WO2015175007A1 - Method to enable deep packet inspection (dpi) in openflow-based software defined network (sdn) - Google Patents
Method to enable deep packet inspection (dpi) in openflow-based software defined network (sdn) Download PDFInfo
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- WO2015175007A1 WO2015175007A1 PCT/US2014/045312 US2014045312W WO2015175007A1 WO 2015175007 A1 WO2015175007 A1 WO 2015175007A1 US 2014045312 W US2014045312 W US 2014045312W WO 2015175007 A1 WO2015175007 A1 WO 2015175007A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
- H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
- H04L63/0254—Stateful filtering
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/02—Capturing of monitoring data
- H04L43/028—Capturing of monitoring data by filtering
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/20—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks the monitoring system or the monitored elements being virtualised, abstracted or software-defined entities, e.g. SDN or NFV
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/38—Flow based routing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/42—Centralised routing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
- H04L61/50—Address allocation
- H04L61/5007—Internet protocol [IP] addresses
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
- H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
- H04L63/0245—Filtering by information in the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
- H04L69/22—Parsing or analysis of headers
Definitions
- the present invention is generally related to network security in Software Defined Networking (SDN). More specifically, the present invention relates to deep packet inspection of a flow of data packets in a Software Defined Networking environment.
- SDN Software Defined Networking
- Deep packet inspection is commonly used today to protect computer networks from viruses and malware.
- Those familiar with packet communications in computer networks understand that data packets sent through a computer network include numerous layers that may be scanned for threats using deep packet inspection. These layers include the Physical Layer (Layer 1), the Data Link Layer (Layer 2), the Network Layer (Layer 3), the Transport Layer (Layer 4); the Session Layer (Layer 5), the Presentation Layer (Layer 6), and the Application Layer (Layer 7) ⁇
- Smart switches include significant computing resources, where commodity switches do not. Because of this, smart switches are significantly more expensive than commodity switches. Since concerns for security have traditionally outweighed concerns for limiting expenditures in the data center, the use of smart switches has expanded overtime.
- SDN Software Defined Networking
- Preferred network switches used in a software defined network are simple inexpensive commodity network switches.
- the simplicity and the lower costs associated with SDN computer networks as compared to traditional computer networks has led to forecasts that SDN will displace traditional computer networks over time.
- the SDN architecture has not addressed how to maximize the security of the data center.
- SDN increases risks associated with passing viruses and malware through a network switch to computers in the computer network. There is therefore a need for low cost methods for performing deep packet inspection on packets in an SDN environment.
- Open Flow is an example of a Software Defined Networking (SDN) protocol. Open Flows uses a collaborative network switch and a controller to direct packets received by the network switch to a destination identified in the packets received. Since Open Flow is currently an important SDN protocol, Open Flow is a protocol that may be used to provide enhanced deep packet inspection functionality in an SDN environment without adding significant costs to an SDN computer network.
- SDN Software Defined Networking
- Open Flow protocol provides a common communication protocol between SDN controllers and other network devices.
- the Open Flow protocol describes message exchanges that take place between an Open Flow controller and one or more Open Flow switches. Commands or messages used by the Open Flow protocol may be extended to include new commands or messages that are compatible with the protocol.
- a flow of packets is a sequence of packets traversing a network that share a set of header field values.
- a flow could consist of all packets with the same source and destination IP addresses, or all packets with the same virtual local area network (VLAN) identifier.
- VLAN virtual local area network
- FIGURE 1 illustrates a system for deep packet inspection in a software defined network.
- FIGURE 2 illustrates a flow diagram for receiving and processing a packet.
- FIGURE 3 illustrates a flow diagram for responding to messages from a firewall.
- FIGURE 4 illustrates a flow diagram for receiving a packet, performing deep packet inspection, and sending a message to a network switch regarding the packet.
- FIGURE 5 illustrates a block diagram of a computing device that may be used to implement various embodiments of the present invention.
- the present invention relates to a method and system for performing deep packet inspection of messages transmitted through a network switch in a Software Defined Network (SDN).
- SDN Software Defined Network
- Embodiments of the invention include a network switch, a controller, and a firewall in a software defined networking environment.
- the network switch is a simple network switch that is physically separate from the controller and the firewall.
- the invention may include a plurality of physically distinct network switches communicating with one or more controllers and firewalls. In certain instances, communications between the network switch, the controller, and the firewall are performed using the Open Flow standard
- An exemplary method of the invention includes the following series of steps: Receiving a set configuration command from a controller by a network switch.
- the set configuration command informs the network switch of a deep packet inspection mode selected by the controller.
- the method continues where the network switch performs the steps of receiving an address of a firewall, establishing communications with the firewall, receiving a get configuration request from the firewall, and sending a configuration reply to the firewall.
- the configuration reply sent to the firewall includes the operational mode for deep packet inspection that was previously received by the network switch.
- the network switch then continues with the method by performs the steps of: Receiving a first packet, determining whether information contained in the first packet does not match any entry in a flow table, forwarding at least a portion of the first packet to the controller, and forwarding at least a portion of the packet to the firewall for DPI if the controller decides to do DPI scan on this flow.
- the firewall receives the portion of the first packet, the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the first packet forwarded to it by the network switch.
- the method of the invention may be performed by a system, or by a non- transitory data storage medium.
- the system of the invention will include a network switch, a controller, and a firewall.
- the controller will send a set configuration command, and an address of a firewall to the network switch.
- the set configuration command sets a deep packet inspection mode of the network switch.
- the address will usually be an internet protocol (IP) address of the firewall.
- IP internet protocol
- the network switch Upon receiving the deep packet set configuration command the network switch will establish communications with the firewall using the address.
- the network switch will then receive a get configuration request from the firewall, and the network switch will then respond to the get configuration request by sending the firewall a message identifying the deep packet inspection mode setting in the network switch.
- Modes supported by the system of the invention typically include, yet are not limited to an observe mode and an enforce mode.
- the network switch examines packets (input packets) as they are received by the network switch.
- the network switch determines whether or not certain information in the packet matches an entry in a flow table. In certain instances, when the information in the packet matches an entry in the flow table, the network switch forwards (mirrors) a copy of at least some of the data associated with a packet flow to the firewall. The number of bytes mirrored to the firewall for a given flow of packets may be configured by the controller.
- the network switch then outputs (sends) the packet through a port of the network switch toward a destination.
- the firewall does not instruct the network switch to drop or forward a packet or a packet flow when a threat is detected. Instead, upon detecting a threat, the firewall may collect information about the threat or may report that threat to another computer (observer) in the computer network.
- the network switch When the information in the packet does not match an entry in the flow table, the network switch will typically send a copy of at least a portion of the packet to the controller. The network switch will then wait for an instruction from the controller regarding what to do with the packet. In these instances, the controller may instruct the network switch to drop the packet, or instruct the network switch to forward the packet through a port toward a destination, or to send the packet to the firewall for deep packet inspection on the packet.
- the controller decides to perform deep packet inspection on a particular packet or a flow of packets, the controller instructs the switch to mirror at least some of the bytes from the particular packet/flow to the firewall, and the firewall performs deep packet inspection on those bytes.
- the network switch When operating in the enforce mode, the network switch will continue table processing of the packet until it receives a message from the firewall.
- the firewall When the switch receives an allow message from the firewall, the firewall has identified that the packet flow does not contain a threat. After receiving an allow message from the firewall, the network switch will then output the packet toward a destination. In contrast, when the firewall detects a threat in the packet, the firewall will send the network switch a deny message. Upon receiving a deny message, the network switch will drop the packet. In certain instances, the firewall inspects information contained within all layers of a packet. When the network switch is looking for a message from the firewall regarding a particular packet, the network switch may continue processing other packets.
- deep packet inspection is performed on a per packet basis, and each packet will either be allowed or denied by the firewall. Since deep packet inspection is performed on a per packet basis, the method described herein does not significantly delay a packet from being processed before being delivered to a destination.
- the firewall In both the observe and enforce mode, the firewall will always analyze data packets forwarded to it.
- the difference between the enforce mode and the observe mode is that in enforce mode, the firewall communicates back to the network switch whether a data packet is malicious or benign.
- the network switch In the enforce mode, the network switch enforces the decision made by the firewall.
- the firewall In the observe mode, the firewall does not communicate the results of a deep packet inspection to the network switch, and the network switch does not look for a response from the firewall after forwarding a packet to the firewall.
- deep packet inspection will be performed on each packet in a packet flow until deep packet inspection has been performed on a series of packets until a pre-determined number of bytes have been analyzed for threats by the firewall.
- the controller may determine the number of bits that will be analyzed for a particular flow of packets.
- a set maximum length command may be used to identify the number of bytes to mirror for a given flow. When using the Open Flow protocol, the maximum length command will be a new command that is compatible with the Open Flow protocol. When a single packet contains more bytes than the number of bytes defined by the maximum length command, deep packet inspection will not be performed on other packets in that packet flow.
- the set maximum length command allows the controller to control the amount of deep packet inspection that is performed on a given flow. When network traffic is high, the controller may decide to reduce the amount of deep packet inspection to perform on a flow.
- FIGURE 1 illustrates a system for deep packet inspection in a software defined network.
- FIGURE 1 as illustrated includes a network switch 110, a controller 120, a firewall 130, a destination computer 140, the Internet 150, and a source computer 160.
- data packets are transmitted over a network connection N from the source computer 160 through the Internet 150 to the network switch 110 through a first port PI.
- the network switch 110 is depicted including a first communication channel CI, and a second communication channel C2.
- the network switch 110 communicates with the controller 120 through the first communication channel CI, and communicates with the firewall 130 through the second
- Network switch 110 communicates with the destination computer 140 through communication port P2. While independent communication ports CI and C2 are depicted in FIGURE 1, the present invention does not require separate communication channels for communicating between the network switch 110 and the controller 120, or the firewall 130.
- different embodiments of the invention may include a plurality of physically distinct network switches communicating with one or more controllers and firewalls. Or include other embodiments, wherein the functions of the controller and the firewall are built within a single electronic assembly.
- FIGURE 2 is a simplified flow diagram of the presently claimed invention receiving and processing a packet.
- a packet is received by the network switch in step 205 "Packet In".
- Step 210 "Match in Table" is where the network switch determines whether information in the packet received matches an entry in a flow table. When there is a match, program flow moves to step 225 where it is determined whether Deep Packet Inspection is configured on this flow. When Deep Packet Inspection is required, at least a portion of the packet is mirrored to the firewall 245. To prevent unnecessary looping, each packet will typically be mirrored to the firewall once.
- Step 250 determines whether enforce mode is enabled. When enforce mode is enabled, program flow moves to step 255 "Look for Firewall Reply".
- the network switch may continue processing other packets.
- the network switch When the firewall is in the enforce mode, the network switch will not output or drop the packet until a message is received from the firewall.
- the network switch When the network switch receives an allow message from the firewall, it will continue processing the packet using another table, until the packet has been processed through all available tables.
- the network switch receives a deny message from the firewall, it will drop the packet.
- step 250 proceeds to step 230 where counters are updated and where instructions associated Software Defined Networking (SDN) actions are prepared.
- SDN Software Defined Networking
- Program flow moves from step 235 back to step 210 when the network switch determines that there are other flow tables to compare with information contained within the packet.
- program flow moves from step 235 to step 240 where certain actions of SDN are performed in the network switch. These actions may include outputting the packet to a destination.
- step 210 determines that information in the packet received does not match an entry in the flow table (a table-miss) program flow proceeds to step 215.
- step 215 "Table-miss flow entry” determines whether a "table miss” flow entry exists in the table. The first packet received for a given flow of packets will usually be matched to the special "table miss" flow entry. When the packet is matched to the "table miss” entry as step 215, program flow moves to step 230 where counters are updated and instructions are executed. When no "table miss" entry exists in step 215, program flow moves to step 220 where the packet is dropped.
- FIGURE 3 is a flow diagram of the network switch responding to messages from the firewall.
- Step 310 is where the network switch receives a message from the firewall.
- Step 320 determines whether the message received is a deny message, if so program flow moves to step 330 where the packet is dropped.
- Step 340 determines whether the message is an allow message, if so program flow moves to step 350 where the network switch continues processing the packet using other tables. In the instance where the message from the firewall is not a deny or an allow message, program flow moves to step 360 where the network switch drops the packet because the code in the reply message is unsupported.
- FIGURE 4 is a flow diagram of the firewall receiving a packet, performing deep packet inspection on the packet, and sending a message to the network switch regarding the packet.
- the firewall receives a request message from the network switch. This request message includes at least a portion of the packet.
- the firewall extracts the packet data from the message and performs deep packet inspection (DPI) on the packet data 420.
- DPI deep packet inspection
- the firewall determines whether the firewall is in observe mode, if yes the firewall stops processing the packet at step 440. The firewall will not send a message to the network switch after receiving a request message from the network switch when the firewall is in the observe mode.
- program flow moves from step 430 to step 450.
- the firewall determines whether it is in the enforce mode 450. When the firewall is in the enforce mode, program flow then moves to step 460 where the firewall sends the DPI result of the packet back to the network switch through a reply message. When the firewall is not in observe mode or in enforce mode, the firewall will identify an exception condition 470. An exception message may cause the firewall to send an unsupported reply code in a message to the network switch.
- Alternate implementations of the present invention include the instance where the network switch does not communicate directly with the firewall.
- the communications between the network switch and the firewall may be passed through the controller.
- the invention utilizes new command types not described in a Software Defined Networking specification.
- Such new command types include communications between the network switch and the firewall, they include, yet are not limited to a reply message from the network switch to the firewall indicating a deep packet inspection mode, and a command for mirroring packet data to the firewall.
- Packet data forwarded to the firewall is a form of mirroring, wherein all or part of a data packet is sent to the firewall.
- commands or messages used will be compatible with the Open Flow protocol specification. Some of these commands or messages may already be defined in the Open Flow protocol specification. Other these commands or protocols used with the present invention are new commands that are allowed by the Open Flow protocol specification.
- New commands or messages used when sending packet data to the firewall may also include a length field, may identify a port though which the packet data should be sent to the firewall, and may include a maximum length field. These fields enable an administrator to balance performance versus a level of security. Packet data contained within a communication from the network switch may be padded, or be aligned (at a bit, byte, or word level).
- New commands or messages may also include other fields or parameters, including yet not limited to: a buffer ID, a total length field, a deep packet inspection mode field, a pad align field, an allow code, a deny code, and a frame type field.
- Messages between the controller, the firewall, and the network switch may also identify the IP address of the controller or the firewall.
- FIGURE 5 is a block diagram of a device for implementing the present technology.
- FIGURE 5 illustrates an exemplary computing system 500 that may be used to implement a computing device for use with the present technology.
- System 500 of FIGURE 5 may be implemented in the contexts of the likes of clients and servers.
- the computing system 500 of FIGURE 5 includes one or more processors 510 and memory 520.
- Main memory 520 may store, in part, instructions and data for execution by processor 510.
- Main memory can store the executable code when in operation.
- the system 500 of FIGURE 5 further includes a storage 520, which may include mass storage and portable storage, antenna 540, output devices 550, user input devices 560, a display system 570, and peripheral devices 580.
- processor unit 510 and main memory 520 may be connected via a local microprocessor bus, and the storage 530, peripheral device(s) 580 and display system 570 may be connected via one or more input/output (I/O) buses.
- I/O input/output
- Storage device 530 which may include mass storage implemented with a magnetic disk drive or an optical disk drive, may be a non-volatile storage device for storing data and instructions for use by processor unit 510. Storage device 530 can store the system software for implementing embodiments of the present invention for purposes of loading that software into main memory 510.
- Portable storage device of storage 530 operates in conjunction with a portable non-volatile storage medium, such as a floppy disk, compact disk or Digital video disc, to input and output data and code to and from the computer system 500 of FIGURE 5.
- a portable non-volatile storage medium such as a floppy disk, compact disk or Digital video disc
- the system software for implementing embodiments of the present invention may be stored on such a portable medium and input to the computer system 500 via the portable storage device.
- Antenna 540 may include one or more antennas for communicating wirelessly with another device.
- Antenna 516 may be used, for example, to communicate wirelessly via Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, with a cellular network, or with other wireless protocols and systems.
- the one or more antennas may be controlled by a processor 510, which may include a controller, to transmit and receive wireless signals.
- processor 510 execute programs stored in memory 512 to control antenna 540 transmit a wireless signal to a cellular network and receive a wireless signal from a cellular network.
- the system 500 as shown in FIGURE 5 includes output devices 550 and input device 560.
- suitable output devices include speakers, printers, network interfaces, and monitors.
- Input devices 560 may include a touch screen, microphone, accelerometers, a camera, and other device.
- Input devices 560 may include an alphanumeric keypad, such as a keyboard, for inputting alpha-numeric and other information, or a pointing device, such as a mouse, a trackball, stylus, or cursor direction keys.
- Display system 570 may include a liquid crystal display (LCD), LED display, or other suitable display device.
- Display system 570 receives textual and graphical information, and processes the information for output to the display device.
- Peripherals 580 may include any type of computer support device to add additional functionality to the computer system.
- peripheral device(s) 580 may include a modem or a router.
- the components contained in the computer system 500 of FIGURE 5 are those typically found in computing system, such as but not limited to a desk top computer, lap top computer, notebook computer, net book computer, tablet computer, smart phone, personal data assistant (PDA), or other computer that may be suitable for use with embodiments of the present invention and are intended to represent a broad category of such computer components that are well known in the art.
- the computer system 500 of FIGURE 5 can be a personal computer, hand held computing device, telephone, mobile computing device, workstation, server, minicomputer, mainframe computer, or any other computing device.
- the computer can also include different bus configurations, networked platforms, multi-processor platforms, etc.
- Various operating systems can be used including Unix, Linux, Windows, Macintosh OS, Palm OS, and other suitable operating systems.
- the presently claimed invention may be implemented in various forms of hardware and software.
- the present invention may be controlled in part or entirely in a non-transitory computer storage medium having embodied thereon a program executable by a processor.
- the present invention may also be implemented using an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), or other forms of electronic hardware.
- ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a method and system for performing deep packet inspection of messages transmitted through a network switch in a Software Defined Network (SDN). Embodiments of the invention include a network switch, a controller, and a firewall in a software defined networking environment. In the present invention, the network switch is a simple network switch that is physically separate from the controller and the firewall. The invention may include a plurality of physically distinct network switches communicating with one or more controllers and firewalls. In certain instances, communications between the network switch, the controller, and the firewall are performed using the Open Flow standard communication protocol.
Description
METHOD TO ENABLE DEEP PACKET INSPECTION (DPI) IN OPENFLOW- BASED SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK (SDN)
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Field of the Invention
The present invention is generally related to network security in Software Defined Networking (SDN). More specifically, the present invention relates to deep packet inspection of a flow of data packets in a Software Defined Networking environment.
Description of the Related Art
Deep packet inspection is commonly used today to protect computer networks from viruses and malware. Those familiar with packet communications in computer networks understand that data packets sent through a computer network include numerous layers that may be scanned for threats using deep packet inspection. These layers include the Physical Layer (Layer 1), the Data Link Layer (Layer 2), the Network Layer (Layer 3), the Transport Layer (Layer 4); the Session Layer (Layer 5), the Presentation Layer (Layer 6), and the Application Layer (Layer 7)·
Performing deep packet inspection on multiple layers of packets in a stream of packets requires significant computing resources. The concern for protecting computer networks from threats created a market for smart network switches that include deep packet inspection functionality. Smart switches include significant computing resources, where commodity switches do not. Because of this, smart switches are significantly more expensive than commodity switches. Since concerns for security have traditionally outweighed concerns for limiting expenditures in the data center, the use of smart switches has expanded overtime.
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a new networking architecture with the goal of simplifying computer networks in the data center while reducing the costs associated with the data center. Preferred network switches used in a software
defined network are simple inexpensive commodity network switches. The simplicity and the lower costs associated with SDN computer networks as compared to traditional computer networks has led to forecasts that SDN will displace traditional computer networks over time. The SDN architecture, however, has not addressed how to maximize the security of the data center. By replacing smart network switches with inexpensive network switches, SDN increases risks associated with passing viruses and malware through a network switch to computers in the computer network. There is therefore a need for low cost methods for performing deep packet inspection on packets in an SDN environment.
Open Flow is an example of a Software Defined Networking (SDN) protocol. Open Flows uses a collaborative network switch and a controller to direct packets received by the network switch to a destination identified in the packets received. Since Open Flow is currently an important SDN protocol, Open Flow is a protocol that may be used to provide enhanced deep packet inspection functionality in an SDN environment without adding significant costs to an SDN computer network.
Open Flow protocol provides a common communication protocol between SDN controllers and other network devices. The Open Flow protocol describes message exchanges that take place between an Open Flow controller and one or more Open Flow switches. Commands or messages used by the Open Flow protocol may be extended to include new commands or messages that are compatible with the protocol.
A flow of packets is a sequence of packets traversing a network that share a set of header field values. For example, a flow could consist of all packets with the same source and destination IP addresses, or all packets with the same virtual local area network (VLAN) identifier.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIGURE 1 illustrates a system for deep packet inspection in a software defined network.
FIGURE 2 illustrates a flow diagram for receiving and processing a packet.
FIGURE 3 illustrates a flow diagram for responding to messages from a firewall. FIGURE 4 illustrates a flow diagram for receiving a packet, performing deep packet inspection, and sending a message to a network switch regarding the packet.
FIGURE 5 illustrates a block diagram of a computing device that may be used to implement various embodiments of the present invention.
SUMMARY OF THE PRESENTLY CLAIMED INVENTION
The present invention relates to a method and system for performing deep packet inspection of messages transmitted through a network switch in a Software Defined Network (SDN). Embodiments of the invention include a network switch, a controller, and a firewall in a software defined networking environment. In the present invention, the network switch is a simple network switch that is physically separate from the controller and the firewall. The invention may include a plurality of physically distinct network switches communicating with one or more controllers and firewalls. In certain instances, communications between the network switch, the controller, and the firewall are performed using the Open Flow standard
communication protocol.
An exemplary method of the invention includes the following series of steps: Receiving a set configuration command from a controller by a network switch. The set configuration command informs the network switch of a deep packet inspection mode selected by the controller. The method continues where the network switch performs the steps of receiving an address of a firewall, establishing communications with the firewall, receiving a get configuration request from the firewall, and sending a configuration reply to the firewall. The configuration reply sent to the firewall includes the operational mode for deep packet inspection that was previously received by the network switch. The network switch then continues with the method by performs the steps of: Receiving a first packet, determining whether information contained in the first packet does not match any entry in a flow table, forwarding at least a portion of the first packet to the controller, and forwarding at least a portion of the packet to the firewall for DPI if the controller decides to do DPI scan on this flow. When the firewall receives the portion of the first packet, the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the first packet forwarded to it by the network switch.
The method of the invention may be performed by a system, or by a non- transitory data storage medium. The system of the invention will include a network switch, a controller, and a firewall.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
In an embodiment of the presently claimed invention, the controller will send a set configuration command, and an address of a firewall to the network switch. The set configuration command sets a deep packet inspection mode of the network switch. The address will usually be an internet protocol (IP) address of the firewall. Upon receiving the deep packet set configuration command the network switch will establish communications with the firewall using the address. The network switch will then receive a get configuration request from the firewall, and the network switch will then respond to the get configuration request by sending the firewall a message identifying the deep packet inspection mode setting in the network switch. Modes supported by the system of the invention typically include, yet are not limited to an observe mode and an enforce mode.
In the observe mode, the network switch examines packets (input packets) as they are received by the network switch. When the network switch inputs a packet, the network switch determines whether or not certain information in the packet matches an entry in a flow table. In certain instances, when the information in the packet matches an entry in the flow table, the network switch forwards (mirrors) a copy of at least some of the data associated with a packet flow to the firewall. The number of bytes mirrored to the firewall for a given flow of packets may be configured by the controller. The network switch then outputs (sends) the packet through a port of the network switch toward a destination. In the observe mode, the firewall does not instruct the network switch to drop or forward a packet or a packet flow when a threat is detected. Instead, upon detecting a threat, the firewall may collect information about the threat or may report that threat to another computer (observer) in the computer network.
When the information in the packet does not match an entry in the flow table, the network switch will typically send a copy of at least a portion of the packet to the controller. The network switch will then wait for an instruction from the controller regarding what to do with the packet. In these instances, the controller may instruct the network switch to drop the packet, or instruct the network switch to forward the
packet through a port toward a destination, or to send the packet to the firewall for deep packet inspection on the packet. When the controller decides to perform deep packet inspection on a particular packet or a flow of packets, the controller instructs the switch to mirror at least some of the bytes from the particular packet/flow to the firewall, and the firewall performs deep packet inspection on those bytes.
When operating in the enforce mode, the network switch will continue table processing of the packet until it receives a message from the firewall. When the switch receives an allow message from the firewall, the firewall has identified that the packet flow does not contain a threat. After receiving an allow message from the firewall, the network switch will then output the packet toward a destination. In contrast, when the firewall detects a threat in the packet, the firewall will send the network switch a deny message. Upon receiving a deny message, the network switch will drop the packet. In certain instances, the firewall inspects information contained within all layers of a packet. When the network switch is looking for a message from the firewall regarding a particular packet, the network switch may continue processing other packets. In the invention deep packet inspection is performed on a per packet basis, and each packet will either be allowed or denied by the firewall. Since deep packet inspection is performed on a per packet basis, the method described herein does not significantly delay a packet from being processed before being delivered to a destination.
In both the observe and enforce mode, the firewall will always analyze data packets forwarded to it. The difference between the enforce mode and the observe mode is that in enforce mode, the firewall communicates back to the network switch whether a data packet is malicious or benign. In the enforce mode, the network switch enforces the decision made by the firewall. In the observe mode, the firewall does not communicate the results of a deep packet inspection to the network switch, and the network switch does not look for a response from the firewall after forwarding a packet to the firewall.
In certain instances, deep packet inspection will be performed on each packet in a packet flow until deep packet inspection has been performed on a series of packets until a pre-determined number of bytes have been analyzed for threats by
the firewall. The controller may determine the number of bits that will be analyzed for a particular flow of packets. A set maximum length command may be used to identify the number of bytes to mirror for a given flow. When using the Open Flow protocol, the maximum length command will be a new command that is compatible with the Open Flow protocol. When a single packet contains more bytes than the number of bytes defined by the maximum length command, deep packet inspection will not be performed on other packets in that packet flow. The set maximum length command allows the controller to control the amount of deep packet inspection that is performed on a given flow. When network traffic is high, the controller may decide to reduce the amount of deep packet inspection to perform on a flow.
FIGURE 1 illustrates a system for deep packet inspection in a software defined network. FIGURE 1 as illustrated includes a network switch 110, a controller 120, a firewall 130, a destination computer 140, the Internet 150, and a source computer 160.
In certain instances data packets are transmitted over a network connection N from the source computer 160 through the Internet 150 to the network switch 110 through a first port PI. The network switch 110 is depicted including a first communication channel CI, and a second communication channel C2. The network switch 110 communicates with the controller 120 through the first communication channel CI, and communicates with the firewall 130 through the second
communication channel C2. Network switch 110 communicates with the destination computer 140 through communication port P2. While independent communication ports CI and C2 are depicted in FIGURE 1, the present invention does not require separate communication channels for communicating between the network switch 110 and the controller 120, or the firewall 130.
Furthermore, different embodiments of the invention may include a plurality of physically distinct network switches communicating with one or more controllers and firewalls. Or include other embodiments, wherein the functions of the controller and the firewall are built within a single electronic assembly.
FIGURE 2 is a simplified flow diagram of the presently claimed invention receiving and processing a packet. In the flow diagram of FIGURE 2 a packet is
received by the network switch in step 205 "Packet In". Step 210 "Match in Table" is where the network switch determines whether information in the packet received matches an entry in a flow table. When there is a match, program flow moves to step 225 where it is determined whether Deep Packet Inspection is configured on this flow. When Deep Packet Inspection is required, at least a portion of the packet is mirrored to the firewall 245. To prevent unnecessary looping, each packet will typically be mirrored to the firewall once. Step 250 determines whether enforce mode is enabled. When enforce mode is enabled, program flow moves to step 255 "Look for Firewall Reply". At this time the network switch may continue processing other packets. When the firewall is in the enforce mode, the network switch will not output or drop the packet until a message is received from the firewall. When the network switch receives an allow message from the firewall, it will continue processing the packet using another table, until the packet has been processed through all available tables. When the network switch receives a deny message from the firewall, it will drop the packet.
When enforce mode is not enabled, i.e. the switch runs in the observe mode, step 250 proceeds to step 230 where counters are updated and where instructions associated Software Defined Networking (SDN) actions are prepared. When deep packet inspection is determined not needed in step 225, program flow also moves to step 230. After step 230, program flow moves to step 235 "Goto Next Table?".
Program flow moves from step 235 back to step 210 when the network switch determines that there are other flow tables to compare with information contained within the packet. When there are no remaining flow tables to compare with the packet information, program flow moves from step 235 to step 240 where certain actions of SDN are performed in the network switch. These actions may include outputting the packet to a destination.
When step 210 determines that information in the packet received does not match an entry in the flow table (a table-miss) program flow proceeds to step 215. Step 215 "Table-miss flow entry" determines whether a "table miss" flow entry exists in the table. The first packet received for a given flow of packets will usually be matched to the special "table miss" flow entry. When the packet is matched to the
"table miss" entry as step 215, program flow moves to step 230 where counters are updated and instructions are executed. When no "table miss" entry exists in step 215, program flow moves to step 220 where the packet is dropped.
FIGURE 3 is a flow diagram of the network switch responding to messages from the firewall. Step 310 is where the network switch receives a message from the firewall. Step 320 determines whether the message received is a deny message, if so program flow moves to step 330 where the packet is dropped. Step 340 determines whether the message is an allow message, if so program flow moves to step 350 where the network switch continues processing the packet using other tables. In the instance where the message from the firewall is not a deny or an allow message, program flow moves to step 360 where the network switch drops the packet because the code in the reply message is unsupported.
FIGURE 4 is a flow diagram of the firewall receiving a packet, performing deep packet inspection on the packet, and sending a message to the network switch regarding the packet. In step 410, the firewall receives a request message from the network switch. This request message includes at least a portion of the packet. Once the request message is received from the network switch, the firewall extracts the packet data from the message and performs deep packet inspection (DPI) on the packet data 420. In step 430 the firewall determines whether the firewall is in observe mode, if yes the firewall stops processing the packet at step 440. The firewall will not send a message to the network switch after receiving a request message from the network switch when the firewall is in the observe mode. When the firewall is not in observe mode, program flow moves from step 430 to step 450. Here the firewall determines whether it is in the enforce mode 450. When the firewall is in the enforce mode, program flow then moves to step 460 where the firewall sends the DPI result of the packet back to the network switch through a reply message. When the firewall is not in observe mode or in enforce mode, the firewall will identify an exception condition 470. An exception message may cause the firewall to send an unsupported reply code in a message to the network switch.
Alternate implementations of the present invention include the instance where the network switch does not communicate directly with the firewall. In such
embodiments, the communications between the network switch and the firewall may be passed through the controller.
In certain instances the invention utilizes new command types not described in a Software Defined Networking specification. Such new command types include communications between the network switch and the firewall, they include, yet are not limited to a reply message from the network switch to the firewall indicating a deep packet inspection mode, and a command for mirroring packet data to the firewall. Packet data forwarded to the firewall is a form of mirroring, wherein all or part of a data packet is sent to the firewall.
In a preferred embodiment of the invention, commands or messages used will be compatible with the Open Flow protocol specification. Some of these commands or messages may already be defined in the Open Flow protocol specification. Other these commands or protocols used with the present invention are new commands that are allowed by the Open Flow protocol specification.
New commands or messages used when sending packet data to the firewall may also include a length field, may identify a port though which the packet data should be sent to the firewall, and may include a maximum length field. These fields enable an administrator to balance performance versus a level of security. Packet data contained within a communication from the network switch may be padded, or be aligned (at a bit, byte, or word level).
New commands or messages may also include other fields or parameters, including yet not limited to: a buffer ID, a total length field, a deep packet inspection mode field, a pad align field, an allow code, a deny code, and a frame type field. Messages between the controller, the firewall, and the network switch may also identify the IP address of the controller or the firewall.
FIGURE 5 is a block diagram of a device for implementing the present technology. FIGURE 5 illustrates an exemplary computing system 500 that may be used to implement a computing device for use with the present technology. System 500 of FIGURE 5 may be implemented in the contexts of the likes of clients and servers. The computing system 500 of FIGURE 5 includes one or more processors 510 and memory 520. Main memory 520 may store, in part, instructions and data for
execution by processor 510. Main memory can store the executable code when in operation. The system 500 of FIGURE 5 further includes a storage 520, which may include mass storage and portable storage, antenna 540, output devices 550, user input devices 560, a display system 570, and peripheral devices 580.
The components shown in FIGURE 5 are depicted as being connected via a single bus 590. However, the components may be connected through one or more data transport means. For example, processor unit 510 and main memory 520 may be connected via a local microprocessor bus, and the storage 530, peripheral device(s) 580 and display system 570 may be connected via one or more input/output (I/O) buses.
Storage device 530, which may include mass storage implemented with a magnetic disk drive or an optical disk drive, may be a non-volatile storage device for storing data and instructions for use by processor unit 510. Storage device 530 can store the system software for implementing embodiments of the present invention for purposes of loading that software into main memory 510.
Portable storage device of storage 530 operates in conjunction with a portable non-volatile storage medium, such as a floppy disk, compact disk or Digital video disc, to input and output data and code to and from the computer system 500 of FIGURE 5. The system software for implementing embodiments of the present invention may be stored on such a portable medium and input to the computer system 500 via the portable storage device.
Antenna 540 may include one or more antennas for communicating wirelessly with another device. Antenna 516 may be used, for example, to communicate wirelessly via Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, with a cellular network, or with other wireless protocols and systems. The one or more antennas may be controlled by a processor 510, which may include a controller, to transmit and receive wireless signals. For example, processor 510 execute programs stored in memory 512 to control antenna 540 transmit a wireless signal to a cellular network and receive a wireless signal from a cellular network.
The system 500 as shown in FIGURE 5 includes output devices 550 and input device 560. Examples of suitable output devices include speakers, printers, network
interfaces, and monitors. Input devices 560 may include a touch screen, microphone, accelerometers, a camera, and other device. Input devices 560 may include an alphanumeric keypad, such as a keyboard, for inputting alpha-numeric and other information, or a pointing device, such as a mouse, a trackball, stylus, or cursor direction keys.
Display system 570 may include a liquid crystal display (LCD), LED display, or other suitable display device. Display system 570 receives textual and graphical information, and processes the information for output to the display device.
Peripherals 580 may include any type of computer support device to add additional functionality to the computer system. For example, peripheral device(s) 580 may include a modem or a router.
The components contained in the computer system 500 of FIGURE 5 are those typically found in computing system, such as but not limited to a desk top computer, lap top computer, notebook computer, net book computer, tablet computer, smart phone, personal data assistant (PDA), or other computer that may be suitable for use with embodiments of the present invention and are intended to represent a broad category of such computer components that are well known in the art. Thus, the computer system 500 of FIGURE 5 can be a personal computer, hand held computing device, telephone, mobile computing device, workstation, server, minicomputer, mainframe computer, or any other computing device. The computer can also include different bus configurations, networked platforms, multi-processor platforms, etc. Various operating systems can be used including Unix, Linux, Windows, Macintosh OS, Palm OS, and other suitable operating systems.
The foregoing detailed description of the technology herein has been presented for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the technology to the precise form disclosed. Many modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teaching. The described embodiments were chosen in order to best explain the principles of the technology and its practical application to thereby enable others skilled in the art to best utilize the technology in various embodiments and with various modifications
as are suited to the particular use contemplated. It is intended that the scope of the technology be defined by the claims appended hereto.
The presently claimed invention may be implemented in various forms of hardware and software. The present invention may be controlled in part or entirely in a non-transitory computer storage medium having embodied thereon a program executable by a processor. The present invention may also be implemented using an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), or other forms of electronic hardware.
While various embodiments have been described above, it should be understood that they have been presented by way of example only, and not limitation. The description are not intended to limit the scope of the presently claimed invention. The present descriptions are intended to cover alternatives, modifications, and equivalents consistent with the spirit and scope of the disclosure.
Claims
1. A method of deep packet inspection in a Software Defined Networking environment, the method comprising:
receiving a set configuration command from a controller by a network switch, wherein the set configuration command sets an operational mode for deep packet inspection;
receiving an address of a firewall;
establishing communications with the firewall;
receiving a get configuration request from the firewall;
sending a configuration reply to the firewall, wherein the configuration reply includes the operational mode for deep packet inspection;
receiving a first packet;
determining whether information contained in the first packet does not match any entry in a flow table; and
forwarding at least a portion of the first packet to the controller, and then forwarding at least a portion of the first packet to the firewall if controller determines DPI scan on this flow, wherein the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the first packet.
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
sending a copy of at least some bytes from the first packet to the controller before forwarding the portion of the first packet to the firewall; and
receiving an instruction from the controller to forward the portion of the first packet to the firewall before forwarding the portion of the first packet to the firewall.
3. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
sending the first packet through a port to an address identified in the flow table without looking for a message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is an observation mode;
receiving a second packet;
determining that information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table and DPI scan is configured on this flow;
forwarding at least a portion of the second packet to the firewall when it is determined that the information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table when a number of bytes forwarded from the first packet is less than a pre-determined number of bytes, wherein the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the second packet forwarded to the firewall; and
sending the second packet through a port to an address identified in the flow table without looking for a message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is in the observation mode.
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
receiving an allow message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is an enforce mode, wherein the allow message indicates that the first packet has passed a deep packet inspection.
5. The method of claim 4, further comprising:
receiving a second packet;
determining that information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table and DPI scan is configured on this flow;
forwarding at least a portion of the second packet to the firewall when it is determined that the information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table when a number of bytes forwarded from the first packet is less than a pre-determined number of bytes, wherein the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the second packet forwarded to the firewall;
receiving a deny message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is the enforce mode, wherein the deny message indicates that the second packet failed a deep packet inspection; and
dropping the second packet.
6. The method of claim 4, further comprising:
receiving a second packet;
determining that information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table;
forwarding at least a portion of the second packet to the firewall when it is determined that the information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table when a number of bytes forwarded from the first packet is less than a pre-determined number of bytes, wherein the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the second packet forwarded to the firewall; and
receiving an allow message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is the enforce mode, wherein the allow message indicates that the second packet passed a deep packet inspection.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the address of the firewall received is an IP address of the firewall, wherein the first packet is sent through a port to an address identified in the flow table after the first packet has passed deep packet inspection, and wherein the second packet is sent through the port to the address identified in the flow table after the second packet has passed deep packet inspection.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least portion of the first packet correspond to a pre-determined number of bytes for performing deep packet inspection on a flow of packets.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the communications established with the firewall are established by the controller communicating with the firewall and with the network switch,
the configuration request received from the firewall is passed through the controller, and
the configuration reply is sent by the network switch to the firewall through the controller.
10. A system for deep packet inspection in a Software Defined Networking environment, the system comprising:
a network switch including a memory;
a controller; and
a firewall, wherein the network switch:
receives a set configuration command from the controller by the network switch, wherein the set configuration command sets an operation mode for deep packet inspection;
receives an address of a firewall;
establishes communications with the firewall;
sends a configuration reply to the firewall, wherein the configuration reply includes the operational mode for deep packet inspection;
receives a first packet;
determines whether information contained in the first packet does not match any entry in a flow table; and
forwards at least a portion of the first packet to the controller, and then forwarding at least a portion of the first packet to the firewall if controller determines DPI scan on this flow, wherein the firewall performs deep packet inspection of the portion of the first packet.
11. The system of claim 1, wherein the network switch:
sends a copy of at least some bytes from the first packet to the controller before forwarding the portion of the first packet to the firewall; and
receives an instruction from the controller to forward the portion of the first packet to the firewall before forwarding the portion of the first packet to the firewall.
12. The system of claim 10, wherein the network switch:
sends the first packet through a port to an address identified in the flow table without looking for a message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is an observation mode;
receives a second packet;
determines that information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table and DPI scan is configured on this flow;
forwards at least a portion of the second packet to the firewall when it is determined that the information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table when a number of bytes forwarded from the first packet is less than a pre-determined number of bytes, wherein the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the second packet forwarded to the firewall; and
sends the second packet through a port to an address identified in the flow table without looking for a message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is the observation mode.
13. The system of claim 10, wherein the network switch:
receives an allow message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is an enforce mode, wherein the allow message indicates that the first packet has passed a deep packet inspection.
14. The system of claim 13, wherein the network switch:
receives a second packet;
determines that information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table and DPI scan is configured on this flow;
forwards at least a portion of the second packet to the firewall when it is determined that the information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table when a number of bytes forwarded from the first packet is less than a pre-determined number of bytes, wherein the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the second packet forwarded to the firewall;
receives a deny message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is the enforce mode, wherein the deny message indicates that the second packet failed a deep packet inspection; and
drops the second packet.
15. The system of claim 14, wherein the network switch:
receives a second packet;
determines that information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table;
forwards at least a portion of the second packet to the firewall when it is determined that the information contained in the second packet matches an entry in the flow table when a number of bytes forwarded from the first packet is less than a pre-determined number of bytes, wherein the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the second packet forwarded to the firewall; and
receives an allow message from the firewall when the operational mode of the network switch is the enforce mode, wherein the allow message indicates that the second packet passed a deep packet inspection.
16. The system of claim 10, wherein the address of the firewall received is an IP address of the firewall, wherein the first packet is sent through a port to an address identified in the flow table after the first packet has passed deep packet inspection, and wherein the second packet is sent through the port to the address identified in the flow table after the second packet has passed deep packet inspection.
17. The system of claim 10, wherein the at least portion of the first packet correspond to a pre-determined number of bytes for performing deep packet inspection on a flow of packets.
18. The system of claim 10, wherein:
the communications established with the firewall are established by the controller communicating with the firewall and with the network switch,
the configuration request received from the firewall is passed through the controller, and
the configuration reply is sent by the network switch to the firewall through the controller.
19. A non-transitory computer readable storage medium having embodied thereon program executable by a processor performing a method of deep packet inspection in a Software Defined Networking environment, the method comprising:
receiving a set configuration command from a controller by a network switch, wherein the set configuration command sets an operational mode for deep packet inspection;
receiving an address of a firewall;
establishing communications with the firewall;
receiving a get configuration request from the firewall;
sending a configuration reply to the firewall, wherein the configuration reply includes the operational mode for deep packet inspection;
receiving a first packet;
determining whether information contained in the first packet does not match any entry in a flow table; and
forwarding at least a portion of the first packet to the firewall, wherein the firewall performs deep packet inspection on the portion of the first packet.
20. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 19, the program being further executable to:
send a copy of at least some bytes from the first packet to the controller before forwarding the portion of the first packet to the firewall; and
receive an instruction from the controller to forward the portion of the first packet to the firewall before forwarding the portion of the first packet to the firewall.
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EP3143714A4 (en) | 2017-04-26 |
CN106464422A (en) | 2017-02-22 |
US9237129B2 (en) | 2016-01-12 |
US20160094518A1 (en) | 2016-03-31 |
US10110562B2 (en) | 2018-10-23 |
US20150334090A1 (en) | 2015-11-19 |
US20180145949A1 (en) | 2018-05-24 |
US20170142070A1 (en) | 2017-05-18 |
EP3143714B1 (en) | 2021-10-20 |
EP3143714A1 (en) | 2017-03-22 |
US9871764B2 (en) | 2018-01-16 |
US9503425B2 (en) | 2016-11-22 |
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