WO2013102449A1 - Systems and methods for authentication - Google Patents
Systems and methods for authentication Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2013102449A1 WO2013102449A1 PCT/CN2013/070125 CN2013070125W WO2013102449A1 WO 2013102449 A1 WO2013102449 A1 WO 2013102449A1 CN 2013070125 W CN2013070125 W CN 2013070125W WO 2013102449 A1 WO2013102449 A1 WO 2013102449A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- authentication
- station
- access point
- fils
- eap
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/10—Active monitoring, e.g. heartbeat, ping or trace-route
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
- H04L63/162—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the data link layer
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/08—Access security
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
- H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
Definitions
- the present invention relates to systems and methods for wireless communications, and, in particular, to systems and methods for authentication.
- IEEE 802.11 is a set of standards for implementing a wireless local area network such as a wireless local area network (WLAN).
- IEEE 802.11 is a family of protocols that includes a series of half-duplex over the air modulation techniques that use the same basic protocol. The protocol defines the media access control (MAC) layer and the physical (PHY) layer.
- MAC media access control
- PHY physical
- IEEE 802.11 incorporates IEEE 802. lx, which defines the encapsulation of the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over local area network (LAN) (EAPOL).
- EAP extensible authentication protocol
- LAN local area network
- IEEE 802.11 i provides a robust security network association (RSNA) involving a 4- way handshake and a group key handshake, which utilize authentication services and port access controls to establish and change the appropriate cryptographic key.
- RSNA security network association
- An embodiment method of performing authentication involves receiving, by a station, an initiation frame and transmitting, by the station, an authentication request.
- the authentication request includes an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over local area network (LAN) (EAPOL) Start and security parameters for a fast initial link setup (FILS) handshake.
- EAP extensible authentication protocol
- LAN local area network
- FILS fast initial link setup
- Another embodiment method of performing authentication involves receiving, by an access point, an authentication request.
- the authentication request includes an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over local area network (LAN) (EAPOL) Start and security parameters for a fast initial link setup (FILS) handshake.
- EAP extensible authentication protocol
- LAN local area network
- FILS fast initial link setup
- An embodiment station includes a processor and a computer readable storage medium storing programming for execution by the processor.
- the programming includes instructions to receive an initiation frame and transmit an authentication request.
- authentication request includes an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over local area network (LAN) (EAPOL) Start and security parameters for a fast initial link setup (FILS) handshake.
- EAP extensible authentication protocol
- LAN local area network
- An embodiment access point includes a processor and a computer readable storage medium storing programming for execution by the processor.
- the programming includes instructions to receive an authentication request.
- the authentication request includes an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over local area network (LAN) (EAPOL) Start and security parameters for a fast initial link setup (FILS) handshake.
- EAP extensible authentication protocol
- LAN local area network
- FILS fast initial link setup
- the programming includes instructions to transmit an access request frame.
- Figure 1 illustrates a block diagram of a system for RSNA authentication
- Figure 2 illustrates a state machine for RSNA authentication
- Figures 3a-b illustrate a flowchart of a method of authenticating with RSNA
- Figure 4 illustrates an embodiment system for authentication
- Figure 5 illustrates an embodiment state machine for authentication
- Figure 6 illustrates a flowchart of an embodiment method of authentication
- Figure 7 illustrates a block diagram illustrating a computing platform that may be used for implementing, for example, the devices and methods described herein, in accordance with an embodiment.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a system for performing RSNA.
- the system includes station (STA) 102, access point (AP) 106, and authorization server (AS) 104.
- Station 102 performs both the policy decision and policy enforcement.
- Authorization server 104 performs policy decision, while access point 106 performs policy enforcement.
- a state machine for RSNA authentication is illustrated in Figure 2.
- the state machine contains state 264, state 266, state 267, and state 268.
- state 264 the system is unauthenticated and unassociated.
- 802.11 authentication the state machine transitions from state 264 to state 266.
- state 266 the state machine transitions to state 266, and there is successful association/re-association and RSNA is required, the state machine transitions to state 267.
- BSS basic service set
- state machine transitions to state 266.
- state 267 When the state machine is in state 266, state 267, or state 268, and the system is deauthenticated, the state machine transitions to state 264.
- Figures 3a-b illustrate a method of performing RSNA authentication.
- the method includes six stages. Stages 1 , 2, and 3 are illustrated in Figure 3a, while stages 4, 5, and 6 are illustrated in Figure 3b. As the method progresses through stage 1 , stage 2, stage 3, stage 4, and stage 5, the state machine progresses through state 264, state 266, state 267, and state 268.
- Stage 1 includes network and security capability discovery 120.
- the access point transmits an initiation frame to the station in step 136.
- the access point transmits a beacon frame.
- the access point transmits a probe response in step 136 in response to a probe request transmitted by the station to the access point in step 134.
- step 2 802.11 authentication and association 122 is performed.
- step 138 the station transmits an 802.11 authentication request to the access point.
- step 140 the access point transmits an 802.11 authentication response to the station.
- step 142 the station transmits an association request to the access point.
- step 144 the access point transmits an 802.11 association response to the station.
- Associated 802. lx blocked security parameters are authenticated in the station in step 146, and in the access point in step 148.
- EAP/802.1x/Radius authentication 124 is performed.
- a mutual authentication protocol is performed based on EAP authentication.
- the access point serves as an authenticator to relay EAP messages.
- the station optionally transmits EAPOL Start.
- the access point transmits EAPOL Request Identity to the station, and in step 154, the station transmits the EAPOL Response identity to the access point.
- the access point transmits an access point radius request to the authentication server in step 156.
- the authentication server and the station perform mutual authentication in step 158.
- the authentication server transmits a radius accept signal to the access point in step 160, and the access point transmits an EPOL success signal to the station in step 162.
- the master session key (MSK) is generated in the station in step 164.
- the MSK is also generated in the authentication server in step 168.
- the pairwise master key (PMK) is generated in the station in step 166.
- the PMK is generated in the authentication server in step 170, and the PMK is transmitted from the authentication server to the access point in step 172.
- step 4 an A-Nonce value is transmitted by the access point to the station.
- the station then constructs a pairwise transient key (PTK) in step 176.
- step 178 the station transmits an S-Nonce value to the access point with a message authorization code (MIC) including authentication.
- MIC message authorization code
- step 180 the access point constructs the PTK and the group temporal key (GTK).
- GTK group temporal key
- step 182 transmits the GTK, the A-Nonce value, a sequence number that will be used in the next multicast or broadcast frame, and another MIC.
- step 184 the station transmits an
- step 190 the GTK is generated and the 802. lx server is unblocked in the station. Also, 802. lx is unblocked in the access point in step 192. A random GTK is generated in the access point in step 194. Then, in optional stage 5, group key handshake 128 is performed.
- step 196 the access point transmits an EAPOL key containing the GTK, a key ID, and a MIC to the station. The station responds, in step 198, by transmitting an acknowledgement of the new GTK to the access point.
- step 6 secure data communication 130 is performed.
- step 202 protected data packets are transmitted between the station and the access point.
- step 204 dynamic host configuration protocol (DHC) requests and responses between the station and a DHCP server are performed.
- DHC dynamic host configuration protocol
- FIG. 4 An embodiment system for authentication is illustrated in Figure 4.
- the system includes station 102, which communicates with access point 106 and authentication server 104. Additionally, access point 106 communicates with authentication server 104.
- the FILS authentication will take place by bypassing state 2 and state 3.
- the FILS authentication exchange will take a condensed version of message exchange compared to the method illustrated by Figures 3a-3b.
- An embodiment state machine for authentication is illustrated in Figure 5.
- the state machine contains three states: state 264, state 268, and state 269. In state 264, the system is unauthenticated and unassociated, and there are class 1 frames. When the state machine is in state 264, and there is successful fast initial link setup (FILS) authentication, the state machine transitions to state 269.
- FILS fast initial link setup
- the state machine When the state machine is in state 269, the system is FILS authenticated, and the IEEE 802. lx controlled port is blocked. Also, there are class 1 and 2 frames with selected management and data frames. Then, if the system is in state 269, and there is a FILS key handshake, the system transition to state 268. When the state machine is in state 268 the system is authenticated and associated, and an IEEE 802. lx controlled port is unblocked. Additionally, in state 268, there are class 1, 2, and 3 frames.
- state machine transitions to state 264.
- state machine transitions to state 264.
- FIG. 6 A flowchart of an embodiment method for authentication involving a station, an access point, and an authentication server is illustrated in Figure 6.
- the method includes state 264, state 269, and state 268.
- FILS specific messages are used to facilitate the FILS authentication.
- stage 2 and stage 3 discussed above with respect to Figures 3a-3b, are bypassed.
- State 264 corresponds to stage 1
- state 269 corresponds to stage 4
- state 268 corresponds to stage 5 and stage 6.
- State 264 includes step 228 and step 230. Also, state 269 includes steps 232- 252. State 268 includes step 254, step 256, step 258, and step 260. Initially, in state 264, the station and access point are unauthenticated, unassociated, and 802. lx is blocked. While in state 264, the access point transmits an initiation frame to the station in step 230. In one embodiment, in step 230, the access point transmits a beacon frame. In another embodiment, the access point transmits a probe response in step 230 in response to a probe request transmitted by the station to the access point in step 228. Then the system transitions to state 269 if FILS authentication is successful.
- the station transmits an authorization request to the access point in step 232.
- the authorization request might include EAPOL start with security parameters for a FILS handshake.
- an EAP request identity transmission is sent from the station to the access point, and the access point responds with an EAP response message.
- the access point transmits an access request to the authentication server in step 234.
- the access request may be an EAP request.
- the station and the authentication server perform an EAP authentication protocol exchange.
- the authorization server generates a PMK in step 238.
- the authorization server transmits an acceptance, an EAP success, and the PMK to the access point.
- the access point then stores the PMK and generates an A-Nonce value in step 242. Then, in step 244, the access point transmits an 802.11 authorization response to the server.
- the 802.11 authorization response may include an EAPOL key, which may include the A-Nonce value and a unicast MIC.
- the station generates a PMK in step 246 and derives the PTK in step 248.
- the station transmits an 802.11 association request to the access point, which may be an EAPOL key, which may include an S-Nonce value and a unicast MIC.
- the access point then transmits an 802.11 association response to the station in step 252.
- the 802.11 association response may include an EAPOL key that may include a PTK, a unicast MIC, and an encrypted GTK or an integrity group temporal key (IGTK).
- IGTK integrity group temporal key
- the station optionally transmits an EAPOL key in step 254, which may contain a unicast MIC, to the access point.
- the server installs the PTK, the GTK and/or the IGTK in step 256, and the access point installs the PTK, the GTK and/or the IGTK in step 258.
- secure data communications between the station and the access point proceed.
- FIG. 7 illustrates a block diagram of processing system 270 that may be used for implementing the devices and methods disclosed herein.
- Specific devices may utilize all of the components shown, or only a subset of the components, and levels of integration may vary from device to device.
- a device may contain multiple instances of a component, such as multiple processing units, processors, memories, transmitters, receivers, etc.
- the processing system may comprise a processing unit equipped with one or more input devices, such as a microphone, mouse, touchscreen, keypad, keyboard, and the like.
- processing system 270 may be equipped with one or more output devices, such as a speaker, a printer, a display, and the like.
- the processing unit may include central processing unit (CPU) 274, memory 276, mass storage device 278, video adapter 280, and I/O interface 288 connected to a bus.
- CPU central processing unit
- the bus may be one or more of any type of several bus architectures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, video bus, or the like.
- CPU 274 may comprise any type of electronic data processor.
- Memory 276 may comprise any type of system memory such as static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), read-only memory (ROM), a combination thereof, or the like.
- SRAM static random access memory
- DRAM dynamic random access memory
- SDRAM synchronous DRAM
- ROM read-only memory
- the memory may include ROM for use at boot-up, and DRAM for program and data storage for use while executing programs.
- Mass storage device 278 may comprise any type of storage device configured to store data, programs, and other information and to make the data, programs, and other information accessible via the bus.
- Mass storage device 278 may comprise, for example, one or more of a solid state drive, hard disk drive, a magnetic disk drive, an optical disk drive, or the like.
- Video adaptor 280 and I/O interface 288 provide interfaces to couple external input and output devices to the processing unit.
- input and output devices include the display coupled to the video adapter and the mouse/keyboard/printer coupled to the I/O interface.
- Other devices may be coupled to the processing unit, and additional or fewer interface cards may be utilized.
- a serial interface card (not pictured) may be used to provide a serial interface for a printer.
- the processing unit also includes one or more network interface 284, which may comprise wired links, such as an Ethernet cable or the like, and/or wireless links to access nodes or different networks.
- Network interface 284 allows the processing unit to communicate with remote units via the networks.
- the network interface may provide wireless communication via one or more transmitters/transmit antennas and one or more receivers/receive antennas.
- the processing unit is coupled to a local-area network or a wide- area network for data processing and communications with remote devices, such as other processing units, the Internet, remote storage facilities, or the like.
- Advantages of an embodiment include compatibility with the RSNA security protocol and security. Another advantage of an embodiment is the use of only nine or ten messages in a handshake. In an example, a four way handshake is reduced to a three way handshake.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Cardiology (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
- Medicines That Contain Protein Lipid Enzymes And Other Medicines (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (7)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP13733620.2A EP2789148B1 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2013-01-06 | Systems and methods for authentication |
EP20157417.5A EP3700162B1 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2013-01-06 | Systems and methods for authentication |
KR1020147021916A KR101582502B1 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2013-01-06 | Systems and methods for authentication |
JP2014550631A JP5866030B2 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2013-01-06 | System and method for authentication |
EP23195380.3A EP4301085A3 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2013-01-06 | Systems and methods for authentication |
RU2014132429/08A RU2587417C2 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2013-01-06 | Authentication systems and methods |
CN201380004164.5A CN103988480B (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2013-01-06 | System and method for certification |
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US201261583856P | 2012-01-06 | 2012-01-06 | |
US61/583,856 | 2012-01-06 | ||
US13/734,471 US9077701B2 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2013-01-04 | Systems and methods for authentication |
US13/734,471 | 2013-01-04 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2013102449A1 true WO2013102449A1 (en) | 2013-07-11 |
Family
ID=48744899
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/CN2013/070125 WO2013102449A1 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2013-01-06 | Systems and methods for authentication |
Country Status (7)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (4) | US9077701B2 (en) |
EP (3) | EP4301085A3 (en) |
JP (1) | JP5866030B2 (en) |
KR (1) | KR101582502B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN103988480B (en) |
RU (1) | RU2587417C2 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2013102449A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (13)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US9077701B2 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2015-07-07 | Futurewei Technologies, Inc. | Systems and methods for authentication |
CN103546982A (en) * | 2012-07-10 | 2014-01-29 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and device for transforming working states of workstation |
WO2014051349A2 (en) * | 2012-09-26 | 2014-04-03 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | Method and apparatus for gaining access in wireless lan system |
US9554324B2 (en) | 2012-10-16 | 2017-01-24 | Stmicroelectronics, Inc. | Fast initial link setup (FILS) frame content for a wireless network |
US9717005B2 (en) * | 2012-11-21 | 2017-07-25 | Empire Technology Development Llc | Schemes for connecting to wireless network |
US20140329498A1 (en) * | 2013-05-02 | 2014-11-06 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Systems and methods for power save during initial link setup |
WO2016015749A1 (en) * | 2014-07-28 | 2016-02-04 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | Authentication in a wireless communications network |
US10555170B2 (en) | 2015-09-04 | 2020-02-04 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Method and apparatus for authentication of wireless devices |
CN107491279A (en) * | 2017-08-15 | 2017-12-19 | 深圳市创维群欣安防科技股份有限公司 | A kind of method, storage medium and throwing screen control device realized mobile terminal and throw screen |
US11075907B2 (en) * | 2017-12-20 | 2021-07-27 | Korea University Research And Business Foundation | End-to-end security communication method based on mac protocol using software defined-networking, and communication controller and computer program for the same |
CN111654865B (en) * | 2020-07-31 | 2022-02-22 | 迈普通信技术股份有限公司 | Terminal authentication method and device, network equipment and readable storage medium |
WO2022046798A1 (en) * | 2020-08-24 | 2022-03-03 | Eleven Software Inc. | Key matching for eapol handshake using distributed computing |
WO2024072379A1 (en) * | 2022-09-28 | 2024-04-04 | Intel Corporation | Enhanced unavailability mode for station devices unassociated to access points |
Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN1501658A (en) * | 2002-11-15 | 2004-06-02 | 华为技术有限公司 | A client authentication method based on 802.1X protocol |
CN101563881A (en) * | 2006-09-18 | 2009-10-21 | 马维尔国际有限公司 | Establishment of ad-hoc networks between multiple devices |
Family Cites Families (12)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7395427B2 (en) * | 2003-01-10 | 2008-07-01 | Walker Jesse R | Authenticated key exchange based on pairwise master key |
US7275157B2 (en) * | 2003-05-27 | 2007-09-25 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Facilitating 802.11 roaming by pre-establishing session keys |
US7646872B2 (en) | 2004-04-02 | 2010-01-12 | Research In Motion Limited | Systems and methods to securely generate shared keys |
US7716724B2 (en) * | 2005-06-16 | 2010-05-11 | Verizon Business Global Llc | Extensible authentication protocol (EAP) state server |
US20070047477A1 (en) | 2005-08-23 | 2007-03-01 | Meshnetworks, Inc. | Extensible authentication protocol over local area network (EAPOL) proxy in a wireless network for node to node authentication |
US7630406B2 (en) * | 2005-11-04 | 2009-12-08 | Intel Corporation | Methods and apparatus for providing a delayed attack protection system for network traffic |
US7911997B2 (en) * | 2006-05-10 | 2011-03-22 | Intel Corporation | Quality of service resource negotiation |
TW200803359A (en) * | 2006-06-13 | 2008-01-01 | Accton Technology Corp | Method of connecting a new discovered AP by early 4-way handshaking |
US7941663B2 (en) * | 2007-10-23 | 2011-05-10 | Futurewei Technologies, Inc. | Authentication of 6LoWPAN nodes using EAP-GPSK |
EP2276278A1 (en) * | 2009-07-13 | 2011-01-19 | Research In Motion Limited | Methods and apparatus for maintaining secure connections in a wireless communication network |
US8837741B2 (en) * | 2011-09-12 | 2014-09-16 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Systems and methods for encoding exchanges with a set of shared ephemeral key data |
US9077701B2 (en) | 2012-01-06 | 2015-07-07 | Futurewei Technologies, Inc. | Systems and methods for authentication |
-
2013
- 2013-01-04 US US13/734,471 patent/US9077701B2/en active Active
- 2013-01-06 EP EP23195380.3A patent/EP4301085A3/en active Pending
- 2013-01-06 EP EP13733620.2A patent/EP2789148B1/en active Active
- 2013-01-06 JP JP2014550631A patent/JP5866030B2/en active Active
- 2013-01-06 KR KR1020147021916A patent/KR101582502B1/en active IP Right Grant
- 2013-01-06 EP EP20157417.5A patent/EP3700162B1/en active Active
- 2013-01-06 CN CN201380004164.5A patent/CN103988480B/en active Active
- 2013-01-06 WO PCT/CN2013/070125 patent/WO2013102449A1/en active Application Filing
- 2013-01-06 RU RU2014132429/08A patent/RU2587417C2/en active
-
2015
- 2015-06-02 US US14/728,560 patent/US9674702B2/en active Active
-
2017
- 2017-04-20 US US15/492,911 patent/US10104546B2/en active Active
-
2018
- 2018-10-12 US US16/159,235 patent/US10904753B2/en active Active
Patent Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN1501658A (en) * | 2002-11-15 | 2004-06-02 | 华为技术有限公司 | A client authentication method based on 802.1X protocol |
CN101563881A (en) * | 2006-09-18 | 2009-10-21 | 马维尔国际有限公司 | Establishment of ad-hoc networks between multiple devices |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
DAN HARKINS ET AL.: "A Protocol for FILS Authentication", 1 November 2011 (2011-11-01), XP055132094, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:Http://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/11-11-1429-00-OOai-fils-authentication.pptx> * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JP2015505647A (en) | 2015-02-23 |
EP4301085A2 (en) | 2024-01-03 |
RU2587417C2 (en) | 2016-06-20 |
EP2789148A1 (en) | 2014-10-15 |
KR101582502B1 (en) | 2016-01-05 |
US9674702B2 (en) | 2017-06-06 |
EP2789148B1 (en) | 2020-03-11 |
US10904753B2 (en) | 2021-01-26 |
EP2789148A4 (en) | 2015-03-11 |
US20190053052A1 (en) | 2019-02-14 |
RU2014132429A (en) | 2016-02-27 |
KR20140110051A (en) | 2014-09-16 |
US20150281962A1 (en) | 2015-10-01 |
US20130179943A1 (en) | 2013-07-11 |
EP3700162B1 (en) | 2023-10-11 |
CN103988480A (en) | 2014-08-13 |
US9077701B2 (en) | 2015-07-07 |
JP5866030B2 (en) | 2016-02-17 |
US20170223534A1 (en) | 2017-08-03 |
EP4301085A3 (en) | 2024-01-17 |
US10104546B2 (en) | 2018-10-16 |
CN103988480B (en) | 2016-11-16 |
EP3700162A1 (en) | 2020-08-26 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US10904753B2 (en) | Systems and methods for authentication | |
CN108293185B (en) | Wireless device authentication method and device | |
CN107005927B (en) | Access method, device and system of User Equipment (UE) | |
EP3700124B1 (en) | Security authentication method, configuration method, and related device | |
CN101500229B (en) | Method for establishing security association and communication network system | |
US9392453B2 (en) | Authentication | |
US20160360407A1 (en) | Distributed configurator entity | |
US11533615B2 (en) | Methods and systems of wireless sensor authentication | |
WO2007082060A2 (en) | Apparatus and method for protection of management frames | |
CN102883316A (en) | Connection establishing method, terminal and access point | |
CN107211272A (en) | Methods, devices and systems | |
US20120017080A1 (en) | Method for establishing safe association among wapi stations in ad-hoc network | |
JP2018526846A (en) | Wireless device configuration and authentication | |
US20130191635A1 (en) | Wireless authentication terminal | |
CN103200004B (en) | Send the method for message, the method for establishing secure connection, access point and work station | |
CN103139770B (en) | The method and system of pairwise master key is transmitted in WLAN access network | |
KR100667186B1 (en) | Apparatus and method for realizing authentication system of wireless mobile terminal | |
CN102014385A (en) | Authentication method for mobile terminal, and mobile terminal | |
CN116847350A (en) | D2D communication method, terminal and medium |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 13733620 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2014550631 Country of ref document: JP Kind code of ref document: A |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2013733620 Country of ref document: EP |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 20147021916 Country of ref document: KR Kind code of ref document: A |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2014132429 Country of ref document: RU Kind code of ref document: A |