WO2018006610A1 - 一种网络认证方法、中转节点及相关系统 - Google Patents

一种网络认证方法、中转节点及相关系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018006610A1
WO2018006610A1 PCT/CN2017/074883 CN2017074883W WO2018006610A1 WO 2018006610 A1 WO2018006610 A1 WO 2018006610A1 CN 2017074883 W CN2017074883 W CN 2017074883W WO 2018006610 A1 WO2018006610 A1 WO 2018006610A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
authentication
identifier
message
network element
user equipment
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PCT/CN2017/074883
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
康鑫
王海光
杨艳江
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Priority to EP17823423.3A priority Critical patent/EP3461061A4/en
Publication of WO2018006610A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018006610A1/zh
Priority to US16/239,409 priority patent/US10827351B2/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/067—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using one-time keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/047—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] without using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0471—Key exchange
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/02—Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks
    • H04W8/04—Registration at HLR or HSS [Home Subscriber Server]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks
    • H04W84/042—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems
    • H04W84/047—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems using dedicated repeater stations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of computer technologies, and in particular, to a network authentication method, a transit node, and a related system.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of interaction between user equipments for network authentication in the prior art, and the authentication process is as follows:
  • Step S101 The user equipment (English: User Equipment, abbreviated as UE) sends a network access request to the mobility management entity (MME: Mobility Management Entity, MME).
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • Step S102 The MME receives the network access request and sends an incoming data request to the home subscription server (English: Home Subcribing Server, HSS for short).
  • the home subscription server English: Home Subcribing Server, HSS for short.
  • Step S103 The HSS receives the incoming data request and determines a key K corresponding to the network access request, and then calculates an authentication vector according to the key K.
  • the authentication vector includes a network side authentication token (English: Authentication Token, abbreviation: AUTN) HSS ), expecting response (English: Expected Response, XRES for short) and access security management key (English: Key Acess Security Management Entity, K ASME for short).
  • Step S104 The HSS sends the authentication vector to the MME.
  • Step S105 The MME receives and saves the authentication vector.
  • Step S106 The MME initiates a user authentication request to the UE, where the user authentication request includes a random number RAND, an AUTN HSS, and a K ASME .
  • Step S107 The UE receives the RAND and AUTN HSS and utilizes an authentication and key agreement (English: Authentication and Key Agreement) for the third generation mobile communication network of the Evolved Packet System (EPS).
  • the AKA) key deduction algorithm performs operations.
  • the input parameters of the operation include the root key K, RAND, the service network (English: Serving Network, SN for short), the serial number (English: Sequence Number, SQN for short), and the operation
  • the output parameters include the user side authentication token AUTN UE , the response (English: Response, RES for short) and K ASME .
  • Step S108 The UE generates a session key of the UE and the network side when confirming that the AUTN UE and the AUTN HSS are the same.
  • Step S109 The UE sends the calculated RES to the MME.
  • Step S110 The MME receives the RES and generates a session key between the network side and the user equipment when it is confirmed that the received RES is the same as the XRES in the authentication vector.
  • a disadvantage of the prior art is that a large number of interactions between the massive IoT user equipment and the network side are required to generate a session key, and the load on the network side is high.
  • the embodiment of the invention discloses a network authentication method, a transit node and related, which can save the overhead of the network authentication process and reduce the load on the network side.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a network authentication system, where the system includes a user equipment, a transit node, and Cellular authentication network element, where:
  • the first authentication message sent by the user equipment to the transit node where the first authentication message includes a first verification identifier and a first encryption identifier, where the first verification identifier is used to verify the cellular network authentication network.
  • An identity of the element, the first encrypted identifier is an encrypted sequence of the information in the first authentication message except the first encrypted identifier; wherein, to be noted, the second encrypted identifier includes the second verification identifier
  • the encrypted sequence, that is, the information on which the second encrypted identifier is generated includes at least the second verification identifier;
  • the forwarding node is configured to receive the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments, and the first encryption in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using an aggregation algorithm
  • the identifier generates the first encrypted information
  • the forwarding node is further configured to send a first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first aggregation message includes the first encryption information and the first authentication sent by the multiple user equipments The first verification identifier in the message;
  • the cellular network authentication network element is configured to receive the first aggregated message, and verify, by using the first encrypted information, whether information in the first aggregated message is correct;
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to send a first response message to the transit node when the information in the first aggregated message is verified to be correct, where the first response message includes a second verification identifier, and the second encryption Identifying the first verification identifier in the first authentication message that is sent by the multiple user equipments, where the second verification identifier is used to verify an identity of the user equipment, where the second encryption identifier is An encrypted sequence of information in the first response message other than the second verification identifier;
  • the transit node is configured to receive and forward the first response message to the plurality of user equipments
  • the user equipment is further configured to receive the first response message forwarded by the transit node, and verify, by using the second encrypted identifier, whether information in the first response message is correct, and verify the first response message. Whether to carry its own first verification mark;
  • the user equipment is further configured to: when verifying that the information in the first response message is correct and carrying its own first verification identifier, generate a session key with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first authentication message required for the authentication is sent to the transit node, and the signature or the message in the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the multiple user equipments is sent by the user equipment to the network authentication system.
  • the authentication code is aggregated to obtain an aggregated signature or an aggregated authentication code, and the transit node uniformly sends the information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element, and uniformly sends the message.
  • the correctness of the message is ensured based on the aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • the user equipment is further configured to send a second authentication message to the transit node when the information in the first response message is correct and carries its own first verification identifier, where the second authentication message includes the a second verification identifier and a third encryption identifier, where the third encryption identifier is an encryption sequence of information other than the third encryption identifier in the second authentication message;
  • the transit node is configured to receive the second authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments, and use the aggregation algorithm to perform the foregoing according to the second authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments
  • the third encryption identifier generates the third Encrypted information
  • the transit node is further configured to send a second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message includes the third encryption information and the second verification identifier carried in the second authentication message ;
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to receive the second aggregation message, and verify, by using the third encryption information, whether information in the second aggregation message is correct, and verify whether the second aggregation message is Carrying its own second verification mark;
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to generate, when the information in the second aggregated message is correct, and carry the second verification identifier of the second aggregation message, generate the user with each of the plurality of the user equipments.
  • the first response message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second verification identifier in the second authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to generate a symmetric key with the user equipment, where The second verification identifier in the second authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the cellular network authentication network element and the user equipment.
  • the first verification identifier is a DH public key of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is, by using a private key of the user equipment, the first authentication message The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, specifically:
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular authentication network element according to its own random number and the second verification identifier in the first response message.
  • the second verification identifier is a DH public key of the cellular authentication network element
  • the second The encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is, by using a private key of the user equipment, the first authentication message The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, specifically:
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular authentication network element according to the private key of the user and the second verification identifier in the first response message.
  • the second verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second The encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first aggregation message includes a second identity of each of the plurality of user equipments Identifying
  • the first authentication message includes the cellular network
  • the forwarding node is further configured to send the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, specifically:
  • the transit node is configured to send, according to the first identity identifier, the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to use the first identity by itself. Decrypting the first verification identifier in the first authentication message;
  • the first verification identifier in the first response message is encrypted by the second identity identifier of the user equipment, and the user equipment is further configured to decrypt the first identity by using the second identity identifier of the user equipment.
  • the first verification identifier in a response message is encrypted by the second identity identifier of the user equipment, and the user equipment is further configured to decrypt the first identity by using the second identity identifier of the user equipment.
  • the first encrypted identifier is a signature of the information other than the first encrypted identifier in the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment;
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, specifically:
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second The encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the forwarding node is further used to The cellular network authentication network element sends a first aggregation message, specifically:
  • the transit node is configured to send, according to the first identity identifier, the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the cellular network authentication network element is used to pre-store the Decoding a symmetric key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element to decrypt the first verification identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first response message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the user equipment is used to pre-store the user equipment. Decrypting the first verification identifier with a symmetric key between the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the first encrypted identifier is a signature of the information other than the first encrypted identifier in the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment;
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, specifically:
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element, where the Two encryption identifiers are passed through the cellular The signature of the private key of the network authentication network element to the information in the first response message other than the second encrypted identifier.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the forwarding node further And sending, to the cellular network authentication network element, a first aggregation message, specifically:
  • the transit node is configured to send, according to the first identity identifier, the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the cellular network authentication network element is used to pre-store the Decoding a symmetric key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element to decrypt the first verification identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first response message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the user equipment is used to pre-store the user equipment. Decrypting the first verification identifier with a symmetric key between the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the first encryption identifier is a message authentication code MAC of the first authentication message
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, specifically:
  • the user equipment generates, according to the private key of the user, the first verification identifier, the second verification identifier in the first response message, and the first identity identifier, and the cellular network authentication network element. Session key.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by the private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first authentication message includes An aggregation identifier that is used to perform an aggregation operation based on the first encryption identifier; the transit node is further configured to determine, according to the aggregation identifier, whether the first encryption identifier needs to be performed Involution;
  • the transit node is configured to perform an operation of generating the first encrypted information by using the first encryption identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using an aggregation algorithm;
  • the transit node is further configured to forward the first authentication message to the cellular authentication network element;
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to receive the first authentication message, and verify, by using the first encryption identifier, whether information in the first authentication message is correct;
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to send a second response message to the transit node when the information in the first authentication message is verified to be correct, where the second response message includes a fourth encrypted identifier, the first a verification identifier and the first verification identifier of the user equipment, where the fourth encryption identifier is the fourth encryption message in the second response message An encrypted sequence of information outside the identification;
  • the transit node is further configured to receive and forward the second response message to the user equipment;
  • the user equipment is further configured to receive the second response message forwarded by the transit node, verify whether the information in the second response message is correct by using the fourth encrypted identifier, and verify the second response message. Whether to carry its own first verification mark;
  • the user equipment is further configured to: when verifying that the information in the second response message is correct and carrying its own first verification identifier, generate a session key with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the user equipment is further configured to send the second authentication message to the transit node when verifying that the information in the second response message is correct and carrying its own first verification identifier;
  • the transit node is further configured to receive the second authentication message and forward the second authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to receive the second authentication message, and verify, by using the third encryption identifier, whether the information in the second authentication message is correct, and verify whether the second authentication message is carried in the second authentication message. Its own second verification identifier;
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to generate a session key with the user equipment when verifying that the information in the second authentication message is correct and carrying its own second verification identifier.
  • the sixteenth possible aspect of the first aspect In conjunction with the first possible implementation of the first aspect, or the second possible implementation of the first aspect, or the third possible implementation of the first aspect, the sixteenth possible aspect of the first aspect In the implementation mode:
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to send a verification failure message to the transit node when the information in the first aggregated message is verified to be incorrect;
  • the transit node is further configured to receive the verification failure message, and forward the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments to the cellular authentication network element according to the verification failure message;
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to separately perform verification on each of the plurality of the user equipments according to the first authentication message.
  • the seventeenth possible aspect of the first aspect In combination with the first possible implementation of the first aspect, or the second possible implementation of the first aspect, or the third possible implementation of the first aspect, the seventeenth possible aspect of the first aspect In the implementation mode:
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to send a verification failure message to the transit node when the information in the first aggregated message is verified to be incorrect;
  • the transit node is further configured to receive the verification failure message, and the part of the first authentication message in the first authentication message sent by the plurality of the user equipments is used by the aggregation algorithm according to the verification failure message.
  • the third encrypted identifier generates fourth encrypted information
  • the forwarding node is further configured to send a third aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the third aggregation message includes the fourth encryption information and the first part of the part of the first authentication message Verification logo
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to receive the third aggregated message and verify, by using the fourth encrypted information, whether information in the third aggregated message is correct.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a transit node, where the transit node includes:
  • a first receiving unit configured to receive a first authentication message that is sent by each user equipment, where the first authentication message sent by each user equipment includes a first verification identifier and a first encryption of each user equipment And the first verification identifier is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify the identity of each user equipment, where the first encryption identifier is information other than the first encryption identifier in the first authentication message.
  • a first aggregating unit configured to generate, by using an aggregation algorithm, the first encrypted information according to the first encrypted identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments;
  • a first sending unit configured to send a first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first aggregation message includes the first encryption information and the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments The first verification identifier;
  • a second receiving unit configured to receive a first response message sent by the cellular network authentication network element, where the first response message is that the cellular network authentication network element verifies the first aggregated message according to the first encrypted message. If the information is correct, the first response message includes the second verification identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, the second encryption identifier, and the first identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments. a verification identifier, where the second encryption identifier is an encrypted sequence of information in the first response message other than the second verification identifier;
  • a second sending unit configured to forward the first response message to the user equipment, where the first verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to verify whether the identity of the cellular network authentication network element is Security, the second verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to forward to the cellular network authentication network element, where the cellular network authentication network element verifies whether the identity of the user equipment is secure.
  • the user equipment sends the first authentication message required for the authentication to the transit node when the network authentication is performed, and the signature or the message authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the multiple user equipments.
  • the aggregation budget is used to obtain an aggregation signature or an aggregation authentication code, and the transit node uniformly sends information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element, and the uniformly sent message is based on the
  • the aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code ensure the correctness of the message. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • a third receiving unit configured to receive a second authentication message that is sent by the multiple user equipment, where the second authentication message is that the user equipment determines that the first response message includes the first verification of the first And the second authentication message includes the second verification identifier and the third encryption identifier, where the third encryption identifier is generated, and the second authentication identifier is generated according to the second encryption identifier.
  • a second aggregating unit configured to generate third encrypted information by using an aggregation algorithm, based on the third encrypted identifier in the second authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments;
  • a third sending unit configured to send a second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message includes the third encryption information and the second verification identifier carried in the second authentication message
  • the second verification identifier in the second aggregation message is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify whether the identity of the multiple user equipments is secure.
  • the first response message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, where The second verification identifier in the second authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the second verification identifier in the second authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the cellular network authentication network element and the user equipment.
  • the first verification identifier is a DH public key of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is, by using a private key of the user equipment, the first authentication message The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification.
  • the second verification identifier is a DH public key of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second The encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is, by using a private key of the user equipment, the first authentication message The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification.
  • the second verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second The encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first aggregation message includes a second identity of each of the plurality of user equipments
  • the first authentication message includes the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the first sending unit is configured to: according to the first identity identifier in the first authentication message, to the first The cellular authentication network element corresponding to the identity identifier sends a first aggregation message
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification identifier in the first response message passes the
  • the second identity identifier of the user equipment is encrypted; the first encryption identifier is a signature of information in the first authentication message other than the first encryption identifier by using a private key of the user equipment.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second The encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, where the first sending unit is specifically used. Sending, by using the first identity identifier in the first verification message, the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification in the first response message Identifying a symmetric key encryption between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, where the first encrypted identifier is the same as the first authentication message in the first authentication message by using the private key of the user equipment The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element, where the The second encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the first sending The unit is configured to send, according to the first identity identifier in the first authentication message, the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification in the first response message
  • the symmetric key encryption between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element is identified, and the first encrypted identifier is a message authentication code MAC of the first authentication message.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by the private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first authentication message includes An aggregation identifier that is used to perform an aggregation operation based on the first encryption identifier; the transit node further includes:
  • a determining unit configured to determine, according to the aggregation identifier, whether an aggregation operation is required to be performed on the first encrypted identifier
  • the first aggregating unit is configured to: when the determining result of the determining unit is yes, perform, by the first aggregating unit, the first authentication message that is sent by the multiple user equipment by using the aggregation algorithm.
  • the first encrypted identifier generates first encrypted information
  • a fourth sending unit configured to forward the first authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element when the determining result of the determining unit is negative;
  • a fourth receiving unit configured to receive a second response message sent by the cellular network authentication network element, where the second response message is that the cellular network authentication network element verifies the first by using the first encrypted identifier
  • the second response message includes a fourth encrypted identifier, the second verification identifier, and the first verification identifier of the user equipment, where the fourth encrypted identifier is the An encrypted sequence of information in the second response message other than the fourth encrypted identifier;
  • a fifth sending unit configured to forward the second response message to the user equipment, where the first verification identifier in the second response message is used by the user equipment to verify whether the identity of the cellular network authentication network element is Security, the second verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to forward to the cellular network authentication network element, where the cellular network authentication network element verifies whether the identity of the user equipment is secure.
  • the transit node further includes
  • a fifth receiving unit configured to receive a second authentication message sent by the user equipment, where the second authentication message is that the user equipment determines that the second response message includes the first verification identifier of the user And generating, according to the second encryption identifier, that the information in the second response message is correct, the second authentication message includes the second verification identifier and a third encryption identifier, where the third encryption identifier is An encrypted sequence of information other than the third encrypted identifier in the second authentication message;
  • a sixth sending unit configured to forward the second authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second verification identifier in the second authentication message is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify the multiple Whether the identity of the user devices is secure.
  • the transit node further includes:
  • a sixth receiving unit configured to receive a verification failure message sent by the cellular network authentication network element when verifying that the information in the first aggregated message is incorrect;
  • a seventh sending unit configured to forward the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments to the cellular authentication network element according to the verification failure message, where the cellular network authentication network element is respectively used by the Each of the plurality of user equipments performs verification separately.
  • the transit node further includes:
  • a seventh receiving unit configured to receive a verification failure message sent by the cellular network authentication network element when verifying that the information in the first aggregated message is incorrect;
  • a third aggregating unit configured to generate a fourth encryption according to the third encryption identifier in a part of the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using an aggregation algorithm according to the verification failure message information;
  • An eighth sending unit configured to send a third aggregated message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the third aggregated message includes the fourth encrypted information and the first part of the part of the first authentication message Verify the identity.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a network authentication method, where the method includes:
  • the transit node receives the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments, and the first authentication message sent by each user equipment includes a first verification identifier and a first encryption identifier of each user equipment, where the a verification identifier is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify the identity of each user equipment, where the first encryption identifier is an encryption sequence of information in the first authentication message other than the first encryption identifier;
  • the transit node generates the first encrypted information based on the first encrypted identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using an aggregation algorithm
  • the transit node Transmitting, by the transit node, the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first aggregation message includes the first encryption information and the first one of the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments First verification identifier;
  • the first response message includes the second verification identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, the second encryption identifier, and the first verification identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments, where the second Encrypting the identifier as an encrypted sequence of information in the first response message other than the second verification identifier;
  • the transit node Transmitting, by the transit node, the first response message to the user equipment, where the first verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to verify whether the identity of the cellular network authentication network element is secure,
  • the second verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to forward to the cellular network authentication network element, so that the cellular network authentication network element verifies whether the identity of the user equipment is secure.
  • the user equipment first sends the first authentication message required for the authentication to the transit node when performing network authentication, and the signature or message authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the plurality of user equipments.
  • the aggregation budget is used to obtain an aggregation signature or an aggregation authentication code, and the transit node uniformly sends information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element, and the uniformly sent message is based on the The aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code ensure the correctness of the message. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • the method further includes:
  • the transit node receives the second authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments, where the second authentication message is that the user equipment determines that the first response message includes the first verification identifier of the user and according to The second encryption identifier is generated when the information in the first response message is correct, and the second authentication message includes the second verification identifier and the third encryption identifier, where the third encryption identifier is An encrypted sequence of information other than the third encrypted identifier in the second authentication message;
  • the transit node generates third encrypted information based on the third encrypted identifier in the second authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using an aggregation algorithm
  • the transit node sends a second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message includes the third encryption information and the second verification identifier carried in the second authentication message;
  • the second verification identifier in the second aggregation message is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify whether the identity of the multiple user equipments is secure.
  • the first response message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, where The second verification identifier in the second authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the second verification identifier in the second authentication message passes the cellular network authentication network element A symmetric key encryption with the user equipment.
  • the first verification identifier is a DH public key of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is, by using a private key of the user equipment, the first authentication message The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification.
  • the second verification identifier is a DH public key of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second The encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is, by using a private key of the user equipment, the first authentication message The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification.
  • the second verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second The encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first aggregation message includes a second identity of each of the plurality of user equipments
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the sending, by the transit node, the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element includes:
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification identifier in the first response message passes the
  • the second identity identifier of the user equipment is encrypted; the first encryption identifier is a signature of information in the first authentication message other than the first encryption identifier by using a private key of the user equipment.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second The encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the sending, by the transit node, the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element includes:
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification in the first response message Identifying a symmetric key encryption between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, where the first encrypted identifier is the same as the first authentication message in the first authentication message by using the private key of the user equipment The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element, where the The second encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the sending, by the transit node, the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element includes:
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification in the first response message
  • the symmetric key encryption between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element is identified, and the first encrypted identifier is a message authentication code MAC of the first authentication message.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by the private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first authentication message includes And an aggregation identifier for performing an aggregation operation based on the first encryption identifier; the method further includes:
  • the step of generating the first encryption information by using the first encryption identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using the aggregation algorithm is performed;
  • the transit node forwards the first authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second response message is that the cellular network authentication network element is configured to verify the first authentication message by using the first encrypted identifier.
  • the second response message includes a fourth encrypted identifier, the second verification identifier, and the first verification identifier of the user equipment, where the fourth encrypted identifier is the second response An encrypted sequence of information in the message other than the fourth encrypted identifier;
  • the transit node Transmitting, by the transit node, the second response message to the user equipment, where the first verification identifier in the second response message is used by the user equipment to verify whether the identity of the cellular network authentication network element is secure,
  • the second verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to forward to the cellular network authentication network element, so that the cellular network authentication network element verifies whether the identity of the user equipment is secure.
  • the transit node forwards the second response message to the user equipment, The method also includes:
  • the transit node receives the second authentication message sent by the user equipment, where the second authentication message is that the user equipment determines that the second response message includes the first verification identifier of the user, and according to the When the second encrypted identifier is verified to be correct when the information in the second response message is correct, the second authentication message includes the second verification target And a third encrypted identifier, where the third encrypted identifier is an encrypted sequence of information in the second authentication message other than the third encrypted identifier;
  • the transit node forwards the second authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second verification identifier in the second authentication message is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify the multiple user equipments Is the identity safe?
  • the method further includes:
  • the transit node receives a verification failure message sent by the cellular network authentication network element when verifying that the information in the first aggregated message is incorrect;
  • the transit node forwards the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments to the cellular authentication network element according to the verification failure message, where the cellular authentication network element respectively uses the multiple Each user device in the user equipment is separately verified.
  • the method further includes:
  • the transit node receives a verification failure message sent by the cellular network authentication network element when verifying that the information in the first aggregated message is incorrect;
  • the transit node generates fourth encrypted information according to the third encrypted identifier in the first authentication message in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using an aggregation algorithm according to the verification failure message;
  • the transit node sends a third aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the third aggregation message includes the fourth encryption information and the first verification identifier in the part of the first authentication message.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides another transit node, where the transit node includes a processor, a memory, and a transceiver, where the memory is used to store programs and data; the processor can control the program by calling a program in the memory.
  • the transceiver receives and transmits data, and the processor calls a program in the memory to perform the network authentication method of the third aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a computer readable storage medium, where the computer readable storage medium is configured to store an instruction, when executed on a computer, to cause the computer to perform any of the third aspect or the third aspect The method described in the implementation.
  • the user equipment first sends the first authentication message required for the authentication to the transit node when the network authentication is performed, and the signature or message in the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the multiple user equipments.
  • the authentication code is aggregated to obtain an aggregated signature or an aggregated authentication code, and the transit node uniformly sends the information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element, and uniformly sends the message.
  • the correctness of the message is ensured based on the aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a network authentication method in the prior art
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a network authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • 3A is a schematic flowchart of a network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3B is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • 3C is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • 3D is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • 3E is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3F is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • 3G is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • 3H is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3I is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3K is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3L is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3P is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3Q is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of still another network authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a transit node according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of still another transit node according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a network authentication system 20 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the network authentication system 20 includes a user equipment 201, a transit node 202, and a cellular network authentication network element 203. It can be a terminal device that can be accessed into the IoT, such as a computer, a mobile phone, a printer, a refrigerator, a robot, etc., and the transit node 202 can be a relay user equipment (relay UE), an aggregation point, etc., and can be authenticated in the user equipment 101 and the cellular network.
  • the node that relays information between the elements 203, and the cellular network authentication network element 203 may be a device that manages the network authentication process, such as an MME.
  • the user equipment 201 After the user equipment 201 passes the network authentication initiated by the cellular network authentication network element 203, the user equipment 201 can access the cellular network.
  • the massive user equipment 101 performs network authentication on the cellular authentication network element 203, and there is a large amount of data interaction.
  • the number of data interactions is reduced and the interaction data is reduced.
  • the total amount, the transit node 202 is specifically introduced, and the relay node 202 can sign and aggregate the signatures in the network authentication messages sent by the plurality of user equipments 201, and then uniformly unify the information in the plurality of network authentication messages except the signature.
  • the aggregated signature is uniformly sent to the cellular network authentication network element 203 for network authentication.
  • the method embodiment shown in FIG. 3A can be implemented based on the network authentication system 20.
  • the user equipment 201, the transit node 202, and the cellular authentication network element 203 no longer carry the number.
  • the method embodiment shown in FIG. 3A includes but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step S301 The first authentication message sent by the user equipment to the transit node.
  • the first authentication message includes an identity identifier of the user equipment, a first verification identifier, and a first encryption identifier.
  • the identity of the user equipment may be referred to.
  • the identifier is a second identity
  • the identity of the cellular network element is the first identity.
  • the second identity of the user equipment UE1 is 8888
  • the second identity of the user equipment UE2 is 9999.
  • the first identity of the authentication network element is 7777.
  • the second identity identifier and the first identity identifier may be an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) and a media access control (English: Media). Access Control, abbreviated as: MAC) address, Internet Protocol (English: Internet Protocol, IP address), etc., can be used to distinguish information from other terminal devices within a certain range.
  • the second identity is used to indicate which user equipment the first authentication message is sent by.
  • the first verification identifier may be a DH public key, a fresh parameter nonce, and the like of the user equipment, where the DH public key is a parameter in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm; the first verification identifier is sent by the user equipment through the transit node. And authenticating the network element to the cellular network, wherein the cellular authentication network element feeds back the first verification identifier to the user equipment via the transit node, if the first verification identifier sent by the user equipment is sent to the first If the verification identifier is matched, the user equipment verifies that the identity of the cellular authentication network element is secure.
  • the first encryption identifier may be a signature of the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment, or may be generated by using a symmetric key between the user equipment and the cellular authentication network element for the first authentication message.
  • the message authentication code (English: Message Authentication Code, MAC for short) is the symmetric key.
  • the message authentication code MAC can be based on the Hash-based Message Authentication Code (English: Hash-based Message Authentication Code). HMAC) is generated, as in the prior art, the signature and the message authentication code MAC are used to verify the correctness of the information.
  • the signature may be a signature of all or part of the information except the signature in the first authentication message, which part of the information is specifically signed, the user equipment that generates the first authentication message, and finally needs to be obtained (
  • the cellular authentication network element, which may be indirectly obtained) the information in the first authentication message has been pre-defined by the protocol.
  • the first encryption identifier includes an encryption sequence of the first verification identifier, that is, the information according to the first encryption identifier is at least the first verification identifier.
  • Step S302 The forwarding node receives the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments, and generates the first encryption information based on the first encryption identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using an aggregation algorithm.
  • N user equipments send the first authentication message to the forwarding node.
  • N user equipments may be assumed that N user equipments send the first authentication message to the transit node, and multiple user equipments described later may Specifically, the N user equipments, N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1.
  • Each user equipment described later refers to each of the N user equipments, and each user equipment described subsequently refers to each of the N user equipments.
  • the first encryption identifier of the plurality of first authentication messages sent by the multiple user equipments is calculated by using a preset aggregation algorithm to obtain the first Encrypt information.
  • the first encrypted information calculated by using the preset algorithm is an aggregate signature; optionally, when the first encryption identifier is the message authentication code MAC, The first encrypted information calculated by the preset algorithm is an aggregated authentication code.
  • Step S303 The forwarding node is further configured to send a first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where
  • the first aggregation message includes the first encryption information, and the first authentication cancellation sent by the multiple user equipments a plurality of the second identity identifiers and a plurality of the first authentication identifiers in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments. That is, the first authentication message and the second identity identifier of the received first authentication message are retained in the first aggregation message, and are used according to the first password identifier in the multiple first authentication messages.
  • the first password information obtained by the aggregation algorithm. It can be understood that if the first password identifier is a signature of the second identity identifier and the first verification identifier, the first password message can be understood as a second identity identifier of the plurality of first authentication messages.
  • the signature of the first verification identifier; optionally, the data length of the first password information is the same as the data length of the first password identifier.
  • Step S304 The cellular network authentication network element is configured to receive the first aggregated message and verify, by using the first encrypted information, whether the information in the first aggregated message is correct.
  • verifying the correctness of the message by means of a signature, a message verification code, or the like is a prior art, and details are not described herein.
  • Step S305 The cellular network authentication network element is further configured to send a first response message to the transit node when verifying that the information in the first aggregated message is correct.
  • the first response message includes a first identity identifier, a second verification identifier, a second encryption identifier, and the plurality of the first verification identifiers of the cellular network authentication network element, where the first identity identifier is used to represent the first identity identifier.
  • a response message is sent from the cellular network authentication network element; the plurality of the first verification identifiers are specifically the first verification identifier included in the first aggregation message received by the cellular network authentication network element, which is equivalent to the cellular network authentication network element. The received first verification identifier is fed back again.
  • the second verification identifier may be a DH public key, a fresh parameter nonce, etc. of the cellular authentication network element; the second verification identifier is sent by the cellular authentication network element to the user equipment by the transit node, and then the user equipment The second verification identifier is fed back to the cellular authentication network element by the transit node, and if the first verification identifier sent by the cellular authentication network element matches the finally received first verification identifier, the cellular The network weak authentication network element verifies that the identity of the user equipment is secure.
  • the second encrypted identifier may be a signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message by using the private key of the cellular network authentication network element, or may use the cellular network authentication for the first response message.
  • a message authentication code generated by a symmetric key between the network element and the user equipment.
  • the message authentication code MAC may be generated based on the HMAC. The signature and the MAC authentication information of the message authentication code are correct as in the prior art.
  • the signature may be a signature of all or part of the information except the signature in the first response message, which part of the information is specifically signed, the user equipment that generates the first response message, and finally needs to be obtained (
  • the cellular authentication network element, which may be indirectly obtained) the information in the first response message, has been pre-defined by the protocol.
  • the second encrypted identifier includes an encrypted sequence of the second verification identifier, that is, the information on which the second encrypted identifier is generated includes at least the second verification identifier.
  • Step S306 The transit node is further configured to receive and forward the first response message to the multiple user equipments.
  • the first identity message is sent by the user equipment to the transit node, and the second identity identifier of the user equipment is carried by the user equipment, so the transit node may send the multiple to the multiple based on the second identity identifier.
  • the user equipment forwards the first response message.
  • Step S307 The user equipment is further configured to receive the first response message forwarded by the transit node, and verify whether the information in the first response message is correct by using the second encrypted identifier, and verify whether the first response message is carried in the first response message. Its own first verification ID.
  • the user equipment needs to analyze whether the first response identifier is carried in the first response message, and whether the information in the first response message is correct according to the second encryption identifier. .
  • Step S308 The user equipment is further configured to: when it is verified that the information in the first response message is correct and carries its own first verification identifier, generate a session key with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the manner of calculating the session key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element includes, but is not limited to, the following three modes:
  • Manner 1 The user equipment generates a session key with the cellular authentication network element based on the random number generated by itself and the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element by using a preset algorithm; correspondingly, the cellular network authentication network element It is also necessary to generate a session key with the user equipment based on the generated random number of the cellular authentication network element and the DH public key of the user equipment by using the preset algorithm.
  • Manner 2 the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element based on the private key of the user equipment and the public key of the cellular authentication network element by using another preset algorithm; the device may be based on the identity
  • the signature technology (English: Identity Based Signature, IBS for short) calculates its own private key based on its second identity, and calculates the cellular authentication network element based on the first identity of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the public key is therefore also understood to be that the user equipment calculates a session key with the cellular authentication network element based on its second identity and the first identity of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the cellular network authentication network element also generates a session key with the user equipment based on the private key of the cellular network authentication network element and the public key of the user equipment by the preset algorithm, and can also be understood as the cellular
  • the network authentication network element calculates a session key with the user equipment based on its first identity and the second identity of the user equipment.
  • Manner 3 The user equipment generates, by using another preset algorithm, the private key of the user equipment, the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the fresh parameters of the user equipment, and the fresh parameters of the cellular network authentication network element. Authenticating the session key between the network elements; the device can calculate its own private key based on the second identity of the IBS, and calculate the cellular authentication network according to the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the public key of the cellular device therefore, it can also be understood that the user equipment is based on the second identity of the user equipment, the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, the fresh parameters of the user equipment, and the freshness of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the parameter is calculated for the session key with the cellular authentication network element.
  • the cellular network authentication network element is also generated by the preset algorithm based on the private key of the cellular network authentication network element, the public key of the user equipment, the fresh parameters of the user equipment, and the fresh parameters of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the session key between the user equipment and the user equipment may also be understood as the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, the second identity identifier of the user equipment, the fresh parameters of the user equipment, and the cellular network authentication network.
  • the fresh parameters of the meta are calculated out of the session key with the user device.
  • Step S309 The user equipment is further configured to send a second authentication message to the transit node when verifying that the information in the first response message is correct and carrying its own first verification identifier.
  • the second authentication message includes the second verification identifier and the third encryption identifier, where the third encryption identifier is an encryption sequence of information other than the third encryption identifier in the second authentication message;
  • the third encrypted identifier may be a signature of the second authentication message by using the private key of the user equipment, or may be a message generated by using a symmetric key between the user equipment and the cellular authentication network element for the second authentication message.
  • Authentication code MAC is a signature of the second authentication message by using the private key of the user equipment, or may be a message generated by using a symmetric key between the user equipment and the cellular authentication network element for the second authentication message.
  • the signature may be a signature of all or part of the information except the signature in the second authentication message, which part of the information is specifically signed, the user equipment that generates the second authentication message, and finally needs to be obtained (
  • the cellular authentication network element, which may be indirectly obtained) the information in the second authentication message has been pre-defined by the protocol.
  • the third encryption identifier includes an encryption sequence of the second verification identifier, that is, the information according to the third encryption identifier is at least the second verification identifier. knowledge.
  • Step S310 The transit node is configured to receive the second authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments, and generate third encrypted information according to the third encrypted identifier in the second authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using an aggregation algorithm. .
  • Step S311 The transit node is further configured to send a second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message includes the third encryption information, the second verification identifier carried in the second authentication message, and the multiple The second identity of the user equipment.
  • Step S312 The cellular network authentication network element is further configured to receive the second aggregation message, and verify, by using the third encryption information, whether the information in the second aggregation message is correct, and verify whether the second aggregation message is carried in the second aggregation message. Its own second verification ID.
  • Step S313 The cellular network authentication network element is further configured to generate, after verifying that the information in the second aggregated message is correct and carrying its own second verification identifier, between each user equipment of the multiple user equipments. Session key.
  • the foregoing describes three ways of calculating a session key between the user equipment and the cellular authentication network element, where the cellular network authentication network element calculates a session key with each user equipment. There are corresponding descriptions in the three methods, and will not be described here.
  • some user equipments do not want to send the first authentication message and the second authentication message to be aggregated at the transit node, but hope that the transit node directly receives the first authentication message and the second authentication message.
  • the first authentication message and the second authentication message are forwarded to the cellular network authentication network element, so that the cellular network authentication network element separately processes the network authentication process of the user equipment.
  • the specific execution flow is as shown in steps S314 to S324 in FIG. 3B.
  • Step S314 The transit node determines, according to the aggregation identifier, whether an aggregation operation needs to be performed on the first encrypted identifier.
  • the first authentication message includes an aggregation identifier for characterizing whether to perform an aggregation operation based on the first encryption identifier.
  • step S302 is performed, and if not, step S315 is performed.
  • Step S315 The transit node forwards the first authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element.
  • Step S316 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first authentication message and verifies whether the information in the first authentication message is correct by using the first encryption identifier.
  • Step S317 The cellular network authentication network element sends a second response message to the transit node when the information in the first authentication message is verified to be correct, where the second response message includes a fourth encrypted identifier, the first An identity identifier, the second verification identifier, and the first verification identifier of the user equipment, where the fourth encrypted identifier is all or part of the second response message except the fourth encrypted identifier.
  • the fourth encryption identifier includes an encryption sequence of at least one of the first verification identifier and the second encryption identifier, that is, the information according to the second encryption identifier is at least the first verification identifier and the second verification.
  • One of the identifiers is possible to the fourth encryption identifiers.
  • the fourth encrypted identifier may be a DH public key of the cellular network authentication network element, a fresh parameter nonce, or the like, and the fourth encrypted identifier may be a signature of the second response message by using a private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the message authentication code MAC generated by using the symmetric key between the user equipment and the cellular authentication network element may also be used for the second response message.
  • Step S318 The transit node is further configured to receive and forward the second response message to the user equipment.
  • Step S319 The user equipment is further configured to receive the second response message forwarded by the transit node, verify whether the information in the second response message is correct by using the fourth encrypted identifier, and verify the second In the response message Whether it carries its own first verification ID;
  • Step S320 The user equipment is further configured to: when it is verified that the information in the second response message is correct and carries its own first verification identifier, generate a session key with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • Step S321 The user equipment is further configured to send the second authentication message to the transit node when it is verified that the second response message is correct and carries its own first verification identifier.
  • Step S322 The transit node is further configured to receive the second authentication message and forward the second authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element.
  • Step S323 The cellular network authentication network element is further configured to receive the second authentication message, and verify, by using the third encryption identifier, whether information in the second authentication message is correct, and verify the second authentication message. Whether to carry its own second verification mark;
  • Step S324 The cellular network authentication network element is further configured to generate a session key with the user equipment when verifying that the information in the second authentication message is correct and carrying its own second verification identifier.
  • the first verification identifier is a DH public key of the user equipment, and the first encryption identifier is used to remove the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment. a signature of the information other than the first encrypted identifier; the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, specifically: the user equipment according to its own random number and the first response message The second verification identifier in the middle generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the second verification identifier is a DH public key of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a second key identifier of the first response message through the private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the signature of the information outside the encrypted identity is an example of steps S401 to S412 in Fig. 3C.
  • Step 401 Each user equipment generates a random number and uses the random number to generate a respective DH public key, for example:
  • RAND 1 random number 1
  • p is a prime number
  • g is a generator of a finite cyclic group G
  • g and p can be published in advance.
  • Step 402 The user equipment generates a first authentication message, where the second authentication identifier, the DH public key, and the first encrypted identifier are included in the first authentication message.
  • the first encryption identifier is a signature of all or part of the first authentication message except the first encrypted identifier by using a private key of the corresponding user equipment, for example,
  • the UE1 generates a first authentication message, where the first authentication message includes a second identity of the standby UE1, a DH public key of the UE1, and a first encrypted identifier, where the first encrypted identifier is the private key of the UE1.
  • the second identity of the UE1 and the signature of the DH public key of the UE1; the first authentication message sent by the UE1 to the transit node may be (ID_UE1, A1, Sig_UE1, ...), where ID_UE1 is the second identity of the UE1 , A1 is the DH public key of UE1, "" It is indicated that the first authentication message may also have other information, and Sig_UE1 is the signature of UE1 on ID_UE1 and A1 in the first authentication message.
  • the UE2 generates a first authentication message, where the first authentication message includes the second identity of the UE2, the DH public key of the UE2, and the first encrypted identifier, where the first encrypted identifier is the UE2 through the private key of the UE2.
  • the second identity identifier and the signature of the DH public key of the UE2; the first authentication message sent by the UE 2 to the transit node is (ID_UE2, A2, Sig_UE2, ...), wherein ID_UE2 is the second identity of the UE2, A2 For the DH public key of UE2, "! indicates that the first authentication message may also have other information, and Sig_UE2 is the signature of UE2 on ID_UE2 and A2 in the first authentication message.
  • the data length of the aggregate signature is the same as the data length of the individual signature of each user equipment.
  • Step 404 The transit node generates a first aggregated message and sends the first aggregated message to a cellular network authentication network element (Authenticator).
  • the first aggregation message may be (Aggre-indicator, ID_Vec, A_Vec, Sig_AG1, ...), wherein the Aggre-indicator is an aggregation authentication flag, the ID_Vec includes a second identity of each user equipment, and the A_Vec includes each user equipment.
  • the DH public key, the " -- corresponds to other information that may exist in the first authentication message, and Sig_AG1 is the aggregated signature.
  • Step 405 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first aggregation message, and verifies the aggregation signature Sig_AG1 according to the information in the first aggregation message, and if the verification succeeds, indicates the information in the first aggregation message; then, the cell
  • the network authentication mode of the cellular network authentication network element may be configured to include at least two types of network authentication modes: aggregation authentication and non-aggregation authentication.
  • the cellular network authentication network element is based on the aggregation authentication flag in the first aggregation message.
  • the indicator can determine the signature in the first aggregated message to be verified by the associated policy of the aggregate authentication.
  • Step 406 The cellular network authentication network element sends a first response message to the transit node, where the first response message may be (ID_AU, B, A_Vec, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element.
  • ID B is the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element
  • A_Vec includes the DH public key of each user equipment
  • Sig_AU is the private key of the cellular authentication network element, except for the Sig_AU in the first response message.
  • the signature of the partial information Sig_AU is the second password identifier described above.
  • Step 407 The transit node receives the first response message, and forwards the first response message to each user equipment UE, for example:
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE1.
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE2.
  • Step 408 Each user equipment receives the first response message forwarded by the transit node, and verifies the signature Sig_AU according to the information in the first response message. If the signature Sig_AU is verified, the first response message carries the user equipment.
  • the DH public key indicates that the information in the first response message is correct; and then, the cellular authentication network element is combined The DH public key generates a session key with the cellular authentication network element.
  • the UE1 verifies the signature Sig_AU, and if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the DH public key of the UE1, the UE generates the network authentication with the random number generated by itself and the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the UE2 verifies the signature Sig_AU, and if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the DH public key of the UE2, the UE generates the network authentication with the random number generated by itself and the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step 409 If each of the foregoing user equipments verifies that the signature Sig_AU passes and both determines that the first response message carries the DH public key of the user equipment, the user equipment sends a second authentication message to the transit node, and the second The authentication message includes a DH public key and a third password identifier of the cellular authentication network element, where the third password identifier is part or all of the second authentication message except the third password identifier by using a private key of the user equipment.
  • Signature for example:
  • UE1 sends a second authentication message (B, Sig_UE1, ...) to the transit node, where B is the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element, and "! indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information.
  • Sig_UE1 is a signature of the DH public key B of the cellular authentication network element by the private key of UE1.
  • the UE2 sends the second authentication message (B, Sig_UE2, ...) to the transit node, where B is the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element, and "" indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information.
  • Sig_UE2 is the signature of the DH public key B of the cellular authentication network element by the private key of UE2.
  • Step 410 The transit node receives the second authentication message, and performs an aggregation operation on the third password identifier (ie, the signature) in each received second authentication message to generate a new aggregate signature Sig_AG2.
  • the third password identifier ie, the signature
  • the transit node sends the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message may be (ID_Vec, B_Vec, Sig_AG2, ...), where ID_Vec includes the second identity of each user equipment.
  • the B_Vec includes the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element returned by the user equipment, and the “...” corresponds to other information that may exist in the second authentication message, and the Sig_AG2 is the aggregate signature.
  • Step 412 The cellular authentication network element and the information in the second aggregation message are used to verify the aggregation signature Sig_AG2 in the second aggregation message, if the verification of the aggregation signature Sig_AG2 and the network side DH public key carried by the second aggregation message are
  • the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element generates a session key with each user equipment according to its own random number and the DH public key of each user equipment of the multiple user equipments, for example:
  • the foregoing steps 401 to 412 describe how to aggregate the signatures in the first authentication message sent by each user equipment to save the data amount. For some reasons, some user equipments may not want to send the first authentication message.
  • the transit node When the identifier indicates that the signature in the first authentication message that the user equipment is willing to send is aggregated, the transit node performs the process of steps 403-412 after learning the user equipment's willingness; When the signature in the first authentication message that the UE1 is not willing to send is aggregated, the transit node learns the will of the user equipment and executes the processes of steps 413 to 420 in FIG. 3D.
  • Step S413 The transit node forwards the first authentication message sent by the UE1 to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first authentication message may be (UE_AGindicator, ID_UE1, A1, Sig_UE1, ...), wherein the willingness identifier UE_AGindicator indicates the The signature of the UE1 is unwilling to be aggregated in the first authentication message, ID_UE1 is the second identity of the UE1, and A1 is the DH public key of the UE1. The "! indicates that other information may exist in the first authentication message.
  • the Sig_UE1 is a signature of all or part of the first authentication message except the Sig_UE1 using the private key of the user equipment UE1.
  • Step S415 The cellular network authentication network element sends a second response message to the transit node, where the second response message may be (ID_AU, B, A1, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element.
  • ID B is the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element
  • A1 is the DH public key of the user equipment UE1
  • "" indicates that other information may exist in the second response message
  • Sig_AU is the use of the cellular authentication network.
  • the private key of the element is a signature of all or part of the information other than Sig_AU in the first response message.
  • Step S416 The transit node receives the second response message and forwards the second response message to the UE1.
  • Step S417 The UE1 receives the second response message, and verifies the signature Sig_AU in the second response message according to the information in the second response message, if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the second response message carries the DH of the UE1.
  • Step S418 The UE1 sends a second authentication message to the transit node, where the second authentication message may be (B, Sig_UE1, ...), where B is the DH of the cellular authentication network element carried in the second response message.
  • the public key, the "" indicates that the second authentication message may further include other information, and the Sig_UE1 is a signature of all or part of the information except the Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message by using the private key of the UE1.
  • Step S420 The cellular network authentication network element receives the second authentication message, and verifies the signature Sig_UE1 in the first authentication message according to the information in the second authentication message, if the signature Sig_UE1 is verified and the second authentication message is verified.
  • the DH public key of the carried network side is the DH public key of the cellular authentication network element and indicates that the information in the second response message is correct; then, the cellular authentication network element combines its own random number with the standby UE1.
  • the second identity identifier can be used to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message
  • the first identity identifier can be used to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is used to exclude the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment. a signature of the information outside the first encrypted identifier; the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, specifically: the user equipment according to its private key and the first response The second verification identifier in the message generates a session key with the cellular authentication network element.
  • the second verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a second key of the first response message by the private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the signature of the information outside the encrypted identity is exemplified by steps S501 to S511 in Fig. 3E.
  • Step S501 The respective user equipment generates a first authentication message based on its own second identity identifier, its own fresh parameter Nonce (Nonce may be a random number, a sequence number, etc., which may be updated with time), and sends the first authentication message to the transit node. Sending the first authentication message, where the first authentication message includes the second identity, the nonce, and the first password identifier, where the first password identifier is the first authentication message by using a private key of the corresponding user equipment.
  • the signature of all or part of the information other than the first password for example:
  • the UE 1 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node, where the first authentication message may be (ID_UE1, Nonce 1, Sig_UE1, . . . ), wherein ID_UE1 is the second identity of UE1.
  • Noce 1 is the fresh parameter Nonce of the UE1, the " -- indicates that other information may exist in the first authentication message, and
  • Sig_UE1 is the signature of the ID_UE1 and Nonce 1 by the private key of the UE1.
  • the UE 2 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • the first authentication message may be (ID_UE2, Nonce 2, Sig_UE2, . . . ), where ID_UE2 is the second identity of UE2.
  • Noce 2 is the fresh parameter Nonce of the UE2, the " -- indicates that other information may exist in the first authentication message, and
  • Sig_UE2 is the signature of the ID_UE2 and Nonce 2 through the private key of the UE2.
  • the data length of the aggregate signature is the same as the data length of the individual signature of each user equipment.
  • Step S503 The transit node generates a first aggregated message and sends the first aggregated message to a cellular network authentication network element (Authenticator).
  • the first aggregation message may be (Aggre-indicator, ID_Vec, Nonce_Vec, Sig_AG1, ...), wherein the Aggre-indicator is an aggregation authentication flag, the ID_Vec includes a second identity of each user equipment, and the Nonce_Vec includes each user equipment. Nonce, the "" corresponds to other information that may exist in the first authentication message, and Sig_AG1 is the signature of the aggregation.
  • Step S504 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first aggregation message, and verifies the aggregation signature Sig_AG1 in combination with the information in the first aggregation message. If the verification succeeds, the information in the first aggregation message is correct; Yes, the network authentication mode of the cellular network authentication network element may be configured to include at least two types of network authentication modes: an aggregation authentication and a non-aggregation authentication.
  • the cellular authentication network element may be based on the Aggre-indicator in the first aggregation message. Indeed The signature in the first aggregated message needs to be verified by a related policy of the aggregate authentication.
  • Step S505 The cellular network authentication network element sends a first response message to the transit node, where the first response message may be (ID_AU, Nonce_AU, Nonce_Vec, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • Nonce_AU is the Nonce of the cellular authentication network element, and Nonce_Vec includes the Nonce of each user equipment.
  • the "" indicates that other information may exist in the first response message, and the Sig_AU is the private key of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the signature of all or part of the information except the Sig_AU in the response message, Sig_AU is the second password identifier described above.
  • Step S506 The transit node receives the first response message, and forwards the first response message to each user equipment UE, for example:
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE1.
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE2.
  • Step S507 Each user equipment receives the first response message forwarded by the transit node, and verifies the signature Sig_AU according to the information in the first response message, if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the user equipment.
  • the nonce indicates that the information in the first response message is correct; then, the session key between the first authentication identifier of the cellular authentication network element and the second identity identifier of the cellular network is generated;
  • the first identity identifier is the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, and the private key of the user equipment can process its second identity identifier by using an identity based signature technology (English: Identity Based Signature, IBS for short). Obtained, therefore, can also be understood to generate a session key with the cellular authentication network element in combination with the public key of the cellular authentication network element and its own private key, for example:
  • the UE1 verifies the signature Sig_AU, and if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the nonce 1 of the UE1, the first identity of the cellular authentication network element and the second identity of the UE1 are generated and the cellular network is generated.
  • the key, H (ID_AU) is the cellular authentication network element public key obtained based on the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element. Therefore, it can also be understood that a session key between the cellular authentication network element and the public key of the UE1 is generated according to the public key of the cellular authentication network element and the private key of the UE1.
  • the UE2 verifies the signature Sig_AU, and if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the nonce 2 of the UE2, the first identity of the cellular authentication network element and the second identity of the UE2 are generated and generated with the cellular network.
  • the key, H (ID_AU) is the cellular authentication network element public key obtained based on the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, and therefore can also be understood as the public key of the cellular authentication network element and the private key of the UE2 according to the key
  • a session key is generated with the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step S508 If each of the foregoing user equipments verifies that the signature Sig_AU passes and both decrypts its own nonce from the first response message, the user equipments respectively send a second authentication message to the transit node, the second authentication message. a DH public key and a third password identifier of the cellular authentication network element, where the third password identifier is a signature of part or all of the second authentication message except the third password identifier by using a private key of the user equipment. ,E.g:
  • UE1 sends a second authentication message (Nonce_AU, Sig_UE1, ...) to the transit node, where Nonce_AU is a nonce of the cellular authentication network element, "! indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE1 is The signature of the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element is passed by the private key of UE1.
  • UE2 sends a second authentication message (Nonce_AU, Sig_UE2, ...) to the transit node, where Nonce_AU is a nonce of the cellular authentication network element, "! indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE2 is The signature of the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element is obtained by the private key of UE2.
  • Step S509 The transit node receives the second authentication message, and performs an aggregation operation on the third password identifier (ie, the signature) in each received second authentication message to generate a new aggregate signature Sig_AG2.
  • the third password identifier ie, the signature
  • Step S510 The transit node sends the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message may be (ID_Vec, Nonce_AU_Vec, Sig_AG2, ...), where ID_Vec includes the second identity of each user equipment.
  • the Nonce_AU_Vec includes a Nonce of the cellular authentication network element sent by the user equipment to the transit node, and the " -- corresponds to other information that may exist in the second authentication message, and the Sig_AG2 is the aggregated signature.
  • Step S511 The cellular network authentication network element verifies the aggregation signature Sig_AG2 in the second aggregation message according to the information in the second aggregation message, and if the verification of the aggregation signature Sig_AG2 and the nonce of the network side carried by the second aggregation message are all
  • the Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element generates a session key with each user equipment in combination with its first identity and a second identity of each of the plurality of user devices, for example:
  • the public key of the UE1 is therefore also understood to be that the cellular authentication network element calculates a session key with the UE1 according to its private key and the public key of the UE1.
  • the public key of the UE2 is therefore also understood to be that the cellular authentication network element calculates a session key with the UE2 according to its private key and the public key of the UE2.
  • the foregoing steps 501-511 describe how to aggregate the signatures in the first authentication message sent by each user equipment to save the data amount. For some reasons, some user equipment may not want to send the first authentication message.
  • the transit node learns the will of the user equipment, and then performs the process of steps 502 to 511;
  • the transit node learns the will of the user equipment and executes the processes of steps 512 to 519 of FIG. 3F.
  • Step S512 The transit node forwards the first authentication message sent by the UE1 to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first authentication message may be (UE_AGindicator, ID_UE1, Nonce 1, Sig_UE1, ...), wherein the willingness identifier UE_AGindicator indicates The signature of the UE1 is unwilling to be aggregated in the first authentication message, ID_UE1 is the second identity of the UE1, and Nonce1 is the fresh parameter of the UE1, and the “...” indicates that there may be other in the first authentication message.
  • the Sig_UE1 is the first authentication message except the private key of the user equipment UE1. The signature of all or part of the information outside of Sig_UE1.
  • Step S513 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first authentication message sent by the transit node, and verifies the signature Sig_UE1 in the first authentication message according to the information in the first authentication message, and if the verification succeeds, indicates the first The information in the authentication message is correct and then the fresh parameter Nonce_AU is generated.
  • Step S514 The cellular network authentication network element sends a second response message to the transit node, where the second response message may be (ID_AU, Nonce_AU, Nonce 1, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the first of the cellular authentication network element.
  • ID_AU is the first of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the identity identifier is the fresh parameter nonce of the cellular authentication network element
  • the nonce 1 is the nonce of the UE 1 carried in the first authentication message
  • the “...” indicates that other information may exist in the second response message
  • the Sig_AU is used.
  • the private key of the cellular authentication network element signs the all or part of the information except the Sig_AU in the second response message.
  • Step S515 The transit node receives the second response message and forwards the second response message to the UE1.
  • Step S516 The UE1 receives the second response message, and verifies the signature Sig_AU in the second response message according to the information in the second response message, if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the second response message carries the nonce 1 of the UE1. The information in the second response message is correct. Then, the UE1 generates a session key with the cellular authentication network element by combining the first identity of the cellular authentication network element with the second identity of the UE1.
  • the session key K1 e(xH(ID_UE1), H(ID_AU)), where xH(ID_UE1) is the private key of the UE1 obtained based on the second identity of UE1, and H(ID_AU) is based on the cell
  • the cellular authentication network element public key obtained by the first identity of the network authentication network element. Therefore, it can also be understood that a session key between the cellular authentication network element and the public key of the UE1 is generated according to the public key of the cellular authentication network element and the private key of the UE1.
  • Step S517 The UE1 sends a second authentication message to the transit node, where the second authentication message may be (Nonce_AU, Sig_UE1, ...), wherein the Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element carried in the second response message.
  • the parameter, the "" indicates that the second authentication message may further include other information, and the Sig_UE1 is a signature of all or part of the information except the Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message by using the private key of the UE1.
  • Step S518 The transit node receives the second authentication message and forwards the second authentication message to the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step S519 The cellular network authentication network element receives the second authentication message, and verifies the signature Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message according to the information in the second authentication message, if the signature Sig_UE1 is verified and the second authentication message is verified.
  • the nonce_AU of the carried network side is the Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element, indicating that the information in the second authentication message is correct; then, the cellular authentication network element is based on its first identity and the second identity of the UE1.
  • the session key K1 e(xH(ID_AU), H(ID_UE1)), where xH(ID_AU) is the first identity according to the cellular authentication network
  • H (ID_UE1) is the public key of the UE1 obtained based on the second identity of the UE1, so it can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element is based on its own private key and The public key of the UE1 calculates a session key with the UE1.
  • the second identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate the session between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate a session key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element; the first verification identifier and the second verification identifier All of them belong to the fresh parameter nonce, so that the parameters of the interaction between the user equipment and the cellular authentication network element are updated according to the time, thereby improving the security performance.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element,
  • the forwarding node is further configured to send the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the transit node is configured to use the first identity identifier to correspond to the cellular network authentication network corresponding to the first identity identifier.
  • the element sends the first aggregate message;
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to use the first identity by itself. Decrypting the first verification identifier in the first authentication message; the first verification identifier in the first response message is encrypted by the second identity identifier of the user equipment; the user The device is further configured to decrypt the first verification identifier in the first response message by using the second identifier of the user identity; the first encryption identifier is the first key identifier of the user equipment a signature of the information other than the first encrypted identifier in the authentication message;
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, specifically: the user equipment according to its own private key, its own first verification identifier, and the first response message.
  • the second authentication identifier and the first identity identifier in the first response message generate a session key with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a second key identifier of the first response message by the private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the signature of the information outside the encrypted identity is exemplified by steps S601 to S611 in Fig. 3G.
  • Step S601 The respective user equipment generates a first authentication message based on the second identity identifier of the user, the fresh parameter Nonce of the user, and the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • An authentication message, the first authentication message includes the second identity identifier, the first identity identifier, the nonce of the user equipment encrypted by the first identity identifier, and the first encrypted identifier, where the first password identifier is The signature of the private key of the user equipment on all or part of the information other than the first password identifier in the first authentication message, for example:
  • the UE 1 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node, where the first authentication message may be (ID_UE1, ID_AU, m1, Sig_UE1, . . . ), where ID_UE1 is the second identity of UE1.
  • the identifier, ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element
  • m1 is the fresh parameter Nonce1 of the UE1 encrypted by the first identity identifier (that is, the public key of the cellular authentication network element), the "
  • Sig_UE1 is a signature of the ID_UE1, ID_AU, and m1 by the private key of the UE1.
  • the UE 2 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node, where the first authentication message may be (ID_UE2, ID_AU, m2, Sig_UE2, ...), where ID_UE2 is the second identity of UE2
  • ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element
  • m2 is the fresh parameter Nonce2 of the UE2 encrypted by the first identity identifier (ie, the public key of the cellular authentication network element), the "
  • Sig_UE2 is a signature of the ID_UE2, ID_AU, and m2 by the private key of the UE2.
  • the data length of the aggregate signature is the same as the data length of the individual signature of each user equipment.
  • Step S603 The transit node generates a first aggregated message and sends the first aggregated message to the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first aggregation message may be (Aggre-indicator, ID_Vec, m_Vec, Sig_AG, ...), wherein the Aggre-indicator is an aggregation authentication flag, which is used to indicate that the message is an aggregation authentication request message, and the ID_Vec includes each user equipment.
  • the second identity identifier, m_Vec contains the fresh parameter Nonce encrypted by the first identity identifier of each user equipment, and the “...” corresponds to other information that may exist in the first authentication message, and Sig_AG is the aggregation signature.
  • the first identity identifier in the first authentication message may be used to indicate that the transit node sends the first aggregate message to the cellular authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier.
  • Step S604 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first aggregation message, and decrypts the fresh parameters of each user equipment from the first aggregation message according to the first identity identifier of the network, and combines the information in the first aggregation message to verify
  • the authentication signature Sig_AG1 indicates that the information in the first aggregation message is correct
  • the network authentication mode of the cellular authentication network element may be configured to include at least two types of network authentication modes: an aggregation authentication and a non-aggregation authentication.
  • the cellular network authentication network element can determine the signature in the first aggregated message by using an aggregated authentication flag Aggre-indicator in the first aggregated message to determine a related policy that needs to be authenticated by the aggregation.
  • Step S605 The cellular network authentication network element sends a first response message to the transit node, where the first response message may be (ID_AU, Nonce_AU, m'_Vec, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the first of the cellular authentication network element.
  • Nonce_AU is a fresh parameter Nonce of the cellular authentication network element
  • m'_Vec contains fresh parameters of each user equipment
  • the fresh parameters of each user equipment are encrypted by the second identity of each user equipment
  • "" indicates that there may be other information in the first response message
  • Sig_AU is a signature of all or part of the first response message except the Sig_AU using the private key of the cellular authentication network element, and Sig_AU is above
  • Step S606 The transit node receives the first response message, and forwards the first response message to each user equipment UE, for example:
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE1.
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE2.
  • Step S607 Each user equipment receives the first response message forwarded by the transit node, decrypts the fresh parameter from the first response message by using the second identity identifier, and verifies the signature Sig_AU according to the information in the first response message. If it is verified that the signature Sig_AU passes and decrypts its own nonce, it indicates that the information in the first response message is correct; then, combined with the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, its second identity, and its own freshness.
  • the parameter and the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element generate a session key with the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the first identity identifier is the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, and the private key of the user equipment may be
  • the identity identification-based signature technology (English: Identity Based Signature, IBS for short) is used to process the second identity of the network, so it can also be understood as the public key of the cellular authentication network element, its own private key,
  • the fresh parameters of the cellular authentication network element and its own fresh parameters generate a session key with the cellular authentication network element, for example:
  • the UE1 decrypts the fresh parameter from the first response message and verifies the signature Sig_AU through the second identity of the UE1 itself, and if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the fresh parameter of the UE1 is decrypted, the UE authenticates the network element.
  • the UE2 decrypts the fresh parameter from the first response message by using the second identity of the UE2 and verifies the signature Sig_AU. If the signature Sig_AU is verified and the fresh parameter of the UE2 is decrypted, the UE authenticates the network element.
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE2, the fresh parameter of the cellular network authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE2 is generated with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • Step S608 If each of the foregoing user equipments verifies that the signature Sig_AU passes and both decrypts its own nonce from the first response message, the user equipments respectively send a second authentication message to the transit node, the second authentication message. a DH public key and a third password identifier of the cellular authentication network element, where the third password identifier is a signature of part or all of the second authentication message except the third password identifier by using a private key of the user equipment. ,E.g:
  • UE1 sends a second authentication message (Nonce_AU, Sig_UE1, ...) to the transit node, where Nonce_AU is a nonce of the cellular authentication network element, "! indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE1 is The signature of the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element is passed by the private key of UE1.
  • UE2 sends a second authentication message (Nonce_AU, Sig_UE2, ...) to the transit node, where Nonce_AU is a nonce of the cellular authentication network element, "! indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE2 is The signature of the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element is obtained by the private key of UE2.
  • Step S609 The transit node receives the second authentication message, and performs an aggregation operation on the third password identifier (ie, the signature) in each received second authentication message to generate a new aggregate signature Sig_AG2.
  • the third password identifier ie, the signature
  • Step S610 The transit node sends the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message may be (ID_Vec, Nonce_AU_Vec, Sig_AG2, ...), where ID_Vec includes the second identity of each user equipment.
  • the Nonce_AU_Vec includes a Nonce of the cellular authentication network element sent by the user equipment to the transit node, and the " -- corresponds to other information that may exist in the second authentication message, and the Sig_AG2 is the aggregated signature.
  • Step S611 The cellular authentication network element and the information in the second aggregation message are used to verify the aggregation signature Sig_AG2 in the second aggregation message, and if the authentication signature Sig_AG2 is passed, and the nonce on the network side carried by the second aggregation message is
  • the Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element combines its own first identity, its own fresh parameters, the second identity of each user device of the multiple user devices, and the freshness of each of the multiple user devices.
  • the parameter generates a session key with each user device, for example:
  • the private key of the cellular authentication network element, H (ID_UE1) is the public key of the UE1 obtained based on the second identity of the UE1, Nonce 1 is the fresh parameter nonce of the UE1, and the Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the parameter nonce therefore, can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element calculates the session key with the UE1 according to its own private key, its own fresh parameters, the public key of the UE1, and the fresh parameters of the UE1.
  • the cellular network authentication network element according to its first identity, its own fresh parameters, the second body of the UE2
  • the foregoing steps 601-611 describe how to aggregate the signatures in the first authentication message sent by each user equipment to save the data amount. For some reasons, some user equipments may not want to send the first authentication message.
  • the transit node learns the will of the user equipment, and then performs the process of steps 602 to 611;
  • the transit node learns the will of the user equipment and executes the processes of steps 612 to 619 in FIG. 3H.
  • Step S612 The transit node forwards the first authentication message sent by the UE1 to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first authentication message may be (UE_AGindicator, ID_UE1, ID_AU, m1, Sig_UE1, ...), where ID_UE1 is UE1 The second identity identifier, ID_AU is the first identity identifier of the cellular authentication network element, and m1 is the fresh parameter Nonce1 of the UE1 encrypted by the first identity identifier (that is, the public key of the cellular authentication network element).
  • the "" indicates that there may be other information in the first authentication message, and Sig_UE1 is a signature of all or part of the information except the Sig_UE1 in the first authentication message by the private key of the UE1.
  • Step S613 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first authentication message sent by the transit node, and decrypts the fresh parameter of the UE1 from the first authentication message according to the first identity identifier of the cell, and the cellular network authentication network element may be based on Calculating the K1 by the first identity of the UE and the second identity of the UE1 in the first aggregation message; the cell authentication network element further verifying the signature in the first authentication message according to the information in the first authentication message Sig_UE1, if the verification succeeds, indicating that the information in the first authentication message is correct, and then generating a fresh parameter Nonce_AU.
  • Step S614 The cellular network authentication network element sends a second response message to the transit node, where the second response message may be (ID_AU, Nonce_AU, m'1, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • An identity identifier Nonce_AU is a fresh parameter nonce of the cellular authentication network element
  • m'1 is a fresh parameter of UE1
  • the fresh parameter is encrypted by the second identity of UE1
  • "" indicates that the second response message may be
  • Sig_AU is the signature of all or part of the information in the second response message except Sig_AU using the private key of the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step S615 The transit node receives the second response message and forwards the second response message to the UE1.
  • Step S616 The UE1 receives the second response message, and the UE1 decrypts the fresh parameter from the second response message by using the second identity identifier of the UE, and verifies the signature Sig_AU in the second response message according to the information in the second response message. If the signature Sig_AU is verified and the fresh parameter nonce1 of the UE1 is decrypted, the information in the second response message is correct; and then, the first identity of the cellular authentication network element and the second identity of the UE1 are combined.
  • xH(ID_UE1) is the private key of the UE1 obtained based on the second identity of UE1
  • H(ID_AU) is based on the cellular authentication network element
  • the cellular identity authentication network element public key obtained by the first identity.
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE1, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element are generated.
  • Step S617 The UE1 sends a second authentication message to the transit node, where the second authentication message may be (Nonce_AU, Sig_UE1, ...), where Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element carried in the second response message.
  • the parameter, the "" indicates that the second authentication message may further include other information, and the Sig_UE1 is a signature of all or part of the information except the Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message by using the private key of the UE1.
  • Step S618 The transit node receives the second authentication message and forwards the second authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element.
  • Step S619 The cellular network authentication network element receives the second authentication message, and verifies the signature Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message according to the information in the second authentication message, if the signature Sig_UE1 is verified and the second authentication message is carried
  • the nonce_AU of the network-side authentication network element indicates that the information in the second authentication message is correct; then, the cellular authentication network element according to its first identity, its own fresh parameter, and the UE1
  • the public key of the UE1, Nonce 1 is the fresh parameter nonce of
  • the second identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate the session between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate a session key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element; the first verification identifier and the second verification identifier All of them belong to the fresh parameter nonce, so that the parameters of the interaction between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element are updated according to the change of time, and the security performance is improved; the second identity identifier and the first identity identifier can also be used.
  • the first verification identifier carried in the information of the interaction is encrypted, which further improves the security performance.
  • the first verification identifier is a nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the forwarding node
  • the method is further configured to send, to the cellular network authentication network element, a first aggregation message, where: the transit node is configured to send, according to the first identity identifier, the cellular network authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier.
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the cellular network authentication network element is used to pre-store the The symmetric key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element decrypts the first verification identifier; the first verification identifier in the first response message passes through the pre-stored user equipment and the Symmetric key encryption between cellular authentication network elements, the user setting And being used to decrypt the first verification identifier by using a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the first encrypted identifier is a signature of the information other than the first encrypted identifier in the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment;
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, specifically: the user equipment according to its own private key, its own first verification identifier, and the first response message.
  • the second authentication identifier and the first identity identifier in the first response message generate a session key with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a second key identifier of the first response message by the private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the signature of the information outside the encrypted identity is exemplified by steps S701 to S711 of FIG. 3I.
  • Step S701 The respective user equipment generates a first authentication message based on the second identity identifier of the user, the fresh parameter Nonce of the user, and the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • An authentication message the first authentication message includes the second identity identifier, the first identity identifier, a nonce and a first encryption identifier of the user equipment that are encrypted by a corresponding user equipment and a symmetric key of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the first password is a signature of all or part of the first authentication message except the first password identifier by a private key of the corresponding user equipment, for example:
  • the UE 1 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node, where the first authentication message may be (ID_UE1, ID_AU, m1, Sig_UE1, . . . ), where ID_UE1 is the second identity of UE1.
  • the identifier, ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element
  • m1 is the fresh parameter Nonce1 of the UE1 encrypted by the symmetric key K1 between the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element, and the “...” indicates the There may be other information in the first authentication message
  • Sig_UE1 is a signature of the ID_UE1, ID_AU, and m1 through the private key of the UE1, where the symmetric key K1 is the second identity ID_UE1 based on the IBS technology combined with the UE1 and the cellular network authentication.
  • the UE 2 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node, where the first authentication message may be (ID_UE2, ID_AU, m2, Sig_UE2, ...), where ID_UE2 is the second identity of UE2 An identifier, ID_AU is a first identity of the cellular authentication network element, and m2 is a fresh parameter Nonce2 of the UE2 encrypted by the symmetric key K2 between the UE2 and the cellular authentication network element, where the “...” indicates the There may be other information in the first authentication message, Sig_UE2 is a signature of the ID_UE2, ID_AU and m2 by the private key of the UE2, wherein the symmetric key K2 is the second identity ID_UE2 combined with the UE1 based on the IBS technology and the cellular authentication
  • the data length of the aggregate signature is the same as the data length of the individual signature of each user equipment.
  • Step S703 The transit node generates a first aggregated message and sends the first aggregated message to a cellular network authentication network element (Authenticator).
  • the first aggregated message may be (Aggre-indicator, ID_Vec, m_Vec, Sig_AG, ...), where
  • the Aggre-indicator is an aggregation authentication flag, which is used to indicate that the message is an aggregation authentication request message
  • ID_Vec includes a second identity of each user equipment
  • m_Vec includes a fresh parameter Nonce encrypted by the corresponding symmetric key of each user equipment.
  • the "" corresponds to other information that may exist in the first authentication message
  • Sig_AG is the aggregate signature.
  • the first identity identifier in the first authentication message may be used to indicate that the transit node sends the first aggregate message to the cellular authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier.
  • Step S704 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first aggregation message, and decrypts the fresh parameters of each user equipment from the first aggregation message according to the corresponding symmetric key. For example, the fresh parameter of the UE1 is decrypted according to the symmetric key K1. Decrypting the fresh parameter of the UE2 according to the symmetric key K2, the cellular network authentication network element may calculate the K1 based on the first identity of the UE and the second identity of the UE1 in the first aggregated message, based on the first identity of the UE The identifier and the second identity of the UE2 in the first aggregated message calculate the K2, and so on.
  • the cellular network authentication network element further verifies the aggregation signature Sig_AG1 in combination with the information in the first aggregation message. If the verification succeeds, the information in the first aggregation message is correct.
  • the cellular network authentication network may be pre-defined.
  • the meta-configuration includes at least two types of network authentication modes, namely, an aggregation authentication and a non-aggregation authentication.
  • the cellular authentication network element can determine, according to the aggregation authentication identifier Aggre-indicator in the first aggregation message, that the related policy needs to be verified by the aggregation authentication.
  • the signature in the first aggregated message can be pre-defined.
  • the meta-configuration includes at least two types of network authentication modes, namely, an aggregation authentication and a non-aggregation authentication.
  • the cellular authentication network element can determine, according to the aggregation authentication identifier Aggre-indicator in the first aggregation message, that the related policy needs to be verified
  • Step S705 The cellular network authentication network element sends a first response message to the transit node, where the first response message may be (ID_AU, Nonce_AU, m'_Vec, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • An identity identifier Nonce_AU is a fresh parameter Nonce of the cellular authentication network element
  • m'_Vec contains fresh parameters of each user equipment
  • fresh parameters of each user equipment are encrypted by the symmetric key of each user equipment, for example,
  • the included fresh parameters of UE1 are encrypted by K1, and the included fresh parameters of UE2 are encrypted by K2.
  • the "" indicates that other information may exist in the first response message, and Sig_AU is the private key of the authentication network element using the cellular network.
  • the Sig_AU is the second password identifier described above.
  • Step S706 The transit node receives the first response message, and forwards the first response message to each user equipment UE, for example:
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE1.
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE2.
  • Step S707 Each user equipment receives the first response message forwarded by the transit node, decrypts the fresh parameter from the first response message by using its corresponding symmetric key, and verifies the signature Sig_AU according to the information in the first response message. If it is verified that the signature Sig_AU passes and decrypts its own nonce, it indicates that the information in the first response message is correct; then, combined with the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, its second identity, and its own freshness.
  • the parameter and the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element generate a session key with the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the first identity identifier is the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, and the private key of the user equipment may be
  • the identity identification-based signature technology (English: Identity Based Signature, IBS for short) is used to process the second identity of the network, so it can also be understood as the public key of the cellular authentication network element, its own private key,
  • the fresh parameters of the cellular authentication network element and its own fresh parameters generate a session key with the cellular authentication network element, for example:
  • the UE1 decrypts the fresh parameter from the first response message by using the symmetric key K1 corresponding to the UE1 (ie, the symmetric key of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element), and verifies the signature Sig_AU, if the signature Sig_AU is verified and decrypted
  • the fresh identity of the UE1 is combined with the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element, the second identity of the UE1,
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE1, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element are generated.
  • UE2 decrypts the fresh parameter from the first response message by using the symmetric key K2 corresponding to UE2 (ie, the symmetric key of the UE2 and the cellular authentication network element), and verifies the signature Sig_AU, if the signature Sig_AU is verified and decrypted
  • the fresh parameters of the UE2 are combined with the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element, the second identity of the UE2, the fresh parameters of the cellular network authentication network element, and the fresh parameters of the UE2 to generate and authenticate the cellular network authentication network element.
  • H (ID_AU) is the cellular authentication network element public key obtained based on the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element. Therefore, it can also be understood that a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE2, the fresh parameter of the cellular network authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE2 is generated with the cellular network authentication network element. .
  • Step S708 If each of the foregoing user equipments verifies that the signature Sig_AU passes and both decrypts its own nonce from the first response message, the user equipments respectively send a second authentication message to the transit node, the second authentication message. a DH public key and a third password identifier of the cellular authentication network element, where the third password identifier is a signature of all or part of the second authentication message except the third password identifier by using a private key of the user equipment. ,E.g:
  • UE1 sends a second authentication message (Nonce_AU, Sig_UE1, ...) to the transit node, where Nonce_AU is a nonce of the cellular authentication network element, "! indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE1 is The signature of the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element is passed by the private key of UE1.
  • UE2 sends a second authentication message (Nonce_AU, Sig_UE2, ...) to the transit node, where Nonce_AU is a nonce of the cellular authentication network element, "! indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE2 is The signature of the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element is obtained by the private key of UE2.
  • Step S709 The transit node receives the second authentication message, and performs an aggregation operation on the third password identifier (ie, the signature) in each received second authentication message to generate a new aggregate signature Sig_AG.
  • the third password identifier ie, the signature
  • Step S710 The transit node sends the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message may be (ID_Vec, Nonce_AU_Vec, Sig_AG, ...), where ID_Vec includes the second identity of each user equipment.
  • Noce_AU_Vec includes the Nonce of the cellular authentication network element sent by the user equipment to the transit node, the " -- corresponding to other information that may exist in the second authentication message, and the Sig_AG is the aggregate signature.
  • Step S711 The cellular authentication network element and the information in the second aggregation message are used to verify the aggregation signature Sig_AG2 in the second aggregation message, and if the authentication signature Sig_AG2 is passed, and the nonce on the network side carried by the second aggregation message is
  • the Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element combines its own first identity, its own fresh parameters, the second identity of each user device of the multiple user devices, and the freshness of each of the multiple user devices.
  • the parameter generates a session key with each user device, for example:
  • the key, H (ID_UE1) is the public key of the UE1 obtained based on the second identity of the UE1
  • Nonce 1 is the fresh parameter nonce of the UE1
  • the Nonce_AU is the fresh parameter nonce of the cellular authentication network element, so it can also be understood as
  • the cellular network authentication network element calculates a session key with the UE1 according to its own private key, its own fresh parameters, the public key of the UE1, and the fresh parameters of the UE1.
  • the private key of the cellular authentication network element, H (ID_UE2) is the public key of the UE2 obtained based on the second identity of the UE2, Nonce 2 is the fresh parameter nonce of the UE2, and the Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the parameter nonce therefore, can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element calculates the session key with the UE2 according to its private key, its own fresh parameters, the public key of the UE2, and the fresh parameters of the UE2.
  • the foregoing steps 701-711 describe how to aggregate the signatures in the first authentication message sent by each user equipment to save the data amount. For some reasons, some user equipment may not want to send the first authentication message.
  • the transit node When the identifier indicates that the signature in the first authentication message that the user equipment is willing to send is aggregated, the transit node performs the process of steps 702-711 after learning the user equipment's willingness; When the signature in the first authentication message that the UE1 is unwilling to send is aggregated, the transit node learns the will of the user equipment and executes the processes of steps 712 to 719 in FIG. 3J.
  • Step S712 The transit node forwards the first authentication message sent by the UE1 to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first authentication message may be (UE_AGindicator, ID_UE1, ID_AU, m1, Sig_UE1, ...), where ID_UE1 is The second identity of the UE1, the ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, and the m1 is the fresh parameter Nonce1 of the UE1 encrypted by the symmetric key K1 between the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element.
  • Sig_UE1 is a signature of the ID_UE1, ID_AU and m1 through the private key of the UE1, wherein the symmetric key K1 is the second identity ID_UE1 based on the IBS technology combined with the UE1.
  • Step S713 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first authentication message sent by the transit node, and decrypts the fresh parameter of the UE1 from the first authentication message according to the symmetric key K1 with the UE1, the cellular network authentication network.
  • the symmetric key K1 may be calculated based on the first identity of the first identity and the second identity of the UE1 in the first authentication message; the cellular authentication network element further verifying the first according to the information in the first authentication message.
  • the signature Sig_UE1 in the authentication message indicates that the information in the first authentication message is correct if the verification succeeds, and then generates a fresh parameter Nonce_AU.
  • Step S714 The cellular network authentication network element sends a second response message to the transit node, where the second response message may be (ID_AU, Nonce_AU, m'1, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • An identity identifier Nonce_AU is a fresh parameter nonce of the cellular authentication network element
  • m'1 is a fresh parameter of UE1 and the fresh parameter
  • the symmetric key K1 is encrypted between the UE1 and the cellular network authentication network element
  • "" indicates that there may be other information in the second response message
  • the Sig_AU is the private key of the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step S715 The transit node receives the second response message and forwards the second response message to the UE1.
  • Step S716 The UE1 receives the second response message, and the UE1 decrypts the fresh parameter from the second response message by using the symmetric key K1 with the cellular network authentication network element, and verifies the signature by combining the information in the second response message.
  • Sig_AU if it is verified that the signature Sig_AU passes and decrypts the fresh parameter nonce1 of the UE1, it indicates that the information in the second response message is correct; and then, combining the first identity of the cellular authentication network element with the second identity of the UE1
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE1, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element are generated.
  • Step S717 The UE1 sends a second authentication message to the transit node, where the second authentication message may be (Nonce_AU, Sig_UE1, ...), where Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element carried in the second response message.
  • the parameter, the "" indicates that the second authentication message may further include other information, and the Sig_UE1 is a signature of all or part of the information except the Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message by using the private key of the UE1.
  • Step S718 The transit node receives the second authentication message and forwards the second authentication message to the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step S719 The cellular network authentication network element receives the second authentication message, and verifies the signature Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message according to the information in the second authentication message, if the signature Sig_UE1 is verified and the second authentication message is carried.
  • the nonce_AU of the network-side authentication network element indicates that the information in the second authentication message is correct; then, the cellular authentication network element according to its first identity, its own fresh parameter, and the UE1
  • the public key of the UE1, Nonce 1 is the fresh parameter nonce of
  • the second identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate the session between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate a session key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element; the first verification identifier and the second verification identifier
  • the parameters of the interaction between the user equipment and the cellular authentication network element are updated according to the change of time, and the security performance is improved; the information of the first verification identifier carried in the interaction process is in the process of interaction. After the symmetric key encryption, the security performance is further improved.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element,
  • the forwarding node is further configured to send the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the transit node is configured to use the first identity identifier to correspond to the cellular network authentication network corresponding to the first identity identifier.
  • the element sends the first aggregate message;
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the cellular network authentication network element is used to pre-store the Decoding a symmetric key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element to decrypt the first verification identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first response message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the user equipment is used to pre-store the user equipment. Decrypting the first verification identifier with a symmetric key between the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the first encryption identifier is a message authentication code MAC of the first authentication message
  • the user equipment generates a session key with the cellular network authentication network element, where the user equipment is configured according to the private key of the user, the first verification identifier, and the first response message.
  • the second verification identifier and the first identity in the first response message generate a session key with the cellular authentication network element.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a second key identifier of the first response message by the private key of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the signature of the information outside the encrypted identity is exemplified by steps S801 to S811 in Fig. 3K.
  • Step S801 The respective user equipment generates a first authentication message based on the second identity identifier of the user, the fresh parameter Nonce of the user, and the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • An authentication message the first authentication message includes the second identity identifier, the first identity identifier, a nonce and a first encryption identifier of the user equipment that are encrypted by a corresponding user equipment and a symmetric key of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the first password identifier is a message authentication code MAC generated by using the symmetric key for the first authentication message, and the message authentication code MAC may be specifically generated based on the HMAC, for example:
  • the UE 1 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • the first authentication message may be (ID_UE1, ID_AU, m1, MAC_1, ...), where ID_UE1 is the second identity of UE1.
  • ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element
  • m1 is the fresh parameter Nonce1 of the UE1 encrypted by the symmetric key K1 between the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element, and the “...” indicates the first
  • MAC_1 is a message authentication code of the first authentication message generated by using the symmetric key of the UE1.
  • the UE 2 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • the first authentication message may be (ID_UE2, ID_AU, m2, MAC_2, ...), where ID_UE2 is the second identity of UE2.
  • ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, and m2 is the fresh parameter Nonce2 of the UE2 encrypted by the symmetric key K2 between the UE2 and the cellular authentication network element, and the " -- indicates the first
  • MAC_2 is a message authentication code of the first authentication message generated by using the symmetric key of the UE2.
  • Step S802 The transit node receives the first authentication message sent by each user equipment, and uses each received message.
  • the message authentication code in the first authentication message of the user equipment is aggregated to generate an aggregation authentication code MAC_AG, which is the first encryption information.
  • Step S803 The transit node generates a first aggregated message and sends the first aggregated message to a cellular network authentication network element (Authenticator).
  • the first aggregation message may be (Aggre-indicator, ID_Vec, m_Vec, MAC_AG, ...), wherein the Aggre-indicator is an aggregation authentication flag, which is used to indicate that the message is an aggregation authentication request message, and the ID_Vec includes each user equipment.
  • the second identity identifier, m_Vec contains the fresh parameter Nonce encrypted by the corresponding symmetric key of each user equipment, and the “...” corresponds to other information that may exist in the first authentication message, and the MAC_AG is the aggregate authentication code.
  • the first identity identifier in the first authentication message may be used to indicate that the transit node sends the first aggregate message to the cellular authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier.
  • Step S804 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first aggregation message, and decrypts the fresh parameters of each user equipment from the first aggregation message according to the corresponding symmetric key. For example, the fresh parameter of the UE1 is decrypted according to the symmetric key K1. Decrypting the fresh parameter of the UE2 according to the symmetric key K2, the cellular network authentication network element may calculate the K1 based on the first identity of the UE and the second identity of the UE1 in the first aggregated message, based on the first identity of the UE The identifier and the second identity of the UE2 in the first aggregated message calculate the K2, and so on.
  • the cellular network authentication network element further verifies the aggregation authentication code MAC_AG according to the information in the first aggregation message. If the verification succeeds, the information in the first aggregation message is correct. It should be noted that the cellular network may be authenticated in advance.
  • the network element configuration includes at least two types of network authentication modes: an aggregation authentication and a non-aggregation authentication.
  • the cellular authentication network element can determine the related policy verification that needs to be authenticated by the aggregation according to the Aggre-indicator in the first aggregation message.
  • the message authentication code in the first aggregated message is the related policy verification that needs to be authenticated by the aggregation according to the Aggre-indicator in the first aggregation message.
  • Step S805 The cellular network authentication network element sends a first response message to the transit node, where the first response message may be (ID_AU, Nonce_AU, m'_Vec, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • An identity identifier Nonce_AU is a fresh parameter Nonce of the cellular authentication network element
  • m'_Vec contains fresh parameters of each user equipment, and fresh parameters of each user equipment are encrypted by the symmetric key of each user equipment, for example,
  • the included fresh parameters of UE1 are encrypted by K1, and the included fresh parameters of UE2 are encrypted by K2.
  • the "" indicates that other information may exist in the first response message, and Sig_AU is the private key of the authentication network element using the cellular network.
  • the Sig_AU is the second password identifier described above.
  • Step S806 The transit node receives the first response message, and forwards the first response message to each user equipment UE, for example:
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE1.
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE2.
  • Step S807 Each user equipment receives the first response message forwarded by the transit node, decrypts the fresh parameter from the first response message by using its corresponding symmetric key, and verifies the signature Sig_AU according to the information in the first response message. If it is verified that the signature Sig_AU passes and decrypts its own nonce, it indicates that the information in the first response message is correct; then, combined with the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, its second identity, and its own freshness.
  • the first identity identifier is the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, and the private key of the user equipment can be processed by using an identity-based signature technology (English: Identity Based Signature, IBS) to process its second identity identifier. Therefore, it can also be understood that a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, its own private key, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and its own fresh parameters is generated with the cellular authentication network element.
  • IBS Identity Based Signature
  • the UE1 decrypts the fresh parameter from the first response message by using the symmetric key K1 corresponding to the UE1 (ie, the symmetric key of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element), and verifies the signature Sig_AU, if the signature Sig_AU is verified and decrypted
  • the fresh parameter of the UE1 is combined with the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element, the second identity of the UE1, the fresh parameters of the cellular network authentication network element, and the fresh parameters of the UE1 to generate and authenticate with the cellular network.
  • the second identity identifies the private key of the UE1
  • H (ID_AU) is the cellular authentication network element public key obtained based on the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element. Therefore, it can also be understood that a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE1, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element are generated. .
  • UE2 decrypts the fresh parameter from the first response message by using the symmetric key K2 corresponding to UE2 (ie, the symmetric key of the UE2 and the cellular authentication network element), and verifies the signature Sig_AU, if the signature Sig_AU is verified and decrypted
  • the fresh parameters of the UE2 are combined with the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element, the second identity of the UE2, the fresh parameters of the cellular network authentication network element, and the fresh parameters of the UE2 to generate and authenticate the cellular network authentication network element.
  • H (ID_AU) is the cellular authentication network element public key obtained based on the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element. Therefore, it can also be understood that a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE2, the fresh parameter of the cellular network authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE2 is generated with the cellular network authentication network element. .
  • Step S808 If each of the foregoing user equipments verifies that the signature Sig_AU passes and both decrypts its own nonce from the first response message, the user equipments respectively send a second authentication message to the transit node, the second authentication message.
  • the DH public key and the third password identifier of the cellular authentication network element are included, and the third password identifier is a message authentication code MAC generated by using the corresponding symmetric key for the second authentication message, for example:
  • UE1 sends a second authentication message (Nonce_AU, MAC'_1, ...) to the transit node, where Nonce_AU is a nonce of the cellular authentication network element, "! indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, MAC'_1 is a message authentication code generated using the symmetric key K1 between the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element for the second authentication message.
  • the UE2 sends a second authentication message (Nonce_AU, MAC'_2, ...) to the transit node, where Nonce_AU is a nonce of the cellular authentication network element, and "" indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information.
  • MAC'_2 is a message authentication code generated using the symmetric key K2 between the UE2 and the cellular authentication network element for the second authentication message.
  • Step S809 The transit node receives the second authentication message, and performs an aggregation operation on the third password identifier (ie, the signature) in each received second authentication message to generate a new aggregate authentication code MAC_AG.
  • the third password identifier ie, the signature
  • Step S810 The transit node sends the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message may be (ID_Vec, Nonce_AU_Vec, MAC_AG, ...), where ID_Vec includes the second body of each user equipment.
  • the share identifier, Nonce_AU_Vec includes a Nonce of the cellular authentication network element sent by the user equipment to the transit node, and the "" corresponds to other information that may exist in the second authentication message, and the MAC_AG is the aggregate authentication code.
  • Step S811 The cellular authentication network element and the information in the second aggregation message are used to verify the aggregation authentication code MAC_AG in the second aggregation message, and if the aggregation authentication code MAC_AG is verified and the second aggregation message carries the nonce on the network side.
  • the nonce_AU of the cellular network authentication network element is combined with its first identity, its own fresh parameters, the second identity of each user device of the multiple user devices, and each user of the multiple user devices.
  • the fresh parameters of the device generate a session key with each user device, for example:
  • the private key of the cellular authentication network element, H (ID_UE1) is the public key of the UE1 obtained based on the second identity of the UE1, Nonce 1 is the fresh parameter nonce of the UE1, and the Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the parameter nonce therefore, can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element calculates the session key with the UE1 according to its own private key, its own fresh parameters, the public key of the UE1, and the fresh parameters of the UE1.
  • the private key of the cellular authentication network element, H (ID_UE2) is the public key of the UE2 obtained based on the second identity of the UE2, Nonce 2 is the fresh parameter nonce of the UE2, and the Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the parameter nonce therefore, can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element calculates the session key with the UE2 according to its private key, its own fresh parameters, the public key of the UE2, and the fresh parameters of the UE2.
  • the foregoing steps 801-811 describe how to aggregate the message authentication codes in the first authentication message sent by each user equipment to save the data amount. For some reasons, some user equipments may not want to send the first one.
  • the transit node learns the will of the user equipment, and then performs the processes of steps 802 to 811;
  • the transit node learns the will of the user equipment and then performs the processes of steps 812 to 819 in FIG. 3L.
  • Step S812 The transit node forwards the first authentication message sent by the UE1 to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first authentication message may be (UE_AGindicator, ID_UE1, ID_AU, m1, MAC_1, ...), where ID_UE1 is The second identity of the UE1, the ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, and the m1 is the fresh parameter Nonce1 of the UE1 encrypted by the symmetric key K1 between the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element.
  • the first authentication message may be (UE_AGindicator, ID_UE1, ID_AU, m1, MAC_1, 10.1.
  • ID_UE1 is The second identity of the UE1
  • ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular authentication network element
  • the m1 is the fresh parameter Nonce1 of the UE1 encrypted by the symmetric key K1 between the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element.
  • MAC_1 is a message authentication code generated by using the symmetric key K1 by the first authentication message, wherein the symmetric key K1 is a second identity identifier based on the IBS technology combined with UE1.
  • Step S813 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first authentication message sent by the transit node, and decrypts the fresh parameter of the UE1 from the first authentication message according to the symmetric key K1 with the UE1, the cellular network authentication network.
  • the symmetric key K1 may be calculated based on the first identity of the first identity and the second identity of the UE1 in the first authentication message; the cellular authentication network element further verifying the first according to the information in the first authentication message.
  • the message authentication code MAC_1 in the authentication message indicates that the information in the first authentication message is correct if the verification succeeds, and then generates a fresh parameter Nonce_AU.
  • Step S814 The cellular network authentication network element sends a second response message to the transit node, where the second response message may be (ID_AU, Nonce_AU, m'1, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • ID_AU is the number of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • An identity identifier Nonce_AU is a fresh parameter nonce of the cellular authentication network element
  • m'1 is a fresh parameter of UE1
  • the fresh parameter is encrypted by a symmetric key K1 between the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element, ""
  • the Sig_AU is a signature of all or part of the information except the Sig_AU in the second response message by using the private key of the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step S815 The transit node receives the second response message and forwards the second response message to the UE1.
  • Step S816 The UE1 receives the second response message, and the UE1 decrypts the fresh parameter from the second response message by using the symmetric key K1 with the cellular network authentication network element, and verifies the signature by combining the information in the second response message.
  • Sig_AU if the verification signature Sig_AU passes and decrypts the fresh parameter nonce1 of UE1, it indicates that the information in the second response message is correct; then, combined with the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, the second identity of UE1,
  • the cellular authentication network element public key obtained by the identity.
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE1, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element are generated.
  • Step S817 The UE1 sends a second authentication message to the transit node, where the second authentication message may be (Nonce_AU, MAC'_1, ...), where the Nonce_AU is the cellular authentication network element carried in the second response message.
  • the fresh parameter, the "" indicates that the second authentication message may further contain other information, and MAC'_1 is a message authentication code generated by using the symmetric key K1 for the second authentication message.
  • Step S818 The transit node receives the second authentication message and forwards the second authentication message to the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step S819 The cellular network authentication network element receives the second authentication message, and combines the information in the second authentication message to verify the message authentication code MAC'_1 in the second authentication message, if the verification message authentication code MAC'_1 passes And the nonce_AU of the network authentication network element carried by the second authentication message indicates that the information in the second authentication message is correct.
  • the second identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate the session between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate a session key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element; the first verification identifier and the second verification identifier
  • the parameters of the interaction between the user equipment and the cellular authentication network element are updated according to the change of time, and the security performance is improved; the information of the first verification identifier carried in the interaction process is in the process of interaction. After the symmetric key encryption, the security performance is further improved.
  • the second verification identifier in the second authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element. The following is exemplified by steps S901 to S911 in Fig. 3M.
  • Step S901 The user equipment generates a first authentication message based on the second identity identifier of the user, the non-new parameter Nonce (the nonce may be a random number, a sequence number, and the like), and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • the first authentication message includes the second identity identifier, the nonce, and the first password identifier, where the first password identifier is all but the first password identifier in the first authentication message by using a private key of the corresponding user equipment.
  • the signature of part of the information for example:
  • the UE 1 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node, where the first authentication message may be (ID_UE1, Nonce 1, Sig_UE1, . . . ), wherein ID_UE1 is the second identity of UE1.
  • Noce 1 is the fresh parameter Nonce of the UE1, the " -- indicates that other information may exist in the first authentication message, and
  • Sig_UE1 is the signature of the ID_UE1 and Nonce 1 by the private key of the UE1.
  • the UE 2 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • the first authentication message may be (ID_UE2, Nonce 2, Sig_UE2, . . . ), where ID_UE2 is the second identity of UE2.
  • Noce 2 is the fresh parameter Nonce of the UE2, the " -- indicates that other information may exist in the first authentication message, and
  • Sig_UE2 is the signature of the ID_UE2 and Nonce 2 through the private key of the UE2.
  • the data length of the aggregate signature is the same as the data length of the individual signature of each user equipment.
  • Step S903 The transit node generates a first aggregated message and sends the first aggregated message to a cellular network authentication network element (Authenticator).
  • the first aggregation message may be (Aggre-indicator, ID_Vec, Nonce_Vec, Sig_AG, ...), wherein the Aggre-indicator is an aggregation authentication flag, the ID_Vec includes a second identity of each user equipment, and the Nonce_Vec includes each user equipment. Nonce, the "" corresponds to other information that may exist in the first authentication message, and Sig_AG is the signature of the aggregation.
  • Step S904 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first aggregation message, and verifies the aggregation signature Sig_AG1 in combination with the information in the first aggregation message. If the verification succeeds, the information in the first aggregation message is correct; Yes, the network authentication mode of the cellular network authentication network element may be configured to include at least two types of network authentication modes: an aggregation authentication and a non-aggregation authentication. The cellular authentication network element may be based on the Aggre-indicator in the first aggregation message. Determining that the signature in the first aggregated message needs to be verified by a related policy of the aggregate authentication.
  • Step S905 The cellular network authentication network element sends a first response message to the transit node, where the first response message may be (ID_AU, m_Vec, Nonce_Vec, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • Step S906 The transit node receives the first response message, and forwards the first response message to each user equipment UE, for example:
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE1.
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE2.
  • Step S907 Each user equipment receives the first response message forwarded by the transit node, and verifies the signature Sig_AU according to the information in the first response message, if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the user equipment.
  • the nonce indicates that the information in the first response message is correct; then, combining the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, its second identity, its own fresh parameters, and the fresh parameters of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular network authentication network element is decrypted by the respective user equipment from the m_Vec in the first response message by using its second identity identifier
  • the first identity is the public key of the cellular authentication network element
  • the private key of the user equipment can use the identity-based signature technology (English: Identity Based Signature, IBS) to identify the second identity of the user. Processed, so it can also be understood as the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, its own private key, and the cellular network authentication.
  • Fresh element parameters and parameter generating its own fresh session key between the authentication network element of the cellular network for example:
  • the UE1 verifies the signature Sig_AU, and if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the nonce 1 of the UE1, the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, the second identity of the UE1, and the cellular network are combined.
  • the cellular network authenticates the network element public key.
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE1, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element are generated.
  • the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular network authentication network element is decrypted by the UE1 from the m_Vec in the first response message by its second identity.
  • the UE2 verifies the signature Sig_AU. If the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the nonce 2 of the UE2, the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, the second identity of the UE2, and the cellular network are combined.
  • the private key, H (ID_AU) is the cellular authentication network element public key obtained based on the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE2, the fresh parameter of the cellular network authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE2 is generated with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element is decrypted by the UE2 from the m_Vec in the first response message by its second identity.
  • Step S908 If each of the foregoing user equipments verifies that the signature Sig_AU passes and both confirms that the first response message carries its own nonce, the user equipments respectively send a second authentication message to the transit node, the second authentication message. a DH public key and a third password identifier of the cellular authentication network element, where the third password identifier is a signature of part or all of the second authentication message except the third password identifier by using a private key of the user equipment. ,E.g:
  • UE1 sends a second authentication message (m1, Sig_UE1, ...) to the transit node, where m1 is a fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element encrypted by the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element. "" indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE1 is the signature of the m1 by the private key of UE1.
  • the UE2 sends a second authentication message (m2, Sig_UE2, ...) to the transit node, where m2 is a fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element encrypted by the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element. "" indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE2 is the signature of the m2 by the private key of UE2.
  • Step S909 The transit node receives the second authentication message, and performs an aggregation operation on the third password identifier (ie, the signature) in each received second authentication message to generate a new aggregate signature Sig_AG.
  • the third password identifier ie, the signature
  • Step S910 The transit node sends the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message may be (ID_Vec, m1, Sig_AG, ...), where ID_Vec includes the second identity of each user equipment.
  • m1 is a fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, where the “...” corresponds to other information that may exist in the second authentication message, where the Sig_AG is the Aggregate the signature.
  • Step S911 The cellular network authentication network element decrypts the nonce of the network side carried in the second aggregation message by using the first identity identifier of the second network, and verifies the aggregation signature Sig_AG2 in the second aggregation message according to the information in the second aggregation message. If it is verified that the aggregated signature Sig_AG2 passes and the decrypted network-side nonce is the Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element, the first identity of the self-identification, its own fresh parameter, and the number of each of the plurality of user equipments are combined.
  • the second identity, the fresh parameter of each user device of the multiple user devices, and the session key between each user device for example:
  • the private key of the cellular authentication network element, H (ID_UE1) is the public key of the UE1 obtained based on the second identity of the UE1, Nonce 1 is the fresh parameter nonce of the UE1, and the Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the parameter nonce therefore, can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element calculates the session key with the UE1 according to its own private key, its own fresh parameters, the public key of the UE1, and the fresh parameters of the UE1.
  • the private key of the cellular authentication network element calculated by the first identity of the authentication network, H (ID_UE2) is the public key of the UE2 obtained based on the second identity of the UE2, and Nonce 2 is the fresh parameter nonce of the UE2.
  • Nonce_AU is the fresh parameter nonce of the cellular authentication network element. Therefore, it can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element calculates and the UE2 according to its own private key, its own fresh parameter, the public key of the UE2, and the fresh parameter of the UE2.
  • the first authentication message in the foregoing step 901 may further include a wish identifier UE_AGindicator, where the wish identifier UE_AGindicator is used to indicate whether the user equipment that sends the first authentication message is willing to
  • the transit node learns the will of the user equipment, and then performs the process of steps 902 to 911;
  • the transit node learns the will of the user equipment and executes the processes of steps 912-919 in FIG. 3N.
  • Step S912 The transit node forwards the first authentication message sent by the UE1 to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first authentication message may be (UE_AGindicator, ID_UE1, Nonce 1, Sig_UE1, ...), wherein the willingness identifier UE_AGindicator indicates The signature of the UE1 is unwilling to be aggregated in the first authentication message, ID_UE1 is the second identity of the UE1, and Nonce1 is the fresh parameter of the UE1, and the “...” indicates that there may be other in the first authentication message.
  • the Sig_UE1 is a signature of all or part of the first authentication message except the Sig_UE1 using the private key of the user equipment UE1.
  • Step S913 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first authentication message sent by the transit node, and verifies the signature Sig_UE1 in the first authentication message according to the information in the first authentication message, and if the verification succeeds, indicates the first The information in the authentication message is correct and then the fresh parameter Nonce_AU is generated.
  • Step S914 The cellular network authentication network element sends a second response message to the transit node, where the second response message may be (ID_AU, m1, Nonce 1, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the first of the cellular authentication network element.
  • ID_AU is the first of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the identity identifier, m1 is the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element encrypted by the second identity of the UE1
  • the nonce1 is the nonce of the UE1 carried in the first authentication message
  • the “...” indicates the second response message.
  • Step S915 The transit node receives the second response message and forwards the second response message to the UE1.
  • Step S916 The UE1 receives the second response message, and decrypts the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular network authentication network element from the second response message by using the second identity identifier of the UE1, and performs verification according to the information in the second response message.
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE1, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element are generated.
  • Step S917 The UE1 sends a second authentication message to the transit node, where the second authentication message may be (m'1, Sig_UE1, ...), where m'1 is the first identity of the authentication network element through the cellular network.
  • the encrypted fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element, the "" indicates that the second authentication message may further contain other information, and the Sig_UE1 is the private key of the UE1, except for the Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message. Signature of all or part of the information.
  • Step S918 The transit node receives the second authentication message and forwards the second authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element.
  • Step S919 The cellular network authentication network element receives the second authentication message, and decrypts the fresh parameter nonce of the network side from the second authentication message by using the first identity identifier of the network, and performs verification according to the information in the second authentication message.
  • the signature Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message indicates that the information in the second authentication message is correct if the fresh parameter of the network side that is verified by the signature Sig_UE1 and is decrypted is its own fresh parameter Nonce_AU; then, the cellular authentication network
  • the second identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate the session between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate a session key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element; the first verification identifier and the second verification identifier All of them belong to the fresh parameter nonce, so that the parameters of the interaction between the user equipment and the cellular authentication network element are updated according to the change of time, and the security performance is improved; the second identity identifier and the first identity identifier can also be used for Encrypting the second verification identifier carried in the interaction process further improves security performance.
  • the cellular network authentication network element is further configured to generate, according to the second identity identifier, a symmetric key with the user equipment, where the second identifier is in the second authentication message.
  • the second verification identifier is encrypted by a symmetric key between the cellular network authentication network element and the user equipment.
  • Step S1001 The user equipment generates a first authentication message based on the second identity identifier of the user, the non-new parameter Nonce (Nonce may be a random number, a sequence number, and the like), and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • the first authentication message includes the second identity identifier, the nonce, and the first password identifier, where the first password identifier is all but the first password identifier in the first authentication message by using a private key of the corresponding user equipment.
  • the signature of part of the information for example:
  • the UE 1 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node, where the first authentication message may be (ID_UE1, Nonce 1, Sig_UE1, . . . ), wherein ID_UE1 is the second identity of UE1.
  • Noce 1 is the fresh parameter Nonce of the UE1, the " -- indicates that other information may exist in the first authentication message, and
  • Sig_UE1 is the signature of the ID_UE1 and Nonce 1 by the private key of the UE1.
  • the UE 2 generates a first authentication message and sends the first authentication message to the transit node.
  • the first authentication message may be (ID_UE2, Nonce 2, Sig_UE2, . . . ), where ID_UE2 is the second identity of UE2.
  • Noce 2 is the fresh parameter Nonce of the UE2, the " -- indicates that other information may exist in the first authentication message, and
  • Sig_UE2 is the signature of the ID_UE2 and Nonce 2 through the private key of the UE2.
  • the data length of the aggregate signature is the same as the data length of the individual signature of each user equipment.
  • Step S1003 The transit node generates a first aggregated message and sends the first aggregated message to a cellular network authentication network element (Authenticator).
  • the first aggregation message may be (Aggre-indicator, ID_Vec, Nonce_Vec, Sig_AG, ...), wherein the Aggre-indicator is an aggregation authentication flag, the ID_Vec includes a second identity of each user equipment, and the Nonce_Vec includes each user equipment. Nonce, the "" corresponds to other information that may exist in the first authentication message, and Sig_AG is the signature of the aggregation.
  • Step S1004 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first aggregation message, and verifies the aggregation signature Sig_AG1 in combination with the information in the first aggregation message. If the verification succeeds, the information in the first aggregation message is correct; Yes, the network authentication mode of the cellular network authentication network element may be configured to include at least two types of network authentication modes: an aggregation authentication and a non-aggregation authentication. The cellular authentication network element may be based on the Aggre-indicator in the first aggregation message. Determining that the signature in the first aggregated message needs to be verified by a related policy of the aggregate authentication.
  • Step S1005 The cellular network authentication network element sends a first response message to the transit node, where the first response message may be (ID_AU, m_Vec, Nonce_Vec, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • m_Vec includes a plurality of encrypted Nonces, and each encrypted Nonce specifically refers to obtaining a fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element through a symmetric key between the cellular authentication network element and a user equipment, and the respective users are obtained.
  • a symmetric key exists between each user equipment in the device and the cellular authentication network element.
  • m_Vec [En(Nonce_AU, K1), En(Nonce_AU, K2)] ⁇ T, where En(Nonce_AU, K1) represents a symmetric key K1 to the cell between the network element and the UE1 through the cellular network.
  • the signature of all or part of the information except the Sig_AU in the first response message, Sig_AU is the second password identifier described above.
  • Step S1006 The transit node receives the first response message, and forwards the first response message to each user equipment UE, for example:
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE1.
  • the transit node forwards the first response message to UE2.
  • Step S1007 Each user equipment receives the first response message forwarded by the transit node, and verifies the signature Sig_AU according to the information in the first response message, if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the user equipment.
  • the nonce indicates that the information in the first response message is correct; then, combining the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, its second identity, its own fresh parameters, and the fresh parameters of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the number is generated with a session key between the cellular network authentication network element, and the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular network authentication network element is a symmetric key corresponding to the user equipment by itself (for example, the symmetric key corresponding to UE1 is K1, UE2)
  • the corresponding symmetric key is K2) decrypted from the m_Vec in the first response message;
  • the first identity is the public key of the cellular authentication network element, and the private key of the user equipment can use the identity-based signature Technology (English: Identity Based Signature, IBS for short) processes its own second identity, so it can also be understood as the public key of the cellular authentication network element, its own private key, and the cellular authentication network element.
  • the fresh parameters and their own fresh parameters generate a session key with the cellular authentication network element, for example:
  • the UE1 verifies the signature Sig_AU, and if the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the nonce 1 of the UE1, the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, the second identity of the UE1, and the cellular network are combined.
  • the cellular network authenticates the network element public key.
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE1, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element are generated.
  • the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element is decrypted by the UE1 from the m_Vec in the first response message by the symmetric key K1 between itself and the cellular authentication network element.
  • the UE2 verifies the signature Sig_AU. If the signature Sig_AU is verified and the first response message carries the nonce 2 of the UE2, the first identity of the cellular authentication network element, the second identity of the UE2, and the cellular authentication are combined.
  • the cellular network authenticates the network element public key.
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE2, the fresh parameter of the cellular network authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE2 is generated with the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element is decrypted by the UE2 from the m_Vec in the first response message by the symmetric key K2 between itself and the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step S1008 If each of the foregoing user equipments verifies that the signature Sig_AU passes and both confirms that the first response message carries its own nonce, the user equipments respectively send a second authentication message to the transit node, the second authentication message. a DH public key and a third password identifier of the cellular authentication network element, where the third password identifier is a signature of part or all of the second authentication message except the third password identifier by using a private key of the user equipment. ,E.g:
  • UE1 sends a second authentication message (m1, Sig_UE1, ...) to the transit node, where m1 is the cellular authentication network element encrypted by the symmetric key K1 between the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element.
  • the fresh parameter Nonce_AU, "" indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE1 is the signature of the m1 by the private key of UE1.
  • the UE2 sends a second authentication message (m2, Sig_UE2, ...) to the transit node, where m2 is the cellular authentication network element encrypted by the symmetric key K2 between the UE2 and the cellular authentication network element.
  • the fresh parameter Nonce_AU, "" indicates that the second authentication message may contain other information, and Sig_UE2 is the signature of the m2 by the private key of UE2.
  • Step S1009 The transit node receives the second authentication message, and in the received second authentication message.
  • the third password identifier ie, signature
  • Step S1010 The transit node sends the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message may be (ID_Vec, m_Vec, Sig_AG, ...), where ID_Vec includes the second identity of each user equipment.
  • m_Vec includes a plurality of encrypted nones, and each encrypted nonce is specifically a symmetric key between the cellular authentication network element and a user equipment in each user equipment, and encrypts the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element. Obtaining that the plurality of encrypted nonce are in one-to-one correspondence with the respective user equipments; the “...” corresponds to other information that may exist in the second authentication message, and the Sig_AG is the aggregated signature.
  • Step S1011 The cellular network authentication network element decrypts the nonce of the network side carried in the second aggregation message by using the corresponding symmetric key, and verifies the aggregation signature Sig_AG2 in the second aggregation message according to the information in the second aggregation message, if the verification is performed.
  • the nonce_AU of the network-authenticated network element that is passed through the encrypted signature Sig_AG2 is combined with its own first identity, its own fresh parameters, and the second identity of each user equipment of the multiple user equipments.
  • the identifier, the fresh parameter of each user equipment of the plurality of user equipments, and the session key between each user equipment for example:
  • the private key of the cellular authentication network element, H (ID_UE1) is the public key of the UE1 obtained based on the second identity of the UE1, Nonce 1 is the fresh parameter nonce of the UE1, and the Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the parameter nonce therefore, can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element calculates the session key with the UE1 according to its own private key, its own fresh parameters, the public key of the UE1, and the fresh parameters of the UE1.
  • the private key of the cellular authentication network element, H (ID_UE2) is the public key of the UE2 obtained based on the second identity of the UE2, Nonce 2 is the fresh parameter nonce of the UE2, and the Nonce_AU is the freshness of the cellular authentication network element.
  • the parameter nonce therefore, can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element calculates the session key with the UE2 according to its private key, its own fresh parameters, the public key of the UE2, and the fresh parameters of the UE2.
  • the foregoing steps 1001 to 1011 describe how to aggregate the signatures in the first authentication message sent by each user equipment to save the data amount. For some reasons, some user equipments may not want to send the first authentication message.
  • the transit node When the identifier indicates that the signature in the first authentication message that the user equipment is willing to send is aggregated, the transit node performs the process of steps 1002 to 1011 after learning the user equipment's willingness; When the signature in the first authentication message that the UE1 is not willing to send is aggregated, the transit node learns the will of the user equipment and executes the processes of steps 1012 to 1019 in FIG. 3P.
  • Step S1012 The transit node forwards the first authentication message sent by the UE1 to the cellular network authentication network element, where
  • the first authentication message may be (UE_AGindicator, ID_UE1, Nonce 1, Sig_UE1, ...), wherein the intention identifier UE_AGindicator indicates that the signature in the first authentication message that the UE1 is unwilling to be aggregated, and the ID_UE1 is the second identity of the UE1.
  • No. 1 is a fresh parameter of the UE1, and the “...” indicates that there may be other information in the first authentication message, where the Sig_UE1 is a private key of the user equipment UE1, except for the Sig_UE1 in the first authentication message. Signature of all or part of the information.
  • Step S1013 The cellular network authentication network element receives the first authentication message sent by the transit node, and verifies the signature Sig_UE1 in the first authentication message according to the information in the first authentication message, and if the verification succeeds, indicates the first The information in the authentication message is correct and then the fresh parameter Nonce_AU is generated.
  • Step S914 The cellular network authentication network element sends a second response message to the transit node, where the second response message may be (ID_AU, m1, Nonce 1, Sig_AU, ...), where ID_AU is the first of the cellular authentication network element.
  • ID_AU is the first of the cellular authentication network element.
  • An identifier m1 is a fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element encrypted by the symmetric key between the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element, and Nonce 1 is a Nonce of the UE 1 carried in the first authentication message, " indicates that there may be other information in the second response message, and
  • Sig_AU is a signature of all or part of the information except the Sig_AU in the second response message using the private key of the cellular authentication network element.
  • Step S1015 The transit node receives the second response message and forwards the second response message to the UE1.
  • Step S1016 The UE1 receives the second response message, and decrypts the fresh parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular network authentication network element from the second response message by using a symmetric key between the UE and the cellular network authentication network element, and combines the first The information in the second response message is used to verify the signature Sig_AU in the second response message.
  • the private key of the UE1, H (ID_AU) is the cellular authentication network element public key obtained based on the first identity of the cellular network authentication network element.
  • a session key between the public key of the cellular network authentication network element, the private key of the UE1, the fresh parameter of the cellular authentication network element, and the fresh parameter of the UE1 and the cellular authentication network element are generated.
  • Step S1017 The UE1 sends a second authentication message to the transit node, where the second authentication message may be (m1, Sig_UE1, ...), where m1 is a symmetric key encryption between the UE1 and the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the new parameter Nonce_AU of the cellular authentication network element, the "" indicates that the second authentication message may further contain other information, and the Sig_UE1 is the private key of the UE1 except the Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message. Signature of all or part of the information.
  • Step S1018 The transit node receives the second authentication message and forwards the second authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element.
  • Step S1019 The cellular network authentication network element receives the second authentication message, and decrypts the fresh parameter nonce of the network side from the second authentication message by using the symmetric key between the UE and the UE1, and combines the second authentication message with the second authentication message.
  • the information of the signature Sig_UE1 in the second authentication message is verified.
  • the fresh parameter of the network side that is verified by the signature Sig_UE1 and is decrypted is its own fresh parameter Nonce_AU
  • the information in the second authentication message is correct; then, the cell is The network authentication network element according to its first identity, its own fresh parameters, the second identity of the UE1, and the UE1
  • Nonce 1 is the fresh parameter nonce of UE1
  • Nonce_AU is the fresh parameter nonce of the cellular authentication network element. Therefore, it can also be understood that the cellular authentication network element is based on its own private key, its own fresh parameters, and the public key of the UE1. The fresh parameters of the UE1 are calculated with the session key between the UE1.
  • the second identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate the session between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first identity identifier can be used not only to identify the source and destination of the corresponding message, but also to calculate a session key between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element; the first verification identifier and the second verification identifier.
  • the parameters of the interaction between the user equipment and the authentication network element of the cellular network are updated according to the change of time, and the security performance is improved; the information of the second verification identifier carried in the interaction process is in the process of interaction. After the symmetric key encryption, the security performance is further improved.
  • the transit node when the transit node performs an aggregation operation on the first password identifier in the multiple first authentication messages, and the session key is not successfully established between the user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, the above may be repeated.
  • the solution is to establish the session key again; the transit node can also adjust the network authentication strategy, and there are many adjusted policies.
  • Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 The following is an example of Strategy 1 and Strategy 2.
  • Strategy 1 Steps S331 to S333 shown in FIG. 3Q are executed.
  • Step S331 The cellular network authentication network element sends a verification failure message to the transit node when it is verified that the information in the first aggregated message is incorrect.
  • Step S332 The transit node receives the verification failure message and forwards the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments to the cellular authentication network element according to the verification failure message.
  • the transit node when the transit node learns that the cellular authentication network element verifies that the information in the second aggregated message is incorrect, the transit node aggregates the first authentication that is originally aggregated into the first aggregated message.
  • the message is separately forwarded to the cellular authentication network element.
  • the first password information in the first aggregation message is obtained by aggregating the first password identifier in the three first authentication messages, and the transit node forwards the three first authentication messages to the cellular network authentication respectively.
  • the network element is no longer aggregated with the information in the three first authentication messages.
  • Step S333 The cellular network authentication network element separately verifies each user equipment of the plurality of the user equipments according to the first authentication message.
  • the cellular network authentication network element receives the first authentication message instead of the first aggregation message, and the cellular authentication network element receives the first authentication message corresponding to each of the multiple user equipments, so the cellular The network authentication network element separately authenticates each user equipment according to each first authentication message, and if the verification succeeds, sends a third response message to the transit node, where the third response message is different from the first response message in that
  • the third response message includes a first verification identifier of the single user equipment, and the first response message includes a first verification identifier of the multiple user equipments.
  • Strategy 2 Steps S333 to S337 shown in FIG. 3R are executed.
  • Step S334 The cellular network authentication network element sends a verification failure message to the transit node when it is verified that the information in the first aggregated message is incorrect.
  • Step S335 The transit node receives the verification failure message, and performs aggregation calculation according to the verification failure message.
  • the method generates fourth encrypted information based on the third encrypted identifier in the first authentication message in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments.
  • Step S336 The forwarding node sends a third aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the third aggregation message includes the fourth encryption information, and the second part of the part of the first authentication message. And the first verification identifier in the identifier and the part of the first authentication message.
  • the transit node when the transit node learns that the cellular authentication network element verifies that the information in the second aggregated message is incorrect, the transit node aggregates the first authentication that is originally aggregated into the first aggregated message.
  • the message is divided into multiple parts, and each part can form a third aggregated message, and the transit node sends a third aggregated message to the cellular authentication network element for authentication.
  • Step S337 The cellular network authentication network element is further configured to receive the third aggregated message and verify, by using the fourth encrypted information, whether information in the third aggregated message is correct.
  • the cellular network authentication network element receives the third aggregated message instead of the first aggregated message, so the cellular network authentication network element performs verification on a part of the user equipment according to the third aggregated message, and if the verification succeeds, the transfer is performed to the transit
  • the node sends a fourth response message, and the fourth response message is different from the first response message in that the number of the first verification identifier of the user equipment included in the fourth response message is smaller than that of the user equipment included in the first response message.
  • the number of first verification IDs is used to the third aggregated message.
  • the user equipment sends the first authentication message required for the authentication to the transit node when the network authentication is performed, and the signature or message in the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the multiple user equipments.
  • the authentication code is aggregated to obtain an aggregated signature or an aggregated authentication code, and the transit node uniformly sends the information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element, and uniformly sends the message.
  • the correctness of the message is ensured based on the aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a transit node 40 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the transit node 40 may include a first receiving unit 401, a first aggregating unit 402, a first sending unit 403, and a second receiving.
  • the first receiving unit 401 is configured to receive a first authentication message that is sent by multiple user equipments, where the first authentication message sent by each user equipment includes a first verification identifier and a first encryption of each user equipment. And the first verification identifier is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify the identity of each user equipment, where the first encryption identifier is information other than the first encryption identifier in the first authentication message. Encrypted sequence
  • the first aggregating unit 402 is configured to generate, by using an aggregation algorithm, the first encrypted information according to the first encrypted identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments;
  • the first sending unit 403 is configured to send the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the first aggregation message includes the first encryption information and the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments.
  • the first verification identifier ;
  • the second receiving unit 404 is configured to receive a first response message sent by the cellular network authentication network element, where the first response The message is that the cellular authentication network element is configured to verify that the information in the first aggregated message is correct according to the first encrypted message, where the first response message includes a second verification identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, a second encryption identifier and the first verification identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipment, where the second encryption identifier is other than the second verification identifier in the first response message. Encrypted sequence of information;
  • the second sending unit 405 is configured to forward the first response message to the user equipment, where the first verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to verify whether the identity of the cellular network authentication network element is Security, the second verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to forward to the cellular network authentication network element, where the cellular network authentication network element verifies whether the identity of the user equipment is secure. .
  • the user equipment sends the first authentication message required for the authentication to the transit node when the network authentication is performed, and the signature or the message authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the multiple user equipments.
  • the aggregation budget is used to obtain an aggregation signature or an aggregation authentication code, and the transit node uniformly sends information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element, and the uniformly sent message is based on the
  • the aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code ensure the correctness of the message. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • the transit node 40 further includes:
  • the third receiving unit is configured to receive the second authentication message that is sent by the multiple user equipments, where the second authentication message is that the user equipment determines that the first response identifier is included in the first response message. And generating, according to the second encryption identifier, that the information in the first response message is correct, the second authentication message includes the second verification identifier and a third encryption identifier, where the third encryption identifier is An encrypted sequence of information in the second authentication message other than the third encrypted identifier;
  • the second aggregating unit is configured to generate, by using an aggregation algorithm, the third encrypted information according to the third encrypted identifier in the second authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments;
  • the third sending unit is configured to send a second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message includes the third encryption information and the second verification identifier carried in the second authentication message;
  • the second verification identifier in the second aggregation message is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify whether the identity of the multiple user equipments is secure.
  • the first response message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the second verification identifier in the second authentication message passes the cellular network
  • the first identity of the authentication network element is encrypted.
  • the second verification identifier in the second authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the cellular network authentication network element and the user equipment.
  • the first verification identifier is a DH public key of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is used to exclude the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment. The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identifier.
  • the second verification identifier is a DH public key of the cellular authentication network element
  • the second encrypted identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is used to exclude the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment. Outside the first encrypted identifier The signature of the information.
  • the second verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element. A signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first aggregation message includes a first one of each of the plurality of the user equipments.
  • a first identity identifier where the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, where the first sending unit is configured to use, according to the first identity identifier in the first authentication message,
  • the cellular authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier sends a first aggregation message
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification identifier in the first response message passes the
  • the second identity identifier of the user equipment is encrypted; the first encryption identifier is a signature of information in the first authentication message other than the first encryption identifier by using a private key of the user equipment.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element. A signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message.
  • the first verification identifier is a nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the first sending unit Specifically, the method is used to send, according to the first identity identifier in the first verification message, the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification in the first response message Identifying a symmetric key encryption between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, where the first encrypted identifier is the same as the first authentication message in the first authentication message by using the private key of the user equipment The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element. A signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, the first The sending unit is configured to send, according to the first identity identifier in the first authentication message, the first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier;
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification in the first response message
  • the symmetric key encryption between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element is identified, and the first encrypted identifier is a message authentication code MAC of the first authentication message.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element. A signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message.
  • the first authentication message includes an aggregation identifier for performing an aggregation operation based on the first encryption identifier
  • the transit node 40 further includes:
  • the determining unit is configured to determine, according to the aggregation identifier, whether an aggregation operation needs to be performed on the first encrypted identifier;
  • the first aggregating unit 402 is specifically configured to: when the determining result of the determining unit is yes, execute, by the first aggregating unit, the first authentication message that is sent by the multiple user equipment by using the aggregation algorithm.
  • the first encrypted identifier in the first encrypted identifier is generated;
  • the fourth sending unit is configured to forward the first authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element when the determining result of the determining unit is negative;
  • the fourth receiving unit is configured to receive a second response message sent by the cellular network authentication network element, where the second response message is that the cellular network authentication network element verifies the first authentication by using the first encrypted identifier
  • the second response message includes a fourth encrypted identifier, the second verification identifier, and the first verification identifier of the user equipment, where the fourth encrypted identifier is the first An encrypted sequence of information other than the fourth encrypted identifier in the second response message;
  • the fifth sending unit is configured to forward the second response message to the user equipment, where the first verification identifier in the second response message is used by the user equipment to verify whether the identity of the cellular network authentication network element is secure.
  • the second verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to forward to the cellular network authentication network element, so that the cellular network authentication network element verifies whether the identity of the user equipment is secure.
  • the transit node 40 further includes
  • the fifth receiving unit is configured to receive the second authentication message that is sent by the user equipment, where the second authentication message is that the user equipment determines that the second response message includes the first verification identifier of the user and according to The second encryption identifier is generated when the information in the second response message is correct, and the second authentication message includes the second verification identifier and the third encryption identifier, where the third encryption identifier is An encrypted sequence of information other than the third encrypted identifier in the second authentication message;
  • the sixth sending unit is configured to forward the second authentication message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second verification identifier in the second authentication message is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify the multiple Whether the identity of the user device is secure.
  • the transit node 40 further includes:
  • the sixth receiving unit is configured to receive a verification failure message sent by the cellular network authentication network element when verifying that the information in the first aggregation message is incorrect;
  • the seventh sending unit is configured to forward the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments to the cellular authentication network element according to the verification failure message, where the cellular network authentication network element respectively performs the Each user device of the plurality of user devices performs verification separately.
  • the transit node 40 further includes:
  • the seventh receiving unit is configured to receive a verification failure message sent by the cellular network authentication network element when verifying that the information in the first aggregation message is incorrect;
  • the third aggregating unit is configured to generate, according to the verification failure message, the fourth encrypted information by using the third encryption identifier in a part of the first authentication message in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using an aggregation algorithm. ;
  • the eighth sending unit is configured to send a third aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the third aggregation message includes the fourth authentication information and the first verification in the part of the first authentication message Logo.
  • the user equipment first sends a first authentication message required for authentication to the transit node when the network authentication is performed, and the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the plurality of user equipments is used.
  • the signature or the message authentication code is aggregated to obtain an aggregation signature or an aggregation authentication code, and the transit node uniformly sends the information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the uniformly sent message ensures the correctness of the message based on the aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • FIG. 5 is still another transit node 50 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the transit node 50 includes a processor 501, a memory 502, and a transceiver 503.
  • the processor 501, the memory 502, and the transceiver 503 pass The buses are connected to each other.
  • Memory 502 includes, but is not limited to, random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM or flash memory), or portable read only memory (CD-ROM), Memory 502 is used for related instructions and data.
  • RAM random access memory
  • ROM read only memory
  • EPROM erasable programmable read only memory
  • CD-ROM portable read only memory
  • the transceiver 503 is for receiving and transmitting data.
  • the processor 501 may be one or more central processing units (English: Central Processing Unit, CPU for short). In the case that the processor 501 is a CPU, the CPU may be a single core CPU or a multi-core CPU.
  • CPU Central Processing Unit
  • the processor 501 in the transit node 50 is configured to read the program code stored in the memory 502, and perform the following operations:
  • the processor 501 receives the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments by using the transceiver 503, and the first authentication message sent by each user equipment includes the first verification identifier and the first encryption of each user equipment. And the first verification identifier is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify the identity of each user equipment, where the first encryption identifier is information other than the first encryption identifier in the first authentication message. Encrypted sequence
  • the processor 501 generates first encrypted information by using an aggregation algorithm based on the first encrypted identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments;
  • the processor 501 sends a first aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element by using the transceiver 503, where the first aggregation message includes the first encryption information and the first authentication sent by the multiple user equipments The first verification identifier in the message;
  • the processor 501 receives the first response message sent by the cellular network authentication network element by using the transceiver 503, where the first response message is that the cellular network authentication network element verifies the first aggregated message according to the first encrypted message. If the information is correct, the first response message includes the second verification identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, the second encryption identifier, and the first identifier in the first authentication message sent by the multiple user equipments. a verification identifier, where the second encryption identifier is an encrypted sequence of information in the first response message other than the second verification identifier;
  • the processor 501 forwards the first response message to the user equipment by using the transceiver 503.
  • the first verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to verify whether the identity of the cellular network authentication network element is Security
  • the second verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to forward to the cellular network authentication network element, where the cellular network authentication network element verifies whether the identity of the user equipment is secure. .
  • the user equipment sends the first authentication message required for the authentication to the transit node when the network authentication is performed, and the signature or the message authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the multiple user equipments.
  • the aggregation budget is used to obtain an aggregation signature or an aggregation authentication code, and the transit node uniformly sends information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element, and the uniformly sent message is based on the
  • the aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code ensure the correctness of the message. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • the processor 501 forwards the first response message to the user equipment by using the transceiver 503, the processor 501 is further configured to:
  • the second authentication message that is sent by the multiple user equipments, where the second authentication message is that the user equipment determines that the first response identifier is included in the first response message, and according to The second encryption identifier is generated when the information in the first response message is correct, and the second authentication message includes the second verification identifier and the third encryption identifier, where the third encryption identifier is An encrypted sequence of information other than the third encrypted identifier in the second authentication message;
  • the transceiver 503 Transmitting, by the transceiver 503, the second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the second aggregation message includes the third encryption information and the second verification identifier carried in the second authentication message;
  • the second verification identifier in the second aggregation message is used by the cellular network authentication network element to verify whether the identity of the multiple user equipments is secure.
  • the first response message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the second verification identifier in the second authentication message passes the cellular network
  • the first identity of the authentication network element is encrypted.
  • the second verification identifier in the second authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the cellular network authentication network element and the user equipment.
  • the first verification identifier is a DH public key of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is used to exclude the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment. The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identifier.
  • the second verification identifier is a DH public key of the cellular authentication network element
  • the second encrypted identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first encryption identifier is used to exclude the first authentication message by using a private key of the user equipment. The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identifier.
  • the second verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element. A signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment
  • the first aggregation message includes a first one of each of the plurality of the user equipments.
  • a second identity identifier the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the processor 501 sends a second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element by using the transceiver 503, specifically:
  • the processor 501 sends, by using the transceiver 503, the first aggregation message to the cellular authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier, according to the first identity identifier in the first authentication message.
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by the first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification identifier in the first response message passes the
  • the second identity identifier of the user equipment is encrypted; the first encryption identifier is a signature of information in the first authentication message other than the first encryption identifier by using a private key of the user equipment.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element. A signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message.
  • the first verification identifier is a nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the processor 501 sends a second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element by using the transceiver 503, specifically:
  • the processor 501 sends a first aggregation message to the cellular authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier by using the transceiver 503 according to the first identity identifier in the first verification message.
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification in the first response message Identifying a symmetric key encryption between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, where the first encrypted identifier is the same as the first authentication message in the first authentication message by using the private key of the user equipment The signature of the information outside the first encrypted identification.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element. A signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message.
  • the first verification identifier is a fresh parameter nonce of the user equipment;
  • the first authentication message includes a first identity identifier of the cellular network authentication network element;
  • the processor 501 sends a second aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element by using the transceiver 503, specifically:
  • the processor 501 sends, by using the transceiver 503, the first aggregation message to the cellular authentication network element corresponding to the first identity identifier, according to the first identity identifier in the first authentication message.
  • the first verification identifier in the first authentication message is encrypted by a symmetric key between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element, and the first verification in the first response message
  • the symmetric key encryption between the pre-stored user equipment and the cellular network authentication network element is identified, and the first encrypted identifier is a message authentication code MAC of the first authentication message.
  • the second verification identifier is the nonce of the cellular network authentication network element
  • the second encryption identifier is a private key pair that is authenticated by the cellular network authentication network element. A signature of the information other than the second encrypted identifier in the first response message.
  • the first authentication message includes an aggregation identifier for indicating whether to perform an aggregation operation based on the first encryption identifier; the processor 501 is further configured to:
  • the processor 501 forwards the first authentication message to the cellular authentication network element through the transceiver 503.
  • the processor 501 receives, by using the transceiver 503, a second response message sent by the cellular network authentication network element, where the second response message is that the cellular network authentication network element verifies the first by using the first encrypted identifier.
  • the second response message includes a fourth encrypted identifier, the second verification identifier, and the first verification identifier of the user equipment, where the fourth encrypted identifier is the An encrypted sequence of information in the second response message other than the fourth encrypted identifier;
  • the processor 501 forwards the second response message to the user equipment by using the transceiver 503.
  • the first verification identifier in the second response message is used by the user equipment to verify whether the identity of the cellular network authentication network element is Security
  • the second verification identifier in the first response message is used by the user equipment to forward to the cellular network authentication network element, where the cellular network authentication network element verifies whether the identity of the user equipment is secure. .
  • the processor 501 forwards the second response message to the user equipment by using the transceiver 503, the processor 501 is further configured to:
  • the second authentication message is that the user equipment determines that the second response message includes the first verification identifier of the user, and according to the When the second encryption identifier is verified to be correct when the information in the second response message is correct, the second authentication message includes the second verification identifier and the third encryption identifier, and the third encryption identifier is the second identifier An encrypted sequence of information other than the third encrypted identifier in the authentication message;
  • processor 501 is further configured to:
  • processor 501 is further configured to:
  • the transceiver 503 Transmitting, by the transceiver 503, the third aggregation message to the cellular network authentication network element, where the third aggregation message includes the fourth encryption information and the first verification identifier in the part of the first authentication message.
  • relay node 50 shown in FIG. 5 can also refer to the corresponding description of the method embodiments shown in FIGS. 3A to 3R.
  • the user equipment first sends a first authentication message required for authentication to the transit node when the network authentication is performed, and the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the multiple user equipments is used.
  • Signature Or the message authentication code is aggregated to obtain an aggregation signature or an aggregation authentication code, and the transit node uniformly sends the information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element for unified transmission.
  • the message ensures the correctness of the message based on the aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • the user equipment sends the first authentication message required for the authentication to the transit node when the network authentication is performed, and the first authentication message sent by the transit node to the multiple user equipments.
  • the signature or the message authentication code in the aggregation budget is used to obtain an aggregation signature or an aggregation authentication code
  • the transit node uniformly sends information other than the signature and the authentication code in the first authentication message sent by the multiple users to the cellular network authentication network element.
  • the uniformly sent message ensures the correctness of the message based on the aggregated signature and the aggregated authentication code. Accordingly, the cellular network synchronizes the plurality of user equipments based on the received information, thereby saving data overhead in the authentication process.
  • the foregoing storage medium includes various media that can store program codes, such as a ROM, a RAM, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

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Abstract

本发明实施例公开了一种网络认证方法、中转节点及相关系统，该系统包括用户设备、中转节点和蜂窝网认证网元，用户设备用于向中转节点发送的第一认证消息，转发节点用于接收多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息，并通过聚合算法基于多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；蜂窝网认证网元用于接收第一聚合消息并在通过第一加密信息验证第一聚合消息中的信息正确时向中转节点发送第一响应消息，用户设备用于在验证出第一响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时，生成与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。采用本发明实施例，能够在多个用户设备进行网络认证时减轻网络侧的认证网元的负载。

Description

一种网络认证方法、中转节点及相关系统 技术领域
本发明涉及计算机技术领域，尤其涉及一种网络认证方法、中转节点及相关系统。
背景技术
物联网(英文：Internet of Things，简称：IoT)是第五代移动通信技术(英文：5th-Generation，简称：5G)的重要应用场景，IoT中的用户设备接入到5G网络需要进行网络认证，图1为现有技术中用户设备进行网络认证的交互示意图，认证过程如下：
步骤S101：用户设备(英文：User Equipment，简称：UE)向移动性管理实体(MME:Mobility Management Entity，MME)发送入网请求。
步骤S102：该MME接收该入网请求并向归属签约服务器(英文：Home Subcribing Server，简称：HSS)发送入网数据请求。
步骤S103：该HSS接收该入网数据请求并确定与该入网请求对应的密钥K,然后根据该秘钥K计算认证向量，该认证向量包括网络侧认证令牌(英文：Authentication Token，简称：AUTNHSS)，期待响应(英文：Expected Response，简称：XRES)和接入安全管理秘钥(英文：Key Acess Security Management Entity，简称：KASME)。
步骤S104：该HSS将该认证向量发送给MME。
步骤S105：该MME接收并保存该认证向量。
步骤S106：该MME向UE发起用户认证请求，该用户认证请求包括随机数RAND、AUTNHSS和KASME。
步骤S107：该UE接收该RAND和AUTNHSS并利用演进分组系统(英文：Evolved Packet System，简称：EPS)第三代移动通讯网络的认证与密钥协商协议(英文：Authentication and Key Agreement，简称：AKA)密钥推演算法进行运算，运算的输入参数包括根秘钥K,RAND,服务网络(英文：Serving Network，简称：SN)标识,序列号(英文：Sequence Number，简称：SQN)，运算的输出参数包括用户侧认证令牌AUTNUE，响应(英文：Response，简称：RES)和KASME。
步骤S108：该UE在确认AUTNUE和AUTNHSS相同时生成该UE与网络侧的会话秘钥。
步骤S109：该UE向MME发送运算得到的RES。
步骤S110：该MME接收该RES并在确认接收到的RES和该认证向量中的XRES相同时生成网络侧与该用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
现有技术的缺陷在于，海量IoT用户设备进行网络认证生成会话秘钥需要与网络侧进行大量的交互，网络侧的负载较高。
发明内容
本发明实施例公开了一种网络认证方法、中转节点及相关，能够节省网络认证过程的开销从而降低网络侧的负载。
第一方面，本发明实施例提供了网络认证系统，所述系统包括用户设备、中转节点和 蜂窝网认证网元，其中：
所述用户设备用于向所述中转节点发送的第一认证消息，所述第一认证消息包括第一验证标识和第一加密标识，所述第一验证标识用于验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的加密序列；其中，需要指出的是，该第二加密标识包括该第二验证标识的加密序列，即生成该第二加密标识时依据的信息至少包含该第二验证标识；
所述转发节点用于接收多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息，并通过聚合算法基于所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，所述第一聚合消息包括所述第一加密信息和所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
所述蜂窝网认证网元用于接收所述第一聚合消息并通过所述第一加密信息验证所述第一聚合消息中的信息是否正确；
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息正确时向所述中转节点发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息包括第二验证标识、第二加密标识和所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识，所述第二验证标识用于验证所述用户设备的身份，所述第二加密标识为所述第一响应消息中除所述第二验证标识外的信息的加密序列；
所述中转节点用于接收并向所述多个所述用户设备转发所述第一响应消息；
所述用户设备还用于接收所述中转节点转发的所述第一响应消息并通过所述第二加密标识验证所述第一响应消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述第一响应消息中是否携带了自身的第一验证标识；
所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时，生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
通过运行该网络认证系统，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式中：
所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时向所述中转节点发送第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
所述中转节点用于接收所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息，并通过聚合算法基于所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第三 加密信息；
所述中转节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，所述第二聚合消息包括所述第三加密信息和所述第二认证消息中携带的所述第二验证标识；
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第二聚合消息并通过所述第三加密信息验证所述第二聚合消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述所述第二聚合消息中是否携带了自身的第二验证标识；
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第二聚合消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第二验证标识时，生成与所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
结合第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式中，所述第一响应消息中包含所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密。
结合第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式中，所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于生成与所述用户设备之间的对称钥，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元与所述用户设备之间的对称钥加密。
结合第一方面，或者第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第四种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的DH公钥，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
所述用户设备根据自身的随机数和所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
结合第一方面的第四种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第五种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第一方面，或者第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第六种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
所述用户设备根据自身的私钥和所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
结合第一方面的第六种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第七种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第一方面，或者第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第八种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一聚合消息包含所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备的第二身份标识；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网 认证网元的第一身份标识，所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，具体为：
所述中转节点用于根据所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密，所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于通过自身的所述第一身份标识解密出所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述用户设备的所述第二身份标识加密；所述用户设备还用于通过自身的所述第二身份标识解密出所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识；
所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
所述用户设备根据自身的私钥、自身的所述第一验证标识、所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识和所述第一身份标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
结合第一方面的第八种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第九种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第一方面，或者第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第十种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，具体为：
所述中转节点用于根据所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述蜂窝网认证网元用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述用户设备用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
所述用户设备根据自身的私钥、自身的所述第一验证标识、所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识和所述第一身份标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
结合第一方面的第十种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第十一种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝 网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第一方面，或者第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第十二种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，具体为：
所述中转节点用于根据所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述蜂窝网认证网元用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述用户设备用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息的消息认证码MAC；
所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
所述用户设备根据自身的私钥、所述第一验证标识、所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识和所述第一身份标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
结合第一方面的第十二种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第十三种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第一方面，或者第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第四种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第五种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第六种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第七种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第八种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第九种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第十种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第十一种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第十二种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第十三种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第十四种可能的实现方式中，所述第一认证消息包括用于表征是否基于所述第一加密标识做聚合运算的聚合标识；所述中转节点还用于根据所述聚合标识判断是否需要对所述第一加密标识做聚合运算；
若需要，则所述中转节点用于执行所述通过聚合算法基于所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息的操作；
若不需要，则所述中转节点还用于将所述第一认证消息转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元；
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第一认证消息并通过所述第一加密标识验证所述第一认证消息中的信息是否正确；
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第一认证消息中的信息正确时向所述中转节点发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息包括第四加密标识、所述第二验证标识和所述用户设备的所述第一验证标识，所述第四加密标识为所述第二响应消息中除所述第四加密 标识外的信息的加密序列；
所述中转节点还用于接收并向所述用户设备转发所述第二响应消息；
所述用户设备还用于接收所述中转节点转发的所述第二响应消息，通过所述第四加密标识验证所述第二响应消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述第二响应消息中是否携带了自身的第一验证标识；
所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时，生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
结合第一方面的第十四种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第十五种可能的实现方式中，
所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时向所述中转节点发送所述第二认证消息；
所述中转节点还用于接收所述第二认证消息并向所述蜂窝网认证网元转发所述第二认证消息；
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第二认证消息并通过所述第三加密标识验证所述第二认证消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述第二认证消息中是否携带了自身的第二验证标识；
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第二认证消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第二验证标识时，生成与所述用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
结合第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第十六种可能的实现方式中：
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时向所述中转节点发送验证失败消息；
所述中转节点还用于接收所述验证失败消息并根据所述验证失败消息将所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息分别转发给所述蜂窝认证网元；
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于根据所述第一认证消息分别对所述多个所述用户设备中每个用户设备分别进行验证。
结合第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第十七种可能的实现方式中：
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时向所述中转节点发送验证失败消息；
所述中转节点还用于接收所述验证失败消息，根据所述验证失败消息通过聚合算法基于所述多个所述用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第四加密信息；
所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息，所述第三聚合消息包括所述第四加密信息和所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第三聚合消息并通过所述第四加密信息验证所述第三聚合消息中的信息是否正确。
第二方面，本发明实施例提供一种中转节点，该中转节点包括：
第一接收单元，用于接收多个用户设备分别发送的第一认证消息，每个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息包括所述每个用户设备的第一验证标识和第一加密标识，所述第一验证标识用于蜂窝网认证网元验证所述每个用户设备的身份，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
第一聚合单元，用于通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
第一发送单元，用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，所述第一聚合消息包括所述第一加密信息和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
第二接收单元，用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元根据第一加密消息验证所述第一聚合消息中的信息正确后生成的，所述第一响应消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第二验证标识、第二加密标识和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识，所述第二加密标识为所述第一响应消息中除所述第二验证标识外的信息的加密序列；
第二发送单元，用于将所述第一响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第一响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
通过运行上述单元，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
结合第二方面，在第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式中：
第三接收单元，用于接收所述多个用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第一响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
第二聚合单元，用于通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第三加密信息；
第三发送单元，用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，所述第二聚合消息包括所述第三加密信息和所述第二认证消息中携带的所述第二验证标识；所述第二聚合消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
结合第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式中，所述第一响应消息包含所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密。
结合第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式中，所 述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元与所述用户设备之间的对称钥加密。
结合第二方面，或者第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第四种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的DH公钥，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第二方面的第四种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第五种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第二方面，或者第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第六种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第二方面的第六种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第七种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第二方面，或者第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第八种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一聚合消息包含所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备的第二身份标识；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；所述第一发送单元具体用于根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述用户设备的所述第二身份标识加密；所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第二方面的第八种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第九种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第二方面，或者第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第十种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第一发送单元具体用于根据所述第一验证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第二方面的第十种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第十一种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第二方面，或者第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第十二种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第一发送单元具体用于根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息的消息认证码MAC。
结合第二方面的第十二种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第十三种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第二方面，或者第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第四种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第五种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第六种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第七种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第八种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第九种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第十种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第十一种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第十二种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第十三种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第十四种可能的实现方式中，所述第一认证消息包括用于表征是否基于所述第一加密标识做聚合运算的聚合标识；所述中转节点还包括：
判断单元，用于根据所述聚合标识判断是否需要对所述第一加密标识做聚合运算；
所述第一聚合单元具体用于在所述判断单元的判断结果为是时，通过所述第一聚合单元执行所述通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
第四发送单元，用于在所述判断单元的判断结果为否时，将所述第一认证消息转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元；
第四接收单元，用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元在通过所述第一加密标识验证出所述第一认证消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二响应消息包括第四加密标识、所述第二验证标识和所述用户设备的所述第一验证标识，所述第四加密标识为所述第二响应消息中除所述第四加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
第五发送单元，用于将所述第二响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第二响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
结合第二方面的第十四种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第十五种可能的实现方式中，所述中转节点还包括
第五接收单元，用于接收所述用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第二响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
第六发送单元，用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元转发所述第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
结合第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第十六种可能的实现方式中，所述中转节点还包括：
第六接收单元，用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
第七发送单元，用于根据所述验证失败消息将所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息分别转发给所述蜂窝认证网元，用于所述蜂窝网认证网元分别对所述多个用户设备中每个用户设备分别进行验证。
结合第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第十七种可能的实现方式中，所述中转节点还包括：
第七接收单元，用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
第三聚合单元，用于根据所述验证失败消息通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第四加密信息；
第八发送单元，用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息，所述第三聚合消息包括所述第四加密信息和所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识。
第三方面，本发明实施例提供一种网络认证方法，该方法包括：
中转节点接收多个用户设备分别发送的第一认证消息，每个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息包括所述每个用户设备的第一验证标识和第一加密标识，所述第一验证标识用于蜂窝网认证网元验证所述每个用户设备的身份，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
所述中转节点通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，所述第一聚合消息包括所述第一加密信息和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
所述中转节点接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元根据第一加密消息验证所述第一聚合消息中的信息正确后生成的，所述 第一响应消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第二验证标识、第二加密标识和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识，所述第二加密标识为所述第一响应消息中除所述第二验证标识外的信息的加密序列；
所述中转节点将所述第一响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第一响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
通过执行上述步骤，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
结合第三方面，在第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式中，所述中转节点将所述第一响应消息转发给所述用户设备之后，所述方法还包括：
所述中转节点接收所述多个用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第一响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
所述中转节点通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第三加密信息；
所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，所述第二聚合消息包括所述第三加密信息和所述第二认证消息中携带的所述第二验证标识；所述第二聚合消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
结合第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式中，所述第一响应消息包含所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密。
结合第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式中，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元与所述用户设备之间的对称钥加密。
结合第三方面，或者第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第四种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的DH公钥，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第三方面的第四种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第五种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第三方面，或者第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第六种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第三方面的第六种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第七种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第三方面，或者第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第八种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一聚合消息包含所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备的第二身份标识；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；
所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息包括：
所述中转节点根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述用户设备的所述第二身份标识加密；所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第三方面的第八种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第九种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第三方面，或者第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第十种可能的实现方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；
所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息包括：
所述中转节点根据所述第一验证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第三方面的第十种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第十一种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第三方面，或者第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第十二种可能的实现 方式中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；
所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息包括：
所述中转节点根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息的消息认证码MAC。
结合第三方面的第十二种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第十三种可能的实现方式中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
结合第三方面，或者第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第四种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第五种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第六种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第七种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第八种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第九种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第十种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第十一种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第十二种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第十三种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第十四种可能的实现方式中，所述第一认证消息包括用于表征是否基于所述第一加密标识做聚合运算的聚合标识；所述方法还包括：
所述中转节点根据所述聚合标识判断是否需要对所述第一加密标识做聚合运算；
若判断结果为是，则执行所述通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息的步骤；
若判断结果为否，则所述中转节点将所述第一认证消息转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元；
所述中转节点接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元在通过所述第一加密标识验证出所述第一认证消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二响应消息包括第四加密标识、所述第二验证标识和所述用户设备的所述第一验证标识，所述第四加密标识为所述第二响应消息中除所述第四加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
所述中转节点将所述第二响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第二响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
结合第三方面的第十四种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第十五种可能的实现方式中，所述中转节点将所述第二响应消息转发给所述用户设备之后，所述方法还包括：
所述中转节点接收所述用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第二响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标 识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元转发所述第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
结合第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第十六种可能的实现方式中，所述方法还包括：
所述中转节点接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
所述中转节点根据所述验证失败消息将所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息分别转发给所述蜂窝认证网元，用于所述蜂窝网认证网元分别对所述多个用户设备中每个用户设备分别进行验证。
结合第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式，或者第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第十七种可能的实现方式中，所述方法还包括：
所述中转节点接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
所述中转节点根据所述验证失败消息通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第四加密信息；
所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息，所述第三聚合消息包括所述第四加密信息和所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识。
第四方面，本发明实施例提供又一种中转节点，该中转节点包括处理器、存储器、收发器，该存储器用于存储程序和数据；该处理器可以通过调用该存储器中的程序来控制该收发器接收和发送数据，该处理器调用该存储器中的程序用于执行第三方面的网络认证方法。
第五方面，本发明实施例提供一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质用于存储指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行第三方面或者第三方面任一可能实现方式所描述的方法。
通过实施本发明实施例，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
附图说明
下面将对背景技术或者实施例所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍。
图1是现有技术中的一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图2是本发明实施例提供的一种网络认证系统的架构示意图；
图3A是本发明实施例提供的一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3B是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3C是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3D是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3E是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3F是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3G是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3H是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3I是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3J是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3K是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3L是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3M是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3N是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3O是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3P是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3Q是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图3R是本发明实施例提供的又一种网络认证方法的流程示意图；
图4是本发明实施例提供的一种中转节点的结构示意图；
图5是本发明实施例提供的又一种中转节点的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行描述。
请参见图2，图2是本发明实施例提供的一种网络认证系统20的架构示意图，该网络认证系统20包括用户设备201、中转节点202和蜂窝网认证网元203，其中，用户设备201可以为电脑、手机、打印机、冰箱、机器人等可以接入到IoT中的终端设备，该中转节点202可以为中继用户设备(relay UE)、聚合点等能够在用户设备101与蜂窝网认证网元203之间中转信息的节点，蜂窝网认证网元203可以为MME等管理网络认证流程的设备。
用户设备201向蜂窝网认证网元203发起的网络认证通过之后该用户设备201才能够接入到蜂窝网络中。在IoT场景中会存在海量的用户设备201，海量的用户设备101向该蜂窝网认证网元203进行网络认证会有大量的数据交互，本发明实施例为了减少数据交互的次数以及减少交互的数据总量，特地引入了中转节点202，该中转节点202可以对多个用户设备201各自发送的网络认证消息中的签名进行签名聚合，然后统一将该多个网络认证消息中除签名以外的信息连同该聚合签名统一发送给蜂窝网认证网元203进行网络认证。
图3A所示的方法实施例可基于该网络认证系统20来实现，为了方便描述，用户设备201、中转节点202和蜂窝网认证网元203后续不再携带编号。图3A所示的方法实施例包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤S301：用户设备向该中转节点发送的第一认证消息。
具体地，该第一认证消息包括该用户设备的身份标识、第一验证标识和第一加密标识；为了与后续描述到的蜂窝网认证网元的身份标识进行区分，可以称该用户设备的身份标识为第二身份标识，称该蜂窝网认证网元的身份标识为第一身份标识，例如，用户设备UE1的第二身份标识为8888，用户设备UE2的第二身份标识为9999，该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识为7777；该第二身份标识和该第一身份标识均可以为移动设备国际识别码(英文：International Mobile Equipment Identity，简称：IMEI)、媒体访问控制(英文：Media Access Control，简称：MAC)地址、互联网协议(英文：Internet Protocol，简称：IP)地址等能够在一定范围内用来与其他终端设备进行区分的信息。该第二身份标识用于表征该第一认证消息由哪个用户设备发送。
该第一验证标识可以为该用户设备的DH公钥、新鲜参数nonce等，该DH公钥是Diffie-Hellman密钥交换算法中的参数；该第一验证标识由该用户设备经该中转节点发送给该蜂窝网认证网元，再由该蜂窝网认证网元经该中转节点将该第一验证标识反馈给该用户设备，如果该用户设备发送出去的第一验证标识与最终接收到的第一验证标识是相匹配的，则该用户设备验证出该蜂窝网认证网元的身份是安全的。
该第一加密标识可以为通过该用户设备的私钥对该第一认证消息的签名，也可以为对该第一认证消息使用该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥产生的消息认证码(英文：Message Authentication Code，简称：MAC)，该对称钥即为对称秘钥，该消息认证码MAC可以具体基于哈希运算消息认证码(英文：Hash-based Message Authentication Code，简称：HMAC)产生，像现有技术一样，该签名和该消息认证码MAC用于验证信息的正确性。需要说明的是，该签名可以为对该第一认证消息中除该签名外的全部或部分信息的签名，具体对哪部分信息进行签名，产生该第一认证消息的用户设备以及最终需要获得(可以为间接获得)该第一认证消息中的信息的蜂窝网认证网元已通过协议预先定义好了。总而言之，该第一加密标识包括该第一验证标识的加密序列，即生成该第一加密标识时依据的信息至少包括该第一验证标识。
步骤S302：该转发节点接收多个用户设备发送的该第一认证消息，并通过聚合算法基于该多个用户设备发送的该第一认证消息中的该第一加密标识生成第一加密信息。
具体地，向该转发节点发送该第一认证消息的用户设备可能有很多，为了方便后续描述可以假设有N个用户设备向该中转节点发送该第一认证消息，后续描述的多个用户设备可以具体为N个用户设备，N为大于等于1的正整数，后续描述的各个用户设备均指该N个用户设备中的各个设备，后续描述的每个用户设备指该N个用户设备中的每个用户设备。
该转发节点接收到该多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息时，使用预先设置的聚合算法对该多个用户设备发送的多个第一认证消息中的第一加密标识进行计算，得到第一加密信息。可选的，当该第一加密标识为该签名时，使用该预设算法计算得到的第一加密信息为聚合签名；可选的，当该第一加密标识为该消息认证码MAC时，使用该预设算法计算得到的该第一加密信息为聚合认证码。
步骤S303：该转发节点还用于向该蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，
具体地，该第一聚合消息包括该第一加密信息、该多个用户设备发送的该第一认证消 息中的多个该第二身份标识和该多个用户设备发送的该第一认证消息中的多个该第一验证标识。也即是说，该第一聚合消息中保留了接收到的多个第一认证消息中的第一验证标识和第二身份标识，以及根据该多个第一认证消息中的第一密码标识使用聚合算法得到的第一密码信息。可以理解的是，如果该第一密码标识为对该第二身份标识和第一验证标识的签名，那么该第一密码消息可以理解为对该多个第一认证消息中的第二身份标识和第一验证标识的签名；可选的，该第一密码信息的数据长度与该第一密码标识的数据长度相同。
步骤S304：该蜂窝网认证网元用于接收该第一聚合消息并通过该第一加密信息验证该第一聚合消息中的信息是否正确。
具体地，通过签名、消息验证码等方式验证消息的正确性为现有技术，此处不赘述。
步骤S305：该蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出该第一聚合消息中的信息正确时向该中转节点发送第一响应消息。
具体地，该第一响应消息包括该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、第二验证标识、第二加密标识和该多个该第一验证标识；该第一身份标识用于表征该第一响应消息来自该蜂窝网认证网元；该多个该第一验证标识具体为该蜂窝网认证网元接收到的第一聚合消息中包含的第一验证标识，相当于该蜂窝网认证网元将接收到的第一验证标识又反馈回去。
该第二验证标识可以为该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥、新鲜参数nonce等；该第二验证标识由该蜂窝网认证网元经该中转节点发送给该用户设备，再由该用户设备经该中转节点将该第二验证标识反馈给该蜂窝网认证网元，如果该蜂窝网认证网元发送出去的第一验证标识与最终接收到的第一验证标识是相匹配的，则该蜂窝网弱认证网元验证出该用户设备的身份是安全的。
该第二加密标识可以为通过该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第一响应消息中除该第二加密标识外的信息的签名，也可以为对该第一响应消息使用该蜂窝网认证网元与该用户设备之间的对称钥产生的消息认证码，该消息认证码MAC可以具体基于HMAC产生，像现有技术一样，该签名和该消息认证码MAC验证信息的正确性。需要说明的是，该签名可以为对该第一响应消息中除该签名外的全部或部分信息的签名，具体对哪部分信息进行签名，产生该第一响应消息的用户设备以及最终需要获得(可以为间接获得)该第一响应消息中的信息的蜂窝网认证网元已通过协议预先定义好了。总而言之，该第二加密标识包括该第二验证标识的加密序列，即生成该第二加密标识时依据的信息至少包含该第二验证标识。
步骤S306：该中转节点还用于接收并向该多个用户设备转发该第一响应消息。
具体地，由于该多个用户设备中每个用户设备向该中转节点发送第一响应消息时携带了用户设备自身的第二身份标识，因此该中转节点可以基于该第二身份标识向该多个用户设备转发该第一响应消息。
步骤S307：该用户设备还用于接收该中转节点转发的该第一响应消息并通过该第二加密标识验证该第一响应消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述第一响应消息中是否携带了自身的第一验证标识。
具体地，该用户设备需要分析该第一响应消息中是否携带了自身的第一验证标识，还需要基于该第二加密标识验证该第一响应消息中的信息是否正确。。
步骤S308：该用户设备还用于在验证出该第一响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时，生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
本发明实施例中，计算该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥的方式包括但不限于如下三种方式：
方式一：用户设备通过预设算法基于自身产生的随机数和该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；相应地，该蜂窝网认证网元也需要通过该预设算法基于该蜂窝网认证网元的产生的随机数和该用户设备的DH公钥生成与该用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
方式二：用户设备通过又一预设算法基于该用户设备的私钥和该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该用设备可以通过基于身份的签名技术(英文：Identity Based Signature，简称：IBS)基于自身的第二身份标识计算出自身的私钥，并根据该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识计算出该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥；因此也可以理解为该用户设备基于自身的第二身份标识和该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识计算出于与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。相应地，该蜂窝网认证网元也通过该预设算法基于该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥和该用户设备的公钥生成与该用户设备之间的会话秘钥，也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元基于自身的第一身份标识和该用户设备的第二身份标识计算出于与该用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
方式三：用户设备通过又一预设算法基于该用户设备的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、该用户设备的新鲜参数和该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该用设备可以通过IBS基于自身的第二身份标识计算出自身的私钥，并根据该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识计算出该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥；因此也可以理解为该用户设备基于该用户设备的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、该用户设备的新鲜参数和该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数计算出于与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。相应地，该蜂窝网认证网元也通过该预设算法基于该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥、该用户设备的公钥、该用户设备的新鲜参数和该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数生成与该用户设备之间的会话秘钥，也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元基于自身的第一身份标识、该用户设备的第二身份标识、该用户设备的新鲜参数和该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数计算出于与该用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S309：该用户设备还用于在验证出该第一响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时向该中转节点发送第二认证消息。
具体地，该第二认证消息包括该第二验证标识和第三加密标识，该第三加密标识为该第二认证消息中除该第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；可选的，该第三加密标识可以为通过该用户设备的私钥对该第二认证消息的签名，也可以为对该第二认证消息使用该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥产生的消息认证码MAC。需要说明的是，该签名可以为对该第二认证消息中除该签名外的全部或部分信息的签名，具体对哪部分信息进行签名，产生该第二认证消息的用户设备以及最终需要获得(可以为间接获得)该第二认证消息中的信息的蜂窝网认证网元已通过协议预先定义好了。总而言之，该第三加密标识包括该第二验证标识的加密序列，即生成该第三加密标识时依据的信息至少包含该第二验证标 识。
步骤S310：该中转节点用于接收该多个用户设备发送的该第二认证消息，并通过聚合算法基于该多个用户设备发送的第二认证消息中的该第三加密标识生成第三加密信息。
步骤S311：该中转节点还用于向该蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，该第二聚合消息包括该第三加密信息、该第二认证消息中携带的该第二验证标识和该多个用户设备的该第二身份标识。
步骤S312：该蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收该第二聚合消息并通过该第三加密信息验证该第二聚合消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述所述第二聚合消息中是否携带了自身的第二验证标识。
步骤S313：该蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出该第二聚合消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第二验证标识时，生成与该多个用户设备中每个用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
具体地，以上描述了计算该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥的三种方式，该蜂窝网认证网元计算与每个用户设备之间的会话秘钥的方式在该三种方式中已经有了相应描述，此处不再赘述。
在实际应用中，有些用户设备不希望自身发送的第一认证消息和第二认证消息在该中转节点处被聚合，而是希望该中转节点接收到该第一认证消息和第二认证消息后直接将该第一认证消息和第二认证消息转发给蜂窝网认证网元，使得该蜂窝网认证网元单独对该用户设备的网络认证流程做处理。在这种情况下，该具体的执行流程如图3B中步骤S314～S324所示。
步骤S314：所述中转节点根据所述聚合标识判断是否需要对所述第一加密标识做聚合运算。所述第一认证消息包括用于表征是否基于所述第一加密标识做聚合运算的聚合标识。
若需要，则执行步骤S302，若不需要，则执行步骤S315。
步骤S315：所述中转节点将所述第一认证消息转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元。
步骤S316：所述蜂窝网认证网元接收所述第一认证消息并通过所述第一加密标识验证所述第一认证消息中的信息是否正确。
步骤S317：所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一认证消息中的信息正确时向所述中转节点发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息包括第四加密标识、所述第一身份标识、所述第二验证标识和所述用户设备的所述第一验证标识，所述第四加密标识为所述第二响应消息中除所述第四加密标识外的全部或部分信息的加密序列。总而言之，该第四加密标识包括该第一验证标识和该第二加密标识中至少一项的加密序列，即生成该第二加密标识时依据的信息至少包含该第一验证标识和该第二验证标识中一项。
具体地，该第四加密标识可以为蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥、新鲜参数nonce等，该第四加密标识可以为通过该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第二响应消息的签名，也可以为对该第二响应消息使用该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥产生的消息认证码MAC。
步骤S318：所述中转节点还用于接收并向所述用户设备转发所述第二响应消息；
步骤S319：所述用户设备还用于接收所述中转节点转发的所述第二响应消息，通过所述第四加密标识验证所述第二响应消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述第二响应消息中是 否携带了自身的第一验证标识；
步骤S320：所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时，生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
具体地，生成会话秘钥的方式上面已经有介绍，此处不再赘述。
步骤S321：所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第二响应消息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时向所述中转节点发送所述第二认证消息；
步骤S322：所述中转节点还用于接收所述第二认证消息并向所述蜂窝网认证网元转发所述第二认证消息；
步骤S323：所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第二认证消息并通过所述第三加密标识验证所述第二认证消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述第二认证消息中是否携带了自身的第二验证标识；
步骤S324：所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第二认证消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第二验证标识时，生成与所述用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
具体地，生成会话秘钥的方式上面已经有介绍，此处不再赘述。
以上是对本发明实施例的概述，以下介绍一些具体的方案以便更好地理解本发明实施例。
在一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的DH公钥，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：所述用户设备根据自身的随机数和所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。下面以图3C中步骤S401～S412来举例说明。
步骤401，各个用户设备分别产生随机数并利用该随机数产生各自的DH公钥，例如：
1a.用户设备UE 1产生随机数1(RAND 1),UE1利用RAND 1计算自身的DH公钥，计算公式为：A1＝gRAND 1mod p,其中，A1为计算出的该UE1的DH公钥，p为一个素数，g是一个有限循环群G的生成元，g和p可以提前公开。
1b.用户设备UE2产生随机数2(RAND 2)，UE2利用RAND 2计算自身的DH公钥，计算公式为：A2＝gRAND 2mod p，其中，A2为计算出的该UE1的DH公钥。
步骤402，该各个用户设备基于自身的第二身份标识、自身的DH公钥生成第一认证消息，该第一认证消息中包含该第二身份标识、该DH公钥和第一加密标识，该第一加密标识为通过相应用户设备的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该第一加密标识外的全部或部分信息的签名，例如，
2a.UE1生成第一认证消息，该第一认证消息包含该备UE1的第二身份标识、该UE1的DH公钥和第一加密标识，该第一加密标识为通过该UE1的私钥对该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的DH公钥的签名；UE 1向该中转节点发送的第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE1，A1，Sig_UE1，…)，其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，A1为UE1的DH公钥，“…” 表示该第一认证消息还可以存在其他信息，Sig_UE1为UE1对该第一认证消息中ID_UE1和A1的签名。
2b.UE2生成第一认证消息，该第一认证消息包含该UE2的第二身份标识、该UE2的DH公钥和第一加密标识，该第一加密标识为通过该UE2的私钥对该UE2的第二身份标识和该UE2的DH公钥的签名；UE 2向该中转节点发送的第一认证消息为(ID_UE2,A2,Sig_UE2，…),其中，ID_UE2为UE2的第二身份标识，A2为UE2的DH公钥，“…”表示该第一认证消息还可以存在其他信息，Sig_UE2为UE2对该第一认证消息中的ID_UE2和A2的签名。
步骤403，该中转节点接收该各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息，并对收到的各个用户设备的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合运算，生成聚合签名Sig_AG1,该聚合签名即为上述第一加密信息,当该各个用户设备具体为UE1和UE2时，对该UE1的第一认证消息中的签名和该UE2的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以得到聚合签名，例如，该聚合签名Sig_AG1＝f(Sig_UE1,Sig_UE2)，可选的，该聚合签名的数据长度与各个用户设备单独的签名的数据长度相同。
步骤404，该中转节点生成第一聚合消息并将该第一聚合消息发送给蜂窝网认证网元(Authenticator)。该第一聚合消息可以为(Aggre-indicator，ID_Vec，A_Vec，Sig_AG1，…),其中，Aggre-indicator为聚合认证标志位，ID_Vec包含了各个用户设备的第二身份标识，A_Vec包含了各个用户设备的DH公钥，该“…”对应该第一认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，Sig_AG1为该聚合签名。
步骤405，该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第一聚合消息，并结合该第一聚合消息中的信息验证该聚合签名Sig_AG1，若验证通过则表明该第一聚合消息中的信息；然后，该蜂窝网认证网元生成随机数RAND_AU,并基于该随机数生成该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，该DH公钥B＝gRAND_AU mod p。需要说明的是，可以预先为该蜂窝网认证网元配置至少包括聚合认证和非聚合认证这两种网络认证方式，该蜂窝网认证网元根据该第一聚合消息中的聚合认证标志位Aggre-indicator即可以确定需要通过聚合认证的相关策略验证该第一聚合消息中的签名。
步骤406，蜂窝网认证网元发送第一响应消息给中转节点，该第一响应消息可以为(ID_AU,B,A_Vec,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，B为该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，A_Vec包含各个用户设备的DH公钥，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第一响应消息中除该Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名，Sig_AU即为以上描述的第二密码标识。
步骤407，该中转节点接收该第一响应消息，并将该第一响应消息分别转发给上述各个用户设备UE，例如：
7a.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE1。
7b.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE2。
步骤408，各个用户设备各自接收该中转节点转发的第一响应消息，并结合该第一响应消息中的信息验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第一响应消息携带该用户设备的DH公钥则表明该第一响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元 的DH公钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥。
8a.UE1验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第一响应消息携带UE1的DH公钥则结合自身生成的随机数和该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1＝BRAND 1mod p。
8b.UE2验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第一响应消息携带UE2的DH公钥则结合自身生成的随机数和该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K2＝BRAND 2mod p。
步骤409，如果上述各个用户设备均验证该签名Sig_AU通过且均确定该第一响应消息携带用户设备自身的DH公钥，则该各个用户设备分别向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息包含该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥和第三密码标识，该第三密码标识为通过用户设备的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该第三密码标识外的部分或全部信息的签名，例如：
9a.UE1将第二认证消息(B,Sig_UE1,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，B为该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过UE1的私钥对该对该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥B的签名。
9b.UE2将第二认证消息(B,Sig_UE2,…)发送该该中转节点,其中，B为该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过UE2的私钥对该对该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥B的签名。
步骤410，该中转节点接收该第二认证消息，并对接收到的各个第二认证消息中的第三密码标识(即签名)进行聚合运算，生成新的聚合签名Sig_AG2。
步骤411，该中转节点向该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第二聚合消息，该第二聚合消息可以为(ID_Vec,B_Vec,Sig_AG2,…),其中，ID_Vec包含该各个用户设备的第二身份标识，B_Vec包含该各个用户设备返回的该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，该“…”对应该第二认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，该Sig_AG2为该聚合签名。
步骤412，蜂窝网认证网元结合该第二聚合消息中的信息验证该第二聚合消息中的聚合签名Sig_AG2,若验证聚合签名Sig_AG2通过且该第二聚合消息携带的网络侧DH公钥均为该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥则结合自身的随机数和该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的DH公钥生成与每个用户设备之间的会话秘钥，例如：
12a.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的随机数和该UE1的DH公钥计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1＝A1RAND_AU mod p。
12b.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的随机数和该UE2的DH公钥计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K2＝A2RAND_AU mod p。
以上通过步骤401～412讲述了如何对各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以节省数据量的开销，出于某方面的原因有些用户设备可能不希望自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名在该转发节点处被聚合，因此，上述步骤402中的第一认证消息中还可以包括意愿标识UE_AGindicator，该意愿标识UE_AGindicator用来表征该发送该第一认证消息的用户设备是否愿意该第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，例如，当UE_AGindicator＝1时表明愿意被聚合，当UE_AGindicator＝0时表明不愿意被聚合。
当该意愿标识表明该用户设备愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行步骤403～412的流程；以UE1为例，当该意愿标识表明UE1不愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行图3D中步骤413～420的流程。
步骤S413：该中转节点将该UE1发送的第一认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元，该第一认证消息可以为(UE_AGindicator,ID_UE1,A1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，意愿标识UE_AGindicator表明该UE1不愿意自身的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，ID_UE1为该UE1的第二身份标识，A1为该UE1的DH公钥，该“…”表明该第一认证消息中还可能存在其他信息，该Sig_UE1为使用该用户设备UE1的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S414：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该中转节点发送的该第一认证消息，并根据该第一认证消息中的信息验证该第一认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证通过则表明该第一认证消息中的信息正确，然后，该蜂窝网认证网元生成随机数RAND_AU,并基于该随机数生成该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，例如，该DH公钥B＝gRAND_AU mod p。
步骤S415：蜂窝网认证网元发送第二响应消息给中转节点，该第二响应消息可以为(ID_AU,B,A1,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，B为该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，A1为该用户设备UE1的DH公钥，“…”表示该第二响应消息中可能还存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第一响应消息中除Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S416：该中转节点接收该第二响应消息并向该UE1转发该第二响应消息。
步骤S417：该UE1接收该第二响应消息，并结合该第二响应消息中的信息验证该第二响应消息中的签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第二响应消息携带UE1的DH公钥则表明该第二响应消息中的信息正确；然后，该UE1结合自身生成的随机数和该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，例如，会话秘钥K1＝BRAND 1mod p。
步骤S418：该UE1向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息可以为(B,Sig_UE1,…),其中，B为该第二响应消息中携带的该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，该“…”表示该第二认证消息中还可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S419：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息并将该第二认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元。
步骤S420：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第二认证消息，并结合该第二认证消息中的信息验证该第而认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证该签名Sig_UE1通过且该第二认证消息中携带的网络侧的DH公钥为该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥并则表明该第二响应消息中的信息正确；然后，该蜂窝网认证网元结合自身的随机数和该备UE1的DH公钥计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1＝A1RAND_AU mod p。
可以理解的是，在步骤S401～S420所描述的方案中，该第二身份标识可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，该第一身份标识可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，该第一验证 标识用于该蜂窝网计算与用户设备之间的会话秘钥，该第二验证标识用于该用户设备计算与该蜂窝网之间的会话秘钥。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：所述用户设备根据自身的私钥和所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。下面以图3E中的步骤S501～S511来举例说明。
步骤S501：该各个用户设备基于自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数Nonce(Nonce可以为随机数、sequence number等可随时间变化而更新的参数)生成第一认证消息，并向该中转节点发送该第一认证消息，该第一认证消息中包含该第二身份标识、该Nonce和第一密码标识，该第一密码标识为通过相应用户设备的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该第一密码标识外的全部或部分信息的签名，例如：
1a.UE 1生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE1,Nonce 1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，Nonce 1为该UE1的新鲜参数Nonce，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该ID_UE1和Nonce 1的签名。
1b.UE 2生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE2,Nonce 2,Sig_UE2,…),其中，ID_UE2为UE2的第二身份标识，Nonce 2为该UE2的新鲜参数Nonce，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过该UE2的私钥对该ID_UE2和Nonce 2的签名。
步骤S502：该中转节点接收该各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息，并对收到的各个用户设备的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合运算，生成聚合签名Sig_AG1,该聚合签名即为上述第一加密信息,当该各个用户设备具体为UE1和UE2时，对该UE1的第一认证消息中的签名和该UE2的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以得到聚合签名，例如，该聚合签名Sig_AG1＝f(Sig_UE1,Sig_UE2)，可选的，该聚合签名的数据长度与各个用户设备单独的签名的数据长度相同。
步骤S503：该中转节点生成第一聚合消息并将该第一聚合消息发送给蜂窝网认证网元(Authenticator)。该第一聚合消息可以为(Aggre-indicator,ID_Vec,Nonce_Vec,Sig_AG1,…),其中，Aggre-indicator为聚合认证标志位，ID_Vec包含了各个用户设备的第二身份标识，Nonce_Vec包含各个用户设备的Nonce，该“…”对应该第一认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，Sig_AG1为该聚合签名。
步骤S504：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第一聚合消息，并结合该第一聚合消息中的信息验证该聚合签名Sig_AG1，若验证通过则表明该第一聚合消息中的信息正确；需要说明的是，可以预先为该蜂窝网认证网元配置至少包括聚合认证和非聚合认证这两种网络认证方式，该蜂窝网认证网元根据该第一聚合消息中的聚合认证标志位Aggre-indicator即可以确 定需要通过聚合认证的相关策略验证该第一聚合消息中的签名。
步骤S505：蜂窝网认证网元发送第一响应消息给中转节点，该第一响应消息可以为(ID_AU,Nonce_AU,Nonce_Vec,Sig_AU,…),其中ID_AU为蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce，Nonce_Vec包含各个用户设备的Nonce，该“…”表示该第一响应消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第一响应消息中除该Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名，Sig_AU即为以上描述的第二密码标识。
步骤S506：该中转节点接收该第一响应消息，并将该第一响应消息分别转发给上述各个用户设备UE，例如：
6a.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE1。
6b.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE2。
步骤S507：各个用户设备各自接收该中转节点转发的第一响应消息，并结合该第一响应消息中的信息验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且且该第一响应消息携带该用户设备的nonce则表明该第一响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识和自身的第二身份标识生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥；由该第一身份标识即为该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥，用户设备的私钥可以使用基于身份的签名技术(英文：Identity Based Signature，简称：IBS)对自身的第二身份标识进行处理得到，因此也可以理解为结合该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥和自身的私钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，例如：
7a.UE1验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第一响应消息携带UE1的nonce 1则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识和UE1的第二身份标识生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥和UE1的私钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
7b.UE2验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第一响应消息携带UE2的nonce 2则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识和UE2的第二身份标识生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K2＝e(xH(ID_UE2),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE2)为基于UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥，因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥和UE2的私钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S508：如果上述各个用户设备均验证该签名Sig_AU通过且均从该第一响应消息解密出了自身的nonce，则该各个用户设备分别向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息包含该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥和第三密码标识，该第三密码标识为通过用户设备的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该第三密码标识外的部分或全部信息的签名，例如：
8a.UE1将第二认证消息(Nonce_AU,Sig_UE1,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的nonce，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过UE1的私钥对该对该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU的签名。
8b.UE2将第二认证消息(Nonce_AU,Sig_UE2,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的nonce，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过UE2的私钥对该对该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU的签名。
步骤S509：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息，并对接收到的各个第二认证消息中的第三密码标识(即签名)进行聚合运算，生成新的聚合签名Sig_AG2。
步骤S510：该中转节点向该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第二聚合消息，该第二聚合消息可以为(ID_Vec,Nonce_AU_Vec,Sig_AG2,…),其中，ID_Vec包含该各个用户设备的第二身份标识，Nonce_AU_Vec包含各个用户设备发送给该中转节点的该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce，该“…”对应该第二认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，该Sig_AG2为该聚合签名。
步骤S511：蜂窝网认证网元结合该第二聚合消息中的信息验证该第二聚合消息中的聚合签名Sig_AG2,若验证聚合签名Sig_AG2通过且该第二聚合消息携带的网络侧的nonce均为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU则结合自身的第一身份标识和该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的第二身份标识生成与每个用户设备之间的会话秘钥，例如：
11a.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识和该UE1的第二身份标识计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥和该UE1的公钥计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
11b.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识和该UE2的第二身份标识计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K2＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE2))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网的私钥，H(ID_UE2)为基于该UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的公钥，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥和该UE2的公钥计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥。
以上通过步骤501～511讲述了如何对各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以节省数据量的开销，出于某方面的原因有些用户设备可能不希望自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名在该转发节点处被聚合，因此，上述步骤501中的第一认证消息中还可以包括意愿标识UE_AGindicator，该意愿标识UE_AGindicator用来表征发送该第一认证消息的用户设备是否愿意该第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，例如，当UE_AGindicator＝1时表明愿意被聚合，当UE_AGindicator＝0时表明不愿意被聚合。
当该意愿标识表明该用户设备愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行步骤502～511的流程；以UE1为例，当该意愿标识表明UE1不愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行图3F步骤512～519的流程。
步骤S512：该中转节点将该UE1发送的第一认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元，该第一认证消息可以为(UE_AGindicator,ID_UE1,Nonce 1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，意愿标识UE_AGindicator表明该UE1不愿意自身的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，ID_UE1为该UE1的第二身份标识，Nonce 1为该UE1的新鲜参数，该“…”表明该第一认证消息中还可能存在其他信息，该Sig_UE1为使用该用户设备UE1的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该 Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S513：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该中转节点发送的该第一认证消息，并根据该第一认证消息中的信息验证该第一认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证通过则表明该第一认证消息中的信息正确，然后生成新鲜参数Nonce_AU。
步骤S514：蜂窝网认证网元发送第二响应消息给中转节点，该第二响应消息可以为(ID_AU,Nonce_AU,Nonce 1,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce 1为第一认证消息中携带的UE 1的Nonce，“…”表示该第二响应消息中可能还存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第二响应消息中除Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S515：该中转节点接收该第二响应消息并向该UE1转发该第二响应消息。
步骤S516：该UE1接收该第二响应消息，并结合该第二响应消息中的信息验证该第二响应消息中的签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第二响应消息携带UE1的nonce 1则表明该第二响应消息中的信息正确；然后，该UE1结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识和UE1的第二身份标识生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥和UE1的私钥生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S517：该UE1向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息可以为(Nonce_AU,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，Nonce_AU为该第二响应消息中携带的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数，该“…”表示该第二认证消息中还可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S518：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息并将该第二认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元。
步骤S519：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第二认证消息，并结合该第二认证消息中的信息验证该第二认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证该签名Sig_UE1通过且该第二认证消息中携带的网络侧的nonce为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU则表明该第二认证消息中的信息正确；然后，该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识和该UE1的第二身份标识计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥和该UE1的公钥计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
可以理解的是，在步骤S501～S519所描述的方案中，该第二身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一验证标识和第二验证标识均为属于新鲜参数nonce，使得该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间交互的参数会根据时间的变化而更新，提高了安全性能。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识，所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，具体为：所述中转节点用于根据所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密，所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于通过自身的所述第一身份标识解密出所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述用户设备的所述第二身份标识加密；所述用户设备还用于通过自身的所述第二身份标识解密出所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识；所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：所述用户设备根据自身的私钥、自身的所述第一验证标识、所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识和所述第一响应消息中的所述第一身份标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。以下通过图3G中的步骤S601～S611来举例说明。
步骤S601：该各个用户设备基于自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数Nonce和预先获知的该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识生成第一认证消息，并向该中转节点发送该第一认证消息，该第一认证消息中包含该第二身份标识、该第一身份标识、经该第一身份标识加密后的该用户设备的nonce和第一加密标识，该第一密码标识为通过相应用户设备的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该第一密码标识外的全部或部分信息的签名，例如：
1a.UE 1生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE1,ID_AU,m1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识,m1为经该第一身份标识(即该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥)加密后的该UE1的新鲜参数Nonce1，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该ID_UE1、ID_AU和m1的签名。
1b.UE 2生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE2,ID_AU,m2,Sig_UE2,…)，其中，ID_UE2为UE2的第二身份标识，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识,m2为经该第一身份标识(即该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥)加密后的该UE2的新鲜参数Nonce2，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过该UE2的私钥对该ID_UE2、ID_AU和m2的签名。
步骤S602：该中转节点接收该各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息，并对收到的各个用户设备的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合运算，生成聚合签名Sig_AG1,该聚合签名即为上述第一加密信息,当该各个用户设备具体为UE1和UE2时，对该UE1的第一认证消息中的签名和该UE2的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以得到聚合签名，例如，该聚合签名Sig_AG1＝f(Sig_UE1,Sig_UE2)，可选的，该聚合签名的数据长度与各个用户设备单独的签名的数据长度相同。
步骤S603：该中转节点生成第一聚合消息并将该第一聚合消息发送给蜂窝网认证网元 (Authenticator)。该第一聚合消息可以为(Aggre-indicator,ID_Vec,m_Vec,Sig_AG,…),其中，Aggre-indicator为聚合认证标志位，用来表示该消息为聚合认证请求消息，ID_Vec包含了各个用户设备的第二身份标识，m_Vec包含了各个用户设备的经第一身份标识加密后的新鲜参数Nonce，该“…”对应该第一认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，Sig_AG为该聚合签名。需要说明的是，该第一认证消息中的第一身份标识可用于指示该中转节点向该第一身份标识对应的该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第一聚合消息。
步骤S604：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第一聚合消息，根据自身的第一身份标识从该第一聚合消息中解密出各个用户设备的新鲜参数，并结合该第一聚合消息中的信息验证该聚合签名Sig_AG1，若验证通过则表明该第一聚合消息中的信息正确；需要说明的是，可以预先为该蜂窝网认证网元配置至少包括聚合认证和非聚合认证这两种网络认证方式，该蜂窝网认证网元根据该第一聚合消息中的聚合认证标志位Aggre-indicator即可以确定需要通过聚合认证的相关策略验证该第一聚合消息中的签名。
步骤S605：蜂窝网认证网元发送第一响应消息给中转节点，该第一响应消息可以为(ID_AU,Nonce_AU,m’_Vec,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce，m’_Vec包含各个用户设备的新鲜参数且每个用户设备的新鲜参数均经过了该每个用户设备的第二身份标识加密，该“…”表示该第一响应消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第一响应消息中除该Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名，Sig_AU即为以上描述的第二密码标识。
步骤S606：该中转节点接收该第一响应消息，并将该第一响应消息分别转发给上述各个用户设备UE，例如：
6a.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE1。
6b.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE2。
步骤S607：各个用户设备各自接收该中转节点转发的第一响应消息，通过自身的第二身份标识从该第一响应消息中解密新鲜参数并结合该第一响应消息中的信息验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了自身的nonce则表明该第一响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数和该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥；由该第一身份标识即为该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥，用户设备的私钥可以使用基于身份的签名技术(英文：Identity Based Signature，简称：IBS)对自身的第二身份标识进行处理得到，因此也可以理解为结合该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、自身的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和自身的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，例如：
7a.UE1通过UE1自身的第二身份标识从该第一响应消息中解密新鲜参数并验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了UE1的新鲜参数则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该 蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
7b.UE2通过UE2自身的第二身份标识从该第一响应消息中解密新鲜参数并验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了UE2的新鲜参数则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE2的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_UE2),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE2)为基于UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE2的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S608：如果上述各个用户设备均验证该签名Sig_AU通过且均从该第一响应消息解密出了自身的nonce，则该各个用户设备分别向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息包含该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥和第三密码标识，该第三密码标识为通过用户设备的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该第三密码标识外的部分或全部信息的签名，例如：
8a.UE1将第二认证消息(Nonce_AU,Sig_UE1,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的nonce，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过UE1的私钥对该对该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU的签名。
8b.UE2将第二认证消息(Nonce_AU,Sig_UE2,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的nonce，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过UE2的私钥对该对该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU的签名。
步骤S609：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息，并对接收到的各个第二认证消息中的第三密码标识(即签名)进行聚合运算，生成新的聚合签名Sig_AG2。
步骤S610：该中转节点向该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第二聚合消息，该第二聚合消息可以为(ID_Vec,Nonce_AU_Vec,Sig_AG2,…),其中，ID_Vec包含该各个用户设备的第二身份标识，Nonce_AU_Vec包含各个用户设备发送给该中转节点的该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce，该“…”对应该第二认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，该Sig_AG2为该聚合签名。
步骤S611：蜂窝网认证网元结合该第二聚合消息中的信息验证该第二聚合消息中的聚合签名Sig_AG2,若验证聚合签名Sig_AG2通过且该第二聚合消息携带的网络侧的nonce均为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU，则结合自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的第二身份标识、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的新鲜参数生成与每个用户设备之间的会话秘钥，例如：
11a.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
11b.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的第二身 份标识和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE2))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE2)为基于该UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的公钥，Nonce 2为UE2的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的公钥和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥。
以上通过步骤601～611讲述了如何对各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以节省数据量的开销，出于某方面的原因有些用户设备可能不希望自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名在该转发节点处被聚合，因此，上述步骤601中的第一认证消息中还可以包括意愿标识UE_AGindicator，该意愿标识UE_AGindicator用来表征发送该第一认证消息的用户设备是否愿意该第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，例如，当UE_AGindicator＝1时表明愿意被聚合，当UE_AGindicator＝0时表明不愿意被聚合。
当该意愿标识表明该用户设备愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行步骤602～611的流程；以UE1为例，当该意愿标识表明UE1不愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行图3H中的步骤612～619的流程。
步骤S612：该中转节点将该UE1发送的第一认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元，该第一认证消息可以为(UE_AGindicator,ID_UE1,ID_AU,m1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识,m1为经该第一身份标识(即该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥)加密后的该UE1的新鲜参数Nonce1，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S613：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该中转节点发送的该第一认证消息，根据自身的第一身份标识从该第一认证消息中解密出UE1的新鲜参数，该蜂窝网认证网元可以基于自身的第一身份标识和该第一聚合消息中的UE1的第二身份标识计算出该K1；该蜂窝网认证网元还根据该第一认证消息中的信息验证该第一认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证通过则表明该第一认证消息中的信息正确，然后生成新鲜参数Nonce_AU。
步骤S614：蜂窝网认证网元发送第二响应消息给中转节点，该第二响应消息可以为(ID_AU,Nonce_AU,m’1,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，m’1为UE1的新鲜参数且该新鲜参数经过了UE1的第二身份标识加密，“…”表示该第二响应消息中可能还存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第二响应消息中除Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S615：该中转节点接收该第二响应消息并向该UE1转发该第二响应消息。
步骤S616：该UE1接收该第二响应消息，UE1通过自身的第二身份标识从该第二响应消息中解密新鲜参数并结合该第二响应消息中的信息验证该第二响应消息中的签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了UE1的新鲜参数nonce1则表明该第二响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标 识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S617：该UE1向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息可以为(Nonce_AU,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，Nonce_AU为该第二响应消息中携带的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数，该“…”表示该第二认证消息中还可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S618：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息并将该第二认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元。
步骤S619：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第二认证消息，并结合该第二认证消息中的信息验证该第二认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证该签名Sig_UE1通过且该第二认证消息携带的网络侧的nonce为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU则表明该第二认证消息中的信息正确；然后，该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
可以理解的是，在步骤S601～S619所描述的方案中，该第二身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一验证标识和第二验证标识均为属于新鲜参数nonce，使得该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间交互的参数会根据时间的变化而更新，提高了安全性能；该第二身份标识和该第一身份标识还可以用于对交互的信息中携带的该第一验证标识加密，进一步提高了安全性能。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识，所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，具体为：所述中转节点用于根据所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述蜂窝网认证网元用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述用户设 备用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：所述用户设备根据自身的私钥、自身的所述第一验证标识、所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识和所述第一响应消息中的所述第一身份标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。以下通过图3I步骤S701～S711来举例说明。
步骤S701：该各个用户设备基于自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数Nonce和预先获知的该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识生成第一认证消息，并向该中转节点发送该第一认证消息，该第一认证消息中包含该第二身份标识、该第一身份标识、经相应用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元的对称钥加密后的该用户设备的nonce和第一加密标识，该第一密码标识为通过相应用户设备的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该第一密码标识外的全部或部分信息的签名，例如：
1a.UE 1生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE1,ID_AU,m1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识,m1为经该UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1加密后的该UE1的新鲜参数Nonce1，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该ID_UE1、ID_AU和m1的签名，其中，对称钥K1为基于IBS技术结合UE1的第二身份标识ID_UE1和该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识ID_AU计算得到，例如，该对称钥K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))。
1b.UE 2生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE2,ID_AU,m2,Sig_UE2,…)，其中，ID_UE2为UE2的第二身份标识，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识,m2为经该UE2与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K2加密后的该UE2的新鲜参数Nonce2，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过该UE2的私钥对该ID_UE2、ID_AU和m2的签名，其中，对称钥K2为基于IBS技术结合UE1的第二身份标识ID_UE2和该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识ID_AU计算得到，例如，该对称钥K2＝e(xH(ID_UE2),H(ID_AU))。
步骤S702：该中转节点接收该各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息，并对收到的各个用户设备的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合运算，生成聚合签名Sig_AG1,该聚合签名即为上述第一加密信息,当该各个用户设备具体为UE1和UE2时，对该UE1的第一认证消息中的签名和该UE2的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以得到聚合签名，例如，该聚合签名Sig_AG1＝f(Sig_UE1,Sig_UE2)，可选的，该聚合签名的数据长度与各个用户设备单独的签名的数据长度相同。
步骤S703：该中转节点生成第一聚合消息并将该第一聚合消息发送给蜂窝网认证网元(Authenticator)。该第一聚合消息可以为(Aggre-indicator,ID_Vec,m_Vec,Sig_AG,…),其中， Aggre-indicator为聚合认证标志位，用来表示该消息为聚合认证请求消息，ID_Vec包含了各个用户设备的第二身份标识，m_Vec包含了各个用户设备的经相应的对称钥加密后的新鲜参数Nonce，该“…”对应该第一认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，Sig_AG为该聚合签名。需要说明的是，该第一认证消息中的第一身份标识可用于指示该中转节点向该第一身份标识对应的该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第一聚合消息。
步骤S704：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第一聚合消息，根据对应的对称钥从该第一聚合消息中解密出各个用户设备的新鲜参数，例如，根据对称钥K1解密出UE1的新鲜参数，根据对称钥K2解密出UE2的新鲜参数，该蜂窝网认证网元可以基于自身的第一身份标识和该第一聚合消息中的UE1的第二身份标识计算出该K1，基于自身的第一身份标识和该第一聚合消息中的UE2的第二身份标识计算出该K2，其余依此类推。该蜂窝网认证网元还结合该第一聚合消息中的信息验证该聚合签名Sig_AG1，若验证通过则表明该第一聚合消息中的信息正确；需要说明的是，可以预先为该蜂窝网认证网元配置至少包括聚合认证和非聚合认证这两种网络认证方式，该蜂窝网认证网元根据该第一聚合消息中的聚合认证标志位Aggre-indicator即可以确定需要通过聚合认证的相关策略验证该第一聚合消息中的签名。
步骤S705：该蜂窝网认证网元发送第一响应消息给中转节点，该第一响应消息可以为(ID_AU,Nonce_AU,m’_Vec,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce，m’_Vec包含各个用户设备的新鲜参数且每个用户设备的新鲜参数均经过了该每个用户设备的对称钥加密，例如，包含的UE1的新鲜参数经过了K1加密，包含的UE2的新鲜参数经过了K2加密，该“…”表示该第一响应消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第一响应消息中除该Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名，Sig_AU即为以上描述的第二密码标识。
步骤S706：该中转节点接收该第一响应消息，并将该第一响应消息分别转发给上述各个用户设备UE，例如：
6a.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE1。
6b.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE2。
步骤S707：各个用户设备各自接收该中转节点转发的第一响应消息，通过自身的对应的对称钥从该第一响应消息中解密新鲜参数并结合该第一响应消息中的信息验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了自身的nonce则表明该第一响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数和该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥；由该第一身份标识即为该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥，用户设备的私钥可以使用基于身份的签名技术(英文：Identity Based Signature，简称：IBS)对自身的第二身份标识进行处理得到，因此也可以理解为结合该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、自身的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和自身的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，例如：
7a.UE1通过UE1对应的对称钥K1(即该UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元的对称钥)从该第一响应消息中解密新鲜参数，并验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了UE1的新鲜参数，则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标识、 该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
7b.UE2通过UE2对应的对称钥K2(即该UE2与该蜂窝网认证网元的对称钥)从该第一响应消息中解密新鲜参数，并验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了UE2的新鲜参数则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE2的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_UE2),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE2)为基于UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE2的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S708：如果上述各个用户设备均验证该签名Sig_AU通过且均从该第一响应消息解密出了自身的nonce，则该各个用户设备分别向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息包含该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥和第三密码标识，该第三密码标识为通过用户设备的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该第三密码标识外的全部或部分信息的签名，例如：
8a.UE1将第二认证消息(Nonce_AU,Sig_UE1,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的nonce，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过UE1的私钥对该对该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU的签名。
8b.UE2将第二认证消息(Nonce_AU,Sig_UE2,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的nonce，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过UE2的私钥对该对该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU的签名。
步骤S709：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息，并对接收到的各个第二认证消息中的第三密码标识(即签名)进行聚合运算，生成新的聚合签名Sig_AG。
步骤S710：该中转节点向该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第二聚合消息，该第二聚合消息可以为(ID_Vec,Nonce_AU_Vec,Sig_AG,…),其中，ID_Vec包含该各个用户设备的第二身份标识，Nonce_AU_Vec包含各个用户设备发送给该中转节点的该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce，该“…”对应该第二认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，该Sig_AG为该聚合签名。
步骤S711：蜂窝网认证网元结合该第二聚合消息中的信息验证该第二聚合消息中的聚合签名Sig_AG2,若验证聚合签名Sig_AG2通过且该第二聚合消息携带的网络侧的nonce均为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU，则结合自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的第二身份标识、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的新鲜参数生成与每个用户设备之间的会话秘钥，例如：
11a.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1, Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
11b.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的第二身份标识和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE2))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE2)为基于该UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的公钥，Nonce 2为UE2的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的公钥和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥。
以上通过步骤701～711讲述了如何对各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以节省数据量的开销，出于某方面的原因有些用户设备可能不希望自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名在该转发节点处被聚合，因此，上述步骤701中的第一认证消息中还可以包括意愿标识UE_AGindicator，该意愿标识UE_AGindicator用来表征发送该第一认证消息的用户设备是否愿意该第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，例如，当UE_AGindicator＝1时表明愿意被聚合，当UE_AGindicator＝0时表明不愿意被聚合。
当该意愿标识表明该用户设备愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行步骤702～711的流程；以UE1为例，当该意愿标识表明UE1不愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行图3J中的步骤712～719的流程。
步骤S712：该中转节点将该UE 1发送的第一认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元，该第一认证消息可以为(UE_AGindicator,ID_UE1,ID_AU,m1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识,m1为经该UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1加密后的该UE1的新鲜参数Nonce1，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该ID_UE1、ID_AU和m1的签名，其中，对称钥K1为基于IBS技术结合UE1的第二身份标识ID_UE1和该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识ID_AU计算得到，例如，该对称钥K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))。
步骤S713：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该中转节点发送的该第一认证消息，根据与该UE1之间的对称钥K1从该第一认证消息中解密出UE1的新鲜参数，该蜂窝网认证网元可以基于自身的第一身份标识和该第一认证消息中的UE1的第二身份标识计算出该对称钥K1；该蜂窝网认证网元还根据该第一认证消息中的信息验证该第一认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证通过则表明该第一认证消息中的信息正确，然后生成新鲜参数Nonce_AU。
步骤S714：蜂窝网认证网元发送第二响应消息给中转节点，该第二响应消息可以为(ID_AU,Nonce_AU,m’1,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，m’1为UE1的新鲜参数且该新鲜参数 经过了UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1加密，“…”表示该第二响应消息中可能还存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第二响应消息中除Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S715：该中转节点接收该第二响应消息并向该UE1转发该第二响应消息。
步骤S716：该UE1接收该第二响应消息，UE1通过与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1从该第二响应消息中解密新鲜参数并结合该第二响应消息中的信息验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了UE1的新鲜参数nonce1则表明该第二响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S717：该UE1向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息可以为(Nonce_AU,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，Nonce_AU为该第二响应消息中携带的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数，该“…”表示该第二认证消息中还可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S718：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息并将该第二认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元。
步骤S719：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第二认证消息，并结合该第二认证消息中的信息验证该第二认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证该签名Sig_UE1通过且该第二认证消息携带的网络侧的nonce为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU则表明该第二认证消息中的信息正确；然后，该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
可以理解的是，在步骤S701～S719所描述的方案中，该第二身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一验证标识和第二验证标识均为属于新鲜参数nonce，使得该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间交互的参数会根据时间的变化而更新，提高了安全性能；携带的该第一验证标识的信息在交互的过程中经过了对称钥加密，进一步提高了安全性能。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识，所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，具体为：所述中转节点用于根据所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述蜂窝网认证网元用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述用户设备用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息的消息认证码MAC；
所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：所述用户设备根据自身的私钥、所述第一验证标识、所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识和所述第一响应消息中的所述第一身份标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。以下通过图3K中的步骤S801～S811来举例说明。
步骤S801：该各个用户设备基于自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数Nonce和预先获知的该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识生成第一认证消息，并向该中转节点发送该第一认证消息，该第一认证消息中包含该第二身份标识、该第一身份标识、经相应用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元的对称钥加密后的该用户设备的nonce和第一加密标识，该第一密码标识为对该第一认证消息用该对称钥产生的消息认证码MAC，该消息认证码MAC可以具体基于HMAC产生，例如：
1a.UE 1生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE1,ID_AU,m1,MAC_1,…)其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识,m1为经该UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1加密后的该UE1的新鲜参数Nonce1，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，MAC_1为使用该UE1的对称钥产生的该第一认证消息的消息认证码。其中，对称钥K1为基于IBS技术结合UE1的第二身份标识ID_UE1和该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识ID_AU计算得到，例如，该对称钥K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))。
1b.UE 2生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE2,ID_AU,m2,MAC_2,…)其中，ID_UE2为UE2的第二身份标识，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识,m2为经该UE2与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K2加密后的该UE2的新鲜参数Nonce2，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，MAC_2为使用该UE2的对称钥产生的该第一认证消息的消息认证码。其中，对称钥K2为基于IBS技术结合UE2的第二身份标识ID_UE2和该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识ID_AU计算得到，例如，该对称钥K2＝e(xH(ID_UE2),H(ID_AU))。
步骤S802：该中转节点接收该各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息，并对收到的各个用 户设备的第一认证消息中的消息认证码进行聚合运算，生成聚合认证码MAC_AG,该聚合认证码即为上述第一加密信息,当该各个用户设备具体为UE1和UE2时，对该UE1的第一认证消息中的消息认证码和该UE2的第一认证消息中的消息认证码进行聚合以得到聚合认证码，例如，该聚合认证码MAC_AG＝f(MAC_1,MAC_2)，可选的，该聚合认证码的数据长度与各个用户设备单独的消息认证码的数据长度相同。
步骤S803：该中转节点生成第一聚合消息并将该第一聚合消息发送给蜂窝网认证网元(Authenticator)。该第一聚合消息可以为(Aggre-indicator,ID_Vec,m_Vec,MAC_AG,…),其中，Aggre-indicator为聚合认证标志位，用来表示该消息为聚合认证请求消息，ID_Vec包含了各个用户设备的第二身份标识，m_Vec包含了各个用户设备的经相应对称钥加密后的新鲜参数Nonce，该“…”对应该第一认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，MAC_AG为该聚合认证码。需要说明的是，该第一认证消息中的第一身份标识可用于指示该中转节点向该第一身份标识对应的该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第一聚合消息。
步骤S804：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第一聚合消息，根据对应的对称钥从该第一聚合消息中解密出各个用户设备的新鲜参数，例如，根据对称钥K1解密出UE1的新鲜参数，根据对称钥K2解密出UE2的新鲜参数，该蜂窝网认证网元可以基于自身的第一身份标识和该第一聚合消息中的UE1的第二身份标识计算出该K1，基于自身的第一身份标识和该第一聚合消息中的UE2的第二身份标识计算出该K2，其余依此类推。该蜂窝网认证网元还结合该第一聚合消息中的信息验证该聚合认证码MAC_AG，若验证通过则表明该第一聚合消息中的信息正确；需要说明的是，可以预先为该蜂窝网认证网元配置至少包括聚合认证和非聚合认证这两种网络认证方式，该蜂窝网认证网元根据该第一聚合消息中的聚合认证标志位Aggre-indicator即可以确定需要通过聚合认证的相关策略验证该第一聚合消息中的消息认证码。
步骤S805：该蜂窝网认证网元发送第一响应消息给中转节点，该第一响应消息可以为(ID_AU,Nonce_AU,m’_Vec,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce，m’_Vec包含各个用户设备的新鲜参数且每个用户设备的新鲜参数均经过了该每个用户设备的对称钥加密，例如，包含的UE1的新鲜参数经过了K1加密，包含的UE2的新鲜参数经过了K2加密，该“…”表示该第一响应消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第一响应消息中除该Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名，Sig_AU即为以上描述的第二密码标识。
步骤S806：该中转节点接收该第一响应消息，并将该第一响应消息分别转发给上述各个用户设备UE，例如：
6a.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE1。
6b.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE2。
步骤S807：各个用户设备各自接收该中转节点转发的第一响应消息，通过自身的对应的对称钥从该第一响应消息中解密新鲜参数并结合该第一响应消息中的信息验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了自身的nonce则表明该第一响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数和该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥；由该 第一身份标识即为该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥，用户设备的私钥可以使用基于身份的签名技术(英文：Identity Based Signature，简称：IBS)对自身的第二身份标识进行处理得到，因此也可以理解为结合该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、自身的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和自身的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，例如：
7a.UE1通过UE1对应的对称钥K1(即该UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元的对称钥)从该第一响应消息中解密新鲜参数，并验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了UE1的新鲜参数，则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
7b.UE2通过UE2对应的对称钥K2(即该UE2与该蜂窝网认证网元的对称钥)从该第一响应消息中解密新鲜参数，并验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了UE2的新鲜参数则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE2的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_UE2),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE2)为基于UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE2的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S808：如果上述各个用户设备均验证该签名Sig_AU通过且均从该第一响应消息解密出了自身的nonce，则该各个用户设备分别向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息包含该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥和第三密码标识，该第三密码标识为对该第二认证消息使用相应对称钥产生的消息认证码MAC，例如：
8a.UE1将第二认证消息(Nonce_AU,MAC’_1,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的nonce，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，MAC’_1为对该第二认证消息使用UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1产生的消息认证码。
8b.UE2将第二认证消息(Nonce_AU,MAC’_2,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的nonce，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，MAC’_2为对该第二认证消息使用UE2与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K2产生的消息认证码。
步骤S809：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息，并对接收到的各个第二认证消息中的第三密码标识(即签名)进行聚合运算，生成新的聚合认证码MAC_AG。
步骤S810：该中转节点向该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第二聚合消息，该第二聚合消息可以为(ID_Vec,Nonce_AU_Vec,MAC_AG,…),其中，ID_Vec包含该各个用户设备的第二身 份标识，Nonce_AU_Vec包含各个用户设备发送给该中转节点的该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce，该“…”对应该第二认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，该MAC_AG为该聚合认证码。
步骤S811：蜂窝网认证网元结合该第二聚合消息中的信息验证该第二聚合消息中的聚合认证码MAC_AG,若验证该聚合认证码MAC_AG通过且该第二聚合消息携带的网络侧的nonce均为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU，则结合自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的第二身份标识、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的新鲜参数生成与每个用户设备之间的会话秘钥，例如：
11a.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
11b.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的第二身份标识和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE2))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE2)为基于该UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的公钥，Nonce 2为UE2的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的公钥和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥。
以上通过步骤801～811讲述了如何对各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的消息认证码进行聚合以节省数据量的开销，出于某方面的原因有些用户设备可能不希望自身发送的第一认证消息中的消息认证码在该转发节点处被聚合，因此，上述步骤801中的第一认证消息中还可以包括意愿标识UE_AGindicator，该意愿标识UE_AGindicator用来表征发送该第一认证消息的用户设备是否愿意该第一认证消息中的消息认证码被聚合，例如，当UE_AGindicator＝1时表明愿意被聚合，当UE_AGindicator＝0时表明不愿意被聚合。
当该意愿标识表明该用户设备愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的消息认证码被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行步骤802～811的流程；以UE1为例，当该意愿标识表明UE1不愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的消息认证码被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行图3L中的步骤812～819的流程。
步骤S812：该中转节点将该UE 1发送的第一认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元，该第一认证消息可以为(UE_AGindicator,ID_UE1,ID_AU,m1,MAC_1,…)，其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识,m1为经该UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1加密后的该UE1的新鲜参数Nonce1，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，MAC_1为通过该第一认证消息使用该对称钥K1产生的消息认证码，其中，对称钥K1为基于IBS技术结合UE1的第二身份标识ID_UE1和 该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识ID_AU计算得到，例如，该对称钥K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))。
步骤S813：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该中转节点发送的该第一认证消息，根据与该UE1之间的对称钥K1从该第一认证消息中解密出UE1的新鲜参数，该蜂窝网认证网元可以基于自身的第一身份标识和该第一认证消息中的UE1的第二身份标识计算出该对称钥K1；该蜂窝网认证网元还根据该第一认证消息中的信息验证该第一认证消息中的消息认证码MAC_1，若验证通过则表明该第一认证消息中的信息正确，然后生成新鲜参数Nonce_AU。
步骤S814：蜂窝网认证网元发送第二响应消息给中转节点，该第二响应消息可以为(ID_AU,Nonce_AU,m’1,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，m’1为UE1的新鲜参数且该新鲜参数经过了UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1加密，“…”表示该第二响应消息中可能还存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第二响应消息中除Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S815：该中转节点接收该第二响应消息并向该UE1转发该第二响应消息。
步骤S816：该UE1接收该第二响应消息，UE1通过与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1从该第二响应消息中解密新鲜参数并结合该第二响应消息中的信息验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证签名Sig_AU通过且解密出了UE1的新鲜参数nonce1则表明该第二响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S817：该UE1向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息可以为(Nonce_AU,MAC’_1,…)，其中，Nonce_AU为该第二响应消息中携带的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数，该“…”表示该第二认证消息中还可能包含其他信息，MAC’_1为通过对该第二认证消息使用该对称钥K1产生的消息认证码。
步骤S818：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息并将该第二认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元。
步骤S819：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第二认证消息，并结合该第二认证消息中的信息验证该第二认证消息中的消息认证码MAC’_1，若验证消息认证码MAC’_1通过且该第二认证消息携带的网络侧的nonce为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU则表明该第二认证消息中的信息正确；然后，该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce， Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
可以理解的是，在步骤S801～S819所描述的方案中，该第二身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一验证标识和第二验证标识均为属于新鲜参数nonce，使得该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间交互的参数会根据时间的变化而更新，提高了安全性能；携带的该第一验证标识的信息在交互的过程中经过了对称钥加密，进一步提高了安全性能。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密。以下通过图3M中的步骤S901～S911来举例说明。
步骤S901：该各个用户设备基于自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数Nonce(Nonce可以为随机数、sequence number等参数)生成第一认证消息，并向该中转节点发送该第一认证消息，该第一认证消息中包含该第二身份标识、该Nonce和第一密码标识，该第一密码标识为通过相应用户设备的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该第一密码标识外的全部或部分信息的签名，例如：
1a.UE 1生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE1,Nonce 1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，Nonce 1为该UE1的新鲜参数Nonce，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该ID_UE1和Nonce 1的签名。
1b.UE 2生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE2,Nonce 2,Sig_UE2,…),其中，ID_UE2为UE2的第二身份标识，Nonce 2为该UE2的新鲜参数Nonce，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过该UE2的私钥对该ID_UE2和Nonce 2的签名。
步骤S902：该中转节点接收该各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息，并对收到的各个用户设备的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合运算，生成聚合签名Sig_AG1,该聚合签名即为上述第一加密信息,当该各个用户设备具体为UE1和UE2时，对该UE1的第一认证消息中的签名和该UE2的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以得到聚合签名，例如，该聚合签名Sig_AG1＝f(Sig_UE1,Sig_UE2)，可选的，该聚合签名的数据长度与各个用户设备单独的签名的数据长度相同。
步骤S903：该中转节点生成第一聚合消息并将该第一聚合消息发送给蜂窝网认证网元(Authenticator)。该第一聚合消息可以为(Aggre-indicator,ID_Vec,Nonce_Vec,Sig_AG,…),其中，Aggre-indicator为聚合认证标志位，ID_Vec包含了各个用户设备的第二身份标识，Nonce_Vec包含各个用户设备的Nonce，该“…”对应该第一认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，Sig_AG为该聚合签名。
步骤S904：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第一聚合消息，并结合该第一聚合消息中的信息验证该聚合签名Sig_AG1，若验证通过则表明该第一聚合消息中的信息正确；需要说明的 是，可以预先为该蜂窝网认证网元配置至少包括聚合认证和非聚合认证这两种网络认证方式，该蜂窝网认证网元根据该第一聚合消息中的聚合认证标志位Aggre-indicator即可以确定需要通过聚合认证的相关策略验证该第一聚合消息中的签名。
步骤S905：蜂窝网认证网元发送第一响应消息给中转节点，该第一响应消息可以为(ID_AU,m_Vec,Nonce_Vec,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，m_Vec包含多个被加密的Nonce，每个被加密的Nonce经过一个用户设备的第二身份标识加密该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU得到，可选的，m_Vec＝[En(Nonce_AU,ID_UE1),En(Nonce_AU,ID_UE2)]^T，其中，En(Nonce_AU,ID_UE1)表示通过UE1的第二身份标识对蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU加密的结果；Nonce_Vec包含各个用户设备的Nonce，该“…”表示该第一响应消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第一响应消息中除该Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名，Sig_AU即为以上描述的第二密码标识。
步骤S906：该中转节点接收该第一响应消息，并将该第一响应消息分别转发给上述各个用户设备UE，例如：
6a.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE1。
6b.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE2。
步骤S907：各个用户设备各自接收该中转节点转发的第一响应消息，并结合该第一响应消息中的信息验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且且该第一响应消息携带该用户设备的nonce则表明该第一响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数和该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU是由该各个用户设备通过自身的第二身份标识从该第一响应消息中的m_Vec中解密出来的；由该第一身份标识即为该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥，用户设备的私钥可以使用基于身份的签名技术(英文：Identity Based Signature，简称：IBS)对自身的第二身份标识进行处理得到，因此也可以理解为结合该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、自身的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和自身的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，例如：
7a.UE1验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第一响应消息携带UE1的nonce 1，则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU是由UE1通过自身的第二身份标识从该第一响应消息中的m_Vec中解密出来的。
7b.UE2验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第一响应消息携带UE2的nonce 2，则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE2的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如， 会话密钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_UE2),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE2)为基于UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE2的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU是由UE2通过自身的第二身份标识从该第一响应消息中的m_Vec中解密出来的。
步骤S908：如果上述各个用户设备均验证该签名Sig_AU通过且均确认该第一响应消息中携带了自身的nonce，则该各个用户设备分别向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息包含该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥和第三密码标识，该第三密码标识为通过用户设备的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该第三密码标识外的部分或全部信息的签名，例如：
8a.UE1将第二认证消息(m1，Sig_UE1,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，m1为经该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识加密后的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过UE1的私钥对该对该m1的签名。
8b.UE2将第二认证消息(m2,Sig_UE2,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，m2为经该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识加密后的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过UE2的私钥对该m2的签名。
步骤S909：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息，并对接收到的各个第二认证消息中的第三密码标识(即签名)进行聚合运算，生成新的聚合签名Sig_AG。
步骤S910：该中转节点向该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第二聚合消息，该第二聚合消息可以为(ID_Vec,m1,Sig_AG,…),其中，ID_Vec包含该各个用户设备的第二身份标识，m1为经该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识加密后的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，该“…”对应该第二认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，该Sig_AG为该聚合签名。
步骤S911：蜂窝网认证网元通过自身的第一身份标识解密该第二聚合消息中携带的网络侧的nonce并结合该第二聚合消息中的信息验证该第二聚合消息中的聚合签名Sig_AG2,若验证聚合签名Sig_AG2通过且解密出的网络侧的nonce为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU，则结合自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的第二身份标识、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的新鲜参数生成与每个用户设备之间的会话秘钥，例如：
11a.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
11b.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的第二身份标识和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE2))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网 认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE2)为基于该UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的公钥，Nonce 2为UE2的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的公钥和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥。
以上通过步骤901～911讲述了如何对各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以节省数据量的开销，出于某方面的原因有些用户设备可能不希望自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名在该转发节点处被聚合，因此，上述步骤901中的第一认证消息中还可以包括意愿标识UE_AGindicator，该意愿标识UE_AGindicator用来表征发送该第一认证消息的用户设备是否愿意该第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，例如，当UE_AGindicator＝1时表明愿意被聚合，当UE_AGindicator＝0时表明不愿意被聚合。
当该意愿标识表明该用户设备愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行步骤902～911的流程；以UE1为例，当该意愿标识表明UE1不愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行图3N中的步骤912～919的流程。
步骤S912：该中转节点将该UE1发送的第一认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元，该第一认证消息可以为(UE_AGindicator,ID_UE1,Nonce 1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，意愿标识UE_AGindicator表明该UE1不愿意自身的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，ID_UE1为该UE1的第二身份标识，Nonce 1为该UE1的新鲜参数，该“…”表明该第一认证消息中还可能存在其他信息，该Sig_UE1为使用该用户设备UE1的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S913：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该中转节点发送的该第一认证消息，并根据该第一认证消息中的信息验证该第一认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证通过则表明该第一认证消息中的信息正确，然后生成新鲜参数Nonce_AU。
步骤S914：蜂窝网认证网元发送第二响应消息给中转节点，该第二响应消息可以为(ID_AU,m1,Nonce 1,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，m1为经该UE1的第二身份标识加密后的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，Nonce1为第一认证消息中携带的UE 1的Nonce，“…”表示该第二响应消息中可能还存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第二响应消息中除Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S915：该中转节点接收该第二响应消息并向该UE1转发该第二响应消息。
步骤S916：该UE1接收该第二响应消息，通过自身的第二身份标识从该第二响应消息中解密出该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，并结合该第二响应消息中的信息验证该第二响应消息中的签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第二响应消息中携带UE1的新鲜参数nonce 1则表明该第二响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该 蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S917：该UE1向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息可以为(m’1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，m’1为经该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识加密后的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，该“…”表示该第二认证消息中还可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S918：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息并将该第二认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元。
步骤S919：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第二认证消息，通过自身的第一身份标识从该第二认证消息中解密出网络侧的新鲜参数nonce，并结合该第二认证消息中的信息验证该第二认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证该签名Sig_UE1通过且解密出的网络侧的新鲜参数为自身的新鲜参数Nonce_AU则表明该第二认证消息中的信息正确；然后，该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
可以理解的是，在步骤S801～S819所描述的方案中，该第二身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一验证标识和第二验证标识均为属于新鲜参数nonce，使得该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间交互的参数会根据时间的变化而更新，提高了安全性能；该第二身份标识和该第一身份标识还可用于对交互过程中携带的该第二验证标识加密，进一步提高了安全性能。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于根据所述第二身份标识生成与所述用户设备之间的对称钥，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元与所述用户设备之间的对称钥加密。以下通过图3O步骤S1001～S1011来举例说明。
步骤S1001：该各个用户设备基于自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数Nonce(Nonce可以为随机数、sequence number等参数)生成第一认证消息，并向该中转节点发送该第一认证消息，该第一认证消息中包含该第二身份标识、该Nonce和第一密码标识，该第一密码标识为通过相应用户设备的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该第一密码标识外的全部或部分信息的签名，例如：
1a.UE 1生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE1,Nonce 1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，ID_UE1为UE1的第二身份标识，Nonce 1为该UE1的新鲜参数Nonce，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该ID_UE1和Nonce 1的签名。
1b.UE 2生成第一认证消息并将该第一认证消息发送该该中转节点，该第一认证消息可以为(ID_UE2,Nonce 2,Sig_UE2,…),其中，ID_UE2为UE2的第二身份标识，Nonce 2为该UE2的新鲜参数Nonce，该“…”表示该第一认证消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过该UE2的私钥对该ID_UE2和Nonce 2的签名。
步骤S1002：该中转节点接收该各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息，并对收到的各个用户设备的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合运算，生成聚合签名Sig_AG1,该聚合签名即为上述第一加密信息,当该各个用户设备具体为UE1和UE2时，对该UE1的第一认证消息中的签名和该UE2的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以得到聚合签名，例如，该聚合签名Sig_AG1＝f(Sig_UE1,Sig_UE2)，可选的，该聚合签名的数据长度与各个用户设备单独的签名的数据长度相同。
步骤S1003：该中转节点生成第一聚合消息并将该第一聚合消息发送给蜂窝网认证网元(Authenticator)。该第一聚合消息可以为(Aggre-indicator,ID_Vec,Nonce_Vec,Sig_AG,…),其中，Aggre-indicator为聚合认证标志位，ID_Vec包含了各个用户设备的第二身份标识，Nonce_Vec包含各个用户设备的Nonce，该“…”对应该第一认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，Sig_AG为该聚合签名。
步骤S1004：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第一聚合消息，并结合该第一聚合消息中的信息验证该聚合签名Sig_AG1，若验证通过则表明该第一聚合消息中的信息正确；需要说明的是，可以预先为该蜂窝网认证网元配置至少包括聚合认证和非聚合认证这两种网络认证方式，该蜂窝网认证网元根据该第一聚合消息中的聚合认证标志位Aggre-indicator即可以确定需要通过聚合认证的相关策略验证该第一聚合消息中的签名。
步骤S1005：蜂窝网认证网元发送第一响应消息给中转节点，该第一响应消息可以为(ID_AU,m_Vec,Nonce_Vec,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，m_Vec包含多个被加密的Nonce，每个被加密的Nonce具体指经过该蜂窝网认证网元与一个用户设备之间的对称钥加密该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU得到，该各个用户设备中每个用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间分别存在一个对称钥。可选的，m_Vec＝[En(Nonce_AU,K1),En(Nonce_AU,K2)]^T，其中，En(Nonce_AU,K1)表示通过该蜂窝网认证网元与UE1之间的对称钥K1对蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU加密的结果；Nonce_Vec包含各个用户设备的Nonce，该“…”表示该第一响应消息中可能存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第一响应消息中除该Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名，Sig_AU即为以上描述的第二密码标识。
步骤S1006：该中转节点接收该第一响应消息，并将该第一响应消息分别转发给上述各个用户设备UE，例如：
6a.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE1。
6b.该中转节点将该第一响应消息转发给UE2。
步骤S1007：各个用户设备各自接收该中转节点转发的第一响应消息，并结合该第一响应消息中的信息验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且且该第一响应消息携带该用户设备的nonce则表明该第一响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、自身的第二身份标识、自身的新鲜参数和该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参 数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU是由该各个用户设备通过自身对应的对称钥(例如，UE1对应的对称钥为K1，UE2对应的对称钥为K2)从该第一响应消息中的m_Vec中解密出来的；由该第一身份标识即为该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥，用户设备的私钥可以使用基于身份的签名技术(英文：Identity Based Signature，简称：IBS)对自身的第二身份标识进行处理得到，因此也可以理解为结合该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、自身的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和自身的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话密钥，例如：
7a.UE1验证该签名Sig_AU,若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第一响应消息携带UE1的nonce 1，则结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU是由UE1通过自身与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1从该第一响应消息中的m_Vec中解密出来的。
7b.UE2验证该签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第一响应消息携带UE2的nonce 2，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE2的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_UE2),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE2)为基于UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE2的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE2的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU是由UE2通过自身与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K2从该第一响应消息中的m_Vec中解密出来的。
步骤S1008：如果上述各个用户设备均验证该签名Sig_AU通过且均确认该第一响应消息中携带了自身的nonce，则该各个用户设备分别向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息包含该蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥和第三密码标识，该第三密码标识为通过用户设备的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该第三密码标识外的部分或全部信息的签名，例如：
8a.UE1将第二认证消息(m1，Sig_UE1,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，m1为经该UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K1加密后的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过UE1的私钥对该对该m1的签名。
8b.UE2将第二认证消息(m2,Sig_UE2,…)发送给该中转节点,其中，m2为经该UE2与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥K2加密后的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，“…”表示该第二认证消息可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE2为通过UE2的私钥对该m2的签名。
步骤S1009：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息，并对接收到的各个第二认证消息中的 第三密码标识(即签名)进行聚合运算，生成新的聚合签名Sig_AG。
步骤S1010：该中转节点向该蜂窝网认证网元发送该第二聚合消息，该第二聚合消息可以为(ID_Vec,m_Vec,Sig_AG,…),其中，ID_Vec包含该各个用户设备的第二身份标识，m_Vec包含多个被加密的nonce，每个被加密的nonce具体为该蜂窝网认证网元与该各个用户设备中一个用户设备之间的对称钥对该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU加密得到，该多个被加密的nonce与该各个用户设备一一对应；该“…”对应该第二认证消息中可能存在的其他信息，该Sig_AG为该聚合签名。
步骤S1011：蜂窝网认证网元通过相应的对称钥解密该第二聚合消息中携带的网络侧的nonce并结合该第二聚合消息中的信息验证该第二聚合消息中的聚合签名Sig_AG2,若验证聚合签名Sig_AG2通过且解密出的网络侧的nonce为该蜂窝网认证网元的Nonce_AU，则结合自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的第二身份标识、该多个用户设备中每个用户设备的新鲜参数生成与每个用户设备之间的会话秘钥，例如：
11a.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
11b.该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的第二身份标识和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K2’＝KDF(K2,Nonce 2,Nonce_AU)且K2＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE2))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE2)为基于该UE2的第二身份标识得到的该UE2的公钥，Nonce 2为UE2的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE2的公钥和该UE2的新鲜参数计算与该UE2之间的会话密钥。
以上通过步骤1001～1011讲述了如何对各个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名进行聚合以节省数据量的开销，出于某方面的原因有些用户设备可能不希望自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名在该转发节点处被聚合，因此，上述步骤1001中的第一认证消息中还可以包括意愿标识UE_AGindicator，该意愿标识UE_AGindicator用来表征发送该第一认证消息的用户设备是否愿意该第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，例如，当UE_AGindicator＝1时表明愿意被聚合，当UE_AGindicator＝0时表明不愿意被聚合。
当该意愿标识表明该用户设备愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行步骤1002～1011的流程；以UE1为例，当该意愿标识表明UE1不愿意自身发送的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合时，该中转节点获知该用户设备的意愿后执行图3P中的步骤1012～1019的流程。
步骤S1012：该中转节点将该UE1发送的第一认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元，该 第一认证消息可以为(UE_AGindicator,ID_UE1,Nonce 1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，意愿标识UE_AGindicator表明该UE1不愿意自身的第一认证消息中的签名被聚合，ID_UE1为该UE1的第二身份标识，Nonce 1为该UE1的新鲜参数，该“…”表明该第一认证消息中还可能存在其他信息，该Sig_UE1为使用该用户设备UE1的私钥对该第一认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S1013：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该中转节点发送的该第一认证消息，并根据该第一认证消息中的信息验证该第一认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证通过则表明该第一认证消息中的信息正确，然后生成新鲜参数Nonce_AU。
步骤S914：蜂窝网认证网元发送第二响应消息给中转节点，该第二响应消息可以为(ID_AU,m1,Nonce 1,Sig_AU,…),其中，ID_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，m1为经该UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密后的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，Nonce 1为第一认证消息中携带的UE 1的Nonce，“…”表示该第二响应消息中可能还存在其他信息，Sig_AU为使用该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对该第二响应消息中除Sig_AU外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S1015：该中转节点接收该第二响应消息并向该UE1转发该第二响应消息。
步骤S1016：该UE1接收该第二响应消息，通过自身与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥从该第二响应消息中解密出该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，并结合该第二响应消息中的信息验证该第二响应消息中的签名Sig_AU，若验证该签名Sig_AU通过且该第二响应消息中携带UE1的新鲜参数nonce 1则表明该第二响应消息中的信息正确；然后，结合该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识、UE1的第二身份标识、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，例如，会话密钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_UE1),H(ID_AU))，其中，xH(ID_UE1)为基于UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的私钥，H(ID_AU)为基于该蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识得到的该蜂窝网认证网元公钥。因此也可以理解为根据该蜂窝网认证网元的公钥、UE1的私钥、该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数和该UE1的新鲜参数生成与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
步骤S1017：该UE1向该中转节点发送第二认证消息，该第二认证消息可以为(m1,Sig_UE1,…)，其中，m1为经该UE1与该蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密后的该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数Nonce_AU，该“…”表示该第二认证消息中还可能包含其他信息，Sig_UE1为通过该UE1的私钥对该第二认证消息中除该Sig_UE1外的全部或部分信息的签名。
步骤S1018：该中转节点接收该第二认证消息并将该第二认证消息转发给该蜂窝网认证网元。
步骤S1019：该蜂窝网认证网元接收该第二认证消息，通过自身与该UE1之间的对称钥从该第二认证消息中解密出网络侧的新鲜参数nonce，并结合该第二认证消息中的信息验证该第二认证消息中的签名Sig_UE1，若验证该签名Sig_UE1通过且解密出的网络侧的新鲜参数为自身的新鲜参数Nonce_AU则表明该第二认证消息中的信息正确；然后，该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的第一身份标识、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的第二身份标识和该UE1 的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥，例如，该会话秘钥K1’＝KDF(K1,Nonce 1,Nonce_AU)且K1＝e(xH(ID_AU)，H(ID_UE1))，其中，xH(ID_AU)为根据该蜂窝网认证网的第一身份标识计算得到的该蜂窝网认证网元的私钥，H(ID_UE1)为基于该UE1的第二身份标识得到的该UE1的公钥，Nonce 1为UE1的新鲜参数nonce，Nonce_AU为该蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，因此也可以理解为该蜂窝网认证网元根据自身的私钥、自身的新鲜参数、该UE1的公钥和该UE1的新鲜参数计算与该UE1之间的会话密钥。
可以理解的是，在步骤S801～S819所描述的方案中，该第二身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一身份标识不仅可以用来标识相应消息的来源和去向，还可以用于计算用户设备与蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥；该第一验证标识和第二验证标识均为属于新鲜参数nonce，使得该用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间交互的参数会根据时间的变化而更新，提高了安全性能；携带的该第二验证标识的信息在交互的过程中经过了对称钥加密，进一步提高了安全性能。
需要说明的是，当该中转节点对多个第一认证消息中的第一密码标识做聚合运算之后，导致用户设备与该蜂窝网认证网元之间没有成功建立会话秘钥时，可以重复以上方案来再次建立会话秘钥；该中转节点还可以调整网络认证的策略，调整后的策略有很多，下面以策略一和策略二来举例说明。
策略一：执行图3Q所示的步骤S331～S333。
步骤S331：所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时向所述中转节点发送验证失败消息。
步骤S332：所述中转节点接收所述验证失败消息并根据所述验证失败消息将所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息分别转发给所述蜂窝认证网元。
具体地，该中转节点通过该验证失败消息获知该蜂窝网认证网元验证出所述第二聚合消息中的信息不正确时，该中转节点将原本聚合到该第一聚合消息中的第一认证消息单独转发给该蜂窝网认证网元。例如，该第一聚合消息中的第一密码信息是对3个第一认证消息中的第一密码标识聚合得到的，那么该中转节点将这3个第一认证消息分别转发给该蜂窝网认证网元，而不再对着3个第一认证消息中的信息做聚合。
步骤S333：所述蜂窝网认证网元根据所述第一认证消息分别对所述多个所述用户设备中每个用户设备分别进行验证。
具体地，该蜂窝网认证网元接收到该第一认证消息而非该第一聚合消息，由于该蜂窝网认证网元会收到该多个用户设备各自对应的第一认证消息，因此该蜂窝网认证网元根据每个第一认证消息对每个用户设备分别进行验证，若验证通过则向该中转节点发送第三响应消息，该第三响应消息与该第一响应消息的区别在于，该第三响应消息中包含单个用户设备的第一验证标识而该第一响应消息包含该多个用户设备的第一验证标识。
策略二：执行图3R所示的步骤S333～S337。
步骤S334：所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时向所述中转节点发送验证失败消息。
步骤S335：所述中转节点接收所述验证失败消息，根据所述验证失败消息通过聚合算 法基于所述多个所述用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第四加密信息。
步骤S336：所述转发节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息，所述第三聚合消息包括所述第四加密信息、所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第二身份标识和所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识。
具体地，该中转节点通过该验证失败消息获知该蜂窝网认证网元验证出所述第二聚合消息中的信息不正确时，该中转节点将原本聚合到该第一聚合消息中的第一认证消息分为多个部分，每个部分可组成一个第三聚合消息，该中转节点向该蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息来进行认证。
步骤S337：所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第三聚合消息并通过所述第四加密信息验证所述第三聚合消息中的信息是否正确。
具体地，该蜂窝网认证网元接收到该第三聚合消息而非该第一聚合消息，因此该蜂窝网认证网元根据第三聚合消息对部分用户设备进行验证，若验证通过则向该中转节点发送第四响应消息，该第四响应消息与该第一响应消息的区别在于，该第四响应消息中包含的用户设备的第一验证标识的数量小于第一响应消息中包含的用户设备的第一验证标识的数量。
在上述方法实施例中，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
上述详细阐述了本发明实施例的方法，为了便于更好地实施本发明实施例的上述方案，相应地，下面提供了本发明实施例的装置。
请参见图4，图4是本发明实施例提供的一种中转节点40的结构示意图，该中转节点40可以包括第一接收单元401、第一聚合单元402、第一发送单元403、第二接收单元404和第二发送单元405，其中，各个单元的详细描述如下。
第一接收单元401用于接收多个用户设备分别发送的第一认证消息，每个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息包括所述每个用户设备的第一验证标识和第一加密标识，所述第一验证标识用于蜂窝网认证网元验证所述每个用户设备的身份，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
第一聚合单元402用于通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
第一发送单元403用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，所述第一聚合消息包括所述第一加密信息和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
第二接收单元404用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第一响应消息，所述第一响应 消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元根据第一加密消息验证所述第一聚合消息中的信息正确后生成的，所述第一响应消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第二验证标识、第二加密标识和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识，所述第二加密标识为所述第一响应消息中除所述第二验证标识外的信息的加密序列；
第二发送单元405用于将所述第一响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第一响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
通过运行上述单元，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
在一种可选的方案中，该中转节点40还包括：
第三接收单元用于接收所述多个用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第一响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
第二聚合单元用于通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第三加密信息；
第三发送单元用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，所述第二聚合消息包括所述第三加密信息和所述第二认证消息中携带的所述第二验证标识；所述第二聚合消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一响应消息包含所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元与所述用户设备之间的对称钥加密。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的DH公钥，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的 信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一聚合消息包含所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备的第二身份标识；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；所述第一发送单元具体用于根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述用户设备的所述第二身份标识加密；所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第一发送单元具体用于根据所述第一验证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第一发送单元具体用于根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息的消息认证码MAC。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一认证消息包括用于表征是否基于所述第一加密标识做聚合运算的聚合标识；所述中转节点40还包括：
判断单元用于根据所述聚合标识判断是否需要对所述第一加密标识做聚合运算；
所述第一聚合单元402具体用于在所述判断单元的判断结果为是时，通过所述第一聚合单元执行所述通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
第四发送单元用于在所述判断单元的判断结果为否时，将所述第一认证消息转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元；
第四接收单元用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元在通过所述第一加密标识验证出所述第一认证消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二响应消息包括第四加密标识、所述第二验证标识和所述用户设备的所述第一验证标识，所述第四加密标识为所述第二响应消息中除所述第四加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
第五发送单元用于将所述第二响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第二响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述中转节点40还包括
第五接收单元用于接收所述用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第二响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
第六发送单元用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元转发所述第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述中转节点40还包括：
第六接收单元用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
第七发送单元用于根据所述验证失败消息将所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息分别转发给所述蜂窝认证网元，用于所述蜂窝网认证网元分别对所述多个用户设备中每个用户设备分别进行验证。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述中转节点40还包括：
第七接收单元用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
第三聚合单元用于根据所述验证失败消息通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第四加密信息；
第八发送单元用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息，所述第三聚合消息包括所述第四加密信息和所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识。
需要说明的是，图4所示中转节点的具体实现还可以对应参照图3A～3R所示的方式实施例的具体描述。
在图4所描述的中转节点40中，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
请参见图5，图5是本发明实施例提供的又一种中转节点50，该中转节点50包括处理器501、存储器502和收发器503，所述处理器501、存储器502和收发器503通过总线相互连接。
存储器502包括但不限于是随机存取存储器(RAM)、只读存储器(ROM)、可擦除可编程只读存储器(EPROM或者快闪存储器)、或便携式只读存储器(CD-ROM)，该存储器502用于相关指令及数据。
收发器503用于接收和发送数据。
处理器501可以是一个或多个中央处理器(英文：Central Processing Unit，简称：CPU)，在处理器501是一个CPU的情况下，该CPU可以是单核CPU，也可以是多核CPU。
所述中转节点50中的处理器501用于读取所述存储器502中存储的程序代码，执行以下操作：
处理器501通过收发器503接收多个用户设备分别发送的第一认证消息，每个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息包括所述每个用户设备的第一验证标识和第一加密标识，所述第一验证标识用于蜂窝网认证网元验证所述每个用户设备的身份，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
处理器501通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
处理器501通过所述收发器503向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，所述第一聚合消息包括所述第一加密信息和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
处理器501通过收发器503接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元根据第一加密消息验证所述第一聚合消息中的信息正确后生成的，所述第一响应消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第二验证标识、第二加密标识和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识，所述第二加密标识为所述第一响应消息中除所述第二验证标识外的信息的加密序列；
处理器501通过收发器503将所述第一响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第一响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
通过执行上述操作，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
在一种可选的方案中，处理器501通过收发器503将所述第一响应消息转发给所述用户设备之后，处理器501还用于：
通过收发器503接收所述多个用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第一响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第三加密信息；
通过收发器503向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，所述第二聚合消息包括所述第三加密信息和所述第二认证消息中携带的所述第二验证标识；所述第二聚合消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一响应消息包含所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元与所述用户设备之间的对称钥加密。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的DH公钥，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一聚合消息包含所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备的第二身份标识；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；
处理器501通过收发器503向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，具体为：
处理器501根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识通过收发器503向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述用户设备的所述第二身份标识加密；所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；
处理器501通过收发器503向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，具体为：
处理器501根据所述第一验证消息中的所述第一身份标识通过收发器503向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；
处理器501通过收发器503向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，具体为：
处理器501根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识通过收发器503向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息的消息认证码MAC。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述第一认证消息包括用于表征是否基于所述第一加密标识做聚合运算的聚合标识；处理器501还用用于：
根据所述聚合标识判断是否需要对所述第一加密标识做聚合运算；
若判断结果为是，则执行所述通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认 证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息的操作；
若判断结果为否，则处理器501通过收发器503将所述第一认证消息转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元；
处理器501通过收发器503接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元在通过所述第一加密标识验证出所述第一认证消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二响应消息包括第四加密标识、所述第二验证标识和所述用户设备的所述第一验证标识，所述第四加密标识为所述第二响应消息中除所述第四加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
处理器501通过收发器503将所述第二响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第二响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述处理器501通过收发器503将所述第二响应消息转发给所述用户设备之后，处理器501还用于：
通过收发器503接收所述用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第二响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
通过收发器503向所述蜂窝网认证网元转发所述第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述处理器501还用于：
通过收发器503接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
根据所述验证失败消息将所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息通过收发器503分别转发给所述蜂窝认证网元，用于所述蜂窝网认证网元分别对所述多个用户设备中每个用户设备分别进行验证。
在又一种可选的方案中，所述处理器501还用于：
通过收发器503接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
根据所述验证失败消息通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第四加密信息；
通过收发器503向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息，所述第三聚合消息包括所述第四加密信息和所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识。
需要说明的是，图5所示的中转节点50还可以参照图3A～3R所示的方法实施例的相应描述。
在图5所描述的中转节点50中，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名 或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
综上所述，通过实施本发明实施例，用户设备向在进行网络认证时将认证所需要的第一认证消息先发送给中转节点，由该中转节点对多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的签名或者消息认证码进行聚合预算得到聚合签名或者聚合认证码，该中转节点统一将该多个用户发送的第一认证消息中除签名和认证码以外的信息以发送给蜂窝网认证网元，统一发送的消息基于该聚合签名和该聚合认证码确保消息的正确性，相应地，该蜂窝网基于接收到的信息同步对该多个用户设备进行认证，节省了认证过程中的数据开销。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解实现上述实施例方法中的全部或部分流程，可通过计算机程序来指令相关的硬件来完成，该的程序可存储于计算机可读取存储介质中，该程序在执行时，可包括如上述各方法的实施例的流程。而前述的存储介质包括：ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可存储程序代码的介质。

Claims (54)

  1. 一种网络认证系统，其特征在于，所述系统包括用户设备、中转节点和蜂窝网认证网元，其中：
    所述用户设备用于向所述中转节点发送的第一认证消息，所述第一认证消息包括第一验证标识和第一加密标识，所述第一验证标识用于验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    所述转发节点用于接收多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息，并通过聚合算法基于所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
    所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，所述第一聚合消息包括所述第一加密信息和所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元用于接收所述第一聚合消息并通过所述第一加密信息验证所述第一聚合消息中的信息是否正确；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息正确时向所述中转节点发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息包括第二验证标识、第二加密标识和所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识，所述第二验证标识用于验证所述用户设备的身份，所述第二加密标识为所述第一响应消息中除所述第二验证标识外的信息的加密序列；
    所述中转节点用于接收并向所述多个所述用户设备转发所述第一响应消息；
    所述用户设备还用于接收所述中转节点转发的所述第一响应消息并通过所述第二加密标识验证所述第一响应消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述第一响应消息中是否携带了自身的第一验证标识；
    所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时，生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的系统，其特征在于：
    所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时向所述中转节点发送第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    所述中转节点用于接收所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息，并通过聚合算法基于所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第三加密信息；
    所述中转节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，所述第二聚合消息包括所述第三加密信息和所述第二认证消息中携带的所述第二验证标识；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第二聚合消息并通过所述第三加密信息验证所述第二聚合消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述所述第二聚合消息中是否携带了自身的第二 验证标识；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第二聚合消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第二验证标识时，生成与所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第一响应消息中包含所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密。
  4. 根据权利要求2所述的系统，其特征在于，所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于生成与所述用户设备之间的对称钥，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元与所述用户设备之间的对称钥加密。
  5. 根据权利要求1～4任一项所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的迪菲赫尔曼DH公钥，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
    所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
    所述用户设备根据自身的随机数和所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  7. 根据权利要求1～4任一项所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
    所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
    所述用户设备根据自身的私钥和所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  9. 根据权利要求1～4任一项所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一聚合消息包含所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备的第二身份标识；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，具体为：
    所述中转节点用于根据所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
    所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密，所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于通过自身的所述第一身份标识解密出所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
    所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述用户设备的所述第二身份标识加密；所述用户设备还用于通过自身的所述第二身份标识解密出所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识；
    所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
    所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
    所述用户设备根据自身的私钥、自身的所述第一验证标识、所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识和所述第一身份标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  11. 根据权利要求1～4任一项所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，具体为：
    所述中转节点用于根据所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
    所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述蜂窝网认证网元用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
    所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述用户设备用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
    所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名；
    所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
    所述用户设备根据自身的私钥、自身的所述第一验证标识、所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识和所述第一身份标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  13. 根据权利要求1～4任一项所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，具体为：
    所述中转节点用于根据所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
    所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述蜂窝网认证网元用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
    所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述用户设备用于通过预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥解密出所述第一验证标识；
    所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息的消息认证码MAC；
    所述用户设备生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥，具体为：
    所述用户设备根据自身的私钥、所述第一验证标识、所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识和所述第一身份标识生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
  14. 根据权利要求13所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  15. 根据权利要求1～14任一项所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第一认证消息包括用于表征是否基于所述第一加密标识做聚合运算的聚合标识；所述中转节点还用于根据所述聚合标识判断是否需要对所述第一加密标识做聚合运算；
    若需要，则所述中转节点用于执行所述通过聚合算法基于所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息的操作；
    若不需要，则所述中转节点还用于将所述第一认证消息转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第一认证消息并通过所述第一加密标识验证所述第一认证消息中的信息是否正确；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第一认证消息中的信息正确时向所述中转节点发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息包括第四加密标识、所述第二验证标识和所述用户设备的所述第一验证标识，所述第四加密标识为所述第二响应消息中除所述第四加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    所述中转节点还用于接收并向所述用户设备转发所述第二响应消息；
    所述用户设备还用于接收所述中转节点转发的所述第二响应消息，通过所述第四加密标识验证所述第二响应消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述第二响应消息中是否携带了自身的第一验证标识；
    所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验 证标识时，生成与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的会话秘钥。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述系统，其特征在于：
    所述用户设备还用于在验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第一验证标识时向所述中转节点发送所述第二认证消息；
    所述中转节点还用于接收所述第二认证消息并向所述蜂窝网认证网元转发所述第二认证消息；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第二认证消息并通过所述第三加密标识验证所述第二认证消息中的信息是否正确，并验证所述第二认证消息中是否携带了自身的第二验证标识；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第二认证消息中的信息正确且携带了自身的第二验证标识时，生成与所述用户设备之间的会话秘钥。
  17. 根据权利要求2～4任一项所述的系统，其特征在于：
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时向所述中转节点发送验证失败消息；
    所述中转节点还用于接收所述验证失败消息并根据所述验证失败消息将所述多个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息分别转发给所述蜂窝认证网元；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于根据所述第一认证消息分别对所述多个所述用户设备中每个用户设备分别进行验证。
  18. 根据权利要求2～4任一项所述的系统，其特征在于，
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时向所述中转节点发送验证失败消息；
    所述中转节点还用于接收所述验证失败消息，根据所述验证失败消息通过聚合算法基于所述多个所述用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第四加密信息；
    所述转发节点还用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息，所述第三聚合消息包括所述第四加密信息和所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
    所述蜂窝网认证网元还用于接收所述第三聚合消息并通过所述第四加密信息验证所述第三聚合消息中的信息是否正确。
  19. 一种中转节点，其特征在于，包括：
    第一接收单元，用于接收多个用户设备分别发送的第一认证消息，每个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息包括所述每个用户设备的第一验证标识和第一加密标识，所述第一验证标识用于蜂窝网认证网元验证所述每个用户设备的身份，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    第一聚合单元，用于通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中 的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
    第一发送单元，用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，所述第一聚合消息包括所述第一加密信息和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
    第二接收单元，用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元根据第一加密消息验证所述第一聚合消息中的信息正确后生成的，所述第一响应消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第二验证标识、第二加密标识和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识，所述第二加密标识为所述第一响应消息中除所述第二验证标识外的信息的加密序列；
    第二发送单元，用于将所述第一响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第一响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
  20. 根据权利要求19所述的中转节点，其特征在于，还包括：
    第三接收单元，用于接收所述多个用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第一响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    第二聚合单元，用于通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第三加密信息；
    第三发送单元，用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，所述第二聚合消息包括所述第三加密信息和所述第二认证消息中携带的所述第二验证标识；所述第二聚合消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
  21. 根据权利要求20所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第一响应消息包含所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密。
  22. 根据权利要求20所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元与所述用户设备之间的对称钥加密。
  23. 根据权利要求19～22任一项所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的DH公钥，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
  24. 根据权利要求23所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响 应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  25. 根据权利要求19～22任一项所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
  26. 根据权利要求25所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  27. 根据权利要求19～22任一项所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一聚合消息包含所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备的第二身份标识；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；所述第一发送单元具体用于根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
    所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述用户设备的所述第二身份标识加密；所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  29. 根据权利要求19～22任一项所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第一发送单元具体用于根据所述第一验证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
    所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
  30. 根据权利要求29所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  31. 根据权利要求19～22任一项所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为 所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第一发送单元具体用于根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
    所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息的消息认证码MAC。
  32. 根据权利要求31所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  33. 根据权利要求19～32任一项所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述第一认证消息包括用于表征是否基于所述第一加密标识做聚合运算的聚合标识；所述中转节点还包括：
    判断单元，用于根据所述聚合标识判断是否需要对所述第一加密标识做聚合运算；
    所述第一聚合单元具体用于在所述判断单元的判断结果为是时，通过所述第一聚合单元执行所述通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
    第四发送单元，用于在所述判断单元的判断结果为否时，将所述第一认证消息转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元；
    第四接收单元，用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元在通过所述第一加密标识验证出所述第一认证消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二响应消息包括第四加密标识、所述第二验证标识和所述用户设备的所述第一验证标识，所述第四加密标识为所述第二响应消息中除所述第四加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    第五发送单元，用于将所述第二响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第二响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
  34. 根据权利要求33所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述中转节点还包括
    第五接收单元，用于接收所述用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第二响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    第六发送单元，用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元转发所述第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
  35. 根据权利要求19～21任一项所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述中转节点还包括：
    第六接收单元，用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
    第七发送单元，用于根据所述验证失败消息将所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息分别转发给所述蜂窝认证网元，用于所述蜂窝网认证网元分别对所述多个用户设备中每个用户设备分别进行验证。
  36. 根据权利要求19～21任一项所述的中转节点，其特征在于，所述中转节点还包括：
    第七接收单元，用于接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
    第三聚合单元，用于根据所述验证失败消息通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第四加密信息；
    第八发送单元，用于向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息，所述第三聚合消息包括所述第四加密信息和所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识。
  37. 一种网络认证方法，其特征在于，包括：
    中转节点接收多个用户设备分别发送的第一认证消息，每个所述用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息包括所述每个用户设备的第一验证标识和第一加密标识，所述第一验证标识用于蜂窝网认证网元验证所述每个用户设备的身份，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    所述中转节点通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息；
    所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息，所述第一聚合消息包括所述第一加密信息和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识；
    所述中转节点接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元根据第一加密消息验证所述第一聚合消息中的信息正确后生成的，所述第一响应消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第二验证标识、第二加密标识和所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识，所述第二加密标识为所述第一响应消息中除所述第二验证标识外的信息的加密序列；
    所述中转节点将所述第一响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第一响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
  38. 根据权利要求37所述的方法，其特征在于，所述中转节点将所述第一响应消息转发给所述用户设备之后，所述方法还包括：
    所述中转节点接收所述多个用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述 用户设备在判断出所述第一响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第一响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    所述中转节点通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第二认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第三加密信息；
    所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息，所述第二聚合消息包括所述第三加密信息和所述第二认证消息中携带的所述第二验证标识；所述第二聚合消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
  39. 根据权利要求38所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一响应消息包含所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密。
  40. 根据权利要求38所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元与所述用户设备之间的对称钥加密。
  41. 根据权利要求37～40任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的DH公钥，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
  42. 根据权利要求41所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的DH公钥，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  43. 根据权利要求37～40任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
  44. 根据权利要求43所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的新鲜参数nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  45. 根据权利要求37～40任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce，所述第一聚合消息包含所述多个所述用户设备中每个所述用户设备的第二身份标识；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；
    所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息包括：
    所述中转节点根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应 的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
    所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述第一身份标识加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了所述用户设备的所述第二身份标识加密；所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
  46. 根据权利要求45所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  47. 根据权利要求37～40任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；
    所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息包括：
    所述中转节点根据所述第一验证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
    所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为通过所述用户设备的私钥对所述第一认证消息中除所述第一加密标识外的信息的签名。
  48. 根据权利要求47所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  49. 根据权利要求37～40任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一验证标识为所述用户设备的新鲜参数nonce；所述第一认证消息包括所述蜂窝网认证网元的第一身份标识；
    所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第二聚合消息包括：
    所述中转节点根据所述第一认证消息中的所述第一身份标识向所述第一身份标识对应的所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第一聚合消息；
    所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一响应消息中的所述第一验证标识经过了预存的所述用户设备与所述蜂窝网认证网元之间的对称钥加密，所述第一加密标识为所述第一认证消息的消息认证码MAC。
  50. 根据权利要求49所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二验证标识为所述蜂窝网认证网元的所述nonce，所述第二加密标识为通过所述蜂窝网认证网元的私钥对所述第一响应消息中除所述第二加密标识外的信息的签名。
  51. 根据权利要求37～50任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一认证消息包括用于表征是否基于所述第一加密标识做聚合运算的聚合标识；所述方法还包括：
    所述中转节点根据所述聚合标识判断是否需要对所述第一加密标识做聚合运算；
    若判断结果为是，则执行所述通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息中的所述第一加密标识生成第一加密信息的步骤；
    若判断结果为否，则所述中转节点将所述第一认证消息转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元；
    所述中转节点接收所述蜂窝网认证网元发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息为所述蜂窝网认证网元在通过所述第一加密标识验证出所述第一认证消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二响应消息包括第四加密标识、所述第二验证标识和所述用户设备的所述第一验证标识，所述第四加密标识为所述第二响应消息中除所述第四加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    所述中转节点将所述第二响应消息转发给所述用户设备；所述第二响应消息中的第一验证标识用于所述用户设备验证所述蜂窝网认证网元的身份是否安全，所述第一响应消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述用户设备转发给所述蜂窝网认证网元，以供所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述用户设备的身份是否安全。
  52. 根据权利要求51所述的方法，其特征在于，所述中转节点将所述第二响应消息转发给所述用户设备之后，所述方法还包括：
    所述中转节点接收所述用户设备发送的第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息为所述用户设备在判断出所述第二响应消息中包含自身的所述第一验证标识且根据所述第二加密标识验证出所述第二响应消息中的信息正确时生成的，所述第二认证消息包括所述第二验证标识和第三加密标识，所述第三加密标识为所述第二认证消息中除所述第三加密标识外的信息的加密序列；
    所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元转发所述第二认证消息，所述第二认证消息中的所述第二验证标识用于所述蜂窝网认证网元验证所述多个用户设备的身份是否安全。
  53. 根据权利要求37～39任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述中转节点接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
    所述中转节点根据所述验证失败消息将所述多个用户设备发送的所述第一认证消息分别转发给所述蜂窝认证网元，用于所述蜂窝网认证网元分别对所述多个用户设备中每个用户设备分别进行验证。
  54. 根据权利要求37～39任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述中转节点接收所述蜂窝网认证网元在验证出所述第一聚合消息中的信息不正确时发送的验证失败消息；
    所述中转节点根据所述验证失败消息通过聚合算法基于所述多个用户设备发送的第一认证消息中的部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第三加密标识生成第四加密信息；
    所述中转节点向所述蜂窝网认证网元发送第三聚合消息，所述第三聚合消息包括所述第四加密信息和所述部分所述第一认证消息中的所述第一验证标识。
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