WO2014036454A1

WO2014036454A1 - One-way key fob and vehicle pairing

Info

Publication number: WO2014036454A1
Application number: PCT/US2013/057608
Authority: WO
Inventors: Jin-Meng Ho
Original assignee: Texas Instruments Japan Ltd; Texas Instruments Inc
Current assignee: Texas Instruments Japan Ltd; Texas Instruments Inc
Priority date: 2012-08-30
Filing date: 2013-08-30
Publication date: 2014-03-06
Anticipated expiration: 2015-02-28
Also published as: CN104583028A; CN106912046B; US20170303134A1; US10477402B2; US20140064488A1; JP2015532816A; JP2019024209A; CN106912046A; JP6444304B2; CN104583028B

Abstract

Key fob and vehicle control unit identifiers (IDs) are used for entity authentication or trust transfer to achieve a secured initial pairing. The key fob (202) is capable of transmitting only (not receiving) and is paired with a control unit (201) in a vehicle or with any other control device. Use of the key fob (205) and control unit (204) IDs prevents unauthorized pairing and access to the operation key (OpKey) that is later used for communications between the devices. Elliptical curve cryptography (ECC) is used for strong security and efficient implementation. In the pairing process, device IDs (204, 205) are used for entity authentication and public key cryptography is used for easy key management. Symmetric encryption is used for fast normal operation and to accommodate key fob addition or revocation after key fob loss.

Description

ONE-WAY KEY FOB AND VEHICLE PAIRING

[0001] This is directed, in general, to vehicle security and, more specifically, to pairing a key fob that is capable of transmitting to, but not receiving from, a vehicle control unit with the unit.

BACKGROUND

[0002] Identifiers are assigned to a wireless key fob and a vehicle control unit by their respective manufacturers or by a vehicle manufacturer. The identifiers are used for

authentication and/or trust transfer to achieve a secured initial pairing. For the key fob and the vehicle control unit to be able to communicate, the devices must be paired at some point in either the manufacturing or the sales process. The pairing of wireless key fobs and their respective vehicles conventionally requires the vehicle manufacturer to deliver a secret key associated with each key fob to the various vehicle dealers. The secret key is a cryptographic key that is used to associate or pair the key fob with a vehicle. Multiple key fobs are typically paired with each vehicle. To simplify design and reduce cost, a key fob may be capable of secured pairing by performing wireless transmission, to but not receiving from, the vehicle.

SUMMARY

[0003] Described embodiments provide methods for vehicle and key fob pairing using the identifiers of the key fob and a vehicle control unit. The identifiers are assigned by their respective manufacturers or by a vehicle manufacturer. The identifiers may be used for entity authentication and trust transfer to achieve secured initial pairing. Embodiments use device identifiers (IDs) to reduce message communications among the vehicle manufacturer, vehicle dealer, vehicle control unit, and key fob before, during, and after the vehicle-key fob pairing. This substantially decreases security vulnerabilities that could be otherwise exploited by hackers.

[0004] The key fob and vehicle control unit IDs are assigned by their respective manufacturers, or by a vehicle manufacturer, and are used for entity authentication or trust transfer to achieve secured initial pairing. The key fob is capable of transmitting only (not receiving) and is paired with a control unit in a vehicle or with any other control device. Use of the key fob and control unit IDs prevents unauthorized pairing and access to the operation key (OpKey) that is later used for communications between the devices. The embodiment described herein minimizes vulnerabilities before, during, and after pairing and reduces communication requirements and human involvement during pairing.

[0005] In the example described herein, elliptical curve cryptography (ECC) is used for strong security and efficient implementation; however, other encryption techniques may also be used. In the pairing process, device IDs are used for entity authentication and public key cryptography is used for easy key management. Symmetric encryption is used for fast normal operation and to accommodate key fob addition or revocation after key fob loss.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0006] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an initial configuration and exchange of information in a system for pairing a vehicle to one or more key fobs.

[0007] FIGS. 2A-E illustrate steps for an initial pairing between a control unit and a selected key fob using a pairing device.

[0008] FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating steps performed by a pairing device according to one embodiment.

[0009] FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating steps performed by a key fob according to one embodiment.

[0010] FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating steps performed by a control unit according to one embodiment.

[0011] FIGS. 6 is a block diagram of an example pairing device in accordance with one embodiment.

[0012] FIGS. 7 is a block diagram of an example key fob in accordance with one embodiment.

[0013] FIGS. 8 is a block diagram of an example control unit in accordance with one embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS

[0014] In one embodiment, a key fob that is capable of transmitting but not receiving is paired with a control unit in a vehicle. The control unit allows a user to perform certain operations, such as opening/closing or locking/unlocking vehicle doors through remotely using the key fob.

[0015] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an initial configuration and exchange of information in a system for pairing a vehicle to one or more key fobs. A vehicle manufacturer 101 provides a unique, secret control unit identifier (ID) 102 to a control unit 103. The control unit 103 may be any control device located inside or outside a vehicle, such as a control unit that locks/unlocks vehicle doors, opens/closes vehicle windows, turns on/off vehicle lights, etc. .

[0016] Vehicle manufacturer 101 also provides the control unit ID 104 to a dealer 105.

The control unit ID exchange 104 is performed in a secure or non-public manner. The dealer 105 should also maintain the secrecy of the control unit ID for system security.

[0017] Although the example used herein refers to a vehicle manufacturer 101 and a vehicle control unit, it will be understood that the control unit 103 may be used to control non- vehicle operations, such as opening/closing a garage door, gate, hotel entrance, remote home entry, etc. Similarly, other parties, such as a third party manufacturers, dealers, or resellers, may provide the control unit ID in place of vehicle manufacturer 101.

[0018] A key fob manufacturer 106 provides, loads, or installs a unique key fob ID 107 to a key fob 108. The key fob ID does not need to be kept secret, which allows users, such as dealer 105, to easily determine the key fob ID for a particular key fob 108, while completely eliminating the procedure and cost that would otherwise incur for maintaining the secrecy and authenticity. The dealer may obtain the key fob ID directly from the key fob manufacturer 106 in transaction 109. Alternatively, dealer 105 may obtain the key fob ID directly from the key fob 108 in transaction 110. For example, the key fob 108 may be marked with the key fob ID.

[0019] Using the process illustrated in FIG. 1 or some other process, the dealer 105 obtains both the secret control unit ID and the non-secret key fob ID. For example, dealer 105 may be a franchisee or licensee that sells, services, or repairs vehicles provided by manufacturer 101. Manufacturer 101 has a trusted relationship with dealer 105 that allows for exchange of the control unit ID while maintaining it as a secret. Dealer 105 may obtain key fobs and key fob IDs from any third-party manufacturer 106 without needing to maintain secrecy of the key fob ID.

[0020] In one embodiment, the key fob ID and control unit ID may be eight character hexadecimal words. [0021] FIG. 2 illustrates an initial pairing between a control unit 201 and a selected key fob 202 using a pairing device 203, which may communicate with control unit 201 and/or key fob 202 wirelessly. Alternatively, pairing unit 203 may be capable of directly connecting to one or both of control unit 201 and key fob 202, such as by connecting using a USB cable or other link, during a pairing process. Additionally, control unit 201 and key fob 202 may communicate wirelessly or directly.

[0022] In addition to the key fob ID, key fob 202 has a public key and a private key that can be used for a password scrambled key agreement protocol, with the key fob ID serving as the password. The key agreement protocol may be based on elliptical curve cryptography (ECC).

[0023] In FIG. 2A, during the pairing process, the dealer may select key fob 202 out of many available unused key fobs, which renders the actual key fob ID being used for pairing secret to others. The dealer also determines the control unit ID for control unit 201, which is maintained as a secret. The dealer then enters the control unit ID (204) and key fob ID (205) in pairing device 203.

[0024] In FIG. 2B, key fob 202 sends its public key scrambled with the key fob ID (206) to pairing device 203. Using the key fob ID, which has already been provided, the pairing device 203 recovers the key fob's public key by unscrambling message 206.

[0025] An unauthorized, fraudulent, or malevolent party may attempt to introduce a fake key fob 212 into the pairing process by transmitting message 216 to pairing device 203. This attempt will be futile because that party does not know the ID of the key fob 202 selected by the dealer for pairing and hence will need to use a different ID to scramble the public key of the fake key fob 212. As a result, even if pairing device 203 did receive message 216 from fake key fob 212, pairing device 203 would not be able to unscramble the fake key fob's public key.

Accordingly, a fake key fob 212 would not be able to inject itself into the pairing process.

[0026] In FIG. 2C, pairing device 203 and control unit 201 execute an ECC-based key agreement protocol, such as a Diffie-Hellman key exchange (207), authenticated by a password taken or derived from the control unit ID. The pairing device 203 and control unit 201 authenticate each other with the control unit ID and generate an encryption key (DHkey) through the authenticated exchange 207. Pairing device 203 encrypts the key fob's public key recovered earlier from message 206 with the DHkey generated in exchange 207. Pairing device 203 then sends the encrypted key fob public key (208) to control unit 201, which recovers the key fob's public key using the DHkey that is shared with pairing device 203.

[0027] An unauthorized, fraudulent, or malevolent party may attempt to use a fake pairing device 213. However, because fake pairing device 213 does not know the secret control unit ID for control unit 201, its authentication with the control unit 201 will fail, thus generating no shared DHKey. Accordingly, a fake pairing device cannot be used to pair a key fob to the control unit 201.

[0028] In FIG. 2D, key fob 202 selects an OpKey for use with control unit 201. Key fob

202 encrypts the OpKey with its private key. Key fob 202 also creates an AES-128 OpKey- encrypted value of OpKey. Key fob 202 extracts a number of bits (verification bits), such as the 8, 16, or 32 lowest-order bits, from the AES-128 OpKey-encrypted value of OpKey for use in verifying exchanges with the control unit. Key fob 202 sends (209) the private -key-encrypted OpKey and the AES-128 verification bits to control unit 201.

[0029] Control unit 201 decrypts the OpKey using the key fob's public key, which was provided by pairing device 203 in message 208. Control unit 201 computes an AES-128 OpKey- encrypted value of the extracted OpKey and extracts a number of bits from the AES-128 OpKey- encrypted value of OpKey. These bits created by control unit 201 are compared to the verification bits received from key fob 202 to verify that the decrypted value of OpKey was correct.

[0030] An unauthorized, fraudulent, or malevolent party may attempt to use fake key fob

212 to pair with control unit 201. However, because fake key fob 212 did not get its public key transferred to pairing device 203, fake key fob 212 never had its public key sent to control unit 201. As a result, when fake key fob 212 sends a fake OpKey encrypted with its private key, control unit 201 is not able to decrypt the fake OpKey without the proper corresponding public key. Accordingly, a fake key fob is not able to pair with the control unit 201.

[0031] As illustrated in FIG. 2E, the key fob 202 may delete its key fob ID and private key after the initial pairing with control unit 201. This prevents unauthorized third-parties from accessing those values and using them to attempt to pair an unauthorized key fob with control unit 201. Additionally, this prevents the key fob 202 from pairing with other devices. [0032] FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating steps performed by a pairing device according to one embodiment. In step 301, the pairing device receives a control unit ID. The control unit ID should be kept secret to the maximum extent practicable so that unauthorized users cannot pair key fobs to the control unit. In one embodiment, the control unit ID is available from a manufacturer or vendor, but cannot be determined directly from the control unit itself. In step 302, the pairing device receives a key fob ID. The key fob ID may be provided by the key fob device itself or by a key fob manufacturer or vendor.

[0033] In step 303, the pairing device receives the key fob's public key, which has been scrambled with the key fob ID. In step 304, the pairing device recovers the key fob's public key by unscrambling the information received in step 303 using the key fob ID received in step 302. Only a device that has the key fob's ID can recover scrambled public key. If the pairing device selects the key fob at random and/or selects the key fob from a large group of key fobs, then unauthorized receivers of the scrambled public key will not know which key fob ID to use to recover the public key.

[0034] In step 305, the pairing device generates a shared key with the control unit using the control unit ID for authentication. In one embodiment, the shared key is generated using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In step 306, the pairing device encrypts the key fob's public key with the shared key and sends it to the control unit. Because the key fob only sends its public key to the pairing device, the control unit can only get the public key via the pairing device. Additionally, because the key fob's public key is scrambled with the key fob ID when sent to the pairing device and encrypted with the shared key when sent to the control unit, an outside observer is not able to obtain the key fob's public key without knowing this additional information.

[0035] FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating steps performed by a key fob according to one embodiment. In step 401, the key fob scrambles its public key with the key fob ID. In step 402, the key fob sends the scrambled public key to the pairing device. The pairing device then unscrambles the public key and passes it to the control unit as described herein.

[0036] In step 403, the key fob selects an OpKey and, in step 404, encrypts the OpKey with the key fob's private key. In step 405, the key fob generates an AES-128 OpKey encrypted value of the OpKey. In step 406, the key fob sends the encrypted OpKey and selected bits of the AES-128 OpKey encrypted value of the OpKey to the control unit.

[0037] FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating steps performed by a control unit according to one embodiment. In step 501, the control unit executes an ECC-based key agreement with the pairing device using the control unit ID for authentication. In step 502, the control unit receives the key fob's public key from the pairing device, where the public key is encrypted with the shared key.

[0038] In step 503, the control unit receives the OpKey from the key fob, where the

OpKey is encrypted using the key fob's private key. In step 504, the control unit receives selected bits of an AES-128 OpKey-encrypted value of OpKey from the key fob.

[0039] In step 505, the control unit decrypts the OpKey using the key fob's public key, which was received from the pairing device in step 502. In step 506, using the decrypted OpKey, the control unit creates an AES-128 OpKey-encrypted value of Opkey. Finally, in step 507, the control unit compares bits from the AES-128 OpKey-encrypted value of Opkey to the selected bits received from the key fob in step 504.

[0040] Following the processes outlined in FIGS. 4 and 5, both the key fob and the control unit have the value of OpKey, which can be used for operations between the key fob and the control unit. One example of the operations between the key fob and the control unit is disclosed in pending U.S. patent application serial number 13,969/133, titled "One -Way Key Fob and Vehicle Pairing Verification, Retention, and Revocation," filed on August 16, 2013, the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.

[0041] FIGS. 6, 7, and 8 show block diagrams of an example pairing device 600, key fob

700, and control unit 800, respectively, in accordance with various examples discussed herein. The three devices - pairing device 600, key fob 700, and control unit 800 - may each comprise a processor (601, 701, 801), a memory (602, 702, 802), and a transceiver or transmitter (603, 703, 803). The processors of the devices may be used to perform the public key scrambling or descrambling computations, authentication computations, common secret key generation computations, public key or OpKey encryption or decryption computation, and OpKey verification value computations that take place during the pairing process. The processors may be a standard CPU, a microcontroller, a low-power digital signal processor, etc. and may be capable of performing complex calculations in a short time.

[0042] The memories of the devices may be used to store the public and private key pairs associated with their respective. Alternatively or additionally, the memories of the three devices may be used to store the IDs of their own or the other devices. For example, the pairing device 600 may store both the key fob ID and control unit ID before initiating a paring sequence. The memories may be a non-volatile storage device such as a flash memory or an EEPROM.

[0043] The transceivers for the three devices may be wired (not shown), wireless, or capable of both. The transceivers may be used by the devices to communicate the device IDs, public keys, and/or scrambled or encrypted data during the initial configuration steps and the initial pairing steps. The key fob allows for remote entry and control of vehicles or other devices and may use wireless technology, such as Bluetooth, LF, or UHF, for those transmissions. The devices may also be able to communicate via a wire during the initial pairing process. The key fob transmitter 703 is capable of transmitting only and does not receive signals from the pairing device 600 or control unit 800.

[0044] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that modifications may be made to the described embodiments, and also that many other embodiments are possible, within the scope of the claimed invention.

Claims

CLAIMS What is claimed is:

1. A key fob-control unit pairing device, comprising:

a transceiver configured to transmit signals to a control unit and to receive signals from the control unit and a key fob;

a memory configured to store a key fob identification and a control unit identification; and

a processor coupled to said transceiver and memory, the processor configured to:

authenticate the control unit using a password authenticated key agreement protocol with the password taken or derived from the control unit identification; and

transmit an encrypted key fob public key to the control unit.

2. The device of claim 1, wherein the password authenticated key agreement protocol performed by the processor is configured to generate a common secret key shared between the pairing device and the control unit.

3. The device of claim 2, wherein the processor is further configured to generate the encrypted key fob public key with the common secret key.

4. The device of claim 1, wherein the password authenticated key agreement protocol is based on elliptical curve cryptography.

5. The device of claim 1, wherein the processor is further configured to receive a scrambled key fob public key from the key fob and to recover the key fob public key using the key fob identification.

6. A key fob, comprising:

a transmitter configured to transmit signals to a pairing device and a control unit;

a memory to store a key fob identification, a public key, a private key, and an operation key; and

a processor coupled to said transmitter and memory, the processor configured to:

generate a scrambled public key using the key fob identification; transmit the scrambled public key to the pairing device;

generate an encrypted operation key using the private key; and

transmit the encrypted operation key to the control unit.

7. The key fob of claim 6, wherein the processor is further configured to:

generate an AES-128 encrypted value of the operation key; and

transmit, along with the encrypted operation key, selected bits of the AES-128 encrypted value of the operation key to the control unit.

8. The key fob of claim 6, wherein the processor is further configured to:

erase the key fob identification and the private key after transmitting the encrypted operation key to the control unit.

9. The key fob of claim 7, wherein the selected bits of the AES-128 encrypted value of the operation key comprise a predetermined number of low-order bits.

10. The key fob of claim 7, wherein the AES-128 encrypted value of the operation key is encrypted with the operation key.

11. The key fob of claim 7, wherein the encrypted operation key and selected bits of the AES-128 encrypted value of the operation key are transmitted wirelessly to the control unit.

12. A method for pairing a key fob with a control unit, comprising:

executing, by a pairing device and the control unit, a password authenticated key agreement protocol with the password taken or derived from a control unit identification to authenticate each other and to generate a shared encryption key;

encrypting, by the pairing device, a key fob public key with the shared encryption key; and

transmitting, by the pairing device, the encrypted key fob public encryption key to the control unit.

13. The method of claim 12, further comprising:

receiving a scrambled public key from a key fob at the pairing device; and

recovering the key fob public key from the scrambled public key using a key fob identification.

14. The method of claim 12, further comprising:

receiving, by the control unit, the encrypted key fob public key from the pairing device; and

decrypting, by the control unit, the key fob public key with the shared encryption key.

15. The method of claim 12, further comprising:

receiving an encrypted operation key from a key fob at the control unit, wherein the encrypted operation key is encrypted using a key fob private key; and

decrypting the encrypted operation key using the key fob public key received from the pairing device to obtain a decrypted operation key.

16. The method of claim 15, further comprising:

receiving operation key verification bits at the control unit;

encrypting the decrypted operation key at the control unit to obtain an AES-128 operation key-encrypted value of the operation key; and

comparing selected bits of the AES-128 encrypted value of the operation key to the operation key verification bits to verify the decrypted operation key.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein the operation key verification bits comprise a predetermined number of low-order bits from an AES-128 encrypted value of the operation key.

18. The method of claim 12, wherein the password authenticated key agreement protocol is based on elliptical curve cryptography.