WO2015080554A1

WO2015080554A1 - Method for coordinating multiple attacking devices in a wireless communication network

Info

Publication number: WO2015080554A1
Application number: PCT/MY2014/000134
Authority: WO
Inventors: Mohd Ariff Abdullah; Muhammad Faheem Mohd Ezani; Shariq Haseeb
Original assignee: Mimos Bhd
Current assignee: Mimos Bhd
Priority date: 2013-11-27
Filing date: 2014-05-29
Publication date: 2015-06-04
Anticipated expiration: 2016-05-27

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method for coordinating multiple attacking devices in a wireless communication network to attack a target access point (AP), one at a time without jamming any frequency. The method is characterized by the steps of: selecting an attacking device from a list of attacking devices (101); connecting the attacking device to the target AP (102); altering transmission protocol in the target AP to idle mode (103), thereafter disengaging the attacking device from the target AP (104); notifying the next attacking device selected from the list of attacking devices to connect to the target AP while the target AP is still in the idle mode (105), and repeating the steps until each of the attacking devices in the list has its turn attacking the target AP (106).

Description

METHOD FOR COORDINATING MULTIPLE ATTACKING DEVICES IN A WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORK TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates to a method for coordinating multiple attacking devices in wireless communication networks.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Denial-of-service (DoS) attack is a type of attack on a network preventing legitimate users of a service from using that service. The methods of DoS attack include attempts to flood a network thereby preventing legitimate network traffic, attempts to disrupt connections between two machines thereby preventing access to a service, attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a service, and attempts to disrupt services to a specific system or person.

Most often, DoS attack is viewed as an attempt to hack information. However, not all hackings are for bad motives. DoS attack may also be used for a purpose of gaining access to information to take down for example pedophile darknets, drug cartels, exposing corporate greed, and uncovering all manner of criminals. Some organizations use DoS attack to check on the vulnerability of their security protocol before implementing preventive measures. In current DoS attack on wireless communication network, the techniques usually involve jamming target device with multiple requests or jamming target frequency with signals. Both of the techniques require a dedicated radio frequency in order for them to be executed. However, recently most of the user's device comes with single radio frequency interface; thus, a more favorable technique is sought instead of using currently available DoS techniques. There are two suggested options to maintain access while performing attacks to a target device, which are by using multiple devices or using a device designated with multiple radio frequency interfaces. Patent registration no. EP 1 433 291 B1 disclosed a method for multi-hop packet transmissions in a wireless network. The disclosed prior art is related to hopping data from device to device before the data reaches its targeted destination, but it is unable to manage a situation if there are multiple devices wanting to access data from one target device.

Patent publication no. US 2013/0023201 A1 disclosed a method for radio frequency hopping communications jamming system. By using this method, it may cause an increase in cost and power consumption. Patent registration no. EP1 648 115 B1 disclosed a method for improving handover procedure between two WLAN cells based on standard wireless network protocol and working at two different frequencies. Herein, only two WLAN cells are involved, thus may not be able to manage a situation when more than two WLAN cells are involved.

All of the above cited documents, when applied, may cause unnecessary jamming to the frequency and thereafter may take longer time for single or multiple devices to gain access to the target device. Accordingly, it can be seen in the prior art that there exists a need to provide a method for coordinating multiple attacking devices on wireless communication networks without jamming any frequency.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention provides a method for coordinating multiple attacking devices in a wireless communication network to prevent legitimate users from using services of a particular target access point. The method is implemented without jamming any frequency. In general, the method works by allowing each of the attacking devices to attack the target access point one at a time. The method comprises the steps of: selecting an attacking device from a list of attacking devices; connecting the attacking device to the target access point; altering transmission protocol in the target access point to idle mode, thereafter disengaging the attacking device from the target access point; notifying the next attacking device in the list of attacking devices to connect to the target access point in the idle mode; and repeating the steps until each of the attacking devices in the list has its turn attacking the target access point.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The features of the invention will become more apparent from the following detailed description and the appended claims when read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings of the preferred embodiment of the present invention, in which:

Figure 1 is a flow chart of a method for coordinating multiple attacking devices in a wireless communication;

Figure 2 is a flow chart showing steps of the attacking device settings network allocation vector in access point;

Figure 3 is a flow chart showing a method for coordinating multiple attacking devices via client attacking device; and

Figure 4 is a flow chart showing a method for coordinating multiple attacking devices via an attacking coordinator.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The above mentioned and other features and objects of this invention will become more apparent and better understood by reference to the following detailed description. It should be understood that the detailed description made known below is not intended to be exhaustive or limit the invention to the precise disclosed form as the invention may assume various alternative forms. On the contrary, the detailed description covers all the relevant modifications and alterations made to the present invention, unless the claims expressly state otherwise. The present invention will now be described with reference to figures 1 - 4.

Referring to figure 1 , the present invention relates to a method for coordinating multiple attacking devices in a wireless communication network, the method characterised by the steps of: selecting an attacking device from a list of attacking devices (101); connecting the attacking device to a target access point (AP) (102); altering transmission protocol in the target AP to idle mode (103), thereafter disengaging the attacking device from the target AP (104); notifying the next attacking device selected from the list of attacking devices to connect to the target AP in the idle mode (105); and repeating the steps until each of the attacking devices in the list has its turn attacking the target AP (106). Once all the attacking devices have finished attacking the target AP, the attacking devices disconnect from the target AP and the list of the attacking device is reset (107).

In an embodiment of the present invention, the step of connecting the attacking device to the target AP (102) further comprises the step of configuring the frequency of the attacking device to be identical to the target AP. In other words, if the target AP is on a different frequency compared to the attacking device, the attacking device may configure its frequency to match the frequency of the target AP before attempting to connect to the target AP. In the case where the frequency of the attacking device is already identical to the target AP, the attacking device may continue to connect to the target AP as one of the wireless clients. Upon successfully connecting to the target AP, the attacking device stores the authentication of the frequency for next attacking devices in the list of attacking devices. The authentication of the frequency may be used by the next attacking devices to connect to the target AP without re-configuring the frequency again. In another embodiment of the present invention, the step of altering transmission protocol in the target AP to idle mode (103) further comprises the step of setting network allocation vector (NAV) (30).

In figure 2, an embodiment of the present invention describes the step of the attacking device setting network allocation vector (NAV) (30) which further comprises the steps of: creating bogus request-to-send (RTS) frame with a maximum value in a two-bytes duration field (31); sending the RTS frame to the target AP (32); waiting for a clear-to-send (CTS) frame from the target AP (33), thereafter forcing the target AP into idle mode (33a) throughout the duration field and initiates NAV timer (33b); and disengaging the attacking device from the target AP after receiving CTS frame (104). If the attacking device did not receive the CTS frame, the attacking device will send the RTS frame to the target AP (32) and wait until CTS frame is received.

In the present method, the purpose of sending RTS frame to the target AP is not to request a timeslot for data transmission but to force the target AP into idle state. This is possible, as the attacking device sets the two bytes duration field into maximum value to transmit opportunity (TXOP) in the RTS frame header. Any devices that are within the range of the attacking device will stop transmitting at that frequency to avoid collision. The duration field in the RTS header will be used to initiate NAV timer on all devices within the range of the attacking device. In a preferred embodiment, the duration field for the next attacking device is equal to the duration field of the previous attacking device.

In the CTS frame header, the duration field is based on the duration field of the previous RTS frame. By responding RTS with CTS, the target AP stops transmitting any frame after NAV is initiated and starts preparing to receive the frame from the attacking device. Any devices that are not within the range of the attacking device but still in the range of the target AP will stop trying to transmit at that frequency range. The restrain in transmission may continue until NAV timer expires. In an embodiment of the present invention, the attacking device disengages from the target AP (104) after receiving the CTS frame to allow the next attacking device to connect to the target AP. During this period, the NAV timer may still be running and no other device will connect to the target AP until the NAV timer is expired.

While the NAV timer is still running, the target AP is still in idle mode waiting to receive the attacking device's frame. On the contrary, the attacking device, which has already disengaged itself from the target AP, is now free to connect to another network or perform other operations during this time. The attacking device may also use this period to serve its own clients, if the attacking device is embodied as an access point. In the present invention, there are two possible ways of coordinating attacking devices that is by client attacking device or by using an appointed attacking coordinator. The attacking coordinator may be appointed among the attacking devices, as long as all the attacking devices are connected to the same network at the same time.

The client attacking device is referred herein as the attacking device. In a further embodiment of the present invention, and by referring to figure 3, the step of the attacking device notifying the next attacking device to connect to the target AP (105), further comprises the steps of: sharing NAV timer of the attacking device with the next attacking device (201); notifying the next attacking device on the expiration of the NAV timer (202); and connecting the next attacking device to the target AP as the NAV timer expires (203). If there are other attacking devices available in the list of the attacking devices, the steps of sharing NAV timer of the attacking device with the next attacking device (201), notifying the next attacking device on the expiration of the NAV timer (202), and connecting the next attacking device to the target AP as the NAV expires (203) continue until all the attacking devices in the list have finished attacking the target AP. If there are no other attacking devices available, the list of the attacking devices is reset (107). In an embodiment of the present invention, the multiple attacks are coordinated through a distribution system by an attacking coordinator. By utilising distribution system, the attacking devices will not consume unnecessary bandwidth from the wireless network. In a preferred embodiment of the present invention and by referring to figure 4, the step of notifying the next attacking device to connect to the target AP (105) via attacking coordinator, further comprises the steps of: receiving NAV timer from the attacking device (301 ); sending the NAV timer to the next attacking device (302); and instructing the next attacking device to attack the target AP as the NAV timer expires (303). If there are other attacking devices in the list of the attacking devices, the attacking coordinator will send the NAV timer to the next attacking device (302) and instructs the next attacking device to attack the target AP as the NAV timer expires (303) until all the attacking devices in the list have finished attacking the target AP. After all the attacking devices in the list have finished attacking the target AP, the list of the attacking device is reset (107).

In another embodiment of the present invention, the attacking devices include devices having identical service set identifier (SSID) as the target AP.

In a preferred embodiment, the attacking devices include wireless devices, client devices, and access points.

By periodically forcing the target AP to stay in idle mode, the attacking devices cause the services of the target AP to be unavailable to its clients without having to waste much time on executing each attack. By coordinating multiple attacking devices systematically, each attacking device can further reduce the time it uses for each attack. The embodiments of the present invention may also be used for a single attack.

Claims

A method for coordinating multiple attacking devices in a wireless communication network, the method is characterized by the steps of: selecting an attacking device from a list of attacking devices (101);

connecting the attacking device to a target access point (AP) (102);

altering transmission protocol in the target AP to idle mode (103), thereafter disengaging the attacking device from the target AP (104); notifying the next attacking device selected from the list of attacking devices to connect to the target AP in the idle mode (105); and

repeating the steps until each of the attacking devices in the list has its turn attacking the target AP (106).

A method according to claim 1 , wherein the step of connecting the attacking device to the target AP (102) further comprises the step of configuring the frequency of the attacking device to be identical to the frequency of the target AP.

A method according to claim 1 , wherein the step of altering transmission protocol in the target AP to idle mode (103) further comprises the step of setting network allocation vector (NAV) (30).

A method according to claim 3, wherein the step of setting network allocation vector (NAV) (30) further comprises the steps of:

creating bogus request-to-send (RTS) frame with a maximum value in a two-bytes duration field (31);

sending the RTS frame to the target AP (32);

waiting for a clear-to-send (CTS) frame from the target AP (33), thereafter forcing the target AP into idle mode (33a) and initiate NAV timer (33b); and

disengaging the attacking device from the target AP (104) after receiving the CTS frame. 5) A method according to claim 1 , wherein the step of notifying the next attacking device selected from the list of attacking devices to connect to the target AP in the idle mode (105) further comprises the steps of:

sharing a NAV timer of the attacking device with the next attacking device (201);

notifying the next attacking device on the expiration of the NAV timer (202); and

connecting the next attacking device to the target AP as the NAV timer expires (203).

6) A method according to claim 1 , wherein the multiple attacks are coordinated through a distribution system by an attacking coordinator.

7) A method according to claim 1 wherein the step of notifying the next attacking device selected from the list of attacking devices to connect to the target AP in the idle mode (105) via an attacking coordinator further comprises the steps of:

receiving a NAV timer from the attacking device (301);

sending the NAV timer to the next attacking device (302); and

instructing the next attacking device to attack the target AP as the NAV timer expires (303).

8) A method according to claim 1 , wherein the attacking devices include devices having identical service set identifier (SSID) as the target AP.