WO2010148646A1 - 一种银行卡支付系统中主密钥安全自动下载的方法及其系统 - Google Patents
一种银行卡支付系统中主密钥安全自动下载的方法及其系统 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2010148646A1 WO2010148646A1 PCT/CN2010/000926 CN2010000926W WO2010148646A1 WO 2010148646 A1 WO2010148646 A1 WO 2010148646A1 CN 2010000926 W CN2010000926 W CN 2010000926W WO 2010148646 A1 WO2010148646 A1 WO 2010148646A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- terminal
- secure
- download
- update
- public
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0873—Details of the card reader
- G07F7/088—Details of the card reader the card reader being part of the point of sale [POS] terminal or electronic cash register [ECR] itself
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/20—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07G—REGISTERING THE RECEIPT OF CASH, VALUABLES, OR TOKENS
- G07G1/00—Cash registers
- G07G1/12—Cash registers electronically operated
- G07G1/14—Systems including one or more distant stations co-operating with a central processing unit
Definitions
- the method of paying for security from the middle of the system is related to the security system, especially the payment security system.
- Background Wood Banking (Ba Ca) is not popular for payment tools.
- the usual payment system includes the sales terminal (Po O Sae POS Terminal Management System (Tem aa age Sys em T) P PA) and hardware (adwa ea dSec y od e S ) wherein the OS terminal accepts the information-passive function, accepts the instructions of the phase, completes the financial transaction information, and the OS terminal centralized management parameter downloading and downloading under the T system, or the delivery of the special OS terminal to the O terminal
- the centralized management and delivery system (p PA ) of the transaction result information is the TP and A line security storage and the security hardware of the P (adwa ea dSec y od e S) is the settlement of several dense external hardware. , text and file source and storage.
- Both parts of (AC) A are generated by T S in the OS to T S to download and use T and store their algorithms are all using the highly secure 3 ES algorithm.
- Hugh work Download process 1 shows that the OS terminal generates T secrets from T S to T and the A OS terminal receives the P and A ciphertext passwords of the T S return. In the very payment, the P is used by the password, and the P is held on the P.
- the middle P is the 3 ES algorithm that uses the hardware. It is currently the user's security is not very high, the algorithm is usually in finance. As you can see from the above work download, T is very good. If T intercepts PA or even P can be cracked by 3DES algorithm, it will be very safe to pay. Therefore, whether T can be safely downloaded to the OS terminal will also be a security step. Below we will directly use the existing T download method but the T generated T plain text directly to the OS terminal. There are a large number of security vulnerabilities in the operation. It is very convenient to intercept the work download and P of the possibility that there is a possibility of manual writing. C plaintext is generated by TS TS. The plaintext C is stored by the T terminal in the OS terminal C.
- T is saved in C. As long as you get the C card, you can download the work and P from the plaintext.
- the C ciphertext is determined by the T generated by the TS ( ).
- the C ciphertext in the C OS terminal C is reused and the stored C line is solved earlier.
- the way is to enhance the function of C in the clear text. Only the talents of each C can reduce the insecure factors in the existing text.
- O Terminal TS generated T cipher-specific OS terminal (OS terminal) The OS terminal connected directly to the O terminal reduces the early insecure factor.
- the security of the mode is not the same as the C mode, but there is a terminal that is inconvenient, and it is very direct in the merchant.
- T download method exists mainly under There is a possibility of a manual approach. Clear security vulnerabilities in plaintext are also easily handled by special operations. C ciphertext and S have partially solved the security in the early but C and OS custody and still have a relatively large security. All of the above T downloading methods require industrial intervention to directly operate the OS terminal, which requires wood support to the O terminal to complete the download. The cost of each work is relatively high, especially in the case where the number of OS terminals is relatively large and the barrier terminals are heavy.
- the purpose of the content book is to provide a secure self-downloading method to solve the security in the download. It is very convenient to pay for the T-Secure download method. It is very convenient to sell the terminal OS terminal management system TS, and hardware. T households, public and private OS terminal passwords are easy to generate TTS public TSTS
- T storage Step, T S and Generate ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS
- T 3 is stored in the TS number. Steps in the T OS terminal connection agent T need to update the update under normal circumstances, need OS terminal update T as long as the O terminal to the TS any include, transaction, etc. then the TS will need to update the OS terminal in the text in the TS The result of the regular result is that the update of T is completed and the self-updating of T is completed. TS completes the solution of T and stores whether the OS terminal has updated T successfully.
- the disclosed payment system includes a sales terminal OS, a terminal management system TS, and a hardware TS user account, which are stored in the number of T stored therein. Storage of TS
- the easy-going household T uses the public of T S . It will be stored in a public T or specially converted to 3 ES storage. Steps in the TS OS terminal interface T need new OS terminal update T As long as the OS terminal to the TS any, transaction, etc., the TS will need to update the OS terminal in the TS to the need of the new The update has been completed on T. The update of T is new to other frequently used cases. This T is easy-going and closed, and the T is not in the safe storage.
- T ciphertext can be solved in T. Because the security of the algorithm is very high, even if the ciphertext is intercepted, it is completely cracked, which completely solves the security vulnerabilities existing in the existing T download.
- the Hugh method solves the defects in the existing T.
- This paper proposes a method to securely download T.
- the download of T is completely controlled and managed by T S.
- the number of S-terminal exchanges is completed.
- the intervention in the middle of the work greatly reduces the cost of power and the safety and reliability of T.
- the security of T introduces a public-private algorithm.
- the idea of the algorithm is to first save the TS in the number of TSs stored in the number of TSs.
- the OS terminal downloads the download process shown in step 2, and generates the TS private and secrets the number of OS terminals stored in the TS.
- the public download OS terminal receives the public return of the TS.
- T is generated by T, and some means are used to go to the O terminal and then the O-terminal according to the solution means that the text can be intercepted by the rabbit or the internal solution.
- the method of generating T in reverse is its T is generated by the OS in the password and is generated by using the previously downloaded TS directly in the TS and then by TS.
- T using T to directly save the plaintext of the T is not present.
- the TS 3 ES T is stored in the number of T.
- the existing S terminal management can be connected to the P and A updates, and P is a transparent work intervention.
- the T update process of the method is shown in the following steps.
- the instruction provided by the O terminal is generated by the O terminal.
- the TS is stored in the TS and the TS is not stored directly.
- the pre-existing 3 ES T stores the P and A exchanges in the TS. Whether the T OS terminal has been updated with T successfully.
- the above update process shows that T is also used by easy-going households.
- T plain text does not appear in the secure storage (and) externally. It uses T ciphertext in TS to solve the problem of sending out the gods. The security is very high, even if the interception of the ciphertext is very cracked, it completely solves the security vulnerabilities in the existing T download.
- the update process of the easy-going households T needs to add instructions to the existing passwords.
- the add-on instruction will be stored in the TS with a public TK or a special 3E.
- This article introduces the new process of T.
- the update process of T is determined by the OS terminal.
- the management requirements of the OS terminal need to be updated in the interface of the TS OS terminal.
- 1) Update 2) Need to update Under normal circumstances, the normal situation refers to There is no need to update the T update in the T system. Requires OS terminal to update T than newly installed O terminal or original T use
- the OS terminal includes any incoming or outgoing T to T, it will need to be updated by T S in the connection.
- the OS terminal in T S is valid and the update is valid.
- the update process of T completes the self-update of T. From this point of view, all updates and management are completed on the T S. No additional intervention and scheduling of wood support is required to update the OS terminal. If the T S receives the update T of the OS terminal under the update, it directly rejects the data of the rabbit OS terminal or steals it from other OS terminals. In the case where the OS terminal fails to update T K , the OS terminal automatically updates the T update process by the T S OS terminal.
- the T-safe download method described in this article only requires the existing and intermediate-increasing instructions. The download and security management requirements of T are both safe and reliable in the existing T. It is a safe and reliable method. The method of sending God's method is very safe and the non-algorithm of the user can not use the existing OS terminal, and other self-terminals that have a beautiful appearance are more commercially worth than the AT terminal and the payment terminal.
Landscapes
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
- Cash Registers Or Receiving Machines (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
- Input From Keyboards Or The Like (AREA)
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA2766491A CA2766491C (en) | 2009-06-25 | 2010-06-24 | A method and system for securely and automatically downloading a master key in a bank card payment system |
| SG2011095908A SG177349A1 (en) | 2009-06-25 | 2010-06-24 | Method for safely and automatically downloading terminal master key in bank card payment system and the system thereof |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN200910053763.1 | 2009-06-25 | ||
| CN200910053763.1A CN101930644B (zh) | 2009-06-25 | 2009-06-25 | 一种银行卡支付系统中主密钥安全自动下载的方法及其系统 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2010148646A1 true WO2010148646A1 (zh) | 2010-12-29 |
Family
ID=43369800
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/CN2010/000926 Ceased WO2010148646A1 (zh) | 2009-06-25 | 2010-06-24 | 一种银行卡支付系统中主密钥安全自动下载的方法及其系统 |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN101930644B (zh) |
| CA (1) | CA2766491C (zh) |
| SG (1) | SG177349A1 (zh) |
| WO (1) | WO2010148646A1 (zh) |
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103714635A (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2014-04-09 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 一种pos终端及其终端主密钥下载模式配置方法 |
| CN106712939A (zh) * | 2016-12-27 | 2017-05-24 | 百富计算机技术(深圳)有限公司 | 密钥离线传输方法和装置 |
| CN108365950A (zh) * | 2018-01-03 | 2018-08-03 | 深圳怡化电脑股份有限公司 | 金融自助设备密钥的生成方法及装置 |
| CN118631428A (zh) * | 2024-05-15 | 2024-09-10 | 中国工商银行股份有限公司 | 密钥更新方法、密钥管理系统、设备、存储介质及产品 |
Families Citing this family (17)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103237005A (zh) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-08-07 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 密钥管理方法及系统 |
| CN103220270A (zh) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-07-24 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统 |
| CN103237004A (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2013-08-07 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统 |
| CN103595718B (zh) * | 2013-11-15 | 2016-08-10 | 拉卡拉支付有限公司 | 一种pos终端激活方法、系统、服务平台及pos终端 |
| US9571279B2 (en) * | 2014-06-05 | 2017-02-14 | Cavium, Inc. | Systems and methods for secured backup of hardware security modules for cloud-based web services |
| CN105281915B (zh) * | 2015-11-04 | 2018-11-20 | 博宏信息技术有限公司 | 一种密码键盘生成密文的方法 |
| CN105978856B (zh) * | 2016-04-18 | 2019-01-25 | 随行付支付有限公司 | 一种pos机密钥下载方法、装置及系统 |
| CN106097608B (zh) * | 2016-06-06 | 2018-07-27 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 远程密钥下载方法及系统、收单机构和目标pos终端 |
| CN106209888B (zh) * | 2016-07-25 | 2019-06-04 | 银联商务有限公司 | 一种信息传输方法及装置 |
| CN109309567A (zh) * | 2018-09-04 | 2019-02-05 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 一种传递密钥的方法及系统 |
| CN112532567A (zh) * | 2019-09-19 | 2021-03-19 | 中国移动通信集团湖南有限公司 | 一种交易加密方法和posp系统 |
| CN111275440B (zh) * | 2020-01-19 | 2023-11-10 | 中钞科堡现金处理技术(北京)有限公司 | 远程密钥下载方法及系统 |
| CN111950999B (zh) * | 2020-07-28 | 2024-06-04 | 银盛支付服务股份有限公司 | 一种在pos机上实现基于ic卡灌密钥安全方法及系统 |
| CN112464188B (zh) * | 2020-12-14 | 2023-10-31 | 艾体威尔电子技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种支付终端与外设密码键盘的绑定方法 |
| CN112462980B (zh) * | 2020-12-15 | 2021-07-20 | 深圳市捷诚技术服务有限公司 | 密码防截取方法、装置及pos机 |
| CN113708923A (zh) * | 2021-07-29 | 2021-11-26 | 银盛支付服务股份有限公司 | 一种远程下载主密钥的方法及系统 |
| CN114039728B (zh) * | 2021-12-24 | 2024-09-17 | 中电长城(长沙)信息技术有限公司 | 一种报文加解密方法及其系统 |
Citations (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA2457263A1 (en) * | 2003-02-11 | 2004-08-11 | Bahram Seyed Zahir Azami | System facilitating a purchase transaction over a wireless network |
| WO2004104725A2 (en) * | 2003-05-20 | 2004-12-02 | Ipdc, L.L.C. | Method of disposable command encoding (dce) for security protection |
| CN1835007A (zh) * | 2006-04-07 | 2006-09-20 | 浙江通普通信技术有限公司 | 基于移动通信网络的移动支付方法 |
| CN101048790A (zh) * | 2004-08-25 | 2007-10-03 | Sk电信有限公司 | 利用移动通信终端的认证和支付系统及方法 |
| CN101359383A (zh) * | 2008-09-23 | 2009-02-04 | 中国移动通信集团广东有限公司 | 一种基于移动通信的非接触卡应用管理系统及管理方法 |
| CN101436280A (zh) * | 2008-12-15 | 2009-05-20 | 北京华大智宝电子系统有限公司 | 实现移动终端电子支付的方法及系统 |
Family Cites Families (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1127033C (zh) * | 2000-07-20 | 2003-11-05 | 天津南开戈德集团有限公司 | 无线移动网络销售点终端系统 |
| WO2008021581A2 (en) * | 2006-02-22 | 2008-02-21 | Hypercom Corporation | Secure electronic transaction system |
| CN101047493A (zh) * | 2006-06-02 | 2007-10-03 | 华为技术有限公司 | 获取简单网络管理协议管理密钥的方法及系统 |
| CN101458794A (zh) * | 2007-12-10 | 2009-06-17 | 国际商业机器公司 | 增强支付安全性的系统及其方法以及支付中心 |
-
2009
- 2009-06-25 CN CN200910053763.1A patent/CN101930644B/zh active Active
-
2010
- 2010-06-24 SG SG2011095908A patent/SG177349A1/en unknown
- 2010-06-24 WO PCT/CN2010/000926 patent/WO2010148646A1/zh not_active Ceased
- 2010-06-24 CA CA2766491A patent/CA2766491C/en active Active
Patent Citations (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA2457263A1 (en) * | 2003-02-11 | 2004-08-11 | Bahram Seyed Zahir Azami | System facilitating a purchase transaction over a wireless network |
| WO2004104725A2 (en) * | 2003-05-20 | 2004-12-02 | Ipdc, L.L.C. | Method of disposable command encoding (dce) for security protection |
| CN101048790A (zh) * | 2004-08-25 | 2007-10-03 | Sk电信有限公司 | 利用移动通信终端的认证和支付系统及方法 |
| CN1835007A (zh) * | 2006-04-07 | 2006-09-20 | 浙江通普通信技术有限公司 | 基于移动通信网络的移动支付方法 |
| CN101359383A (zh) * | 2008-09-23 | 2009-02-04 | 中国移动通信集团广东有限公司 | 一种基于移动通信的非接触卡应用管理系统及管理方法 |
| CN101436280A (zh) * | 2008-12-15 | 2009-05-20 | 北京华大智宝电子系统有限公司 | 实现移动终端电子支付的方法及系统 |
Cited By (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103714635A (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2014-04-09 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 一种pos终端及其终端主密钥下载模式配置方法 |
| CN103729943A (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2014-04-16 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 一种将传输密钥导入kms系统的方法及系统 |
| CN103729942A (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2014-04-16 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 将传输密钥从终端服务器传输到密钥服务器的方法及系统 |
| CN103714635B (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2015-11-11 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 一种pos终端及其终端主密钥下载模式配置方法 |
| CN103729943B (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2015-12-30 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 一种将传输密钥导入kms系统的方法及系统 |
| CN103729942B (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2016-01-13 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 将传输密钥从终端服务器传输到密钥服务器的方法及系统 |
| CN106712939A (zh) * | 2016-12-27 | 2017-05-24 | 百富计算机技术(深圳)有限公司 | 密钥离线传输方法和装置 |
| CN108365950A (zh) * | 2018-01-03 | 2018-08-03 | 深圳怡化电脑股份有限公司 | 金融自助设备密钥的生成方法及装置 |
| CN118631428A (zh) * | 2024-05-15 | 2024-09-10 | 中国工商银行股份有限公司 | 密钥更新方法、密钥管理系统、设备、存储介质及产品 |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN101930644B (zh) | 2014-04-16 |
| CA2766491C (en) | 2016-06-07 |
| CN101930644A (zh) | 2010-12-29 |
| SG177349A1 (en) | 2012-02-28 |
| CA2766491A1 (en) | 2010-12-29 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| WO2010148646A1 (zh) | 一种银行卡支付系统中主密钥安全自动下载的方法及其系统 | |
| KR101544722B1 (ko) | 부인 방지 방법, 이를 위한 결제 관리 서버 및 사용자 단말기 | |
| EP2700003B1 (en) | Key management using quasi out of band authentication architecture | |
| US20080289019A1 (en) | Framework for automated dissemination of security metadata for distributed trust establishment | |
| JP2002158650A (ja) | 認証・暗号化処理代行用のサーバ、アクセスカード、プログラム記録媒体及び携帯端末 | |
| CN104468562B (zh) | 一种面向移动应用透明的数据安全保护便携式终端 | |
| US20130333006A1 (en) | Enterprise triggered 2chk association | |
| CN107332701A (zh) | 管理节点的方法和系统 | |
| WO2013023499A1 (zh) | 手机支付安全控制方法及系统 | |
| US20170006021A1 (en) | Providing a single session experience across multiple applications | |
| CN108234509A (zh) | 基于tee和pki证书的fido认证器、认证系统及方法 | |
| CN1968095B (zh) | 登录本地机的方法和装置 | |
| CN109587101A (zh) | 一种数字证书管理方法、装置及存储介质 | |
| US20250055704A1 (en) | Non-repudiation method and system | |
| CN104954123A (zh) | 智能pos终端主密钥更新系统及更新方法 | |
| CN103152425A (zh) | 基于云技术的移动设备的安全管理系统 | |
| JP2018037987A (ja) | 秘密鍵管理システムおよび秘密鍵管理方法 | |
| JP5781678B1 (ja) | 電子データ利用システム、携帯端末装置、及び電子データ利用システムにおける方法 | |
| CN115761939A (zh) | 一种提款箱开关锁控制方法、提款箱、系统及装置 | |
| CN104657856A (zh) | 基于位置认证的智能移动客户端支付方法及服务器系统 | |
| CN109388923B (zh) | 一种程序执行方法及装置 | |
| JP5678150B2 (ja) | ユーザ端末、鍵管理システム、及びプログラム | |
| KR20080087917A (ko) | 일회용 비밀번호 생성방법과 키 발급 시스템 및 일회용비밀번호 인증 시스템 | |
| KR20190099984A (ko) | 개인 키 관리 시스템 | |
| CN104144256B (zh) | 一种基于移动终端的便携式密码装置 |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 10791153 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
| WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2766491 Country of ref document: CA |
|
| NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
| 32PN | Ep: public notification in the ep bulletin as address of the adressee cannot be established |
Free format text: NOTING OF LOSS OF RIGHTS PURSUANT TO RULE 112(1) EPC (EPO FORM 1205A DATED 23/04/2012) |
|
| 122 | Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase |
Ref document number: 10791153 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |