WO2012146824A1 - Method and apparatus for providing service provider-controlled communication security - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for providing service provider-controlled communication security Download PDFInfo
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- WO2012146824A1 WO2012146824A1 PCT/FI2012/050390 FI2012050390W WO2012146824A1 WO 2012146824 A1 WO2012146824 A1 WO 2012146824A1 FI 2012050390 W FI2012050390 W FI 2012050390W WO 2012146824 A1 WO2012146824 A1 WO 2012146824A1
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- Prior art keywords
- encryption
- network
- context information
- processing
- ciphers
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
- H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0872—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using geo-location information, e.g. location data, time, relative position or proximity to other entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/107—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources wherein the security policies are location-dependent, e.g. entities privileges depend on current location or allowing specific operations only from locally connected terminals
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/30—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/30—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
- H04L63/304—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information intercepting circuit switched data communications
Definitions
- Service providers and device manufacturers are continually challenged to deliver value and convenience to consumers by, for example, providing compelling network services.
- end users often use the services to store, access, or otherwise manage potentially personal or sensitive information.
- one area of development with respect to these services has been providing end users privacy and security when using these services.
- security and privacy are often be affected or dictated by different regulations, requirements, and/or practices (e.g., Lawful Interception (LI) requirements) associated with the jurisdictions from which end users are accessing the services.
- LI Lawful Interception
- access network operators, service providers and device manufacturers face significant technical challenges associated with providing the privacy and security for users accessing services while also complying with local requirements and providing for efficient operation of the services.
- a method comprises receiving a request for a secure connection from a device.
- the method also comprises determining context information (e.g., country of origin) associated with the device, a user of the device, an access network, or a combination thereof.
- the method further comprises processing and/or facilitating a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers.
- the method also comprises causing, at least in part, establishment of the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers.
- the device may be, for example, any type of device, including a mobile terminal, a personal or impersonal, human or non-human operated, fixed terminal, or portable terminal, such as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a netbook computer, a tablet computer, and the like.
- the device may be associated with a service that is attempting to establish a secure connection.
- an apparatus comprises at least one processor, and at least one memory including computer program code, the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause, at least in part, the apparatus to receive a request for a secure connection from a device.
- the apparatus is also caused to determine context information (e.g., country of origin) associated with the device, a user of the device, an access network or a combination thereof.
- the apparatus is further caused to process and/or facilitate a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers.
- the apparatus is also caused to establish the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers.
- a computer-readable storage medium carries one or more sequences of one or more instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, cause, at least in part, an apparatus to receive a request for a secure connection from a device.
- the apparatus is also caused to determine context information (e.g., country of origin) associated with the device, a user of the device, an access network, or a combination thereof.
- the apparatus is further caused to process and/or facilitate a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers.
- the apparatus is also caused to establish the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers.
- an apparatus comprises means for receiving a request for a secure connection from a device.
- the apparatus also comprises means for determining context information (e.g., country of origin) associated with the device, a user of the device, an access network or a combination thereof.
- the apparatus further comprises means for processing and/or facilitating a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers.
- the apparatus also comprises means for causing, at least in part, establishment of the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers.
- a method comprising facilitating access to at least one interface configured to allow access to at least one service, the at least one service configured to perform any one or any combination of network or service provider methods (or processes) disclosed in this application.
- An apparatus comprising means for performing the method of any of originally filed claims 1 -10 and 24.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram of a system capable of determining an appropriate encryption cipher, according to one embodiment
- FIG. 2 is a diagram of the components of a security platform, according to one embodiment
- FIG. 3A is a flowchart of a process for determining an appropriate encryption cipher, according to one embodiment
- FIG. 3B is a flowchart of one or more optional and/or alternative steps to the flowchart illustrated in FIG. 3 A, according to one embodiment.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram of hardware that can be used to implement an embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram of a system capable of determining an appropriate encryption cipher, according to one embodiment.
- End user privacy and security is a critical issue of concern in providing internet services.
- a widely applied way of protecting end user data is to use Transport Layer Security (TLS), which was earlier called Secure Socket Layer (SSL), to encrypt data sent over, for example, a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) transport.
- TLS Transport Layer Security
- SSL Secure Socket Layer
- HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
- LI Lawful Interception
- Example communications may include, but are not limited to, emails, web discussion board messages, instant messages, etc.
- a commonly claimed reason for allowing a governing authority to eavesdrop is anti-terrorism.
- the European Community has requirements for protecting the end user data. But, even when a communication service is provided in the European Community, a local access network operator may be required to block access to that service if the local access network operation cannot fulfill a governing authority's Lawful Interception (LI) requirements allowing the governing authority to eavesdrop.
- LI Lawful Interception
- the European Community in this example, wishes to protect the integrity of the end user, which may ultimately conflict with the desire by other jurisdictions to have the ability to view encrypted data.
- a system 100 of FIG. 1 introduces the capability of determining an appropriate encryption cipher that meets a governing authority's requirements while maintaining the ability for an end user to receive an encrypted dataset at the service-provider end.
- the system 100 determines context information (e.g., a location) of a user device that is to receive a dataset by way of an internet communication and selects a cipher, such as a TLS cipher, based on the context information (e.g., the access network or country where the end user device is resident at the time of the request), so long as the cipher is known and/or required for the particular context (e.g., country of origin).
- any other context of the device may be used to determine the appropriate security protocol (e.g., encryption cipher) to use.
- context information such as time of the request, activity at the device, history of user activity at the device, user behavior patterns, or any combination of contexts can be used in the various embodiments described herein.
- the system 100 will search for an appropriate cipher to determine whether there are any application local requirements before allowing establishment of the communication session for transmission of the dataset.
- the appropriate cipher may be an encryption cipher that the governing authority for the location has set to enable LI (e.g., by specifying an encryption cipher key length for which the governing authority knowingly has the ability to decipher).
- Such an encryption may also be known as a weak encryption because while the dataset is still encrypted, it may be broken by a select few, or those with superior decryption skills to those of the average consumer.
- a weak encryption cipher may be, for example, a 40-bit encryption.
- the selection for using weak ciphers may be based on IP subnet lists provided by the access network operator (e.g., the ISP or a cellular access network operator) when the LI capability is requested by a governing or security authority of a particular country or location.
- the selection may be based on a statistically determined source IP address belonging to the range reserved for certain mobile network operators by mapping the subnets to a mobile country code (MCC) and a mobile network code (MNC) identifying the operator.
- MCC mobile country code
- MNC mobile network code
- the system 100 may employ any default security protocol (e.g., a strong TLS cipher).
- strong cipher may be a 256-bit encryption or higher.
- the location of the end user can be detected by analyzing the source Internet Protocol (IP) address from when the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection is established before starting a TLS handshaking, for example.
- IP Internet Protocol
- TCP Transmission Control Protocol
- the end user location may also be determined by any means for determining the position of an electronic device such as, for example, global positioning, geolocation, cellular network location systems (e.g., E-OTD), etc. as long as the means for determining the location of the device is from a trusted source (e.g., cannot be modified).
- the system 100 comprises connection originators (COs) lOla-lOln (also collectively referred to as COs 101) having connectivity to a security platform 103 and a service provider 107 via a communication network 105.
- COs connection originators
- the security platform 103 performs various embodiments of the processes associated with determining and/or specifying the appropriate security protocol(s) or cipher(s) for the service provider 107 to respond to one or more communication or service requests from the COs 101.
- the security platform 103 is depicted as a separate component to the communication network 105, it is contemplated that the security platform 103 and/or one or more of its functions and/or modules may be included in or performed by the service provider 107 and/or any of the services 109a-109m provided by the service provider 107.
- the functionality may be implemented by a load balancer or TLS accelerator terminating the TLS connection and thus taking care of the TLS session negotiation (e.g., outside of a the actual service, and event outside of the service provider).
- a CO 101 requests to establish a communication session to receive a data transmission from the service provider 107, the services 109, one or more content providers 1 11 a- 11 1 j , any other CO 101 , or a combination thereof by way of communication network 105.
- the security platform 103 determines context information of the CO 101 to facilitate determination of an appropriate security protocol.
- the context information is location information
- the security platform 103 determines the location of the CO 101 by analyzing the source Internet Protocol (IP) address from when the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection is established before starting a TLS handshaking.
- IP Internet Protocol
- TCP Transmission Control Protocol
- the security platform 103 may base the location determination of the CO 101 on a network code (e.g., a mobile network code (MNC)), a country code (e.g., a mobile country code (MCC)), or any combination thereof that have been pre-collected or determined based on non-personal relational information between the source IP subnets and the MNCs/MCCs (e.g., probe data).
- a network code e.g., a mobile network code (MNC)
- MCC mobile country code
- the security platform 103 determines an appropriate encryption cipher or security protocol based on the context information (e.g., country of origin) of the CO 101.
- the governing authorities may provide ranges or network addresses or other identifiers associated with target COs 101.
- the security platform 103 can compare the network identifier of the requesting CO 101 against the range of addresses provided by the governing authority to apply a security protocol or cipher associated with the range.
- the system 100 enables the service provider 107 (e.g., via the security platform 103) to service requests from many different jurisdictions without having to configure individual servers for each jurisdiction with different security requirements.
- the server-side approach described in the various embodiments avoids a need to configure any settings on the client to change security protocols and/or encryption ciphers or even assist the decision with potentially false data.
- the communication network 105 of system 100 includes one or more networks such as a data network (not shown), a wireless network (not shown), a telephony network (not shown), or any combination thereof.
- the data network may be any local area network (LAN), metropolitan area network (MAN), wide area network (WAN), a public data network (e.g., the Internet), short range wireless network, or any other suitable packet-switched network, such as a commercially owned, proprietary packet-switched network, e.g., a proprietary cable or fiber-optic network, and the like, or any combination thereof.
- LAN local area network
- MAN metropolitan area network
- WAN wide area network
- a public data network e.g., the Internet
- short range wireless network e.g., a commercially owned, proprietary packet-switched network, e.g., a proprietary cable or fiber-optic network, and the like, or any combination thereof.
- the wireless network may be, for example, a cellular network and may employ various technologies including enhanced data rates for global evolution (EDGE), general packet radio service (GPRS), global system for mobile communications (GSM), Internet protocol multimedia subsystem (IMS), universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS), etc., as well as any other suitable wireless medium, e.g., worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX), Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks, code division multiple access (CDMA), wideband code division multiple access (WCDMA), wireless fidelity (WiFi), wireless LAN (WLAN), Bluetooth®, Internet Protocol (IP) data casting, satellite, mobile ad-hoc network (MANET), and the like, or any combination thereof.
- EDGE enhanced data rates for global evolution
- GPRS general packet radio service
- GSM global system for mobile communications
- IMS Internet protocol multimedia subsystem
- UMTS universal mobile telecommunications system
- WiMAX worldwide interoperability for microwave access
- LTE Long Term Evolution
- CDMA code division multiple
- the CO 101 can be any type of originator device.
- the CO 101 is any type of mobile terminal, personal or impersonal, human or non-human operated, fixed terminal, or portable terminal including a mobile handset, station, unit, device, multimedia computer, multimedia tablet, Internet node, communicator, desktop computer, laptop computer, notebook computer, netbook computer, tablet computer, personal communication system (PCS) device, personal navigation device, personal digital assistants (PDAs), audio/video player, digital camera/camcorder, positioning device, television receiver, radio broadcast receiver, electronic book device, game device, or any combination thereof, including the accessories and peripherals of these devices, or any combination thereof.
- the CO 101 can support any type of interface to the user (such as "wearable" circuitry, etc.).
- the CO 101 may be user equipment, such as a mobile handset.
- the CO 101 , the security platform 103, and the service provider 107 communicate with each other and other components of the communication network 105 using well known, new or still developing protocols.
- a protocol includes a set of rules defining how the network nodes within the communication network 105 interact with each other based on information sent over the communication links.
- the protocols are effective at different layers of operation within each node, from generating and receiving physical signals of various types, to selecting a link for transferring those signals, to the format of information indicated by those signals, to identifying which software application executing on a computer system sends or receives the information.
- the conceptually different layers of protocols for exchanging information over a network are described in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model.
- OSI Open Systems Interconnection
- Each packet typically comprises (1) header information associated with a particular protocol, and (2) payload information that follows the header information and contains information that may be processed independently of that particular protocol.
- the packet includes (3) trailer information following the payload and indicating the end of the payload information.
- the header includes information such as the source of the packet, its destination, the length of the payload, and other properties used by the protocol.
- the data in the payload for the particular protocol includes a header and payload for a different protocol associated with a different, higher layer of the OSI Reference Model.
- the header for a particular protocol typically indicates a type for the next protocol contained in its payload.
- the higher layer protocol is said to be encapsulated in the lower layer protocol.
- the headers included in a packet traversing multiple heterogeneous networks, such as the Internet typically include a physical (layer 1) header, a data-link (layer 2) header, an internetwork (layer 3) header and a transport (layer 4) header, and various application (layer 5, layer 6 and layer 7) headers as defined by the OSI Reference Model.
- the CO 101 e.g., via the respective communication modules 1 13a-113n, collectively referred to as CO 101
- the security platform 103 interact according to a client- server model. It is noted that the client-server model of computer process interaction is widely known and used.
- a client process sends a message including a request to a server process, and the server process responds by providing a service.
- the server process may also return a message with a response to the client process.
- the direction of the possible request/response pairs of the application protocol inside the TLS— after a cipher selected— is not an important.
- the client process and server process execute on different computer devices, called hosts, and communicate via a network using one or more protocols for network communications.
- the term "server” is conventionally used to refer to the process that provides the service, or the host computer on which the process operates.
- client is conventionally used to refer to the process that makes the request or initiates the connection, or the host computer on which the process operates.
- server refers to the processes, rather than the host computers, unless otherwise clear from the context.
- process performed by a server can be broken up to run as multiple processes on multiple hosts (sometimes called tiers) for reasons that include reliability, scalability, and redundancy, among others.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram of the components of the security platform 103, according to one embodiment.
- the security platform 103 includes one or more components for processing context information for determining an appropriate encryption cipher. It is contemplated that the functions of these components may be combined in one or more components or performed by other components of equivalent functionality.
- the security platform 103 includes at least a control logic 201 which executes at least one algorithm for executing functions of the security platform 103.
- the control logic 201 interacts with a communication request module 203 to determine (e.g., receive or intercept) communication or service requests from the COs 101 to the service provider 107, the services 109, and/or the content providers 111.
- the security platform 103 may also include a load balancer and/or a TLS accelerator.
- a load balancer may terminate the TLS connection and distribute the application protocol request to various application servers (e.g., services 109).
- the TLS accelerator may speed up the data encrypting and decrypting inside the secure connection as well the cryptographic calculations needed in the secure connection establishment (e.g., the TLS session handshaking with special hardware).
- the TLS accelerator may implement the dynamic cipher selection logic, as described herein.
- the communication request module 203 interacts with the context module 205 to begin processing the request.
- the context module 205 determines the context information received as part of the communication request. For example, the context module 205 can determine the location of the requesting CO 101 from a network address (e.g., an Internet protocol (IP) address) associated with the originating CO 101.
- IP Internet protocol
- the context module 205 may include a table or other database of MNCs/MCCs that have been associated with one or more IP subnets. By comparing a network address of the CO 101 to the table or database, the context module can derive the MCC associated with the CO 101 for determining the country of origin.
- the context module 205 can process context information that is received from the CO 101 to determine the location of the CO 101. For example, the context module 205 may determine a location of the CO 101 based on information received from a network address, any GPS, geo-location information, and the like. In one embodiment, in addition to location information, the context module 205 may determine any other potentially relevant context information or other general context information (e.g., time, activity, user history, user behavior, etc.) received about the CO 101 or the user of the CO 101 so that the context may be used to determine an appropriate encryption cipher or security protocol.
- any other potentially relevant context information or other general context information e.g., time, activity, user history, user behavior, etc.
- general context information refers to, at least in part, all contextual data, user data and user-to-device interaction data (e.g., date, time of day, location, activity, motion, position, modality, spatiotemporal element, etc.) as collected, and can be used for determining a present state or modality of the device.
- context information can be determined through analysis of historical data pertaining to the user or device, so as to enable a means of predicting to a degree of certainty expected or future device states or modalities.
- the compilation of context information can be analyzed appropriately, including reference with respect to additional data and/or a context model, for enabling the context of a device, device user or one or more other associated users and their respective devices to be determined accordingly.
- the context module 205 can process probe data.
- the context module 205 may use probe data associated with the access network and match the source IP address of the connection against subnetworks and detected MNC/MCC values.
- the context module 205 may compare source addresses and MNC/MCC relations stored in a database and determine the country of origin based on the information in the database. The context module 205 under this approach allows for an alternate way in determining the cipher suite if there is not any available source IP range information provided by other means.
- a security determination module 207 of the security platform 103 can determine an appropriate security protocol or encryption cipher to apply to the requested communication session.
- the security determination module 207 has connectivity to a regulations database 209 that includes information on regulations, restrictions, practices, etc. associated with operating one or more security protocols and/or encryption ciphers with respect to one or more jurisdictions.
- regulations database 209 is created by any means by which a security, regulatory or government agency may openly communicate its encryption, or lawful interception, protocols with the service provider 107.
- the service provider 107 may create its own database of such regulatory information, or determine the regulations from other databases.
- the security determination module 207 may also use context information about the source of the dataset that is requested by the CO 101 when determining which encryption cipher the dataset should be sent with.
- governing authorities may provide the information directly to the service provider 107.
- the security determination module 207 may receive an input for specifying a range of network addresses, some of which may be suspect or flagged on a watch list by the security platform 103.
- the security determination module 207 may then compare a detected network address of a CO 101 with the range of network addresses to determine the appropriate encryption cipher based on the comparison.
- the governing authority may specify and individual address or range of addresses or identifiers associated with one or more COs 101 subject to security restrictions (e.g., lawful interception).
- the regulations database can include both generally applicable regulatory restrictions and/or restrictions specific to particular COs 101 , wherein the restrictions relate to what security protocols and/or ciphers can be applied.
- the security determination module 207 can then provide or identify the determined security protocol and/or encryption ciphers to the service provider 107 via the service interface 211.
- the service provider 107 can store the location information and associated encryption cipher for future use. In this way, the service provider 107 need not request the determination from the security platform 103 for subsequent requests from the same CO 101 or other COs 101 in a similar source address range.
- the service provider 107 then allows transmission of the requested dataset or communication session to the CO 101 and encrypts the dataset or session using the appropriate encryption cipher in, for example, a Transport Layer Security or Secure Sockets Layer protocol for the detected location.
- the service provider remains in compliance with the any applicable regulations (e.g., including LI regulations that permit security and/or government agencies to lawfully decrypt the communication session) while still enabling privacy protection using the highest level of security or encryption permitted in a particular jurisdiction.
- the service provider 107 may transmit the requested dataset to the CO 101 in a manner that is encrypted with a strong encryption cipher, such as the 256-bit cipher, as discussed above.
- the service provider 107 has the flexibility to support multiple levels or forms of encryption depending on the requirements of the local jurisdiction of the requesting CO 101.
- the security platform 103 may include an encryption module 213 capable of supporting any of the ciphers that might be specified or determined for a jurisdiction. The encryption module 213 can then perform the appropriate encryption for the service provider 107 in case, for example, the service provider does not support a particular encryption cipher or security protocol determined for the requesting CO 101.
- FIG. 3A is a flowchart of a process for determining an appropriate encryption cipher, according to one embodiment.
- the security platform 103 performs the process 300 and is implemented in, for instance, a chip set including a processor and a memory as shown in FIG. 5.
- the service provider 107 may perform all or a portion of the process 300.
- the security platform 103 receives a request for a secure connection from a CO 101.
- the request can include a request to establish a secure connection for exchanging information between the CO 101 and the service provider 107, the services 109, and/or the content provider 1 11 to which the request is directed.
- the process continues to step 303 in which the security platform 103 determines context information associated with the CO 101 , an access network, a user of the CO 101, or a combination thereof for determining an encryption cipher or security protocol to apply to establish the requested connection.
- the context determination step can be based, at least in part, on information implicitly provided as part of the request, such as determining context information from an IP address associated with the requesting CO 101.
- the security platform 103 consults, for instance, the regulations database 209 to determine an appropriate strength of the encryption cipher based on the determined context information.
- the strength of the encryption cipher is set by a governmental authority, a regulatory entity, the service provider 107, or a combination thereof.
- the security platform 103 stores this information to determine what level of encryption (e.g., how many bits, what encryption schemes or algorithm, etc.) to apply.
- the strength can be specified by identifying specific encryption ciphers.
- the encryption can be specified by one or more criteria. Then, the security platform 103 can select one or more encryption ciphers conforming to those criteria.
- the security platform 103 processes and/or facilitates processing of the context information (and the other information determined in the above steps) to determine one or more encryption ciphers appropriate to the context and the applicable regulations. In cases where no regulations exist for a particular location, the security platform 103 can determine a default protocol or cipher (e.g., a strong cipher) to apply. Once the encryption cipher is determined, the security platform 103 (e.g., in cooperation with the service provider 107) causes, at least in part, an establishment of the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers (step 309).
- a default protocol or cipher e.g., a strong cipher
- FIG. 3B is a flowchart of one or more optional and/or alternative steps to the flowchart illustrated in FIG. 3A, according to one embodiment.
- the security platform 103 performs the process 320 and is implemented in, for instance, a chip set including a processor and a memory as shown in FIG. 5.
- the service provider 107 may perform all or a portion of the process 320. Although illustrated as a sequence, in various embodiments, not all of the steps are performed, nor do the steps need to be performed in the illustrated sequence.
- the security platform 103 determines the location information based, at least in part, on a network address, a network code, a country code, or a combination thereof associated with the CO 101.
- the country or access network level residence of a user may be determined by using the probe data associated with the access network and by matching the source IP address of the connection against the subnetworks and their detected MNC/MCC values.
- the security platform 103 may collect source addresses and MNC/MCC relations and store this information in a database.
- the country of origin may then be determined based on the information in the database.
- the ability to use the database that collects the source addresses and MNC/MCC relations enables determining the country of origin of the client.
- Other means than the MCC/MNC may be available to determine the country of origin based on the source IP address such as external geo IP databases for which the security platform 103 may consult.
- the security platform 103 may then determine previously stored probe data associated with the access network used by the CO 101 , and then process and/or facilitate a processing of the probe data to determine the country of origin.
- the security platform 103 may determine by examining the regulations database 209 that the security platform 103 has received an input (e.g., from a governing or security authority) that specifies a range of network addresses to which particular regulations, security protocols, encryption ciphers, etc. apply.
- a governing authority may have specific interest in applying a particular encryption cipher or security protocol to one or more devices or COs 101 operating within its jurisdiction.
- the encryption cipher or security protocol can support one or more lawful interception requirements of a locality associated with the device.
- the authority can provide the specific targeted network addresses to the service provider 107.
- an administrator may specify a range of addresses that are specific to certain locations to which different security and/or encryption ciphers apply. For example, if a country requires a certain cipher, then the range of network addresses assigned or otherwise determined to be associated with devices operating in that country can be specified.
- FIG. 4 illustrates a computer system 400 that may implement an embodiment of the invention.
- the computer system 400 is programmed (e.g., via computer program code or instructions) to determine an appropriate encryption cipher as described herein and includes a communication mechanism such as a bus 410 for passing information between other internal and external components of the computer system 400.
- Information also called data
- Information is represented as a physical expression of a measurable phenomenon, typically electric voltages, but including, in other embodiments, such phenomena as magnetic, electromagnetic, pressure, chemical, biological, molecular, atomic, sub-atomic and quantum interactions. For example, north and south magnetic fields, or a zero and non-zero electric voltage, represent two states (0, 1) of a binary digit (bit). Other phenomena can represent digits of a higher base.
- a superposition of multiple simultaneous quantum states before measurement represents a quantum bit (qubit).
- a sequence of one or more digits constitutes digital data that is used to represent a number or code for a character.
- information called analog data is represented by a near continuum of measurable values within a particular range.
- Computer system 400, or a portion thereof, constitutes a means for performing one or more steps of determining an appropriate encryption cipher.
- a bus 410 includes one or more parallel conductors of information so that information is transferred quickly among devices coupled to the bus 410.
- One or more processors 402 for processing information are coupled with the bus 410.
- a processor (or multiple processors) 402 performs a set of operations on information as specified by computer program code related to determine an appropriate encryption cipher.
- the computer program code is a set of instructions or statements providing instructions for the operation of the processor and/or the computer system to perform specified functions.
- the code for example, may be written in a computer programming language that is compiled into a native instruction set of the processor.
- the code may also be written directly using the native instruction set (e.g., machine language).
- the set of operations include bringing information in from the bus 410 and placing information on the bus 410.
- the set of operations also typically include comparing two or more units of information, shifting positions of units of information, and combining two or more units of information, such as by addition or multiplication or logical operations like OR, exclusive OR (XOR), and AND.
- Each operation of the set of operations that can be performed by the processor is represented to the processor by information called instructions, such as an operation code of one or more digits.
- At least one sequence of operations, such as sequences of operation codes are executed by the processor 402 (or multiple processors) as one serial sequence of operations executed sequentially by single or multiple processors, as multiple parallel sequences of operations executed in parallel by multiple processors, or a combination thereof.
- the at least one sequences of operations constitute processor instructions, also called computer system instructions or, simply, computer instructions. Processors may be implemented as mechanical, electrical, magnetic, optical, chemical or quantum components, among others, alone or in combination.
- Computer system 400 also includes at least one memory 404 coupled to bus 410.
- the memory 404 such as dynamic memory (e.g., RAM, magnetic disk, writable optical disk, etc.) and/or static memory (e.g., ROM, CD-ROM, etc.), stores information including processor instructions for determining an appropriate encryption cipher.
- Dynamic memory allows information stored therein to be changed by the computer system 400.
- RAM allows a unit of information stored at a location called a memory address to be stored and retrieved independently of information at neighboring addresses.
- the memory 404 is also used by the processor 402 to store temporary values during execution of processor instructions.
- the computer system 400 also includes a read only memory (ROM) 406 or any other static storage device coupled to the bus 410 for storing static information, including instructions, that is not changed by the computer system 400. Some memory is composed of volatile storage that loses the information stored thereon when power is lost. Also coupled to bus 410 is a non-volatile (persistent) storage device 408, such as a magnetic disk, optical disk or flash card, for storing information, including instructions, that persists even when the computer system 400 is turned off or otherwise loses power.
- the storage devices 408 may be in communication with the processor 402 and other elements of the computer system 400 through the communication interface 470, and thus be located external to the computer system 400, such as within a local area network 480.
- Computer system 400 also includes one or more instances of the communications interface 470 coupled to bus 410.
- Communication interface 470 provides a one-way or two-way communication coupling to a variety of external devices that operate with their own processors, such as external storage devices 408. In general the coupling is with a network link 416 that is connected to a local network 416 to which a variety of external devices with their own processors are connected.
- communications interface 470 may be a local area network (LAN) card to provide a data communication connection to a compatible LAN, such as Ethernet. Wireless links may also be implemented.
- LAN local area network
- the communications interface 470 sends or receives or both sends and receives electrical, acoustic or electromagnetic signals, including infrared and optical signals, that carry information streams, such as digital data.
- the communications interface 470 enables connection to the communication network 105 through the local network 416 for determining an appropriate encryption cipher for a connection of a CO 101.
- the local network 416 may include one or more load balancers that may be used to terminate the TLS/SSL requests. The load balancers may further reduce the computational drain regarding TLS/SSL requests at the processor 402 of the computer system 400.
- Non-transitory media such as nonvolatile media, include, for example, optical or magnetic disks, such as storage device 408.
- Volatile media include, for example, dynamic memory 404.
- Transmission media include, for example, twisted pair cables, coaxial cables, copper wire, fiber optic cables, and carrier waves that travel through space without wires or cables, such as acoustic waves and electromagnetic waves, including radio, optical and infrared waves.
- Signals include man-made transient variations in amplitude, frequency, phase, polarization or other physical properties transmitted through the transmission media.
- Common forms of computer-readable media include, for example, a floppy disk, a flexible disk, hard disk, magnetic tape, any other magnetic medium, a CD-ROM, CDRW, DVD, any other optical medium, punch cards, paper tape, optical mark sheets, any other physical medium with patterns of holes or other optically recognizable indicia, a RAM, a PROM, an EPROM, a FLASH-EPROM, an EEPROM, a flash memory, any other memory chip or cartridge, a carrier wave, or any other medium from which a computer can read.
- the term computer-readable storage medium is used herein to refer to any computer-readable medium except transmission media.
- At least some embodiments of the invention are related to the use of computer system 400 for implementing some or all of the techniques described herein. According to one embodiment of the invention, those techniques are performed by computer system 400 in response to processor 402 executing one or more sequences of one or more processor instructions contained in memory 404. Such instructions, also called computer instructions, software and program code, may be read into memory 404 from another computer-readable medium such as storage device 408 or network link 416. Execution of the sequences of instructions contained in memory 404 causes processor 402 to perform one or more of the method steps described herein.
- the computer system 400 may be part of a cluster of computer systems (e.g., multiple computer systems 400) that may accomplish the functions of a single computer system 400 in a distributed and/or parallel manner.
- the multiple computer systems may communicate with each other over the local network 416 via separate network links 414 for each computer system 400.
- the computer systems 400 may not include the storage device 408 but instead, as described above, be in communication with multiple storage devices 408 connected within the local network 416.
- the individual computer systems 400 are effectively processors 402 that are connected within the local network via a high-speed network links 414 (e.g., gigabit Ethernet, or other specialty links).
- the computer system 400 may include an accelerator 418 that is connected to the elements of the computer system 400 through the bus 410 (e.g., through a PCI slot).
- the accelerator 418 offers offloading processor-intensive public key encryption algorithms involved in TLS/SSL transactions.
- the accelerator 418 may include one or processors that handle the TLS/SSL processing rather than the processor 402 of the computer system 400.
- the accelerator 418 may include custom ASIC or RISC chips or chip sets that handle the complex computational processing for the TLS/SSL security encryption. While the invention has been described in connection with a number of embodiments and implementations, the invention is not so limited but covers various obvious modifications and equivalent arrangements, which fall within the purview of the appended claims. Although features of the invention are expressed in certain combinations among the claims, it is contemplated that these features can be arranged in any combination and order.
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Abstract
An approach is provided for service provider controlled communication security. A security platform receives a request for a secure connection from a client device. The security platform determines context information associated with the device,an access network,a user of the device, or a combination thereof,and then processes and/or facilitates a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers. Next, the security platform causes, at least in part, establishment of the secure connection using, at least in part, the one the offered encryption ciphers.
Description
METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR
PROVIDING SERVICE PROVIDER-CONTROLLED COMMUNICATION SECURITY
BACKGROUND
Service providers and device manufacturers (e.g., wireless, cellular, etc.) are continually challenged to deliver value and convenience to consumers by, for example, providing compelling network services. As the popularity and scope of these services increases, end users often use the services to store, access, or otherwise manage potentially personal or sensitive information. As a result, one area of development with respect to these services has been providing end users privacy and security when using these services. However, such security and privacy are often be affected or dictated by different regulations, requirements, and/or practices (e.g., Lawful Interception (LI) requirements) associated with the jurisdictions from which end users are accessing the services. Accordingly, access network operators, service providers and device manufacturers face significant technical challenges associated with providing the privacy and security for users accessing services while also complying with local requirements and providing for efficient operation of the services. SOME EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS
Therefore, there is a need for an approach for a service-provider side mechanism for determining an appropriate means (e.g., privacy and/or security protocols) to maximize user privacy requirements while still fulfilling the local requirements.
According to one embodiment, a method comprises receiving a request for a secure connection from a device. The method also comprises determining context information (e.g., country of origin) associated with the device, a user of the device, an access network, or a combination thereof. The method further comprises processing and/or facilitating a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers. The method also comprises causing, at least in part, establishment of the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers. In one embodiment, the device may be, for example, any type of device, including a mobile terminal, a personal or impersonal, human or non-human operated, fixed terminal, or portable terminal, such as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a netbook computer, a tablet computer, and the like. In one embodiment, the device may be associated with a service that is attempting to establish a secure connection.
According to another embodiment, an apparatus comprises at least one processor, and at least one memory including computer program code, the at least one memory and the computer
program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause, at least in part, the apparatus to receive a request for a secure connection from a device. The apparatus is also caused to determine context information (e.g., country of origin) associated with the device, a user of the device, an access network or a combination thereof. The apparatus is further caused to process and/or facilitate a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers. The apparatus is also caused to establish the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers.
According to another embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium carries one or more sequences of one or more instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, cause, at least in part, an apparatus to receive a request for a secure connection from a device. The apparatus is also caused to determine context information (e.g., country of origin) associated with the device, a user of the device, an access network, or a combination thereof. The apparatus is further caused to process and/or facilitate a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers. The apparatus is also caused to establish the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers.
According to another embodiment, an apparatus comprises means for receiving a request for a secure connection from a device. The apparatus also comprises means for determining context information (e.g., country of origin) associated with the device, a user of the device, an access network or a combination thereof. The apparatus further comprises means for processing and/or facilitating a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers. The apparatus also comprises means for causing, at least in part, establishment of the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers.
For various example embodiments of the invention, the following is also applicable: a method comprising facilitating access to at least one interface configured to allow access to at least one service, the at least one service configured to perform any one or any combination of network or service provider methods (or processes) disclosed in this application.
For various example embodiments, the following is applicable: An apparatus comprising means for performing the method of any of originally filed claims 1 -10 and 24.
Still other aspects, features, and advantages of the invention are readily apparent from the following detailed description, simply by illustrating a number of particular embodiments and implementations, including the best mode contemplated for carrying out the invention. The invention is also capable of other and different embodiments, and its several details can be modified in various obvious respects, all without departing from the spirit and scope of the
invention. Accordingly, the drawings and description are to be regarded as illustrative in nature, and not as restrictive.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The embodiments of the invention are illustrated by way of example, and not by way of limitation, in the figures of the accompanying drawings:
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a system capable of determining an appropriate encryption cipher, according to one embodiment;
FIG. 2 is a diagram of the components of a security platform, according to one embodiment;
FIG. 3A is a flowchart of a process for determining an appropriate encryption cipher, according to one embodiment;
FIG. 3B is a flowchart of one or more optional and/or alternative steps to the flowchart illustrated in FIG. 3 A, according to one embodiment; and
FIG. 4 is a diagram of hardware that can be used to implement an embodiment of the invention.
DESCRIPTION OF SOME EMBODIMENTS
Examples of a method, apparatus, and computer program for providing service provider- controlled communication security are disclosed. In the following description, for the purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the invention. It is apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the embodiments of the invention may be practiced without these specific details or with an equivalent arrangement. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the embodiments of the invention.
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a system capable of determining an appropriate encryption cipher, according to one embodiment. End user privacy and security is a critical issue of concern in providing internet services. A widely applied way of protecting end user data is to use Transport Layer Security (TLS), which was earlier called Secure Socket Layer (SSL), to encrypt data sent over, for example, a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) transport. At the same time, in many jurisdictions (e.g., countries and/or other localities), governing authorities have enacted or otherwise implemented regulations or other requirements that control how such data protection is provided. For example, some governing authorities have enacted Lawful Interception (LI) requirements that mandate, for instance, that access network operators and/or service providers provide a way for governments to eavesdrop on internet communications and/or data transfers to end users in their respective jurisdictions regardless of how the data is encrypted. Example communications may include, but are not limited to, emails, web discussion board messages,
instant messages, etc. A commonly claimed reason for allowing a governing authority to eavesdrop is anti-terrorism.
While governing authorities want to have access to view encrypted data, if data protection such as TLS is disabled all together, all of the users of a communication service are vulnerable to abuse in the form of phishing, identity theft or leakage of personal information to third parties, for example.
On the other hand, for example, the European Community has requirements for protecting the end user data. But, even when a communication service is provided in the European Community, a local access network operator may be required to block access to that service if the local access network operation cannot fulfill a governing authority's Lawful Interception (LI) requirements allowing the governing authority to eavesdrop. In other words, the European Community, in this example, wishes to protect the integrity of the end user, which may ultimately conflict with the desire by other jurisdictions to have the ability to view encrypted data.
For service providers who have end users from many different jurisdictions, these contradicting privacy requirements typically lead to the additional burden of having to maintain servers configured specifically to the requirements of a particular region, which potentially can lead to inefficiencies and problems of scalability and/or load-balancing. In some cases, service providers may resort to not securing internet communication at all, or at least securing the communications in a very weak manner. But, if there is no reasonable means for a governing authority to view internet communications, it may become illegal to provide services to the residents of some countries.
To address this problem, a system 100 of FIG. 1 introduces the capability of determining an appropriate encryption cipher that meets a governing authority's requirements while maintaining the ability for an end user to receive an encrypted dataset at the service-provider end. In one embodiment, the system 100 determines context information (e.g., a location) of a user device that is to receive a dataset by way of an internet communication and selects a cipher, such as a TLS cipher, based on the context information (e.g., the access network or country where the end user device is resident at the time of the request), so long as the cipher is known and/or required for the particular context (e.g., country of origin). Although various embodiments are discussed with location of the end user devices as the context information, it is contemplated that any other context of the device may be used to determine the appropriate security protocol (e.g., encryption cipher) to use. For example, context information such as time of the request, activity at the device, history of user activity at the device, user behavior patterns, or any combination of contexts can be used in the various embodiments described herein.
In one embodiment, if the cipher is not known by the system 100 for the determined context or location, the system 100 will search for an appropriate cipher to determine whether there are any application local requirements before allowing establishment of the communication session for transmission of the dataset. By way of example, the appropriate cipher may be an encryption cipher that the governing authority for the location has set to enable LI (e.g., by specifying an encryption cipher key length for which the governing authority knowingly has the ability to decipher). Such an encryption may also be known as a weak encryption because while the dataset is still encrypted, it may be broken by a select few, or those with superior decryption skills to those of the average consumer. A weak encryption cipher may be, for example, a 40-bit encryption.
In one embodiment, the selection for using weak ciphers may be based on IP subnet lists provided by the access network operator (e.g., the ISP or a cellular access network operator) when the LI capability is requested by a governing or security authority of a particular country or location. Alternatively, the selection may be based on a statistically determined source IP address belonging to the range reserved for certain mobile network operators by mapping the subnets to a mobile country code (MCC) and a mobile network code (MNC) identifying the operator. The binding between the MNC and MCC and the source address can be made beforehand by some other user or client contacting the service and that information may be applied later if the LI capability is requested by the security authorities via the local ISP to the internet service provider.
For networks that the encryption requirements may not be found, or it is known that the governing authority does not require eavesdropping access to a communication or does not need any technical assistance in eavesdropping, the system 100 may employ any default security protocol (e.g., a strong TLS cipher). By way of example, strong cipher may be a 256-bit encryption or higher.
In one embodiment, the location of the end user can be detected by analyzing the source Internet Protocol (IP) address from when the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection is established before starting a TLS handshaking, for example. The end user location may also be determined by any means for determining the position of an electronic device such as, for example, global positioning, geolocation, cellular network location systems (e.g., E-OTD), etc. as long as the means for determining the location of the device is from a trusted source (e.g., cannot be modified).
As shown in FIG. 1 , the system 100 comprises connection originators (COs) lOla-lOln (also collectively referred to as COs 101) having connectivity to a security platform 103 and a service provider 107 via a communication network 105. In one embodiment, the security platform 103
performs various embodiments of the processes associated with determining and/or specifying the appropriate security protocol(s) or cipher(s) for the service provider 107 to respond to one or more communication or service requests from the COs 101. Although the security platform 103 is depicted as a separate component to the communication network 105, it is contemplated that the security platform 103 and/or one or more of its functions and/or modules may be included in or performed by the service provider 107 and/or any of the services 109a-109m provided by the service provider 107. By way of example, in one embodiment, the functionality may be implemented by a load balancer or TLS accelerator terminating the TLS connection and thus taking care of the TLS session negotiation (e.g., outside of a the actual service, and event outside of the service provider).
In one embodiment, a CO 101 requests to establish a communication session to receive a data transmission from the service provider 107, the services 109, one or more content providers 1 11 a- 11 1 j , any other CO 101 , or a combination thereof by way of communication network 105. In one embodiment, the security platform 103 (e.g., on behalf of or in cooperation with the service provider 107) determines context information of the CO 101 to facilitate determination of an appropriate security protocol. By way of example, if the context information is location information, the security platform 103 determines the location of the CO 101 by analyzing the source Internet Protocol (IP) address from when the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection is established before starting a TLS handshaking. In one embodiment, the security platform 103 may base the location determination of the CO 101 on a network code (e.g., a mobile network code (MNC)), a country code (e.g., a mobile country code (MCC)), or any combination thereof that have been pre-collected or determined based on non-personal relational information between the source IP subnets and the MNCs/MCCs (e.g., probe data).
In one embodiment, the security platform 103 then determines an appropriate encryption cipher or security protocol based on the context information (e.g., country of origin) of the CO 101. In some embodiments, the governing authorities may provide ranges or network addresses or other identifiers associated with target COs 101. In this case, the security platform 103 can compare the network identifier of the requesting CO 101 against the range of addresses provided by the governing authority to apply a security protocol or cipher associated with the range. By placing the logic for dynamically determining an appropriate security protocol on the network side, the system 100 enables the service provider 107 (e.g., via the security platform 103) to service requests from many different jurisdictions without having to configure individual servers for each jurisdiction with different security requirements. Moreover, the server-side approach described in the various embodiments avoids a need to configure any settings on the client to change security protocols and/or encryption ciphers or even assist the decision with potentially false data.
By way of example, the communication network 105 of system 100 includes one or more networks such as a data network (not shown), a wireless network (not shown), a telephony network (not shown), or any combination thereof. It is contemplated that the data network may be any local area network (LAN), metropolitan area network (MAN), wide area network (WAN), a public data network (e.g., the Internet), short range wireless network, or any other suitable packet-switched network, such as a commercially owned, proprietary packet-switched network, e.g., a proprietary cable or fiber-optic network, and the like, or any combination thereof. In addition, the wireless network may be, for example, a cellular network and may employ various technologies including enhanced data rates for global evolution (EDGE), general packet radio service (GPRS), global system for mobile communications (GSM), Internet protocol multimedia subsystem (IMS), universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS), etc., as well as any other suitable wireless medium, e.g., worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX), Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks, code division multiple access (CDMA), wideband code division multiple access (WCDMA), wireless fidelity (WiFi), wireless LAN (WLAN), Bluetooth®, Internet Protocol (IP) data casting, satellite, mobile ad-hoc network (MANET), and the like, or any combination thereof.
The CO 101 can be any type of originator device. By way of example, the CO 101 is any type of mobile terminal, personal or impersonal, human or non-human operated, fixed terminal, or portable terminal including a mobile handset, station, unit, device, multimedia computer, multimedia tablet, Internet node, communicator, desktop computer, laptop computer, notebook computer, netbook computer, tablet computer, personal communication system (PCS) device, personal navigation device, personal digital assistants (PDAs), audio/video player, digital camera/camcorder, positioning device, television receiver, radio broadcast receiver, electronic book device, game device, or any combination thereof, including the accessories and peripherals of these devices, or any combination thereof. It is also contemplated that the CO 101 can support any type of interface to the user (such as "wearable" circuitry, etc.). In one embodiment, for instance, the CO 101 may be user equipment, such as a mobile handset. By way of example, the CO 101 , the security platform 103, and the service provider 107 communicate with each other and other components of the communication network 105 using well known, new or still developing protocols. In this context, a protocol includes a set of rules defining how the network nodes within the communication network 105 interact with each other based on information sent over the communication links. The protocols are effective at different layers of operation within each node, from generating and receiving physical signals of various types, to selecting a link for transferring those signals, to the format of information indicated by those signals, to identifying which software application executing on a computer system sends or receives the information. The conceptually different layers of protocols for exchanging
information over a network are described in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model.
Communications between the network nodes are typically effected by exchanging discrete packets of data. Each packet typically comprises (1) header information associated with a particular protocol, and (2) payload information that follows the header information and contains information that may be processed independently of that particular protocol. In some protocols, the packet includes (3) trailer information following the payload and indicating the end of the payload information. The header includes information such as the source of the packet, its destination, the length of the payload, and other properties used by the protocol. Often, the data in the payload for the particular protocol includes a header and payload for a different protocol associated with a different, higher layer of the OSI Reference Model. The header for a particular protocol typically indicates a type for the next protocol contained in its payload. The higher layer protocol is said to be encapsulated in the lower layer protocol. The headers included in a packet traversing multiple heterogeneous networks, such as the Internet, typically include a physical (layer 1) header, a data-link (layer 2) header, an internetwork (layer 3) header and a transport (layer 4) header, and various application (layer 5, layer 6 and layer 7) headers as defined by the OSI Reference Model. In one embodiment, the CO 101 (e.g., via the respective communication modules 1 13a-113n, collectively referred to as CO 101) and the security platform 103 interact according to a client- server model. It is noted that the client-server model of computer process interaction is widely known and used. According to the client-server model, a client process sends a message including a request to a server process, and the server process responds by providing a service. The server process may also return a message with a response to the client process. However, as discussed herein, the direction of the possible request/response pairs of the application protocol inside the TLS— after a cipher selected— is not an important. Often the client process and server process execute on different computer devices, called hosts, and communicate via a network using one or more protocols for network communications. The term "server" is conventionally used to refer to the process that provides the service, or the host computer on which the process operates. Similarly, the term "client" is conventionally used to refer to the process that makes the request or initiates the connection, or the host computer on which the process operates. As used herein, the terms "client" and "server" refer to the processes, rather than the host computers, unless otherwise clear from the context. In addition, the process performed by a server can be broken up to run as multiple processes on multiple hosts (sometimes called tiers) for reasons that include reliability, scalability, and redundancy, among others.
FIG. 2 is a diagram of the components of the security platform 103, according to one embodiment. By way of example, the security platform 103 includes one or more components
for processing context information for determining an appropriate encryption cipher. It is contemplated that the functions of these components may be combined in one or more components or performed by other components of equivalent functionality. In one embodiment, the security platform 103 includes at least a control logic 201 which executes at least one algorithm for executing functions of the security platform 103. In one embodiment, the control logic 201 interacts with a communication request module 203 to determine (e.g., receive or intercept) communication or service requests from the COs 101 to the service provider 107, the services 109, and/or the content providers 111. In one embodiment, the security platform 103 may also include a load balancer and/or a TLS accelerator. For instance, a load balancer may terminate the TLS connection and distribute the application protocol request to various application servers (e.g., services 109). Further, for instance, the TLS accelerator may speed up the data encrypting and decrypting inside the secure connection as well the cryptographic calculations needed in the secure connection establishment (e.g., the TLS session handshaking with special hardware). In one embodiment, the TLS accelerator may implement the dynamic cipher selection logic, as described herein.
If the communication request includes a request to establish a secure communication session, the communication request module 203 interacts with the context module 205 to begin processing the request. In this embodiment, the context module 205 determines the context information received as part of the communication request. For example, the context module 205 can determine the location of the requesting CO 101 from a network address (e.g., an Internet protocol (IP) address) associated with the originating CO 101. In one embodiment, the context module 205 may include a table or other database of MNCs/MCCs that have been associated with one or more IP subnets. By comparing a network address of the CO 101 to the table or database, the context module can derive the MCC associated with the CO 101 for determining the country of origin.
In addition or alternatively, the context module 205 can process context information that is received from the CO 101 to determine the location of the CO 101. For example, the context module 205 may determine a location of the CO 101 based on information received from a network address, any GPS, geo-location information, and the like. In one embodiment, in addition to location information, the context module 205 may determine any other potentially relevant context information or other general context information (e.g., time, activity, user history, user behavior, etc.) received about the CO 101 or the user of the CO 101 so that the context may be used to determine an appropriate encryption cipher or security protocol.
For example, general context information refers to, at least in part, all contextual data, user data and user-to-device interaction data (e.g., date, time of day, location, activity, motion, position, modality, spatiotemporal element, etc.) as collected, and can be used for determining a present
state or modality of the device. In addition, context information can be determined through analysis of historical data pertaining to the user or device, so as to enable a means of predicting to a degree of certainty expected or future device states or modalities. Hence, the compilation of context information can be analyzed appropriately, including reference with respect to additional data and/or a context model, for enabling the context of a device, device user or one or more other associated users and their respective devices to be determined accordingly.
In one embodiment, the context module 205 can process probe data. By way of example, the context module 205 may use probe data associated with the access network and match the source IP address of the connection against subnetworks and detected MNC/MCC values. The context module 205 may compare source addresses and MNC/MCC relations stored in a database and determine the country of origin based on the information in the database. The context module 205 under this approach allows for an alternate way in determining the cipher suite if there is not any available source IP range information provided by other means.
Based, at least in part, on the determined context information, a security determination module 207 of the security platform 103 can determine an appropriate security protocol or encryption cipher to apply to the requested communication session. In one embodiment, the security determination module 207 has connectivity to a regulations database 209 that includes information on regulations, restrictions, practices, etc. associated with operating one or more security protocols and/or encryption ciphers with respect to one or more jurisdictions. In regulations database 209 is created by any means by which a security, regulatory or government agency may openly communicate its encryption, or lawful interception, protocols with the service provider 107. For example, the service provider 107 may create its own database of such regulatory information, or determine the regulations from other databases. In certain embodiments, the security determination module 207 may also use context information about the source of the dataset that is requested by the CO 101 when determining which encryption cipher the dataset should be sent with. In one embodiment, governing authorities may provide the information directly to the service provider 107. For example, the security determination module 207 may receive an input for specifying a range of network addresses, some of which may be suspect or flagged on a watch list by the security platform 103. The security determination module 207 may then compare a detected network address of a CO 101 with the range of network addresses to determine the appropriate encryption cipher based on the comparison. For example, the governing authority may specify and individual address or range of addresses or identifiers associated with one or more COs 101 subject to security restrictions (e.g., lawful interception). In this way, the regulations database can include both generally applicable regulatory restrictions and/or
restrictions specific to particular COs 101 , wherein the restrictions relate to what security protocols and/or ciphers can be applied.
In one embodiment, the security determination module 207 can then provide or identify the determined security protocol and/or encryption ciphers to the service provider 107 via the service interface 211. In one embodiment, the service provider 107 can store the location information and associated encryption cipher for future use. In this way, the service provider 107 need not request the determination from the security platform 103 for subsequent requests from the same CO 101 or other COs 101 in a similar source address range.
In one embodiment, the service provider 107 then allows transmission of the requested dataset or communication session to the CO 101 and encrypts the dataset or session using the appropriate encryption cipher in, for example, a Transport Layer Security or Secure Sockets Layer protocol for the detected location. In this way, the service provider remains in compliance with the any applicable regulations (e.g., including LI regulations that permit security and/or government agencies to lawfully decrypt the communication session) while still enabling privacy protection using the highest level of security or encryption permitted in a particular jurisdiction. Alternatively, if there is not an encryption protocol restriction for the detected area, the service provider 107 may transmit the requested dataset to the CO 101 in a manner that is encrypted with a strong encryption cipher, such as the 256-bit cipher, as discussed above. Accordingly, under the various embodiments of the approach described herein, the service provider 107 has the flexibility to support multiple levels or forms of encryption depending on the requirements of the local jurisdiction of the requesting CO 101. In some embodiments, the security platform 103 may include an encryption module 213 capable of supporting any of the ciphers that might be specified or determined for a jurisdiction. The encryption module 213 can then perform the appropriate encryption for the service provider 107 in case, for example, the service provider does not support a particular encryption cipher or security protocol determined for the requesting CO 101.
FIG. 3A is a flowchart of a process for determining an appropriate encryption cipher, according to one embodiment. In one embodiment, the security platform 103 performs the process 300 and is implemented in, for instance, a chip set including a processor and a memory as shown in FIG. 5. In addition or alternatively, the service provider 107 may perform all or a portion of the process 300.
In step 301 , the security platform 103 receives a request for a secure connection from a CO 101. By way of example, the request can include a request to establish a secure connection for exchanging information between the CO 101 and the service provider 107, the services 109,
and/or the content provider 1 11 to which the request is directed. The process continues to step 303 in which the security platform 103 determines context information associated with the CO 101 , an access network, a user of the CO 101, or a combination thereof for determining an encryption cipher or security protocol to apply to establish the requested connection. As described above, the context determination step can be based, at least in part, on information implicitly provided as part of the request, such as determining context information from an IP address associated with the requesting CO 101.
In step 305, the security platform 103 consults, for instance, the regulations database 209 to determine an appropriate strength of the encryption cipher based on the determined context information. By way of example, the strength of the encryption cipher is set by a governmental authority, a regulatory entity, the service provider 107, or a combination thereof. In one embodiment, the security platform 103 stores this information to determine what level of encryption (e.g., how many bits, what encryption schemes or algorithm, etc.) to apply. In one embodiment, the strength can be specified by identifying specific encryption ciphers. In other embodiments, the encryption can be specified by one or more criteria. Then, the security platform 103 can select one or more encryption ciphers conforming to those criteria.
In step 307, the security platform 103 processes and/or facilitates processing of the context information (and the other information determined in the above steps) to determine one or more encryption ciphers appropriate to the context and the applicable regulations. In cases where no regulations exist for a particular location, the security platform 103 can determine a default protocol or cipher (e.g., a strong cipher) to apply. Once the encryption cipher is determined, the security platform 103 (e.g., in cooperation with the service provider 107) causes, at least in part, an establishment of the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers (step 309).
FIG. 3B is a flowchart of one or more optional and/or alternative steps to the flowchart illustrated in FIG. 3A, according to one embodiment. In one embodiment, the security platform 103 performs the process 320 and is implemented in, for instance, a chip set including a processor and a memory as shown in FIG. 5. In addition or alternatively, the service provider 107 may perform all or a portion of the process 320. Although illustrated as a sequence, in various embodiments, not all of the steps are performed, nor do the steps need to be performed in the illustrated sequence.
For example, in one embodiment, in step 321 , the security platform 103 determines the location information based, at least in part, on a network address, a network code, a country code, or a combination thereof associated with the CO 101. By way of example, the country or access network level residence of a user may be determined by using the probe data associated with the
access network and by matching the source IP address of the connection against the subnetworks and their detected MNC/MCC values. The security platform 103 may collect source addresses and MNC/MCC relations and store this information in a database. The country of origin may then be determined based on the information in the database. The ability to use the database that collects the source addresses and MNC/MCC relations enables determining the country of origin of the client. This is an alternate way for determining the cipher suite if there is not any available source IP range information provided by other means. Other means than the MCC/MNC may be available to determine the country of origin based on the source IP address such as external geo IP databases for which the security platform 103 may consult. The security platform 103 may then determine previously stored probe data associated with the access network used by the CO 101 , and then process and/or facilitate a processing of the probe data to determine the country of origin.
Further, in one embodiment, in step 323, the security platform 103 may determine by examining the regulations database 209 that the security platform 103 has received an input (e.g., from a governing or security authority) that specifies a range of network addresses to which particular regulations, security protocols, encryption ciphers, etc. apply. For example, if permitted by regulations, a governing authority may have specific interest in applying a particular encryption cipher or security protocol to one or more devices or COs 101 operating within its jurisdiction. For example, the encryption cipher or security protocol can support one or more lawful interception requirements of a locality associated with the device. In this case, the authority can provide the specific targeted network addresses to the service provider 107. In another embodiment, an administrator may specify a range of addresses that are specific to certain locations to which different security and/or encryption ciphers apply. For example, if a country requires a certain cipher, then the range of network addresses assigned or otherwise determined to be associated with devices operating in that country can be specified.
The processes described herein for determining an appropriate encryption cipher may be advantageously implemented via software, hardware, firmware or a combination of software and/or firmware and/or hardware. Such exemplary hardware for performing the described functions is detailed below.
FIG. 4 illustrates a computer system 400 that may implement an embodiment of the invention. The computer system 400 is programmed (e.g., via computer program code or instructions) to determine an appropriate encryption cipher as described herein and includes a communication mechanism such as a bus 410 for passing information between other internal and external components of the computer system 400. Information (also called data) is represented as a physical expression of a measurable phenomenon, typically electric voltages, but including, in other embodiments, such phenomena as magnetic, electromagnetic, pressure, chemical,
biological, molecular, atomic, sub-atomic and quantum interactions. For example, north and south magnetic fields, or a zero and non-zero electric voltage, represent two states (0, 1) of a binary digit (bit). Other phenomena can represent digits of a higher base. A superposition of multiple simultaneous quantum states before measurement represents a quantum bit (qubit). A sequence of one or more digits constitutes digital data that is used to represent a number or code for a character. In some embodiments, information called analog data is represented by a near continuum of measurable values within a particular range. Computer system 400, or a portion thereof, constitutes a means for performing one or more steps of determining an appropriate encryption cipher.
A bus 410 includes one or more parallel conductors of information so that information is transferred quickly among devices coupled to the bus 410. One or more processors 402 for processing information are coupled with the bus 410. A processor (or multiple processors) 402 performs a set of operations on information as specified by computer program code related to determine an appropriate encryption cipher. The computer program code is a set of instructions or statements providing instructions for the operation of the processor and/or the computer system to perform specified functions. The code, for example, may be written in a computer programming language that is compiled into a native instruction set of the processor. The code may also be written directly using the native instruction set (e.g., machine language). The set of operations include bringing information in from the bus 410 and placing information on the bus 410. The set of operations also typically include comparing two or more units of information, shifting positions of units of information, and combining two or more units of information, such as by addition or multiplication or logical operations like OR, exclusive OR (XOR), and AND. Each operation of the set of operations that can be performed by the processor is represented to the processor by information called instructions, such as an operation code of one or more digits. At least one sequence of operations, such as sequences of operation codes, are executed by the processor 402 (or multiple processors) as one serial sequence of operations executed sequentially by single or multiple processors, as multiple parallel sequences of operations executed in parallel by multiple processors, or a combination thereof. The at least one sequences of operations constitute processor instructions, also called computer system instructions or, simply, computer instructions. Processors may be implemented as mechanical, electrical, magnetic, optical, chemical or quantum components, among others, alone or in combination.
Computer system 400 also includes at least one memory 404 coupled to bus 410. The memory 404, such as dynamic memory (e.g., RAM, magnetic disk, writable optical disk, etc.) and/or static memory (e.g., ROM, CD-ROM, etc.), stores information including processor instructions for determining an appropriate encryption cipher. Dynamic memory allows information stored
therein to be changed by the computer system 400. RAM allows a unit of information stored at a location called a memory address to be stored and retrieved independently of information at neighboring addresses. The memory 404 is also used by the processor 402 to store temporary values during execution of processor instructions. The computer system 400 also includes a read only memory (ROM) 406 or any other static storage device coupled to the bus 410 for storing static information, including instructions, that is not changed by the computer system 400. Some memory is composed of volatile storage that loses the information stored thereon when power is lost. Also coupled to bus 410 is a non-volatile (persistent) storage device 408, such as a magnetic disk, optical disk or flash card, for storing information, including instructions, that persists even when the computer system 400 is turned off or otherwise loses power. However, in one embodiment, the storage devices 408 (or multiple storage devices) may be in communication with the processor 402 and other elements of the computer system 400 through the communication interface 470, and thus be located external to the computer system 400, such as within a local area network 480.
Computer system 400 also includes one or more instances of the communications interface 470 coupled to bus 410. Communication interface 470 provides a one-way or two-way communication coupling to a variety of external devices that operate with their own processors, such as external storage devices 408. In general the coupling is with a network link 416 that is connected to a local network 416 to which a variety of external devices with their own processors are connected. As an example, communications interface 470 may be a local area network (LAN) card to provide a data communication connection to a compatible LAN, such as Ethernet. Wireless links may also be implemented. For wireless links, the communications interface 470 sends or receives or both sends and receives electrical, acoustic or electromagnetic signals, including infrared and optical signals, that carry information streams, such as digital data. In certain embodiments, the communications interface 470 enables connection to the communication network 105 through the local network 416 for determining an appropriate encryption cipher for a connection of a CO 101. In certain embodiments, the local network 416 may include one or more load balancers that may be used to terminate the TLS/SSL requests. The load balancers may further reduce the computational drain regarding TLS/SSL requests at the processor 402 of the computer system 400.
The term "computer-readable medium" as used herein refers to any medium that participates in providing information to processor 402, including instructions for execution. Such a medium may take many forms, including, but not limited to computer-readable storage medium (e.g., non-volatile media, volatile media), and transmission media. Non-transitory media, such as nonvolatile media, include, for example, optical or magnetic disks, such as storage device 408. Volatile media include, for example, dynamic memory 404. Transmission media include, for example, twisted pair cables, coaxial cables, copper wire, fiber optic cables, and carrier waves
that travel through space without wires or cables, such as acoustic waves and electromagnetic waves, including radio, optical and infrared waves. Signals include man-made transient variations in amplitude, frequency, phase, polarization or other physical properties transmitted through the transmission media. Common forms of computer-readable media include, for example, a floppy disk, a flexible disk, hard disk, magnetic tape, any other magnetic medium, a CD-ROM, CDRW, DVD, any other optical medium, punch cards, paper tape, optical mark sheets, any other physical medium with patterns of holes or other optically recognizable indicia, a RAM, a PROM, an EPROM, a FLASH-EPROM, an EEPROM, a flash memory, any other memory chip or cartridge, a carrier wave, or any other medium from which a computer can read. The term computer-readable storage medium is used herein to refer to any computer-readable medium except transmission media.
At least some embodiments of the invention are related to the use of computer system 400 for implementing some or all of the techniques described herein. According to one embodiment of the invention, those techniques are performed by computer system 400 in response to processor 402 executing one or more sequences of one or more processor instructions contained in memory 404. Such instructions, also called computer instructions, software and program code, may be read into memory 404 from another computer-readable medium such as storage device 408 or network link 416. Execution of the sequences of instructions contained in memory 404 causes processor 402 to perform one or more of the method steps described herein.
In one embodiment, the computer system 400 may be part of a cluster of computer systems (e.g., multiple computer systems 400) that may accomplish the functions of a single computer system 400 in a distributed and/or parallel manner. The multiple computer systems may communicate with each other over the local network 416 via separate network links 414 for each computer system 400. In such an embodiment, the computer systems 400 may not include the storage device 408 but instead, as described above, be in communication with multiple storage devices 408 connected within the local network 416. In such an embodiment, the individual computer systems 400 are effectively processors 402 that are connected within the local network via a high-speed network links 414 (e.g., gigabit Ethernet, or other specialty links).
In one embodiment, the computer system 400 may include an accelerator 418 that is connected to the elements of the computer system 400 through the bus 410 (e.g., through a PCI slot). The accelerator 418 offers offloading processor-intensive public key encryption algorithms involved in TLS/SSL transactions. The accelerator 418 may include one or processors that handle the TLS/SSL processing rather than the processor 402 of the computer system 400. By way of example, the accelerator 418 may include custom ASIC or RISC chips or chip sets that handle the complex computational processing for the TLS/SSL security encryption.
While the invention has been described in connection with a number of embodiments and implementations, the invention is not so limited but covers various obvious modifications and equivalent arrangements, which fall within the purview of the appended claims. Although features of the invention are expressed in certain combinations among the claims, it is contemplated that these features can be arranged in any combination and order.
Claims
1. A method comprising:
receiving a request for a secure connection from a device;
determining context information associated with the device, an access network, a user of the device, or a combination thereof;
processing and/or facilitating a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers; and
causing, at least in part, establishment of the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers.
2. A method of claim 1 , further comprising:
processing and/or facilitating a processing of the context information to determine location information,
wherein the one or more encryption ciphers are determined based, at least in part, on the location information.
3. A method of claim 2, wherein the location information is based, at least in part, on a source IP address, a network code, a country code, or a combination thereof associated with the device.
4. A method according to any of claims 1 -3, further comprising:
determining probe data associated with the access network;
processing and/or facilitating a processing of the probe data to determine to a country of origin via the source IP address, the network code, the country code, or a combination thereof.
5. A method according to any of claims 1 -4, further comprising:
receiving an input for specifying a range of network addresses; and
causing, at least in part, a comparison of a network address of the device against the range of network addresses;
wherein the one or more encryption ciphers are determined based, at least in part, on the comparison.
6. A method according to any of claims 1 -5, further comprising:
processing and/or facilitating a processing of the context information to determine a strength of encryption for the connection request, wherein the one or more encryption ciphers are determined based, at least in part, on the strength of the encryption.
7. A method according to any of claims 1 -6, wherein the strength of encryption is specified, at least in part, by a governmental authority, a regulatory entity, a service provider, or a combination thereof.
8. A method according to any of claims 1 -7, further comprising:
receiving an input from the device for specifying at least a portion of the context information.
9. A method according to any of claims 1 -8, wherein at least one of the one or more encryption ciphers supports one or more lawful interception requirements of a country of origin associated with the device.
10. A method according to any of claims 1 -9 , wherein the one or more encryption ciphers operate via one or more cryptographic protocols including, at least in part, a Transport Layer Security protocol or a Secure Sockets Layer protocol.
11. An apparatus comprising:
at least one processor; and
at least one memory including computer program code for one or more programs, the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to perform at least the following,
receive a request for a secure connection from a device;
determine context information associated with the device, an access network, a user of the device, or a combination thereof;
process and/or facilitate a processing of the context information to determine one or more encryption ciphers; and
establish the secure connection using, at least in part, the one or more encryption ciphers.
12. An apparatus of claim 1 1, wherein the apparatus is further caused to:
process and/or facilitate a processing of the context information to determine location
information,
wherein the one or more encryption ciphers are determined based, at least in part, on the location information.
13. An apparatus of claim 12, wherein the location information is based, at least in part, on a source IP address, a network code, a country code, or a combination thereof associated with the device.
14. An apparatus of claim 13, wherein the apparatus is further caused to:
determine probe data associated with the access network;
process and/or facilitate a processing of the probe data to determine a source IP address via the network address, the network code, the country code, or a combination thereof.
15. An apparatus according to any of claims 11-14, wherein the apparatus is further caused to:
receive an input for specifying a range of network addresses; and
cause, at least in part, a comparison of a network address of the device against the range of network addresses;
wherein the one or more encryption ciphers are determined based, at least in part, on the comparison.
16. An apparatus according to any of claims 11-15, wherein the apparatus is further caused to:
process and/or facilitate a processing of the context information to determine a strength of encryption for the connection request,
wherein the one or more encryption ciphers are determined based, at least in part, on the strength of the encryption.
17. An apparatus according to any of claims 11-16, wherein the strength of encryption is specified, at least in part, by a governmental authority, a regulatory entity, a service provider, or a combination thereof.
18. An apparatus according to any of claims 11-17, wherein the apparatus is further caused to:
receive an input from the device for specifying at least a portion of the context information.
19. An apparatus according to any of claims 11-18, wherein at least one of the one or more encryption ciphers supports one or more lawful interception requirements of a country of origin associated with the device.
20. An apparatus according to any of claims 11-19, wherein the one or more encryption ciphers operate via one or more cryptographic protocols including, at least in part, a Transport Layer Security protocol or a Secure Sockets Layer protocol.
21. An apparatus comprising means for performing the method of any one of claims 1-10.
22. A computer-readable storage medium carrying one or more sequences of one or more instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, cause an apparatus to perform at least the method of any one of claims 1-10.
23. A computer program product including one or more sequences of one or more instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, cause an apparatus to at least perform the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 -10.
24. A method comprising facilitating access to at least one interface configured to allow access to at least one service, the at least one service configured to perform the method of any one of claims 1-10.
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
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| US20120275598A1 (en) | 2012-11-01 |
| US9450752B2 (en) | 2016-09-20 |
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