围之外。
步骤103：攻击者重新向UE发送认证请求消息，所述认证请求消息中包括步骤101中捕获的随机挑战(RAND)和认证令牌(AUTN)。
步骤104：UE进行网络认证，在网络认证完成后，UE发送认证响应消息。在UE网络认证失败的情况下，UE发送携带有错误消息的认证响应消息，例如错误消息为SYNC_FAIL消息；攻击者截获认证响应消息，获得认证响应消息中的错误消息，根据该错误消息确定需要跟踪的UE在特定区域内，这样攻击者通过截获认证响应消息中的错误消息跟踪到UE。
下面结合附图及具体实施例对本申请作进一步详细的说明。
本申请实施例提供了一种认证信息处理方法。图2为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图一；如图2所示，所述方法包括：
步骤201：终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
步骤202：所述终端向所述第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
本实施例中，所述第一网络设备和所述第二网络设备可以是用于网络认证的核心网设备。作为一种示例，在5G系统或NR系统的场景下，所述第一网络设备具体可以是鉴权服务器功能节点(AUSF，Authentication Server Function)；所述第二网络设备可以是安全锚节点功能(SEAF，SEcurity Anchor Function)。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，在终端进行网络认证之前，也即在步骤201之前，所述方法还包括：所述终端根据所述会话根密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
本实施例中，终端在进行网络认证之前，基于所述终端和所述网络侧共同知道的会话根密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；另一方面，第一网络设备可基于与终端共同知道的会话根密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行解密，从而获得第一指示信息中包含的错误消息类型。
本实施例中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。作为一种示例，所述 第一会话根密钥具体可以为K AUSF；所述第二会话根密钥具体可以为K SEAF。
其中，所述终端根据所述会话根密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥，包括：所述终端至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战(RAND)采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
作为一种实施方式，所述加密密钥的确定方式可满足以下表达式：
K E＝KDF(K AUSF，RAND‖RAND的长度‖“Encryption Key”‖“Encryption Key”的长度)；
其中，K E表示加密密钥；KDF为密钥推导函数；RAND表示随机挑战；“‖”表示字符串级联；“Encryption Key”表示加密密钥；作为一种示例，“Encryption Key”可以为终端与第一网络设备中预先获知的对应于K E的字符串。
所述完整性密钥的确定方式可满足以下表达式：
K M＝KDF(K AUSF，RAND‖RAND的长度‖“MAC Key”‖“MAC Key”的长度)；
其中，K M表示加密密钥；KDF为密钥推导函数；RAND表示随机挑战；“‖”表示字符串级联；“MAC Key”表示完整性密钥；作为一种示例，“MAC Key”可以为终端与第一网络设备中预先获知的对应于K M的字符串。
上述加密密钥和完整性密钥的确定方式是依据会话根密钥K AUSF确定的，在其他实施方式中，加密密钥和完整性密钥也可依据会话根密钥K SEAF确定，具体的确定方式与上述表达式表示的确定方式类似，这里不再赘述。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，在终端进行网络认证之前，所述方法还包括：所述终端与所述第一网络设备之间进行首次认证，在认证成功的情况下生成会话根密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端执行与所述第二网络设备之间的NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，所述终端存储所述会 话根密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端与所述第一网络设备之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且所述终端与所述第二网络设备之间的NAS SMC流程成功的情况下更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥。
本实施例中，终端在于第一网络设备之间进行首次相互认证成功的情况下，终端与第一网络设备均生成会话根密钥，如生成K AUSF和/或K SEAF；在终端与第二网络设备之间NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，终端和第一网络设备存储会话根密钥。或者在终端与第一网络设备之间进行非首次相互认证成功的情况下，并且在终端与第二网络设备之间NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，终端和第一网络设备可更新存储的会话根密钥，或者保持存储的会话根密钥不变。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，即在步骤202中，所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息，包括：所述终端通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；其中，所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。可以理解，所述终端将包含有加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息的认证响应消息发送至第二网络设备，再由第二网络设备的转发将认证响应消息发送至第一网络设备。
本实施例中，所述认证响应消息包括所述第一指示信息的加密部分和所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分；所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分为用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，包括：所述终端基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。相应的，所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息，包括： 所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和MAC信息。
本实施例中，所述MAC信息可以理解为一个序列或者一个数值，用于对第一指示信息进行完整性保护。实际应用中，终端接收到网络设备(具体是第三网络设备)的认证请求消息，所述认证请求消息中包括随机挑战(RAND)和认证令牌(AUTN)；作为一种示例，所述认证令牌(AUTN)可以为128位数值；则终端基于认证令牌(AUTN)中的信息进行MAC信息校验。例如，终端基于认证令牌(AUTN)中的信息生成MAC信息，将生成的MAC信息与自身的MAC信息进行校验；若校验一致，则表示校验成功；若校验不一致，则表示校验失败。
本实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
这里，所述第一类型的错误消息具体可以是MAC失败(MAC_FAIL)消息，其中，MAC_FAIL消息表示UE检验认证令牌(AUTN)中的MAC信息失败，通常是由于UE的根密钥与网络侧的根密钥不匹配造成的；所述第二类型的错误消息具体可以是同步失败(SYNC_FAIL)消息，表示网络侧的SQN值在UE允许的范围之外。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数(如通过Nonce表示)、用户永久标识(例如SUPI)；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
本实施例中，所述第二随机数为一次性随机数，用于使所述第一指示 信息(也可为认证响应消息)的密文每次都不相同，以防止攻击者猜测所述第一指示信息中的错误消息类型。所述第一指示信息中可携带有用户永久标识，以防止第二网络设备无法获得终端的用户永久标识的情况下向终端发起身份请求。
本实施例中，所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关。在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；作为一种示例，所述响应数据为AUTS；在所述错误消息的类型为第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据可以为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
本申请实施例的技术方案，无论错误消息类型是第一类型或第二类型，终端向网络侧发送相同格式的认证响应消息，且认证响应消息通过加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护，使得攻击者即使捕获到认证响应消息，也无法从密文上获取认证响应消息中的错误消息类型，另一方面由于终端发送相同格式的认证响应消息，也避免SEAF回应不同类型的认证响应消息，从而产生关联性攻击，避免终端被攻击者跟踪到。
本申请实施例还提供了一种认证信息处理方法。图3为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图二；如图3所示，所述方法包括：
步骤301：第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
步骤302：所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
本实施例中，所述第一网络设备和所述第二网络设备可以是用于网络认证的核心网设备。作为一种示例，在5G系统或NR系统的场景下，所述第一网络设备具体可以是AUSF；所述第二网络设备可以是SEAF。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备根据所述会话根密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
本实施例中，第一网络设备基于所述终端和所述网络侧共同知道的会话根密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行解密，从而获得第一指示信息中包含的错误消息类型。
本实施例中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。作为一种示例，所述第一会话根密钥具体可以为K AUSF；所述第二会话根密钥具体可以为K SEAF。
所述第一网络设备根据所述会话根密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥，包括：所述第一网络设备至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战(RAND)采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
作为一种实施方式，所述加密密钥的确定方式可满足以下表达式：
K E＝KDF(K AUSF，RAND‖RAND的长度‖“Encryption Key”‖“Encryption Key”的长度)；
其中，K E表示加密密钥；KDF为密钥推导函数；RAND表示随机挑战；“‖”表示字符串级联；“Encryption Key”表示加密密钥；作为一种示例，“Encryption Key”可以为终端与第一网络设备中预先获知的对应于K E的字符串。
所述完整性密钥的确定方式可满足以下表达式：
K M＝KDF(K AUSF，RAND‖RAND的长度‖“MAC Key”‖“MAC Key” 的长度)；
其中，K M表示加密密钥；KDF为密钥推导函数；RAND表示随机挑战；“‖”表示字符串级联；“MAC Key”表示完整性密钥；作为一种示例，“MAC Key”可以为终端与第一网络设备中预先获知的对应于K M的字符串。
上述加密密钥和完整性密钥的确定方式是依据会话根密钥K AUSF确定的，在其他实施方式中，加密密钥和完整性密钥也可依据会话根密钥K SEAF确定，具体的确定方式与上述表达式表示的确定方式类似，这里不再赘述。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，也即在步骤302之前，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备与所述终端之间进行首次认证，在认证成功的情况下生成会话根密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备接收所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功；所述第一网络设备存储所述会话根密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备与所述终端之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且所述第一网络设备接收到所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息的情况下，更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥；所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功。
本实施例中，终端在于第一网络设备之间进行首次相互认证成功的情况下，终端与第一网络设备均生成会话根密钥，如生成K AUSF和/或K SEAF；在终端与第二网络设备之间NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，终端和第一网络设备存储会话根密钥。或者在终端与第一网络设备之间进行非首次相互认证成功的情况下，并且在终端与第二网络设备之间NAS SMC流程成功的情 况下，终端和第一网络设备可更新存储的会话根密钥，或者保持存储的会话根密钥不变。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息，包括：所述第一网络设备通过认证响应消息接收所述终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。可以理解，所述终端将包含有加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息的认证响应消息发送至第二网络设备，再由第二网络设备的转发将认证响应消息发送至第一网络设备。
本实施例中，所述认证响应消息包括所述第一指示信息的加密部分和所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分；所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分为用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密，包括：所述第一网络设备基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
本实施例中，所述MAC信息可以理解为一个序列或者一个数值，用于对第一指示信息进行完整性保护。
本实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
这里，所述第一类型的错误消息具体可以是MAC失败(MAC_FAIL) 消息，其中，MAC_FAIL消息表示UE检验认证令牌(AUTN)中的MAC信息失败，通常是由于UE的根密钥与网络侧的根密钥不匹配造成的；所述第二类型的错误消息具体可以是同步失败(SYNC_FAIL)消息，表示网络侧的SQN值在UE允许的范围之外。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数(如通过Nonce表示)、用户永久标识(例如SUPI)；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
本实施例中，所述第二随机数为一次性随机数，用于使所述第一指示信息(也可为认证响应消息)的密文每次都不相同，以防止攻击者猜测所述第一指示信息中的错误消息类型。所述第一指示信息中可携带有用户永久标识，以防止第二网络设备无法获得终端的用户永久标识的情况下向终端发起身份请求。
本实施例中，所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关。在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；作为一种示例，所述响应数据为AUTS；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据可以为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备向所述第二网络设备发送第三指示信息，所述第三指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
本申请实施例的技术方案通过一个消息(即第一指示信息)指示错误 消息类型，即终端无论获得何种类型的错误消息，均向网络侧发送相同格式的指示信息，避免网络侧根据不同类型的指示信息进行响应，从而避免攻击者通过截获不同类型的响应以确定错误消息类型；并且，终端通过与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并根据加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，使得攻击者即使捕获到认证响应消息，也无法从密文上获取认证响应消息中的错误消息类型。
下面结合一个具体施例对本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法进行详细说明，在本示例中，以AUSF对应于前述实施例中的第一网络设备、以SEAF对应于前述实施例中的第二网络设备、以UDM/ARPF对应于前述实施例中的第三网络设备为例进行说明。
图4为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的具体流程示意图；如图4所示，所述方法包括：
步骤401：UE与AUSF之间进行首次认证，在认证成功的情况下，UE与AUSF分别生成会话根密钥；本示例中，所述会话根密钥包括：K AUSF和/或K SEAF。
步骤402：UE与SEAF之间进行NAS SMC流程，在NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，终端存储会话根密钥。
步骤403：SEAF向AUSF发送指示信息。
这里，在NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，SEAF向AUSF发送指示信息，所述指示信息用于指示NAS SMC流程成功，在这种情况下，AUSF存储会话根密钥。基于此，UE与AUSF均存储有会话根密钥。
在其他实施例中，在UE与AUSF之间进行非首次相互认证成功的情况下，并且在UE与SEAF之间NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，UE和AUSF可更新存储的会话根密钥，或者保持存储的会话根密钥不变。
步骤404：UDM/ARPF基于选定的认证协议向UE发送认证请求消息； 所述认证请求消息中可包括：随机挑战(RAND)和认证令牌(AUTN)。
步骤405：UE基于进行网络验证，并获得网络验证失败的结果。
步骤406：UE通过SEAF向AUSF发送认证响应消息(Authentication Response)。
本实施例中，所述认证响应消息可包括：错误原因(FAIL_CAUSE)、随机数(Nonce)、SUPI、响应数据(RES_DATA)以及用于完整性保护的MAC信息。其中，错误原因(FAIL_CAUSE)的不同取值和分别对应第一类型的错误消息和第二类型的错误消息；所述第一类型的错误消息具体可以是MAC失败(MAC_FAIL)消息，所述第二类型的错误消息具体可以是同步失败(SYNC_FAIL)消息。所述随机数为一次性随机数，用于使所述第一指示信息(也可为认证响应消息)的密文每次都不相同，以防止攻击者猜测所述第一指示信息中的错误消息类型。所述认证响应消息中可携带有SUPI，以防止第二网络设备无法获得终端的SUPI的情况下向终端发起身份请求。所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关。在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；作为一种示例，所述响应数据为AUTS；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据可以为一随机数。其中，AUTS的长度与随机数的长度相同。
本实施例中，UE基于加密密钥K E对认证响应消息进行加密，基于完整性密钥K M生成MAC信息以进行完整性保护。其中，所述加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M基于会话根密钥(K AUSF和/或K SEAF)确定。
步骤407：AUSF基于加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M对认证响应消息进行解密处理，确定错误消息类型。
本实施例中，AUSF可基于存储的会话根密钥(K AUSF和/或K SEAF)确定加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M，从而对认证响应消息进行解密处理。
作为一种示例，AUSF基于完整性密钥K M校验认证响应消息中的MAC信息；在验证通过的情况下，基于加密密钥K E对认证响应消息进行解密处理。在验证不通过的情况下，结束流程。
步骤408：在认证响应消息中包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，AUSF向UDM/ARPF发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于UDM/ARPF恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
这里，在认证响应消息中的错误原因(FAIL_CAUSE)的取值为SYNC_FAIL的情况下，执行本步骤。
作为一种示例，AUSF向UDM/ARPF发送Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request消息，所述消息中携带认证失败同步参数。作为一种示例，所述认证失败同步参数具体可以是随机挑战(RAND)和AUTS，以使UDM/ARPF根据随机挑战(RAND)和AUTS恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
步骤409：AUSF向SEAF发送错误消息类型和SUPI。
这里，AUSF向SEAF发送Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response消息，所述消息中携带错误消息类型和SUPI，也即所述消息中携带错误原因(FAIL_CAUSE)和SUPI。
本申请实施例的技术方案通过一个消息(即第一指示信息)指示错误消息类型，即终端无论获得何种类型的错误消息，均向网络侧发送相同格式的指示信息，避免网络侧根据不同类型的指示信息进行响应，从而避免攻击者通过截获不同类型的响应以确定错误消息类型；并且，终端通过与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并根据加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，使得攻击者即使捕获到认证响应消息，也无法从密文上获取认证响应消息中的错误消息类型。
本申请实施例还提供了一种终端。图5为本申请实施例的终端的一种组成结构示意图；如图5所示，所述终端包括加密单元51和第一通讯单元 52；其中，所述加密单元51，配置为在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述第一通讯单元52，配置为向所述第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，如图6所示，所述终端还包括第一确定单元53，配置为在进行网络认证之前，根据所述会话根密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一确定单元53，配置为至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战(RAND)采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，如图7所示，所述终端还包括第一执行单元54，配置为与所述第一网络设备之间进行首次认证，在认证成功的情况下生成会话根密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，如图7所示，所述终端还包括第一存储单元55；所述第一执行单元54，配置为执行与所述第二网络设备之间执行NAS SMC流程；
所述第一存储单元55，配置为在所述第一执行单元54执行与所述第二网络设备之间执行NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，存储所述会话根密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一执行单元54，还配置为与所述第一网络设备之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且与所述第二网络设备之间的NAS SMC流程成功的情况下更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述 会话根密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一通讯单元52，配置为通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述加密单元51，配置为基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
本实施例中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
本申请实施例中，所述终端中的加密单元51、第一确定单元53和第一执行单元54，在实际应用中均可由所述终端中的中央处理器(CPU，Central Processing Unit)、数字信号处理器(DSP，Digital Signal Processor)、微控制单元(MCU，Microcontroller Unit)或可编程门阵列(FPGA，Field－Programmable Gate Array)实现；所述终端中的第一通讯单元52，在实际应用中可通过通信模组(包含：基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准 化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现；所述终端中的第一存储单元55，在实际应用中可通过存储器实现。
需要说明的是：上述实施例提供的终端在进行认证信息处理时，仅以上述各程序模块的划分进行举例说明，实际应用中，可以根据需要而将上述处理分配由不同的程序模块完成，即将终端的内部结构划分成不同的程序模块，以完成以上描述的全部或者部分处理。另外，上述实施例提供的终端与认证信息处理方法实施例属于同一构思，其具体实现过程详见方法实施例，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种网络设备。图8为本申请实施例的网络设备的一种组成结构示意图；如图8所示，所述网络设备包括第二通讯单元61和解密单元62；其中，所述第二通讯单元61，配置为通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述解密单元62，配置为基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，如图9所示，所述网络设备还包括第二确定单元63，配置为所述解密单元62基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，根据所述会话根密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第二确定单元63，配置为至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战(RAND)采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，如图10所示，所述网络设备还包括第二执行单元64，配置为所述解密单元62基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，与所述终端之间进行首次认证，在认证成功的情况下生成会话根密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，如图10所示，所述网络设备还包括第二存储单元65；所述第二通讯单元61，还配置为接收所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功；
所述第二存储单元65，配置为存储所述会话根密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，如图10所示，所述第二执行单元64，还配置为与所述终端之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且所述第二通讯单元61接收到所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息的情况下，更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥；所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元61，配置为通过认证响应消息接收所述终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述解密单元62，配置为基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所 述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元61，还配置为在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元61，还配置为向所述第二网络设备发送第三指示信息，所述第三指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
本实施例中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
本申请实施例中，所述网络设备中的解密单元62、第二确定单元63和第二执行单元64，在实际应用中均可由所述网络设备中的CPU、DSP、MCU或FPGA实现；所述网络设备中的第二通讯单元61，在实际应用中可通过通信模组(包含：基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现；所述网络设备中的第二存储单元65，在实际应用中可通过存储器实现。
需要说明的是：上述实施例提供的网络设备在进行认证信息处理时，仅以上述各程序模块的划分进行举例说明，实际应用中，可以根据需要而将上述处理分配由不同的程序模块完成，即将网络设备的内部结构划分成不同的程序模块，以完成以上描述的全部或者部分处理。另外，上述实施 例提供的网络设备与认证信息处理方法实施例属于同一构思，其具体实现过程详见方法实施例，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种通信设备。图11为本申请实施例的通信设备的硬件组成结构示意图，如图11所示，通信设备包括存储器72、处理器71及存储在存储器72上并可在处理器71上运行的计算机程序。作为一种实施方式，所述处理器71执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例中应用于终端的认证信息处理方法的步骤；作为另一种实施方式，所述处理器71执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例中应用于第一网络设备的认证信息处理方法的步骤。
可选地，通信设备还包括通信接口73。可以理解，通信设备中的各个组件通过总线系统74耦合在一起。可理解，总线系统74用于实现这些组件之间的连接通信。总线系统74除包括数据总线之外，还包括电源总线、控制总线和状态信号总线。但是为了清楚说明起见，在图11中将各种总线都标为总线系统74。
可以理解，存储器72可以是易失性存储器或非易失性存储器，也可包括易失性和非易失性存储器两者。其中，非易失性存储器可以是只读存储器(ROM，Read Only Memory)、可编程只读存储器(PROM，Programmable Read-Only Memory)、可擦除可编程只读存储器(EPROM，Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory)、电可擦除可编程只读存储器(EEPROM，Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory)、磁性随机存取存储器(FRAM，ferromagnetic random access memory)、快闪存储器(Flash Memory)、磁表面存储器、光盘、或只读光盘(CD-ROM，Compact Disc Read-Only Memory)；磁表面存储器可以是磁盘存储器或磁带存储器。易失性存储器可以是随机存取存储器(RAM，Random Access Memory)，其用作外部高速缓存。通过示例性但不是限制性说明，许多形式的RAM可用，例 如静态随机存取存储器(SRAM，Static Random Access Memory)、同步静态随机存取存储器(SSRAM，Synchronous Static Random Access Memory)、动态随机存取存储器(DRAM，Dynamic Random Access Memory)、同步动态随机存取存储器(SDRAM，Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory)、双倍数据速率同步动态随机存取存储器(DDRSDRAM，Double Data Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory)、增强型同步动态随机存取存储器(ESDRAM，Enhanced Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory)、同步连接动态随机存取存储器(SLDRAM，SyncLink Dynamic Random Access Memory)、直接内存总线随机存取存储器(DRRAM，Direct Rambus Random Access Memory)。本申请实施例描述的存储器72旨在包括但不限于这些和任意其它适合类型的存储器。
上述本申请实施例揭示的方法可以应用于处理器71中，或者由处理器71实现。处理器71可能是一种集成电路芯片，具有信号的处理能力。在实现过程中，上述方法的各步骤可以通过处理器71中的硬件的集成逻辑电路或者软件形式的指令完成。上述的处理器71可以是通用处理器、数字信号处理器(DSP，Digital Signal Processor)，或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件等。处理器71可以实现或者执行本申请实施例中的公开的各方法、步骤及逻辑框图。通用处理器可以是微处理器或者任何常规的处理器等。结合本申请实施例所公开的方法的步骤，可以直接体现为硬件译码处理器执行完成，或者用译码处理器中的硬件及软件模块组合执行完成。软件模块可以位于存储介质中，该存储介质位于存储器72，处理器71读取存储器72中的信息，结合其硬件完成前述方法的步骤。
在示例性实施例中，通信设备可以被一个或多个应用专用集成电路(ASIC，Application Specific Integrated Circuit)、DSP、可编程逻辑器件 (PLD，Programmable Logic Device)、复杂可编程逻辑器件(CPLD，Complex Programmable Logic Device)、现场可编程门阵列(FPGA，Field-Programmable Gate Array)、通用处理器、控制器、微控制器(MCU，Micro Controller Unit)、微处理器(Microprocessor)、或其他电子元件实现，用于执行前述方法。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，作为一种实施方式，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例中应用于终端的认证信息处理方法的步骤；作为另一种实施方式，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例中应用于第一网络设备的认证信息处理方法的步骤；作为又一种实施方式，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例中应用于第三网络设备的认证信息处理方法的步骤。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的设备和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。以上所描述的设备实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，如：多个单元或组件可以结合，或可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另外，所显示或讨论的各组成部分相互之间的耦合、或直接耦合、或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，设备或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性的、机械的或其它形式的。
上述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是、或也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是、或也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，也可以分布到多个网络单元上；可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各实施例中的各功能单元可以全部集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各单元分别单独作为一个单元，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中；上述集成的单元既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用硬件加软件功能单元的形式实现。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解：实现上述方法实施例的全部或部分步骤可以通过程序指令相关的硬件来完成，前述的程序可以存储于一计算机可读取存储介质中，该程序在执行时，执行包括上述方法实施例的步骤；而前述的存储介质包括：移动存储设备、ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
或者，本申请上述集成的单元如果以软件功能模块的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，也可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请实施例的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机、服务器、或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分。而前述的存储介质包括：移动存储设备、ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
本申请所提供的几个方法实施例中所揭露的方法，在不冲突的情况下可以任意组合，得到新的方法实施例。
本申请所提供的几个产品实施例中所揭露的特征，在不冲突的情况下可以任意组合，得到新的产品实施例。
本申请所提供的几个方法或设备实施例中所揭露的特征，在不冲突的情况下可以任意组合，得到新的方法实施例或设备实施例。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (43)

  1. 一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：
    终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
    所述终端向所述第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，在终端进行网络认证之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战RAND采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端执行与所述第二网络设备之间的非接入层安全模式命令NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，所述终端存储所述会话根密钥。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端与所述第一网络设备之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且所述终端与所述第二网络设备之间的NAS SMC流程成功的情况下更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥。
  5. 根据权利要求1至4任一项所述的方法，其中，所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息，包括：
    所述终端通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的方法，其中，所述分别基于加密密钥和完整 性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，包括：
    所述终端基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
  7. 根据权利要求1至6任一项所述的方法，其中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；
    所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；
    第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
    其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
  9. 根据权利要求1至8任一项所述的方法，其中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
  10. 一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：
    第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同 格式的第一指示信息；
    所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其中，所述第一网络设备根据所述会话根密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥，包括：
    所述第一网络设备至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战RAND采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  12. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一网络设备接收所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功；
    所述第一网络设备存储所述会话根密钥。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一网络设备与所述终端之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且所述第一网络设备接收到所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息的情况下，更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥；所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功。
  14. 根据权利要求10至13任一项所述的方法，其中，所述第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息，包括：
    所述第一网络设备通过认证响应消息接收所述终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的方法，其中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密，包括：
    所述第一网络设备基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成 功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
  16. 根据权利要求10至15任一项所述的方法，其中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；
    所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；
    第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
    其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
  17. 根据权利要求16所述的方法，其中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
  18. 根据权利要求16或17所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
  19. 根据权利要求16至18任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一网络设备向所述第二网络设备发送第三指示信息，所述第三指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
  20. 根据权利要求10至19任一项所述的方法，其中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
  21. 一种终端，所述终端包括加密单元和第一通讯单元；其中，
    所述加密单元，配置为在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
    所述第一通讯单元，配置为向所述第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的终端，其中，所述终端还包括第一确定单元，配置为至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战RAND采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  23. 根据权利要求21所述的终端，其中，所述终端还包括第一执行单元和第一存储单元；
    所述第一执行单元，配置为执行与所述第二网络设备之间执行非接入层安全模式命令NAS SMC流程；
    所述第一存储单元，配置为在所述第一执行单元执行与所述第二网络设备之间执行非接入层安全模式命令NAS SMC流程成功的情况下，存储所述会话根密钥。
  24. 根据权利要求23所述的终端，其中，所述第一执行单元，还配置为与所述第一网络设备之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且与所述第二网络设备之间的NAS SMC流程成功的情况下更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥。
  25. 根据权利要求21至24任一项所述的终端，其中，所述第一通讯单元，配置为通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信 息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
  26. 根据权利要求25所述的终端，其中，所述加密单元，配置为基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
  27. 根据权利要求21至26任一项所述的终端，其中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；
    所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；
    第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
    其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的终端，其中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
  29. 根据权利要求21至28任一项所述的终端，其中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
  30. 一种网络设备，所述网络设备为第一网络设备，所述网络设备包括第二通讯单元和解密单元；其中，
    所述第二通讯单元，配置为通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于会话根密钥获得；所述会话根密钥在所述终端与第一网络设备之间首次认证成功的情况下生成；所述第 一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
    所述解密单元，配置为基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
  31. 根据权利要求30所述的网络设备，其中，所述网络设备还包括第二确定单元，配置为至少根据所述会话根密钥和随机挑战RAND采用密钥推导函数确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  32. 根据权利要求30所述的网络设备，其中，所述网络设备还包括第二存储单元；
    所述第二通讯单元，还配置为接收所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功；
    所述第二存储单元，配置为存储所述会话根密钥。
  33. 根据权利要求32所述的网络设备，其中，所述网络设备还包括第二执行单元，配置为与所述终端之间进行非首次认证，在认证成功、且所述第二通讯单元接收到所述第二网络设备的第二指示信息的情况下，更新所述会话根密钥，或者保持所述会话根密钥；所述第二指示信息用于指示所述第二网络设备与所述终端之间的NAS SMC流程成功。
  34. 根据权利要求30至33任一项所述的网络设备，其中，所述第二通讯单元，配置为通过认证响应消息接收所述终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
  35. 根据权利要求34所述的网络设备，其中，所述解密单元，配置为基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
  36. 根据权利要求30至35任一项所述的网络设备，其中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；
    所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；
    第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
    其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
  37. 根据权利要求36所述的网络设备，其中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
  38. 根据权利要求36或37所述的网络设备，其中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
  39. 根据权利要求36至38任一项所述的网络设备，其中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为向所述第二网络设备发送第三指示信息，所述第三指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
  40. 根据权利要求30至39任一项所述的网络设备，其中，所述会话根密钥包括第一会话根密钥和第二会话根密钥；所述第二会话跟密钥通过所述第一会话跟密钥确定。
  41. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求1至9任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求10至20任一项所述方法的步骤。
  42. 一种终端，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求1至9任一项所述方法的步骤。
  43. 一种网络设备，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求10至20任一项所述方法的步骤。
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CN109309566A (zh) * 2017-07-28 2019-02-05 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 一种认证方法、装置、系统、设备及存储介质

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CN113726524B (zh) * 2021-09-02 2025-01-14 山东安控信息科技有限公司 一种安全通信方法及通信系统
CN116232620A (zh) * 2021-12-06 2023-06-06 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 认证方法、装置、通信设备及可读存储介质
CN116232620B (zh) * 2021-12-06 2025-10-03 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 认证方法、装置、通信设备及可读存储介质
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