WO2013123891A1 - 建立安全上下文的方法、装置及系统 - Google Patents

建立安全上下文的方法、装置及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013123891A1
WO2013123891A1 PCT/CN2013/071759 CN2013071759W WO2013123891A1 WO 2013123891 A1 WO2013123891 A1 WO 2013123891A1 CN 2013071759 W CN2013071759 W CN 2013071759W WO 2013123891 A1 WO2013123891 A1 WO 2013123891A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
encryption
key
base station
access node
encryption algorithm
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2013/071759
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
张冬梅
陈璟
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Priority to EP20214432.5A priority Critical patent/EP3879867B1/en
Priority to EP13752434.4A priority patent/EP2804409B1/en
Priority to PL17167011T priority patent/PL3261373T3/pl
Priority to EP17167011.0A priority patent/EP3261373B1/en
Publication of WO2013123891A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013123891A1/zh
Priority to US14/460,748 priority patent/US9673974B2/en
Priority to US15/594,975 priority patent/US10084594B2/en
Priority to US16/140,338 priority patent/US20190028268A1/en
Priority to US16/140,217 priority patent/US10735185B2/en
Priority to US16/537,330 priority patent/US10812256B2/en
Priority to US17/030,926 priority patent/US11659393B2/en

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/24—Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]

Definitions

  • LTE Hi Long Term Evolution Hi
  • UE User Equipment
  • PCC Primary Carrier Cell
  • the UE is connected to the core network through the access node.
  • User plane data and control plane data can be transmitted on the PPC, while user plane data can only be transmitted on the SCC.
  • the base station can hierarchically transmit different UE services according to quality of service (QoS) requirements and operator policies. For example, voice or video services with high quality of service requirements are transmitted on the PCC, and low value-added services such as short messages are transmitted on the SCC.
  • QoS quality of service
  • voice or video services with high quality of service requirements are transmitted on the PCC
  • low value-added services such as short messages are transmitted on the SCC.
  • the user plane data and/or control plane data transmitted on the Uu port are protected by context security through encryption and integrity protection.
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide a method, an apparatus, and a system for establishing a security context, which are capable of comprehensive security protection of UE data.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a security context, including: acquiring an encryption algorithm of an access node;
  • the access node is notified to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and the UE is notified of downlink decryption and uplink encryption during the algorithm negotiation process.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a method for establishing a security context, including: receiving an encryption key sent by a base station;
  • Downlink encryption and uplink decryption are initiated according to the encryption key and the encryption algorithm.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a method for establishing a security context, including: sending a root key to the access node, where the root key is used by the access node to derive the access The encryption key used by the node;
  • the encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm selected by the access node according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE; and an encryption algorithm of the access node Sending to the UE to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE;
  • the access node is notified to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and the UE is notified of downlink decryption and uplink encryption during the algorithm negotiation process.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides a method for establishing a security context, including: Receiving a root key sent by the base station;
  • Downlink encryption and uplink decryption are initiated according to the startup indication of the base station.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a method for establishing a security context, including: receiving an encryption algorithm of an access node sent by a base station, thereby completing an algorithm negotiation with the base station;
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides a base station, including:
  • An acquirer configured to acquire an encryption algorithm of the access node
  • the acquirer is configured to acquire a root key
  • a processor configured to be connected to the acquirer, to derive an encryption key of the access node according to the root key acquired by the acquirer and the encryption algorithm;
  • a transmitter configured to send the encryption key derived by the processor and the encryption algorithm obtained by the acquirer to the access node, so as to connect the processor and the acquirer
  • the ingress node initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption
  • the transmitter is configured to send an encryption algorithm acquired by the acquirer to the UE, so as to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE;
  • the notifier is configured to notify the access node to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notify the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during an algorithm negotiation process.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides an access node, including:
  • a receiver configured to receive an encryption key sent by the base station
  • An acquirer configured to obtain an encryption algorithm
  • the processor is connected to the receiver and the acquirer, and is configured to start downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to the encryption key received by the receiver and an encryption algorithm acquired by the acquirer.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides a base station, including:
  • a sender configured to send a root key to the access node, where the root key is used by the access node to derive an encryption key used by the access node;
  • An occupant configured to obtain an encryption algorithm used by the access node, where the encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm selected by the access node according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE;
  • the transmitter is connected to the acquirer, and is configured to send an encryption algorithm acquired by the acquirer to the UE, so as to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE;
  • the notifier is configured to notify the access node to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notify the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during an algorithm negotiation process.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides an access node, including:
  • a receiver configured to receive a root key sent by the base station
  • a processor configured to select an encryption algorithm according to its security capability, a security policy, and a security capability of the UE;
  • the processor is connected to the receiver, and is configured to derive an encryption key according to the root key received by the receiver and the encryption algorithm;
  • a transmitter configured to send, by the processor, the encryption algorithm selected by the processor to the base station, so that the base station negotiates an encryption algorithm with the UE;
  • the processor is configured to start downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to the startup indication of the base station.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides a user equipment UE, including:
  • a receiver configured to receive an encryption algorithm of an access node sent by the base station, thereby completing an algorithm negotiation with the base station;
  • the processor is further configured to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption after deriving the encryption key of the UE.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a system for establishing a security context, including: a base station, configured to acquire an encryption algorithm of an access node, obtain a root key, and derive according to the root key and the encryption algorithm. Encrypting key of the access node, sending the encryption key and the encryption algorithm to the access node, so that the access node initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and encrypts the access node An algorithm is sent to the UE to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE, to notify the access node to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notify the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption in an algorithm negotiation process;
  • An access node configured to receive an encryption key sent by the base station, obtain an encryption algorithm, and start downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to the encryption key and the encryption algorithm;
  • the UE is configured to receive an encryption algorithm of the access node sent by the base station, thereby completing an algorithm negotiation with the base station, and deriving the encryption key of the UE according to the root key and the encryption algorithm, where the root key is After the UE and the network authentication are derived, the downlink decryption and the uplink encryption are started after the encryption key of the UE is derived.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a system for establishing a security context, including: a base station, configured to send a root key to the access node, where the root key is used for deriving the access node
  • the encryption key used by the access node acquires an encryption algorithm used by the access node, and the encryption algorithm is an encryption selected by the access node according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE.
  • An algorithm is configured to send an encryption algorithm of the access node to the UE, to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE, notify the access node to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notify the UE to start during an algorithm negotiation process.
  • Downstream decryption and upstream encryption ;
  • An access node configured to receive a root key sent by the base station, select an encryption algorithm according to its security capability, a security policy, and a security capability of the UE, and derive an encryption key according to the root key and the encryption algorithm. Sending the encryption algorithm to the base station, so that the base station negotiates an encryption algorithm with the UE, and starts downlink encryption and uplink solution according to the startup indication of the base station.
  • the UE is configured to receive an encryption algorithm of the access node sent by the base station, thereby completing an algorithm negotiation with the base station, and deriving the encryption key of the UE according to the root key and the encryption algorithm, where the root key is After the UE and the network authentication are derived, the downlink decryption and the uplink encryption are started after the encryption key of the UE is derived.
  • the method, device and system for establishing a security context can select an encryption algorithm for the access node and the UE, and derive an encryption key on both the access node and the UE according to the root key and the selected encryption algorithm.
  • the user plane data transmitted by the Uu and the port is encrypted and protected by the algorithm negotiation, the generation of the encryption, and the synchronous activation of the encryption protection.
  • the problem of protecting the user plane data for the Uu and the port transmission in the prior art can be solved, and the UE data can be solved. Provide comprehensive security protection.
  • Embodiment 1 is a flowchart of a method for establishing a security context in Embodiment 1 of the present invention
  • Embodiment 2 is a flowchart of a method for establishing a security context in Embodiment 2 of the present invention
  • Embodiment 3 is a flowchart of a method for establishing a security context in Embodiment 3 of the present invention
  • Embodiment 4 is a flowchart of a method for establishing a security context in Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a flowchart of a method for establishing a security context according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a method for establishing a security context in Embodiment 6 of the present invention.
  • Embodiment 7 is a flowchart of a method for establishing a security context in Embodiment 7 of the present invention.
  • Embodiment 8 is a flowchart of a method for establishing a security context according to Embodiment 8 of the present invention
  • 9 is a flowchart of a method for establishing a security context in Embodiment 9 of the present invention
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a base station according to Embodiment 10 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a base station according to Embodiment 10 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic structural diagram of a base station according to Embodiment 10 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of a Hi AP according to Embodiment 11 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 14 is a schematic structural diagram of a Hi AP according to Embodiment 11 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of a Hi AP according to Embodiment 11 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of a base station according to Embodiment 12 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 17 is a schematic structural diagram of a Hi AP according to Embodiment 13 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 18 is a schematic structural diagram of a UE in Embodiment 14 of the present invention.
  • the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention are clearly and completely described in the following with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. It is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. example. All other embodiments obtained by a person of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without creative efforts are within the scope of the present invention.
  • Hi AP Hi Acces s Point
  • the UE is connected to the core network through the Uu port through the Uu port, and is connected to the core network through the U AP through the Uu interface.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a security context. As shown in FIG. 1, the method includes the following steps:
  • the base station acquires an encryption algorithm of the Hi AP.
  • the encryption algorithm is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm is used.
  • the encryption algorithm is taken as an example for description, and is not limited in practical applications.
  • the base station acquires a root key.
  • the base station derives an encryption key of the H i AP according to the root key and the encryption algorithm.
  • the deciphering of the encryption key is required at both ends of the Hi AP and the UE. This step is to derive the description of the Hi AP encryption key, and the encryption key of the UE side is deduced by the UE.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is described by using a symmetric key encryption method as an example. Therefore, the Hi AP side and the UE side use the same key used to derive the encryption key. In practical applications, the Hi AP side After the authentication, the root key is sent to the base station by the solid E, and the root key of the UE side is derived by the permanent key saved in the UE card. Since the root key used by both the Hi AP and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption keys pushed by the Hi AP and the UE are also the same.
  • the base station sends the encryption key and the encryption algorithm to the Hi AP.
  • the base station Since the encryption algorithm and the derivation encryption key are selected by the base station for the Hi AP, and the main body of the encryption algorithm and the encryption key is the H i AP , the base station transmits the encryption key and the encryption algorithm to the Hi AP, so that the Hi AP starts. Downstream encryption and upstream decryption.
  • the base station sends the encryption algorithm to the UE, and completes an algorithm negotiation with the UE.
  • Both the Hi AP and the UE need to derive the encryption key based on the root key and the encryption algorithm. Therefore, the purpose of transmitting the encryption algorithm to the UE in this step is to enable the UE to obtain the encryption algorithm after the UE obtains the root key. The UE can derive the encryption key.
  • the base station notifies the Hi AP to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notifies the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during the algorithm negotiation process.
  • the UE After receiving the encryption algorithm sent by the base station, the UE derives the encryption key according to the encryption algorithm and the root key in the UE card. After the base station notifies the Hi AP and the UE to start decryption and encryption, the Hi AP and the UE can encrypt the uplink data and the downlink data according to the same encryption algorithm and the encryption key.
  • the method for establishing a security context provided by the embodiment of the present invention can obtain the encryption of the Hi AP Algorithm, and deriving the encryption key for the Hi AP according to the root key and the obtained encryption algorithm. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu interface by means of algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not implemented in the prior art, and the UE data can be performed. Comprehensive security protection.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a security context.
  • the method is further extended to the first embodiment. As shown in FIG. 2, the method includes the following steps:
  • the base station acquires an encryption algorithm of the Hi AP.
  • the encryption algorithm is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the AES algorithm is used as the encryption algorithm as an example, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the base station can obtain the encryption algorithm in at least two ways:
  • the base station receives the AES algorithm selected by the Hi AP, and the AES algorithm is the encryption algorithm with the highest priority selected by the Hi AP according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE. Before receiving the AES algorithm selected by the H i AP, the base station needs to send the security capability of the UE to the Hi AP, so that the Hi AP selects the encryption algorithm.
  • the base station receives the security capabilities and security policies of the Hi AP, and selects the encryption algorithm with the highest priority for the H i AP according to the security capabilities, security policies, and security capabilities of the UE. 202. Deriving an encryption key of the Hi AP.
  • the base station acquires a root key.
  • the base station derives an encryption key of the H i AP according to the root key and the encryption algorithm.
  • the deciphering of the encryption key is required at both ends of the Hi AP and the UE. This step is to derive the description of the Hi AP encryption key, and the encryption key of the UE side is deduced by the UE.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is described by using a symmetric key encryption method as an example. Therefore, the Hi AP side and the UE side use the same key used to derive the encryption key. In practical applications, the Hi AP side After the authentication, the root key is sent to the base station by the solid E, and the root key of the UE side is guaranteed by the UE card. Derived from the permanent key deduction. Since the root key used by the Hi AP and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption keys pushed by the Hi AP and the UE are also the same.
  • the base station derives the encryption key based on the root key and the AES algorithm.
  • the root key is a root key that is derived from the permanent key shared by the UE and the network side.
  • the root key may be a KeNB, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the base station derives the encryption key Kupenc according to the KeNB and sends the Kupenc to the H i AP.
  • the Kupenc is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the base station sends the encryption key and the encryption algorithm to the Hi AP.
  • the base station Since the encryption algorithm and the derivation encryption key are selected by the base station for the Hi AP, and the encryption algorithm and the encryption key are used by the Hi AP, the base station transmits the encryption key and the encryption algorithm to the Hi AP, so that the H i AP Start downstream encryption and upstream decryption.
  • the base station sends a security mode command (SMC) to the UE, where the SMC carries the AES algorithm.
  • SMC security mode command
  • the UE After receiving the AES algorithm sent by the base station, the UE completes the algorithm negotiation, and derives the Kupenc according to the AES algorithm and the KeNB of the UE and the network authentication.
  • Both the Hi AP and the UE need to derive the encryption key based on the root key and the encryption algorithm. Therefore, the purpose of transmitting the encryption algorithm to the UE in this step is to enable the UE to obtain the encryption algorithm after the UE obtains the root key. The UE can derive the encryption key.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is described by using a symmetric key encryption method as an example. Therefore, the Hi AP side and the UE side use the same key used to derive the encryption key.
  • the H i AP The root key of the side is sent by the core network, and the root key of the UE side is derived locally by the UE and the network according to the permanent key. Since the root key used by the Hi AP and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption key pushed by both the Hi AP and the UE is also the same.
  • the root key used by the H i AP side and the UE side to derive the encryption key may also be the KeNB* derived from the KeNB.
  • KeNB is used to deduct the user plane data encryption for Uu.
  • it is also used to derive the encryption key Kupenc for the user plane data on the Uu port and to derive the integrity protection key Krrc int and the encryption key Krrcenc for the control plane data on the Uu interface.
  • the Uu' port uses KeNB* to derive the key, the Kupenc* that is played is different from the Kupenc that is played for the Uu port.
  • the base station receives SMP signaling sent by the UE.
  • the UE sends a Security Mode Complete Command (SMP) to the base station, where the SMP is used to inform the base station that the UE has completed the derivation of the encryption key according to the encryption algorithm and the root key.
  • SMP Security Mode Complete Command
  • the base station notifies the Hi AP to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notifies the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during the algorithm negotiation process.
  • the base station After the encryption key is pushed on both sides of the Hi AP and the UE, when the Hi AP starts downlink encryption and uplink decryption, the base station notifies the UE to start downlink decryption and uplink encryption. Since the Hi AP is the sender of the downlink data and the receiver of the uplink data, the H i AP initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption. Similarly, since the UE is the receiver of the downlink data and the sender of the uplink data, the UE initiates downlink decryption and uplink encryption.
  • a security context may also be established for the Uu port, specifically:
  • the base station selects an encryption algorithm for the Uu port.
  • the AES algorithm is used as an example to describe the control algorithm of the control plane data, the encryption algorithm of the control plane data, and the encryption algorithm of the user plane data. In practice, the three can be used. Two or two different.
  • the base station sends the selected AES algorithm to the UE through the SMC, and the UE derives Kupenc, Krrc int, and Krrcenc according to the AES algorithm and the root key KeNB.
  • the encryption algorithm selected for the Uu interface may be selected as the Uu port in step 205.
  • the encryption algorithm is sent to the UE together to complete the algorithm negotiation with the UE.
  • the method for establishing a security context can obtain an encryption algorithm of a Hi AP and a UE, and derive an encryption key used by the Hi AP and the UE on both sides of the base station and the UE according to the root key and the obtained encryption algorithm.
  • Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu port on the SSC by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection can solve the problem that the user plane data protection for the Uu and the mouth is not protected in the prior art.
  • Comprehensive security protection for UE data can be performed by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection.
  • the method for establishing a security context may also use a root key different from the Uu port derivation key when deriving the encryption key for the Hi AP, for example, the KeNB* that can be derived according to the KeNB* As the Hi AP, the root key of the encryption key is derived.
  • the data transmitted on the Uu port uses a different root key than the data transmitted on the Uu port to further enhance data security.
  • the method for establishing a security context provided by the embodiment of the present invention can also perform algorithm negotiation on the behalf of the Uu interface and the Uu by the base station, and reduce the signaling interaction step.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a security context. As shown in FIG. 3, the method includes the following steps:
  • the Hi AP receives an encryption key sent by the base station.
  • the deciphering of the encryption key is required at both ends of the Hi AP and the UE.
  • the Hi AP receives the description of the encryption key deduced by the base station, and the encryption key of the UE side is deduced by the UE.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is described by taking the symmetric key encryption method as an example. Therefore, the base node and the UE side use the same root key used for deriving the encryption key. In practical applications, the base station side is dense. After the key is authenticated, it is sent to the base station by the solid E, and the base station derives the encryption key for the Hi AP according to the root key and the encryption algorithm. The root key of the UE side is derived from the permanent key saved in the UE card. Since the base key used by the base station and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption key pushed by both the base station and the UE is also the same. 302. The Hi AP obtains an encryption algorithm.
  • Hi AP obtains encryption algorithms in two ways:
  • the Hi AP acquires an encryption algorithm sent by the base station, and the encryption algorithm is selected by the base station.
  • the Hi AP selects an encryption algorithm according to its security capabilities, security policies, and UE security capabilities. After selecting the secret algorithm, the H i AP also sends the selected encryption algorithm to the base station, so that the base station and the UE perform algorithm negotiation.
  • the Hi AP starts downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to an encryption key and an encryption algorithm.
  • the base station sends the encryption algorithm of the Hi AP to the UE, so that the UE derives the encryption key of the UE side according to the encryption algorithm and the root key in the UE card.
  • the UE pushes the encryption key, it starts uplink encryption and downlink decryption according to the indication of the base station. Since the same encryption algorithm and the same encryption key are used on both sides of the Hi AP and the UE, the user plane data transmitted on the SCC can be encrypted and protected.
  • the method for establishing a security context provided by the embodiment of the present invention can perform the downlink encryption and the uplink decryption according to the encryption algorithm and the encryption key sent by the base station, and the Uu interface on the S SC.
  • the user plane data transmitted is encrypted and protected, which can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not in the prior art, and can comprehensively protect the UE data.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a security context, where the method is further extended to the third embodiment, where the method includes the following steps:
  • the Hi AP receives an encryption key sent by the base station.
  • the deciphering of the encryption key is required at both ends of the Hi AP and the UE.
  • the description of the encryption key is derived for the Hi AP, and the encryption key of the UE side is deduced by the UE.
  • the base station acquires a root key and derives an encryption key based on the root key.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is described by taking the symmetric key encryption method as an example. Therefore, the base node and the UE side use the same root key used for deriving the encryption key. In practical applications, the base station side is dense.
  • the MME sends the key to the base station.
  • the root key of the UE is derived from the permanent key saved in the UE card.
  • the root key phase used by the base station and the UE to derive the encryption key The same algorithm used is the AES algorithm, so the encryption key pushed by both the base station and the UE is also the same.
  • the base station derives the encryption key based on the root key and the AES algorithm.
  • the root key is a root key that is derived from the permanent key shared by the UE and the network side.
  • the root key may be a KeNB, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the base station derives the encryption key Kupenc according to the KeNB and sends the Kupenc to the H i AP.
  • the Kupenc is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the Hi AP acquires an encryption key sent by the base station. Since the encryption algorithm and the derivation encryption key are selected by the base station for the Hi AP, and the encryption algorithm and the encryption key are used by the Hi AP, the base station transmits the encryption key and the encryption algorithm to the Hi AP, so that the Hi AP starts. Downstream encryption and upstream decryption.
  • the Hi AP obtains an encryption algorithm.
  • the encryption algorithm is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the AES algorithm is used as the encryption algorithm as an example, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • a Hi AP can obtain an encryption algorithm in at least two ways:
  • the highest priority encryption algorithm selected by the Hi AP according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE.
  • the embodiment of the present invention uses the AES algorithm as the encryption algorithm. Before selecting the AES algorithm, the Hi AP needs to acquire the security capabilities of the UE sent by the base station to obtain the selected AES algorithm. After the Hi AP selects the AES algorithm, the AES algorithm needs to be sent to the base station, so that the base station performs algorithm negotiation with the UE according to the AES algorithm.
  • the Hi AP acquires an encryption algorithm sent by the base station, where the encryption algorithm is the encryption algorithm with the highest priority selected by the base station according to the security capabilities, security policies, and security capabilities of the UE. Before obtaining the encryption algorithm, the Hi AP needs to send its own security capability and security policy to the base station, so that the base station selects the encryption algorithm.
  • this step should be performed before step 401, so that the base station derives the H i AP according to the encryption algorithm sent by the Hi AP and the root key. Send the encryption key.
  • the H i AP starts downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to an encryption key and an encryption algorithm.
  • the base station sends the encryption algorithm to the UE to complete the algorithm negotiation with the UE.
  • the base station sends an SMC to the UE, where the SMC carries an AES algorithm.
  • the UE After receiving the AES algorithm sent by the base station, the UE completes the algorithm negotiation, and derives the Kupenc according to the AES algorithm and the KeNB of the UE and the network authentication.
  • the H i AP and the UE both need to derive the encryption key based on the root key and the encryption algorithm. Therefore, the purpose of transmitting the encryption algorithm to the UE in this step is to enable the UE to obtain the encryption algorithm after the UE obtains the root key. So that the UE can derive the encryption key.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is described by taking the symmetric key encryption method as an example. Therefore, the base node and the UE side use the same root key used for deriving the encryption key. In practical applications, the base station side is dense. The key is sent by the core network, and the root key of the UE side is derived locally by the UE and the network according to the permanent key. Since the root key used by the base station and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption key pushed by both the H i AP and the UE is also the same.
  • the root key used by the base station side and the UE side to derive the encryption key may also be the KeNB* derived from the KeNB.
  • the KeNB is also used to derive the encryption key Kupenc for the user plane data on the Uu interface and to derive the integrity protection key Krrc int and the control plane data on the Uu interface.
  • Encryption key Kr rcenc When the Uu' port uses KeNB* to derive the root key, the Kupenc* that is played is different from the Kupenc that is played for the Uu port.
  • the base station notifies the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during the algorithm negotiation process.
  • the base station After the ciphering key is pushed on both sides of the base station and the UE, when the H i AP initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption, the base station notifies the UE to start downlink decryption and uplink encryption. Since the H i AP is the sender of the downlink data and the receiver of the uplink data, the H i AP initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption. same, Since the UE is the receiver of the downlink data and the sender of the uplink data, the UE initiates downlink decryption and uplink strength.
  • a security context may also be established for the Uu port, specifically:
  • the base station selects an encryption algorithm for the Uu port.
  • the AES algorithm is used as an example to describe the control algorithm of the control plane data, the encryption algorithm of the control plane data, and the encryption algorithm of the user plane data. In practice, the three can be used. Two or two different.
  • the base station sends the selected AES algorithm to the UE through the SMC, and the UE derives Kupenc, Krrc int, and Krrcenc according to the AES algorithm and the root key KeNB.
  • the method for establishing a security context provided by the embodiment of the present invention can perform the downlink encryption and the uplink decryption according to the encryption algorithm and the encryption key sent by the base station, and the Uu interface on the S SC.
  • the user plane data transmitted is encrypted and protected, which can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not in the prior art, and can comprehensively protect the UE data.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a security context. As shown in FIG. 5, the method includes the following steps:
  • the base station sends the root key to the H i AP.
  • the root key is not limited to the fixed E, and is used by the Hi AP to derive the encryption key used by the Hi AP.
  • the base station acquires an encryption algorithm used by the Hi AP.
  • the encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm selected by the Hi AP according to its security capabilities, security policies, and security capabilities of the UE.
  • the base station sends the encryption algorithm of the Hi AP to the UE, so as to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE. Both the Hi AP and the UE must derive the encryption key based on the root key and the encryption algorithm, so this step
  • the purpose of transmitting the encryption algorithm to the UE is to enable the UE to obtain an encryption algorithm after the UE obtains the root key, so that the UE can derive the encryption key.
  • the UE derives the encryption key of the UE side according to the encryption algorithm sent by the base station and the root key in the UE card. Since the H i AP and the UE use the same root key and the same encryption algorithm on both sides, the encryption keys derived from both sides are also the same.
  • the base station notifies the Hi AP to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notifies the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during the algorithm negotiation process.
  • the UE After receiving the encryption algorithm sent by the base station, the UE derives the encryption key according to the encryption algorithm and the root key in the UE card. After the base station notifies the Hi AP and the UE to start decryption and encryption, the Hi AP and the UE can encrypt the uplink data and the downlink data according to the same encryption algorithm and the encryption key.
  • the Hi AP side selection encryption algorithm and the execution entity of the Hi AP side derivation encryption key are Hi APs.
  • the method for establishing a security context can select an encryption algorithm by the Hi AP, and derive an encryption key according to the root key and the selected encryption algorithm. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu interface by means of algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not implemented in the prior art, and the UE data can be performed. Comprehensive security protection.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a security context. The method is further extended to the fifth embodiment. As shown in FIG. 6, the method includes the following steps:
  • the base station sends the security capability of the UE to the Hi AP, so that the Hi AP selects an encryption algorithm.
  • the encryption algorithm is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the AES algorithm is used as the encryption algorithm as an example, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the base station sends the root key to the H i AP.
  • the root key is not limited to the solid E, and is used by the Hi AP to derive the encryption key used by the Hi AP.
  • the key is sent to the base station by the fixed E after the authentication, and the root key of the UE side is derived by the permanent key saved in the UE card. Since the root key used by the Hi AP and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption keys pushed by the Hi AP and the UE are also the same.
  • the base station derives the encryption key based on the root key and the AES algorithm.
  • the root key is a root key that is derived from the permanent key shared by the UE and the network side.
  • the root key may be a KeNB, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the base station derives the encryption key Kupenc according to the KeNB and sends the Kupenc to the H i AP.
  • the Kupenc is used to protect the user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the base station acquires an encryption algorithm used by the Hi AP.
  • the encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm selected by the Hi AP according to its security capabilities, security policies, and security capabilities of the UE.
  • the base station sends an encryption algorithm of the Hi AP to the UE, so as to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE.
  • the base station sends an SMC to the UE, where the SMC carries an AES algorithm.
  • the UE receives the transmission sent by the base station
  • Both the Hi AP and the UE need to derive the encryption key based on the root key and the encryption algorithm. Therefore, the purpose of transmitting the encryption algorithm to the UE in this step is to enable the UE to obtain the encryption algorithm after the UE obtains the root key. The UE can derive the encryption key.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is described by using a symmetric key encryption method as an example. Therefore, the Hi AP side and the UE side use the same key used to derive the encryption key.
  • the H i AP The root key of the side is sent by the core network, and the root key of the UE side is derived locally by the UE and the network according to the permanent key. Since the root key used by the Hi AP and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption key pushed by both the Hi AP and the UE is also the same.
  • the root key used by the H i AP side and the UE side to derive the encryption key may also be based on KeNB* derived from KeNB.
  • the KeNB is also used to derive the encryption key Kupenc for the user plane data on the Uu interface and to derive the integrity protection key Krrc int and the control plane data on the Uu interface.
  • Encryption key Krrcenc When the Uu' port uses KeNB* to derive the key, the Kupenc* that is played is different from the Kupenc that is played for the Uu port.
  • the base station receives the SMP signaling sent by the UE.
  • the UE sends an SMP to the base station, where the SMP is used to inform the base station that the UE has completed the derivation of the encryption key according to the encryption algorithm and the root key.
  • the base station notifies the Hi AP to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notifies the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during the algorithm negotiation process.
  • the UE After receiving the encryption algorithm sent by the base station, the UE derives the encryption key according to the encryption algorithm and the root key in the UE card. After the base station notifies the Hi AP and the UE to start decryption and encryption, the Hi AP and the UE can encrypt the uplink data and the downlink data according to the same encryption algorithm and the encryption key.
  • the Hi AP side selection encryption algorithm and the execution entity of the Hi AP side derivation encryption key are Hi APs.
  • the method for establishing a security context can select an encryption algorithm by the Hi AP, and derive an encryption key according to the root key and the selected encryption algorithm. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu port on the SSC by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection, can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not in the prior art. Comprehensive security protection for UE data.
  • the method for establishing a security context may also use a root key different from the Uu port derivation key when the Hi AP deduces the encryption key.
  • the KeNB* derived from the KeNB may be used as The Hi AP derives the root key of the encryption key.
  • the data transmitted on the Uu port uses a different root key than the data transmitted on the Uu port to further enhance data security.
  • Example 7 An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for security context. As shown in FIG. 7, the method includes the following steps:
  • the Hi AP receives a root key sent by the base station.
  • the root key is not limited to the solid E, and the base station sends the root key to the Hi AP, so that the H i AP derives the encryption key.
  • the Hi AP selects an encryption algorithm according to its security capability, security policy, and security capabilities of the UE.
  • the Hi AP selects the highest priority encryption algorithm according to its security capabilities, security policies, and UE security capabilities.
  • the Hi AP derives the encryption key according to the root key and the encryption algorithm.
  • the Hi AP sends the encryption algorithm to the base station, so that the base station negotiates an encryption algorithm with the UE.
  • Both the Hi AP and the UE need to derive the encryption key based on the root key and the encryption algorithm. Therefore, the purpose of the base station and the UE to negotiate the encryption algorithm is to enable the UE to obtain the encryption algorithm after the UE obtains the root key, so that the UE can perform the deduction. Encryption key.
  • the UE derives the encryption key of the UE side according to the encryption algorithm sent by the base station and the root key in the UE card. Since the H i AP and the UE use the same root key and the same encryption algorithm on both sides, the encryption keys derived from both sides are also the same.
  • the Hi AP starts downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to the startup indication of the base station.
  • the UE After receiving the encryption algorithm sent by the base station, the UE derives the encryption key according to the encryption algorithm and the root key in the UE card. After the base station notifies the Hi AP and the UE to start decryption and encryption, the Hi AP and the UE can encrypt the uplink data and the downlink data according to the same encryption algorithm and the encryption key.
  • the Hi AP side selection encryption algorithm and the execution entity of the Hi AP side derivation encryption key are Hi APs.
  • the method for establishing a security context can select an encryption algorithm and derive an encryption key according to the root key and the selected encryption algorithm.
  • User plane data transmitted by Uu, port is encrypted by algorithm negotiation, generation of encryption, and synchronous activation of encryption protection. It can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu is not in the prior art, and can comprehensively protect the UE data.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a security context.
  • the method is further extended to the seventh embodiment. As shown in FIG. 8, the method includes the following steps:
  • the Hi AP receives a root key sent by the base station.
  • the base station can obtain the root key from the MN, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key is sent to the base station by the fixed E after the authentication, and the root key of the UE side is derived by the permanent key saved in the UE card. Since the root key used by the Hi AP and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption key that is pushed by both the Hi AP and the UE is the same.
  • the Hi AP receives the security capability of the UE sent by the base station.
  • the encryption algorithm is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the AES algorithm is used as the encryption algorithm as an example, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the Hi AP selects an encryption algorithm according to its security capabilities, security policies, and security capabilities of the UE.
  • the Hi AP selects the highest priority encryption algorithm according to its security capabilities, security policies, and UE security capabilities.
  • the Hi AP derives the encryption key according to the root key and the encryption algorithm.
  • the Hi AP derives the encryption key based on the root key and the AES algorithm.
  • the root key is a root key that is derived according to the permanent key shared by the UE and the network side.
  • the root root key may be a KeNB, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the Hi AP derives an encryption key Kupenc according to the KeNB, and the Kupenc is used to encrypt and protect the user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the H i AP sends an encryption algorithm to the base station, so that the base station negotiates an encryption algorithm with the UE.
  • the base station sends an SMC to the UE, where the SMC carries an AES algorithm.
  • the UE receives the transmission sent by the base station After the AES algorithm, the algorithm negotiation is completed, and Kupenc is derived according to the AES algorithm and the KeNB of the UE and the network authentication.
  • Both the Hi AP and the UE need to derive the encryption key based on the root key and the encryption algorithm. Therefore, the purpose of transmitting the encryption algorithm to the UE in this step is to enable the UE to obtain the encryption algorithm after the UE obtains the root key. The UE can derive the encryption key.
  • the root key used by the H i AP side and the UE side to derive the encryption key may also be the KeNB* derived from the KeNB.
  • the KeNB is also used to derive the encryption key Kupenc for the user plane data on the Uu interface and to derive the integrity protection key Krrc int and the control plane data on the Uu interface.
  • Encryption key Krrcenc When the Uu' port uses KeNB* to derive the root key, the Kupenc* that is played is different from the Kupenc that is played for the Uu port.
  • the Hi AP starts downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to the startup indication of the base station.
  • the UE After receiving the encryption algorithm sent by the base station, the UE derives the encryption key according to the encryption algorithm and the root key in the UE card. After the base station notifies the Hi AP and the UE to start decryption and encryption, the Hi AP and the UE can encrypt the uplink data and the downlink data according to the same encryption algorithm and the encryption key.
  • the Hi AP side selection encryption algorithm and the execution entity of the Hi AP side derivation encryption key are Hi APs.
  • the method for establishing a security context provided by the embodiment of the present invention can select an encryption algorithm, and derive an encryption key according to the root key and the selected encryption algorithm. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu port on the SSC by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection, can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not in the prior art. Comprehensive security protection for UE data.
  • the method for establishing a security context may also use a root key different from the Uu port derivation key when deriving the encryption key.
  • the KeNB* derived from the KeNB may be used as a derivation encryption.
  • the root key of the key The data transmitted on the Uu port and the data transmitted on the Uu port use different root keys to further enhance the security of the data.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a security context. As shown in FIG. 9, the method includes the following steps:
  • the UE receives an encryption algorithm of the Hi AP sent by the base station, thereby completing an algorithm negotiation with the base station.
  • the purpose of the UE receiving the encryption algorithm sent by the base station in this step is that the UE can derive the encryption key according to the encryption algorithm and the root key.
  • the encryption algorithm is the highest priority encryption algorithm selected by the Hi AP according to its security capability, the security policy, and the security capability of the UE, or the priority selected by the base station according to the security capabilities, security policies, and security capabilities of the UE.
  • the highest encryption algorithm is the highest priority encryption algorithm selected by the Hi AP according to its security capability, the security policy, and the security capability of the UE, or the priority selected by the base station according to the security capabilities, security policies, and security capabilities of the UE. The highest encryption algorithm.
  • the UE derives an encryption key of the UE according to the root key and the encryption algorithm.
  • the UE sends SMP signaling to the base station.
  • the purpose of the UE transmitting the SMP to the base station is to inform the base station that the UE has derived the encryption key based on the root key and the encryption algorithm transmitted by the base station.
  • the UE After the UE pushes the encryption key, the UE starts downlink decryption and uplink encryption.
  • the Hi AP and the UE can encrypt the uplink data and the downlink data according to the same encryption algorithm and the encryption key.
  • the method for establishing a security context can derive the encryption key used by the UE by the UE.
  • the user plane data transmitted by the Uu port on the SSC is encrypted and protected by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection, which can solve the problem in the prior art.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a base station, as shown in FIG. 10, to implement the second embodiment.
  • the base station includes:
  • the acquirer 1001 is configured to obtain an encryption algorithm and a root key of the Hi AP.
  • the root key is used to derive an encryption key.
  • the encryption key and the encryption algorithm are used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the AES algorithm is used as the encryption algorithm as an example, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the processor 1002 is connected to the acquirer 1001, and is configured to derive an encryption key of the Hi AP according to the root key and the encryption algorithm acquired by the acquirer 1001.
  • the deciphering of the encryption key is required at both ends of the Hi AP and the UE.
  • the processor 1002 derives a description of the Hi AP encryption key, and the encryption key of the UE side is deduced by the UE.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is described by taking the symmetric key encryption method as an example. Therefore, the processor 1002 and the root key used by the UE to derive the encryption key are the same.
  • the processor 1002 derives an encryption key based on the root key and the AES algorithm.
  • the root key is a root key that is derived from the permanent key shared by the UE and the network side.
  • the root key may be a KeNB, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the processor 1002 derives the encryption key Kupenc according to the KeNB, and then transmits the Kupenc to the Hi AP by the transmitter 1003.
  • the Kupenc is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the transmitter 1003 is connected to the processor 1002 and the acquirer 1001, and configured to send an encryption key derived by the processor 1002 and the encryption algorithm acquired by the acquirer 1001 to Hi AP, so that the H i AP initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption.
  • the transmitter 1003 in the base station transmits the encryption key and the encryption algorithm to Hi AP, so that the H i AP initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption.
  • the transmitter 1003 is configured to send the encryption algorithm acquired by the acquirer 1001 to the UE. In order to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE.
  • the transmitter 1003 sends a security mode command (SMC) to the UE, where the SMC carries the AES algorithm.
  • SMC security mode command
  • the UE After receiving the AES algorithm sent by the transmitter 1003, the UE completes the algorithm negotiation, and derives the Kupenc according to the AES algorithm and the KeNB of the UE and the network authentication.
  • the transmitter 1003 sends the encryption algorithm to the UE in this step, so that after the UE obtains the root key, the UE is re- An encryption algorithm is obtained so that the UE can derive the encryption key.
  • the notifier 1004 is configured to notify the Hi AP to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notify the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during the algorithm negotiation process.
  • the notifier 1004 After the ciphering key is pushed on both sides of the Hi AP and the UE, when the Hi AP starts downlink encryption and uplink decryption, the notifier 1004 notifies the UE to start downlink decryption and uplink encryption. Since the Hi AP is the sender of the downlink data and the receiver of the uplink data, the Hi AP initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption. Similarly, since the UE is the receiver of the downlink data and the sender of the uplink data, the UE initiates downlink decryption and uplink encryption.
  • the acquirer 1001 may include:
  • the first obtaining unit 1101 is configured to obtain an encryption algorithm selected by the Hi AP, where the encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm selected by the Hi AP according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE.
  • the second obtaining unit 1102 is configured to select the encryption algorithm according to a security capability of the Hi AP, a security policy, and a security capability of the UE.
  • the transmitter 1003 is further configured to send the security capability of the UE to the Hi AP, so that the Hi AP selects an encryption algorithm according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE.
  • the base station may include:
  • the receiver 1201 is connected to the acquirer 1001, and configured to receive a security capability and a security policy sent by the Hi AP, so that the second acquisition in the acquirer 1001 is performed.
  • the unit 1102 selects an encryption algorithm according to the security capabilities of the H i AP, the security policy, and the security capabilities of the UE.
  • the root key is a root key used to derive a security key and an encryption key on an interface between the base station and the UE, or is a base station and the UE according to the
  • the sub-key derived from the root key used by the secret key and the encryption key is derived from the interface.
  • the base station provided by the embodiment of the present invention can obtain the encryption algorithm of the Hi AP and the UE, and derive the encryption key used by the Hi AP and the UE on both sides of the base station and the UE according to the root key and the obtained encryption algorithm. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu port on the SSC by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not in the prior art. Comprehensive security protection for UE data.
  • the base station provided by the embodiment of the present invention may also use a root key different from the Uu port derivation key when deriving the encryption key for the Hi AP.
  • the KeNB* derived from the KeNB may be used as the Hi AP.
  • the root key of the encryption key The data transmitted on the Uu port and the data transmitted on the Uu port use different root keys to further enhance the security of the data.
  • the base station provided by the embodiment of the present invention can also perform algorithm negotiation on the Uu interface and the Uu by the base station in the algorithm negotiation phase, and reduce the signaling interaction step.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides an access node, as shown in FIG. 13, to implement Embodiment 4.
  • the Hi AP includes: a receiver 1301, configured to receive an encryption key sent by the base station.
  • the deciphering of the encryption key is required at both ends of the Hi AP and the UE.
  • the description of the encryption key is derived for the Hi AP, and the encryption key of the UE side is deduced by the UE.
  • the acquirer 1302 is configured to acquire an encryption algorithm.
  • the encryption algorithm is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the AES algorithm is used as the encryption algorithm as an example, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the processor 1303, the processor 1303, the receiver 1301, and the acquirer 1302 Connected, for performing downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to an encryption key received by the receiver 1301 and an encryption algorithm acquired by the acquirer 1302.
  • the base station sends the encryption algorithm to the UE to complete the algorithm negotiation with the UE.
  • the acquirer 1302 may include:
  • the obtaining unit 1401 is configured to acquire an encryption algorithm sent by the base station, where the encryption algorithm is selected by the base station.
  • the obtaining unit 1401 is further configured to select an encryption algorithm according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE.
  • the sending unit 1402 is connected to the obtaining unit 1401, and configured to send the encryption algorithm selected by the acquiring unit 1401 to the base station.
  • the receiver 1301 is connected to the acquirer 1302, and is configured to receive a security capability of the UE sent by the base station, where the security capability of the UE is used by the acquiring unit 140 in the acquirer 1302 to select an encryption algorithm.
  • the Hi AP may include:
  • the transmitter 1501 is configured to send its own security capability and security policy to the base station, so that the base station selects an encryption algorithm for the Hi AP.
  • the Hi AP provided by the embodiment of the present invention can perform the Uu, port transmission user plane on the SSC by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to the encryption algorithm and the encryption key sent by the base station.
  • the data is encrypted and protected, which can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not in the prior art, and can comprehensively protect the UE data.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a base station for implementing Embodiment 6.
  • the base station includes:
  • the sender 1601 is configured to send the root key to the Hi AP, where the root key is used by the H i AP to derive an encryption key used by the Hi AP.
  • the acquirer 1602 is configured to obtain an encryption algorithm used by the Hi AP, where the encryption algorithm is a Hi AP An encryption algorithm selected based on its own security capabilities, security policies, and security capabilities of the UE.
  • the transmitter 1601 is connected to the acquirer 1602, and configured to send the encryption algorithm acquired by the acquirer 1602 to the UE, so as to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE.
  • the sender 1601 sends an SMC to the UE, where the SMC carries an AES algorithm. After receiving the AES algorithm sent by the transmitter 1601, the UE completes the algorithm negotiation, and derives the Kupenc according to the AES algorithm and the KeNB of the UE and the network authentication.
  • Both the Hi AP and the UE need to derive the encryption key based on the root key and the encryption algorithm. Therefore, the purpose of transmitting the encryption algorithm to the UE in this step is to enable the UE to obtain the encryption algorithm after the UE obtains the root key. The UE can derive the encryption key.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is described by using a symmetric key encryption method as an example. Therefore, the Hi AP side and the UE side use the same key used to derive the encryption key.
  • the H i AP The root key of the side is sent by the core network, and the root key of the UE side is derived locally by the UE and the network according to the permanent key. Since the root key used by the Hi AP and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption key pushed by both the Hi AP and the UE is also the same.
  • the notifier 1603 is configured to notify the Hi AP to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notify the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during the algorithm negotiation process.
  • the transmitter 1601 is further configured to send the security capability of the UE to the Hi AP, so that the Hi AP selects an encryption algorithm.
  • the root key is a root key used for deriving a security key and an encryption key on an interface between the base station and the UE, or is between the base station and the UE according to the The subkey derived from the root key used by the secret key and the encryption key is derived on the interface.
  • the base station provided by the embodiment of the present invention can select an encryption algorithm by the Hi AP, and according to the root The key and the chosen encryption algorithm derive the encryption key. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu port on the SSC by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection, can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not in the prior art. Comprehensive security protection for UE data.
  • the base station provided by the embodiment of the present invention may also use a root key different from the Uu port derivation key when the Hi AP derives the encryption key.
  • the KeNB* derived from the KeNB may be used as the Hi AP deduction encryption.
  • the root key of the key The data transmitted on the Uu port and the data transmitted on the Uu port use different root keys to further enhance the security of the data.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides an access node for implementing the eighth embodiment.
  • the Hi AP is used as an access node, and the Hi AP includes: a receiver 1701, configured to receive a root key sent by the base station.
  • the base station can obtain the root key from the MN, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key is sent to the base station by the fixed E after the authentication, and the root key of the UE side is derived by the permanent key saved in the UE card. Since the root key used by the Hi AP and the UE to derive the encryption key is the same and the algorithm used is the AES algorithm, the encryption key that is pushed by both the Hi AP and the UE is the same.
  • the processor 1702 is configured to select an encryption algorithm according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE.
  • the processor 1702 selects an encryption algorithm with the highest priority according to its own security capabilities, security policies, and security capabilities of the UE.
  • the encryption algorithm is used to encrypt and protect user plane data transmitted on the SCC.
  • the AES algorithm is used as the encryption algorithm as an example, which is not limited in practical applications.
  • the processor 1702 is connected to the receiver 1701, and is configured to derive an encryption key according to a root key received by the receiver 1701 and an encryption algorithm.
  • the transmitter 1703 is connected to the processor 1702, and configured to send the encryption algorithm selected by the processor 1702 to the base station, so that the base station negotiates an encryption algorithm with the UE.
  • the processor 1702 is configured to start downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to a startup indication of the base station. Further, the receiver 1701 is further configured to receive a security capability of the UE sent by the base station, where the security capability of the UE is used by the processor 1702 to select an encryption algorithm.
  • the root key is a root key used for deriving a security key and an encryption key on an interface between the base station and the UE, or is between the base station and the UE according to the The subkey derived from the root key used by the secret key and the encryption key is derived on the interface.
  • the Hi AP provided by the embodiment of the present invention can select an encryption algorithm and derive an encryption key according to the root key and the selected encryption algorithm. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu port on the SSC by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection, can solve the problem that the user plane data protection for the Uu and the mouth is not protected in the prior art. Comprehensive security protection for UE data.
  • the Hi AP provided by the embodiment of the present invention may also use a root key different from the Uu port derivation key when deriving the encryption key.
  • the KeNB* derived from the KeNB may be used as the derivation encryption key. Root key.
  • the data transmitted on the Uu port and the data transmitted on the Uu port use different root keys to further enhance data security.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a user equipment UE, which is used to implement the ninth embodiment.
  • the UE includes:
  • the receiver 1801 is configured to receive an encryption algorithm of the Hi AP sent by the base station, thereby completing an algorithm negotiation with the base station.
  • the receiver 1801 in this step receives the encryption algorithm sent by the base station, and the processor 1802 can follow the encryption algorithm and the root density. Key deduction of the encryption key.
  • the encryption algorithm is the highest priority encryption algorithm selected by the Hi AP according to its security capability, the security policy, and the security capability of the UE, or the security capability of the base station according to the Hi AP.
  • the processor 1802 is connected to the receiver 1801, and is configured to derive an encryption key of the UE according to the root key and an encryption algorithm received by the receiver 1801, where the root key is derived by the processor 1802 and the network authentication. Out.
  • the processor 1802 is further configured to: after deriving the encryption key of the UE, initiate downlink decryption and uplink security.
  • the UE provided by the embodiment of the present invention can derive the encryption key used by the UE by the UE. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu port on the SSC by algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection, can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not in the prior art. Comprehensive security protection for UE data.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a system for establishing a security context, where the system includes a base station, an access node, and a UE, and the UE connects to the core network through the base station through the Uu interface. And connected to the core network via the access node through the Uu' port. among them,
  • the base station is configured to acquire an encryption algorithm of the access node, obtain a root key, derive an encryption key of the access node according to the root key and the encryption algorithm, and use the encryption key and the encryption
  • An algorithm is sent to the access node, so that the access node initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and sends an encryption algorithm of the access node to the UE, so as to negotiate an encryption algorithm with the UE, and notify the connection.
  • the ingress node initiates downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and notifies the UE to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption during algorithm negotiation.
  • the access node is configured to receive an encryption key sent by the base station, obtain an encryption algorithm, and start downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to the encryption key and the encryption algorithm.
  • the system for establishing a security context can select an encryption algorithm for the access node, and derive an encryption key for the access node according to the root key and the selected encryption algorithm. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu interface by means of algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not implemented in the prior art, and the UE data can be performed. Comprehensive security protection.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a system for establishing a security context, where the system includes a base station, an access node, and a UE, and the UE connects to the core network through the Uu port through the base station, and passes the Uu, the port is connected to the core network via the access node.
  • the base station is configured to send a root key to the access node, where the root key is used by the access node to derive an encryption key used by the access node, and obtain the access node to use.
  • An encryption algorithm sends an encryption algorithm of the access node to the UE according to an encryption algorithm selected by the access node according to its security capability, security policy, and security capability of the UE, so that An encryption algorithm is negotiated with the UE, and the access node is notified to initiate downlink encryption and uplink decryption, and the UE is notified to initiate downlink decryption and uplink encryption in an algorithm negotiation process.
  • the access node is configured to receive a root key sent by the base station, select an encryption algorithm according to its security capability, a security policy, and a security capability of the UE, and derive an encryption key according to the root key and the encryption algorithm. Key, sending the encryption algorithm to the base station, so that the base station negotiates an encryption algorithm with the UE, and starts downlink encryption and uplink decryption according to the startup indication of the base station.
  • the system for establishing a security context can select an encryption algorithm by the access node, and derive an encryption key by the access node according to the root key and the selected encryption algorithm. Encrypting and protecting the user plane data transmitted by the Uu interface by means of algorithm negotiation, generating encryption, and synchronously starting the encryption protection can solve the problem that the user plane data protection on the Uu interface is not implemented in the prior art, and the UE data can be performed. Comprehensive security protection.
  • the present invention can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general hardware, and of course, by hardware, but in many cases, the former is a better implementation. .
  • the technical solution of the present invention which is essential or contributes to the prior art, may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a readable storage medium, such as a floppy disk of a computer.
  • a hard disk or optical disk or the like includes instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention.

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Abstract

本发明公开了一种建立安全上下文的方法、装置及系统，涉及通信领域，为全面保护UE数据而发明。所述方法包括：获取接入节点的加密算法；获取根密钥，根据所述根密钥和所述加密算法推演所述接入节点的加密密钥；将所述加密密钥以及所述加密算法发送给所述接入节点，以便所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密；将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所述UE，以便与所述UE协商加密算法；通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密，并在算法协商过程中通知所述UE启动下行解密和上行加密。本发明主要应用于SCC的安全性保护。

Description

建立安全上下文的方法、 装置及系统
本申请要求于 2012 年 02 月 22 日提交中国专利局、 申请号为 201210041047.3、 发明名称为"建立安全上下文的方法、 装置及系统"的中国 专利申请的优先权， 其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。 技术领域 本发明涉及通信领域， 尤其涉及一种建立安全上下文的方法、 装置及 系统。 背景技术 长期演进 Hi架构 （Long Term Evolution Hi, LTE Hi )是为面向固定、 低速场景而设计的一套依托于现有移动通信技术的网络架构。 在 LTE Hi架 构中， 用户设备（User Equipment, UE )初始与基站建立主载波小区连接
(Primary Carrier Cell, PCC ), 连接到核心网。 当网络流量负荷增大到 运营商设置的限值时， 基站通过高层信令为 UE 配置次载波小区连接
( Secondary Carrier Cell, SCC ) , UE 通过接入节点连接到核心网。 PPC 上可以传输用户面数据和控制面数据， 而 SCC上只能传输用户面数据。 基 站可以根据服务质量（Quality of Service, QoS )需求、 运营商策略等将 不同的 UE业务分层进行传输。 例如将对服务质量要求较高的语音或视频业 务放在 PCC上传输， 将短信等低附加值业务放在 SCC上传输。 对于 PCC上 的 Uu口， 通过加密和完整性保护的方式对 Uu口上传输的用户面数据和 /或 控制面数据进行上下文的安全性保护。
虽然 PCC上的 Uu口存在安全性保护 ,但 SCC上的 Uu， 口没有安全性保 护， 无法保证在 Uu， 口上传输的用户面数据的传输安全。 发明内容 本发明的实施例提供一种建立安全上下文的方法、 装置及系统， 能够 对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
一方面， 本发明实施例提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 包括： 获取接入节点的加密算法；
获取根密钥， 根据所述根密钥和所述加密算法推演所述接入节点的加 密密钥；
将所述加密密钥以及所述加密算法发送给所述接入节点， 以便所述接 入节点启动下行加密和上行解密；
将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所述 UE ,以便与所述 UE协商加密算 法；
通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中通 知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 包括： 接收基站发送的加密密钥；
获取加密算法；
根据所述加密密钥和所述加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 包括： 将根密钥发送给所述接入节点， 所述根密钥用于所述接入节点推演所 述接入节点使用的加密密钥；
获取所述接入节点使用的加密算法， 所述加密算法为所述接入节点根 据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择的加密算法； 将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所述 UE ,以便与所述 UE协商加密算 法；
通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中通 知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 包括： 接收所述基站发送的根密钥；
根据自身的安全能力、安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择加密算法； 根据所述根密钥以及所述加密算法推演加密密钥；
将所述加密算法发送给所述基站， 以便所述基站与所述 UE协商加密算 法；
根据所述基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 包括： 接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述基站的算法协 商；
根据根密钥以及所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所述根密钥为 所述 UE与网络认证后推演得出的；
在推演出所述 UE的加密密钥以后， 启动下行解密以及上行加密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种基站， 包括：
获取器， 用于获取接入节点的加密算法；
所述获取器用于获取根密钥；
处理器， 与所述获取器相连， 用于根据所述获取器获取的所述根密钥 和所述加密算法推演所述接入节点的加密密钥；
发送器， 与所述处理器和所述获取器相连， 用于将所述处理器推演的 加密密钥以及所述获取器获取的所述加密算法发送给所述接入节点， 以便 所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密；
所述发送器用于将所述获取器获取的加密算法发送给所述 UE , 以便与 所述 UE协商加密算法；
通知器， 用于通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法 协商过程中通知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种接入节点， 包括：
接收器， 用于接收基站发送的加密密钥；
获取器， 用于获取加密算法； 处理器， 与所述接收器和所述获取器相连， 用于根据所述接收器接收 的所述加密密钥和所述获取器获取的加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种基站， 包括：
发送器， 用于将根密钥发送给所述接入节点， 所述根密钥用于所述接 入节点推演所述接入节点使用的加密密钥；
获取器， 用于获取所述接入节点使用的加密算法， 所述加密算法为所 述接入节点根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择的 加密算法；
所述发送器与所述获取器相连， 用于将所述获取器获取的加密算法发 送给所述 UE , 以便与所述 UE协商加密算法；
通知器， 用于通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法 协商过程中通知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种接入节点， 包括：
接收器， 用于接收所述基站发送的根密钥；
处理器， 用于根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力 选择加密算法；
所述处理器与所述接收器相连， 用于根据所述接收器接收的所述根密 钥以及所述加密算法推演加密密钥；
发送器， 与所述处理器相连用于将所述处理器选择的所述加密算法发 送给所述基站， 以便所述基站与所述 UE协商加密算法；
所述处理器用于根据所述基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解密。 另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种用户设备 UE , 包括：
接收器， 用于接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述 基站的算法协商；
处理器， 与所述接收器相连， 用于根据根密钥以及所述接收器接收的 所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所述^ =艮密钥为所述处理器与网络认 证后推演得出的； 所述处理器还用于在推演出所述 UE的加密密钥以后， 启动下行解密以 及上行加密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种建立安全上下文的系统， 包括： 基站， 用于获取接入节点的加密算法， 获取根密钥， 根据所述根密钥 和所述加密算法推演所述接入节点的加密密钥， 将所述加密密钥以及所述 加密算法发送给所述接入节点， 以便所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解 密， 将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所述 UE , 以便与所述 UE协商加密算 法， 通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中通 知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密；
接入节点， 用于接收所述基站发送的加密密钥， 获取加密算法， 根据 所述加密密钥和加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密；
UE , 用于接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述基站 的算法协商， 根据根密钥以及所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所述 根密钥为所述 UE与网络认证后推演得出的， 在推演出所述 UE的加密密钥 以后， 启动下行解密以及上行加密。
另一方面， 本发明实施例还提供了一种建立安全上下文的系统， 包括： 基站， 用于将根密钥发送给所述接入节点， 所述根密钥用于所述接入 节点推演所述接入节点使用的加密密钥， 获取所述接入节点使用的加密算 法， 所述加密算法为所述接入节点根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所 述 UE的安全能力选择的加密算法， 将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所述 UE , 以便与所述 UE协商加密算法， 通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行 解密， 并在算法协商过程中通知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密；
接入节点， 用于接收所述基站发送的根密钥， 根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择加密算法， 根据所述根密钥以及所述 加密算法推演加密密钥， 将所述加密算法发送给所述基站， 以便所述基站 与所述 UE协商加密算法， 根据所述基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解 UE , 用于接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述基站 的算法协商， 根据根密钥以及所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所述 根密钥为所述 UE与网络认证后推演得出的， 在推演出所述 UE的加密密钥 以后， 启动下行解密以及上行加密。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法、 装置及系统， 能够为接 入节点和 UE选择加密算法， 并且根据根密钥以及选择的加密算法在接入节 点和 UE两侧推演加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保 护的方式对 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中 没有针对 Uu， 口上传输的用户面数据保护的问题，能够对 UE数据进行全面 的安全保护。
附图说明 为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例或现有技术中的技术方案， 下面将对 实施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍， 显而易见地， 下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例， 对于本领域普通技术人员 来讲， 在不付出创造性劳动的前提下， 还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附 图。
图 1为本发明实施例一中建立安全上下文的方法的流程图；
图 2为本发明实施例二中建立安全上下文的方法的流程图；
图 3为本发明实施例三中建立安全上下文的方法的流程图；
图 4为本发明实施例四中建立安全上下文的方法的流程图；
图 5为本发明实施例五中建立安全上下文的方法的流程图；
图 6为本发明实施例六中建立安全上下文的方法的流程图；
图 7为本发明实施例七中建立安全上下文的方法的流程图；
图 8为本发明实施例八中建立安全上下文的方法的流程图； 图 9为本发明实施例九中建立安全上下文的方法的流程图；
图 10为本发明实施例十中基站的结构示意图；
图 11为本发明实施例十中基站的结构示意图；
图 12为本发明实施例十中基站的结构示意图；
图 13为本发明实施例十一中 Hi AP的结构示意图；
图 14为本发明实施例十一中 Hi AP的结构示意图；
图 15为本发明实施例十一中 Hi AP的结构示意图；
图 16为本发明实施例十二中基站的结构示意图；
图 17为本发明实施例十三中 Hi AP的结构示意图；
图 18为本发明实施例十四中 UE的结构示意图。 具体实施方式 下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图， 对本发明实施例中的技术方案进 行清楚、 完整地描述， 显然， 所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例， 而不是全部的实施例。 基于本发明中的实施例， 本领域普通技术人员在没 有作出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例， 都属于本发明保护的 范围。
本发明实施例中以 Hi AP ( Hi Acces s Point )作为接入节点为例进行 说明， UE通过 Uu口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu， 口经由 Hi AP连 接到核心网， 实际应用中对可使用的接入节点不作限制。
实施例一
本发明实施例提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 如图 1 所示， 所述 方法包括如下步骤：
101、 基站获取 Hi AP的加密算法。
所述加密算法用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。 本发 明实施例中以高级力口密标准 ( Advanced Encrypt ion Standard, AES ) 算法 作为所述加密算法为例进行说明， 实际应用中对此不作限制。
102、 基站获取根密钥。
所述^ =艮密钥用于推演加密密钥。
103、 基站根据根密钥和加密算法推演 H i AP的加密密钥。
在 Hi AP和 UE两端都需要进行加密密钥的推演， 本步骤为推演 Hi AP 加密密钥的描述， UE侧的加密密钥由 UE自主进行推演。
需要说明的是， 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 Hi AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的才艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， Hi AP侧的根密钥在认证后由固 E下发给基站， UE侧的根密钥由 UE卡中保 存的永久密钥推演得出的。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的根 密钥相同且使用的算法都为 AES算法， 所以 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演出的加密 密钥也相同。
104、 基站将加密密钥和加密算法发送给 Hi AP。
由于为 Hi AP选择加密算法和推演加密密钥是有基站完成的， 而加密 算法和加密密钥的主体为 H i AP , 所以基站将加密密钥和加密算法发送给 Hi AP, 以便 Hi AP启动下行加密和上行解密。
105、 基站将加密算法发送给 UE, 完成与 UE的算法协商。
Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中将加密算法发送给 UE的目的在于， 在 UE得到根密钥后， 使 UE再获得 加密算法， 以便 UE能够推演加密密钥。
106、 基站通知 Hi AP启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中 通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
UE在接收到基站发送的加密算法后，根据该加密算法以及 UE卡中的根 密钥推演加密密钥。 基站通知 Hi AP和 UE启动解密和加密后， Hi AP和 UE 就可以根据相同的加密算法以及加密密钥对上行数据和下行数据进行加 密。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 能够获取 Hi AP 的加密 算法， 并且根据根密钥以及获取的加密算法为 Hi AP推演加密密钥。 通过 算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对 Uu， 口传输的用户面 数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据 保护的问题， 能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
实施例二
本发明实施例提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 所述方法是对实施 例一的进一步扩展， 如图 2所示， 所述方法包括如下步骤：
201、 基站获取 Hi AP的加密算法。
所述加密算法用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。 本发 明实施例中以 AES 算法作为所述加密算法为例进行说明， 实际应用中对此 不作限制。
基站可以至少通过两种方式获取加密算法：
1 )基站接收 Hi AP选择的 AES算法， 所述 AES算法为 Hi AP根据自身 的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择的优先级最高的加密算法。 基站在接收 H i AP选择的 AES算法之前，需要将 UE的安全能力发送给 Hi AP, 以便 Hi AP选择加密算法。
2 )基站接收 Hi AP的安全能力以及安全策略， 根据 H i AP的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力为 H i AP选择优先级最高的加密算法。 202、 推演 Hi AP的加密密钥。
202、 基站获取根密钥。
所述^ =艮密钥用于推演加密密钥。
203、 基站根据根密钥和加密算法推演 H i AP的加密密钥。
在 Hi AP和 UE两端都需要进行加密密钥的推演， 本步骤为推演 Hi AP 加密密钥的描述， UE侧的加密密钥由 UE自主进行推演。
需要说明的是， 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 Hi AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的才艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， Hi AP侧的根密钥在认证后由固 E下发给基站， UE侧的根密钥由 UE卡中保 存的永久密钥推演得出的。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的根 密钥相同且使用的算法都为 AES算法， 所以 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演出的加密 密钥也相同。
基站根据根密钥以及 AES算法推演加密密钥。 所述根密钥为根据 UE和 网络侧共享的永久密钥所推演出来的根密钥， 本实施例中根根密钥可以是 KeNB, 实际应用中对此不作限制。 基站根据 KeNB推演出加密密钥 Kupenc , 并将 Kupenc发送给 H i AP。 所述 Kupenc用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据 进行加密保护。
204、 基站将加密密钥和加密算法发送给 Hi AP。
由于为 Hi AP选择加密算法和推演加密密钥是由基站完成的， 而加密 算法和加密密钥的使用主体为 Hi AP, 所以基站将加密密钥和加密算法发送 给 Hi AP, 以便 H i AP启动下行加密和上行解密。
205、 将加密算法发送给 UE , 完成与 UE的算法协商。
基站向 UE发送安全模式命令 ( Secur i ty Mode Command , SMC ), 所述 SMC中携带 AES算法。 UE接收到基站发送的 AES算法后， 完成算法协商， 并根据该 AES算法和 UE与网络认证的 KeNB推演 Kupenc。
Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中将加密算法发送给 UE的目的在于， 在 UE得到根密钥后， 使 UE再获得 加密算法， 以便 UE能够推演加密密钥。
需要说明的是， 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 Hi AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的才艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， H i AP侧的根密钥由核心网发送下来， UE侧的根密钥由 UE与网络认证后根 据永久密钥在本地推演而来。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的 根密钥相同且使用的算法都为 AES算法， 所以 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演出的加 密密钥也相同。
可选的， H i AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥也可以是根据 KeNB推演出来的 KeNB*。 KeNB除了用于为 Uu， 口上的用户面数据推演加密 密钥以外， 还用于为 Uu口上的用户面数据推演加密密钥 Kupenc以及为 Uu 口上的控制面数据推演完整性保护密钥 Krrc int 和加密密钥 Krrcenc。 当 Uu' 口使用 KeNB*推演才艮密钥时， 推演出的 Kupenc*与为 Uu 口推演出的 Kupenc不同。
206、 基站接收 UE发送的 SMP信令。
UE向基站发送安全模式完成命令（Cecur i ty Mode Complete , SMP ), 所述 SMP用于告知基站， UE已经根据加密算法和根密钥完成加密密钥的推 演。
207、 基站通知 Hi AP启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中 通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
在 Hi AP和 UE两侧都推演出加密密钥后， 当 Hi AP启动下行加密和上 行解密时， 基站通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。 由于 Hi AP是下行数据 的发送方和上行数据的接收方， 所以 H i AP启动下行加密和上行解密。 同 样， 由于 UE是下行数据的接收方和上行数据的发送方， 所以 UE启动下行 解密和上行加密。
优选的， 在为 Uu， 口建立安全上下文之前，还可以为 Uu口建立安全上 下文， 具体的：
基站为 Uu口选择加密算法，本发明实施例中以控制面数据的完保算法、 控制面数据的加密算法以及用户面数据的加密算法都为 AES 算法为例进行 说明， 实际应用中三者可以两两不同。 选择完加密算法后， 基站根据根密 钥和 AES算法为 Uu口推演密钥， 其中， ^=艮密钥可以是 KeNB。 由于 Uu口上 传输用户面数据和控制面数据， 所以基站为 Uu口推演的密钥包括： 用户面 数据的加密密钥 Kupenc、 控制面数据的完整性保护密钥 Krrc int 以及控制 面数据的加密密钥 Krrcenc。 基站将选择的 AES算法通过 SMC发送给 UE , UE根据 AES算法和根密钥 KeNB推演 Kupenc、 Krrc int以及 Krrcenc。
可选的， 如果基站在为 Uu 口建立安全上下文的过程中没有向 UE发送 AES算法， 也可以在步骤 205中将为 Uu口选择的加密算法与为 Uu， 口选择 的加密算法一同方发送给 UE , 以便完成与 UE的算法协商。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 能够获取 Hi AP和 UE的 加密算法，并且根据根密钥以及获取的加密算法在基站和 UE两侧推演 Hi AP 和 UE使用的加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保护的 方式对在 SSC上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有 技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题，能够对 UE数据进行全 面的安全保护。
此外， 本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 还可以在为 Hi AP 推演加密密钥时， 使用与为 Uu口推演密钥不同的根密钥， 例如可以将根据 KeNB推演出的 KeNB*作为 Hi AP推演加密密钥的根密钥。 在 Uu口上传输的 数据与在 Uu， 口上传输的数据使用不同的根密钥可以进一步加强数据的安 全性。
此外， 本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 还能够在算法协 商阶段， 由基站同时代表 Uu口和 Uu， 口与 UE进行算法协商， 减少了信令 交互的步骤。
实施例三
本发明实施例提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 如图 3 所示， 所述 方法包括如下步骤：
301、 Hi AP接收基站发送的加密密钥。
在 Hi AP和 UE两端都需要进行加密密钥的推演， 本步骤为 Hi AP接收 基站推演的加密密钥的描述， UE侧的加密密钥由 UE自主进行推演。
需要说明的是， 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以基站侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥相同， 在实际应用中， 基 站侧的根密钥在认证后由 固 E 下发给基站， 由基站根据根密钥及加密算法 为 Hi AP推演加密密钥。 UE侧的根密钥由 UE卡中保存的永久密钥推演得出 的。 由于基站和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥相同且使用的算法都 为 AES算法， 所以基站和 UE两侧推演出的加密密钥也相同。 302、 Hi AP获取加密算法。
Hi AP获取加密算法包括两种方式：
1 ) Hi AP获取基站发送的加密算法， 该加密算法由基站进行选择。
2 ) Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择加密 算法。 在选择玩机密算法后， H i AP还要将选择的加密算法发送给基站， 以 便基站与 UE进行算法协商。
303、 Hi AP根据加密密钥和加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密。
同时基站将 Hi AP的加密算法发送给 UE, 以便 UE根据加密算法以及 UE卡中的根密钥推演出 UE侧的加密密钥。 UE推演出加密密钥后根据基站 的指示启动上行加密和下行解密。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧使用相同的加密算 法和相同的加密密钥， 所以可以对 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 能够根据基站发送的加 密算法以及加密密钥， 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动启动下行加 密和上行解密的方式对在 S SC上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题， 能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
实施例四
本发明实施例提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 所述方法是对实施 例三的进一步扩展， 所述方法包括如下步骤：
401、 Hi AP接收基站发送的加密密钥。
在 Hi AP和 UE两端都需要进行加密密钥的推演， 本步骤为 Hi AP推演 加密密钥的描述， UE侧的加密密钥由 UE自主进行推演。
基站获取根密钥并根据该根密钥推演加密密钥。
需要说明的是， 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以基站侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥相同， 在实际应用中， 基 站侧的根密钥在认证后由 MME下发给基站， UE侧的根密钥由 UE卡中保存的 永久密钥推演得出的。 由于基站和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥相 同且使用的算法都为 AES算法， 所以基站和 UE两侧推演出的加密密钥也相 同。
基站根据根密钥以及 AES算法推演加密密钥。 所述根密钥为根据 UE和 网络侧共享的永久密钥所推演出来的根密钥， 本实施例中根根密钥可以是 KeNB, 实际应用中对此不作限制。 基站根据 KeNB推演出加密密钥 Kupenc , 并将 Kupenc发送给 H i AP。 所述 Kupenc用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据 进行加密保护。
Hi AP获取基站发送的加密密钥。 由于为 Hi AP选择加密算法和推演加 密密钥是有基站完成的， 而加密算法和加密密钥的使用主体为 Hi AP, 所以 基站将加密密钥和加密算法发送给 Hi AP, 以便 Hi AP启动下行加密和上行 解密。
402、 Hi AP获取加密算法。
所述加密算法用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。 本发 明实施例中以 AES 算法作为所述加密算法为例进行说明， 实际应用中对此 不作限制。
Hi AP可以至少通过两种方式获取加密算法：
1 ) Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择的优 先级最高的加密算法， 本发明实施例以 AES算法作为加密算法。 Hi AP在选 择 AES算法之前，还需要获取基站发送的 UE的安全能力，以便获取选择 AES 算法。 Hi AP选择完 AES算法后， 还需将该 AES算法发送给基站， 以便基站 根据 AES算法与 UE进行算法协商。
2 ) Hi AP获取基站发送的加密算法， 所述加密算法为基站根据 Hi AP 的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择的优先级最高的加密算法。 Hi AP在获取加密算法之前还需将自身的安全能力、 安全策略发送给基站， 以便基站选择加密算法。
需要说明的是， 当由 H i AP选择加密算法时， 本步骤应在步骤 401之 前执行， 以便基站根据 Hi AP发送的加密算法以及根密钥为 H i AP推演并 发送加密密钥。
403、 H i AP根据加密密钥和加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密。
同时， 基站将加密算法发送给 UE , 完成与 UE的算法协商。
具体的， 基站向 UE发送 SMC , 所述 SMC中携带 AES算法。 UE接收到基 站发送的 AES算法后， 完成算法协商， 并根据该 AES算法和 UE与网络认证 的 KeNB推演 Kupenc。
H i AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中将加密算法发送给 UE的目的在于， 在 UE得到根密钥后， 使 UE再获得 加密算法， 以便 UE能够推演加密密钥。
需要说明的是， 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以基站侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥相同， 在实际应用中， 基 站侧的根密钥由核心网发送下来， UE侧的根密钥由 UE与网络认证后根据永 久密钥在本地推演而来。 由于基站和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥 相同且使用的算法都为 AES算法， 所以 H i AP和 UE两侧推演出的加密密钥 也相同。
可选的， 基站侧和 UE 侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥也可以是根据 KeNB推演出来的 KeNB*。 KeNB除了用于为 Uu， 口上的用户面数据推演加密 密钥以外， 还用于为 Uu口上的用户面数据推演加密密钥 Kupenc以及为 Uu 口上的控制面数据推演完整性保护密钥 Krrc int 和加密密钥 Kr rcenc。 当 Uu' 口使用 KeNB*推演根密钥时， 推演出的 Kupenc*与为 Uu 口推演出的 Kupenc不同。
基站接收 UE发送的 SMP , 所述 SMP用于告知基站， UE已经根据加密算 法和^ =艮密钥完成加密密钥的推演。
基站在算法协商过程中通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
在基站和 UE两侧都推演出加密密钥后， 当 H i AP启动下行加密和上行 解密时， 基站通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。 由于 H i AP是下行数据的 发送方和上行数据的接收方， 所以 H i AP启动下行加密和上行解密。 同样， 由于 UE是下行数据的接收方和上行数据的发送方， 所以 UE启动下行解密 和上行力口密。
优选的， 在为 Uu， 口建立安全上下文之前，还可以为 Uu口建立安全上 下文， 具体的：
基站为 Uu口选择加密算法，本发明实施例中以控制面数据的完保算法、 控制面数据的加密算法以及用户面数据的加密算法都为 AES 算法为例进行 说明， 实际应用中三者可以两两不同。 选择完加密算法后， 基站根据根密 钥和 AES算法为 Uu口推演密钥， 其中， ^=艮密钥可以是 KeNB。 由于 Uu口上 传输用户面数据和控制面数据， 所以基站为 Uu口推演的密钥包括： 用户面 数据的加密密钥 Kupenc、 控制面数据的完整性保护密钥 Krrc int 以及控制 面数据的加密密钥 Krrcenc。 基站将选择的 AES算法通过 SMC发送给 UE , UE根据 AES算法和根密钥 KeNB推演 Kupenc、 Krrc int以及 Krrcenc。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 能够根据基站发送的加 密算法以及加密密钥， 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动启动下行加 密和上行解密的方式对在 S SC上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题， 能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
实施例五
本发明实施例提供一种建立安全上下文的方法， 如图 5 所示， 所述方 法包括如下步骤：
501、 基站将根密钥发送给 H i AP。
所述根密钥不限来自于固 E , 用于 Hi AP推演 Hi AP使用的加密密钥。
502、 基站获取 Hi AP使用的加密算法。
所述加密算法为 Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全 能力选择的加密算法。
503、 基站将 Hi AP的加密算法发送给 UE, 以便与 UE协商加密算法。 Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中将加密算法发送给 UE的目的在于， 在 UE得到根密钥后， 使 UE再获得 加密算法， 以便 UE能够推演加密密钥。
UE根据基站发送的加密算法以及 UE卡中的根密钥推演出 UE侧的加密 密钥。 由于 H i AP和 UE两侧使用相同的根密钥和相同的加密算法， 所以两 侧推演的加密密钥也相同。
504、 基站通知 Hi AP启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中 通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
UE在接收到基站发送的加密算法后，根据该加密算法以及 UE卡中的根 密钥推演加密密钥。 基站通知 Hi AP和 UE启动解密和加密后， Hi AP和 UE 就可以根据相同的加密算法以及加密密钥对上行数据和下行数据进行加 密。
本发明实施例中为 Hi AP侧选择加密算法以及为 Hi AP侧推演加密密 钥的执行主体为 Hi AP。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 能够由 Hi AP选择加密 算法， 并且根据根密钥以及选择的加密算法推演加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加 密保护，可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题， 能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
实施例六
本发明实施例提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 所述方法是对实施 例五的进一步扩展， 如图 6所示， 所述方法包括如下步骤：
601、 基站将 UE的安全能力发送给 Hi AP, 以便 Hi AP选择加密算法。 所述加密算法用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。 本发 明实施例中以 AES 算法作为所述加密算法为例进行说明， 实际应用中对此 不作限制。
602、 基站将根密钥发送给 H i AP。
所述根密钥不限来自于固 E , 用于 Hi AP推演 Hi AP使用的加密密钥。 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 Hi AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的^ =艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， Hi AP侧的^ =艮密 钥在认证后由固 E下发给基站， UE侧的根密钥由 UE卡中保存的永久密钥推 演得出的。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥相同且使用 的算法都为 AES算法， 所以 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演出的加密密钥也相同。
基站根据根密钥以及 AES算法推演加密密钥。 所述根密钥为根据 UE和 网络侧共享的永久密钥所推演出来的根密钥， 本实施例中根根密钥可以是 KeNB, 实际应用中对此不作限制。 基站根据 KeNB推演出加密密钥 Kupenc , 并将 Kupenc发送给 H i AP。 所述 Kupenc用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据 进行力口密保护。
603、 基站获取 Hi AP使用的加密算法。
所述加密算法为 Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全 能力选择的加密算法。
604、 基站将 Hi AP的加密算法发送给 UE, 以便与 UE协商加密算法。 基站向 UE发送 SMC, 所述 SMC中携带 AES算法。 UE接收到基站发送的
AES算法后， 完成算法协商， 并根据该 AES算法和 UE与网络认证的 KeNB推 演 Kupenc。
Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中将加密算法发送给 UE的目的在于， 在 UE得到根密钥后， 使 UE再获得 加密算法， 以便 UE能够推演加密密钥。
需要说明的是， 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 Hi AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的才艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， H i AP侧的根密钥由核心网发送下来， UE侧的根密钥由 UE与网络认证后根 据永久密钥在本地推演而来。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的 根密钥相同且使用的算法都为 AES算法， 所以 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演出的加 密密钥也相同。
可选的， H i AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥也可以是根据 KeNB推演出来的 KeNB*。 KeNB除了用于为 Uu， 口上的用户面数据推演加密 密钥以外， 还用于为 Uu口上的用户面数据推演加密密钥 Kupenc以及为 Uu 口上的控制面数据推演完整性保护密钥 Krrc int 和加密密钥 Krrcenc。 当 Uu' 口使用 KeNB*推演才艮密钥时， 推演出的 Kupenc*与为 Uu 口推演出的 Kupenc不同。
605、 基站接收 UE发送的 SMP信令。
UE向基站发送 SMP, 所述 SMP用于告知基站， UE已经根据加密算法和 根密钥完成加密密钥的推演。
606、 基站通知 Hi AP启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中 通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
UE在接收到基站发送的加密算法后，根据该加密算法以及 UE卡中的根 密钥推演加密密钥。 基站通知 Hi AP和 UE启动解密和加密后， Hi AP和 UE 就可以根据相同的加密算法以及加密密钥对上行数据和下行数据进行加 密。
本发明实施例中为 Hi AP侧选择加密算法以及为 Hi AP侧推演加密密 钥的执行主体为 Hi AP。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 能够由 Hi AP选择加密 算法， 并且根据根密钥以及选择的加密算法推演加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对在 SSC上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面 数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据 保护的问题， 能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
此外， 本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 还可以在 Hi AP 推演加密密钥时， 使用与为 Uu口推演密钥不同的根密钥， 例如可以将根据 KeNB推演出的 KeNB*作为 Hi AP推演加密密钥的根密钥。 在 Uu口上传输的 数据与在 Uu， 口上传输的数据使用不同的根密钥可以进一步加强数据的安 全性。
实施例七 本发明实施例提供了一种安全上下文的方法， 如图 7 所示， 所述方法 包括如下步骤：
701、 Hi AP接收基站发送的根密钥。
所述根密钥不限来自于固 E, 基站将根密钥发送给 Hi AP, 以便 H i AP 推演加密密钥。
702、 Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择加 密算法。
Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择优先级 最高的加密算法。
703、 Hi AP根据根密钥以及加密算法推演加密密钥。
704、 Hi AP将加密算法发送给基站， 以便基站与 UE协商加密算法。
Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以基站 与 UE协商加密算法的目的在于， 在 UE得到根密钥后， 使 UE再获得加密算 法， 以便 UE能够推演加密密钥。
UE根据基站发送的加密算法以及 UE卡中的根密钥推演出 UE侧的加密 密钥。 由于 H i AP和 UE两侧使用相同的根密钥和相同的加密算法， 所以两 侧推演的加密密钥也相同。
705、 Hi AP根据基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解密。
UE在接收到基站发送的加密算法后，根据该加密算法以及 UE卡中的根 密钥推演加密密钥。 基站通知 Hi AP和 UE启动解密和加密后， Hi AP和 UE 就可以根据相同的加密算法以及加密密钥对上行数据和下行数据进行加 密。
本发明实施例中为 Hi AP侧选择加密算法以及为 Hi AP侧推演加密密 钥的执行主体为 Hi AP。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 能够选择加密算法， 并 且根据根密钥以及选择的加密算法推演加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加 密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保 护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题， 能 够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
实施例八
本发明实施例提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 所述方法是对实施 例七的进一步扩展， 如图 8所示， 所述方法包括如下步骤：
801、 Hi AP接收基站发送的根密钥。
基站可以从丽 E获取所述根密钥， 本发明实施例对此不做限制。
本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 Hi AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的^ =艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， Hi AP侧的^ =艮密 钥在认证后由固 E下发给基站， UE侧的根密钥由 UE卡中保存的永久密钥推 演得出的。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥相同且使用 的算法都为 AES算法， 所以 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演出的加密密钥也相同。
802、 Hi AP接收基站发送的 UE的安全能力。
所述加密算法用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。 本发 明实施例中以 AES 算法作为所述加密算法为例进行说明， 实际应用中对此 不作限制。
803、 Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择加 密算法。
Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择优先级 最高的加密算法。
804、 Hi AP根据根密钥以及加密算法推演加密密钥。
Hi AP根据根密钥以及 AES算法推演加密密钥。 所述根密钥为根据 UE 和网络侧共享的永久密钥所推演出来的根密钥， 本实施例中根根密钥可以 是 KeNB,实际应用中对此不作限制。 Hi AP根据 KeNB推演出加密密钥 Kupenc , 所述 Kupenc用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。
805、 H i AP将加密算法发送给所述基站，以便基站与 UE协商加密算法。 基站向 UE发送 SMC, 所述 SMC中携带 AES算法。 UE接收到基站发送的 AES算法后， 完成算法协商， 并根据该 AES算法和 UE与网络认证的 KeNB推 演 Kupenc。
Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中将加密算法发送给 UE的目的在于， 在 UE得到根密钥后， 使 UE再获得 加密算法， 以便 UE能够推演加密密钥。
可选的， H i AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥也可以是根据 KeNB推演出来的 KeNB*。 KeNB除了用于为 Uu， 口上的用户面数据推演加密 密钥以外， 还用于为 Uu口上的用户面数据推演加密密钥 Kupenc以及为 Uu 口上的控制面数据推演完整性保护密钥 Krrc int 和加密密钥 Krrcenc。 当 Uu' 口使用 KeNB*推演根密钥时， 推演出的 Kupenc*与为 Uu 口推演出的 Kupenc不同。
806、 Hi AP根据基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解密。
同时， UE在接收到基站发送的加密算法后，根据该加密算法以及 UE卡 中的根密钥推演加密密钥。 基站通知 Hi AP和 UE启动解密和加密后， Hi AP 和 UE就可以根据相同的加密算法以及加密密钥对上行数据和下行数据进行 加密。
本发明实施例中为 Hi AP侧选择加密算法以及为 Hi AP侧推演加密密 钥的执行主体为 Hi AP。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 能够选择加密算法， 并 且根据根密钥以及选择的加密算法推演加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加 密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对在 SSC上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进 行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的 问题， 能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
此外， 本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 还可以在推演加 密密钥时， 使用与为 Uu 口推演密钥不同的根密钥， 例如可以将根据 KeNB 推演出的 KeNB*作为推演加密密钥的根密钥。 在 Uu 口上传输的数据与在 Uu， 口上传输的数据使用不同的根密钥可以进一步加强数据的安全性。 实施例九
本发明实施例提供了一种建立安全上下文的方法， 如图 9 所示， 所述 方法包括如下步骤：
901、 UE接收基站发送的 Hi AP的加密算法， 由此完成与基站的算法协 商。
Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中 UE接收基站发送的加密算法的目的在于 UE能够根据加密算法以及根 密钥推演加密密钥。
所述加密算法为 Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全 能力选择的优先级最高的加密算法， 或者为基站根据 Hi AP 的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择的优先级最高的加密算法。
902、 UE根据根密钥以及加密算法推演 UE的加密密钥。
本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 Hi AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的^ =艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， Hi AP侧的^ =艮密 钥在认证后由固 E下发给基站， UE侧的根密钥由 UE卡中保存的永久密钥推 演得出的， 或者为 UE与网络认证后推演得出的。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧推 演加密密钥所使用的^ =艮密钥相同且使用的算法也相同， 所以 Hi AP和 UE两 侧推演出的加密密钥也相同。
903、 UE向基站发送 SMP信令。
UE向基站发送 SMP的目的在于告知基站 UE已根据根密钥以及基站发送 的加密算法推演出加密密钥。
904、 UE在推演出加密密钥以后， 启动下行解密以及上行加密。
基站通知 Hi AP和 UE启动解密和加密后， Hi AP和 UE就可以才艮据相同 的加密算法以及加密密钥对上行数据和下行数据进行加密。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的方法， 能够由 UE推演 UE使用 的加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对在 SSC上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没 有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题，能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全 保护。
实施例十
参考实施例二的实现， 本发明实施例提供了一种基站， 如图 10所示， 用以实现实施例二。 所述基站包括：
获取器 1001 , 用于获取 Hi AP的加密算法和根密钥。
所述根密钥用于推演加密密钥。 所述加密密钥以及所述加密算法用于 对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。 本发明实施例中以 AES算法 作为所述加密算法为例进行说明， 实际应用中对此不作限制。
处理器 1002 , 所述处理器 1002与所述获取器 1001相连， 用于才艮据所 述获取器 1001获取的根密钥和加密算法推演 Hi AP的加密密钥。
在 Hi AP和 UE两端都需要进行加密密钥的推演， 本步骤为所述处理器 1002推演 Hi AP加密密钥的描述， UE侧的加密密钥由 UE自主进行推演。
需要说明的是， 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以所述处理器 1002和 UE推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥相同。
所述处理器 1002根据根密钥以及 AES算法推演加密密钥。 所述根密钥 为根据 UE和网络侧共享的永久密钥所推演出来的根密钥， 本实施例中根根 密钥可以是 KeNB, 实际应用中对此不作限制。 所述处理器 1002根据 KeNB 推演出加密密钥 Kupenc , 并在后续由发送器 1003将 Kupenc发送给 Hi AP。 所述 Kupenc用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。
发送器 1003 , 所述发送器 1003与所述处理器 1002和所述获取器 1001 相连， 用于将所述处理器 1002推演的加密密钥以及所述获取器 1001获取 的所述加密算法发送给 Hi AP, 以便 H i AP启动下行加密和上行解密。
由于为 Hi AP选择加密算法和推演加密密钥是由基站完成的， 而加密 算法和加密密钥的使用主体为 Hi AP , 所以基站中的所述发送器 1003将加 密密钥和加密算法发送给 Hi AP, 以便 H i AP启动下行加密和上行解密。
所述发送器 1003用于将所述获取器 1001获取的加密算法发送给 UE , 以便与 UE协商加密算法。
所述发送器 1003向 UE发送安全模式命令 ( Secur i ty Mode Command, SMC ) , 所述 SMC中携带 AES算法。 UE接收到所述发送器 1003发送的 AES算 法后， 完成算法协商， 并根据该 AES 算法和 UE 与网络认证的 KeNB推演 Kupenc。
Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中所述发送器 1003将加密算法发送给 UE的目的在于， 在 UE得到根密钥 后， 使 UE再获得加密算法， 以便 UE能够推演加密密钥。
通知器 1004 , 用于通知 Hi AP启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协 商过程中通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
在 Hi AP和 UE两侧都推演出加密密钥后， 当 Hi AP启动下行加密和上 行解密时， 所述通知器 1004通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。 由于 Hi AP 是下行数据的发送方和上行数据的接收方， 所以 Hi AP 启动下行加密和上 行解密。 同样， 由于 UE是下行数据的接收方和上行数据的发送方， 所以 UE 启动下行解密和上行加密。
进一步的， 如图 11所示， 所述获取器 1001可以包括：
第一获取单元 1101 , 用于获取 Hi AP选择的加密算法， 所述加密算法 为 Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择的加密算 法。
第二获取单元 1102 , 用于根据 Hi AP的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的 安全能力选择所述加密算法。
进一步的， 所述发送器 1003还用于将 UE的安全能力发送给 Hi AP, 以 便 Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择的加密算 法。
进一步的， 如图 12所示， 所述基站可以包括：
接收器 1201 , 所述接收器 1201与所述获取器 1001相连， 用于接收 Hi AP发送的安全能力以及安全策略，以便所述获取器 1001中的所述第二获取 单元 1102根据 H i AP的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择加密 算法。
进一步可选的， 所述根密钥为为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保 密钥和加密密钥所使用的根密钥， 或者为根据所述为基站与所述 UE之间的 接口上推演完保密密钥和加密密钥所使用的根密钥推演的子密钥。
本发明实施例提供的基站， 能够获取 Hi AP和 UE的加密算法， 并且根 据根密钥以及获取的加密算法在基站和 UE两侧推演 Hi AP和 UE使用的加 密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对在 SSC 上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针 对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题，能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
此外， 本发明实施例提供的基站， 还可以在为 Hi AP推演加密密钥时， 使用与为 Uu 口推演密钥不同的根密钥， 例如可以将根据 KeNB推演出的 KeNB*作为 Hi AP推演加密密钥的根密钥。 在 Uu口上传输的数据与在 Uu， 口上传输的数据使用不同的根密钥可以进一步加强数据的安全性。
此外， 本发明实施例提供的基站， 还能够在算法协商阶段， 由基站同 时代表 Uu口和 Uu， 口与 UE进行算法协商， 减少了信令交互的步骤。
实施例十一
参考实施例四的实现， 本发明实施例提供了一种接入节点， 如图 13所 示， 用以实现实施例四。 以 Hi AP作为接入节点为例， 所述 Hi AP包括： 接收器 1301 , 用于接收基站发送的加密密钥。
在 Hi AP和 UE两端都需要进行加密密钥的推演， 本步骤为 Hi AP推演 加密密钥的描述， UE侧的加密密钥由 UE自主进行推演。
获取器 1302 , 用于获取加密算法。
所述加密算法用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。 本发 明实施例中以 AES 算法作为所述加密算法为例进行说明， 实际应用中对此 不作限制。
处理器 1303 , 所述处理器 1303与所述接收器 1301和所述获取器 1302 相连， 用于根据所述接收器 1301接收的加密密钥和所述获取器 1302获取 的加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密。
同时， 基站将加密算法发送给 UE, 完成与 UE的算法协商。
进一步的， 如图 14所示， 所述获取器 1302可以包括：
获取单元 1401 , 用于获取基站发送的加密算法， 该加密算法由基站进 行选择。
所述获取单元 1401还用于根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的 安全能力选择加密算法。
发送单元 1402 ,与所述获取单元 1401相连，用于将所述获取单元 1401 选择的加密算法发送给基站。
进一步的， 所述接收器 1301与所述获取器 1302相连， 用于接收基站 发送的 UE的安全能力， UE的安全能力用于所述获取器 1302中的所述获取 单元 140选择加密算法。
进一步的， 如图 15所示， 所述 Hi AP可以包括：
发送器 1501 , 用于将自身的安全能力以及安全策略发送给基站， 以便 基站为 Hi AP选择加密算法。
本发明实施例提供的 Hi AP, 能够根据基站发送的加密算法以及加密密 钥， 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动启动下行加密和上行解密的方 式对在 SSC上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技 术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题，能够对 UE数据进行全面 的安全保护。
实施例十二
参考实施例六的实现， 本发明实施例提供了一种基站， 用以实现实施 例六。 如图 16所示， 所述基站包括：
发送器 1601 , 用于将根密钥发送给 Hi AP, 所述根密钥用于 H i AP推 演 Hi AP使用的加密密钥。
获取器 1602 , 用于获取 Hi AP使用的加密算法， 该加密算法为 Hi AP 根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择的加密算法。 所述发送器 1601与所述获取器 1602相连， 用于将所述获取器 1602获 取的加密算法发送给 UE, 以便与 UE协商加密算法。
所述发送器 1601向 UE发送 SMC, 所述 SMC中携带 AES算法。 UE接收 到所述发送器 1601发送的 AES算法后， 完成算法协商， 并根据该 AES算法 和 UE与网络认证的 KeNB推演 Kupenc。
Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中将加密算法发送给 UE的目的在于， 在 UE得到根密钥后， 使 UE再获得 加密算法， 以便 UE能够推演加密密钥。
需要说明的是， 本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 Hi AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的才艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， H i AP侧的根密钥由核心网发送下来， UE侧的根密钥由 UE与网络认证后根 据永久密钥在本地推演而来。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的 根密钥相同且使用的算法都为 AES算法， 所以 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演出的加 密密钥也相同。
通知器 1603 , 用于通知 Hi AP启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协 商过程中通知 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
UE在接收到所述发送器 1601发送的加密算法后，根据该加密算法以及 UE卡中的 ^=艮密钥推演加密密钥。 所述通知器 1603通知 Hi AP和 UE启动解 密和加密后， Hi AP和 UE就可以根据相同的加密算法以及加密密钥对上行 数据和下行数据进行加密。
进一步的， 所述发送器 1601还用于将 UE的安全能力发送给 Hi AP, 以 便 Hi AP选择加密算法。
进一步的， 所述根密钥为为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密钥 和加密密钥所使用的根密钥， 或者为根据所述为基站与所述 UE之间的接口 上推演完保密密钥和加密密钥所使用的根密钥推演的子密钥。
本发明实施例提供的基站， 能够由 Hi AP选择加密算法， 并且根据根 密钥以及选择的加密算法推演加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同 步启动加密保护的方式对在 SSC上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保 护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题， 能 够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
此外， 本发明实施例提供的基站， 还可以在 Hi AP推演加密密钥时， 使用与为 Uu 口推演密钥不同的根密钥， 例如可以将根据 KeNB推演出的 KeNB*作为 Hi AP推演加密密钥的根密钥。 在 Uu口上传输的数据与在 Uu， 口上传输的数据使用不同的根密钥可以进一步加强数据的安全性。
实施例十三
参考实施例八的实现， 本发明实施例提供了一种接入节点， 用以实现 实施例八。 如图 17所示， 以 Hi AP作为接入节点为例， 所述 Hi AP包括： 接收器 1701 , 用于接收基站发送的根密钥。
基站可以从丽 E获取所述根密钥， 本发明实施例对此不做限制。
本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 Hi AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的^ =艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， Hi AP侧的^ =艮密 钥在认证后由固 E下发给基站， UE侧的根密钥由 UE卡中保存的永久密钥推 演得出的。 由于 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演加密密钥所使用的根密钥相同且使用 的算法都为 AES算法， 所以 Hi AP和 UE两侧推演出的加密密钥也相同。
处理器 1702 , 用于根据自身的安全能力、安全策略以及 UE的安全能力 选择加密算法。
所述处理器 1702根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力 选择优先级最高的加密算法。
所述加密算法用于对在 SCC上传输的用户面数据进行加密保护。 本发 明实施例中以 AES 算法作为所述加密算法为例进行说明， 实际应用中对此 不作限制。
所述处理器 1702与所述接收器 1701相连， 用于根据所述接收器 1701 接收的根密钥以及加密算法推演加密密钥。 发送器 1703 , 所述发送器 1703与所述处理器 1702相连， 用于将所述 处理器 1702选择的加密算法发送给基站， 以便基站与 UE协商加密算法。
所述处理器 1702用于根据基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解密。 进一步的，所述接收器 1701还用于接收基站发送的 UE的安全能力， UE 的安全能力用于所述处理器 1702选择加密算法。
进一步的， 所述根密钥为为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密钥 和加密密钥所使用的根密钥， 或者为根据所述为基站与所述 UE之间的接口 上推演完保密密钥和加密密钥所使用的根密钥推演的子密钥。
本发明实施例提供的 Hi AP, 能够选择加密算法， 并且根据根密钥以及 选择的加密算法推演加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加 密保护的方式对在 SSC上的 Uu， 口传输的用户面数据进行加密保护， 可以 解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面数据保护的问题，能够对 UE数 据进行全面的安全保护。
此外， 本发明实施例提供的 Hi AP, 还可以在推演加密密钥时， 使用与 为 Uu口推演密钥不同的根密钥，例如可以将根据 KeNB推演出的 KeNB*作为 推演加密密钥的根密钥。在 Uu口上传输的数据与在 Uu， 口上传输的数据使 用不同的根密钥可以进一步加强数据的安全性。
实施例十四
参考实施例九的实现， 本发明实施例提供了一种用户设备 UE, 用以实 现实施例九。 如图 18所示， 所述 UE包括：
接收器 1801 , 用于接收基站发送的 Hi AP的加密算法， 由此完成与基 站的算法协商。
Hi AP和 UE两侧都要基于根密钥和加密算法推演加密密钥， 所以本步 骤中所述接收器 1801接收基站发送的加密算法的目的在于处理器 1802能 够在后续根据加密算法以及根密钥推演加密密钥。
所述加密算法为 Hi AP根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全 能力选择的优先级最高的加密算法， 或者为基站根据 Hi AP 的安全能力、 安全策略以及 UE的安全能力选择的优先级最高的加密算法。
处理器 1802 , 与所述接收器 1801相连， 用于根据根密钥以及所述接收 器 1801接收的加密算法推演 UE的加密密钥， 根密钥为所述处理器 1802与 网络认证后推演得出的。
所述处理器 1802还用于在推演出 UE的加密密钥以后， 启动下行解密 和上行力口密。
本发明实施例是以对称密钥加密法为例进行说明的， 所以 H i AP侧和 UE侧推演加密密钥所使用的^ =艮密钥相同， 在实际应用中， H i AP侧的^ =艮密 钥在认证后由固 E下发给基站， UE侧的根密钥由 UE卡中保存的永久密钥推 演得出的， 或者为 UE与网络认证后推演得出的。 由于 H i AP和 UE两侧推 演加密密钥所使用的^ =艮密钥相同且使用的算法也相同， 所以 H i AP和 UE两 侧推演出的加密密钥也相同。
本发明实施例提供的 UE , 能够由 UE推演 UE使用的加密密钥。 通过算 法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对在 SSC上的 Uu， 口传输 的用户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用 户面数据保护的问题， 能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
实施例十五
参考实施例一至实施例四以及实施例九的实现， 本发明实施例提供了 一种建立安全上下文的系统， 所述系统包括基站、 接入节点以及 UE , UE 通过 Uu口经由基站连接到核心网，并通过 Uu' 口经由接入节点连接到核心 网。 其中，
所述基站用于获取接入节点的加密算法， 获取根密钥， 根据所述根密 钥和所述加密算法推演所述接入节点的加密密钥， 将所述加密密钥以及所 述加密算法发送给所述接入节点， 以便所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行 解密， 将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所述 UE , 以便与所述 UE协商加密 算法， 通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中 通知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。 所述接入节点用于接收所述基站发送的加密密钥， 获取加密算法， 根 据所述加密密钥和加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密。
所述 UE用于接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述基 站的算法协商， 根据根密钥以及所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所 述^ =艮密钥为所述 UE与网络认证后推演得出的， 在推演出所述 UE的加密密 钥以后， 启动下行解密和上行加密。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的系统， 能够为接入节点选择加 密算法， 并且根据根密钥以及选择的加密算法为接入节点推演加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对 Uu， 口传输的用 户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面 数据保护的问题， 能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
实施例十六
参考实施例五至实施例九的实现， 本发明实施例提供了一种建立安全 上下文的系统， 所述系统包括基站、 接入节点以及 UE , UE通过 Uu口经由 基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu， 口经由接入节点连接到核心网。 其中， 所述基站用于将根密钥发送给所述接入节点， 所述根密钥用于所述接 入节点推演所述接入节点使用的加密密钥， 获取所述接入节点使用的加密 算法， 所述加密算法为所述接入节点根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 所述 UE的安全能力选择的加密算法， 将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所 述 UE , 以便与所述 UE协商加密算法， 通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上 行解密， 并在算法协商过程中通知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
所述接入节点用于接收所述基站发送的根密钥， 根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择加密算法， 根据所述根密钥以及所述 加密算法推演加密密钥， 将所述加密算法发送给所述基站， 以便所述基站 与所述 UE协商加密算法， 根据所述基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解 密。
所述 UE用于接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述基 站的算法协商， 根据根密钥以及所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所 述^ =艮密钥为所述 UE与网络认证后推演得出的， 在推演出所述 UE的加密密 钥以后， 启动下行解密和上行加密。
本发明实施例提供的建立安全上下文的系统， 能够由接入节点选择加 密算法， 并且根据根密钥以及选择的加密算法由接入节点推演加密密钥。 通过算法协商、 生成加密以及同步启动加密保护的方式对 Uu， 口传输的用 户面数据进行加密保护， 可以解决现有技术中没有针对 Uu， 口上的用户面 数据保护的问题， 能够对 UE数据进行全面的安全保护。
通过以上的实施方式的描述， 所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到 本发明可借助软件加必需的通用硬件的方式来实现， 当然也可以通过硬件， 但很多情况下前者是更佳的实施方式。 基于这样的理解， 本发明的技术方 案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出 来， 该计算机软件产品存储在可读取的存储介质中， 如计算机的软盘， 硬 盘或光盘等， 包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备（可以是个人计算机, 服务器， 或者网络设备等）执行本发明各个实施例所述的方法。
以上所述， 仅为本发明的具体实施方式， 但本发明的保护范围并不局 限于此， 任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本发明揭露的技术范围内， 可 轻易想到变化或替换， 都应涵盖在本发明的保护范围之内。 因此， 本发明 的保护范围应所述以权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims

权利要求
1、 一种建立安全上下文的方法， 在所述方法中用户设备 UE通过 Uu口 经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu ' 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其特 征在于， 包括：
获取接入节点的加密算法；
获取根密钥， 根据所述根密钥和所述加密算法推演所述接入节点的加 密密钥；
将所述加密密钥以及所述加密算法发送给所述接入节点， 以便所述接 入节点启动下行加密和上行解密；
将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所述 UE ,以便与所述 UE协商加密算 法；
通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中通 知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述获取接入节点的加 密算法， 包括：
获取所述接入节点选择的加密算法， 所述加密算法为所述接入节点根 据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择的加密算法； 或 者，
根据所述接入节点的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择 所述加密算法。
3、 根据权利要求 2所述的方法， 其特征在于， 在获取所述接入节点选 择的加密算法之前， 包括：
将所述 UE的安全能力发送给所述接入节点， 以便所述接入节点根据自 身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择的加密算法。
4、 根据权利要求 2所述的方法， 其特征在于， 在所述根据所述接入节 点的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择所述加密算法之前， 包括：
接收所述接入节点发送的安全能力以及安全策略。
5、 根据权利要求 1至 4中任意一项所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述根 密钥为为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密钥和加密密钥所使用的根 密钥， 或者为根据所述为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密密钥和加 密密钥所使用的根密钥推演的子密钥。
6、 一种建立安全上下文的方法， 在所述方法中用户设备 UE通过 Uu口 经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu' 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其特 征在于， 包括：
接收基站发送的加密密钥；
获取加密算法；
根据所述加密密钥和所述加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密。
7、 根据权利要求 6所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述获取加密算法， 包 括：
获取所述基站发送的加密算法， 所述加密算法由所述基站进行选择； 或者，
根据自身的安全能力、安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择加密算法， 并将选择的加密算法发送给所述基站。
8、 根据权利要求 7所述的方法， 其特征在于， 在所述根据自身的安全 能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择加密算法之前， 包括：
接收所述基站发送的所述 UE的安全能力， 所述 UE的安全能力用于接 入节点选择加密算法。
9、 根据权利要求 7所述的方法， 其特征在于， 在所述获取所述基站发 送的加密算法之前， 包括：
将自身的安全能力以及安全策略发送给所述基站， 以便所述基站为所 述接入节点选择加密算法。
10、 一种建立安全上下文的方法， 在所述方法中用户设备 UE通过 Uu 口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu ' 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其 特征在于， 包括：
将根密钥发送给所述接入节点， 所述根密钥用于所述接入节点推演所 述接入节点使用的加密密钥；
获取所述接入节点使用的加密算法， 所述加密算法为所述接入节点根 据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择的加密算法； 将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所述 UE ,以便与所述 UE协商加密算 法；
通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中通 知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
11、 根据权利要求 10所述的方法， 其特征在于， 在所述获取所述接入 节点使用的加密算法之前， 包括：
将所述 UE的安全能力发送给所述接入节点， 以便所述接入节点选择加 密算法。
12、 根据权利要求 1 0或 1 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述根密钥为 为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密钥和加密密钥所使用的根密钥， 或者为根据所述为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密密钥和加密密钥 所使用的根密钥推演的子密钥。
1 3、 一种建立安全上下文的方法， 在所述方法中用户设备 UE通过 Uu 口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu ' 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其 特征在于， 包括：
接收所述基站发送的根密钥；
根据自身的安全能力、安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择加密算法； 根据所述根密钥以及所述加密算法推演加密密钥；
将所述加密算法发送给所述基站， 以便所述基站与所述 UE协商加密算 法；
根据所述基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解密。
14、 根据权利要求 1 3所述的方法， 其特征在于， 在所述根据自身的安 全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择加密算法之前， 包括：
接收所述基站发送的所述 UE的安全能力， 所述 UE的安全能力用于所 述接入节点选择加密算法。
15、 根据权利要求 1 3或 14所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述根密钥为 为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密钥和加密密钥所使用的根密钥， 或者为根据所述为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密密钥和加密密钥 所使用的根密钥推演的子密钥。
16、 一种建立安全上下文的方法， 在所述方法中用户设备 UE通过 Uu 口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu ' 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其 特征在于， 包括：
接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述基站的算法协 商；
根据根密钥以及所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所述根密钥为 所述 UE与网络认证后推演得出的；
在推演出所述 UE的加密密钥以后， 启动下行解密和上行加密。
17、 一种基站， 用户设备 UE通过 Uu 口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通 过 Uu， 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其特征在于， 包括：
获取器， 用于获取接入节点的加密算法；
所述获取器用于获取根密钥；
处理器， 与所述获取器相连， 用于根据所述获取器获取的所述根密钥 和所述加密算法推演所述接入节点的加密密钥；
发送器， 与所述处理器和所述获取器相连， 用于将所述处理器推演的 加密密钥以及所述获取器获取的所述加密算法发送给所述接入节点， 以便 所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密；
所述发送器用于将所述获取器获取的加密算法发送给所述 UE , 以便与 所述 UE协商加密算法； 通知器， 用于通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法 协商过程中通知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
18、 根据权利要求 17所述的基站， 其特征在于， 所述获取器， 包括： 第一获取单元， 用于获取所述接入节点选择的加密算法， 所述加密算 法为所述接入节点根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力 选择的加密算法；
第二获取单元， 用于根据所述接入节点的安全能力、 安全策略以及所 述 UE的安全能力选择所述加密算法。
19、 根据权利要求 18所述的基站， 其特征在于， 所述发送器还用于将 所述 UE的安全能力发送给所述接入节点， 以便所述接入节点根据自身的安 全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择的加密算法。
20、 根据权利要求 18所述的基站， 其特征在于， 包括：
接收器， 与所述获取器相连， 用于接收所述接入节点发送的安全能力 以及安全策略， 以便所述获取器中的所述第二获取单元根据所述接入节点 的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择所述加密算法。
21、 根据权利要求 1 7至 20中任意一项所述的基站， 其特征在于， 所 述根密钥为为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密钥和加密密钥所使用 的根密钥， 或者为根据所述为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密密钥 和加密密钥所使用的根密钥推演的子密钥。
22、 一种接入节点， 用户设备 UE通过 Uu口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu， 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其特征在于， 包括：
接收器， 用于接收基站发送的加密密钥；
获取器， 用于获取加密算法；
处理器， 与所述接收器和所述获取器相连， 用于根据所述接收器接收 的所述加密密钥和所述获取器获取的加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密。
23、 根据权利要求 22所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述获取器包括： 获取单元， 用于获取所述基站发送的加密算法， 所述加密算法由所述 基站进行选择；
所述获取单元还用于根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安 全能力选择加密算法；
发送单元， 与所述获取单元相连， 用于将所述获取单元选择的加密算 法发送给所述基站。
24、 根据权利要求 23所述的接入节点， 其特征在于， 所述接收器与所 述获取器相连， 用于接收所述基站发送的所述 UE的安全能力， 所述 UE的 安全能力用于所述获取器中的所述获取单元选择加密算法。
25、 根据权利要求 23所述的接入节点， 其特征在于， 包括：
发送器， 用于将自身的安全能力以及安全策略发送给所述基站， 以便 所述基站为所述接入节点选择加密算法。
26、 一种基站， 用户设备 UE通过 Uu 口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通 过 Uu， 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其特征在于， 包括：
发送器， 用于将根密钥发送给所述接入节点， 所述根密钥用于所述接 入节点推演所述接入节点使用的加密密钥；
获取器， 用于获取所述接入节点使用的加密算法， 所述加密算法为所 述接入节点根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择的 加密算法；
所述发送器与所述获取器相连， 用于将所述获取器获取的加密算法发 送给所述 UE , 以便与所述 UE协商加密算法；
通知器， 用于通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法 协商过程中通知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密。
27、 根据权利要求 26所述的基站， 其特征在于， 所述发送器还用于将 所述 UE的安全能力发送给所述接入节点，以便所述接入节点选择加密算法。
28、 根据权利要求 26或 27所述的基站， 其特征在于， 所述根密钥为 为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密钥和加密密钥所使用的根密钥， 或者为根据所述为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密密钥和加密密钥 所使用的根密钥推演的子密钥。
29、 一种接入节点， 用户设备 UE通过 Uu口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu， 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其特征在于， 包括：
接收器， 用于接收所述基站发送的根密钥；
处理器， 用于根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力 选择加密算法；
所述处理器与所述接收器相连， 用于根据所述接收器接收的所述根密 钥以及所述加密算法推演加密密钥；
发送器， 与所述处理器相连， 用于将所述处理器选择的所述加密算法 发送给所述基站， 以便所述基站与所述 UE协商加密算法；
所述处理器用于根据所述基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解密。
30、 根据权利要求 29所述的接入节点， 其特征在于， 所述接收器还用 于接收所述基站发送的所述 UE的安全能力， 所述 UE的安全能力用于所述 处理器选择加密算法。
31、 根据权利要求 29或 30所述的接入节点， 其特征在于， 所述根密 钥为为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密钥和加密密钥所使用的根密 钥， 或者为根据所述为基站与所述 UE之间的接口上推演完保密密钥和加密 密钥所使用的根密钥推演的子密钥。
32、 一种用户设备 UE , UE通过 Uu口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu， 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其特征在于， 包括：
接收器， 用于接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述 基站的算法协商；
处理器， 与所述接收器相连， 用于根据根密钥以及所述接收器接收的 所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所述^ =艮密钥为所述处理器与网络认 证后推演得出的；
所述处理器还用于在推演出所述 UE的加密密钥以后， 启动下行解密和 上行力口密。
33、 一种建立安全上下文的系统， 在所述系统中用户设备 UE通过 Uu 口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu ' 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其 特征在于， 包括：
所述基站用于获取接入节点的加密算法， 获取根密钥， 根据所述根密 钥和所述加密算法推演所述接入节点的加密密钥， 将所述加密密钥以及所 述加密算法发送给所述接入节点， 以便所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行 解密， 将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所述 UE , 以便与所述 UE协商加密 算法， 通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上行解密， 并在算法协商过程中 通知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密；
所述接入节点用于接收所述基站发送的加密密钥， 获取加密算法， 根 据所述加密密钥和加密算法启动下行加密和上行解密；
所述 UE用于接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述基 站的算法协商， 根据根密钥以及所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所 述^ =艮密钥为所述 UE与网络认证后推演得出的， 在推演出所述 UE的加密密 钥以后， 启动下行解密和上行加密。
34、 一种建立安全上下文的系统， 在所述系统中用户设备 UE通过 Uu 口经由基站连接到核心网， 并通过 Uu ' 口经由接入节点连接到核心网， 其 特征在于， 包括：
所述基站用于将根密钥发送给所述接入节点， 所述根密钥用于所述接 入节点推演所述接入节点使用的加密密钥， 获取所述接入节点使用的加密 算法， 所述加密算法为所述接入节点根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及 所述 UE的安全能力选择的加密算法， 将所述接入节点的加密算法发送给所 述 UE , 以便与所述 UE协商加密算法， 通知所述接入节点启动下行加密和上 行解密， 并在算法协商过程中通知所述 UE启动下行解密和上行加密；
所述接入节点用于接收所述基站发送的根密钥， 根据自身的安全能力、 安全策略以及所述 UE的安全能力选择加密算法， 根据所述根密钥以及所述 加密算法推演加密密钥， 将所述加密算法发送给所述基站， 以便所述基站 与所述 UE协商加密算法， 根据所述基站的启动指示启动下行加密和上行解 密；
所述 UE用于接收基站发送的接入节点的加密算法， 由此完成与所述基 站的算法协商， 根据根密钥以及所述加密算法推演所述 UE的加密密钥， 所 述^ =艮密钥为所述 UE与网络认证后推演得出的， 在推演出所述 UE的加密密 钥以后， 启动下行解密和上行加密。
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US14/460,748 US9673974B2 (en) 2012-02-22 2014-08-15 Method, apparatus, and system for performing an establishment of a security context between user equipment and an access node by a base station
US15/594,975 US10084594B2 (en) 2012-02-22 2017-05-15 Method, apparatus, and system for performing an establishment of a security context between a user equipment and an access node
US16/140,338 US20190028268A1 (en) 2012-02-22 2018-09-24 Method, apparatus, and system for establishing security context
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US16/537,330 US10812256B2 (en) 2012-02-22 2019-08-09 Method, apparatus, and system for performing an establishment of a security context between user equipment and an access node
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