WO2009057730A2 - System and method for selection of security algorithms - Google Patents
System and method for selection of security algorithms Download PDFInfo
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- WO2009057730A2 WO2009057730A2 PCT/JP2008/069834 JP2008069834W WO2009057730A2 WO 2009057730 A2 WO2009057730 A2 WO 2009057730A2 JP 2008069834 W JP2008069834 W JP 2008069834W WO 2009057730 A2 WO2009057730 A2 WO 2009057730A2
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- base station
- security
- security policy
- capability information
- connection
- Prior art date
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 120
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 29
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 claims description 11
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 claims description 6
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000010295 mobile communication Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000007727 signaling mechanism Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 101100086716 Caenorhabditis elegans ran-3 gene Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 101150014328 RAN2 gene Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 101150074586 RAN3 gene Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 230000002159 abnormal effect Effects 0.000 description 1
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/08—Access security
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
- H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
- H04L69/24—Negotiation of communication capabilities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/16—Gateway arrangements
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the selection of security algorithms in telecommunications networks, particularly but not exclusively networks operating according to the 3GPP standards or equivalents or derivatives thereof.
- connections are established between components or nodes in the network.
- connections are established between user equipment (UE), such as mobile communication devices, and base station (eNodeB) components, at least in part over a wireless interface.
- UE user equipment
- eNodeB base station
- Wireless connections are particularly vulnerable to interception and potentially hostile third parties may attempt to obtain information from communications transmitted over these connections.
- Communication over the wireless connections is secured using an agreed algorithm.
- the algorithm to use for communication over a particular connection is agreed between the parties to the connection, such as the eNodeB and UE components, when the connection is established.
- Connections may be established when a UE connects to an eNodeB in an attachment process, for example when a mobile device is switched on, or when a UE transfers from one eNodeB to a different eNodeB in the network in a handover process.
- the eNodeB to which the UE is connecting determines the security capabilities of the UE. Based on this information and its own security capabilities, the eNodeB selects and defines the security algorithm for traffic on the connection.
- this requires a high level of trust of the eNodeB component by the network and by the connecting user, which may be problematic particularly for a roaming user. Selection of an inappropriate or weak security algorithm by the eNodeB may lead to poor security for a connecting user and may provide a point of weakness in the security of the network as a whole.
- a method of managing security for a connection between a user device and a communications network comprising at least one base station and a core network, the method comprising: receiving at the core network security capability information for the user device connecting to the communications network; obtaining security capability information for the base station; processing in the core network the security capability information for the user device and the security capability information for the base station to select a security policy for a connection between the user device and the base station; and transmitting the selected security policy to the base station.
- the method enables selection of the security policy to be controlled by the core network.
- Receiving security capability information for the base station enables this selection to be made taking into account the capabilities of the base station.
- the eNodeB may not select the most secure algorithm available or the algorithm selected may not accord with the security policies of the core network. Therefore, a connecting user must trust the eNodeB to implement an appropriate security policy.
- Selection of the security policy by the core network as claimed provides a greater level of trust for connecting users and may enable optimisation of security across the network.
- the method further includes obtaining security policy information for the core network and selecting a security policy based on the security policy information for the core network.
- the method therefore allows the selection of the security policy to take into account any requirements or preferences of the core network.
- the core network may allow connections using a limited number of security policies or may have one or more preferred security policies.
- the security policy may be selected from a prioritised list of security policies, which may be defined by the core network or composed by the device that is handling the security policy selection, for example based on prior experience of security policies used by base stations in the network.
- the core network prior to receiving security capability information for the user device, receives security capability information for each of a plurality of base stations in the core network.
- the security capability information is received following establishment of a connection between a base station and the core network.
- a new base station such as an eNodeB
- a core network component such as a gateway
- the base station transmits details of its security capability information to the core network.
- the information may then be stored in a database in the core network, for example in a context associated with each base station.
- the core network can obtain information relating to the security capabilities of each component connected to it before users attempt to set up connections via the base stations. This information can then be obtained from memory and used in determining a security policy for a requested connection.
- this method imposes the minimum signalling overhead when a connection to a user is set up, since the core network is already aware of the security capabilities of the base station. Therefore, no further messages are required to determine security capabilities of the base station at this time, enabling faster connection set up.
- the method may further comprise receiving security capability information for a base station and updating a database to store the security capability information. Security capability information is therefore stored for use in the event that user equipment requests connection to that base station.
- the method may further include receiving a notification regarding transfer of the user device from a source base station to a target base station; obtaining security capability information for the target base station; determining whether a change in the security policy is required for connection to the target base station; and transmitting the selected security policy to the target base station.
- the method further comprises receiving security capability information from a base station.
- the information may be received as part of an attachment request message or on request from the core network component.
- This embodiment provides the advantage that the core network does not need to maintain a database of the security capabilities of each base station component. Rather, the core network obtains the necessary information only when it needs to use this information.
- security capability information is obtained from base stations after a user has requested the establishment of a connection via that base station.
- the information may also be stored in a database as described above.
- a method of providing a connection between a user device and a communications network comprising at least one base station and a core network, the method comprising: transmitting from the base station to the core network security capability information for the base station; receiving from the core network a selected security policy for the connection between the user device and the base station; and establishing a connection between the user device and the base station using the selected security policy
- a method of managing security for a connection between a user device and a communications network comprising at least one base station and a core network, the method comprising: selecting in the core network at least one preferred security policy for a connection between the user device and a base station; transmitting the at least one preferred security policy to the base station; receiving information identifying a selected security policy from the base station; comparing the selected security policy to the at least one preferred security policy; and transmitting a message to the base station if the selected security policy does not match a preferred security policy.
- the core network component has a list of acceptable or preferred security policies, which are sent to the base station on receipt of a connection establishment request.
- This embodiment may advantageously be implemented without the requirement for any new, additional, messages to be transmitted between the base station and core network. Further, the core network does not have to store any security capability information for network components.
- the method further includes obtaining security policy information for the core network prior to selecting at least one preferred security policy.
- a connection is established between the user device and the base station if the selected security policy matches a preferred security policy.
- the message may indicate that the base station should not establish the connection if the selected security policy does not match a preferred security policy.
- the message indicates that the base station should not establish the connection. Hence the connection is not established if the selected security policy does not match a preferred security policy. Alternatively, the base station may be given a further opportunity to select an acceptable security policy.
- a method of providing a connection between a user device and a communications network comprising at least one base station and a core network, the method comprising: receiving at the base station at least one preferred security policy for a connection between the user device and the base station; selecting a security policy for the connection; transmitting the selected security policy to the core network; and receiving at the base station a message from the core network, if the selected security policy does not match a preferred security policy
- Figure 1 schematically illustrates a mobile telecommunication system of a type to which the embodiment is applicable
- Figure 2 schematically illustrates a base station forming part of the system shown in Figure 1 ;
- FIG 3 schematically illustrates a gateway device forming part of the system shown in Figure 1 ;
- Figure 4 illustrates a network implementing a security management system according to one embodiment
- Figure 5 is a schematic illustration of an attach procedure according to one embodiment
- Figure 6 is a schematic illustration of a handover or relocation procedure according to one embodiment
- Figure 7 is a schematic illustration of an attach procedure according to a further embodiment
- Figure 8 is a schematic illustration of a handover or relocation procedure according to a further embodiment
- Figure 9 is a schematic illustration of a handover or relocation procedure according to a further embodiment.
- FIG. 1 schematically illustrates a mobile (cellular) telecommunication system 1 in which users of mobile (or cellular) telephones (MT) 3-0, 3-1 , and 3- 2 can communicate with other users (not shown) via one of the base stations 5- 1 , 5-2 or 5-3 and a telephone network 7.
- the telephone network 7 includes a plurality of components including gateway components 9-1 , 9-2. It will be appreciated by the skilled person that the each base station 5-1 , 5-2, 5-3 may connect to the telephone network 7 via either gateway 9-1 , 9-2 and that all base stations 5-1 , 5-2, 5-3 may connect via the same gateway 9-1 , 9-2. Similarly, each mobile telephone 3 may connect to the telephone network 7 via either base station 5 and that all mobile telephones 3 may connect via the same base station 5.
- One or more base stations 5 may be arranged into a Radio Access Network (RAN), controlled by a Radio Network Controller (RNC), which may be implemented as part of a base station 5 in the RAN or as a separate component (not shown).
- a connection is established between the mobile telephone 3 and a base station 5 and between the base station 5 and a gateway device 9. This enables communication between the mobile telephone 3 and other components in the network 7.
- a handover procedure (protocol) is carried out in the source and target base stations 5 and in the mobile telephone 3, to control the handover process.
- the handover is enabled by the establishment of a connection between the source and target base stations 5.
- the gateway device 9-1 , 9-2 via which communications from a mobile telephone 3 are transmitted to the telephone network may change.
- the gateway device 9-1 , 9-2 through which communications are transmitted may remain the same, but the base station 5-1 , 5-2 to which the mobile device is connection may change.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating the main components of each of the base stations 5 used in this embodiment.
- each base station 5 includes a transceiver circuit 21 which is operable to transmit signals to and to receive signals from the mobile telephones 3 via one or more antennae 23 and which is operable to transmit signals to and to receive signals from the telephone network 7 via a network interface 25.
- the network interface 25 includes an S1 network interface for communicating with network components, such as gateways 9, using the S1 protocol.
- the network interface 25 also includes an X2 interface for communicating with other base station components using the X2 protocol.
- a controller 27 controls the operation of the transceiver circuit 21 in accordance with software stored in memory 29.
- the software includes, among other things, an operating system 211 , a security database 213 for storing information relating to the security capabilities of the base station and a security module 215 for communicating information relating to the security capabilities to other network components.
- an operating system 211 for executing code to control the security database 213 .
- a security database 213 for storing information relating to the security capabilities of the base station
- a security module 215 for communicating information relating to the security capabilities to other network components.
- the operation of the security database 213 and the security module 215 are described below.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating the main components of each of the gateway components 9 used in this embodiment.
- each gateway 9 includes a transceiver circuit 31 , which is operable to transmit signals to and to receive signals from at least one base station 5 via a base station interface 33 and which is operable to transmit signals to and receive signals from the rest of the telephone network 7 via a network interface 35.
- a controller 37 controls the operation of the transceiver circuit 31 in accordance with software stored in memory 39.
- the software includes, among other things, an operating system 311 , a database 313 for storing information relating to the security capabilities of network components and a security controller 315 for managing security policies within the network. The operation of the database 313 and the security controller 315 are described below.
- both the base stations 5 and the gateways 9 are described for ease of understanding as having respective discrete modules which operate according to the methods described herein. Whilst the features may be provided in this way for certain applications, for example where an existing system has been modified to implement the invention, in other applications, for example in systems designed with the inventive features in mind from the outset, these features may be built into the overall operating system or code and so the modules described above may not be discemable as discrete entities.
- LTE Long Term Evolution
- UE the mobile telephone 3
- eNodeB each base station 5
- elMB each gateway component
- MME the mobile telephone 3
- UE each base station 5
- elMB each gateway component
- MME the mobile telephone 3
- UE each base station 5
- elMB each gateway component
- MME the mobile telephone 3
- eNodeB each base station 5
- MME each gateway component
- the protocol entities used in LTE have the same names as those used in UMTS except for the Radio Link Control (RLC) entities which, under LTE, are called the Outer ARQ (Automatic Repeat Request) entities.
- RLC Radio Link Control
- Outer ARQ entities of LTE have substantially the same (although not identical) functionality to the RLC entities of UMTS.
- the term "dedicated message” as used herein refers to a message sent in respect of a particular UE.
- the dedicated message includes an identifier of a connection to a particular UE.
- the term "common message” refers to a message sent between two components in the network, for example between two eNodeBs, that does not relate to a particular connection to a UE and therefore has no UE connection identifier.
- each eNodeB signals its security capabilities to the MME 43. This is done using an S1 common message 45 after initialisation of the Stream Control Transmission Protocol SCTP connection.
- the MME 43 stores in a database 47 an eNodeB context 49-1 , 49- 2, 49-3 for each eNodeB 41-1, 41-2, 41-3 that is connected to it, containing the security capabilities of the eNodeB.
- the MME 43 On receipt of an S1 common message 45 from an eNodeB, the MME 43 updates the eNodeB context with the security capability information or creates a new context if one does not already exist for that eNodeB. It is noted that the eNodeB context 49-1 , 49-2, 49-3 for each eNodeB may also store other relevant information for the eNodeB, for example the connection status of the eNodeB.
- each eNodeB signals its security capabilities to the MME using an S1 common message 51 and this is stored in an eNodeB context in the MME.
- the MME accesses the security context for the eNodeB and determines its security capabilities.
- the MME selects an algorithm 55 based in part on the eNodeB capabilities and instructs the eNodeB to use the selected algorithm via an S1 dedicated message 57.
- a handover procedure will now be described in more detail with reference to Figure 6.
- the eNodeB sends an S1 : HandoverRequired message 61 to the MME 43.
- the MME 43 determines the target eNodeB 41-2 to which the UE is transferring. Since the MME 43 has already stored in its database 47 a context for each eNodeB 49-1 , 49-2 identifying the security capabilities of each eNodeB, the MME 43 can determine whether a change in the security algorithm is required by the transfer.
- the MME 43 informs the target eNodeB 41-2 of the new security algorithm when it sends the S1 : Handover Request message 63 to the target eNodeB.
- the new security algorithm may or may not be the same as the security algorithm used for the source eNodeB.
- the eNodeB security capabilities are sent to the MME as part of the UE attach or handover procedure.
- An attach procedure according to this embodiment is illustrated in Figure 7.
- a UE sends an S1 : Initial UE message 71 via an eNodeB to an MME.
- the eNodeB incorporates information relating to its own security capabilities and transmits this as part of the S1 : Initial UE message 71 to the MME.
- the MME selects the security algorithm 73 for the connection and informs the eNodeB using an S1 dedicated message 75.
- a handover method will now be described with reference to Figure 8.
- the source eNodeB sends an S1 : Handover Required message 83 message to the MME.
- S1 Handover Required message
- the MME needs to know the security capabilities of the target eNodeB. This is achieved using a separate S1 : Security capability Request / Response procedure 85, which may be implemented either as a dedicated procedure for a particular UE connection, or as a common procedure.
- an S1 : Handover Request message 87 is sent from the MME to the target eNodeB, the message advising the target eNodeB of the security algorithm that has been selected.
- the handover request is acknowledged 89 by the target eNodeB and the MME issues an S1 : Handover Command 811 to the source eNodeB.
- the attach procedure operates in the same way as already described for the second embodiment and illustrated in Figure 7. That is, the security capabilities are forwarded to the MME using a dedicated S1 : Initial UE message.
- FIG. 9 An S1 relocation or handover procedure is illustrated in Figure 9.
- the MME sends an S1 : Handover Request message 93 to the target eNodeB.
- the S1 : Handover Request message 93 incorporates a list of preferred security algorithms.
- the target eNodeB selects one algorithm from the list and informs the MME of its selection in the S1 : Handover Request Acknowledge message 95.
- the MME checks the target eNodeB choice 97 and will then have the authority to reject the target eNodeB decision if it selects an algorithm not belonging to the preferred list. If the algorithm is rejected, the MME will send a Resource Release message to the target eNodeB and reject the handover to the source eNodeB.
- the connection is established between the eNodeB and the user device in accordance with the usual procedures.
- the SRNC would select the security algorithm on the base of its security capabilities, UE security capability and the allowed Algorithm information coming from the CN.
- the TRNC would, if needed, choose another algorithm depending on its capabilities (stored in its database), the current algorithm being used (information given from the source RNC) and the allowed security algorithms (information given by the CN in the RANAP: Relocation Request). Proposals
- MME will select the security algorithms for NAS, RRC and UP traffic.
- the security algorithm selection takes place during the following procedures: o Attach procedure; o Inter eNB Handover, either via X2 or S1.
- the proposal focuses on the signalling mechanism of the eNB security capability to the MME, storage of these security capabilities in the eNB context within MME and query of the eNB context during the Attach and S1 Relocation procedures in order to decide the security algorithm.
- MME keep an eNB context, containing the eNB securities capabilities, which will then be queried during both Attach and S1 Relocation procedures.
- the eNB inform the MME on its security capabilities by an S1 common message.
- the MME will then update the eNB context and stores its capability information.
- 3.1.1.2 Attach procedure At the reception of the S1 : Initial UE message, the MME will select the security algorithm according to the UE capabilities, the eNB capabilities stored in the eNB Context, within the MME, and the allowed RRC/UP security algorithms also known to the MME.
- the MME At the reception of the S1 : Relocation Required, the MME should be able to evaluate whether an algorithm change is required and if so it should inform the target eNB on the new algorithm in the S1 : Relocation Request message.
- the eNB security capabilities are sent to the MME by means of following S1 messages i.e.: • S1 Initial UE message during Attach procedure
- the MME by the time it receives the S1 Relocation Required, it has to decide whether an algorithm change is needed i.e. it needs to know the target eNB capabilities. MME gets to know the target eNB capabilities by means of the new S1 : Security capability Request/Response procedure. This procedure may either be a dedicated procedure or a common procedure.
- the MME would get the security capabilities by dedicated S1 message i.e. S1 : Initial UE message (same as proposal 2).
- S1 Initial UE message
- the MME inform the target eNB on a preferred list of security Algorithms; the eNB will select one algorithm and inform the MME about it in the S1: Relocation Request acknowledge.
- the MME will then have the authority to reject the target eNB decision if it selects an algorithm not belonging to the preferred list. Subsequently, the MME will:
- Proposal 1 - Provides minumum signalling overhead, but the MME needs to maintain the security information within the eNodeB context.
- Proposal 2 - The MME does not need to maintain the eNodeB context, but the proposal has an associated signalling overhead since UE dedicated messages are used to signal the eNodeB capabilities and there is a delay in the handover preparation procedure.
- Handover procedure may fail after target eNodeB allocates the resources. This would be an abnormal case e.g. the target eNodeB is not a trusted eNodeB (i.e. eNodeB not under the operator control).
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Abstract
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Priority Applications (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2010513552A JP5273406B2 (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2008-10-27 | System and method for selecting a security algorithm |
CN2008801142318A CN101953193A (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2008-10-27 | System and method for selection of security algorithms |
US12/734,393 US8949927B2 (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2008-10-27 | System and method for selection of security algorithms |
KR1020127033273A KR101355735B1 (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2008-10-27 | System and method for selection of security algorithms |
EP08846015.9A EP2213115B1 (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2008-10-27 | System and method for selection of security algorithms |
US13/619,946 US9661498B2 (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2012-09-14 | System and method for selection of security algorithms |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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GB0721337.4 | 2007-10-31 | ||
GB0721337A GB2454204A (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2007-10-31 | Core network selecting security algorithms for use between a base station and a user device |
Related Child Applications (2)
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US12/734,393 A-371-Of-International US8949927B2 (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2008-10-27 | System and method for selection of security algorithms |
US13/619,946 Division US9661498B2 (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2012-09-14 | System and method for selection of security algorithms |
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WO2009057730A2 true WO2009057730A2 (en) | 2009-05-07 |
WO2009057730A3 WO2009057730A3 (en) | 2009-06-25 |
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PCT/JP2008/069834 WO2009057730A2 (en) | 2007-10-31 | 2008-10-27 | System and method for selection of security algorithms |
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US (2) | US8949927B2 (en) |
EP (2) | EP3301961A1 (en) |
JP (2) | JP5273406B2 (en) |
KR (2) | KR101260567B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN101953193A (en) |
GB (1) | GB2454204A (en) |
WO (1) | WO2009057730A2 (en) |
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US9661498B2 (en) | 2017-05-23 |
US20130014210A1 (en) | 2013-01-10 |
CN101953193A (en) | 2011-01-19 |
WO2009057730A3 (en) | 2009-06-25 |
EP2213115B1 (en) | 2018-01-03 |
EP3301961A1 (en) | 2018-04-04 |
US20100263021A1 (en) | 2010-10-14 |
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JP2011501479A (en) | 2011-01-06 |
JP2012195969A (en) | 2012-10-11 |
KR101260567B1 (en) | 2013-05-06 |
KR101355735B1 (en) | 2014-01-27 |
GB0721337D0 (en) | 2007-12-12 |
JP5273406B2 (en) | 2013-08-28 |
KR20100086016A (en) | 2010-07-29 |
US8949927B2 (en) | 2015-02-03 |
JP5578335B2 (en) | 2014-08-27 |
EP2213115A2 (en) | 2010-08-04 |
GB2454204A (en) | 2009-05-06 |
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