WO2013120317A1 - 一种消息过滤方法及系统 - Google Patents

一种消息过滤方法及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013120317A1
WO2013120317A1 PCT/CN2012/073930 CN2012073930W WO2013120317A1 WO 2013120317 A1 WO2013120317 A1 WO 2013120317A1 CN 2012073930 W CN2012073930 W CN 2012073930W WO 2013120317 A1 WO2013120317 A1 WO 2013120317A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
message
sequence code
mobile network
terminal
network server
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2012/073930
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
陶伟成
陈军
姚立哲
Original Assignee
中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 中兴通讯股份有限公司 filed Critical 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority to US14/378,728 priority Critical patent/US20140380052A1/en
Priority to EP12868352.1A priority patent/EP2806667B1/en
Publication of WO2013120317A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013120317A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L51/00—User-to-user messaging in packet-switching networks, transmitted according to store-and-forward or real-time protocols, e.g. e-mail
    • H04L51/21—Monitoring or handling of messages
    • H04L51/212—Monitoring or handling of messages using filtering or selective blocking
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/108—Source integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/12—Messaging; Mailboxes; Announcements
    • H04W4/14—Short messaging services, e.g. short message services [SMS] or unstructured supplementary service data [USSD]

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of communications, and more particularly to a method and system for message filtering. Background technique
  • the main technical solutions can be divided into two categories: one is to filter the source address.
  • the usual practice is to set a filter address (number library) library in advance (similar to blacklist).
  • the extracted sender address is compared with the set filtering address, and if it can be found in the filtering address library, it is determined to be a spam message.
  • the disadvantage of this scheme is that it is not saved in the filtering address library.
  • the garbage body of the spam sender address is invalid.
  • the message sender can easily hide, forge or masquerade his own address information, so that the receiver cannot determine whether the message is a spam message or a message.
  • the second is to filter the content of the message.
  • the main feature of this scheme is to set a filter rule base in advance.
  • the filter rule library stores some spam feature information, such as sensitive words, uncivilized words, and so on.
  • spam feature information such as sensitive words, uncivilized words, and so on.
  • the feature of the message is extracted and matched with the filtering rule base or the similarity is calculated. If the matching is successful, the message is filtered, otherwise it is not filtered, or a similarity threshold is set, above the threshold. Determined as spam, under the threshold is considered non-spam.
  • the disadvantage of this scheme is that it is often difficult to extract features that represent spam messages, which is due to the large number of synonyms in natural language and the irregularities of natural language.
  • the main object of the present invention is to provide a method for verifying the authenticity of a message or filtering a message based on a sequence code. It is especially suitable for scenarios where the receiver can communicate with the mobile communication network and can send and receive packet data through the mobile Internet.
  • a message filtering method comprising:
  • the message server and the mobile network server authenticate each other, and after the authentication is completed, the two parties negotiate a sequence code for performing message verification;
  • the message server sends a message to the terminal, where the sequence code is carried in the message;
  • the terminal sends the sequence code in the message to the mobile network server.
  • the mobile network server determines whether the sequence code sent by the terminal is consistent with the sequence code negotiated by the previous mobile network server and the message server, and sends the determination result to the terminal;
  • the terminal presents the message to the user.
  • the method further includes: the message server and the mobile network server negotiate a session key, and negotiate the sequence code by using the session key.
  • the message server and the mobile network server respectively save the session key, and the message server encrypts the sequence code by using the session key when sending the message to the terminal; Transmitting the sequence code encrypted using the session key to a mobile network server, after the mobile network server uses the session key to decode to obtain the sequence code, Verification of the sequence code is performed.
  • sequence code negotiated by the message server and the mobile network server is a set of sequence codes; the message server and the mobile network server select a sequence code used by the current time window through a time window, and use the current time window.
  • the serial code performs the corresponding operation.
  • the terminal After receiving the determination result sent by the mobile network server, the terminal stores the determination result and the corresponding sequence code; when the next time the next synchronization code is received, the terminal sends the message further.
  • the method of sending the sequence code to the mobile network server is: the terminal extracts the sequence code from the message, and sends the extracted sequence code to the mobile network server; or the terminal carries the The message of the serial code is directly sent to the mobile network server; when the terminal sends the message carrying the serial code directly to the mobile network server, the mobile network server needs to The sequence code is extracted from the message.
  • the invention also provides a message filtering system, the system comprising:
  • a message server configured to perform mutual authentication with the mobile network server, and negotiate a sequence code for performing message verification with the mobile network server after the authentication is completed; and send a message carrying the sequence code to the terminal;
  • a terminal configured to receive a message sent by the message server, and send a sequence code in the message to the mobile network server; receive a risk certificate result of the sequence code fed back by the mobile network server, when When the card passes, the terminal presents the message to the user;
  • a mobile network server configured to perform mutual authentication with the message server, and negotiate a sequence code for performing message verification with the message server after the authentication is completed; and receive a sequence code sent by the terminal, and determine the terminal
  • the sequence code sent is consistent with the sequence code negotiated by the mobile network server and the message server. If they are consistent, the verification result of the verification is fed back to the terminal, otherwise the verification result of the verification failure is fed back to the terminal.
  • the message server and the mobile network server are further configured to negotiate a session key, and negotiate the sequence code by using the session key.
  • the message server and the mobile network server are further configured to save the session key, and when the message server sends the message to the terminal, the message server is further configured to perform the sequence code by using the session key. Encrypting; the terminal transmitting the sequence code encrypted by using the session key to a mobile network server; the mobile network server is further configured to obtain the sequence code by using the session key to decode.
  • sequence code negotiated by the message server and the mobile network server is a set of sequence codes; the message server and the mobile network server select a sequence code used by the current time window through a time window, and use the current time window.
  • the serial code performs the corresponding operation.
  • the terminal after receiving the verification result sent by the mobile network server, the terminal is further configured to store the verification result and the corresponding sequence code, and the next time the next use is received, the terminal will further The manner in which the sequence code in the message is sent to the mobile network server is: the terminal extracts the sequence code from the message, and sends the extracted sequence code to the mobile network server; or the terminal will The message carrying the sequence code is directly sent to the mobile network server; when the terminal directly sends the message carrying the sequence code to the mobile network server, the mobile network server further performs the determination before performing the determination. Used to extract the sequence code from the message.
  • the invention generates a sequence code for performing message verification through negotiation between the message server and the mobile network server, and verifies the source of the message through the sequence code when the terminal receives the message, thereby preventing the fake message server from distributing the false information to the terminal.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a message filtering method according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a message filtering system according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for filtering a message based on a sequence code according to the present invention, where the method includes:
  • Step S101 After the message server and the mobile network server authenticate each other by using existing technologies, one party encrypts a sequence code through the negotiated session key and sends it to the other party for storage;
  • Authentication between the message server and the mobile web server can use existing technologies, such as
  • the sequence code may be an arbitrary random number, a random number hash, and any unique sequence; the sequence code It can be generated by either party and sent to the other party. It can also be generated by the same algorithm, such as MD5, with the same parameters, without being transmitted between the two.
  • Step S102 The message server sends a message to the terminal, and carries the sequence code in the message; the message and the sequence code may be separately sent, or may be carried in the message.
  • Step S103 The terminal extracts the sequence code in the message or sends the message carrying the sequence code to the mobile network server for verification;
  • the terminal may extract the sequence code in the message and send it to the mobile network server, or directly send the message carrying the sequence code to the mobile network server, and the latter needs to move the network server to extract the sequence code in the message; because the terminal (usually a mobile phone)
  • There is an existing set of authentication mechanisms (such as the A3 algorithm in the GSM network) between the mobile network and the communication between them.
  • the communication between them is usually started after mutual authentication (for example, when the mobile phone is turned on) The authentication process is completed) and is therefore reliable and trustworthy.
  • Step S104 The mobile network server performs verification on the received sequence code or extracts the sequence code from the received message, that is, determines the sequence code sent by the terminal and the message server that is saved by itself. If the authentication is consistent, if the authentication is successful, the mobile network server returns a verification response to the terminal, indicating that the terminal can accept and present the message sent by the message server to the user, otherwise the verification fails, indicating that the terminal is unacceptable and The user presents a cancellation step S105 sent by the message server, if the verification passes, the terminal accepts and presents the message sent by the message server to the user, otherwise rejects the acceptance and does not present the user with the disguise sent by the message server.
  • the message server and the mobile network server do not have a consensus sequence code, so the spoofed message server will not be authenticated, thus eliminating the disguised message server from distributing forged messages and avoiding unnecessary losses.
  • the masqueraded message server cannot forge the serial code even if it can forge the source address. Even if the sequence code can be forged, the legal sequence code cannot be forged.
  • the message server and the mobile network server may further save the session key.
  • the message server sends the message in step S102
  • the sequence code encrypted by the session key is carried, and the terminal directly sends the encrypted sequence code to the terminal in step S103.
  • the mobile network server in the verification phase of step S104, the mobile network server decodes the encrypted sequence code using the saved session key, and compares the decrypted sequence code with the saved sequence code. Avoid malicious message servers to attack by obtaining serial codes.
  • the message server and the mobile network server can generate a set of sequence codes when negotiating, and control the selection of the sequence code through the time window. Even if an attacker intercepts a previous serial code, it cannot cause an attack.
  • Negotiation phase negotiates a set of sequence codes, and divides the sequence code into several segments according to time. When the time is , the message server sends the sequence code corresponding to the time period to the terminal, and the same is received on the mobile network server side. When the sequence code is used, the sequence code corresponding to the current time period is compared for comparison. The synchronization of time can be ensured by existing mechanisms. Please refer to the corresponding literature.
  • the terminal may save the sequence code sent by the message server and the verification result of the mobile network server for subsequent message filtering.
  • the message server may not participate in the filtering process through the mobile network server. Simply compare the locally saved sequence code with the sequence code in the message to decide whether or not to accept the message.
  • Another aspect of the present invention provides a system for message filtering, including a terminal 10, a mobile network server 20, and a message server 30, as shown in FIG.
  • the terminal 10 refers to a function of having independent communication, receiving a message, and verifying a result. It comprises a message receiving module 11, a serial code transceiver module 12, and a verification result receiving module 13.
  • the message receiving module 11 is configured to receive the message sent by the message server 30 after the verification is passed;
  • the sequence code transceiver module 12 is configured to receive the sequence code sent from the message server 30 and send the sequence code to the mobile network server 20;
  • the verification result The receiving module 13 is configured to receive the verification result sent by the mobile network server 20.
  • the mobile network server 20 is for communication of the terminal 10, and it can be deployed in a mobile communication system such as an MSC (Mobile Switching Center;), a base station, or the like. It includes a first sequence code negotiation module 21, a verification module 22, and a storage module 23
  • the first sequence code negotiation module 21 is used to perform the serial code negotiation with the message server 30.
  • the verification module 22 is configured to receive the sequence code sent by the serial code transceiver module 12 of the terminal 10 and negotiate the authentication code with the message server 30. Verification, and the verification result is sent to the terminal 10.
  • the storage module 23 is used to store the sequence code negotiated with the message server 30.
  • the message server 30 primarily distributes messages to the terminal 10 device, which includes a message sending module 31, a second sequence code negotiation module 32, and an optional storage module 33.
  • the message sending module 31 is configured to send a message to the terminal 10;
  • the second sequence code negotiation module 32 is configured to perform serial code negotiation with the mobile network server 20; and
  • the storage module 33 is configured to store a sequence code negotiated with the mobile network server 20.
  • the terminal 10 further includes: a storage module, configured to save the verification result and the sequence code, for filtering the message sent by the message server 30 next time.
  • Example 1
  • a message server e.g., a National Disaster Warning Center
  • a mobile network server e.g., a mobile switching center MSC
  • the server of the National Disaster Warning Center can send emergency messages to all mobile user terminals to which the mobile switching center belongs to inform the disaster and emergency measures.
  • the user terminal can filter the emergency message of the garbage through the serial code.
  • the specific authentication process is as follows:
  • Step S31 the server of the National Disaster Warning Center and the mobile switching center server mutually authenticate the certificate, and negotiate the session key;
  • the servers and mobile switching center servers of the National Disaster Warning Center authenticate the identity of each other through a Certificate Authority (CA), through a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). To negotiate a session key.
  • CA Certificate Authority
  • PKI Public Key Infrastructure
  • Step S32 The server of the National Disaster Warning Center generates a random number, generates a hash sequence by using the random number as a parameter, saves the hash sequence, and encrypts the hash sequence with the session key to the mobile switching center.
  • the server, the mobile switching center server decrypts the saved hash sequence.
  • the hash sequence can be generated using existing techniques such as MD5, SHA, and the like.
  • the masquerading disaster warning server Since the masquerading disaster warning server does not have a hash sequence (sequence code) that is negotiated with the mobile switching center server, the masquerading disaster warning server sends a message to the terminal, because the terminal does not know or has no corresponding sequence code, therefore, the terminal cannot The sequence code is extracted from the received message, and the message cannot be verified, so that the forged message will also be filtered by the terminal.
  • Example 2 This embodiment describes a scenario in which a fire occurs in a certain area. After the government or fire alarm center knows the news, it wants to send a message such as a fire message and a fire emergency plan to the user terminal in the area to inform them of the fire. Occurrence and emergency measures.
  • the terminal verifies the source of the message (the fire alarm center server) before deciding whether to present the message to the user before presenting the message to the user.
  • the negotiation of the sequence code can be implemented according to the embodiment 1.
  • the specific process of filtering the message in this scenario is as follows:
  • Step S41 The fire alarm center server (message server) sends a fire alarm message to the user terminal, and carries the sequence code in the fire alarm message.
  • Step S42 The user terminal extracts the sequence code from the fire alarm message, and sends the extracted sequence code to the mobile switching center (mobile network server), or directly sends the fire alarm message carrying the sequence code to the mobile switching center.
  • the mobile switching center mobile network server
  • Step S43 The mobile switching center queries the sequence code negotiated with the fire alarm center server according to the sequence code sent by the user terminal or the sequence code extracted from the message, and determines the sequence code sent by the terminal and the local and fire alarm center server. Whether the negotiated sequence codes are equal. If they are equal, the response to the successful verification is returned to the terminal; if not, the verification unsuccessful response is returned to the terminal.
  • Step S44 The terminal determines whether to filter the received fire alarm message according to the returned verification result; if the verification is passed, the terminal presents the fire alarm message to the user, otherwise the fire alarm message is filtered out and is not presented to the user.
  • the terminal can save the sequence code and the verification result, and can filter the received message in the future.
  • Example 3
  • This embodiment describes the scenario in which a natural disaster occurs in a certain area, and the government authorities (such as the National Disaster Warning Center) are informed of the news and want to send disaster news, emergency plans, etc.
  • User terminals in the area to inform them of the occurrence of disasters and emergency measures.
  • the terminal verifies the source of the message before deciding whether to present the message to the user before presenting the message to the user.
  • the negotiation of the sequence code can be implemented according to the embodiment 1.
  • the sequence code library saved by the terminal is saved based on the previous filtering of the message.
  • the specific process of filtering the message in this scenario is as follows:
  • Step S51 The disaster warning center server (message server) sends a disaster message to the user terminal and carries the sequence code;
  • Step S52 The user terminal extracts the sequence code and compares it with the saved sequence code library. If found, it transfers to S53; otherwise, it transfers to S54;
  • Step S53 The user terminal queries the verification (previous) result corresponding to the sequence code. If the previous verification is passed, the message is presented to the user, otherwise the filtering is not presented to the user, and the process ends.
  • Step S54 The user terminal sends the extracted sequence code to the mobile switching center (mobile network server);
  • Step S55 The mobile switching center queries the sequence code negotiated with the disaster warning center server according to the sequence code sent by the user terminal, and determines whether the received sequence code is equal to the serial code stored locally. If they are equal, they return a response to the successful verification of the terminal; otherwise, if the verification fails, it returns a failure to the terminal and the response is unsuccessful.
  • Step S56 The terminal determines whether to filter the fire alarm message according to the returned verification result; if the verification is passed, the terminal presents the message to the user, otherwise the filtering is not presented to the user.
  • Step S57 The terminal stores the sequence code and the risk certificate result in a local sequence code library, and is used to filter the received message in the future.
  • the terminal of the present invention can verify the source of the message by using the sequence code, so as to prevent the fake message server from distributing the false information to the terminal.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

本发明公开了一种消息过滤方法及系统，用于解决终端无法判断消息的真伪的技术问题。本发明中，消息服务器和移动网络服务器首先相互鉴权，并协商用于进行消息验证的序列码；消息服务器向终端发送消息时，在消息中携带序列码；终端接收到消息时，将序列码发送给移动网络服务器进行验证，当验证通过时为用户呈现所述消息，否则拒绝所述消息。通过本发明，终端在收到消息时，可通过序列码对消息的来源进行验证，从而杜绝虚假消息服务器向终端散布虚假信息。

Description

一种消息过滤方法及系统 技术领域
本发明涉及通信领域， 更具体涉及到一种消息过滤的方法及系统。 背景技术
消息在人们的日常生活和工作中起着重要的作用， 人们根据消息来从 事社会化生产活动。 因此验证消息的真实性、 消息产生者的合法性显得至 关重要， 尤其是在网络环境下， 验证消息的真实性、 消息产生者的合法性 能有效的避免垃圾消息或不真实消息的带来的损失。
目前在垃圾消息的过滤机制上， 主要的技术方案可分为 2 大类， 一是 对源地址进行过滤， 通常的做法是， 事先设定一个过滤地址（号码库）库 (类似于黑名单）， 当接收到消息时， 提取发送方地址与设定的过滤地址进 行比较， 如果在过滤地址库中能找到， 则判定为垃圾消息， 这种方案的缺 点是， 对于在过滤地址库中没有保存的垃圾消息发送方地址的垃圾主体则 无效， 此外在分组网络中， 对于点对点的消息， 消息发送方很容易隐藏、 伪造或伪装自己的地址信息， 使得接收方无法判别消息是否是垃圾消息或 消息的真伪； 二是对消息内容进行过滤， 这种方案的主要特征是事先设置 一个过滤规则库， 过滤规则库中保存了一些垃圾消息特征信息， 比如敏感 词、 不文明词等。 当接收到新的消息时， 提取消息的特征并将其与过滤规 则库进行匹配或者相似度计算， 若匹配成功则过滤消息， 否则不过滤， 或 者设定一个相似度阈值， 在阈值之上的判定为垃圾消息， 在阈值之下的视 为非垃圾消息。 这种方案的缺点在于能提取代表垃圾消息的特征往往比较 困难， 这是由于自然语言中有大量的近义词以及自然语言的不规则决定的。
以上方法都不能较好的过滤垃圾消息或验证消息的真伪， 尤其是在分 组网络、 P2P网络中发送方很容易伪装或伪造合法消息发送方的地址来发布 消息， 特别在消息是紧急消息的情况下， 如不能判定消息的真伪以及过滤 伪造的紧急消息， 将会造成重大的损失， 一种典型的场景就是政府向民众 发布的紧急消息， 如果伪造者伪装成合法的政府机关， 发布一条假的海嘯 紧急消息， 将会导致的民众恐慌， 引起 ¾：动和混乱。 发明内容
有鉴于此， 本发明的主要目的在于提供一种基于序列码验证消息真伪 或过滤消息的方法。 特别适合接收方既可以通过移动通信网来通信又可以 通过移动互联网来收发分组数据的场景。
为达到上述目的， 本发明的技术方案是这样实现的：
一种消息过滤方法， 该方法包括：
A、 消息服务器和移动网络服务器相互鉴权， 鉴权完成后双方协商用于 进行消息验证的序列码；
B、 消息服务器向终端发送消息， 在所述消息中携带所述序列码；
C、 终端将所述消息中的序列码发送给移动网络服务器；
D、移动网络服务器判断终端发送的序列码与之前移动网络服务器与消 息服务器协商的序列码是否一致， 并将判断结果发送给终端；
E、 判断结果为一致时， 终端为用户呈现所述消息。
进一步地， 在消息服务器和移动网络服务器协商所述序列码之前， 所 述方法还包括： 消息服务器和移动网络服务器协商会话密钥， 并通过该会 话密钥来协商所述序列码。
进一步地， 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器分别保存所述会话密钥 , 且所述消息服务器在向终端发送所述消息时， 使用所述会话密钥对所述序 列码进行加密； 所述终端将所述使用会话密钥加密的序列码发送给移动网 络服务器， 移动网络服务器使用所述会话密钥解码获得所述序列码之后， 进行对所述序列码的验证。
进一步地， 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器协商的所述序列码为一 组序列码； 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器通过时间窗来选择当前时间 窗所使用的序列码， 并使用当前时间窗的序列码执行相应操作。
进一步地， 所述终端接收到所述移动网络服务器发送的判断结果后， 存储所述判断结果及对应的序列码； 当下一次接收到使用相同序列码发送 进一步地， 所述终端将所述消息中的序列码发送给移动网络服务器的 方式为： 所述终端从所述消息中提取出所述序列码， 并将提取出的序列码 发送给所述移动网络服务器； 或所述终端将所述携带序列码的消息直接发 送给所述移动网络服务器； 当所述终端将所述携带序列码的消息直接发送 给所述移动网络服务器时， 所述移动网络服务器在执行所述判断之前， 需 从所述消息中提取所述序列码。 本发明还提供一种消息过滤系统， 该系统包括：
消息服务器， 用于与移动网络服务器进行相互鉴权， 并在鉴权完成后 与移动网络服务器协商用于进行消息验证的序列码； 以及向终端发送携带 所述序列码的消息；
终端， 用于接收所述消息服务器发送的消息， 并将所述消息中的序列 码发送给所述移动网络服务器； 接收所述移动网络服务器反馈的对所述序 列码的险证结果， 当 3 证通过时， 终端为用户呈现所述消息；
移动网络服务器， 用于与所述消息服务器进行相互鉴权， 并在鉴权完 成后与消息服务器协商用于进行消息验证的序列码； 以及接收所述终端发 送的序列码， 并判断所述终端发送的序列码与之前该移动网络服务器与所 述消息服务器协商的序列码是否一致， 若一致则向终端反馈验证通过的验 证结果， 否则向终端反馈验证失败的验证结果。 进一步地， 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器还用于协商会话密钥， 并通过该会话密钥来协商所述序列码。
进一步地， 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器还用于保存所述会话密 钥， 且所述消息服务器在向终端发送所述消息时， 还用于使用所述会话密 钥对所述序列码进行加密； 所述终端将所述使用会话密钥加密的序列码发 送给移动网络服务器； 所述移动网络服务器还用于使用所述会话密钥解码 获得所述序列码。
进一步地， 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器协商的所述序列码为一 组序列码； 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器通过时间窗来选择当前时间 窗所使用的序列码， 并使用当前时间窗的序列码执行相应操作。
进一步地， 所述终端接收到所述移动网络服务器发送的验证结果后， 还用于存储所述验证结果及对应的序列码， 及在下一次接收到使用相同序 进一步地， 所述终端将所述消息中的序列码发送给移动网络服务器的 方式为： 所述终端从所述消息中提取出所述序列码， 并将提取出的序列码 发送给所述移动网络服务器； 或所述终端将所述携带序列码的消息直接发 送给所述移动网络服务器； 当所述终端将所述携带序列码的消息直接发送 给所述移动网络服务器时， 所述移动网络服务器在执行所述判断之前， 还 用于从所述消息中提取所述序列码。
本发明通过消息服务器和移动网络服务器的协商生成用于进行消息验 证的序列码， 并在终端收到消息时， 通过序列码对消息的来源进行验证， 从而杜绝虚假消息服务器向终端散布虚假信息。
附图说明
图 1 为本发明实施例提供的一种消息过滤方法的流程图; 图 1为本发明实施例提供的一种消息过滤系统的结构示意图。 具体实施方式
为使本发明的目的、 技术方案和优点更加清楚明白， 以下举实施例并 参照附图， 对本发明进一步详细说明。
图 1 为本发明提供的一种基于序列码过滤消息的方法的流程图， 该方 法包括：
步驟 S101、消息服务器和移动网络服务器采用现有的技术互相鉴权后， 一方通过协商好的会话密钥加密一个序列码发送给对方， 进行保存；
消息服务器和移动网络服务器之间的鉴权可以采用现有的技术， 比如
PKI, 相互查询证书并验证通过后， 协商一个会话密钥， 用该密钥来协商序 列码， 该序列码可以是一个任意的随机数、 随机数的哈希以及任意唯一的 序列； 该序列码可以由任意一方产生， 发送给对方， 也可以通过相同的算 法， 比如 MD5以相同的参数来产生， 而不在两者之间进行传输。
步驟 S102、 消息服务器向终端发送消息， 并在消息中携带序列码； 可分开发送消息和序列码， 也可以携带在消息中。
步驟 S103、 终端提取消息中的序列码或将携带序列码的消息， 发送给 移动网络服务器进行验证；
终端可以提取消息中的序列码发送给移动网络服务器， 也可以直接将 携带有序列码的消息发送给移动网络服务器， 后者需要移动网络服务器来 提取消息中的序列码； 由于终端 （通常为手机）和移动网络之间有现有的 一套鉴权机制（比如 GSM网络中的 A3算法等），它们之间的通信通常是在 相互鉴权后才开始通信的 （例如手机在开机的时候就完成了鉴权过程）， 因 此是可靠、 可信任的。
步驟 S104、 移动网络服务器对接收到的序列码或从接收的消息中提取 序列码进行验证， 即判断终端发送的序列码与自己保存的与消息服务器协 商的序列码是否一致； 如果一致， 则验证通过， 移动网络服务器向终端返 回验证通过响应， 指示终端可接受并为用户呈现由消息服务器发送的消息， 否则验证不通过， 指示终端不可接受并为用户呈现由消息服务器发送的消 步驟 S105、 如果验证通过， 则终端接受并为用户呈现由消息服务器发 送的所述消息， 否则拒绝接受且不为用户呈现由消息服务器发送的所述消 由于伪装的消息服务器和移动网络服务器没有协商一致的序列码， 因 此伪装的消息服务器将不能得到认证， 从而杜绝了伪装的消息服务器分发 伪造的消息， 避免不必要的损失。
相比现有基于源地址过滤的方案， 伪装的消息服务器即使能伪造源地 址， 也不能伪造序列码， 即使能伪造序列码， 也不能伪造合法的序列码。
上述方案步驟 S101中， 消息服务器和移动网络服务器还可以保存会话 密钥， 在步驟 S102消息服务器发送消息时， 携带会话密钥加密的序列码， 在步驟 S103 中终端直接将加密的序列码发送给移动网络服务器， 在步驟 S104验证阶段， 移动网络服务器利用保存的会话密钥对加密的序列码进行 解码， 并将解密的序列码与保存的序列码进行比较。 避免恶意消息服务器 通过获取序列码来进行攻击。
进一步地， 为抵抗重放攻击， 消息服务器和移动网络服务器协商时可 以产生一组序列码， 通过时间窗口来控制序列码的选择。 即使攻击者截获 了一个之前的序列码也不能造成攻击。 例如： 协商阶段协商一组序列码， 根据时间将序列码划分为几个区段， 在时间为 Τ时， 消息服务器给终端发 送 Τ时段对应的序列码， 同样的在移动网络服务器端接收到此序列码时， 取当前时间段对应的序列码进行比较。 关于时间的同步可采用现有机制来 确保。 可参阅相应的文献资料。 进一步地， 在步驟 S104之后， 移动网络服务器验证后， 终端可以保存 消息服务器发来的序列码以及移动网络服务器的验证结果， 用于后续的消 息过滤。 当下一次消息服务器发送消息过来时， 可不通过移动网络服务器 来参与过滤过程。 只需将本地保存的序列码与消息中的序列码进行比较， 以决定是否接受此消息。 本发明的另一方面提供了消息过滤的系统， 包括终端 10、 移动网络服 务器 20以及消息服务器 30, 如图 2所示。
所述终端 10是指具有独立通信、 接收消息以及验证结果的功能。 它包 括消息接收模块 11、 序列码收发模块 12、 验证结果接收模块 13。
其中消息接收模块 11用来在验证通过后接收消息服务器 30发来的消 息； 序列码收发模块 12用来接收从消息服务器 30发来的序列码和将序列 码发送给移动网络服务器 20;验证结果接收模块 13用来接收移动网络服务 器 20发来的验证结果。
所述移动网络服务器 20是为终端 10通信服务的， 它可以部署在 MSC (移动交换中心；)、基站等移动通信系统中。它包括第一序列码协商模块 21、 验证模块 22以及存储模块 23
其中第一序列码协商模块 21用来与消息服务器 30进行序列码的协商； 验证模块 22用来接收终端 10序列码收发模块 12发来的序列码并将其与消 息服务器 30协商的认证码进行验证， 并将验证结果下发至终端 10。存储模 块 23用来存储与消息服务器 30协商的序列码。
所述消息服务器 30主要向终端 10设备分发消息， 它包括消息发送模 块 31、 第二序列码协商模块 32, 以及可选的存储模块 33。
其中消息发送模块 31用于向终端 10发送消息； 第二序列码协商模块 32用来与移动网络服务器 20进行序列码的协商； 存储模块 33用来存储与 移动网络服务器 20协商的序列码。 进一步地， 所述终端 10还包括： 存储模块用来保存验证结果以及序列 码， 用于在下一次对消息服务器 30发送的消息进行过滤。 实施例 1 :
本实施例描述了如下场景， 消息服务器 （例如国家灾难预警中心） 与 移动网络服务器（例如移动交换中心 MSC )进行序列码的协商。 以备在灾 难发生时， 国家灾难预警中心的服务器能发送紧急消息给该移动交换中心 所属的所有移动用户终端， 以告知灾难的发生以及应急措施。 用户终端可 通过序列码来过滤垃圾的紧急消息， 具体的认证流程如下：
步驟 S31 :国家灾难预警中心的服务器和移动交换中心服务器相互验证 证书， 协商会话密钥；
这一步完全可以采用现有的技术来完成， 国家灾难预警中心的服务器 和移动交换中心服务器通过认证中心（ Certificate Authority, CA )来验证对 方的身份， 通过公钥基础设施（Public Key Infrastructure, PKI )来协商会话 密钥。
步驟 S32: 国家灾难预警中心的服务器产生一个随机数， 并将该随机数 作为参数生成一个哈希序列， 保存该哈希序列， 并将此哈希序列用会话密 钥进行加密发送给移动交换中心服务器， 移动交换中心服务器解密后保存 所述哈希序列。
可以采用 MD5、 SHA等现有技术来产生哈希序列。
由于伪装的灾难预警服务器没有与移动交换中心服务器协商一致的哈 希序列 （序列码）， 因此伪装的灾难预警服务器发送消息给终端时， 由于不 知道或者没有相应的序列码， 因此， 终端无法从接收到的消息中提取到序 列码， 消息无法得到验证， 从而其伪造的消息也将会被终端过滤。 实施例 2: 本实施例描述了如下场景， 某一区域内发生了火灾， 政府当局或火警 中心获知此消息后欲将火灾消息、 火灾应急预案等消息发给该区域内的用 户终端上， 以告知他们火灾的发生情况以及应急措施等。 而用户终端在收 到此消息时， 为防止此消息是伪造的， 终端在将消息呈现给用户前， 其对 消息的来源 （火警中心服务器）进行验证， 以决定是否将消息呈现给用户。 序列码的协商可以根据实施例 1 来实现， 本场景下对消息的过滤具体的流 程如下：
步驟 S41 : 火警中心服务器（消息服务器） 向用户终端发送火警消息， 并在火警消息中携带序列码。
步驟 S42: 用户终端从火警消息中提取序列码，并将提取的序列码发送 给移动交换中心（移动网络服务器）， 或直接将携带序列码的火警消息发送 给移动交换中心。
步驟 S43 :移动交换中心根据用户终端发来的序列码或从消息中提取出 的序列码查询与火警中心服务器协商的序列码， 判断由终端发送来的序列 码与存储在本地的与火警中心服务器协商的序列码是否相等， 如果相等， 则向终端返回验证成功的响应； 如果不相等， 则向终端返回验证不成功响 应。
步驟 S44: 终端根据返回的验证结果决定是否过滤所接收到的火警消 息； 如果验证是通过的， 则终端将火警消息呈现给用户， 否则过滤掉该火 警消息， 不呈现给用户。
进一步地， 终端可以保存此序列码以及验证结果， 可对以后的接收的 消息进行过滤。 实施例 3 :
本实施例描述了如下场景， 某一区域内发生了自然灾难，政府当局（比 如国家灾难预警中心） 获知此消息后欲将灾难消息、 应急预案等消息发给 该区域内的用户终端上， 以告知他们灾难的发生情况以及应急措施等。 而 用户终端在收到此消息时， 为防止此消息是伪造的， 终端在将消息呈现给 用户前， 其对消息的来源进行验证， 以决定是否将消息呈现给用户。 序列 码的协商可以根据实施例 1 来实现， 终端保存的序列码库， 基于之前过滤 消息时保存的， 本场景下对消息的过滤具体的流程如下：
步驟 S51 : 灾难预警中心服务器（消息服务器）向用户终端发送灾难消 息并携带序列码；
步驟 S52: 用户终端提取序列码， 并与保存的序列码库进行比较， 如果 找到则转 S53 ; 否则转 S54;
步驟 S53 : 用户终端查询该序列码对应的验证（之前的）结果， 如果之 前的验证是通过的， 则将消息呈现给用户， 否则过滤掉不呈现给用户， 流 程结束。
步驟 S54: 用户终端将提取的序列码发送给移动交换中心（移动网络服 务器 )；
步驟 S55:移动交换中心根据用户终端发来的序列码查询与灾难预警中 心服务器协商的序列码， 判断接收到的序列码与存储在本地的序列码是否 相等。 如果相等， 其向终端返回验证成功的响应； 否则验证不通过， 其向 终端返回险证不成功响应。
步驟 S56: 终端根据返回的验证结果决定是否过滤此火警消息； 如果验 证是通过的， 则终端将消息呈现给用户， 否则过滤掉不呈现给用户。
步驟 S57: 终端将序列码以及险证结果存入本地序列码库， 用于对以后 的接收的消息进行过滤。
以上所述， 仅为本发明的较佳实施例而已， 并非用于限定本发明的保 护范围。 工业实用性
本发明终端在收到消息时， 可通过序列码对消息的来源进行验证， 从 而杜绝虚假消息服务器向终端散布虚假信息。

Claims

权利要求书
1、 一种消息过滤方法， 该方法包括：
A、 消息服务器和移动网络服务器相互鉴权， 鉴权完成后双方协商用于 进行消息验证的序列码；
B、 消息服务器向终端发送消息， 在所述消息中携带所述序列码；
C、 终端将所述消息中的序列码发送给移动网络服务器；
D、移动网络服务器判断终端发送的序列码与之前移动网络服务器与消 息服务器协商的序列码是否一致， 并将判断结果发送给终端；
E、 判断结果为一致时， 终端为用户呈现所述消息。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中， 在消息服务器和移动网络服务 器协商所述序列码之前， 所述方法还包括：
消息服务器和移动网络服务器协商会话密钥， 并通过该会话密钥来协 商所述序列码。
3、 根据权利要求 2所述的方法， 其中，
所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器分别保存所述会话密钥， 且所述消 息服务器在向终端发送所述消息时， 使用所述会话密钥对所述序列码进行 加密；
所述终端将所述使用会话密钥加密的序列码发送给移动网络服务器， 移动网络服务器使用所述会话密钥解码获得所述序列码之后， 进行对所述 序列码的验证。
4、 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中，
所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器协商的所述序列码为一组序列码； 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器通过时间窗来选择当前时间窗所使 用的序列码， 并使用当前时间窗的序列码执行相应操作。
5、 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中，
所述终端接收到所述移动网络服务器发送的判断结果后， 存储所述判 断结果及对应的序列码；
当下一次接收到使用相同序列码发送的消息时， 所述终端使用所保存 的判断结果决定是否向用户呈现所述消息。
6、 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中， 所述终端将所述消息中的序列 码发送给移动网络服务器的方式为： 所述终端从所述消息中提取出所述序 列码， 并将提取出的序列码发送给所述移动网络服务器； 或所述终端将所 述携带序列码的消息直接发送给所述移动网络服务器；
当所述终端将所述携带序列码的消息直接发送给所述移动网络服务器 时， 所述移动网络服务器在执行所述判断之前， 需从所述消息中提取所述 序列码。
7、 一种消息过滤系统， 该系统包括：
消息服务器， 设置为与移动网络服务器进行相互鉴权， 并在鉴权完成 后与移动网络服务器协商用于进行消息验证的序列码； 以及向终端发送携 带所述序列码的消息；
终端， 设置为接收所述消息服务器发送的消息， 并将所述消息中的序 列码发送给所述移动网络服务器； 接收所述移动网络服务器反馈的对所述 序列码的险证结果， 当险证通过时， 终端为用户呈现所述消息；
移动网络服务器， 设置为与所述消息服务器进行相互鉴权， 并在鉴权 完成后与消息服务器协商用于进行消息验证的序列码； 以及接收所述终端 发送的序列码， 并判断所述终端发送的序列码与之前该移动网络服务器与 所述消息服务器协商的序列码是否一致， 若一致则向终端反馈验证通过的 验证结果， 否则向终端反馈验证失败的验证结果。
8、 根据权利要求 7所述的系统， 其中， 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器还设置为协商会话密钥， 并通过该 会话密钥来协商所述序列码。
9、 根据权利要求 8所述的系统， 其中，
所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器还设置为保存所述会话密钥， 且所 述消息服务器在向终端发送所述消息时， 还设置为使用所述会话密钥对所 述序列码进行加密；
所述终端将所述使用会话密钥加密的序列码发送给移动网络服务器； 所述移动网络服务器还设置为使用所述会话密钥解码获得所述序列 码。
10、 根据权利要求 7所述的系统， 其中，
所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器协商的所述序列码为一组序列码； 所述消息服务器和移动网络服务器通过时间窗来选择当前时间窗所使 用的序列码， 并使用当前时间窗的序列码执行相应操作。
11、 根据权利要求 7所述的系统， 其中，
所述终端接收到所述移动网络服务器发送的验证结果后， 还设置为存 储所述验证结果及对应的序列码， 及在下一次接收到使用相同序列码发送
12、 根据权利要求 7所述的系统， 其中， 所述终端将所述消息中的序 列码发送给移动网络服务器的方式为： 所述终端从所述消息中提取出所述 序列码， 并将提取出的序列码发送给所述移动网络服务器； 或所述终端将 所述携带序列码的消息直接发送给所述移动网络服务器；
当所述终端将所述携带序列码的消息直接发送给所述移动网络服务器 时， 所述移动网络服务器在执行所述判断之前， 还设置为从所述消息中提 取所述序列码。
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