WO2010000712A1 - Anti-instrusion method and system for a communicaiton network - Google Patents
Anti-instrusion method and system for a communicaiton network Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2010000712A1 WO2010000712A1 PCT/EP2009/058142 EP2009058142W WO2010000712A1 WO 2010000712 A1 WO2010000712 A1 WO 2010000712A1 EP 2009058142 W EP2009058142 W EP 2009058142W WO 2010000712 A1 WO2010000712 A1 WO 2010000712A1
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- component
- decision
- action
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- making component
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of the communication systems.
- the present invention relates to an anti-intrusion method and system for a communication network.
- a communication network comprises three logical main planes, i.e. a data plane, which is the plane suitable for transmitting user data, a control plane, which is the plane suitable for executing control operations, and a management plane, which is the plane suitable for executing management operations.
- a data plane which is the plane suitable for transmitting user data
- a control plane which is the plane suitable for executing control operations
- a management plane which is the plane suitable for executing management operations.
- Managing a communication network provides to perform a number of operations, such as for instance:
- network management station or system or, briefly, NMS
- NMS network management station
- the NMS is provided with a software application which is termed “manager”, capable of exchanging information with software applications which are termed “agent”, which agents are placed at the network elements.
- Manager and agents exchange each other management information by using a management protocol, which is executed in the management plane and depends on the type of communication network. Examples of management protocols are SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol), CMIP (Common Management Information Protocol), Q3, and TL1.
- SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
- CMIP Common Management Information Protocol
- Q3, and TL1 Communication Information Protocol
- the control plane and the management plane are particularly subjected to attacks by the so-called "hackers”.
- the term "attack” will designate an attempt by an hacker to introduce unauthorized software in the communication network and/or to manipulate in a unauthorized way the management and control software managing and controlling the communication network. Possible types of attacks are:
- the data plane is secure as such, as it does not interact in any way with the software applications of the network elements.
- user data are transported in a transparent way in the data plane, i.e. the software applications of the network elements do not process the user data.
- anti-intrusion mechanism-system-method will designate a mechanism-system-method implemented in a communication network and suitable for isolating one or more network elements which are subjected to an attack from the other network elements of the network.
- Un elemento di rete soggetto ad un attacco verra anche indicato "elemento di rete infetto”.
- anti-intrusion mechanisms such as for instance asymmetric cryptography, one-way hash functions, and the like.
- These known anti-intrusion mechanisms typically provide coding/decoding keys, such as typically a public coding/decoding key, which is known by everybody, and a private coding/decoding key, which is kept secret.
- the public and private coding/decoding keys are related one to another. In particular, information coded by the public coding key can be decoded only by the corresponding private decoding key, and vice versa information coded by the private coding key can be decoded only by the corresponding public decoding key.
- management systems based on web technology. This is mainly due to the fact that management systems operating in this way advantageously allow to use management graphic interfaces similar to the graphic interfaces of current computer programs for browsing the web (which are commonly termed "web browsers"), such as Mozilla, Internet Explorer, etc.
- a management system could thus be implemented through a browser executed by the NMS and capable of supporting a web-like management graphical interface, wherein the management information are displayed as graphic objects typical of the web interfaces, i.e. windows, icons, etc.
- these mechanisms are passive mechanisms from the decisional point of view.
- these mechanisms detect an anomalous traffic within the network, which anomalous traffic generally indicates that the communication network is undergoing an attack, and they transmit to the operator a visual and/or acoustic alarm signal.
- the operator stops the traffic, for example by isolating the infected network element by closing the ports through which the anomalous traffic transit, and he analyses the network thereby detecting the cause of the anomaly. Therefore, these mechanisms present a delay between the detection time of the attack and the time at which the infected network element is isolated by the intervention of the operator. Then, disadvantageously, the operator may intervene when the damage is already particularly broaden.
- known anti-intrusion mechanisms are onerous in terms of the calculation resources employed.
- the Applicant has faced the problem to provide an anti-intrusion method and system for a communication network capable of overcoming at least one of the above mentioned drawbacks.
- the Applicant has faced the problem to provide a anti-intrusion method and system for a communication network which present a particularly reduced delay between the detection time of the attack and the time at which the infected network element is isolated from the other network elements.
- the present invention provides an anti-intrusion method for a communication network, the communication network comprising a plurality of network elements, the method comprising the following steps: a) providing a passive monitoring component, a decision making component and an action making component cooperating with the communication network; b) at the passive monitoring component, detecting management information indicative of an attack against at least one network element of the plurality of network elements, processing the management information thus generating infection data, and transmitting the infection data to the decision making component; c) at the decision making component, receiving the infection data, making a decision about an action to be carried out to block the attack, and transmitting the decision to the action making component; and d) at the action making component, based on the decision, instructing the at least one network element to perform the action.
- step a) comprises providing the passive monitoring component at each of the plurality of network elements.
- step a) further comprises providing the decision making component and the action making component at one of the plurality of network elements.
- step a) further comprises providing the decision making component and the action making component at each of the plurality of network elements.
- step a) comprises providing the decision making component at one of the plurality of network elements and providing the action making component at another one of the plurality of network elements.
- step a) further comprises at least one of the following steps: - providing the decision making component at at least two of the plurality of network elements, thus forming a decision making cluster; and
- step c) further comprises making the decision by using at least one of a static association table and a dynamic association table, each of the static association table and the dynamic association table comprising a plurality of rows, each of the plurality of rows including a security threshold value and a possible action associated to the security threshold value.
- the present invention provides a anti- intrusion system for a communication network, the communication network comprising a plurality of network elements, the system comprising: a passive monitoring component, a decision making component, and an action making component cooperating with the communication network, wherein:
- the passive monitoring component is suitable for detecting management information indicative of an attack against at least one network element of the plurality of network elements, processing the management information thus generating infection data, and transmitting the infection data to the decision making component;
- the decision making component is suitable for receiving the infection data, making a decision about an action to be carried out to block the attack, and transmitting the decision to the action making component; and
- the action making component is suitable for, based on the decision, instructing the at least one network element to perform the action.
- the passive monitoring component is provided at each of the plurality of network elements.
- the decision making component and the action making component are provided at one of the plurality of network elements.
- the decision making component and the action making component re provided at each of the plurality of network elements.
- the decision making component is provided at one of the plurality of network elements and the action making component is provided at another one of the plurality of network elements.
- the decision making component is provided at at least two of the plurality of network elements, thus forming a decision making cluster; and/or the action making component is provided at at least another two of the plurality of network elements, thus forming an action making cluster.
- the system further comprises at least one of a static association table and a dynamic association table, each of the static association table and the dynamic association table comprising a plurality of rows, each of the plurality of rows including a security threshold value and a possible action associated to the security threshold value, the decision making component being suitable for making the decision by using the at least one of a static association table and a dynamic association table.
- Figure 1 schematically shows a communication network provided with an anti-intrusion system according to a first embodiment of the present invention
- Figures 2 and 3 show in more detail, respectively, the structure of a first and second elements of the communication network of Figure 1; - Figure 4 schematically shows a communication network provided with an anti-intrusion system according to a second embodiment of the present invention;
- Figure 5 schematically shows a communication network provided with an anti-intrusion system according to a third embodiment of the present invention
- Figures 6 and 7 show in more detail, respectively, the structure of a first and second network elements of the communication network of Figure 5;
- Figure 8 schematically shows a communication network provided with an anti-intrusion system according to a fourth embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 1 schematically shows a communication network CN provided with an anti-intrusion system according to a first embodiment of the present invention.
- the communication network CN comprises only four network elements NE1 , NE2, NE3 1 and NE4. Obviously, this is merely exemplary, since the communication network CN may comprise any number of network elements.
- Each network element NE1 , NE2, NE3 1 and NE4 comprises one or more input/output ports for a respective data traffic. For simplicity, the input/output ports are not shown in Figure 1.
- the network elements NE1 , NE2, NE3 1 and NE4 form part of the same calculation grid G.
- a calculation grid allows to execute distributed applications, i.e. it allows to share execution of a given application among all the computers forming the grid. In other words, the application is shared among all the computers forming the grid.
- the computers forming the grid communicate with each other via web by means of an application which is termed "middleware".
- An exemplary calculation grid is the one proposed by the Globus Alliance, which uses the middleware Globus.
- the network elements NE1 , NE2, NE3' and NE4 of the communication network CN are connected the one to the others via web by means of a middleware.
- the Applicant has performed some positive tests by using the above mentioned middleware Globus.
- the communication network CN is further connected to a management terminal MT, which is configured to execute a browsing module B and is connected to anyone of the network elements of the grid G, e.g. the network element NE1.
- the browsing module B is capable of supporting a web-like management graphic interface, which for simplicity is not shown in the figures.
- the web-like management graphic interface is suitable for displaying as graphic objects, such as windows and icons, management information relative to the management of the communication network CN, i.e.: resource configuration parameters of the network elements NE1 , NE2, NE3' and NE4, resource performance parameters of the network elements NE1 , NE2, NE3' and NE4, and any alarms generated by the network elements NE1 , NE2, NE3 1 and NE4.
- the calculation grid G cooperates with an anti-intrusion module AIM and an anti-intrusion monitoring module AIMM.
- the anti-intrusion module AIM is installed in one network element of the communication network CN, e.g. the network element NE3 1 .
- the anti-intrusion module AIM comprises: a passive monitoring component PMC, a communication component CC, a decision making component DMC and an action making component AMC.
- the passive monitoring component PMC is preferably suitable for: locally monitoring in a continuous way the management information traffic passing through the ports of the network element NE3 1 ; processing these management information to generate possible infection data; and providing the possible infection data to the decision making component DMC.
- the decision making component DMC is preferably suitable for: receiving possible infection data coming from the passive monitoring component PMC, and, through the communication component CC, from the other network elements; making a decision, preferably in real time, on possible actions to be carried out to block a possible attack; and transmitting such a decision to the action making component AMC.
- the action making component AMC is configured to activate, based on the decision received from the decision making component DMC, the best blocking action to defend the communication network.
- the decision making component DMC decides on the basis of a pair of association tables, namely a static association table and a dynamic association table.
- the static association table is compiled by the operator during the configuration step of the anti-intrusion module AIM, and it comprises a series of rows, each row including a security threshold value.
- each security threshold value is associated to a respective behavior of the anti- intrusion module AIM.
- Table 1 provides an example of a static association table.
- 1 DMC decides to exclude the infected network element from the communication network.
- AMC carries out the decision of excluding the infected network element from the communication network, by closing each port of the infected network element.
- CC carries out a continuous monitoring, thereby determining in real time any attack developments.
- DMC decides to execute a "benign" code at the infected network element, thereby removing any infections.
- AMC carries out the decision of transmitting the "benign" code to the infected network element, through a port defined ad hoc,
- CC carries out a periodical monitoring, thereby determining any attack developments. For example, the network element is monitored every 10 minutes, and if the infection diffusion is detected, more invasive interventions are activated.
- DMC decides to monitor the infected network element and to intervene only if dangerous developments are detected, e.g. the infection begins to propagate on the configuration files of the network element, or anomalies begin to occur in the memory operation.
- AMC carries out the decision of monitoring the infected network element.
- CC carries out a periodical monitoring, thereby determining any attack developments. For example the network element is monitored every hour, and if an infection diffusion is detected, more invasive interventions are activated.
- the dynamic association table is dynamically compiled on the basis of previous behaviors of the communication network CN, by using known auto-learning techniques.
- the static association table and the dynamic association table are implemented as one table, wherein some rows are compiled in a static way and other rows are dynamically compiled.
- the network elements NE1 , NE2 and NE4 are provided with a respective anti-intrusion monitoring module AIMM.
- Figure 3 shows in detail the structure of one of the network elements NE1 , NE2 and NE4.
- the anti-intrusion monitoring module AIMM of the generic network element NEi comprises a passive monitoring component PMC and a communication component CC, which are connected in cascade.
- the network element NE4 is attacked by a hacker, e.g. a DOS type attack.
- the infected network element NE4 tends to attack the other network elements of the communication network CN, for example by duplicating the management information and broadcasting them in the communication network CN, so as to overload the links between the network elements.
- the network element NE4 autonomously detects, by means of its passive monitoring component PMC, that it has been attacked and it communicates this to the other network elements, in particular to the network element NE3 1 .
- the network element NE4 does not become aware to be infected.
- the other network elements of the communication network CN detect the infection of the network element NE4, by monitoring the management information exchanged on the grid G by means of their respective passive monitoring components PMC.
- the passive monitoring component PMC of the network element which has detected the anomaly of the management information traffic at the network element NE4 generates infection data and transmits them to the decision making component DMC of the network element NE3 1 .
- the infection is detected by the passive monitoring component PMC of the network element NE3', it directly transmits the infection data to the decision making component DMC.
- the infection is detected by the passive monitoring component PMC of any other network element, it transmits the infection data to the decision making component DMC through its communication component CC.
- the decision making component DMC makes a decision.
- the decision making component DMC has a security threshold stored therein, which security threshold is selected among those above listed in Table 1.
- the security threshold can be set up by the operator responsible of managing the communication network CN based on the needs of the costumer which uses the communication network.
- the decision making component DMC receives the infection data indicating the infection of the network element NE4, it preferably determines if the security threshold has been overcome and, in the affirmative, selects the corresponding action within the static association table previously stored.
- the decision making component DMC determines a new security threshold and a new corresponding action and updates the dynamic association table. For example, the decision making component DMC can decide to close the port of the network element NE4 through which the management information traffic flows, and to consequently command the action making component AMC. As a result, the action making component ACM commands the port closure by means of its communication component CC, thereby isolating the infected network element NE4 from the communication network CN.
- the anti-intrusion system described above is active from the decisional point of view. This advantageously allows to react substantially in real time upon detection of any infection affecting one or more of the network elements, thereby containing the damage caused by the attack to the communication network CN.
- the anti-intrusion system described above presents a particularly reduced delay between the detection time of the attack and the time at which the infected network element is isolated, since the communication network CN itself automatically reacts to the external attacks, without requiring the operator's intervention.
- the anti-intrusion system described above is implemented at the network elements of the communication network. This advantageously results in a decentralization of the anti-intrusion mechanism, thus allowing to reduce the amount of calculation resources dedicated to the implementation of the anti-intrusion mechanism at the management terminal MT.
- each network element NE1 1 , NE2', NE3' and NE4 1 is provided with a respective anti-intrusion module AIM.
- the network elements NE1', NE2', NE3' and NE4 1 is provided with a respective anti-intrusion module AIM.
- the network elements NE1', NE2', NE3' and NE4 1 is provided with a respective anti-intrusion module AIM.
- NE2', NE3' and NE4' have all a structure similar to that of the network element NE3', shown in Figure 2.
- NE2', NE3 1 and NE4' is capable of independently managing a possible attack.
- each network element in the event of an attack attempt, is capable of: - deciding, independently and substantially in real time, an action to be carried out (decision making component DMC); and - making the decided action (action making component AMC).
- the other network elements of the communication network CN continue to be suitable for executing all the operations provided from the above described anti-intrusion system
- the decision making and action making functions are separately implemented in respective network elements of the communication network CN.
- each network element NE1 , NE4 comprises a respective anti- intrusion monitoring module AIMM similar to that shown in Figure 3.
- the network element NE2" comprises a module AIM' with a passive monitoring component PMC, a communication component CC and a decision making component DMC.
- the passive monitoring component PMC is preferably suitable for: - locally monitoring in a continuous way the management information flowing through the ports of the network element NE2";
- the decision making component DMC is preferably suitable for:
- the network element NE3" comprises a module AIM" with a passive monitoring component PMC, a communication component CC and an action making component AMC.
- the passive monitoring component PMC is preferably suitable for:
- the action making component AMC is preferably suitable for:
- the decision making function and the action making function may be separately located within the communication network according to various criteria, such as for instance: topology of the communication network CN, position of the infected network element(s), and so on.
- the decision making function is implemented in a first group of network elements of the communication network CN, which in the following is termed "decision making cluster”.
- the action making function is implemented in a second group of network elements, which in the following is termed "action making cluster”.
- the decision making function is implemented at the network element NE2", whose structure is preferably similar to that shown in Figure 6.
- the action making function is implemented in an action making cluster AC formed by the network elements NE3" and NE4".
- the structure of the network elements NE3" and NE4" is preferably similar to that shown in Figure 7.
- the network element NE1 carries out the monitoring function only and therefore it has a structure preferably similar to that shown in Figure 3,
- composition of a decision making cluster and/or an action making cluster may be determined either by the operator or by the communication network CN itself according to different criteria, such as for instance: available calculation resources (the network elements NE3" and NE4" could be the ones with the greatest amount of available calculation resources), topology of the communication network CN, number of hops between the infected network element and the network elements implementing the decision making function and the action making function.
- duplicating the decision function and/or the action function within the communication network CN advantageously allows to ensure that such functions continue being implemented even though one of the network elements belonging to the group become failed.
- the inventive anti-intrusion system preferably provides that the network element that is infected at the management plane simulates a failure, by interrupting the transmission of the paying traffic. In this way, the other network elements of the communication network CN activate a restoration mechanism, which reroutes the paying traffic along an alternative path which does not include the infected network element.
- the anti-intrusion system is active from the decisional point of view. This advantageously allows to react substantially in real time upon detection of an attack against one or more of the network elements, thereby preventing the infected network element(s) from transmitting the "infection" to the other network elements.
- the anti-intrusion system described above presents a particularly reduced delay between the detection time of the attack and the time at which the infected network element is isolated, since the communication network CN itself automatically reacts to the external attacks, without requiring the operator's intervention.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
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- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
- Radar Systems Or Details Thereof (AREA)
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP2011515420A JP5307238B2 (en) | 2008-07-04 | 2009-06-30 | Intrusion prevention method and system for communication networks |
| KR1020107029497A KR101202212B1 (en) | 2008-07-04 | 2009-06-30 | Anti-intrusion method and system for a communication network |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP08425464A EP2141884B1 (en) | 2008-07-04 | 2008-07-04 | Anti-intrusion method and system for a communication network |
| EP08425464.8 | 2008-07-04 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2010000712A1 true WO2010000712A1 (en) | 2010-01-07 |
Family
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Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/EP2009/058142 Ceased WO2010000712A1 (en) | 2008-07-04 | 2009-06-30 | Anti-instrusion method and system for a communicaiton network |
Country Status (8)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US8321369B2 (en) |
| EP (1) | EP2141884B1 (en) |
| JP (1) | JP5307238B2 (en) |
| KR (1) | KR101202212B1 (en) |
| CN (1) | CN101621427B (en) |
| AT (1) | ATE495620T1 (en) |
| DE (1) | DE602008004491D1 (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2010000712A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US8943200B2 (en) * | 2008-08-05 | 2015-01-27 | At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. | Method and apparatus for reducing unwanted traffic between peer networks |
| AU2011227073B2 (en) * | 2010-03-19 | 2013-09-19 | Josef Gorek | Spinal fixation apparatus and methods |
| CN102811196B (en) * | 2011-05-30 | 2016-12-21 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Network safety protective method, device and system in ASON |
| US8693335B2 (en) * | 2012-03-22 | 2014-04-08 | Avaya Inc. | Method and apparatus for control plane CPU overload protection |
| CN105812166B (en) * | 2014-12-30 | 2020-06-12 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Connection realization method and system, network server and gateway network element, and management method |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20020107953A1 (en) * | 2001-01-16 | 2002-08-08 | Mark Ontiveros | Method and device for monitoring data traffic and preventing unauthorized access to a network |
| US20050005017A1 (en) * | 2003-07-03 | 2005-01-06 | Arbor Networks, Inc. | Method and system for reducing scope of self-propagating attack code in network |
| WO2006080930A1 (en) * | 2005-01-24 | 2006-08-03 | The Barrier Group | Integrated data traffic monitoring system |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP2001249866A (en) * | 2000-03-06 | 2001-09-14 | Fujitsu Ltd | Network in which firewall function is distributed, firewall server having firewall distribution function, and edge node having firewall function |
| JP4088082B2 (en) * | 2002-02-15 | 2008-05-21 | 株式会社東芝 | Apparatus and program for preventing infection by unknown computer virus |
| JP2004030286A (en) * | 2002-06-26 | 2004-01-29 | Ntt Data Corp | Intrusion detection system and intrusion detection program |
| JP2005117100A (en) * | 2003-10-02 | 2005-04-28 | Oki Electric Ind Co Ltd | Intrusion detection system and traffic aggregating apparatus |
| JP2006148778A (en) * | 2004-11-24 | 2006-06-08 | Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> | Packet transfer control device |
| CN100450012C (en) * | 2005-07-15 | 2009-01-07 | 复旦大学 | A mobile agent-based intrusion detection system and method |
| JP4380710B2 (en) * | 2007-02-26 | 2009-12-09 | 沖電気工業株式会社 | Traffic anomaly detection system, traffic information observation device, and traffic information observation program |
-
2008
- 2008-07-04 AT AT08425464T patent/ATE495620T1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2008-07-04 DE DE602008004491T patent/DE602008004491D1/en active Active
- 2008-07-04 EP EP08425464A patent/EP2141884B1/en not_active Not-in-force
-
2009
- 2009-06-29 US US12/459,247 patent/US8321369B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2009-06-30 JP JP2011515420A patent/JP5307238B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2009-06-30 KR KR1020107029497A patent/KR101202212B1/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2009-06-30 WO PCT/EP2009/058142 patent/WO2010000712A1/en not_active Ceased
- 2009-07-06 CN CN2009101517156A patent/CN101621427B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20020107953A1 (en) * | 2001-01-16 | 2002-08-08 | Mark Ontiveros | Method and device for monitoring data traffic and preventing unauthorized access to a network |
| US20050005017A1 (en) * | 2003-07-03 | 2005-01-06 | Arbor Networks, Inc. | Method and system for reducing scope of self-propagating attack code in network |
| WO2006080930A1 (en) * | 2005-01-24 | 2006-08-03 | The Barrier Group | Integrated data traffic monitoring system |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| JP5307238B2 (en) | 2013-10-02 |
| EP2141884A1 (en) | 2010-01-06 |
| CN101621427B (en) | 2011-12-28 |
| ATE495620T1 (en) | 2011-01-15 |
| US8321369B2 (en) | 2012-11-27 |
| DE602008004491D1 (en) | 2011-02-24 |
| EP2141884B1 (en) | 2011-01-12 |
| KR20110015024A (en) | 2011-02-14 |
| US20100017357A1 (en) | 2010-01-21 |
| KR101202212B1 (en) | 2012-11-19 |
| CN101621427A (en) | 2010-01-06 |
| JP2011526751A (en) | 2011-10-13 |
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