WO2009109221A1 - Ip address delegation - Google Patents
Ip address delegation Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2009109221A1 WO2009109221A1 PCT/EP2008/052634 EP2008052634W WO2009109221A1 WO 2009109221 A1 WO2009109221 A1 WO 2009109221A1 EP 2008052634 W EP2008052634 W EP 2008052634W WO 2009109221 A1 WO2009109221 A1 WO 2009109221A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- public key
- host
- network routing
- ipv6
- range
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/33—User authentication using certificates
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2101/00—Indexing scheme associated with group H04L61/00
- H04L2101/60—Types of network addresses
- H04L2101/604—Address structures or formats
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2101/00—Indexing scheme associated with group H04L61/00
- H04L2101/60—Types of network addresses
- H04L2101/618—Details of network addresses
- H04L2101/659—Internet protocol version 6 [IPv6] addresses
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
- H04L61/50—Address allocation
- H04L61/5092—Address allocation by self-assignment, e.g. picking addresses at random and testing if they are already in use
Definitions
- the present invention relates to IP address delegation and in particular to the delegation of responsibility for a Cryptographically Generated Address from a node owning that address to a further node.
- IPv6 addresses are 128 bits in length.
- the first 64 bits of an address form a routing prefix which uniquely identifies the Internet access node (or so-called "local link") used by an IP terminal or node, whilst the last 64 bits form a host suffix which uniquely identifies the mobile terminal to the access node (or within the local link).
- the host suffix is referred to as an "interface identifier" as it identifies the host uniquely over the access interface.
- the host learns the routing prefix of the access node from an advertisement message sent from the access node.
- a host then generates its interface identifier using a random number generated by the host.
- the host may additionally use a link layer address to generate the interface identifier, the link layer address being for example a MAC layer address used by the access network.
- WO02/076060 describes how a node can generate a cryptographic version of the interface identifier using a one-way coding function, such as a hash function, and provide this to another peer user, who can then verify that the node is the owner of the interface identifier part of the IP address.
- a one-way coding function such as a hash function
- Such cryptographically generated addresses are known as CGAs.
- CGAs provide a level of security to help prevent, for example, a denial of service attack, in which the attacker claims to be the owner of the IP address that the node wishes to use.
- the CGA approach has been standardised in IETF RFC3972 and is used inter alia in the Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) protocol standardised in IETF RFC 3971. According to RFC 3972, CGAs are generated as follows:
- Hashl hash(modif ⁇ er
- IPv6 address prefix
- Hashl with certain bits set according to security level and other requirements.
- prefix is the network routing prefix
- hash is a cryptographic hash function (SHA-I)
- public key is a public key of the node generating the address
- extensions is a currently unused field for carrying standardised information.
- modifier is a 128 bit value generated by the node to both increase security and enhance randomness. More particularly, depending upon the required security level, a modifier value is selected that results in a certain concatenation of data (including the modifier and the public key) hashing to a value (“Hash2”) which has a specified number of "0"s in the leftmost bit positions.
- a node In order to prove ownership of a CGA, a node must be able to provide a certificate containing the Interface Identifier (HD) part of the CGA address, the modifier, public key, and any extension, arranged as a CGA data structure.
- the certificate contains a digital signature (SHA-I) taken across the message to be sent (concatenated with a 128- bit CGA type tag) using the node's private key.
- a peer node receiving the certificate first computes Hash2 and verifies that it has the correct number of "0"s in the leftmost bit positions.
- a host owning a CGA may delegate responsibility for that address to some further node (the "delegated” node), for example to allow the delegated node to request that traffic be directed to the delegating node.
- the delegated node may provide the certificate to the third party which is able to verify that the HD belongs to the public key, and that the certificate is validly signed by the owner of the public key.
- the delegated node may sign any request relating to the CGA with its private key, thus allowing the third party to prove that the delegated node owns the claimed identity.
- a problem with this approach to delegation is that the certificate provided by the delegating node to the delegated node is tied to a single CGA. In the event that the delegating node changes its IPv6 address, e.g. due to mobility and its use of a new network routing prefix, a new certificate must be provided to the delegated node.
- a method of verifying a request made in respect of an IPv6 address comprising a network routing prefix and a cryptographically generated Interface Identifier.
- the request includes a delegation certificate containing at least a public key of said host, one or more further parameters or a formula or formulae for generating one or more further parameters, a specification of a range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes, an identity of a delegated host, and a digital signature taken over at least said identity and said specification of a range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes using a private key associated with said public key.
- the method comprises verifying that said network routing prefix of said IPv6 address is contained within said specification, verifying that said public key and said further parameter(s) can be used to generate said cryptographically generated Interface Identifier, and verifying said signature using said public key.
- Embodiments of the present invention allow a host to delegate responsibility for IPv6 addresses to a further host, even when these addresses have not yet been generated. When an address is brought into use, subsequent signalling between the hosts is reduced or even eliminated.
- said one or more further parameters include a modifier which introduces a degree of randomness into the address generation process. More preferably, said certificate includes a formula for generating said modifier such that said modifier changes each time an Interface Identifier is generated. Said one or more further parameters may also include one or more extensions.
- Said range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes may be a subset of all available routing prefixes.
- said specification of a range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes may specify all available routing prefixes, i.e. the certificate authorises the delegated node to act in respect of all routing prefixes.
- Said step of verifying that said public key and said further parameter(s) can be used to generate said cryptographically generated Interface Identifier may comprise using said network routing prefix of the IPv6 address in the verification process, and employing a hashing algorithm.
- a hashing algorithm may also be used to verify said signature, using said public key.
- an IPv6 host comprising a first processor configured to generate a delegation certificate, the certificate containing at least a public key of said host, one or more further parameters or a formula or formulae for generating one or more further parameters, a specification of a range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes, an identity of a delegated host, and a digital signature taken over at least said identity and said specification of a range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes using a private key associated with said public key.
- Said public key and said one or more further parameters can be used to compute an Interface Identifier part of a Cryptographically Generated Address.
- the host further comprises an output for providing said certificate to said delegated host, and a second processor configured to generate an Interface Identifier using at least said public key and said one or more further parameters, and to combine the Interface Identifier with a network routing prefix contained within said range or set of prefixes in order to generate a Cryptographically Generated Address.
- Said output may be further configured to send a notification to said delegated host when a Cryptographically Generated Address has been generated, the notification containing said Cryptographically Generated Address.
- an IPv6 host comprising a first input for receiving from a peer IPv6 host a delegation certificate, the certificate containing at least a public key of said peer host, one or more further parameters or a formula or formulae for generating one or more further parameters, a specification of a range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes, an identity of the receiving host, and a digital signature taken over at least said identity and said specification of a range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes using a private key associated with said public key.
- the host further comprises a second input for receiving from said peer host a notification that the peer host is using a Cryptographically Generated Address mapping to said certificate, and an output for sending a request in respect of the Cryptographically Generated Address to a third party node and for including said certificate in the request.
- a fourth aspect of the present invention there is provided computer storage medium on which is stored delegation certificate containing at least a public key of a host, one or more further parameters or a formula or formulae for generating one or more further parameters, a specification of a range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes, an identity of a delegated host, and a digital signature taken over at least said identity and said specification of a range or set of IPv6 network routing prefixes using a private key associated with said public key.
- Figure 1 illustrates schematically an example structure for a new CGA delegation certificate
- Figure 2 illustrates schematically components of a communication system involved in the generation and use of a CGA delegation certificate
- Figure 3 is a flow diagram illustrating a process for validating a request made in respect of an IPv6 address.
- a mechanism is proposed here which involves generating at the delegating node a certificate which contains information required to generate those undetermined CGAs.
- the certificate includes a signature created with a private key of the delegating node, and is provided to the delegated node.
- a node wishing to delegate responsibility for as yet undetermined CGAs generates a certificate having the data structure illustrated in Figure 1.
- the certificate contains a new CGA data structure and an identity of the delegated node. This identity may be a public key belonging to the delegated node.
- the new data structure consists of a modifier, the delegating node's public key, any extensions, and a range, set, or other definition of permissible network routing prefixes.
- the permissible prefixes may be defined algorithmically, e.g. using a Bloom filter, or indeed the data structure may contain an indication that all prefixes are permissible.
- the delegating node includes in the certificate a signature created with its private key, and provides the certificate to the delegated node. This could be done by any appropriate mechanism, e.g. using the mechanism described in Section 6 of IETF RFC3972. As will be appreciated by those of skill in the art, the signature is bound to the CGA data structure. At some later point in time, the delegating node will generate a CGA for itself. To do this it will, if necessary, generate the modifier (and any extensions) using the specified algorithm(s) and select or generate an appropriate network routing prefix and follow the procedure set out in Section 4 of RFC 3972.
- the delegating node will notify the delegated node its new IPv6 address. Subsequently, when the delegated node wishes to request a third party node (the "verifying" node) to act in respect of the new CGA, the delegated node should include the certificate with the request.
- the verifying node performs the following actions in order to verify the request:
- the verifying node must set the collision count consecutively to 1, 1, and 2, and then perform the algorithm of Section 5 of IETF RFC3972 in order to verify that the CGA belongs to the delegating node's public key.
- the verifying node attempts to verify that the signature contained within the certificate has been generated using the private key corresponding to the delegating node's public key.
- the verifying node may attempt to verify that the sender of the request, i.e. the delegated node, is the owner of the identity contained within the certificate. Where that identity is a further public key, this may involve verifying a further signature contained within the request generated using the delegated node's private key.
- FIG. 2 illustrates schematically delegating node 1 and which comprises a first processor 2 configured to generate a delegation certificate as described above.
- a second processor 3 is configured to generate a CGA using the parameters contained within said certificate. Both the certificate and a notification of CGA generation are sent via an output 4 to a delegated node 5.
- This node 5 receives the certificate at a first input 6, and receives notifications at a second input 7.
- a processor 9 is responsible for generating requests in respect of a delegated CGA and for sending these to a verifying node 10, together with the certificate. Requests are received by the verifying node 10 at an input 11.
- a three stage verification process is performed on the certificate, namely: verify routing prefix is within range 12, verify HD matches public key 13, and verify signature 14.
- FIG 3 is a flow diagram illustrating a process for verifying a certificate.
- the steps illustrated comprise receiving a request (in respect of a CGA) at a verifying node from a delegated node (step 100), extracting the routing prefix from the CGA (step 101), verifying that the routing prefix is within the range specified in the certificate (step 102), verifying the HD of the CGA (step 103), and verifying the signature (step 104). If the verification fails at any step, the request is rejected (step 106). If all verification steps are successful, the request is accepted and processed (step 105).
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (8)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN200880127946.7A CN101960814B (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | IP address delegation |
EP08717390.2A EP2250784B1 (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | Ip address delegation |
US12/920,209 US8843751B2 (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | IP address delegation |
RU2010140392/08A RU2469492C2 (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | Delegation of ip address |
KR1020107022081A KR101527249B1 (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | Ip address delegation |
JP2010549017A JP5291725B2 (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | IP address delegation |
PL08717390T PL2250784T3 (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | Ip address delegation |
PCT/EP2008/052634 WO2009109221A1 (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | Ip address delegation |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2008/052634 WO2009109221A1 (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | Ip address delegation |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2009109221A1 true WO2009109221A1 (en) | 2009-09-11 |
Family
ID=40070731
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2008/052634 WO2009109221A1 (en) | 2008-03-04 | 2008-03-04 | Ip address delegation |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8843751B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2250784B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP5291725B2 (en) |
KR (1) | KR101527249B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN101960814B (en) |
PL (1) | PL2250784T3 (en) |
RU (1) | RU2469492C2 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2009109221A1 (en) |
Cited By (2)
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CN101710906A (en) * | 2009-12-18 | 2010-05-19 | 工业和信息化部电信传输研究所 | IPv6 address structure and method and device for allocating and tracing same |
FR2961994A1 (en) * | 2010-06-29 | 2011-12-30 | France Telecom | METHOD OF SECURALLY ALLOCATING IPV6 ADDRESS TO A NODE OF A PRIVATE NETWORK |
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US8548467B2 (en) | 2008-09-12 | 2013-10-01 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Ticket-based configuration parameters validation |
US9148335B2 (en) * | 2008-09-30 | 2015-09-29 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Third party validation of internet protocol addresses |
US9894093B2 (en) | 2009-04-21 | 2018-02-13 | Bandura, Llc | Structuring data and pre-compiled exception list engines and internet protocol threat prevention |
US8468220B2 (en) * | 2009-04-21 | 2013-06-18 | Techguard Security Llc | Methods of structuring data, pre-compiled exception list engines, and network appliances |
CN103297550B (en) * | 2012-02-28 | 2018-05-04 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | A kind of processing method and system of IPv6 stateless address |
US10097525B2 (en) | 2016-03-08 | 2018-10-09 | Qualcomm Incorporated | System, apparatus and method for generating dynamic IPV6 addresses for secure authentication |
US10652950B2 (en) * | 2017-11-16 | 2020-05-12 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Method and system for providing signed user location information |
CN111343298B (en) * | 2020-02-28 | 2021-12-14 | 王鹏 | Method for generating IPv6 address, storage device and processing device |
CN111404884B (en) * | 2020-03-02 | 2021-07-20 | 清华大学 | Secure communication method, client and non-public server |
US11558277B2 (en) * | 2020-05-08 | 2023-01-17 | Bank Of America Corporation | System for generating and signing cryptographically generated addresses using computing network traffic |
WO2021254897A1 (en) * | 2020-06-15 | 2021-12-23 | Signify Holding B.V. | An efficient method for mapping between a local short address and a long ip address |
CN114422474B (en) * | 2021-12-20 | 2023-11-10 | 广西壮族自治区公众信息产业有限公司 | User IPv6 address generating method based on RADIUS server |
CN117040943B (en) * | 2023-10-10 | 2023-12-26 | 华中科技大学 | Cloud network endophytic security defense method and device based on IPv6 address driving |
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2008
- 2008-03-04 KR KR1020107022081A patent/KR101527249B1/en active IP Right Grant
- 2008-03-04 JP JP2010549017A patent/JP5291725B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2008-03-04 EP EP08717390.2A patent/EP2250784B1/en active Active
- 2008-03-04 CN CN200880127946.7A patent/CN101960814B/en active Active
- 2008-03-04 RU RU2010140392/08A patent/RU2469492C2/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2008-03-04 US US12/920,209 patent/US8843751B2/en active Active
- 2008-03-04 WO PCT/EP2008/052634 patent/WO2009109221A1/en active Application Filing
- 2008-03-04 PL PL08717390T patent/PL2250784T3/en unknown
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Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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CN101710906A (en) * | 2009-12-18 | 2010-05-19 | 工业和信息化部电信传输研究所 | IPv6 address structure and method and device for allocating and tracing same |
CN101710906B (en) * | 2009-12-18 | 2013-02-13 | 工业和信息化部电信传输研究所 | IPv6 address structure and method and device for allocating and tracing same |
FR2961994A1 (en) * | 2010-06-29 | 2011-12-30 | France Telecom | METHOD OF SECURALLY ALLOCATING IPV6 ADDRESS TO A NODE OF A PRIVATE NETWORK |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US8843751B2 (en) | 2014-09-23 |
RU2469492C2 (en) | 2012-12-10 |
CN101960814A (en) | 2011-01-26 |
CN101960814B (en) | 2014-08-13 |
US20110004766A1 (en) | 2011-01-06 |
EP2250784B1 (en) | 2013-09-11 |
EP2250784A1 (en) | 2010-11-17 |
PL2250784T3 (en) | 2014-02-28 |
KR20100126783A (en) | 2010-12-02 |
RU2010140392A (en) | 2012-04-10 |
JP2011515049A (en) | 2011-05-12 |
JP5291725B2 (en) | 2013-09-18 |
KR101527249B1 (en) | 2015-06-08 |
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