WO2014072933A1 - Probabilistic key distribution in vehicular networks with infrastructure support - Google Patents
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
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- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
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- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
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- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
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- H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
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- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3265—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate chains, trees or paths; Hierarchical trust model
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- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
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- H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
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Definitions
- VANETs Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
- VANETs Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
- These networks are characterized by short-lived pairwise connections, which makes the network topology highly dynamic.
- single trip of a vehicle may involve communication with a large number of other vehicles.
- Dependence on such technology may turn hazardous if not implemented securely, particularly due to the vulnerability of the wireless medium to passive and active attacks.
- securing safety messages requires the deployment of a scheme that would privilege authentication over confidentiality [1], since the information contained in the message is not particularly sensitive and may be of interest to multiple users, while the legitimacy of the source is important.
- These applications lie at the heart of vehicular networks, and perhaps for that reason it is generally considered that integrity and authentication are of greater concern than confidentiality. Therefore, most security schemes adopt vehicular public key infrastructures (PKI), e.g., [2], [3] that, in general, make use of public key cryptography (PKC) for authentication.
- PKI vehicular public key infrastructures
- a large number of applications and services that could be deployed in VANETs may depend on confidential data transmission.
- driver assistance systems e.g., [4]
- traffic information systems e.g., [5]
- infotainment applications e.g., [6).
- PKC could also be used for encryption, efficiency dictates that the best course of action to provide confidential transmission is to use symmetric encryption with a shared secret [7].
- PKC solutions are not adequate for noisy environments since they generally employ several rounds of interaction between users.
- the overhead of message transmission and signature verification can be prohibitive [1].
- Each node is registered only in a given CA, which provides it with a unique ID, a long-term pair of private/public keys and a long-term certificate.
- short-term private-public key pairs and certificates are used. These are internally generated by the node and signed by the CA.
- Raya and Hubaux [1] designed a security framework for VANETs based on PKI.
- a protocol is proposed which uses the geographic location of vehicles. In the protocol, a geographic group is formed, which elects a group leader, responsible for distributing a group key to its members, enabling secure communication within the group. In any scenario where the protocol cannot function properly, the fallback to a simple digital signature scheme is ensured.
- VANETs are characterized by a dynamic topology and link disconnections are frequent. Moreover, sporadic and burst errors are common due to the presence of signal propagation obstacles that lead to shadowing [10]. Therefore, it is crucial that the key agreement protocol makes use of the least possible interaction between users in order to minimize the overall delay in the key establishment procedure as well as maximizing the probability of success. This can be achieved by means of probabilistic key distribution schemes. However, due to the size and dynamic nature of these networks, key pre-distribution is unfeasible.
- the disclosure comprises a method of key distribution by trusted nodes for a vehicular ad hoc network, VANET, wherein said vehicular ad hoc network is composed of nodes, a node being either a mobile vehicle node equipped with an on-board unit or a static road-side unit node, herewith referred respectively as vehicle nodes and RSU nodes, wherein said RSU nodes have a permanent connection to a certificate authority, CA, said CA being responsible for a specific geographic region in which the VANET is comprised and said CA acting as the root of trust for the VANET, and wherein the VANET nodes have at least one pair of public-private keys and the corresponding certificates, issued by said CA, wherein said method comprises the steps of:
- each vehicle node on entering said specific geographic region, requests a set of keys from an RSU node that is within range and within that region, either by direct communication, or
- said vehicle node sends a key request to said RSU, said request including the vehicle node public key;
- said RSU node sends said vehicle node a set of private keys, selected from a pool of private keys available to the RSU node, said set of keys being encrypted with the vehicle node public key, wherein said set of private keys also includes a key identifier for each private key in said set;
- said RSU node sends said vehicle node a list with the key identifiers of the private keys shared by said vehicle node and the other vehicle nodes that have most recently contacted said RSU for a predetermined period of time; - said RSU informs the VANET nodes, within a neighborhood of a predetermined number of hops from said RSU, of the presence of said vehicle node and of the identifiers of keys obtained by said vehicle node; such that two vehicle nodes are able to immediately establish a secure connection if there are shared keys between those two vehicles, without further interaction, by deriving a new shared secret which is a cryptographic hash function of the keys shared by said two nodes.
- An embodiment, wherein a sender node which is interested in communicating with a receiver node, if said sender node does not know the private keys held by the receiver node, comprises the step of both nodes broadcasting the key identifiers of the private keys held by each node, such that if there are shared keys then two nodes are then able to establish a secure connection, without further interaction, by deriving a new shared secret which is a cryptographic hash function of the keys shared by said vehicle node and one of the other vehicle nodes.
- said method comprises the steps of:
- the CA provides a new pool of keys to all RSU nodes that are not compromised, from which said pool of keys the vehicle nodes will then be able to obtain new keys;
- the vehicle nodes are informed of the existence of the compromised RSU node or nodes.
- the private key identifiers are sequential IDs attributed as the private keys are generated.
- each CA with a predetermined geographical area the pool of private keys available to each RSU node is unique to a partitioned key space corresponding to the geographical area of each independent CA.
- the pool of private keys available to each RSU node comprises an additional key space that is parallel to said CA's and is thus shared by all CA's.
- each CA with a predetermined geographical area said additional key space is made available by the RSU nodes only to vehicles that require communication between independent CAs.
- An embodiment, for a vehicle node on moving from a first CA geographic region to a second CA geographic region comprises the following steps:
- said vehicle node requests a set of keys from an RSU node that is within range and within that first CA region, indicating that those requested keys are for said second CA geographic region;
- said RSU node then sends the vehicle node request to the first CA for a set of keys that can be used within the region controlled by the second CA;
- the first CA forwards the vehicle node request to the second CA;
- the second CA responds with a set of keys that can be used within the region controlled by the second CA with the respective list of identifiers which are sent to to the vehicle node encrypted with the vehicle node public key;
- said RSU node is a RSU border node of the first CA geographic region.
- the disclosure also comprises a device for key distribution by trusted nodes for a vehicular ad hoc network, VANET, wherein said vehicular ad hoc network is composed of nodes, a node being either a mobile vehicle node equipped with an on- board unit or a static road-side unit node, herewith referred respectively as vehicle nodes and RSU nodes, wherein said RSU nodes have a permanent connection to a certificate authority, CA, said CA being responsible for a specific geographic region in which the VANET is comprised and said CA acting as the root of trust for the VANET, and wherein the VANET nodes have at least one pair of public-private keys and the corresponding certificates, issued by said CA, wherein each node comprises a data processing module configured to carry out the method of any one of the previous embodiments.
- the disclosure also comprises a computer readable data carrier comprising the computer program instructions adapted to perform the method of any of the previous embodiment methods when said program is run on a data processor.
- the proposed probabilistic key distribution scheme can act as a mechanism for ensuring secure communication in VANETs.
- the present protocol ensures that a secure connection can be established with high probability for reasonably small key rings. Leveraging on network infrastructure, the number of (re)transmissions required by the key exchange protocol can be reduced when compared to that of a standard Diffie-Hellman key agreement under an end-to-end erasure model.
- the main advantages of the protocol here proposed are: i) reduction of the need to invoke public-key security mechanisms, ii) reduction of the amount of messages exchanged during the secret sharing procedure and iii) reduced complexity of security infrastructure.
- the scheme is robust to topology changes and link failures.
- the present solution preserves long-term privacy since there exists no link between the keys assigned by trusted nodes that serve different geographic regions. It also prevents man-in-the-middle attacks as the keys used to share a secret are already known by the nodes and issued by authorized entities.
- the present disclosure is applicable to similar schemes in the presence of trusted mobile nodes.
- the proposed method provides an alternative solution to the problem of key management in vehicular networks using the concept of randomized key pre- distribution (RKPD) [8]. Since in RKPD keys are computed from the common information possessed by vehicles, interaction between users for key agreement is minimized.
- RKPD randomized key pre- distribution
- the proposed protocol does not intend to replace PKI-based schemes, since it is not aimed at guaranteeing authentication. Rather, it is envisioned to be a lightweight key distribution service that transparently enables network nodes to form a shared secret, allowing them to establish secure connections via symmetric encryption with implicit key agreement.
- Key distribution protocol A probabilistic key distribution protocol that enables vehicles to establish secure pairwise connections with arbitrarily high probability of success and low communication complexity is proposed. The protocol exploits spatially bounded communication patterns that are present in VANETs by advertising the common keys between vehicles that are near each other.
- a VANET is composed of nodes, which can be mobile (vehicles) or static (road-side units or RSUs).
- a VPKI is assumed to be in place, so that nodes possess at least one pair of public-private keys and the corresponding certificates, issued by CAs.
- Each CA is responsible for a specific geographic region (e.g. one or more highways, an urban area, etc.) and acts as the root of trust for a VANET.
- the RSUs are infrastructure-based devices located next to the road, and therefore provide coverage within a given radio range. Ideally, the deployment coverage should be such that any vehicle can contact an RSU when entering a specific region controlled by a CA.
- the protocol can function even in environments with sparsely deployed RSUs.
- RSUs are considered to have a permanent connection to some CA.
- Vehicles are equipped with on-board units (OBUs) and IEEE 802. lip radios. No assumptions are made with respect to the penetration rate of equipped vehicles. Key dissemination is enabled by RSUs, albeit a more general case can be considered where key dissemination is enabled by any trusted node (static or mobile).
- OBUs on-board units
- IEEE 802. lip radios No assumptions are made with respect to the penetration rate of equipped vehicles. Key dissemination is enabled by RSUs, albeit a more general case can be considered where key dissemination is enabled by any trusted node (static or mobile).
- the goal of the proposed scheme is to enable any two vehicles to establish a secure connection via a shared key.
- Each vehicle entering a certain geographic region requests a set of keys from an RSU that is within that region.
- Users can contact RSUs in one of two ways: a) through direct communication (i.e. when an RSU is within communication range) or b) through multi-hop communication (in which case vehicles flood a key request message to the network).
- the former approach limits the number of messages flooded in the network.
- it requires higher RSU density for a timely bootstrap, i.e., to satisfy the key requests immediately.
- the latter is more robust to sparse RSU densities, while being more prone to active attacks by intermediate nodes.
- vehicle V send a key request message to an RSU with its public key K v .
- the RSU draws a ring of k keys out of a pool of N keys, and sends the vehicle node the set of keys Kv (encrypted with the vehicle node's public key), along with the respective identifiers.
- the RSU sends to vehicle node V a list of identifiers of the common keys shared by V and the set NJ(t) of vehicles that have contacted the RSU at most t seconds ago.
- vehicle V will be able to immediately establish a secure connection with the vehicles in NJ(t) without further interaction, as long as they share some keys.
- the RSU also informs its x-hop neighborhood, J x , about the presence of vehicle V, broadcasting the identifiers of keys attributed to vehicle V. This allows the vehicles in J x to have fresh information about incoming vehicles that are geographically close.
- K f(ki, k s ), where f(.) is a cryptographic hash function.
- Fig.l illustrates the key dissemination procedure.
- vehicle node A requests a set of keys to RSU R 3 .
- RSU R 3 will send vehicle node A a list of all the key identifiers that vehicle nodes B,C,D,E,F and G have in common with vehicle node A.
- the information flowing in the network is asymmetric and nodes might not be aware of other nodes' keys. With respect to the asymmetry, there are two cases that need to be taken into account. If the sender is not aware of the receiver's keys (that information has not reached him yet), both nodes need to broadcast key identifiers to find the common keys and proceed as before to compute the shared secret. The other case is when they do not have shared keys. I n this case, they can fallback to one of the standard key agreement approaches.
- the messages exchanged over the wireless links are assumed to be encrypted - in particular, after bootstrapping the protocol, using the newly derived key.
- the eavesdropper is unable to break the underlying cipher, his goal is to gain access to the key that is used to secure the link - in particular, after bootstrapping the protocol, the new derived key.
- the presence of an eavesdropper is generally oblivious to both legitimate users.
- users that comply with the communication protocol and are part of the network may also eavesdrop on other users.
- the key used to encrypt the communication link (after bootstrap) is a function of intersection of the key sets assigned to each user. This means that adversaries can successfully attack a link if they possess all the keys used to compute the shared secret. In this context, a group of colluding eavesdroppers can be seen as a single eavesdropper with access to a larger set of keys.
- K A and K B denote the ring of keys possessed by nodes A and B, respectively. Additionally, let
- outage as the event that an eavesdropper with access to a set of keys is able to compromise the security of a link.
- the outage probability can then be defined as
- Fig. 3 shows the outage probability as a function of the number of keys k' obtained by colluding eavesdroppers and the number of keys k given to each user.
- node A wishes to share a secret with node B.
- each node transmits a message prior to computing a shared secret. Additionally, the two nodes must acknowledge the reception of both packets, which gives four transmissions in total.
- a and B share keys assigned by the RSU and are aware of the common keys, they already possess a shared secret. If they are unaware of the common keys, they will broadcast their key identifiers and acknowledge the reception of this information, i.e., they will use the same number of transmissions as a DH scheme. Lastly, if they do not share keys, they will fallback to the DH scheme.
- the nodes of a vehicular network can be compromised (e.g., a vehicle can be stolen).
- efficient key revocation mechanisms must ensure that compromised nodes do not impair network security.
- a centralized approach can be used, where a base station (e.g. an RSU) broadcasts revocation messages to all nodes that need to remove copies of the revoked keys.
- RSU random key distribution scheme
- the drawback of such approach is a single point of failure of the revocation scheme. Additionally, this approach involves the broadcast of messages over long distances, which might result in an undesirable communication overhead.
- key revocation can be performed in a distributed fashion.
- the key space is independently partitioned over a geographical space, a mechanism that ensures vehicles can communicate with vehicles controlled by other CAs is required. This can be achieved by considering parallel key spaces that address these geographical boundaries.
- the key pools can be coordinated among the different CAs, and vehicles that require communication between independent CAs should request a set of keys from this pool. This mechanism would operate much as a roaming service to provide keys to every possible geographic region.
- This roaming service can also be used to assign keys to vehicles that are entering a certain CA geographic region without the need to communicate with an RSU that is within that CA region for requesting keys specific to that CA geographic region.
- VANET is commonly defined as a Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network which is a class of wireless networks composed of mobile and static nodes.
- Mobile nodes are nodes whose geographic position changes according to time at different velocities.
- the most common form of mobile nodes are vehicles equipped with wireless interfaces of homogeneous or heterogeneous technologies. Vehicles can either be private or belong to a public transportation system.
- Other mobile nodes can also be a part of the network such as mobile end-user devices (these are generally characterized by slow mobility).
- Static nodes do not change their geographic position in time. They can be a part of a specialized network infrastructure such as road-side units (or roadside equipment) that supports vehicular communication.
- These units can be part of private networks, controlled by network operators/service providers or part of a network controlled by a public entity, such as the government or a municipality.
- a public entity such as the government or a municipality.
- Vehicular Network Techniques, Standards, and Applications. Published:April 9, 2009. Editors: Hassnaa Moustafa; Yan Zhang (Chapter 1).
- Certificate authorities are commonly defined as entities assumed to be responsible for the certification/atribution of public/private keys that are permanently assigned to vehicles.
- CAs public authorities (such as vehicle registration authorities) or private authorities (such as car manufacturers).
- public authorities such as vehicle registration authorities
- private authorities such as car manufacturers
- CAs can be considered according to some geographic refinement (e.g. a CA covers vehicles within a country, state, metropolitan area, etc.).
- Different CAs are assumed to be cross-certified so that vehicles with keys issued by different CAs can authenticate/communicate with each other. For example, see the reference: Securing Vehicular Communications, Maxim Raya, Panos Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux.
- VPKI vehicular public key infrastructure
- VPKI vehicular public key infrastructure
- Securing Vehicular Communications Maxim Raya, Panos Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux.
- IEEE Wireless Communications Magazine Special Issue on Inter-Vehicular Communications, October 2006.
- Figure 1 Schematic representation of a first preferred embodiment of an example of the key request procedure where:
- (A) represents the vehicle requesting keys
- (B) represents a vehicle in the network that may want to have a secure connection with A
- (C) represents a vehicle in the network that may want to have a secure connection with A
- (D) represents a vehicle in the network that may want to have a secure connection with A
- (E) represents a vehicle in the network that may want to have a secure connection with A
- (F) represents a vehicle in the network that may want to have a secure connection with A
- (G) represents a vehicle in the network that may want to have a secure connection with A
- (R2) represents a Road Side Unit
- (R3) represents a Road Side Unit to which A requests a set of keys.
- Figure 2 Schematic representation for an embodiment of the probability of two nodes sharing a secret key not possessed by any of their d neighbors.
- Key pool size P 100000.
- Figure 6 Schematic representation for an embodiment of roaming between VANETs. Detailed description
- the proposed scheme allows nodes to request keys through one-hop (direct communication with RSU) or multi-hop communications (broadcast).
- Fig. 5 for varying RSU densities, it is shown the cumulative fraction of vehicles that receive their keys within a given time.
- the dashed lines represent the case of one-hop and solid lines the case of multi-hop.
- the figure shows that key dissemination time in the multi-hop case is almost immediate.
- the one-hop case requires a high RSU density to achieve a timely bootstrap.
- Multi-hop communication at 0.92 RSUs/km 2 achieves a similar performance as single-hop at 1.82 RSUs/km 2 .
- Simulations also confirm that increasing the vehicular density speeds up key dissemination considerably in the multi-hop case, while having almost no impact in one-hop case.
- the percentage of secure paths that are immediately available for communications i.e., when two nodes meet for the first time, is analyzed.
- a path between two nodes is considered secure if and only if each link of the path is secure. Note that this definition is directed, i.e., a secure path from A to B does not necessarily imply a secure path from B to A.
- Table 1 shows the percentage of secure paths of minimum distance as a function of the path length.
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Priority Applications (6)
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BR112015010379A BR112015010379A2 (en) | 2012-11-07 | 2013-11-07 | probability distribution of keys in vehicle networks with infrastructure support |
EP13817733.2A EP2789118B1 (en) | 2012-11-07 | 2013-11-07 | Probabilistic key distribution in vehicular networks with infrastructure support |
US14/402,536 US9276743B2 (en) | 2012-11-07 | 2013-11-07 | Probabilistic key distribution in vehicular networks with infrastructure support |
SG11201503244RA SG11201503244RA (en) | 2012-11-07 | 2013-11-07 | Probabilistic key distribution in vehicular networks with infrastructure support |
JP2015540270A JP6329163B2 (en) | 2012-11-07 | 2013-11-07 | Probabilistic key distribution in vehicle networks with infrastructure support |
US15/051,817 US9692604B2 (en) | 2012-11-07 | 2016-02-24 | Probabilistic key distribution in vehicular networks with infrastructure support |
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US14/402,536 A-371-Of-International US9276743B2 (en) | 2012-11-07 | 2013-11-07 | Probabilistic key distribution in vehicular networks with infrastructure support |
US15/051,817 Continuation US9692604B2 (en) | 2012-11-07 | 2016-02-24 | Probabilistic key distribution in vehicular networks with infrastructure support |
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Also Published As
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SG11201503244RA (en) | 2015-05-28 |
US9276743B2 (en) | 2016-03-01 |
BR112015010379A2 (en) | 2017-07-11 |
EP2789118A1 (en) | 2014-10-15 |
EP2789118B1 (en) | 2015-09-16 |
US20160248594A1 (en) | 2016-08-25 |
JP6329163B2 (en) | 2018-05-23 |
US9692604B2 (en) | 2017-06-27 |
JP2016502786A (en) | 2016-01-28 |
PT2789118E (en) | 2015-12-31 |
US20150139421A1 (en) | 2015-05-21 |
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