WO2020160804A1 - Improved ue with an integrated subscriber identity modules (isim) by resource sharing - Google Patents

Improved ue with an integrated subscriber identity modules (isim) by resource sharing Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020160804A1
WO2020160804A1 PCT/EP2019/081215 EP2019081215W WO2020160804A1 WO 2020160804 A1 WO2020160804 A1 WO 2020160804A1 EP 2019081215 W EP2019081215 W EP 2019081215W WO 2020160804 A1 WO2020160804 A1 WO 2020160804A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
isim
modem
improved
subscriber identity
shared components
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP2019/081215
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Martin FRÖHLICH
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co Ltd filed Critical Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co Ltd
Publication of WO2020160804A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020160804A1/en
Priority to US17/169,422 priority Critical patent/US11778456B2/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
    • H04W12/35—Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/40—Security arrangements using identity modules
    • H04W12/42—Security arrangements using identity modules using virtual identity modules

Definitions

  • the invention relates to an improved Narrowband Internet of Things device (UE) supporting resource sharing for
  • UE Narrowband Internet of Things device
  • iSIM integrated Subscriber Identity Modules
  • SIMs integrated SIMs
  • UE 3GPP based cellular user equipments
  • Narrowband Internet of Things devices such as mobile phone
  • the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC - the hardware)
  • a USIM application (the software) running on it
  • the UICC is a high secure hardware module that is connected (wired) to the UE .
  • the USIM application is a high secure hardware module that is connected (wired) to the UE .
  • the USIM application is provisioned by the cellular
  • the secret keys inside the USIM application stored on the UICC must not be read out.
  • the keys are used to authenticate the UE against the core network with the help of a
  • the USIM application generates the secret session keys for the UE .
  • each UE requires a USIM application (running on the UICC) to attach to a core network successfully.
  • the modem to UICC communication is done via wired serial interface which is standardized in ISO/IEC 7816-3.
  • the disadvantage of a separate UICC is it's embodiment as a separated secure hardware element, a SIM card, which is required in a UE . This causes additional system costs. Cost sensitive systems require a solution where the UICC becomes part of the modem inside the UE . Thus, the integration of the UICC (with the USIM application) is called for
  • iSIM integrated Subscriber Identity Modules
  • a quite simple solution for an iSIM is just to put the UICC chip and the modem chip in one package (SIP - System in Package) or to have the UICC chip as part of the modem chip (figure 1) .
  • the objective of the invention is to further reduce the cost per UE by reducing the chip area and energy consumption of an integrated UICC chip.
  • UE Narrowband Internet of Things device
  • iSIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • Integrated Subscriber Identity Modules require for network authentication and provisioning cryptographic functions like AES, HMAC, Elliptic Curve Cryptography or true random numbers.
  • Secure hardware modules including iSIMs, provide special hardware accelerator to support such functions. Those special hardware accelerators are also used in the modem, e. g. for secure boot, firmware encryption and integrity checking, for encryption of the network packets, or end-to-end data protection with DTLS-Datagram Transport Layer Security.
  • the component by the other module either the modem or the iSIM and prevents any kind of information leaking.
  • the hardware arbiter comprises a timer for preventing blocking of said shared components. If an attacker can execute code on a modem or an application processor, he allocates the resource or component and, in the worst case, never releases that resource or component again, thus blocking the entire system. With the timer, the arbiter can specify that a resource can only be used for a certain time. After the timer has expired, the resource is forced to be released again .
  • the hardware arbiter ensures real-time operating and hence preventing the blocking of a shared component.
  • a blocked component can be released either through a request of the modem for example or after the timer has expired. This prevents that the system fails entirely and ensures a real- time operating.
  • the hardware arbiter provides reset and/or RAM cryptography procedures for securely removing all information that remains after usage of said shared components by the modem or the iSIM.
  • the shared components are cryptographic accelerators. Cryptographic accelerators are suitable because they can be reset easily to remove all remaining information. The securely removing of information in registers after usage can be done by a reset. These components are rarely. An access protection module will grand access only to one party - iSIM or modem. The other has to wait till the usage was finished.
  • RAM which as such has no reset.
  • asymmetric cryptography which is based on elliptic curves
  • asymmetric cryptography which is based on elliptic curves
  • RAM which as such has no reset.
  • XOR mask with a random value can be used. All data written to RAM will be XOR-ed with the XOR mask. The XOR mask, which is stored in a register, is then reset. Only if one knew the value of the XOR mask, a recovery of the RAM would be possible .
  • the arbiter must prevent any kind of
  • Fig. 1 Basic components of an iSIM (state-of-the-art); Fig. 2 Secure component sharing via a secure arbiter.
  • iSIM state-of-the-art
  • Fig. 2 Secure component sharing via a secure arbiter.
  • Figure 2 illustrates the inventive UE with a modem chip which comprises a modem and an iSIM.
  • the modem and the iSIM share components which are used by both - the modem and the iSIM.
  • a shared component can be typically cryptographic accelerators which is used e.g. for AES, HMAC, Elliptic Curve Cryptography or true random number generator.
  • an AES core is used by the iSIM for data-encryption or data-decryption or session key generation. After the network authentication and provisioning the iSIM releases the AES core.
  • the secure hardware arbiter ensures that all information is removed after said usage.
  • the modem uses the AES core for data (packet data) encryption or decryption. It is important, that the hardware arbiter prevents any access of the AES core by the respective other component (modem or iSIM) if it is used.
  • the hardware arbiter obfuscate the access time to prevent side channel attacks, because the execution time of asymmetric crypto accelerators is key dependent. This is done by some hardware that generates randomly non operation cycles or stops the clock for some cycles .
  • the modem is booting and uses the AES for the firmware image decryption and the ECC module to verify the firmware signature. Afterwards the modem starts the iSIM. The iSIM does the same with the firmware. The modem tries to connect to the network. The modem receives the authenticate data from the network and sends the data to the iSIM. The iSIM uses the AES to check the authentication data, generates the response and the session keys for the modem. The modem uses the session keys to encrypt and/or decrypt the network data.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses an improved Narrowband Internet of Things device (UE) supporting resource sharing for integrated Subscriber Identity Modules (iSIM). The object of the invention to further reduce the cost per UE by reducing the chip area and energy consumption of an integrated UICC chip will be solved therein that identical components of the modem and the iSIM are designed as shared components, whereas a secure hardware arbiter securely manages any access to said shared components by the modem or the iSIM and prevents any kind of information leaking.

Description

Improved UE with an integrated Subscriber Identity Modules
(iSIM) by resource sharing
The invention relates to an improved Narrowband Internet of Things device (UE) supporting resource sharing for
integrated Subscriber Identity Modules (iSIM) .
There are standards describing the "classical" SIM/UICC or the embedded version eSIM, see: https://www.gsma.com/esim/. Consumer benefits of such eSIMs include, that a simpler device setup is possible without the need to insert or replace a SIM card; devices can operate independently of a tethered smartphone, with their own subscriptions; and a range of new, enhanced mobile-connected devices benefit from the standardized eSIM.
So far, integrated SIMs (iSIMs) are not yet standardized.
All 3GPP based cellular user equipments (UE) , also known as Narrowband Internet of Things devices, such as mobile phone, require a mechanism to prove their identity against the cellular network and to exchange keys for a secure
connection .
Therefore, the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC - the hardware) , with a USIM application (the software) running on it, is used. The UICC is a high secure hardware module that is connected (wired) to the UE . The USIM application
contains all secret keys and provider specific information. The USIM application is provisioned by the cellular
operator . The secret keys inside the USIM application stored on the UICC must not be read out. The keys are used to authenticate the UE against the core network with the help of a
cryptographic algorithm. Furthermore, the USIM application generates the secret session keys for the UE .
Thus, each UE requires a USIM application (running on the UICC) to attach to a core network successfully.
The modem to UICC communication is done via wired serial interface which is standardized in ISO/IEC 7816-3. The disadvantage of a separate UICC is it's embodiment as a separated secure hardware element, a SIM card, which is required in a UE . This causes additional system costs. Cost sensitive systems require a solution where the UICC becomes part of the modem inside the UE . Thus, the integration of the UICC (with the USIM application) is called for
integrated Subscriber Identity Modules (iSIM) .
A quite simple solution for an iSIM is just to put the UICC chip and the modem chip in one package (SIP - System in Package) or to have the UICC chip as part of the modem chip (figure 1) .
The objective of the invention is to further reduce the cost per UE by reducing the chip area and energy consumption of an integrated UICC chip.
The objective of the invention will be solved by an improved Narrowband Internet of Things device (UE) comprising a modem and an integrated Subscriber Identity Module (iSIM) both combined on a modem chip, wherein identical components of the modem and the iSIM are designed as shared components, whereas a secure hardware arbiter securely manages any access to said shared components by the modem or the iSIM and prevents any kind of information leaking.
Integrated Subscriber Identity Modules (iSIMs) require for network authentication and provisioning cryptographic functions like AES, HMAC, Elliptic Curve Cryptography or true random numbers. Secure hardware modules, including iSIMs, provide special hardware accelerator to support such functions. Those special hardware accelerators are also used in the modem, e. g. for secure boot, firmware encryption and integrity checking, for encryption of the network packets, or end-to-end data protection with DTLS-Datagram Transport Layer Security.
The usage of shared hardware components requires a secure hardware arbiter that prevents any access of a used
component by the other module, either the modem or the iSIM and prevents any kind of information leaking.
In a preferred embodiment of the inventive UE, the hardware arbiter comprises a timer for preventing blocking of said shared components. If an attacker can execute code on a modem or an application processor, he allocates the resource or component and, in the worst case, never releases that resource or component again, thus blocking the entire system. With the timer, the arbiter can specify that a resource can only be used for a certain time. After the timer has expired, the resource is forced to be released again .
So, in a further preferred embodiment of the inventive UE, the hardware arbiter ensures real-time operating and hence preventing the blocking of a shared component. A blocked component can be released either through a request of the modem for example or after the timer has expired. This prevents that the system fails entirely and ensures a real- time operating.
In another embodiment of the inventive UE, the hardware arbiter provides reset and/or RAM cryptography procedures for securely removing all information that remains after usage of said shared components by the modem or the iSIM. In an embodiment of the inventive UE the shared components are cryptographic accelerators. Cryptographic accelerators are suitable because they can be reset easily to remove all remaining information. The securely removing of information in registers after usage can be done by a reset. These components are rarely. An access protection module will grand access only to one party - iSIM or modem. The other has to wait till the usage was finished.
If asymmetric cryptography is used, which is based on elliptic curves, one need RAM, which as such has no reset. For securely removing the information inside the RAM there is either the possibility to overwrite the RAM with random data by means of a routine. Or alternatively an XOR mask with a random value can be used. All data written to RAM will be XOR-ed with the XOR mask. The XOR mask, which is stored in a register, is then reset. Only if one knew the value of the XOR mask, a recovery of the RAM would be possible .
To summarize, the arbiter must prevent any kind of
information leaking. The invention will be explained in more detail using
exemplary embodiments.
The appended drawings show
Fig. 1 Basic components of an iSIM (state-of-the-art); Fig. 2 Secure component sharing via a secure arbiter.
Figure 2 illustrates the inventive UE with a modem chip which comprises a modem and an iSIM. The modem and the iSIM share components which are used by both - the modem and the iSIM. A shared component can be typically cryptographic accelerators which is used e.g. for AES, HMAC, Elliptic Curve Cryptography or true random number generator. For example, an AES core is used by the iSIM for data-encryption or data-decryption or session key generation. After the network authentication and provisioning the iSIM releases the AES core. The secure hardware arbiter ensures that all information is removed after said usage. Afterwards, the modem uses the AES core for data (packet data) encryption or decryption. It is important, that the hardware arbiter prevents any access of the AES core by the respective other component (modem or iSIM) if it is used.
It is also important that the hardware arbiter obfuscate the access time to prevent side channel attacks, because the execution time of asymmetric crypto accelerators is key dependent. This is done by some hardware that generates randomly non operation cycles or stops the clock for some cycles .
The modem is booting and uses the AES for the firmware image decryption and the ECC module to verify the firmware signature. Afterwards the modem starts the iSIM. The iSIM does the same with the firmware. The modem tries to connect to the network. The modem receives the authenticate data from the network and sends the data to the iSIM. The iSIM uses the AES to check the authentication data, generates the response and the session keys for the modem. The modem uses the session keys to encrypt and/or decrypt the network data.
Improved UE with an integrated Subscriber Identity Modules
(iSIM) by resource sharing
List of Reference Signs
1 modem chip
2 modem
3 integrated Subsciber Identity Module
4 serial interface
5 secure hardware arbiter
6 shared component

Claims

Improved UE with an integrated Subscriber Identity Modules
(iSIM) by resource sharing
Claims 1. An improved Narrowband Internet of Things device - UE - comprising a modem (2) and an integrated Subscriber Identity Module (3) - iSIM - both combined on a modem chip (1), wherein identical components of the modem (2) and the iSIM (3) are designed as shared components (6), whereas a secure hardware arbiter (5) securely manages any access to said shared components (6) by the modem (2) or the iSIM (3) and prevents any kind of
information leaking.
2. The improved UE according to claim 1, wherein the
hardware arbiter (5) comprises a timer for preventing blocking of said shared components (6) .
3. The improved UE according to claim 2, wherein the
hardware arbiter (5) ensures real-time operating.
4. The improved UE according to claim 1, wherein the
hardware arbiter (5) provides reset and/or RAM
cryptography procedures for securely removing all information that remains after usage of said shared components (6) by the modem (2) or the iSIM (2) .
5. The improved UE according to claim 1, wherein the
shared components (6) are cryptographic accelerators.
PCT/EP2019/081215 2019-02-05 2019-11-13 Improved ue with an integrated subscriber identity modules (isim) by resource sharing Ceased WO2020160804A1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US17/169,422 US11778456B2 (en) 2019-02-05 2021-02-06 UE with integrated subscriber identity modules by resource sharing

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP19155419 2019-02-05
EP19155419.5 2019-02-05
EP19195307.4 2019-09-04
EP19195307.4A EP3694241B1 (en) 2019-02-05 2019-09-04 Improved user equipement, ue, with an integrated subscriber identity module (isim) and resource sharing

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US17/169,422 Continuation US11778456B2 (en) 2019-02-05 2021-02-06 UE with integrated subscriber identity modules by resource sharing

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Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114268479B (en) * 2021-12-14 2023-08-18 北京奕斯伟计算技术股份有限公司 Processing method and device for defending shared storage side channel attack and electronic equipment

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WO2016075622A1 (en) * 2014-11-11 2016-05-19 Simless, Inc. Communication with plurality of cellular networks using cellular modem and virtual subscriber identity modules stored in software-based embedded universal integrated circuit card (euicc)
WO2017082966A1 (en) * 2015-11-09 2017-05-18 Intel IP Corporation Integrated universal integrated circuit card on mobile computing environments

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CN104813695A (en) * 2012-12-28 2015-07-29 英特尔公司 Virtualized subscriber identification module (SIM)
US10691797B2 (en) * 2016-04-21 2020-06-23 Big Stream Solutions, Inc. Systems and methods for compiler guided secure resource sharing

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2016075622A1 (en) * 2014-11-11 2016-05-19 Simless, Inc. Communication with plurality of cellular networks using cellular modem and virtual subscriber identity modules stored in software-based embedded universal integrated circuit card (euicc)
WO2017082966A1 (en) * 2015-11-09 2017-05-18 Intel IP Corporation Integrated universal integrated circuit card on mobile computing environments

Non-Patent Citations (1)

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Title
ARM: "Unlocking the cellular IoT potential for chipset makers Whitepaper", 1 February 2019 (2019-02-01), pages 1 - 7, XP055666839, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:https://learn.arm.com/rs/714-XIJ-402/images/Kigen-Unlocking_whitepaper.pdf> [retrieved on 20200210] *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US20210160690A1 (en) 2021-05-27
EP3694241B1 (en) 2023-07-26
US11778456B2 (en) 2023-10-03
EP3694241A1 (en) 2020-08-12

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